COLLECTION

OF

POLITICAL TRACTS.



The SECOND EDITION.

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PREFACE.

HE Works of those wise and great Men, who have been employ'd in publick Transactions, have always been esteem'd, by the best Judges, of the utmost Consequence and of the highest Entertainment; as they enable us to trace the secret Springs of Events, and to form a true Judgment of Princes and the Conduct of their Ministers; to oppose the dangerous Attacks on Liberty, and settle the just Bounds of Prerogative.

With a View to the Prosecution of this Design the following Tracts are now collected together; but it may not perhaps be thought impertinent to acquaint the Reader that, in the Infancy of the late Opposition, some of them were usber'd into the World from a printing Press under the Sanction of a late noble Duke, handed privately about, and very difficult to be procured; others were more openly published, but appear'd at different Periods of Time, and amongst weekly Productions.

The Importance of the Subjects and the Elegance, with which they were treated, were their first Recommendation, and will, I doubt not, always secure them the public Esteem.



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THE

Occasional WRITER.

Fidens animi atque in utrumque paratus. VIRG.

Inscribed to the Person, to whom alone it can belong.

Most Noble SIR,

Am one, whose Ambition it hath been, ever fince I came into the World to diftinguish myself as a Writer; in which, I fairly confess, I had not only the View of raising my Reputation, but that of establishing my Fortune. A Prospect, which seem'd very reasonable in a Time of general Peace and universal Affluence; in an Age so particularly polite, that it is even the Fashion to appear knowing in all the elegant Arts and Sciences; and that to whatever Branch of them a Genius shall think sit to turn himfels.

felf, he is fure it will be to one that is in

Vogue.

The first Essays of my Pen made a good Deal of Noise in the World; they fill'd foreign Journals, and were translated into feveral Languages. The Sorbonne, and both our Mother Universities, return'd me Thanks for having reconciled feveral Disputes, and folved feveral Difficulties in Chronology and History, which had perplex'd the learned World, from the impartial Eusebius, down to the circumstantial Prideaux; my philosophical Poems were received with the greatest Applause; and it is well known, that if the gay Part of the World read my Anti-Lucretius for Amusement, the gravest Divines have not disdain'd to borrow Arguments from it in their Disputes with the Materialists.

Animated by fuch Success, in one Part of my Aim, I proceeded with indefatigable Labour, till continual Disappointments, in the other, render'd me at length more indifferent to that imaginary good Applause, and less patient of that real Evil, Want. I began then to compare my Condition with that of several great Authors both antient and modern; and finding upon the Comparison that they had not been better treated than myself, I was soon led by my Reslections to discover the true Reason of our ill Fortune in the World. I was soon convinced that they and I had been on a wrong Pursuit; that Ministers of State pay no Respect to the brightest Ta-

lents.

lents, when they are misapply'd, and esteem all Talents to be so, which are not wholly employ'd about the present Time, and principally dedicated to the Service of their Administration; neither can I say this Proceeding is unjust, how much soever I suffer by it.

If we write for Posterity, we must not complain that the Care of rewarding our Merit is left to Posterity; and if we neglect to ferve the State, those, who are appointed to prefide over it, break no Rule of Equity when they neglect us. Spencer has been amply recompenced by Posterity for his Fairy Queen; but the wife Treasurer Burleigh declined the Payment of an hundred Pounds, which Queen Elizabeth order'd him, and left this admirable Poet to starve. Had Spencer apply'd himfelf to more ferious Studies, had he excell'd in Phyficks, in Metaphyficks, or even in the first Philosophy, or in Theology, instead of excelling in Wit and Poetry, the amabiles Infaniæ of Horace, his Usage would have been the fame no doubt. Even the greatest Productions of these Studies are but Trifles in the Account of a confummate Statesman, and may properly enough be distinguish'd from the others in his Sense, by the Title of Infaniæ severiores.

Our English Ministers, to their Honour be it spoken, have at all Times proceeded upon this admirable Principle; the most excellent Sermons, the most elaborate Treatises, have not been sufficient to procure the Advance-

B 3

men

ment of fome Divines, whilst a forry Pamphlet or a spiritual Libel has raised others to the highest Dignities of the Church. As it has fared with mere Divinity, so has it fared with mere Eloquence; as one never caused the Divine, fo the other never caused the Lawyer to be diftinguish'd. But we know that if either of them be employ'd in a Court Caufe, he never fails of making his Fortune. The fime Fate has attended Writers of another Kind; the celebrated Tatlers, and Spectators, had no Reward except from Bookfellers and Fame. But when those Authors made the Discovery I have made, and apply'd their Talents better, in writing the Englishman and the Freeholder, one was foon created a Knight, and the other became Secretary of State. In short, without enumerating any more Inflances, I may confidently affirm, that this has been the Case from the Days of Burleigh to this Time; how much fooner it began to be fo, I hope, Sir, you will not give me the Leifure to enquire.

From the Moment I refolved to become a State-Writer, I mentally devoted myfelf to your Service, and I do it now in this publick and most folemn Manner. Employ me, Sir, as you please; I abandon myself intirely to you; my Pen is at your Disposition, and my Conscience in your keeping. Like a Lawyer, I am ready to support the Cause, in which, give me Leave to suppose that, I shall be soon netain'd with Ardour; and, if Occasion be,

with

with Subtilty and Acrimony. Like a Swifs, I will behave myself with equal Boldness and Fidelity; my Pen is my Fortune, and I think it as honourable to offer it, as offer my Sword, without enquiring in a general Battle, or in private Skirmishes, at what Relation or Friend I strike. I cancel at once all former Obligations and Friendship, and will most implicitly follow your Instructions in Panegyrick on Yourself and Friends, in Satyr on your Adversaries, in writing for or against any Subject; nay, in writing for or against the same Subject, just as your Interest, or even your

Paffions, may render it expedient.

I am not ignorant that when Carneades offer'd to argue for Virtue, and then against it, Cato proposed to drive that great Philosopher and Orator out of Rome. But Cato was a Man of narrow Principles and of too confined an Understanding. He consider'd Virtue abstractedly, without any Regard to Time, to Place, and to that vast Variety of Conjunctures, which happen in the Course of human Affairs. In common Life, Morality is no doubt necessary, and therefore Legislators have been careful to enforce the Practice of it; but whenever Morality clashes with the Interest of the State, it must be, and it always has been, laid afide. These are my Opinions, and it is a great Comfort to my Conscience to find them confirm'd by the Practice of some reverend Persons, whose Examples ought to be of greater Weight with me, than that of a B 3 wretched

wretched Pagan; I shall therefore shew my-felf neither squeamish nor whimsical in pur-fuing the Enterprize to which I offer my Services, but shall remain firmly persuaded, that all the moral Vices, I may be occasionally guilty of in so good a Course, will be exalted

into political Virtues.

After this plain and honest Account, which I have given of myself, it may be allow'd me to say, that you cannot find a Person better qualify'd for your Service, or more worthy to be listed among those, who draw their Pens in your Cause, and of whom I am willing to hope that you have a greater and an abler Body in Reserve, than you have hitherto

judged proper to bring into the Field.

It is evident, that a Minister, in every Circumstance of Life, stands in as much need of us publick Writers as we of him; in his Prosperity he can no more subsist without daily Praise, than we without daily Bread, and the farther he extends his Views the more necessary are we to his Support. Let him speak as contemptuously of us as he pleases, for that is frequently the Manner of those, who employ us most, and pay us best; yet will it fare with his Ambition as with a losty Tree, which cannot shoot it's Branches into the Clouds, unless it's Root work into the Dirt, from which it rose, on which it stands, and by which it is nourished.

If a Minister falls into Adversity, shall he take up the Pen in his own Defence? Would

not the Case be as deplorable for him to be left to write, as for a Prince to be left to fight in his own Quarrel? Believe me, Sir, whenever Fortune abandons you, (and who knows how foon that may happen?) you will find yourself in a very forlorn State. At the Name of your Successor, those Crowds, that attend your Levee, will vanish like Spirits at the Dawn of Day. None will remain about you, but fuch as no other Administration will condescend to employ; and we may therefore very probably behold you, which would be a pitiful Sight indeed, endeavouring to fecure a fafe Retreat with H—— on one Side of you, and Leb on the other, two grotesque Personages, exactly pair'd and nearly ally'd, but furely as little fit to support a Minister in his Decline, as to adorn his Triumph. In fuch a Turn as this, you may depend on my utmost Efforts to keep up a Spirit for you, and I can make no doubt of being seconded by feveral of my Fellow-Writers, fince I am certain you will not scruple to share some Part of that Fortune, which your Industry and Parsimony have raised, with those who unite to fave the whole; and fince we shall be reasonable enough not to expect above Sixpence in the Pound out of it, which cannot well amount to more than fifteen or twenty thousand Pounds. A trifling Sum for so great a Service and fo weighty a Purfe!

You may perhaps, after all I have faid, be still apt to think that these are wild Discour-

Defire to render myself necessary. You may refine too much in your Resections on my Conduct, and too little in those you make on your present Situation; or if you judge rightly of this, it is not impossible but you may depend too much on your own Vigilance and Dexterity. Should any of those Flatterers, who often betray their Patrons into a fatal Security, speak to you much in the same Manner, as Sleep addresses himself to Palinurus in the fifth Book of the Æneis.

— Palinure, ferunt ipsa æquora classem, Æquatæ spirant auræ, datur hora quieti; Pone caput, fessosque oculos furare labori.

You would answer, I am persuaded, as this Pilot did.

Mene salis placidi vultum, fluctusque quietos Ignorare jubes? mene buic confiaere monstro?

But Palinurus slept, and you know the

Consequence.

Be not therefore displeased if a fincere and zealous Servant rowzes you, admonishes you not to trust too much to Appearances, and shews you Danger when perhaps you least expect it. You have fail'd long in a smooth Sea with gentle and favourable Gales. We believe your Courage and your Abilities extremely great, but we believe it implicitly; for

for you have not had foul Weather enough to give any confiderable Proofs of either. These Circumstances, which might be abused to inspire Security, I urge as Reasons why you should be alarm'd; for the Element you have to deal with is by the Laws of Nature inconstant; and therefore the longer you have been without a Storm the more Reason you have to expect one. There is no surer Presage of an Hurricane than just such a dead Calm as I have observed for some Time.

To fpeak without a Figure; I would not have you flatter yourfelf, that the undisturb'd Quiet you have fo long enjoy'd is merely owing to your own Integrity and political Merit, or to the uncommon Profecution of Hawkers and Pamphleteers, which has been carry'd on by the Direction of one of your principal Instruments, and indeed a most vigorous Statesman. This Quiet, Sir, is owing to deep and inveterate Defigns, which it becomes me to lay before you, without any Regard to the Cenfure I may incur, of revealing private Conversation, and of Breach Know then that from the Time you came into a Fulness of Power, many were shock'd at the Manner, in which you feized it, and at the Use you made of it. They faid that both were hurtful, indecent, and even shameless. They went still farther, and affirm'd, that your Conduct was foolish with Regard to your own Interest, fince it was foolish for a Man to trust to one single

Expedient of Government, who had feveral in his Power; and especially to such an Expedient as that of Money, which would equally ferve to support him or to hang him. These Persons however, notwithstanding their Discontent, resolved to lye quiet, till your Male-Administration should become so glaring as to justify their Opposition, even in his Majesty's Sight; they said they would not follow your Example, and upon that Occafion they remember'd with fome Sharpness how you did your utmost to distress the King's Affairs, upon the first Disgust you received; nay, they were malicious enough to call to mind some personal Reflections*, which the Heat of your Imagination, and your Familiarity with Majesty, betray'd you into, and for which they faucily wish'd what I dare not name. These seditious Spirits flatter'd themselves that you would do your own Bufiness when you had the full Swing of your Power. They were acquainted, they faid, with the Prefumption and Distrust, with the Boldness and Pusillanimity, with the Indiscretion and Cunning, and with fifty other Centradictions, which made up your Character; and upon these they depended for putting a speedy End to your Administration. This End they imagine to be now at Hand, for thus they reason. A Minister, who is attack'd on his Management of the publick Re-

^{*} See a Pamphlet call'd An Answer to an infamous Libel, intitied, Sedition and Defamation display'd. Printed for R. Francklin.

venue, and has all the Advantages of Money and Authority on his Side, may escape though he is guilty; but if he is innocent, the Proceedings against him in fuch a Case must necessarily confirm his Power, and establish his Reputation; nothing more defirable than fuch an Attack can happen to him. But our present Minister, say these Malignants, directly stops all Enquiry; in publick he evades giving fuch Accounts as the Representatives of the People have a Right to demand; in private he is modest and discreet enough to laugh at those, who think him such a Fool as to furnish Proofs against himself. Can a Minister keep his Groundlong, who has no other Defence than an imply'd Confession of his Guilt? Will fuch a Behaviour be endured in a Nation hitherto free, and where there remain at least some Sparks of Honour and of Love of the Country?

These and many other Reslections, which for Brevity sake I omit, upon your particular Conduct, and upon our domestick Affairs, are frequently thrown out. But, Sir, I confets to you that I tremble when I hear the same Persons discourse concerning the State of the Nation with regard to her foreign Interests. They affirm and they offer to demonstrate, that the Affairs of Europe never were in greater Consuson, and that the Part we take upon ourselves is such an one, as no Nation ever acted which was not betray'd, or whose Ministers were not insatuated. That

you are so, they say, is past Dispute, whether you have conducted these Affairs yourfelf, or have left them to those Men of eminent Talents, who are concern'd in this Part of your Administration; they infift that nothing could have happen'd to us, if you had intirely neglected our foreign Interests, worse than what you have brought upon us, by running into the other Extreme. For they ask, what is the Fruit of your continual Negotiations, supported by a vast Expence, and carry'd on as bufily as if the Welfare of Great-Britain had been at Stake in every Dispute, which has happen'd on the Continent? They answer for you, and they defy you to contradict them, that we have made the Quarrels of other People our own, and that we find ourselves engaged as Principals, in some Cases where we have but a very remote Concern, and in others where we have no Concern at all. That our Commerce fuffers and runs the Risque of being lost, not for a Time, but for ever in feveral Branches, much more beneficial to us than the Oftend Trade, and that our Right to keep those important Possessions, which were yielded to us in the most solemn and authentick Manner, is come, by Dint of Negotiation, from being indifputable, to be call'd in Question. In a Word, that to restore the publick Tranquility, and to settle our own Interests, we must engage in a new War, and conclude a new Peace; that you have contrived to make it impossible for us

to do One, without fighting against the very Principle for which we have fought ever fince the Revolution, or to attempt the other without lying under the particular Circumstance, that our principal Allies will be as much in earnest as our Enemies, to wrest out of our Hands the chief Advantages which we obtain'd by the Treaty of Utrecht. At the Time when these Treaties were made, continue they, your Great Minister cry'd aloud, and spared not. He complain'd as much as any Man, that the exorbitant Power of France was not fufficiently reduced, and that the Barriers of our Allies, on the Rhine and in the Netherlands, were left too weak; and is it under his Administration that we are to fee a Pretence given to the French, and an Opportunity thrown into their Hands, of threngthening their Power, and of extending their Barriers? When I tell these Objectors that your Brother answers for the Court of France, they laugh in my Face, and reply, well he may, and fo might any of those, who were in the French Interest, have done at the Time when the Triple Alliance was broken, and France was encouraged by England to fall upon the Dutch. The Ministers, who are answer'd for, would be as weak as he, who answers for them, if they did not see the Advantage in the prefent Juncture, and did not take a fecret malicious Pleasure in making us, who contributed fo much to reduce their Power, become the Instruments of raising it again.

again. In the Case of a War then, we have according to this reasoning, which really, Sir, has an Air of Truth, nothing fo much to fear as the Affistance of our chief Ally; and in the Case of a Treaty, not only France, but Holland likewise, must be against us in that important Article of Gibraltar and Port-Mahon, and in all particular Advantages of Commerce, which we have enjoy'd, and may find it reasonable to pretend to. The late Duke of Orleans, as dear a Friend as he was to us, infifted strenuously, that we should give up the Places before mentioned; pretended a Promise to this Effect, and himself obliged in Honour to fee this Promife kept. Every one, who knows any Thing of the Transactions of those Times, knows with how envious an Eye the Dutch beheld the separate Privileges in Trade, and the sole Posfession of Gibraltar, and of the Island of Minorca, which we obtain'd at the last Peace, and what Lengths they would have gone to facilitate the Negotiations, which at that Time they opposed, if they might have been admitted to a Share in these Advantages.

The Danger of an immediate Invasion, and the Engagements enter'd into by the Emperor and the King of Spain to insult us with their Fleets, and to conquer Great-Britain and Ireland for the Pretender, have been very industriously propagated by those, who are already in your Pay, and by me, who stand a Candidate for this Honour, but am hitherto a

Volun-

Voluntier in your Service. I am forry to tell you, Sir, but Heaven forbid that I should conceal fo material a Circumstance from your Knowledge; we do not fucceed. We raife a Spirit, but this Spirit turns against you. There are more People than ever against the Pretender; and Zeal for supporting the prefent Establishment never ran higher. But this Zeal is not any longer without Knowledge; it is directed to its proper Object, and there is no Poffibility of leading it hoodwink'd to ferve any other Purpofes. Some incredulous Wretches there are, who smile when we talk to them of Invasions and the Pretender, and who content themselves to reply that the Machine is very feafonably introduced, and according to the Rules of Art. The greater Number take Fire, and lay this new Distress, which we threaten them with, at your Door: For, they fay, that we disobliged Spain some Years ago, to tye the Emperor the more firmly to us, and that we have fince that Time difobliged the Emperor, by affecting a closer Correspondence, and greater Union of Councils with France than ever was known between the two Nations. They fend us to that excellent Treatife, the Barrier Treaty vindicated, to learn our true and lasting Interest in foreign Alliances, and there they pretead that we shall find the Condemnation of all your Measures; they lament the miserable Scene. which they apprehend may foon be open'd, his Majesty's foreign Dominions exposed to

Danger of being lost; we ourselves struggling against domestick Enemies, and defending our Coasts against Invasions; these Mischiess brought upon us by a Conjunction of the Emperor our old Ally, with the King of Spain his Rival, a Conjunction so unnatural that nothing but the highest Resentment at our Behaviour to them both could have brought it about; in short, to finish up the Picture, Great-Britain reduced in this Distress to lean folely upon France, and the Faith of that Court to become our chief Security.

Upon the whole Matter, your Enemies, Sir, the Substance of whose private Converfation I have now honestly reported to you, conclude very insolently that you have fill'd up the Measure of your Iniquity and your Folly, and that You must fink or the Nation must fink under the Weight of that Calamity, which you have brought and suf-

fer'd to be brought upon her.

As shocking as this Account must be to your Ears; I promise myself that the Sincerity and Plainness, with which I have given it, will be agreeable to you; and that you will receive into your Bosom a Man whose Affections for your Person and Zeal for your Service, must be above all Suspicion, after giving you Intelligence of so high a Nature, without any Stipulation for the Discovery.

(-17)

I expect to hear from you in eight Days from the Date hereof; if I do not, you shall hear again from him, who is,

Most Noble SIR,

Your Honour's

most devoted Servant,

From my Garret, Jan. 1726-7.

The Occasional Writer,

The Occasional Writer.

Number II.

To the same.

Most Noble S I R;

Think myself obliged in Honour to let the World know, that you have treated all my Proposals to write in your Service with a Contempt unusual from one in your Station; for I have seen the Times when every little paultry Prostitute of his Pen sound CounCountenance and Encouragement. These Wretches are sure of both, whenever there are any bad Measures to be justify'd, or any bold Strokes to be given; and the Croaking of these Ravens has always, in my Imagination, boded some Mischief or other to the Commonwealth.

For this Reason, I took upon me the Character of a most infamous Libeller in my first Address to you, that I might be able to make a surer Judgment of our present Condition, and know better what Expectations to entertain; so that I own I am most agreeably disappointed in not receiving any Letter or Message from you. I own, that instead of biting

you, I am fairly bit myfelf.

Some malicious Refiners may pretend, perhaps, that an Address of such a Nature, made in fo publick a Manner, could meet with no other Treatment, even from a Minister, who was willing to accept the Propofal. Malice, I say, may refine thus, and endeavour to depreciate a virtuous Action, which cannot be deny'd, by supposing such Motives to it as cannot be proved. The Practice is too common, and especially where Men are divided into Parties, where publick Disputes create and nourish private Animofities, and where perpetual Feuds irritate the natural Malignity of the Heart. But far be it from me to judge with fo little Charity; I am willing to believe, Sir, that you declined the Offers made you, not on Account of the publick Address.

Address, by which they were convey'd, but because you disdain'd to support a virtuous

Administration by a venal Pen.

When I meet a Man with loaded Piftols in his Pocket, or a Dagger under his Cloak, I suspect that he is going upon no very honourable Designs. House-breakers and Coiners have been detected, by having their Tools found about them. Informers, Spies, and hireling Scribblers are the Tools of an evil Statesman; and when I see all such discouraged, and none of them about a Minister, I think myself obliged to suppose that his Designs are honourable, and his Measures di-

rected to the publick Good.

I take this Opportunity therefore of begging your Pardon for the Trial I prefumed to make. The Liberty indeed was great; but fince it has turn'd fo vastly to your Honour, I hope to be the more eafily forgiven. Shall I own it, Sir? My Hopes go still farther; you disdain'd me under the feign'd Character, which I affumed; from the same Principle of Honour, from the same Consciousness of Merit, you will, nay, you must afford me some Share of your Esteem, when I appear, as I intend to do for the future, under my own. These Papers shall breathe nothing but Zeal to promote the Honour of his Majesty, the Security of our present happy Establishment, and in one Word, the Good of our Country. The fame Spirit, which animates you and me, shall animate them; and I cannot doubt of your

your Approbation, when I co-operate with you to these Purposes, which were certainly the sole Inducements you had to enter into Business; as it is manifest that you continue at the Head of Affairs for no other Reasons.

The Truth is, however, (for I think it becoming a Friendship, which is likely to grow as intimate as ours, that I should disguise nothing from you) two Things have lately happen'd, which gave some little Shock to my good Opinion of you. The first is an Unwillingness you manifested, that the true State of the national Debts should be known by the Nation, and the fevere Cenfure you pass'd on fuch Persons, as were desirous to give their Countrymen a fair Account of their Condition in a Part fo effential, that our being a Nation, or not a Nation, depends almost entirely, in this Crifis, on our running or not running farther into Debt. The other is the Publication of a Pamphlet supposed to be written by your Direction, which is evidently defigned to keep us no less in the dark as to all our Affairs abroad.

As to the first, that Matter has been taken up already; and will, I doubt not, in all Places, and in all Manners, be so thoroughly fifted, that we shall no longer be at a Loss, either as to the Revenue, and the real Charges upon it, or as to the whole Management of it. In which Examination, Sir, let me advise you, as a Friend, to act an ingenuous Part, that

that Suspicions may not increase, and that I may not be obliged to write to you in a Stile, to which I shall turn my Pen with Re-

luctancy.

As to the latter, I hope, it will be likewise examined; and if I was able to take fuch a Task on myself, I should, I am persuaded, in doing fo, but make a fecond Trial of you to your Glory, and knit the Bands of our Friendship the closer, by answering a Pamphlet of fo pernicious Consequence, and writ with fo ill a Defign. But I know my own Unfitness to inform, to instruct, and to rouse our Countrymen, some from their Lethargy, and fome from their golden Dreams. I may toll the Alarm-Bell, but Persons of greater Strength and Skill must be called upon to raise it, and to ring it out in the Ears of the Nation.

We are grown more easy, nay, more willing than ever, to be imposed upon; and we do more than half the Work of those, who find their Account in deluding us. Almost every Man confiders himself as a single Perfon; those few, who extend their Considerations farther, feldom or never carry them beyond the narrow System of a Family or a Party. And thus it happens, that private Interest is become the Criterion, by which Judgments are formed upon publick Affairs. The Man, whoever he be, who is at any Time in Fashion, has nothing to do but to hold out that Purse, which the more he empties it, the furer

furer he is to fill. After which let him declaim imperiously, and affert boldly, without regarding Proof, or condescending to argue; let one of his Tools write a Pamphlet in much the same Strain, and the Work is done, the Opinion of Mankind is settled, the Crowd repeats what the Orator has said, and the Author writ; the Clamour is echoed back on all Sides, and these Echoes, the Reverse of all others, strengthen by Repetition. Thus the Corrupt lead the Blind, and the Blind lead one another; the still Voice of Reason is drowned in popular Clamour, and Truth is overwhelm'd by Prejudice.

This is a true Account of what happens frequently; it is so far from being a Description drawn from Imagination, that I could give several Instances, and perhaps shall have Occasion to quote some, of such gross Impositions on the common Sense of Mankind, offer'd in this Manner, and offer'd with Success, as no one would be bold enough to attempt putting on the weakest Man in Britain

in private Conversation.

There are, therefore, God knows, but too many Reasons for him to despond, who enentertains a Thought of prevailing on the Generality of People to lay aside their Prejudices, to check their Passions, and to consider the State of the Nation in a due Extent, and in a true Light; and yet such is our Condition, such a Crisis are we in, that if we do not take and execute this Resolution now,

it may very probably be out of our Power to

do it hereafter to any good Purpose.

In our Senate we hear of great Dangers, which we have to apprehend from abroad; and if we believe what is faid in a foreign * State, we are exposed to very great ones at home. I am willing to hope, that both one and the other are magnified; but they may grow to be fuch in Reality as they are reprefented to be, if we do not take more than ordinary Care; first, to weigh in a just Balance each of the many Evils, which threaten the Nation; and, fecondly, if we do not penetrate into every one of the Causes, which have combined them to bring upon us. Should we fail in the first Point, we may increase our Dangers from abroad, by over-rating those at home, and by applying ourselves solely to prevent the latter. But I believe no one thinks us disposed to run into this Extreme; we are much more likely to run into the other, and fo encrease our Dangers at home, by over-rating those, which we apprehend from abroad. Should we fail in the fecond Point, and neglect to penetrate into all the Causes, which combine to bring our present Distress upon us, palliative Remedies alone will be apply'd, in the Use of which we may very probably expire after a tedious Langour, but from which we cannot expect a radical Cure.

^{*} Vide Letter from Stockholm.

Convinced therefore, that if we neglect the present Moment, if every Man does not think and write, and speak and act for his Country at this Time, according to his best Talents, and according to the Opportunities, which he has of exerting them, we shall soon

be in every Sense a ruin'd Nation.

I confess, that I am impatient, however low my Hopes of Success run, till some abler Pen accepts the Invitation, which the Enquirer into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain gives to every Member of this Community, till an Enquiry be made, according to the Right which he is pleased to allow, into our present State, and into the Measures, which have led to it. But then this Enquiry must be made upon better Principles, aud with an honester View than he has, who made this, which lies before me; the Person, who accepts his Invitation, should be one, who would blush to follow his Example; for he acts the Part of an Apologist, where he professes to act that of an impartial Enquirer; he feems very zealous for the Success of the Cause, which he pleads, and very indifferent what Means he employs to procure this Success; many Things are difguifed, many are conceal'd, and hardly any are represented in their natural and proper Light. Fallacy, Sophism, and a puerile Declamation, swell the elaborate Treatise; but there was a Design perhaps, as well as Habit, in fuch a Manner of Writing upon this Occesion, since a bad Cause must

be defended by fuch Means; and, therefore, by fuch Pens as would diffrace and weaken a good one; fince it may possibly appear upon a fair Examination, that the Cause he is retain'd in is none of the best.

If this should appear, I am apt to believe, that those, who set him at work, will not be much concerned; they could not look on this Pamphlet as any Thing better than a momentary Expedient to mislead and inflame. If it has that Effect, if it serves to keep up the Delusion till all the Jobs, which are to be done, are done; the Ends, which they proposed to themselves, are perhaps answer'd. But if this Nation should awaken to a Sense of their true Interest, and if the British Spirit should once more revive amongst us, it might very well happen that these Persons would have made a faulty Reckoning; for furely, after having exercised the Justice of the Nation, by cenfuring in one Parliament a Treaty of Peace, which has been approved in another, it will not be thought strange, if we punish at one Time or another those, who have negotiated us out of Peace and Tranquility, into War and Confusion, although the Wisdom of the Nation should think fit to support for the present the Measures of these Ministers.

The Enquirer supposes the whole Face of Affairs in Europe to have received the great Alteration, which he is so much surprized at, within the Space of the last Year; but I can-

not agree with him, that the Turn has been so sudden as he represents it. The Calm hardly to be parallel'd by any past Prospect, as this great Master of Style expresses himself by a Figure of Hybernian Rhetorick, was accompany'd, as Calms frequently are, by many Signs of an approaching Storm; which Signs did not escape the Observation of the Sailors. and even Passengers in our Vessel, though they escaped that of our able Pilots, who were it feems all that while in a most ferene Security. The particular Evils, which we apprehend at prefent, were known to our Ministers above a Year ago; if it be true, as the Enquirer affirms, that the Treaty of Hanover, and Negotiations, in Consequence of it, are the Steps, which the Court of Great Britain thought fit to take as foon as possible after the Danger we were in appear'd evident beyond all Contradiction. But before the particular Danger appear'd, the general Danger was evident enough. When the Treaty of Vienna was made, our Ship struck; but we had been failing among Rocks and Shoals long before, ever fince we quitted our Port, and launch'd out to Sea, on the wife Errand of convoying other People fafe to theirs.

He therefore, who is desirous to make the Enquiry proposed, in such a Manner as may be of real Use to the Publick, must take up Things much higher than this partial Writer was instructed to do. Many Things happen'd during the Congress of Cambray, which deserve

deserve to be explain'd; and there are Treaties both previous and subsequent to the Quadruple Alliance, which deserve to be commented

upon.

Nay, there feems to be a Necessity of going farther back than this Reign, or even than this Century, if we design to be thoroughly acquainted with the Original of our present Distress. When we have taken a general Survey of the Conduct of Britain, with relation to the Affairs of Europe, for about two hundred Years, we shall come much better prepared to discover our true Point of Interest; and by observing how we have departed from it, we shall learn how to return to it.

This Part I will venture to undertake; and what I shall say upon it, may serve at least as an Introduction to that Work, which, I hope,

will be performed by some abler Hand.

The Foundations of the Grandeur of France, and those of the Grandeur of the House of Austria, were laid very near at the same Period. Ferdinand and Isabella began the latter; and in Charles V. their Grandson, and almost immediate Successor, it was carry'd up to that exorbitant Height, which made Europe tremble under his Reign, under that of his Son, and upon some Occasions even later. The Progress, which France made, was not so rapid, but was perhaps as sure; she shared with her Rival the Spoils of the House of Burgundy, by the Address and Vigour

Vigour of Lewis XI. who not only extended the Bounds, and strengthen'd the Frontier of that close compact Body, (whose very Figure is an Addition to the Force of it, but assured its inward Tranquility better,) and render'd that Monarchy more formidable than it had been in the Time of his Predecessors, when the Authority of the Prince was less.

The forming of two fuch Powers, in Europe, made it the Interest of all other Princes and States, to keep as much as possible a Balance between them. And here began that Principle of English Policy to be establish'd, which, however true and wise in itself, has hardly ever been truly and wisely

We should take Things rather too high, if we went up to the Reign of King Henry VII. though even there some Observations are to be made, which have relation to our

present Subject.

purfued.

Frequent and important Occasions of acting on this Principle presented themselves in the Time of Henry VIII. Some he took, some he neglected, and some he managed ill; for to say the Truth, the whole Conduct of this Prince was a continued Course of Extravagance, Violence, and Levity; his Vices glared through the best Actions of his Life. He exercised the Tyranny, and practised the bloody Precepts of the Church of Rome, even while he was delivering us from the papal Yoke. His Deliberations for Peace or War seem'd often

often to have a Mixture of Humour in them, and his own Passions, as well as Wolsey's, made him hold the Balance of Europe, if he

did hold it, with an uneven Hand.

The Reformation, which began in his Time in Germany, and which was compleated by Edward VI. and by Queen Elizabeth, in England, gave Occasion to a new Division of Interests; and made it of the utmost Importance to the Welfare of this Nation, not only to preferve a Balance between the two great Powers of Europe, but to support the Protestant Cause against them both. The first of these was to be done by throwing as much as the Occasion might require of our Weight, sometimes into one, and sometimes into the other of these Scales; but the latter could be effected by nothing less than a constant Adherence to that Side, which was for a long Time the weakest, and which, I doubt, is fo still.

Both these Principles were pursued by Queen Elizabeth, with the greatest Wisdom, and with the greatest Success. To illustrate this fully, it would be necessary to run through the Annals of her glorious Reign. But a few general Observations will suffice for our present Purpose. When she came to the Crown, the Nation was divided between two powerful Parties, exasperated by religious Zeal; Ireland was Papist, Scotland was under the immediate Insluence of France, and the Queen of that Kingdom, marry'd to the Dauphine

of France, disputed her Title to the Crown of England. In short, the surest Support she had amidst all those Difficulties, besides the Firmness of her Mind, and the Penetration of her Understanding, was in Philip II, whom the disobliged by refusing to make him her Husband; and who could not fail of being on many Accounts, as he proved to be, her most implacable and dangerous Enemy; she kept Measures for a while with him, nay, perhaps, with the Court of Rome, and foon fettled her Government, and establish'd her Power; her own Kingdom was the first and principal Object of her Care; and she judged very wifely, that, in order to be confiderable abroad, she must begin by making herself so at home. Her Revenue was administer'd with the utmost Frugality, Industry was encouraged, Manufactures improved, and Commerce extended; she was far from neglecting foreign Alliances, but her Negotiations were conducted with great Art, and little Expence, and the Engagements she took were always necessary, seldom chargeable. She supported the Protestant Cause in France, with good Offices, with Loans of Money; and, upon fome preffing Occasions, with Troops. But she never depended on the Gratitude of Henry IV. and was neither suprized nor unprepared when he made Returns very unworthy of the Obligations he had to her. The Dutch could not have sustained their Revolt from Spain, nor have formed their Commonwealth.

wealth, without her Affistance. She help'd them powerfully, but she exacted cautionary Towns from them, as a Security for her Reimbursement, whenever they should be in a Condition to pay; and in the mean Time as a Check to keep them under the Influence and Direction of England. By such Methods as these, her own Country grew rich and flourishing, while she not only preserved a Balance of Power abroad, but contributed extremely to reduce Spain from being the Terror of Europe, to that low State, into which it fell under the Successors of King Philip II.

The Reign of King James I. is not to be read without a Mixture of Indignation and Contempt. He came to the Crown with great Advantages; but a bad Hand, and a worse Heart, hinder'd him from improving any of them. He lost the Opportunity of uniting the two Kingdoms, but suffer'd his Revenue to be ill-administer'd, his Ministers were notoriously corrupt, and he himself very profuse.

Instead of asswaging, he fomented Disputes by his Pedantry; establish'd such Principles of Government, and raised such a Spirit in the Clergy, as could harldly fail to produce the terrible Effects, which follow'd in the Reign of his Son.

Such a Management of domestick Affairs would have put it out of his Power, if it had been his Inclination to act a wifer Part in foreign

foreign Affairs; but he had no fuch Inclination. Twelve Years he fuffer'd himself to be amused with the Spanish Match; he countenanced at least the Popish, and he absolutely neglected the Protestant Interest, both in France and Germany. Instead of helping the Dispositions, which appear'd, to take the Imperial Crown out of the House of Austria, he favoured the Cause of that Family, and abandoned his own Children to the Refentment of the Emperor and the Popish League. When the thirty Years War began in 1618, the Liberty of Germany, and the whole Protestant Interest, were in the utmost Peril. The sole Measures, which he took for the Support of either, confifted in fimple Embaffies, ridiculous Letters, and languid Negotiations. Queen Elizabeth defeated the ambitious Defigns of the Spanish Branch of the Austrian Family; King James favoured those of the German Branch of the fame Family.

Over the succeeding Reign, and all that follow'd, to the Restoration of King Charles

II. let us draw a Veil.

During this Time the Decay of the Spanish Monarchy increased apace, the Liberties of Germany were afferted, and the Power of the Emperor bounded by the Treaties of West-phalia; but another Power, That of France, began to rise very fast on the Foundations laid long ago. Richelieu and Mazarine had given that Crown a great Superiority in the Affairs of Europe, and the Prince, who wore it,

it, resolved to maintain and augment this Superiority, at the Expence of all his Neighbours.

The Attack, which Lewis XIV. made upon the Low Countries in 1667, shew'd both in the Manner of it, and in the Pretence taken for it, what Europe had to expect from this Prince. On this Occasion the Tripple Alliance was made, and happy had it been if the same Principles of Policy had continued to prevail. But the King, who sat on our Throne, with better Sense and more Courage than his Grandfather, was at last as unfit as he to defend the Liberties of Europe, and perhaps more unfit to defend the Protestant Interest.

King Charles II. join'd his Councils and his Arms to those of France; and when he could not openly affift, he privately abetted the Usurpation of that Crown. He might, by conforming to the Desires of his People, who were in his and their true Interest, have had the immortal Honour of preferving a Balance of Power in Europe; but he chose the eternal Infamy of helping to destroy this Balance; and not content to be the Ally of a Prince, whose Enemy he ought to have been, he condescended to be his Instrument, and This Conduct, which even his Pensioner. took fo much Strength from that Side, which was already too weak, and which added fo much to that, which was already too ftrong, establish'd the absolute Superiority of France, and left Spain, Germany, Italy, and the feventeen Provinces, nay and Britain too in Con-

sequence, at her Mercy.

This terrible Face of Things did not mend on the Accession of King James II. to the Throne. Whatever his Politicks were, Religion would have got the better of them. Bigotry must have cemented a close Union between him and the King of France, who was alone able and willing to affift him in the Work he had undertaken at home. But the Greatness of our Danger, as it sometimes happens, faved us; and in faving us, faved all Europe. The Revolution in our Government caused a total Change in our Conduct. A Prince, who had been long at the Head of a weak, but resolute Opposition to France, mounted our Throne; and the Principles of maintaining a Balance between the great Powers of Europe, and of supporting the Protestant Interest, came once more into Fashion in this Kingdom, after having been for near a Century, either neglected, or acted against.

The Body of the Nation refumed these Principles with Warmth, and has supported them ever fince with unparallel'd Spirit and Vigour. But let it be said without Offence, since it may be said with Truth, and since it is necessary that it should be said upon this Occasion, we have not pursued them with as much Wisdom as Zeal. If we have err'd in our Politicks since the Revolution, it is sure we have err'd on the right Side. But

Errors

Errors on the right Side are Errors still, and may, in Time, prove as fatal as Errors on the other; and are in one respect at least more dangerous, as they are less attended to at first, or guarded against.

Between all Extremes there is a certain middle Point, which Men of Genius perceive, and to which Men of Honour adhere

in private and in publick Life.

Thus Avarice and Prodigality are at an immense Distance; but there is a Space mark'd out by Virtue between them, where Frugality and Generosity reside together. Thus again, to abandon those, whom it is our Interest to support, is an Excess of Folly; and to support the Interests of other People, to the Ruin of our own, is an Excess of Folly likewise. But there are Lines described by Prudence, between these two Excesses, within which our common Interests meet, and may proceed together.

It would be an invidious as, well as tedious Task, to go through all the Instances, which might be produced; wherein we have, under Pretence of preserving a Balance of Power in Europe, gratify'd the Passions of particular Men, and served the Turns of private Interest, till we have rendered that Principle, in a reasonable Pursuit of which our Sasety, and our Glory consist, the Occasion of real Danger to the Interest, and of Reproach to the Wisdom of our Nation. A sew of these Instances will suffice to deduce the

Progress of our mistaken Policy, to evince the Truth of what has been advanced in general, and to fix the Application of the whole to the present Conjuncture; wherein I apprehend that we are about to pay the Price not only of late Errors, but a long Series of Errors.

The War which begun in 1688, was no doubt a very necessary War. It was necessary to extinguish the Rebellion in Scotland; it was necessary to reduce Ireland; it was neceffary to affert the new Establishment of our Government. These were our immediate Interests; but we had remote Interests likewise concern'd, which were of themselves sufficient to engage us to enter, at least as Allies and Friends, into the War. The Empire was in danger by the taking of Philipsburgh, and other Enterprizes of the French; and Holland lay once more open to their Invafions, by the feizing of Bonne. In the Course of this War, Ireland was reduced; all the Efforts against the Government in England and Scotland were defeated; and by the Peace, France acknowledged King William.

As unfortunate as we had been on the Rhine and in Flanders, every Thing which the French had taken in the Course of the War from our Allies, was restored at Ryswick; and Luxembourg, which France had usurp'd before the War, was likewise given up. Thus far all was well. The Points, which England

England contended for, were carried; and our Allies recover'd by Treaty more than they

had loft by War.

If a common Guaranty of this Treaty had been enter'd into as foon as those Powers acceded, who refused to fign when England and Holland did; the Tranquillity of Europe would have been better secured, than it was at this Time, or at the Peace of Nimeghen; at least England would have engaged, as far as it became her to do, even upon the Principle of maintaining the Balance of Power, and no farther.

But instead of taking this Step, we took another, which proved fatal in its Confequences. The Death of Charles II. King of Spain, without Children, was then in Prospect. The Pretentions of France were known, and its Power had been lately felt. Whenever the Case should happen, a War seem'd to be unavoidable. But this War must have been made by France alone, for the Conquest of the Spanish Monarchy; which, as powerful as we then thought her, and as infolent as she really was, she would not have engaged in lightly. Neither could she have supported it, if she had, fince even with Spain on her Side she could not have supported the last, if the Mines of Peru had not been unaccountably left open to her.

On the Apprehension, however, of such a War, and on the specious Pretence of preferving a Balance of Power in Europe, the

D3 Par-

Partition Treaties were made; that is, without the Knowledge of the King of Spain, we disposed of his Inheritance; without the Confent of the Emperor, and in Concert with his adverse Party, we settled the Rights contested between the Houses of Austria and Bourbon; and we engaged to make this Par-

tition good by Arms.

I do not enter into the Reasons for and against this Treaty, which may be drawn from the particular Stipulations contain'd in it, but content myself to observe in general, what impolitick Measures we were at this Period betray'd into, by an over-weening Defire to preserve the Balance of Power; and how much Reason we have to be always on our Guard against Errors of this Kind, since a Prince, whom Genius and Experience had render'd the greatest Man of his Age, was not exempt from them, but drew both England and Holland satally into them.

Whenever this Balance is in real Danger by the exorbitant Growth of one Power, or by the Union of more, other Princes and States will be alarmed of course. All of them ought, and most of them will take Measures for their common Security. But the wise Councils amongst them will, upon every such Occasion, proportion their Measures, and the Engagements they enter into, not according to the Nature of the Danger consider'd generally, but according to the immediate or remote Relation, which it has to each of them,

and according to the Strength, Situation, or any other Circumstance, which may be peculiar to each of them.

To do otherwise, would be to lose Sight of our own particular Interest in the Pursuit of a common Interest. It would be nothing better than fetting up for the Don Quixotes of the World, and engage to fight the Battles of all Mankind. The State, which keeps its own particular Interest constantly in View, has no invariable Rule to go by; and this Rule will direct and limit all its Proceedings in foreign Affairs; fo that fuch a State will frequently take no Share, and frequently a small Share in the Disputes of its Neighbours, and will never exert its whole Strength, but when its Whole is at Stake. But a State, who neglects to do This, has no Rule at all to go by, and must fight to negotiate, and negotiate to fight again, as long as it is a State; because, as long as it is a State, there will be Disputes among its Neighbours, and some of these will prevail at one Time, and fome at another, in the perpetual Flux and Reflux of human Affairs.

If the Kings of France and Spain, and the Emperor, had made an Agreement amongst themselves, about the Succession to the Dominions of Spain, consistent with the common Interest of Europe, and considering the Partiality, which the Court of Spain had, at that Time, for the House of Austria, there was little Room to fear, that such an Agree-

D 4

ment would have been too favourable to the House of Bourbon. If any such Partition had been made, I fay, no Objection would have remain'd, either as to the Right or Manner of making it, and we might have escaped a War. If these Princes had done nothing of this Kind, we might have been engaged upon the King of Spain's Death, as I faid before, in a defensive War, for preserving the Dominions of our old Allies, and the Liberties of Europe, against the Usurpations of our antient Enemy. But instead of waiting to be Auxiliaries in a defensive War, we put ourselves under a Necessity of being Principals in an offensive one; and by affecting to fecure the Balance of Power, when we had neither Call nor Right to meddle, we reduced our Affairs to this abfurd Alternative, that we must either make an offensive War as Principals, against the Emperor and Spain, in order to conquer for France, which was equally impolitick and unjust, or against France and Spain, in order to conquer for the Emperor, under the greatest Disadvantages possible; which happen'd to be the Case.

The Partition Treaties forced the King of Spain, to make a Will in favour of the House of Bourbon; and the Spaniards threw themselves into the Arms of France, to prevent the Dismemberment of their Monarchy.

Thus was the Balance of Power loft by our meddling where we had nothing to do, even before it could have been in Danger, if we had not meddled at all. We loft it, and the Emperor knew that we must restore it for our own Sakes, which could be done no otherwise than by conquering for him; and This he left to us to do the best we could. While we fought his Battles, he lent us the Austrian Title, the Person of his Son, the present Emperor, and little else. We neglected every Thing, and facrificed every Thing in the Profecution of this Quarrel. But the imperial Councils were fo far from neglecting any Thing, or facrificing any Thing to it, that they feemed wholly taken up for fome Years in fettling the Affairs of Hungary to their Satisfaction; and they facrificed to an idle Refinement in Politicks the greatest Opportunity, which we ever had, or must ever hope to have; I mean that of destroying the naval Force of France, by the taking of Toulon. This they deliberately and almost avowedly hinder'd.

If ever People were call'd upon to think of their own immediate Interests, we were so at this Time. Whether we could then have put an End to the expensive War, we were engaged in for the House of Austria, in a Manner consistent with the publick Interest of Europe, I am not able to determine. Certain it is in Fact, that far from entertaining any such Thoughts, we redoubled our Spirit, and our Efforts in the Prosecution of the War. As we acquired new Allies, we enlarged our Engagements; and as we obtain'd new Vic-

tories, we extended our Views. The grand Alliance formed by King William, for restoring a Balance of Power in Europe, proposed no other Objects than sufficient Barriers, Security to Trade, and reasonable Satisfaction to the House of Austria*. These were thought, by that great Prince, all the Points necessary to be contended for. But instead of confining ourselves to so narrow a Plan. we judged that the Balance of Power could not be effectually restored, unless we wrested the whole Spanish Monarchy from the House of Bourbon, to give it to the House of Au-For this Prize we fought, and fought with as little Regard to all other Interests, as if we had defended our own Altars, and our own Houses.

Must we not acknowledge upon this Occafion, Sir, the Shortness of human Foresight? The very Measure, which we pursued at so great Expence of Blood and Treasure, (because nothing less could secure the Balance of Power in Europe, and even the Trade of this Kingdom, and the Protestant Succession, against the Invasions of France and the Pretender) that very Measure would, it seems, have put all these into the utmost Peril.

If we had succeeded in our Attempts to set the Crown of Spain on the Head of the present Emperor, and his Brother the Emperor Foseph had lived; would our Danger from

the Union of these two Brothers not have been at least as great, as that, which is apprehended from the Union of the present Emperor, and of the present King of Spain, Rivals almost from their Cradles, and by a long Course of Opposition, such inveterate Enemies, that they could bardly be kept, as the Enquirer affures us, within the Bounds of common Decency towards one another, by all the Address of two powerful Mediators in a publick Treaty? Might not the same Address, as threw these Enemies into one another's Arms, (for it will appear they did not run thither fo unaccountably) and united them in Defigns destructive to the Commerce and Rights of other Nations, have fucceeded equally well between the two Brothers, especially since in this Case there would have been but Half the Work to do? The Union would have been form'd to our Hands, and our Address could only have been thewn, in giving fuch proper Provocations, as might have inspired the Defigns.

Would Charles have been less favourable to the Trade of his Brother's Subjects, at any Place in the Austrian Dominions, than Philips shews himself to the Trade of the Subjects of Charles? Would Joseph not have concurr'd to affish his Brother to regain Gibraltar, and the Island of Minorca; at least, as zealously, as we can suppose, that Charles concurs to affish Philip, either by good Offices, or, if you please to have it so, by Force of Arms? Would

Would not a League between the two Brothers have been as much a Popish League. as that, which we are so much alarmed at, between the furviving Brother, and the present King of Spain? Would not the first have made Use of the Pretender, as the latter is faid to do, and as every Prince or State, with whom we happen to be at Variance, may be provoked to do? In short, I may safely challenge the Author of the Enquiry, as great a Cafuift as he is, to shew any Difference between the two Cases, which I have compared together, except this, that we might have been exposed to greater Dangers from that Settlement of Europe, which we fought to bring about, than we are, or can probably be exposed to, from that, which we were so follicitous to prevent. But the Case is still stronger than I have put it. For even after the Death of the Emperor Joseph, his present Imperial Majesty, continued his Claim to the whole Spanish Monarchy; and You, and I, and many of us, continued to support his Claim, and opposed, with all our Force, the Negotiations of Peace, which were begun upon a different Principle. Happily we fail'd of Success. The many, who remonstrated, that we were hastening apace, to make him a Power too great; and too formidable; and that we should find in him, at last, the Enemy we then dreaded only in another, prevail'd. Had they not, in what a Condition should we have been at this Time? Would

the Emperor have been more grateful, or less powerful, with the Crown of Spain and the Indies, added to so many others? If the Union between him, and the King of Spain, is formidable to us, how much more Reason should we have had, to apprehend the Consequences to our Trade, and in the End to our Liberties, and our Religion, themselves; if these divided Powers, had been united in the same ungrateful Person, as it is the Mode at present to call the Emperor?

If Don Carlos should marry the eldest Arch-Dutchess, if the Emperor should die without Issue Male, if the King of France should die without Issue Male, if the Prince of Asturias should die without Issue Male, and the Princes of the Blood in France and Spain should not support the Validity of the Renunciations, all which is within the Bounds of Poffibility; " Don Carlos may be at once " Emperor, King of France, and King of " Spain; and have the vast Strength and " Riches of all these Powers united and cen-" ter'd in bim." This terrible Object stares our speculative Enquirer in the Face, and disturbs his Head. It disturbs very probably those excellent Heads, who set him a scribbling, who can fee so far into Futurity at prefent; and who, not very long ago, were unable to discern the nearest and most probable Events. Let us confider now, what Confequence of this Kind might have happened; if, for securing a Balance of Power in Europe,

the present Emperor had been likewise King of Spain. If then the King of France, instead of marrying the Daughter of Staniflaus, had marry'd the eldest Daughter of the Emperor, which furely had been within the Bounds of Poffibility; there would remain but one Chance at this Time, viz. The Emperor having a Son, to fave us from the Combination of fuch a Power, as would in reality form what we commonly, tho' improperly, call Universal Monarchy; fince there would be nothing elfe, which could hinder Lewis XV. from being King of France, of Spain, and of the West-Indies, Master of all the Austrian Dominions; and, by Confequence, Emperor. The Truth I would inculcate by what I have faid is this, that as the Partition Treaty threw too much Weight into the Scale of Bourbon, to the Destruction of the Balance of Power in Europe; so the necessary Consequence of the War we made to restore this Ballance must have been, if we had succeeded according to our Defires, to destroy it again, by throwing too much Weight into the Scale of Austria. This has been proved by the Event, and the Enquirer demonstrates it, or he demonstrates nothing.

As far, therefore, as we have brought this Deduction, that is, to the End of the last War; it is manifest, that the Notion of preserving a Balance of Power in *Europe* has, for the Reasons touch'd upon above, and which every Man will extend in his own Thoughts,

proved

proved to us like an Ignis fatuus; in the Pursuit of which we have been led from Difficulty to Difficulty, and from Danger to

Danger.

If we enquire whether the Treaties of Utrecht and Baden did afford us an Opportunity of correcting our Errors, and of profiting by our Experience, it will be found that they did; fince all the Points, which had been in Contest were then settled, and this Settlement acquiesced in by all the Parties to the War, except the Emperor, who kept up still his

Claim against Philip V.

But the keeping up this Claim could not have endanger'd the publick Tranquility. He was unable to attack Spain for want of a maritime Force, or even Sicily, which was cover'd besides by the Guaranty of the Neutrality of Italy; and this Neutrality served likewise to hinder Spain from attacking him. There might have been a War of the Pen, and there could have been no other between them.

At the worst, if the King of Spain had invaded any Part of Italy, the Guarantees of the Neutrality might easily have prevented such an Attempt; and in so doing, they would have observed the Treaties, and kept the Peace, far from breaking either one or the other.

In such a State of foreign Affairs, we had certainly an Opportunity of looking carefully after our own. The King of Spain had no Pretence

Pretence to ask for any Alteration in the Settlement so lately establish'd with his own Consent; and the Emperor could not have complain'd of his Majesty for observing Treaties, which he would not have made, but which he found made; nor for resusing to enter into a new War on this Account.

Whether we improved this Opportunity, or not, what our prefent Condition is, and by what Steps we have been reduced to it, I leave to the Enquiry of some Person more capable than myself. Let it suffice, that I have endeavour'd to remove some Delusions, which have affected even Men of the best Understandings, and the best Intentions; and to prepare the Minds of my Countrymen to consider, at this critical Point of Time, what our national Interest really is, without being biassed in their Judgments, by what they may have thought of it on any former Occasions.

I am,

Most noble SIR,

Your Honour's

most devoted Servant,

February 3, 1726-7.

The Occasional Writer.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

Press, a Paper, intitled, A Letter to the Occasional Writer, was brought to me. I have read this stiff pedantick Piece, with more Attention than it deserves, though I read it cursorily; and, notwithstanding the Pains which the Author takes to pass for you, I am ready to acquit you of the Scandal. You would certainly have writ better, and your Pen at least would not have appeared so near a-kin to that of the Craftsman Extraordinary.

Who this Author supposes the Occasional Writer to be, I cannot guess. Such a Wretch as he describes is, I believe, to be found no where, not even such an Image of Guilt and Misery any where, except in the Horrors of his own Mind. I shall therefore, with a decent Contempt for this scurrilous Scribbler, and without any Concern about his imaginary Correspondent, continue these offensive Letters, in great Tranquility and Sedateness, as often as Occasion invites me, or as I find myfelf in the Humour.



The Occasional Writer.

Number III.

To the Same.

Quis te, Juvenum confidentissime, nostras Justita dire Domes? Quidve binc petis? inquit. At ille, Scis Proteu, scis ipse, neque est te fallere cuiquam.

VIRG.

Most Noble SIR,

HEN I writ the Poftscript to my last Letter, I believed firmly that the Answer to the Occafional Writer was neither writ by you, nor published by your Order. Many Confiderations determined me to this Opinion. For Instance; I could not think, that in order to vent yourself in a Fit of Railing, you would draw a Picture out of your own Imagination which cannot pass for that of the Person, who writ to you, even in the low and vile Character he affumed, and which you will hardly venture to own that you meant to be the Resemblance of any Man in Britain. I could not perfuade myself that you would give Occasion, as I apprehend very much that you may have done, to the drawing of another Picture after the Life, which

no one will mistake, and which you will not be curious to place in your Collection of Paintings. I have, with the rest of Mankind, a great Regard for some of your Friends; but I have, with the rest of Mankind likewise, a great Regard for your particular Enemies, among whom it seem'd impossible to me that you, who know them so well, should presume to find either Slaves or Criminals, or insolvent Debtors. I dare affirm, that there is not one of them, who ever mortgaged his Estate for more than its Value, or reduced himself near the Necessity of living by Contribution.

These are some of the Motives, which induced me to acquit you of the Scandal, as I then thought it, of writing this Paper. But upon better Information, and farther Reflection, I have changed my Opinion; and I see nothing inconsistent with my Respect for you,

in believing that you did write it.

As great an Advantage as it is in all the Affairs of Life for a Man to keep his Temper, it is often excusable, and perhaps sometimes even Praise-worthy, to lose it. When a Minister is contradicted in Matters relating to his Administration, and when busy People shall presume to ask his Reasons, instead of submitting to his Authority, can we wonder if his Passion transports him into Rhodomontades, and if he behaves himself a little wildly? But when the Virtue of a Minister like you, whose whole Life has been one bright E a

Example of publick and private Virtue shall be suspected, so far as to be tempted to Passion; who can resuse him even Applause, if his generous Soul, transported with a just Indignation, breathes forth such Expressions, as might upon a less Occasion, pass for indecent

Ribaldry?

This was your Cafe, most noble Sir, in the Trial, which I prefumed lately to make, with too much Boldness perhaps, but furely with a very good Defign. A Man writes to you from his Garret, describes himself as a prostitute Scribbler, and offers you the Service of his Pen; this, and this alone appears to you; upon which a noble Indignation feizes you, and you strike boldly, though you strike in the Dark; there is really somewhat fine in this Sally of Refentment, and it confirms, in the highest Degree, the Sentiments I have long entertain'd of your Integrity, of your Ability, and of a certain Grace, which accompanies and gives a Lustre to every Part of vour Conduct.

The Share I have had in this Adventure, affords me great Satisfaction. Your Anger fell on a feign'd Character, and hurts me not; but the Honour of having drawn an Answer from a first Minister, and an Answer in print, accrues to me, and is such a one, as the greatest of our weekly Authors could never

boast.

Give me Leave therefore to be transported in my Turn, but to be transported with Joy, and

and to infert an Abstract of your Answer in this Paper, as Balzac placed at the Head of his Works, a Letter from the Cardinal de Richlieu. I consult my own Honour, it must be confess'd, in doing this, but I consider still more that just Applause and Admiration which I, with the rest of the World, am obliged on this Occasion to give you.

To those Parts of the Occasional Writer's Letter, which shews that you are at this Juncture in want of such Services, as the Scoundrel personated might be sit to do, you make no Reply. The Want you seem to admit, but the Offer of Service you reject; let the Publick hear in what Manner.

Abstract of the M---r's ANSWER to the Occasional Writer.

Pag. 1. "HO' you have not fign'd your Name, I know you. Because "a Man, who is without all Principles of Ho"nesty, who in no one thing can be rely'd "upon, a Betrayer of his Friend, a Traitor to his Prince, an Enemy to his Country, a

" perjured, ungrateful, unfaithful Rascal, must

" be You; one who is a Composition of all

" these, can be only You.

Pag. 2. "You are an infamous Fellow,

" who make a Reputation of doing Mif-"chief; and Herostratus and Nero, were not

greater Villains than You.

E 3 "You

"You are of fo profligate a Character, that in your Profperity no Body envy'd you, and

in your Difgrace no Body pities you.

"You were in the Interest of France, and of the Pope, as hath appeared by your

"Writings, and you went out of the Way to

" fave yourfelf from the Gallows.

Page 3. "You are a Fellow, who have no

" Conscience at all, or a damnable complying one; and if you would lend it to ine, it

" would be of no Use to me.

"You have no Abilities; you are an eman-"cipated Slave, a proscribed Criminal, and an "insolvent Debtor; and I am not in such a

" desperate forlorn Condition, to employ a "Fellow, who hath no Talents.

Pag. 4. "You have been a Traitor, and "fhould be used like one. And I love my

" Master so well, that I will never advise him

" to use you, lest you should jostle me out of my

Employment.

"The Majority are of my Opinion. One Side rails at you, the other diflikes you;

" and that Palinurus would deserve to be drown'd indeed, who let you have the Rud-

" der, if he could help it.

Pag. 5. " I do not value what You or your

"Company say of me; neither am I to be frighted with a parliamentary Scrutiny. You rail at me, because you envy me; and

"I despise all that a Man in the Impotence

" of Difgrace can do against me, who could

" never

never terrify me in the Zenith of his Power."

Then follow these admirable Arguments:

Pag. 6, 7, 8. "I. You may talk what you will of France, Spain, and the Emperor, " Power is fluctuating, and perhaps I know " who is Britain's Enemy as well as another. "II. Though we did lend the Emperor a " helping Hand, we are not to let him do " what he pleases; and when we set him up, " it was good Politicks, and now it is equally " good to take him down. III. I don't que-" ftion but we shall humble him, IV. I must " tell you plainly, You and I, as to foreign " Affairs, differ widely in Opinion. V. When " our Neighbours grow faucy and encroach-" ing, it is high Time to look about us, and " not to be taken napping. VI. I know you " are like the Emperor, because he is like " yourfelf in Ingratitude; and you hate our " Friend France, because you were well re-" ceived there,

"If any Body fays any Thing of me, pray tell them ALL THESE THINGS.

" But for all that, I will not give you an Em-

" ployment.

"I know you to be so hot-headed, that when you have read this, you will vent all your Malice against me. But I do not value it; for I would rather have you my.

" Enemy than my Friend.

E 4. " Change

"Change your Names, and be as abufive and fcurrilous as you please, I shall find you out. I am Aristæus; you are Proteus. "You may change to a Flame, a Lion, a Bull, or a Bear, I shall know you, baffle you, conquer you, and contemn you. All your Opposition will redound to my Homour and Glory. And so, Sir, I scorn your

or proffer'd Services. Sir,

" Your most, &c."

How great! how free! how bold! how generous! Well may those, who have the Honour of a near Approach to you, extol the noble Openness of your Nature, which displays itself in this uncommon Manner, and think that Temper in a Statesman truely admirable, which lofes itself fo gloriously. Did ever Minister speak so plainly, or lay himself fo open to any Man, and especially to such a Man, as you supposed yourself writing to at that Time? Far from discovering Hatred and Contempt of fuch Wretches, Persons in your Situation have generally encouraged, and even fear'd them. Nay, they have fometimes aspired to be themselves of that Class; and Seneca's Apocolocynthosis upon Claudius, is not the fole Instance of Ministers, who have dipp'd their Pens in Satyr, to rail at the Memory of a dead Prince,

But now after this honourable Declaration, which you have made, after this great Example, which you have given, let every mer-

cenary Scribbler, every Tool of secret Service, tremble and despair. Long may you live, most noble Sir, the just Model of a Minister, who scorns the Assistance of Flattery, Fal-

shood, Artifice, or Corruption.

I have devoted myself to your Service, and shall certainly attend you through every Stage of your Fortune; as long as we both draw vital Air, you shall feel the Effects of my Zeal in your Cause, and I promise you very solemnly, that from henceforward I will live for no other Purpose; so that I am persuaded, you will hear with Pleasure the three Engagements, which I think it proper to take with

the Publick and with you.

The first is, that my Pen shall constantly preserve Decency and good Manners; and thall never be stain'd with any Abuse of particular Persons. I will chastise Vice, I will expose Folly, and I will combat Error, wherever I find them. But I will never touch upon any unalterable Defects in Figure, in Family, in Birth, in any kind whatfoever; much less will I allow myself to hint at any particular Scandal, or even to mention any real Misfortune, which may equally befal the best and the worst of Men; unless I am forced by my Subject to it, and unless I can soften the Evil by the very Manner of recalling it to Memory. To attack a Vice, a Folly or an Error, is Correction. To attack the Person, is Defamation. He, who writes an Invective, does a filly Thing, because he loses his

his End; and the wifest of Men has said, He that uttereth Slander is a Fool. Even Truth loses its Force in an Invective, as it does in a Panegyrick; in one, it is thrown into the Lump with Malice, in the other, with Flattery; and he, who is guilty of the first, that is, he, who writes against the Man, not against his Crimes, his Follies, or his Errors, feldom proves any thing more than his own Envy, and the other's Superiority. To conclude this Head; he, who writes an Invective, does a base and wicked Thing; because his Defign is to disturb the Quiet, and destroy the Peace of another Man, but not to reform him, or to ferve the Publick. The Pen of fuch a Writer, like one of those Scourges, of which the profound Meibomius has writ so learnedly, while it chastifes the Person, serves only to provoke the Vice.

The fecond Obligation, which I lay myself under, and which equally becomes a Man, who writes in the Cause of Truth, is that of

intire Difinterestedness.

I know the Generosity of your Nature, I know what Places and Pensions have been the Rewards of some very mean Performances in Verse and Prose; and that R. R. State-Writer, of whom we are obliged to ask Blessing, is most certainly not at the Head of our Prosession. These Examples, and a due Consideration of the Importance of my Services, teach me sufficiently what Expectations I might entertain, without any Risque of a Dis-

Disappointment. But I have neither Ambition of this Kind, nor Avarice. My Fortune is above wanting the Necessaries, and my Philosophy above wanting the Superfluities of Life. I therefore discharge you from all Obligation of rewarding my Services; and I wish for the sake of your Ease, your Honour, and your Safety, my Example was likely to be follow'd.

When we behold a great Man among a Croud of difinterested Friends, we know that they sollow his Virtues, and his Merit; when we hear an Orator bring over the Majority of an unprejudiced Audience to his Opinion, we must impute it to the Force of his Eloquence. But surely it is as rare for a Minister to have disinterested Friends, as an unprejudiced Audience, so that a Number of Followers can be no Proof of his personal Virtues, or a Ma-

jority of his Eloquence.

The Antients placed great Happiness in their inemptæ dapes; I would rather you should place yours in the inempti amici. But alas! Sir, as amiable as you are, this Happiness will hardly fall to your Lot, in our degenerate Age; and I know not whether to maintain your Power, you may not be forced to tarnish the Lustre of your glorious Administration. The King has indeed the Hearts of the People; his Service will always be supported by a national Concurrence, because his Views are always directed to the national Good. This Part is easy and secure, but when

once Men come to distinguish between the King's Service and yours, there will arise another Part not so easy nor secure. You have blended them pretty artfully together hitherto, but I doubt the Discrimination is at Hand. When that comes, you will be reduced to a melancholy Alternative; which I beg you to think of, and to prepare for. To quit your Power and your Pretentions, and to quit them before you have establish'd in your Room that dear Brother of yours, who does you so much Service at home, by tiring the ----, and the Nation fo much Honour abroad by diverting the C--- of F----, would indeed be hard. But, on the other Hand, be pleased to consider that this Nation has gone very far into Corruption already, that there is a Point of Corruption, to which no Nation can arrive and recover their Liberties, if they are loft; or even preserve them, if they are not lost, according to Machiavel's Observation; and that whoever is the Instrument of plunging his Country irretrievably into this Abyss, I use a Word you seem fond of, will fall into a terrible Abyss himself, and have no Superiority any where, but where the Briber stands before the Bribed, as the Devil stands before the Sinner.

You fee, Sir, how my Zeal transports me, and carries me upon the least Hint, which may be improved to your Honour or Service, even out of my Subject. I return to it, and

the third Engagement, which I take is to ob-

ferve a strict Impartiality.

To do otherwise, would be to act contrary to my Nature, and to the Dictates of my Reason. I have a natural Abhorrence of Injustice, and I confider'd, when I first drew my Pen, in how particular a Manner it behoves us political Writers to be on our Guard, against falling into any Partiality. The Judge is circumfcribed by Forms, to the Observance of which he is bound, he has the Law open before him; the Parties, on whom he fits in Judgment, are generally indifferent to him, and far from having any of his Passions awaken'd, the whole Man is fometimes prone to Sleep. When there is Room to suspect a Judge of Partiality in a particular Cafe, it is agreeable to the Practice of some Countries that he should decline presiding at the Trial, or be obliged to withdraw at the Requisition of the Party. With all these, and many other Precautions, which wife Constitutions have establish'd, it is neither easy nor safe for the venerable Sages of the Law to exercise Partiality. But we political Writers are not under the same Restraints, and are exposed to strong Temptations. No Forms are prescribed to regulate our Proceedings; no particular Laws, adapted to the particular Cases, which may occur, lie open before us. The general Law of Reason is the only Rule we have to follow; the Application of this Rule requires the most nice Exactness, and we are obliged

obliged to make this Application often, in pronouncing Judgment on Men and Things, when we are the most warmly engaged in those civil Contests, which the Duty of our Profession exposes us to, and even when our Tempers are russed by Opposition. From which Consideration, the Dissiculty of preserving a strict Impartiality may evidently appear; give me Leave, however, to illustrate this Matter a little farther.

In the Athenian Commonwealth, the Citizen, who took no Side, was deem'd indifferent to the publick Good, and was branded for his infamous Neutrality. Now, if fuch an Obligation as this lay upon every private Citizen, in that democratical Government, it is certain, that we publick Persons, at least, ought to think ourselves under the same Obligation, even in this limited Monarchy of ours. Indifference must be a Crime in us, to be rank'd but one Degree below Treachery; for deferting the Commonwealth is next to betraying it. Our Duty must oblige us in all publick Disputes to take the best Side, and to espouse it with Warmth; this Warmth will beget Warmth; for you know, Sir, that the worst Side is not always the worst defended. Provocations will multiply daily, and we may be attack'd in the most sensible Parts. You, Sir, yourfelf, may for aught I know be infulted, and your spotless Character may be defiled by some faucy Scribbler; in this licentious Age, nothing is held facred; under the **fpecious**

fpecious Pretence of Free-thinking, the Providence, and the very Being of God, have been openly call'd in Question, and Reflections on your Administration may possibly steal into the World.

Suppose, for a Moment, that any Thing so monstrous as this should happen, that you should be directly inveighed against, or which perhaps is more poignant, ironically commended, and then consider how difficult it would be for a profess'd Admirer of you, heated in the Contest, to keep his Temper, and to preserve his Impartiality; you must agree with me, the Task would be extremely difficult.

But I am fure you will agree likewise, that as difficult as it would be, a conscientious Man

ought to impose it upon himself.

The ill Effects of Partiality in us political Writers, when it carries us to give unjust and false Representations of Men and Things, will not be thought of little Moment by you, who labour for Fame, and expect a great Part of your Reward from Posterity, as Posterity is to receive a great Part of the Advantages, which your wife and virtuous Administration procures, in reviving, supporting, and extending Credit, in opening so comfortable a Prospect of the Payment of our Debts, in strengthening us abroad by so many beneficial Alliances, and above all in amending our Morals, by the total Discouragement of every kind of Artisice and Corruption.

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The Civil Magistrate may give away a Man's Estate, or take away his Life; but we can do, and often have done more; we set the general Characters and particular Actions of Men in what Light we please, and deliver them down, sometimes very unjustly, under the most amiable, or the most hateful Colours to suture Ages; for the rash Sentence we pronounce is eagerly received, and as eagerly transmitted by those, who are animated with the same Passion.

In this Manner are unjust, and even false Representations established. They become the general Opinion of Mankind, and then, although our Works should grow out of Date as fast as a Gazette, which it must be confefs'd happens very frequently; yet still the Mischief is done, the Historian perpetuates the Slander, which the Politician broach'd, and triumphs in the cotemporary Authority, upon which he writes to ferve the prefent Turn, or to fatisfy Resentment of Party; fuch Persons as have no other Crime but that of differing in Opinion from us, and fuch Events as have no other Demerit, but our Diflike of the Persons, who bring them about, are loaded with Infamy. Posterity is imposed upon as well as the present Age, and the Children continue the Fathers Vengeance, without having the Fathers Provocation.

This faint Sketch of some Consequences that follow the Partiality of political Writers, and of the Danger wherein we all stand of

being

being transported by our own Passions, or hurry'd by those of other People, so far to be answerable for such Consequences, may suffice to shew how much Reason there is for a Man, who undertakes the Career I am entering upon, to be watchful over himself, and to lay himself under as strong a Restraint as I do

by this folemn Engagement.

Indeed, as the World goes, it is only by running into Extremes that a State-Writer can effectually please his Party, or serve himfelf; the Eye of Party fees nothing but quite white, or quite black, observes no Degrees between them, and can diffinguish no middle Colour that partakes of both. The greatest Genius in Writing, may be exposed to share the Fate of the greatest Genie in Painting. Annibal Carache, who follow'd Nature and Truth with the utmost Exactness, found his noblest Works discountenanced and neglected. He thereupon advised Guido and Caravagio, his two favourite Scholars, to take quite another Manner, to trace nothing faithfully, but to outrage all they represented, the one by painting in the darkest, and the other in the lightest Manner. By these Means both of them were fure of Admirers, and both of them grew rich.

To imitate these Painters, is all our Party-Writers aim at; whether their Manner be black or white, Satyr, or Panegyrick, no Matter. Their Principle is to lay their Colours on thick, and to be equally in an Ex-

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treme. But I hope, for my own Part, to prove that I am not of this Number. On the contrary, I will endeavour to excel in a much more difficult Way, in Softenings and middle Teints; and yet by these to form a Manner so strong, as shall be sufficient for my own Reputation, and for your Service. To you, who have so fine a Taste in Painting, this Attempt will, I slatter myself, be agreeable, and will secure the Continuance of your Favour to,

Most noble SIR,

Your Honour's

Most devoted Servant,

February 13, 1726-7.

The Occasional Writer.



The first VISION of CAMILICK.

In Hoc Signo vinces.

AVING as yet given the Reader little besides grave Discourses on publick Matters, and foreseeing that, during the Session fion of Parliament, I shall be obliged to continue daily in the same Track, I am willing to take this one Opportunity of presenting him with something, which has no Relation at all to publick Affairs, but is of a Nature purely amusing, and entirely void of Reslec-

tion upon any Person whatsoever.

My Friend Alvarez (a Man not unknown to many here, by his frequent Journies to England) did some Time since make me a Present of a Persian Manuscript, which he met with while he follow'd the Fortunes of Meriwes An exact Translation of the first Chapter has been made, at my Request, by the learn'd Mr. Solomon Negri, and is as follows.

CAMILICK'S VISION.

In the Name of God, ever merciful, and of Haly his Prophet. I flept in the Plains of Bagdad, and I dreamed a Dream. I lifted my Eyes, and I faw a vast Field, pitch'd with the Tents of the mighty, and the strong ones of the Earth in Array of Battle. I observed the Arms and Ensigns of either Host. In the Banners of the one were pictured a Crown and Sceptre; and upon the Shields of the Soldiers were engraven Scourges, Chains, iron Maces, Axes, and all kinds of Instruments of Violence. The Standards of the other bore the Crown and Sceptre also; but the Devices on the Shields were the Balance, the Olive F 2

Wreath, the Plough-Share, and other emblematical Figures of Justice, Peace, Law, and Liberty. Between these two Armies, I saw a King come forth, and fign a large Roll of Parchment; at which loud Shouts of Acclamation were heard from every Quarter. The Roll itself flew up into the Air, and appear'd over their Heads, encompass'd with Rays of Glory. I observed that where ever the second Army moved, this glorious Apparition attended them; or rather the Army feem'd only to move, as That guided or directed. Soon after, I saw both these Hosts engaged, and the whole Face of the Land overspread with Blood. I faw the King, who had fign'd and broken that facred Charter, drink out of a golden Cup, fall into Convulsions, gasp and die.

I then faw another King take his Place; who, in the most folemn Manner, engaged to make the Words contain'd in the Roll the Guide of his Actions; but notwithstanding This, I faw both Armies again encounter. I faw the King a Prisoner. I faw his Son relieve him, and I faw the Chiefs of the other Army put to Death. Yet that victorious Son himself bow'd his Head to the Parchment; which now appear'd with fuller Lustre than before. Several other Battles enfued, with vast Slaughter on both Sides; during which the celestial Volume was fometimes clouded over; but still again exerted its Rays, and after every Cloud appear'd the brighter. I ob-

I observed those Heroes, who fought beneath it, though ever fo unfortunate, not once to abate their Courage, while they had the least Glimpse of that heavenly Apparition in their View; and even Those, whom I saw overthrown, pierced with ghaftly Wounds, and panting in Death, refign'd their Lives in Smiles, and with Eyes cast up to that glorious Object. At last the long Contention ceased. I beheld both Armies unite and move together under the fame Influence. I faw one King twelve Times bow down before the bright Phænomenon; which from thence-forward foread a Light over the whole Land; and, descending nearer to the Earth, the Beams of it grew fo warm as it approach'd, that the Hearts of the Inhabitants leap'd for Joy. The Face of War was no more. The fame Fields, which had fo long been the Scene of Death and Desolation, were now cover'd with golden Harvests. The Hills were cloath'd with Sheep. The Woods fung with Gladness. Plenty laugh'd in the Valleys. Industry, Commerce, and Liberty danced Hand in Hand through the Cities.

While I was delighting myself with this amiable Prospect, the Scene entirely changed. The Fields and Armies vanish'd; and I saw a large and magnificent Hall, resembling the great Divan or Council of the Nation. At the upper End of it, under a Canopy, I beheld the facred Covenant, shining as the Sun. The Nobles of the Land were there assembled.

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bled. They prostrated themselves before it, and they sung an Hymn. Let the Heart of the King be glad; for his People are happy! May the Light of the Covenant be a Lanthorn to the Feet of the Judges; for by This shall they separate Truth from Falshood. O Innocence, rejoice! for by this Light shalt thou walk in Safety; nor shall the Oppressor take hold on thee. O fustice, be exceeding glad! for by this Light all thy Judgments shall be decreed with Wisdom; nor shall any Man say thou hast err'd. Let the Hearts of all the People be glad! for This have their Grandfathers died; in This have their Fathers rejoiced; and in this may their Posterity rejoice evermore!

Then all the Rulers took a folemn Oath to preserve it inviolate and unchanged, and to facrifice their Lives and their Fortunes, rather than suffer themselves or their Children to be

deprived of fo invaluable a Bleffing.

After This, I saw another and larger Assembly come forward into the Hall, and join the first. These paid the same Adorations to the Covenant; took the same Oath; they sung the same Hymn; and added a solemn Form of Imprecation to this Effect. Let the Words of the Roll be for ever in our Eyes, and graven on our Hearts; and accursed be He who layeth Hands on the same. Accursed be He, who shall remove this Writing from the People; or who shall hide the Law thereof from the King. Let that Man be cut off from the

the Earth. Let his Riches be scatter'd as the Dult. Let his Wife be the Wife of the People. Let not bis first-born be rank'd among the Nobies. Let bis Palaces be destroy'd. Let his Gardens be as a Defart, having no Water. Let bis Horses and bis Horsemen be overthrown; and let his Dogs devour their Carcases ! ---- In the midst of these Execrations enter da Man, dress'd in a plain Habit, with a Purie of Gold in his Hand. He threw himfelf forward into the Room, in a bluff, ruffianly Manner. A Smile, or rather a Sneer, fat on his Countenance. His Face was bronzed over with a Glare of Confidence. An arch Malignity leer'd in his Eye. Nothing was fo extraordinary as the Effect of this Person's Appearance. They no sooner saw him, but They all turn'd their Faces from the Canopy, and fell prostrate before him. He trod over their Backs, without any Ceremony, and march'd directly up to the Throne. He open'd his Purse of Gold; which he took out in Handfuls, and scatter'd amongst the Assembly. While the greater Part were engaged in scrambling for these Pieces, he seized, to my inexpressible Surprise, without the least Fear, upon the facred Parchment itself. He rumpled it rudely up, and cramm'd it into his Pocket. Some of the People began to murmur. He threw more Gold, and they were pacified. No fooner was the Parchment taken away, but in an Instant I saw half the august Assembly in Chains. Nothing was F 4 heard

heard through the whole Divan, but the Noise of Fetters, and Clank of Irons. I saw Pontiffs in their ecclefiaftical Habits, and Senators, clad in Ermine, link'd together like the most ignominious Slaves. Terror and Amazement were impress'd on every Countenance, except on That of some few, to whom the Man continued dispersing his Gold. This he did, till his Purse became empty. he dropt it; but then too, in the very fame Moment, he himfelf dropt with it to the Ground. That, and the Date of his Power, at once expired. He funk, and funk for ever. The radiant Volume again role; again shone out, and re-assum'd its Place above the Throne; the Throne, which had been darken'd all this Time, was now fill'd with the Effulgence of the Glory, which darted from it. Every Chain drop'd off in an Instant, Every Face regain'd its former Chearfulness. Heaven and Earth resounded with Liberty! Liberty! and the HEART OF THE KING WAS GLAD WITHIN HIM.

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On LUXURY.

A DISCOURSE on Operas, and the gayer Pleasures of the Town may seem to be too trisling for the important Scene of Affairs, in which we are at present engaged; but I must own my Fears, that they will bear

bear too great a Part in the Success of a WAR to make the Confideration of them foreign to A very little Reflection on History will fuggest this Observation; that every Nation has made either a great or inconfiderable Figure in the World, as it has fallen into Luxury or refisted its Temptations. What People are more distinguish'd than the Persians under Cyrus, nursed up in Virtue, and inured to Labour and Toil? Yet (in the short Space of 220 Years*) they became fo contemptible under Darius, as scarce to give Honour to the Conqueror's Sword. The Spartans, and the Long-Rulers of the World, the Romans speak the same Language; and I wish future History does not furnish more modern Examples.

When the Mind is enervated by Luxury, the Body foon falls an eafy Victim to it; for how is it possible to imagine, that a Man can be capable of the great and generous Sentiments, which Virtue inspires, whose Mind is fill'd with the soft Ideas, and wanton Delicacies that Pleasure must insuse? And were it possible to be warm'd with such Notions, could it ever put them in Execution? For Toils and Fatigues would be Difficulties unsurmountable to a Soul dissolved in Ease. Nor are these the imaginary, speculative Ideas of a Closet; but such as have been the Guide and Policies of the wisest States. Of This we

^{*} Liv. lib. 9. cap 19.

have the most remarkable Instance in Herodotus. "The Perfians, after their great and " extended Conquests, desired Cyrus to give " them Leave to remove out of their own " barren and mountainous Country into one " more bleft by the Indulgence of Providence. " But that great and wise Prince, revolving " the Effect in his Mind, bid them do as they would; telling them, at the fame Time, " that for the future they must not expect to " command, but obey; for Providence had " fo order'd it, that an effeminate Race of " People were the certain Produce of a deli-"cious Country." What Regard the great Historian had to this Opinion, may be easily collected from his referving it for the Conclufion of this excellent Piece. And the Case is directly the same, whether Pleasures are the natural Product of a Country, or adventitious Exoticks. They will have the same Effect, and cause the same extended Ruin. often have they revenged the Captive's Caufe and made the Conqueror's Sword the Instrument of his own undoing? Capua destroy'd the bravest Army, which Italy ever faw, flush'd with Conquest, and commanded by Hannibal. The Moment Capua was taken, that Moment the Walls of Carthage trembled. What was it that destroy'd the Republick of Athens, but the Conduct of Pericles; * who by his pernicious Politicks first

^{*} Plut. in Peric. & Demoft. Orat.

debauch'd the People's Minds with Shews and Festivals, and all the studied Arts of Ease and Luxury; that he might, in the mean Time, fecurely guide the Reins of Empire, and riot in Dominion? He first laid the Foundation of Philip's Power; nor had a Man of Macedon ever thought of enflaving Greece, if Pericles had not first made them Slaves to * That great Statesman Tiberius Pleafure. clearly faw what was the fureft Instrument of arbitrary Power; and therefore refused to have Luxury redress'd, when Application was made to him in the Senate for that Purpose. Artful Princes have frequently introduced it with that very View. Davilla tells us, that in an Interview and Semblance of Treaty with the King of Navar, Catharine of Medicis broke the Prince's Power more with the infidious Gayeties, of her Court, than many Battles before had done. But there is a fingle Paffage in + Herodotus, which will supply the Place of more Quotations. "When Cy-" rus had received an Account that the Ly-" dians had revolted from him, he told " Cræsus, with a good deal of Emotion, that " he had almost determin'd to make them all " Slaves. Cræsus beg'd him to pardon them; " but, fays he, that they may no more rebel, " or be troublesome to you, command them " to lay afide their Arms, to wear long Vefts " and Buskins. Order them to fing and play

^{*} Tac. An. lib. 2, cap. 33. + Herod. lib. 1. cap. 155.

" on the Harp; to drink and debauch; and " you'll foon fee their Spirits broken, and them-" felves changed from Men into Women; " fo that they will no more rebel, or be uneafy to you for the future." And the Event answer'd the Advice. They are puny Politicians, who attack a People's Liberty directly. The Means are dangerous, and the Success precarious. Notions of Liberty are interwoven with our very Being; and the least Sufpicion of its being in Danger fires the Soul with a generous Indignation. But He is the Statesman form'd for Ruin and Destruction, whose wilely Head knows how to disguise the fatal Hook with Baits of Pleasure, which his artful Ambition dispenses with a lavish Hand, and makes himself popular in undoing. Thus are the easy, thoughtless Crowd made the Instruments of their own Slavery; nor do they know the fatal Mine is laid till they feel the goodly Pile come tumbling on their Heads. This is the finish'd Politician; the darling Son of Tacitus and Machiavel.

But, thanks to Providence, the facred Monuments of History extend the short contracted Span of human Life, and give us Years in Books. These point out the glorious Landmarks for our Sasety; and bid us be wise in Time, before Luxury has made too great a Progress among us. Operas and Masquerades, with all the politer Elegancies of a wanton Age, are much less to be regarded for their Expence (great as is it) than for the

Tendency, which they have to deprave our Musick has fomething fo peculiar in it, that it exerts a willing Tyranny over the Mind, and forms the ductil Soul into whatever Shape the Melody directs. Wife Nations have observed its Influence, and have therefore kept it under proper Regulations. The * Spartans, vigilantly provident for the People's Safety, took from the famed Timotheus's Harp the additional Strings, as giving his Musick a Degree of Softness inconsistent with their Discipline. The divine Plato is expresly of Opinion, that the Mufick of a Country cannot be changed, and the publick Laws remain unaffected. Heroes will be Heroes, even in their Musick. Soft and wanton are the warbled Songs of + Paris; but Achilles fings the godlike Deeds of Heroes. A noble, manly Musick will place Virtue in its most beautiful Light, and be the most engaging Incentive to it. A well wrought Story, attended with its prevailing Charms, will transport the Soul out of itself; fire it with glorious Emulation; and lift the Man into an Hero; but the foft Italian Musick relaxes and unnerves the Soul, and finks it into Weakness; so that while we receive their Musick, we at the same Time are adopting their Man-

^{*} Cicero, lib. 2. de leg. cap. 39. † Hor. lib. 1. Od. 15.

— Grataque feminis, Imbelli cithara, carmina divides. ‡ Hom. Iliad, 9. 189.

ners. The Effects of it will appear in the strongest Light from the Fate of the People of Sybaris; a Town in Italy, strong and wealthy; bless'd with all the Goods of Fortune, and skill'd in all the Arts of Luxury and Ease; which they carry'd to so great an Excess, that their very Horses were taught to move and form themselves as the Musick directed. Their constant Enemies, the People of Crotona, observing This, brought a great Number of Harps and Pipes into the Field, and when the Battle began, the Mufick play'd; upon which these well-bred Horses immediately began to dance; which fo disconcerted the whole Army, that 300,000 were kill'd, and the whole People deftroy'd. Though this Story feems a little fabutous, yet it contains at least a very good Moral. - What Effect Italian Musick might have on our polite Warriors at Gibraltar, I cannot take upon me to fay; but I wish our Luxury at home ma y not influence our Courage abroad.



An ANSWER to the * London Journal of Saturday, December 21, 1723.

HE Family of the Publicola are furely very numerous. I pretend to no

^{*} This Paper was supposed to be then under the Direction of Benjamin Lord Bishop of ** * * * *

Aequaintance with them, and I defire none. Far be it from me therefore to affign to any one of the Fraternity his particular Lucubration. I do not prefume to fay, for Instance, that such a Piece was writ by BEN, or such a one by ROBIN; but I can plainly distinguish in their Productions, a Difference of Style and Character. In some, I feel myself lull'd by a regular, mild, and frequently languid Harrangue; such as often descends upon as from the Pulpit. In others, I observe a crude, incoherent, rough, inaccurate, but sometimes sprightly Declamation; well enough fitted for popular Assemblies, where the Majority is already convinc'd.

The Publicola of the 7th of December quite jaded me. I handled the numb Fish, till I fancy'd a Torpor seiz'd my Imagination; and perhaps you may think, that I am hardly yet recover'd from the Consequences of that Accident. However, I shall venture to play a little with the Publicola of this Day; for I think I can go through an Answer to his Paper. He returns the Ball at least, and keeps

up the Game.

Before I come to This, give me Leave to

premise a Word or two more.

As different as the *Publicola* are in other Things, in one they are all alike. They are fcurrilous and impatient. They call Names, and grow angry at a Sneer. Raleigh laid down his Pen rather than continue such a Bear-Garden Contest. I took it up and an-

fwer'd

they must not expect so much Complaisance from me any more. The Matters we enter upon are serious, and by me they shall be treated seriously and calmly. I shall consider the Dignity of the Cause I plead for; the Cause of Truth; the Cause of my Country; and I shall look down with Contempt on the Invectives and Menaces, which they may throw out; and by which they will suit their Style, with great Propriety, to their Subject.

- But let us come to the Point.

The Publicola, of this Day, fets out with stating, in an half Light, a Question, which hath been much debated in the World. No Man that I know of (no reasonabale Man I am fure) did ever find Fault that we avoided a War. Our national Circumstances are fo well known, they are fo feverely felt, that Ministers, who maintain'd Peace, and procured to their Country the Bleffings of Peace, Quiet, Improvement of Trade, Diminution of Taxes, Decrease of Debts, would be almost the Objects of publick Adoration. But the Exception taken to our Conduct hath been This; that we provoked a War first, and shew'd a Fear of it afterwards. People recall the Passages of three Years past. They wish we had practised greater Caution at that Time; but then the same People very confistently wish that we had exerted greater If the Honour and Interest of Vicour fince. his late Majesty, and of the British Nation,

fay they, were so severely wounded by the publick or private Treaties of Vienna, that it was fit to keep no longer any Measures, even fuch as have been thought of Decency, with the Emperor and the King of Spain: why this Fear of disobliging them? Why this long Forbearance under all the Infults offer'd to us by the Spaniards? If we were in a Condition, by our own Strength, and by our Alliance with France, to enter, with a Prospect of Success, into an immediate War; why, again; have we chosen to defer it, under fo many Provocations to begin it? Why have we endured some of the worst Consequences of a War, without taking those Advantages, which acting offensively would undeniably have procured to us? But if all This was quite otherwise, continue the same political Reasoners; if the Honour and Interest of his late Majesty, and of the British Nation, were not fo severely wounded; if we were, neither by our own Strength, nor by the Alliance of France, in a Condition to risque a War; nay more, if Things were so unfortunately jumbled, that perhaps this War would have been more to our own Detriment than to That of our Enemies, (as the Publicolæ have more than once infinuated in their Papers) what could we mean, three Years ago, when Matters were carry'd to greater and harsher Extremities, than it is possible to find any Example of, amongst civilized Nations, since the Quarrels of Charles the Vth, and Francis

Francis the Ist? If our principal Ally would have been dangerous to our Interests, in the Operations of a War, and is indifferent to them in the Negotiations of Peace, (for this hath been infinuated too from the same Quarter) what a Treaty was that, which procured us this Ally? What Assurances were those, which made us depend upon him? The Difficulty of these Dilemmas cannot, I think, be solved; and Those, who attempt it, deceive themselves, whilst they mean to deceive the

People.

But we are told that we went into a War, as far as the Reason of Things would give us Leave. It feems then that the Reason of Things would neither give us Leave to protect our Trade, nor to make Reprizals, when our Merchants were plunder'd. If these Words are to pass for any Thing more than empty Sound, it will follow either that Publicola is capable of affirming the groffest Untruth in a Paper, address'd to the People of England; or that our Situation is worse than the least fanguine of our Friends ever thought it, or the most malicious of our Enemies ever represented it. Very bad indeed must it be if the Reason of Things obliged us to bear from the Spaniards, at this low Ebb of their maritime Power, what would not have been borne when their proud Armada cover'd the Seas; what would hardly have been borne, even in the Reign of King James the First. But,

But, God be praised! this is not our Case; and therefore Publicola must be content to lie under the Imputation, which he hath drawn on himself by the Boldness of his Affertions.

He is frequently guilty of this Fault; and the Words, which immediately follow those I have quoted, afford a strong Instance of it. We did not, fays he, take the Galleons and bring them home; but we block'd them up; which as compleatly answer'd the true End and Design of sending that Fleet, as the actual taking of them. The Design was to keep the Money out of their Hands, (the Spaniards) and so disable them to carry on the Project of the Treaty of Vienna. Very well. Matter is brought to a short Issue. The Blockade of the Galleons is over. Our Fleet is come back from the West-Indies. The Galleons are either come or coming. The Spamiards therefore are, according to Publicola, no longer disabled from carrying on the Project of the Vienna Treaty. I alk then, have they abandon'd, have they renounced these Projects? If our Fleet block'd up the Galleons till this was done, he is in the Right. This answer'd the Design of sending it. If they should, after this, break their Faith, and renounce the most sacred Obligations, none but they are to be complain'd of.

Publicola would have us believe, indeed, that they have renounced these Projects; that they have granted us the main Things in

G 2 Dispute;

Dispute; and that the Congress is only to fettle other Affairs of les Importance; but this I deny; and he shall be obliged to confess either that he advances, here again, a bold Untruth; or that he reckons our keeping Gibraltar not amongst the main Things in Distute, but amongst those of less Importance. Let him shew me, if he can, in the Preliminaries, a particular and express Confirmation of our Right to this Place, made by the Spaniards. I will undertake to shew him the general Words, by which the Spaniards will pretend in the Congress, as it is notorious they do every where and on all Occasions, that they have still a Right to demand the Restitution of Gibraltrr, and that this Right is to be discuss'd in the Congress.

I know it hath been faid more than once, in a very publick Place, and in a very folemn Manner, that Gibraitar should not be even mention'd at the Congress; but it would be impertinent to lay any Stress on the Assurances of a Person, who hath presumed to give so many groundless ones already; and who either hath been banter'd most egregiously himself, or hath made no Scruple of bantering his

Country.

Here then is one main Point of our Interests, to mention no more, still unsettled; not because the Spaniards have flown off from any Agreement they had come to with us about it; but because it was never settled;

and yet the Galleons are left at Liberty to come home.

If afferting our Right to Gibraltar, and fome other Things, which were founded so high by an Acquaintance of yours, Mr. Publicola, (the Author of the Enquiry) had no Share in the Ends, which were proposed by sending our Fleet to the West-Indies, such strange incomprehensible Ends may, for aught I know, have been compleatly answer'd; but if these Points, so essential to Great-Britain, were any of the main Things in Dispute; if they were any of the Ends proposed by what is called distressing the Spaniards; then is it false to affert that these Ends have been compleatly answer'd.

When we consider what Numbers of able and useful Subjects his Majesty hath lost in the Expedition to the West-Indies; and that we are, at least, as far off from a Settlement of Interests with Spain now, as we were before that Expedition was undertaken, it is impossible not to feel great and unaffected Concern.

If it be ask'd, what was to be done? I shall answer that, perhaps, it little becomes a private Man to determine such great Questions; but I will proceed to shew that all, which Publicola advances against taking the Galleons, is trifling.

First then, if Blocking up the Galleons in the Spanish Ports was of such Consequence, Taking them would have been a more effectively.

tual Measure to all the same Purposes.

G 3 Secondly,

Secondly, if we had taken them (as it is certain that Mr. Hosier could have done with Ease, and with all their Treasure on Board, immediately on his first Arrival) we should have had a Chance the more for taking the Flota too; which stole away to Europe, whilst our Squadron lay rotting before Portobello.

Thirdly, if we had taken this Treasure, we should have had in our Hands a sufficient Security for indemnisying our Merchants; who have been the only Sufferers, by the Depredations of the Spaniards; whilst the French and Dutch have sail'd securely; and to one Body of whom (I mean the South-Sea Company) the King of Spain owes, for former Seizures, unjustly made, as much perhaps as his Proportion in the Treasure of the Galleons amounts to.

Fourthly, to have taken the Galleons would not have been liable to the same Inconveniencies, as we have severely selt by pursuing another Measure. The Expedition would have been soon over. The Expence of Lives and Treasure would have been infinitely less. It would have cost little or nothing to have kept the Spaniards out of their Money by a Seizure, as long as the true Reason of Things should have required it; whereas it hath cost us more than all that Money is worth, to keep them out of it by a Blockade only for a Time; and for a Time, which hath not been sufficient to secure us against their Designs,

or to make them lay afide their Pretenfions. But if we had taken them (fays Publicola) we should have taken the Money of other People, as well as of the Spaniards. We should have been Pyrates. Let us fee how this hangs together. If we had restored immediately to the Proprietors their respective Shares, as he supposes we must have done, the Brand of Pyracy would not have stuck upon us. But suppose we had ' thought fit not to restore their Shares to the Spaniards, till our Differences with the Court of Madrid had been fettled; should we have been Pyrates in that Case? He will be laugh'd at, who affirms it. Would the King of Spain's Share in this Treasure have been no Loss to him? Would he not have mis'd the extravagant Indulto, which he is now going to receive on this immense Treasure? Should we have been Pyrates for punishing, in this Manner, a Prince, who actually befieged one of our Fortresses; who actually detain'd the Ships and seized the Estates of our Merchants; and whose Subjects every Day kill'd, robb'd and plunder'd the Subjects of Great Britain?

But I go a Step farther; for if we stop with Publicola, it will be always short of the Mark; and we shall never exhaust the Subject, as I desire to do, because I desire to find the Truth, and to be sure that I find it. What hath been said hitherto, hath been said on the Supposition of a Seizure only; and I hope the Scruples of Publicola's timorous Conscience are appealed. I hope he hath sound out, by this Time, that

G 4 fucl

fuch a Seizure might have been carry'd on without Pyracy. But suppose it had been a Capture, not a Seizure; fuch a Capture as can never be made but in Time of open War; fuch a Capture as intitles the Captors, by our Laws, to the whole Profit of the Prize. Why then we had commenced a War against Spain by this Action; as Spain had done long before against us by a thousand Hostilities. Why then Vice-Admiral Hofier, and the Officers and Seamen of his Squadron, had been in the same Case as Sir Charles Wager, and the Officers and Seamen of his Squadron were in the last War; and I do not remember that these gallant Men were ever prosecuted as Pyrates at home; or reputed fuch abroad; or obliged to refund any Part of the Treasure they had taken.

Upon the whole Matter, Publicola's Argument proves nothing in the prefent Case; or it proves that even when we are at War with Spain, we must not presume to attack these facred Galleons. Other Nations are always interested in them, as well as the Spaniards. It will therefore be always unlawful, according to this excellent Casuist, to make Prize of them; and he is defied to diffinguish himself

out of this Abfurdity.

Having now gone through what Mr. Publicola calls, I know not why the Subject in general, we will examine the fecond Part of his Epistle. I pass over all the Billing sgate, with which he ushers in this Part; though I

could

could make myself and you too very merry, if I would apply his Criticisms on what Raleigh says, concerning one Promise, to the Interpretation, which was given to another Promise; by which we might have learn'd, amongst many other curious Distinctions, the Difference between a direct Promise and a Promise ministerially worded; but I shall leave him to his Phrenzy, and proceed soberly to shew you that he says nothing, or that, which is worse than nothing, in every Line of this Performance; in which he seems to triumph

with fuch vaft Complacency.

The Point he labours is to shew that the Promise made by the Lord Stanbope to restore Gibraltar, which hath not been comply'd with; and the Destruction of the Spanish Fleet on the Coast of Sicily, threw the Court of Madrid into the Arms of the Emperor, and were the true Root and real Caufe of all that thorough Hatred and deep Malice shewn in the Treaty of Vienna; and by Confequence that all our present Difficulties with Spain proceed from hence; from Causes laid many Years ago; and when the present Ministers were not in Power. My Bufiness shall not be to blame or to excuse any Ministers; but to make a true Deduction of Facts; and to reason clearly and justly upon them; and I charitably hope, that I may bring Publicola to do fo in Time; if for no other Reason, at least by obliging him to take Shame to himfelf fo often; for though I am not fo bloodyminded

minded as Publicola, who talks as if he had Heads in his Power, yet I affure him that I will not let him alone whilft, amongst other Enormities, he makes it his Business to bury Truth and common Sense under such weekly

Heaps of Rubbish.

I shall shew immediately that in whatever Terms or Manner we suppose Lord Stanhope to have made a Promise of restoring Gibraltar to the Spaniards, it will be of no Avail to Publicola's Purpose. But since he hath told us what he hath heard, and Raleigh hath told us what he hath heard (for neither of them can pretend to speak on their own Knowledge, concerning this Affair) I will likewise take Leave to state what I have been inform'd of, upon better Authority than what my Adversary hath often writ upon in his affirmative Style.

I have been inform'd then that Lord Stanhope had been induced, or seduced (call it which you please) by the late Regent of France to make an Overture of this kind at the Court of Madrid. Lord Stanhope, says our Author, might think that Gibraltar was to be honestly given up for valuable Considerations. He might so; and he was so honest a Man, so sincere a Lover of his Country, that if he had thought in another Manner, no Consideration of private Interest, no Regard to the Service of a Ministry, could have prevail'd on him to make, nor even to entertain the Motion. But have a Care of your Insinuations. tions, Mr. Publicola; and learn to make them with a little more Delicacy. The Case is vastly different now. The Sense of our august Monarch is known. The Sense of the whole Nation hath been loudly proclaim'd; and I believe no Minister, how presuming soever, will venture, at this Time, to say that Gibraltar may be honourably or advantageously given up; and therefore no virtuous Minister will think he can honestly give it up; or conspire in Measures, which may create the Appearance of a Necessity so to do.--- But to

return to my Narration.

If fuch an Overture was made by Lord Stanbope, it was made to prevail on the Court of Spain to defift from the Enterprize they had then in hand; an Enterprize, which we should have been obliged to prevent, if the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance had never been made, by Virtue of our Guaranty to the Neutrality of Italy. That this Overture was not received is evident; fince the Spaniards went on with their Expedition, which ended in the Destruction of their Fleet. Now call This an Overture, as I do; or call it a Promise as Publicola will affect to do; it was vacated to all Intents and Purposes by the Spaniards, who refused to comply with the Condition, on which it was and only could be grounded.

It hath been faid by some, that this Promise was renew'd afterwards, to pacify the Spaniards for the Loss of their Ships, and for their Defeat in Sicily; but this deserves Explanation;

planation; and will not stand in the Light, which those, who urge it, defired it should.

It is, I believe, true that the French, who first induced us to make this Overture, would on the Pretences just now mentioned, and on the Pretence of the Hopes, which the Regent had continued to give the Spaniards, have obliged us to acknowledge this vacated Promise as a subsisting Obligation; but I have been inform'd that this was refused statly to the Minister sent over hither upon that Occasion, and to the Regent himself by our Minister abroad. The Promise then continued vacated; and we were as much disentangled from the Snares, which our good Allies laid for us, as if no such Promise or Overture had been ever made.

But farther. If a *Promife* of this kind had been made on our Part, even after the Expedition to *Sicily*, which there is no Colour to affirm, yet that *Promife* must likewise have been void, since it was made so, to all Intents and Purposes, by the King of *Spain's Acces-*

fion to the * Quadruple Alliance.

That all Possessions are mutually confirm'd by that Treaty, except such as are specify'd in it, cannot be deny'd. The Possession of Gibraltar was therefore again confirm'd to us by the King of Spain, when he acceded to that Treaty; unless he can shew that our Possession of it was excepted; or can produce any private Article or Declaration, which

made a Refervation of his Right to this Place, notwithstanding the Cessation of it made at Utrecht. But nothing of This can be shewn; and it hath been said, I believe, truly that a contrary Declaration was made solemnly and publickly by the British Minister in Holland, at the very Time when the Accession was

fign'd.

Thus far then the Way is clear before us. When we came Mediators to the Congress of Cambray (for such we were at that Place, though we have the Missortune to find ourselves principally and almost solely concern'd in the Disputes to be settled at Soissons) the King of Spain had no Right, nor Pretence of Right to demand of Great Britain the Restitution of Gibraltar. Indeed, if he had then such a Pretence; if a Promise, on our Part, to restore this Place to him, which Promise we resuled to execute, had then subsisted, how could we have accepted of our Mediation.

Ay, but (fays this poor hunted Author, who doubles and shifts and works and tries, at any Rate to save himself) Lord Stanbope, according to Raleigh's own Confession, was first in this Affair, and laid the Foundation of this Expectation in the Spaniards.— 'Tis plain the Spaniards had such Assurances. It is allow'd you, at least for Argument sake, that Lord Stanbope was first in this Affair. The Spaniards had such Assurances. Make your most of it. These Assurances were discharged. These Promises were released:

released; and whatever Lord Stanhope can be supposed to have done or said about Gibraltar hath no more Relation to the present Dispute, than what was done or said about Gibraltar in the Time of King Rodrigue and the Count Julian; so that our Author is building up a Right for the Spaniards upon Foundations, which were demolished as soon as laid. He is building up a Right, or he is building up nothing; for to talk, as he does, of Expectations, in Cases of this Nature, without establishing a Right, real or plausible, is too frivolous to deferve an Answer.

Let me illustrate this by a familiar Instance; for Things cannot be made too plain to him. I will suppose him a Clergyman. will suppose that by Merit, of some kind or other, he gets a Promise of a Bishoprick. After this he does fomething, inconfiftent with fuch a Promotion. He forfeits all Title. He renounces all Pretentions to it. Shall his Advocate be admitted to infift that, notwithstanding all this, he expects to be a Bishop fill; and, instead of grounding his Expectations on his Right, ground his Right on his Expectations? No certainly; fuch an Advocate would be his'd out of Court, and would deserve at least to have his Gown pull'd over his Ears.

But the Spaniards are not so chimerical. They ground their Expectations, and what they call their Right, on a new Engagement taken by us, as they say, fince all the Transactions,

actions, mentioned above, were over; on a private Article, in a Treaty made with them in 1721, stipulating the Contents of a Letter to be written by the late King; and on the Letter, written in pursuance of this Article, the Original of which they offer to produce; and which they pretend to be a positive Engagement to restore Gibraltar to them.

With what Front now could Publicela affirm, that what Raleigh fays about the Letter is nothing to his Purpose; unless this mysterious Letter had been wrote before this same kind of a verbal Promise was made? ----If this mysterious or ministerial Letter had been writ before Lord Stanhope's Promise was made, it would have been nothing to Raleigh's Purpose; because his Purpose was to shew that the Demand, which the Spaniards now make of Gibraltar, cannot be made on any other Thing, which pass'd in Stanbope's Time; but it was extremely to his Purpose to shew that this Letter was writ after Lord Stanbope's Death. Had Publicola taken upon him to ridicule the plainest and easiest Demonstration in Euclid, he could not have render'd himself more ridiculous than he does on this Occasion.

I am at a Loss what Words to use. I have debarr'd myself from using bard ones; and none but the bardest are equal to what this Writer deserves. Let him pass then without any Animadversion from me. Let the Reader pronounce Sentence upon him.

To fum up the whole on this Head. Publicola was to prove that my Lord Stanhope's Promise to restore Gibraltar is one of the Reasons of the present Obstinacy of the Spaniards, and by Consequence of our present Difficulties. Now it is notorious that in Fact the Spaniards ground their Demand on something, which pass'd whilst he was alive. Publicola fays it never appear'd that the present Ministry came into Such Assurances. means the Assurances given by my Lord Stanbope, and long ago made null, he is most certainly in the Right, for a very obvious Reason. But if he means the Assurances still infifted upon, I have nothing to fay but this. These Assurances, or what the Spaniards call by that Name, were given in the Year of our Lord 1721.

The fecond Reason assign'd by this profound Politician, for the Obstinacy of the Spaniards, is the Resentment, which hath lain at their Hearts, ever since we destroy'd their Fleet. Here are no Proofs offer'd, nor can there be any, which are direct; because the Assertion relates to what passes, and hath pass'd these many Years, in the Hearts of the King, Queen and Ministers of Spain. It is a Fact, which we are to take on the bare Word of this Author, or to reject. I make no Scruple of rejecting it, because the probable Reasons against it seem to me of much greater Weight than his single Authority in any Case, and especially in a Case of this Nature. The

Spaniards were certainly not very well pleafed with us for destroying their Fleet. But doth it follow from hence that the Refentment, which they conceived upon this Occasion, operates thus strongly still? How often were the French beaten by us in the last War? Were not whole Squadrons of their Ships deftroy'd? How many of their Armies were defeated? How many of their Towns were taken? Notwithstanding which, we see with Pleasure, the most perfect Harmony, the most intimate Friendship, subsist between their Court and ours; even from the Time, when their Difgraces were recent, and when their Refentments against us must have run the highest, if it was true that Resentment, and not the Ragione di Stato (as the Italians call it) govern'd the Conduct of Princes. But the Spaniards are more vindicative than the French. This may be faid perhaps by People, who are apt to support one Affirmation by another, and to call That Proof. But then how came it to pass that the Spaniards were so soon reconciled to the French, and enter'd into such close Alliances with them immediately after the Campaign of 1718? If the British Arms beat the Spanish Fleet, the French Arms took the Spanish Towns at the same Time. near Relation and the antient Friendship between the two Courts of France and Spain, it may be faid again, render'd their Reconciliation easy. But this would be to suppose what is quite contrary to the natural Courfe

of human Passions. According to that, the Court of Spain must have been infinitely more piqued against their own Family, for joining in Opposition to them with the Emperor, who had been fo long their common Enemy, than against the Court of Britain, who had not the same Ties to them, and who acted for an old Ally. This is natural and probable. Nay, when we confider how many Marks of the utmost Resentment were shewn at that Time by the Spanish to the French Court; how many Intrigues the former carry'd on to subvert the Government, and to raise a Rebellion in France; I think we may justify affirming that this is true in Fact. And yet how foon was all this forgot at Madrid? How toon was the Reunion of the two Courts brought about in the closest Manner, and cemented by Marriages?

The King and Queen of Spain might look on the Proceedings of the French, in this Affair, as a political Quarrel and a national Wrong; but they look'd on an Affair, which happen'd a few Years afterwards, as a perfonal Injury and Affront. I mean the fending back the Infanta in so abrupt, so unprepared a Manner, without any softening, and with so many aggravating Circumstances. Never Resentment run higher, nor was express'd in Terms of greater Passion, than that of the Court of Madrid upon this Occasion; and yet one or two Sacrifices, a little Address, and a little Management pacify'd all; united the

two Courts again; and restored to the French, in a short Time, such an Insluence in Spain, that it is marvellous we, who depend so much upon it, should not yet have found the least Effect from it in our Favour.

I have dwelt upon these Observations, in order to shew to what poor Expedients those Writers are reduced, who attribute the prefent Obstinacy of the Spaniards, to the beating their Fleet above nine Years ago. it is strange that the Cardinal de Fleury should have been able, in leven or eight Months Time, to re-establish a good Correspondence and Friendship between the two Courts of France and Spain, after so great and so sensible an Affront as Philip and his Queen thought was put upon them by his Predeceffor in the Ministry; and that our Ministers should not be able, in the Course of as many Years, to atone for what their Predecessors did; nor to pacify the Resentment of the Spaniards, for their Loss of the Fleet in an Action, which they might have avoided; and which they render'd, in some Sort, unavoidable to us. It is impossible to believe that such an Incident should produce these Effects; which feem to strengthen, rather than to grow weaker, the farther they are removed from this supposed Cause of them. There must be something more recent than this Anger at a Lofs, long fince fustained and repair'd too, as I believe. Perhaps we may begin to make fome Discovery of this kind, when we examine H 2

the next Article; to which I shall proceed as soon as I have made a few Reflections more on this Head, which Publicola most prudently suggests to me, and which will be of wonderful Service to his Cause.

Nor does the Quadruple Alliance (fays he: but he must mean the King of Spain's Accesfion to this Alliance) being after the Promise (that is, Lord Stanbepe's Promife or Overture, concerning Gibraltar) prove the Spaniards had given up their Expectations founded on that Promife; but only that they were not, at that Time, in proper Circumstances to infift upon it. I have shewn how filly it is to talk of Expectations, without any Right to expect; and how the Right of the Spaniards to Gibraltar, acquired by Lord Stanbope's Promife, or Overture, either real or supposed, was extinguish'd before the Year 1721. But I agree that if they had then had even a real Right, they must have submitted to give it up, as they did at that Time, because of the Circumstances, into which they were fallen. me ask Mr. Publicola what reduced them to thefe Circumstances? He must answer, it was beating their Fleet. They had been as obstinate before that Time, as it is possible for them to be now. Alberoni talk'd at least as high as the Marquis de la Paz. But they grew complying as foon as this Hostility was commit-Might not the taking their Galleons have had the fame Effect lately? Would not our incomparable Ministers, who run up and down

down the World negotiating and making Treaties, with fo much Credit to themselves, and fo much Honour and Advantage to the Nation, have done better (I fpeak it with due Submission to their approved Wisdom) to imitate, than to blame the Conduct of their Predecessors? From 1721, to 1725, we heard of nothing but the bappy and flourishing State of our Affairs. This must have been owing, according to Publicola, to the Circumstances the Spaniards were in; and therefore this must have been owing to the Defeat, which they received in the Mediterranean. How came we to hear, from the very same Persons, that all our Difficulties and the Distresses we are in at present ought to be dated before the Year 1721? Surely, to be in a flourishing State, a Nation must be in a fecure State; and how could that be true, if, during the four Years I have mention'd, a powerful Neighbour meditated Revenge, and only waited an Opportunity of striking home? How could it be declared, even from the Throne, that * nothing more than the Forms of a Congress were wanting to establish the publick Tranquility, if the grand Quarrel between us and Spain did, in Effect, sublist at that Time?

There are People so very regardless of Truth, and so very indifferent to the Shame H 3 of

^{*} See the King's Speech at the Opening of the Session

of being convicted of Falshood, that they never confider, when they affirm a Fact, any Thing more than the present Expediency. Strange, almost incredible Instances of this might be quoted. I pass them over in Silence for many Reasons; and, amongst others, for this Reason, that some of them are too recent to be forgot. I stick to the Point before me; and shall conclude it by observing that when Publicola affigns all the Difficulties, which we have labour'd under, fince the Year 1725, to what pass'd before the Year 1721, he is confuted not only by the Reasons I have urg'd, which feem to me unanswerable, but likewife by an Authority, which every Man wil allow to be decifive.

The next Article to be confider'd is this, Raleigh, who was not fatisfy'd with Publicola's Way of accounting for our prefent Difficulties, and for the close Alliance between the Emperor and Spain, had ascribed both to our Refusal of the sole Mediation at Cambray. He is accused of maliciously concealing the Truth, and of imputing that to ill Management, extraordinary Refinement and great Tenderness, which was the Result of true Reason. Now I think I can demonstrate that Publicola is ignorant of the Truth; or that he conceals it, I will not say corruptly, but unfairly.

That the Treaty of Vienna was actually and in Form sign'd, before it could be so much as known at Vienna that we had refused the sole

fole Mediation, I might grant in one Sense, and for the fake of Argument; (though I do not believe that the Fact is just as he states it) and yet I might fafely deny the fame Thing in the only Sense, in which this Fact can be of the least Use to our Author. I can grant that this Treaty might be fign'd in Form at Vienna, before it could be known there, in Form, that we had refused the sole Mediation; before the Couriers from Cambray to London, from London to Paris, from Paris to Madrid, from Madrid to Vienna could perform their Journies, and the feveral Courts could hold their Councils and make their Dispatches. But the certain Knowledge of our refusing this Mediation might very well arrive at Vienna before the Treaty was fign'd; nay, the Treaty might be fign'd upon this Knowledge, by Virtue of Instructions given with this Contingency specify'd in them. I say this might be the Case; and therefore to affirm this Fact; in the Terms Publicola affirms it, is nothing to the Purpose. What Raleigh advanced may still be true.

That full Powers were given by Spain to carry on the Treaty of Vienna four Months before this Offer of the Mediation, is most certainly true; and therefore there is as much Reason to be astonish'd that early Measures were not taken to prevent it, as there is that other Measures, than what we have seen pursued, were not taken to prevent the Effects of such a Treaty. Could it be an absolute H 4 Secret

Secret to our Ministers, (who ought to be well inform'd; fince they have had fuch immense Sums for secret Service, as were never heard of before their Time) that Spain was negotiating at Vienna, during these four Months? Could it be a Secret to them that, from the Death of the Duke of Orleans, and about a Year, at least, before this Treaty was concluded, the Spanish Ministers were full of Fears and Jealousies about the compleating the Infanta's Marriage with the King of France? If these Things, which were not quite unknown to most private Persons, who observed the Course of publick Events, and who fought Information about them, did not escape the Intelligence of our Ministers, how could a Confideration of the Circumstances, which the Court of Spain was in at that Period, escape their Sagacity?

From the Time of the Accession of the King of Spain to the Quadruple Alliance, the whole Management of the Court of Madrid had been left to the Duke of Orleans and his Cardinal du Bois; and if we were drawn into the Treaty made at Madrid in 1721, by this Prince and his Minister, as I verily believe we were; it is easy to see who was thank'd for this by the Spaniards, and how watchful France hath constantly been to seize and improve every Occasion of rendering our Title to Gibraltar disputable, and of wresting this important Place out of our Hands. We came then into the Congress of Cambray joint Mediators

diators with the French, between the Emperor and the King of Spain, but not with equal Advantage; not with an equal Share in the Confidence of one of the Parties; and with our Share in the Confidence of the other, perhaps, a little diminish'd; for it is not unlikely that the private Treaty, made at Madrid with the King of Spain, whilst we were Mediators at Cambray between him and the Emperor, might give Umbrage at least to the latter. I know not whether this Step did not even occasion some Complaint, though not in Form perhaps, from the Imperial Mini-

Aers.

In this State of Things, and in this Dispofition of all Parties, what could it be imagined that the Spaniards should turn themselves to. on the Forefight of a Rupture of all Intimacy. and even Correspondence with France? Could they resolve to leave themselves without any Ally with fo many Enemies, and with their Interests still unadjusted? Could they resolve to run the Risque, in this Condition, of falling back into a State of War, when they were about to purchase Peace at a Price, which they thought fo dear? Could they refolve to abandon themselves intirely to Great-Britain, who had hitherto shewn so much Partiality to the Emperor, still their Enemy, and whose principal Intercourse with them had been managed hitherto by France, to whom they expected foon to become Enemics? Certainly they could not refolve upon this,

this, even as I have stated the Case; much less could they do so, if they had such an inveterate Rancour at Heart, as Publicola re-What then could our Ministers presents. imagine the Spaniards should do upon a Forefight of the Infanta's being fent back, and by Consequence of breaking with France? I will venture to fay, for it is plain and evident, that if they thought any Thing on this Affair, they must think the very Thing, which the Spaniards did. The Spaniards began to treat at Vienna, that they might prepare for the worst; and they delay'd concluding their Treaty, till what they fear'd happen'd. Give me Leave to add, that it was easy to see that, whenever the Ministers of Philip and the Imperialists should come to examine their Master's Interest together, they would soon find these Interests not so hard to reconcile, nor their Want of Mediators fo great, as they had imagined, whilft Rivalship and Pique kept them at a Distance; and that there were Men of great Weight in the Emperor's Court, whose private Interest must render them particularly zealous to promote this Union. this happen'd; and it affords a pregnant Instance of what I said above, that Reason of State will determine the Conduct of Princes; not old stale, Resentments.

From what hath been thus stated I desire to make some Inferences, and to recommend

them to Publicola's Confideration.

First then. It appears more ridiculous than ever to talk of the Promise of Gibraltar, and the Loss of their Fleet as lying at the Hearts of the Spaniards, and breaking out upon this Occasion. Neither must it be said absolutely, that our resusing the sole Mediation at Cambray threw Spain into the Arms of the Emperor. In what Respect this Step might contribute to it, will be said presently. But the principal, and determining Cause of Spain's uniting so closely with the Emperor, was the sending back the Infanta.

Secondly. However sudden the immediate Resolution for the Departure of this Princess from France might be; yet this Design had been long in Agitation; so long, that the Suspicion of it had been entertain'd by the Spaniards, and was even publickly own'd by their Ministers very many Months before they sent their full Power, for carrying on a Treaty

at Vienna.

Thirdly. There was furely, in the whole Progress of this Affair, Notice enough to alarm any reasonable Men; and Time enough to prepare for the Consequences of a Breach between France and Spain. During the Life of the Duke of Orleans, he had, and it could not well be otherwise, the chief Credit of Madrid. But it was obvious enough that, by sending back the Infanta, his Successor would surnish us with a fair Opportunity of attempting at least to get between France and Spain, as France had stood between Spain

and us, and of maintaining ourselves in that Post. This indeed was an Object of the utmost Importance; which deserved more than all our Negotiations have cost us; and which it is not impossible might have been accomplish'd for less. Whenever it shall appear that we took all the Measures, in our Power, in a proper Manner, and at a proper Time, for this great End, infinite Honour will accrue to our Ministers without Dispute.

Fourthly. If we had been as much prepared, as one would think we might in so many Months have been, we should have had some great Advantages, which, if we were unprepared for these Events, and even surprized at them, it was impossible we should reap.

The fole Mediation could not indeed have been sooner offer'd than it was; because it could not be offer'd till Spain had broke with France, and then it was offer'd to us. Nay, if it had been offer'd fooner, I agree that we could not have accepted it fooner, for Reafons of Policy and even of Decency. But if we had been prepared for these Events, we might have struck a great Stroke, as the Generality of the World thought, and continue to think, by accepting the Mediation in Form, as foon as it was offer'd. In the Cafe supposed of pretaratory Measures taken by us, on a Forefight of such a Conjuncture, it is probable that Spain would not have been extravagant enough to precipitate fo bad a Bargain as she made for herself in the Vienna Treaty. Having

no Mediator nor even Ally, she was under a Necessity of granting almost any Terms to the Emperor, provided she secured the main Points, which she had in View. But, sure of our Support, and she might have had Asfurances sufficient for her to depend upon, it is impossible to think she would have carry'd her Concessions farther than she needed to have done. In this Case, none of those Engagements (which were talk'd of, but which have never yet appear'd) so injurious to Britain could have been taken; and we might have had perhaps the Satisfaction of feeing the Peace of Europe confummated by the Reconciliation of two Princes; the Adjustment of whose Interests had been so long our Care: and whose Union is, without Doubt, in general, and unless some particular Circumstances of a very extraordinary Nature hinder it, the common Advantage of all those, who defire to see a Ballance of Power preserved in the Western World. But I go farther. I will suppose that we had not been able to soften Spain; or that we had not attempted it, which perhaps was the Case; that Spain look'd on us with a jealous, and even a revengeful Eye; and in short that the Mediation was offer'd to us without any Defign that we should concern ourselves in it, and purely for Form fake; yet furely, even in this Cafe, fome Advantages might have been taken by our immediate Acceptance of it. Our Conduct, at least, would have been free from

would have been left without any Colour of Excuse. Might not such a Step have retarded the Conclusion of this famous *Treaty?* Might not Time have been gain'd; and would not the least Time, in this Case, have been of the

greatest Moment to us.

When the Mediation was offer'd Fifthly. us, we could not know how foon the Treaty would be fign'd. It cannot be pretended that we did. Our Refusal of it therefore must have been grounded purely on these two Confiderations (so often urged in Defence of this Measure) that the Spaniards were our inveterate Enemies, and that we were in Alliance with the French. What is meant by being in Alliance with the French, and making this a Distinction between our Relation to them and our Relation to the Spaniards, I am at a Loss to find. We were furely in Alliance with one Nation, as well as the other, from the Moment the King of Spain acceeded to the Quadruple Alliance, and the Matters still unsettled at Cambray were folely relative to him and to the Emperor. If it be meant that we thought the French our Friends, and knew that the Spaniards waited only for a pretended Occasion to break out into Enmity with us, I think this Reason will prove the very contrary of what it is advanced to prove. Did we expect that fomething contrary to our Interest, something dangerous to us, was working up in the Negotiation of Vienna; and and did we for this very Reason decline an Opportunity of coming at fome Knowledge of what was in Agitation there? Did we, for this very Reason, refuse the best Means we could have hoped for, of keeping up our ancient Friendship with the Imperial Court, and of being in a Condition to check the Court of Spain? Such Arguments as these will not pass; and whoever produces them, hath too mean an Opinion of the rest of Mankind, and too prefumptuous an Opinion of his own Sufficiency. On the Part of France, no Objection could have been made to us, if we had accepted this Mediation; for either the Points to be mediated upon were pure Trifles; fuch as the Titles, and other Matters of as little Weight, refer'd to the Congress of Cambray : in which Case our accepting the sole Mediation must have been quite indifferent to the French; or these Points were of Moment to the general Interest; and in this Case the French ought to have defired that we should continue in the Mediation, for the fame Reasons, which ought to have determined us to do fo. Friendship and Confidence between us and the French was not fo strict as it hath been reprefented, they did not deserve the Compliment we made them. If this Friendship and Confidence were so strict, they might and they would have trusted us with Pleasure. Every one knows how concern'd and alarm'd the French were at the Resentment, which the King of Spain shew'd on this Occasion. Their first Care was to try all possible Means of pacifying him. If we could have been one of these Means, their Obligations to, and their Considence in us must have increased. We might have treated for them, when they could not treat for themselves. Instead of this, by Dint of Management, we so disposed Affairs, that the French in a short Time treated for us with the Emperor and the King of Spain, with whom we could not treat for ourselves.

The last Inference I shall make, from all that hath been faid, is this. As fending back the Infanta, was the certain and immediate Cause of throwing Spain into the Arms of the Emperor; so our Refusal of the sole Mediation may justly be deem'd an accessory Cause This Refusal might give Occasion to carry the Engagements of these two Princes farther than it was for our Interest that they should do. At least, our Acceptance of it was the fole, probable Measure, in that Inflant, of preventing such Engagements; for this Union of the Emperor and the King of Spain is not, in itself, so terrible. Spain might be as well, nay better for us and for all Europe, in the Arms of the Emperor than of France; and if this Union is become formidable to us, we may thank for it our own Management, through a long Series of Business, and through divers Revolutions of Affairs; our too much Neglect of Spain; our too much Dependence on France; our being, upon all, Occasions, indefatigably busy about the Interefts

terests of other People, and leaving to other People the Conduct of our own; of which furely a more strange Example cannot be imagined than that, which is before our Eyes. We would not attempt, nay we would not consent to be Mediators, when we stood in that Character, and could stand in no other, notwithstanding all the Reasons for it in that nice Conjuncture. Such was our Delicacy. But we have admitted and (may I be allow'd to fay fo?) we have courted France to act as Mediator, where she is a Party; for France is a Party to the Treaty of Hanover; and the Treaty of Hanover, with the Treaty of Vienna, give Occasion jointly to the Congress of Soiflons, and all the present Negotiations.

That France is a Party in our Quarrel, we have been often told; and that she would act as such, we have been often assured. She was to make besieging Gibraltar a Casus Faderis. She was to march an Army into Rousillon. What was she not to do? — But we have seen her act hitherto no Part but that of a Mediator; a common Friend; but unconcern'd in the Quarrel. No good Effect hath yet appear'd, even from her Offices as Mediator. If, by these Offices, she hath kept us from acting for curselves, and made us prefer a precarious Dependence to a vigorous War, I am sure the Effect of her acting in this Cha-

racter hath been a bad one for Britain.

Nothing can be more plain than that Chain of Causes and Effects, which hath drag'd

us into our present Difficulties; and as these Difficulties increased, the Obstinacy of Spain must of Course increase likewise. It that Court had never thought of getting Gibraltar out of our Hands, the State we brought ourselves into was fufficient to fuggest the Defign to When once Spain had purchased the Emperor's Alliance, (I may use this Expresfion; the Treaty of Vienna will justify it) the might flatter herself that he would adhere to her, even in unreasonable Expectations; fince he had no more to expect from us, and had fo much to receive from ber. As foon as we had fagely declined having to do with her, or for her, unless in Concert with France, with whom she would have nothing to do at that Time, France employ'd all poffible Means to be reconciled to her. Intrigues of every Sort, ecclefiastical and secular, were fet on Foot. They succeeded; and Spain faw she had nothing to apprehend. What she had to hope, I determine not, from this Party to the Hansver Treaty. The other Princes and States, who acceded to this Treaty, acceded in fuch a Manner, as it is easy to prove (if Publicola should think fit to deny it) that we could have little to hope and Spain little to apprehend from their Engagements, in her Disputes with us about our immediate Interells.

All other Powers foften'd towards each other by Degrees; and by Degrees WE got deeper into the Quarrel. Spain, from hav-

ing no Ally, came to have many; fome more, fome less to be depended on; none to be fear'd. From having a Multitude of Disputes, she came to have none, except with us. We, on the other Hand, from having none of our Interests in Dispute, are come to see hardly any other in Controversy. From feeling ourselves back'd by feveral Allies, we are come, at least in the Points of direct Relation to us, to have in Effect no Ally but one; and with that one we own that we are dissatisfy'd; nay we own that we are afraid of him. Writer, I am answering, infinuates both; nay, he does it almost in express Words. He complains of the Indifference of France in support of our Interests; and of the Danger of engaging in a War, in Concert with France. Who would have thought it, Mr. D'Anvers? Here is the London Journal contradicting the Enquiry; and I am able to point out to you many gross Instances of his doing the fame Thing. Here is Publicola accounting for our present Difficulties, now they are come upon us, by the very Arguments, which were urged against the Hanover Treaty, and which proved that the natural Confequence of that Treaty was just what the Event hath shewn it to be. Those, who wrote against the Enquiry, foretold what would happen. Publicola justifies the Ministry, by complaining that it hath happen'd!

I will mention but one Instance more of this kind; and that shall be with Relation to

the Oftend Company. The grand Quarrely fays Publicola, was between Us and Spain. The Oftend Trade, about which fuch a Noise both been made, was more the Concern of our Neighbours, both by Treaty and Interest, than our own. - Now I will leave the World to decide by WHOM all this Noise about the Oftend Trade kath been made. Did not you, Mr. D' Anvers, and feveral other Writers, maintain that this Company was of but little Concern to us, in Opposition to the whole Party, on the contrary Side, who took all poffible Pains, both within Doors and without, to prove that the Oftend Trade was a Point of the utmost Concern to Britain, and even equal to Gibraltar itself? Nay the Author of the Enquiry (who hath now the Mortification to fee himself given up, in every material Article, by both Parties; even by Those, who fet him to work) goes fo far, p. 57. of that memorable Performance, as to affert that Gibraltar would be of no Importance to us, if the Oftend Company should be suffer'd to subfift; and having labour'd that Point, with all his Strength, for no less than twenty Pages together, concludes it thus; that not only our own East and West-India Trade, and that of the Dutch, will be ruin'd by the Oftend Company, which will be the immediate Effect of it (or rather is for already in some Degree) but also that the Contagion will spread to many other Branches of the British and Dutch Trade; and convey along with it the Riches, the Strength,

Strength, and the naval Power to the same

Spanish Netherlands.

But were it so that Holland alone would be the Sufferer by the Oftend Trade; (which is far from being the Case;) yet the Ruin of Holland must carry along with it, in the End, the Ruin of Britain.

Such Absurdities as these would provoke Merriment in a Case of less Consequence; but they provoke Indignation in a Case, where the Honour and Interest of our King and

Country are fo deeply concern'd.

Into this State were our fereign Affairs brought, when his present Majesty came to the Crown. I mention this the rather, because they, who now think it for their Interest to date the Rife of all this Mitchief fo much backwarder than it can confistently with truth be dated, may possibly find it for their Interest hereaster, if new and almost unavoidable Difficulties should come upon us, in Confequence of what they have done in a FORMER REIGN, to date the Rife of them as much too forward. Let it then be remember'd that all, which hath happen'd in THIS REIGN, is no more than a Prolongation of the same Scene. The great Scenes of the World are not to be thifted at our Pleafure. They must be continued sometimes, when we are convinced the most that they are weakly framed. Opportunities must be waited for, and we trust they will happen. We are fure they will be improved by the Capacity

Capacity, the Vigour, the Experience and Valour of our august Monarch. A feasonable and powerful Effort hath often broke through the most complicated Evils. A Word hath often effected what the most tedious Negotiations, such as we have been accustom'd to,

could never have brought about.

I have now done with Mr. Publicola for this Time; and I hope for good and all. If my Letter is grown into a greater Length than I defign'd, this hath been owing principally to an earnest Defire of setting these Matters (so often and so grossly misrepresented) in a just and clear Light. I have advanced no Facts, but fuch as are of publick Notoriety; fuch as I know to be true; and fuch as I do verily believe to be fo, upon fuch Grounds as reasonable Men have always thought sufficient to constitute, in Cases of this Nature, the highest Probability. I have endeavour'd to push no Consequence, nor to strain any Argument farther than I judged it would evidently bear; for whatever Publicola may think, which concerns me little, I affure you, Mr.D'Anvers, that I would not have given myfelf this Trouble, small as it is, of answering him for any other Reason but this; that, in order to get well out of our present Difficulties and Dangers, it is necessary to know truly how we came into them; and that he therefore, who contributes to difpel from before the Eyes of Mankind those Mists of Error, which are so industriously raised at this Time, doe

does fome Service to his King and his Country.

I am, SIR, &c.

JOHN TROT

<u>COCOCOCOCOCO</u>

REMARKS on a late Pampblet, intitled, Observations on the Conduct of GREAT-BRITAIN, &c. In a Letter to CALEB D'ANVERS, Esq;

Written in the Year, 1729.

HE late Pamphlet, intitled, Observations on the Conduct of Great-Britain, &c. being chiefly defign'd as an Answer to my first Letter on the pretended Project of a Truce, it may be thought incumbent on me to justify what I have written; for though this Piece (which consists of nothing but Inconsistencies, Contradictions, Prevarications, and downright Falshoods) is already sunk into that Contempt, which it deserves; yet when a private Person launches into Politicks, it is his Duty to pay some Regard to an Adversary, who produces the least Marks of Authority, however mean and despicable his Personmance may be thought.

The Shortness of Time will, I hope, excuse any little Inaccuracies of Stile, or trivial

Mistakes,

Mistakes, that I may happen to fall into through the Course of these Remarks, which every Body will perceive required Haste.

I shall pass over all his little Sophistry on the Freedom of Writing, as well as his dirty Imputations of Libelling, Disaffection and ill Designs against the Government (those trite, worn-out Topicks of every wretched Scribbler against you for above these two Years past) and come directly to the Points, upon which the whole Stress of his Arguments, such as they are, depends.

The first Objection, which he undertakes to confute, is the supposed Inactivity of our Squadrons, and the Depredations committed by the Spaniards upon our Merchants in the West-

Indies.

In order to do this, he hath given us, what he calls, the *Instructions* to Admiral *Hosier*, and the other Commanders of our Squadrons in those Parts.

- I shall not enquire from whom he received these Lights; though it seems very extraordinary that a little, obscure Pampkleteer should be favour'd with Papers of such a private Nature, as have been sometimes resused, even

upon Applications in Parliament.

Neither will I offer to dispute whether these Instructions are genuine and authentick; tho' there are several Things in them, which have a suspicious Aspect. By the first Orders, given to Admiral Hoser, it looks as if those, who sent him, did not understand the Service they

they fent him upon; for they direct him to block up the Flota and Galleons in the Port of Carthagena; which is indeed a proper Port to look for the Galleons in; but the Flota was never there, fince the Spaniards traded to that Country. By the fecond Instructions, they seem to be sensible of their Mistake, by giving him distinct Orders to take Care of the Flota; which make it probable that, at first, they took the Flota and Galleons to be the same Fleet, and did not know that one came from Peru, and the other from Mexico.

Neither can I find out the Reason for preferring the Galleons, in these Instructions, to the Flota; for if keeping the Spanish Treasure from going home was the Intent of that Expedition, the Flota was as material an Attention as the Galleons, having as much Money aboard them; and both might have been intercepted, had our Fleet been rightly station'd at first, viz. in the Bay of Matanzas in the Island of Cuba, where they might have stay'd much more conveniently than at the Bastimentos.

Indeed stopping the Flota is made the next Point to stopping the Galleons; but considering the Port, from whence it comes, and the Course it steers, it was almost impossible that a Squadron, lying at the Bastimentos, should intercept them, or gain any Intelligence of them.

In another Part of these Orders, Admiral Hosser is instructed to Persuade the Spaniards

niards to let him take them; which I confess looks, at first Sight, somewhat romantick and ridiculous.

These Particulars, I say, might render the whole liable to Suspicion; but though I could not help taking some Notice of them, I would not be thought to infer from bence the Imposfibility of their being authentick, for though I have a very bad Opinion of the Pamphleteer, I cannot think that he would dare to impose upon the World in a Matter of fuch Confequence; but fince it was thought necessary to give the Publick some Satisfaction in this Affair, I could wish he had favour'd us with ALL these Instructions at Length and entire, (for this does not appear to be the Case) that we might have been able to form a true Judgment, upon a View of the Whole, which cannot be fo well done by Scraps and Extracts.

However, it appears from these Orders themselves (as he hath thought sit to publish them) that stopping the Galleons was to be their chief Care; and that they were not to risque the Success of it upon any Account. I will therefore leave it to the Judgment of Mankind, whether any prudent Officer, under such a strict and particular Injunction, would run the least Hazard of failing in that main Point, by endeavouring to protect our Merchants. It is certain, at least, that the Spaniards did, and do still continue their Outrages with very little Molestation, and with-

without any confiderable Reprifals made on our Parts. Nay, the Commanders of our Squadrons were fo far from giving any Affiftance to our Merchants in those Seas, that it is well known the Exigencies of the publick Service obliged them to make such an Impress on their Ships (to supply the great Loss and Destruction of the Men, on board our Squadrons) as render'd them unable to perform their Voyages.

His reasoning therefore, on this Head, is reduced to one of these Points; either sirst, that the naval Force, sent to those Parts, was not sufficient to perform such different Services; or secondly, that our Admiral and Commanders did apprehend themselves to be confined or embarrass'd by some Cautions and Limitations; or thirdly, that they either neglected, or did not understand their Duty; which would be such a Resection upon the Skill, Courage and Integrity of those excellent Officers, as will not easily pass upon the World.

The Pampbleteer hath produced Part of one Letter from Admiral Hosier; in which he gives an Account, contrary to the general Opinion here till this Time, that the Spaniards had disembark'd their Treasure, and sent it back to Panama, before he arrived at the Basimentos; upon which this Writer observes, that he could not have taken any Thing but empty Hulks; and then seems to think himself very smart in asking, whether such a Pledge

Pleage would have had much Influence on the Counsels of Spain? To which I reply, first, that this is nothing to the Purpose, because it is plain, that the Admiral had no Power to feize the Galleons, in case they had not been unloaded; fo that his Arrival could have no other Effect, than that of their own Advice-Boat, to make them fecure their Treasure. Secondly, I do not think it would have been fuch bad Policy to have taken even the empty Hulks, or burnt them in the Port, (fo that the Spaniards could have made no farther Use of them) and to have fail'd immediately to Vera Cruz, and feiz'd the Flota, instead of lying fo long to watch empty Hulks, till our own Ships became rotten, and almost empty Hulks themselves.

I could wish, for the farther Information and Satisfaction of the Publick, that the Pamphleteer had found it convenient to give us the Sight of Admiral Hosser's Letters; for no doubt he must have sent several, during his long and disastrous Continuance on that Station; from whence perhaps we might have had some farther Light into this Affair, or collected at least what his Opinion was of the Nature of his Instructions, and the Conduct of that Expedition. However, it is well known in what Manner he express'd himself upon several Occasions, both at Jamaica, and in Letters to his Friends in England.

I am ready to subscribe, with the greatest Pleasure and Sincerity, to all the Enconiums, which

which this Writer makes on Sir Charles Wager; whom I know to be a Gentleman of the most amiable Character both in publick and private Life. I am confident that no Difficulties or Dangers could deter him from doing his Duty; that no Temptations could prevail upon him to betray his Truft; and that he did not want the greatest Skill and Abilities to execute it. I have the fame good Opinion of Sir John Jennings, and other Commanders, who were fent upon those Services; and when the Pamphleteer was in his panegyrical Strain, I could wish that he had done justice to their Characters; and likewife paid some small Tribute of Gratitude to the Memory of those brave Officers, who had the Misfortune to perish (I was going to fay, were facrificed) in the Service of their Country. --- But they are dead, and have it not now in their Power to justify themselves, or to accuse others.

But to return --- I do not find by the Orders given to Sir Charles Wager, the 22d of December 1726, that he was impower'd to intercept any Ships with Stores, Ammunition, or Provisions bound for the Spanish Camp, then in Sight of Gibraltar, in order to besiege it; nor instructed, even by the soft Endeavours of Persuasion, or otherwise to get them or their Cargo into his Possession, to disable them from beginning Hostilities; notwithstanding the same Orders directed him to reinforce the Garrison of Gibraltar, which

was then going to be befieged, by sending the Land Forces then on board Admiral Hopson's Squadron, and, in case of Need, to give all the Relief and Assistance he was able to the said Garrison; though I have been credibly inform'd the Spaniards were permitted to pass by our Squadron, even under the Stern of the Admiral, and safely landed Stores, Provisions, Ammunition and other Necessaries for the

Siege of that Place.

If this be true, as I am affured it is, I should be glad to know for what Reason his Instructions ran in that soft Strain; or why so much Complaisance was shewn to the Spaniards, upon the Occasion of such an undisguised Defign against that important Fortress. I am the more desirous to know this, because I am sure it could not proceed from any want of Vigilance or Zeal in that brave and excellent Officer, who is a Man of too established a Character to suffer in any Body's Opinion, by the oblique and ungenerous Insinuation of this Writer, after all his Compliments, that he was not attended with his former good Fortune.

The Pamphleteer having thus refuted the Objections against the Jupposed Inactivity of our Squadrons, by producing some Parts of the Instructions to the Commanders of them; and shewn, as he tells us, that the Losses of our Merchants have not been owing to any Want of that Care, which the Government ought always to take for the Protection of our Trade;

he proceeds in the next Place, to give us fome Account of those Captures, which he says are not near so considerable as they have been represented; and having prefaced this Part likewise with a great many angry Reslections, he produces a List of twenty-six Ships, which he would have us to believe to be All, that we have really lost. — His Address in cooking

up this Account is very remarkable.

1. We are told this is an exact List of all fuch Ships as have been taken by the Spamiards in the West-Indies, fince the Conclufion of the Treaty of Hanover. But why should be confine it thus to Place and Time? I mention'd indeed, only three Years past, by Reason of the Frequency of the Captures during that Time; but if I had undertaken to give the Publick an Account of all our Losses, I should certainly have begun my Account a great deal farther back; much less should I have limited it to the West-Indies; fince I presume that Ships taken in the Ocean and other Seas, are as much Losses to our Merchants as those taken in America, and that they have the same Right to expect Reparation for them.

2. This is a List of such Captures only, as have been, at any Time, convey'd to the Know-ledge of the Government, either by the immediate Complaints of the Merchants concern'd in those Captures; their Representations to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations; or the Account transmitted by his Majesty's Ministers

nifters and Confuls abroad, which is what I suppose he means by the most authentick Testimonies. But is it to be inferr'd from hence, as he feems to do, that no more Losses have been fustain'd than what have been thus formally complain'd of? I grant, indeed, that no Merchant can expect Reparation, who does not give in the Particulars of his Losses; but it is well known that many of these Sufferers did not do this; which might proceed from different Causes. Several Merchants, who reside in our Plantations and Settlements abroad, might not have Opportunity to transmit the Particulars of their Losses, and authorize their Agents to make a regular Complaint; for, if I am not mifinform'd, fome Complaints were actually brought in, after the Account was closed, and therefore not inferted in it. Others might neglect to do it, by despairing of Success; and thinking, perhaps, that the Prospect of Reparation would not answer the Trouble of complaining.

The Publick, I believe, will soon see a true Account of our Losses, by the Depredations of the Spaniards, both in the West-Indies and in other Seas, from a proper Period of Time; which will more fully shew the Fallacy of this partial List, which ought to be resented with the utmost Indignation, as an Insult on the Missortunes and Calamities of the British

Merchants.

I am told that the Pamphleteer had a Defign to oblige us likewise, in this Piece, with a countera Counter-List of those Ships, which we have taken from the Spaniards, during the late Disturbances; and that this was actually printed, but afterwards cancell'd and suppress'd. I am forry to hear that any Motives could induce so impartial a Writer to rob us of this Catalogue, which was not only very proper, but would no Doubt give great Satisfaction to the Publick.

The only Objection, fays the Pamphleteer, that remains to be answer'd upon this Point of the Spanish Depredations, is with Regard to Letters of Marque and Reprifal; by which the Traders might have been authorized to make themselves Reparation. He acknowledges that the Merchants, in the Situation we were then in, with Regard to Spain, had a Right, both by our own Law and that of Nations, to demand fuch Letters. He then proceeds to justify the Ministry (which I hope wants no Justification) by shewing that such Letters were not refused. Those are his Words. But how does he shew it? Why, he gives us two Instances of Owners of Ships, who did apply for them, upon an Order publish'd in the Gazette, and were actually refused; and does not produce one Instance of any Man whatsoever, to whom they were granted.

He tells us indeed, by Way of Apology for this Refusal, that the preliminary Treaty having been for some Time negotiating at Paris, his late Majesty thought proper to defer issuing these

these Commissions, till be should see the Success of that Negotiation. He adds, that the preliminary Articles were fign'd at Paris, the 20th of May, and that Draughts of Instructions to the Lords of the Admiralty for granting Letters of Marque, were fign'd by his late Majesty after the 21st of April. As therefore the preliminary Treaty had been some Time negotiating at Paris, the Question is whether it was not actually negotiating at the Time, when this Order was publish'd in the Gazette; and if it was, why was the Order publish'd at all; fince it could only tend to putting the Merchants upon equipping Ships for this Service (as I am told feveral did at Bristol) to no purpose, and at a great Expence.

This therefore is fuch a fushification of the Ministry, as I am sure you, Mr. D'Anvers,

would be afraid to publish.

He proceeds, in the last Place, to expose the Clamour, that hath been raised against the Negotiations at Soissons, and the Project of Accommodation, which hath caused so much

Difquiet.

I confess it gives me some Pleasure to find that I was right in my Conjecture, that if any such Project was really in Agitation, it would not bear the Name of a Truce; for lo! it is not call'd a Truce; it is a provisional Treaty; though, for my Part; I am not able to discover any Difference between them, unless it be in the Sound; for a provisional Treaty does

not feem to imply, any more than a Truce, a final Determination of all the Differences, which is so much wanted, but only a Suspen-

fion of them for a Time.

The preliminary Treaty was, properly speaking, a provisional Treaty, as it was to provide for something farther at the Congress; but that the Negotiations at this Assembly should end in a provisional Treaty only, is not what we had Reason to expect from the Assu-

rances so often given us.

I cannot forbear observing, in this Place, the various Denominations, under which this Treaty hath pass'd. At first, we were promifed a full, formal and establish'd Peace; but soon after the Conclusion of the last Session, it was call'd, in the foreign Prints, a Pacification; and after that an Idea of a Pacification; then it was a Truce, and bore that Name in all Papers, foreign and domestick, for several Months together; at last, according to this Writer, it is neither a Peace, nor a Pacification, nor an Idea of a Pacification, nor a Truce, but a provisional Treaty.

Well! if a *Peace* could not be obtain'd, and a *Truce* would not go down; e'en let it be a *provisional Treaty*; or what else they please. I scorn to insist upon *Names* with these Gentlemen; but will examine the *Treaty* itself, as it is given us by the *Pampb*-

leteer.

It is somewhat strange that a Writer, who takes upon himself such an Air of Authority, should condescend to borrow his Materials from the Post-Bey; and more strange, that he should charge me with affecting to call this Treaty a Truce; when he cannot be ignorant that the Post-Boy, from which he quotes the Articles, as well as the Dutch Prints, from whence the Post-Boy translated them, and all Papers, for at least two Months before I wrote my first Letter, call'd it constantly by that Name.

When I first undertook this Examination of the pretended Project of a Truce, I treated it as chimerical, or the Invention of ill designing Men, and argued from the Defects of the Articles, that I could not believe them to be genuine. What therefore could induce this Writer to affirm, that we have not so much as pretended to shew that this Project is deficient, in not providing for all those Points, that have been the Subject of the late Disputes between Great-Britain and foreign Powers; when the whole Tenor of that Letter was to prove the Defects of it, by a very circumstantial Induction of Particulars?-----But in this he not only advances a Falshood, but contradicts himfelf, as fuch Writers are apt to do; for in the very Page before this Affertion, that we have not so much as pretended to shew that this Projest is deficient, he tells us, that he shall make some Observations on the Objections, which thefe Writers have made to it.

Neither

Neither can it furely be forgot, that the Author of the British Journal represented this Project, and these very Articles, in the fame Manner, as chimerical, and charged me with trumping them up, in order to afperfe the Ministers with odious Designs. He call'd them besides unintelligible Projects, dark Things, and ill meant Reports, which bear no Sign of Credibility, and do not deferve the Name of Intelligence; fo that when thefe Articles had been given up, in this Manner, by a Writer (who, I was inform'd, had Access to a Person in Authority) it would have been ridiculous to enter into a farther Detail of the Defects of them. ---- But now (according to the usual Inconfishency of these Men, and their defultory Method of Reasoning) we are to unbelieve every Thing, which we were taught to believe about fix Weeks ago. These unintelligible Projects, which it was Faction at that Time even to mention, are now acknowledged to be really genuine; the whole Success of our Negotiations is put upon them; and they are made the Basis of our future Settlement .---- Some farther Obfervations therefore are now become fe fonable and requisite.

He tells us that, by this Treaty, we obtain the plainest and most direct Acknowledgment and Consirmation of our Right to all our Possessent those, which had been disputed, in Opposition to preceding Treaties. But in what Man-

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ner is this Acknowledgment and Confirmation obtain'd? The Pamphleteer proves it thus. By the fecond Article, the Treaties of Utrecht, Rastad and Baden, the Treaty of the Hague in 1717, together with the Quadruple Alliance, and All the Treaties and Conventions, antecedent to 1725, the preliminary Articles, and the Convention sign'd at the Pardo, are made the Basis and Foundation of the present Treaty; and being expressly consirm'd by it, without any Restriction of Time, whatever hath been stipulated in our Favour, in any of those Treaties and Conventions, receives a new and perpetual Sanction by this. ----- Upon which I observe.

porary Treaty, which I take a provisional Treaty to be, can give a perpetual Sanction to

any Thing.

2. Can a Treaty be properly call'd perpetual (though not expressly limited to any Time) or be said to give a perpetual Sanction, which does not finally adjust one Point in Dispute, but leaves them to the Determination of Commissioners, and consequently subject to suture Debates?

3. Supposing this Treaty leaves us upon the Foot of former Treaties; is it not well known that the Sense of some of these Treaties hath been disputed; and may they not be disputed again, and occasion the same Disturbances?

I will instance only in the Case of Gibraltar. As the second Article of this Treaty is

to the very same Effect as the second Article of the preliminary Treaty; (both of which relate to our Possessions in general; for Gibraltar is not particularly mention'd in either) I cannot see how we are better secured against the Pretentions of Spain to this Place, than we were by the preliminary Articles; and is it not notorious that the Spaniards have infifted, and do yet infift, that their Pretenfions, founded upon a Promise under the Hand of his late Majesty, in the Year 1721, are confirm'd by the faid Preliminaries? As they infift therefore to have this pretended Promife clear'd and adjusted in the Congress in their Favour; fo, as we maintain, on the other hand, that thefe Pretensions to Gibraltar, however founded, are given up by this fecond Article, it is equally incumbent upon us to infift that the Preliminaries should be so explain'd in our Favour, as to exclude all Doubts and Questions upon them for the future; for as this is the most important Point with Relation to Great-Britain, it is reasonable that it should be secured to us, in this Treaty, by a particular Article to explain it; as some other Things of less Consequence have been, which feem to require no Explanation, and are as fully and clearly provided for, in the fecond Article of this Treaty.

It must be farther observed, says the Pamphleteer, that by this Article, and by the third and sifth, we are effectually secured from all the dangerous Engagements, contained in the

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publick

ublick and private Treaties of Vienna.----Those dangerous Engagements were, as he

tells us.

1. That the trading Subjects of the Empefor should be treated in the Dominions of Spain MORE FAVOURABLY than those of Great-Britain. But this appears to be false from the Treaty itself, which mentions only that they should be treated as the most favour'd Nations, which other Treaties provide for us, who are to be always look'd upon as Gens amicissima; and confequently whatever Privileges the Emperor, or any other Prince, may obtain for their Subjects, from his Catholick Majesty, must be conceded to us, at the same Time, by Virtue of those former Treaties. But how are we now fecured from the dangerous Engagements of the Vienna Treaty, unless by a Declaration of his Catholick Majesty, that he never understood to grant, by the faid Treaty of Vienna, any Privilege contrary to the Treaties confirm'd with us, nor to give to the Subjects of his Imperial Majesty any greater Advantages than those, enjoy'd by any other Nations? This is no more than what both the Courts of Vienna and Madrid have from the Beginning declared. Yet as this hath been a labour'd Point, and strenuously afferted by us, as well in Parliament as elfewhere, and made the Basis of the Hanover Treaty, as of the utmost Importance to this Kingdom; a Declaration only, in this Case, can be of no more Force and Virtue than it hath hitherto been,

been, whilst the Vienna Treaty subsists in every Part, as much as it did the first Day it was made.

2. That the Emperor, in case his good Offices were ineffectual, would assist his Catholick Majesty to recover Gibraltar by Force.—
This likewise does not appear by the Treaty; nor did his Imperial Majesty, as far as I ever heard, give the Spaniards the least Assistance, when they actually besieged that Fortress.

Emperor in carrying on the Oftend Trade, which is to be suspended by this Treaty. It must be own'd indeed, that the Dutch are extremely happy, if this Provision content them, in having such Advocates, or rather Champions, to support their Quarrels; whilst our Fleets and Armies, at the Expence of our Treasure, and the Lives of so many brave Men, have procured them these Concessions, and they remain unactive in all Parts, reaping the Benefit of our Quarrels, and driving on the Trade of the whole World; and are at the same Time courted, to say no more, to espouse their own Interest.

And here it must be repeated, that though it has been disputed whether the Ostend Charter is an Infraction of former Treaties; yet since it is made a Point, and insisted upon to be prejudicial to our Commerce, and we are bound by Treaties to support the Dutch in these Pretensions; it might seem perhaps absolutely necessary to have this Affair finally

adjusted,

adjusted, so as never to break out again; or at least to be revived in any short Time; by which Europe may be engaged in the like Quarrel; in which England must bear the greatest Part, if she is not made the only Principal; and therefore it is not so absurd to expect that the Emperor should put an End to this Dispute by revoking his Charter.

But it is pretty extraordinary that, confidering the great Interest we have in this Asfair, (as it is affirm'd) and the *Point* we have made of it, there should be no Notice taken of us, in the Article, which provides for its Suspension, nor so much as a Compliment made to us for our generous Interposition.

4. And lastly (pray observe him!) our Apprehensions were, that there might be Engagements in Favour of the Pretender .----Alas! how do the Observations fall short of that Spirit, which appear'd in the Enquiry? There we see the Author rouzing up the Nation to a just Resentment of those dangerous Engagements in Favour of the Pretender. We fee him affirming, with the greatest Confidence, that soon after the Publication of the Vienna Treaties of Peace and Commerce, they had positive Intelligence, and Intelligence from more than one Person, and such as could be intirely depended on, that one express Article of this Alliance between the Emperor and Spain contain'd an Obligation in Favour of the Pretender. We have not his Authority for it only, but the Assurance of a certain Gentle.

Gentleman in Parliament that he knew, and was absolutely convinced of the Truth of this. We had the Addresses of the whole Kingdom justly inflamed on this Occasion. We had his Excellency Mr. Isaac Lebeup's vigorous Remonstrances at the Diet of Ratisbon, in the very Teeth of the Emperor, concurring in and affirming the fame Charge. Nay, we had still much greater Authority, even Authority from the Throne; for did not his late Majesty declare that * he had certain and undoubted Intelligence that it was refolved to attempt an Invafion of these Kingdoms, in Consequence of a secret Article to this Purpose? And, was not the Imperial Minister order'd to depart the Kingdom, in a very abrupt Manner, for denying any fuch Engagement or Design in his Master's Name? And after all these repeated Assurances, after all these extraordinary Steps, are we fallen so low as to acknowledge that we had Apprehenfions only that there might be fuch Engagements? - If this Scribbler takes upon him to advance Facts of less Consequence, he may depart from them (as he generally does when Expedient's are wanting) without hurting any Body; but in Affairs of this high Nature he ought not to meddle, let who will be his Instructor, without good Grounds and fufficient Authority.

^{*} Vide his Speech at the Opening of the Seffion in 1727.

For my Part, I was always willing to believe (for the Honour of his late Majesty and the British Nation, as well as out of Regard to those, who drew, or advised, or approved that Speech) that he had fomething more than bare Apprehensions to justify us in such Declarations and extraordinary Proceedings; for the Honour of the Crown is a Thing of a very facred Nature, and ought not to be trifled with on any Occasion, or made an In-Arument to serve ministerial Purposes.

King James the First observes very justly (in a Speech to his Parliament, in the first Year of his Reign; which is, perhaps, the best he ever made) that Speeches from the Throne should be plain and fincere. By Sincerity, fays he, I mean that Uprightness and Honesty, which ought to be in a King's whole Speeches and Actions; that as far as a King is, in Honour, above his Subjects, so far should be strive, in Sincerity, to be above them all; and that his Tongue should be the true Messenger of his Heart.

Yet this King, at the latter End of his Reign, was drawn in by Buckingham to make a false Representation of the Spanish Affair to his Parliament; which had its Effect fo far, as to make Buckingham a little popular for the present, at his Majesty's Expence; but as foon as the People found themselves imposed upon, they gave no Credit to the Affertions and Assurances of this lying Minister any

more.

Nay, we have a much later and more remarkable Instance of the Effect of any supposed Endeavours to prostitute the Honour of the Crown; for it cannot be forgot that a certain Gentleman thought sit to make it an Article of Impeachment against the late Earl of Oxford, that he had corrupted the sacred Fountain of Truth, and put Falshoods into the Mouth of Majesty, in order to obtain the Sanction of Parliament to his traiterous Proceedings.

I hope this Digression, upon so important a Point, will not be thought unseasonable. But I now return to the provisional Treaty.

If it is really true, that the Emperor and the King of Spain did enter into all, or any of these dangerous Engagements, I could wish to see them formally renounced and annihilated; for I still think that a solemn Cassation of the Treaties of Vienna would secure these our most important Interests more effectually than is done by the fore-mention'd Articles, that leave them upon the precarious Foot of former Treaties, which we have already found ineffectual to these Ends.

For, when different Interpretations have been put upon the same Treaties by different Powers; when Objections have been started on both Sides; when contrary Claims and Pretentions have been made, and embroil'd Europe for several Years; what other effectual Method can be used to secure us against the like Disputes and Disturbances for the su-

ture, than finally to adjust the Sense of such Treaties, and confirm the respective Rights, Privileges and Possessions of the Powers concern'd in the plainest, most direct and explicite Manner?

And if the Powers, with whom we are concren'd, do really understand these Articles in the same Sense, which the Pamphleteer hath put upon them, why should they resuse to make us easy by a particular Explanation? Or, if they do actually resuse this, is there any Room to doubt that they have some Reasons for preferring dark and ambiguous Terms?

But it may be objected, says the Pamphleteer, that I have mispent my Time and Labour, in endeavouring to silence the Clamours which have been raised against that particular Form of a Peace, which hath been the Object of our late Negotiations, since it does not appear that the King of Spain is disposed to accept even of these Terms. Why truly that is a very material Objection, and may arise perhaps from a determined Resolution of his Catholick Majesty not to come to any Terms with us, after what hath pass'd, without obtaining his favourite Ends.

He tells us indeed but two Lines before, in his usual self-contradicting Stile, that none of the Powers concerned have hitherto given just Cause to conclude that they will reject it. Now, methinks, where there is an apparent Disposition not to accept it, there is some Cause to con-

clude

Reasons there may be against it abroad, I am

fure there are many at bome.

It is, at best, by his own Confession, only a Plan or a Project, which is not yet accepted. But let us suppose it accepted, for Argument sake. Nay let us go farther, and for Argument sake likewise, suppose it to be a good one; the Question will still return, whether we have taken the shortest, the least dangerous, or the least expensive Methods to accomplish it. But to glory in Measures, which have not succeeded, whether commendable or not, and have only a bare Probability of Success,

is certainly very extraordinary.

Laftly, let us examine this Affair with refpect to the Time we have been about it. The Pampbleteer indeed fays, and feems to triumph upon it, that this Progress towards the Establishment of a general Peace bath been made in a few Months, after the Opening of the Congress. But how much Time, as well as Money, did we spend in Expeditions, Embassies, Negotiations, Preliminaries, and Ratifications, before the Congress was opened? Nay, though we date the present Disturbances but three Years back, it is certain that we have not been in a State of perfect Amity, and free Commerce with Spain for above these seven Years past; but by the great Sagacity and Penetration of certain Gentlemen (to fay nothing of fecret Service-Money) we have at last, according to this Writer, some Hopes

Hopes of being, one Time or another, in almost as good a Condition as we were in, before our Affairs were thus embroil'd.

This puts me in mind of Sir Epicure Mammon, in the Alchymist; who, when he had spent his whole Estate in search of the Philosopher's Stone, was comforted after all his Cost, though disappointed of his main End, with the Hopes of getting a little something to cure the Itch.

He tells us, at the Conclusion, that this Nation never acted a Part more suitable to its Dignity and Character; and that to the Firmness and Fidelity of our Allies, and to these Measures we owe our present Tranquility. I shall say nothing of that glorious Part, which we have been lately acting; nor of the Firmness and Fidelity of our Allies. I neither know what they engaged to do, nor what they have actually done for us. But to boast of the present Tranquility, when we are at best only in a State of political Purgatory between Peace and War; when our Ships are every Week taken, as in Time of War; when we are at all the Expences, and under almost all the Inconveniencies of a War; to talk and boast of Tranquility, I say, at such a Time, must either be an egregious Banter on the Ministry, or an Infult on the Nation; and let the Pamphleteer take his Choice.

I have but one Thing more to mention, before I conclude; which is, that the Author of this wretched Pamphlet hath the Infolence

to make the regal Character subservient to his Designs. Whatever Measures, or whatever Conduct he finds it necessary to approve, are the King's Measures, and the King's Conduct. This is a mean Artifice, which hath been constantly practiced of late by these Men, when other Arguments are wanting. But I hope it will not put a Stop to your Enquiries; for every Englishman hath a Right, by our Laws, to judge and debate these Affairs; and I am sure his Majesty will abhor the Thoughts of abridging this Liberty, though weak and wicked Men endeavour to screen themselves under the Protection of his sacred Name.

I am, SIR, &c.

W. RALEIGH.

An ANSWER to the Defence of the Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of GREAT-BRITAIN, &c. In a Letter to CALEB D'ANVERS, Esq;

SIR,
S foon as I heard that the Author of the * Enquiry had condescended to take Notice of a LETTER, which you thought

^{*} The following was the Motto to this Answer to the Defence, &c. viz. Nor can we conceive a more abject Servility of Conduct, than for a People, so long famed for L

thought fit to publish in your Journal of the 4th of January last, I resolved to make my Acknowledgments to him for fo great an Honour, and to defire you to convey them into the World. This Duty should have been discharged immediately, if I had not been diverted from it by Avocations of a very different Nature; and if I had not observed, on a Review of the present Dispositions, that there was no Reason in force to make a very fpeedy Reply necessary. What I am going to fay now will, I think, justify me for what I have faid already, in the Opinion of Mankind; and at least in the fecret Thoughts even of the Author and Defender of the Enguiry; and as this Effect of the little additional Trouble I am about to give myself is the principal, nay, the fole good one, which I dare expect, we are in Time for that, and by Confequence I shall not lose my Labour by my Delay.

This Author hath thrown feveral Matters in my Way, to which it is proper I should

Commerce and Bravery, to see their darling Good, and their peculiar Glory, the Pledge of their Liberty, and Life of all their Poverty, just going to be forcibly and unrighteously torn from them; and tamely to look on without one Struggle for so great a Blessing, or one hearty Esfort against the Invaders of it. What can we become, if we give our Consent to such Ruin by our own supine Indolence and Insensibility; and suffer ourselves to be siript of our boossed Strength and Ornament at once; but a Nation, the most despicable of all Nations under Heaven; exposed to the Contempt and Insults of the World about us here below, and render'd utterly unworthy, by our cwn Conduct, of the Care of Providence above us?

fay fomething before I enter into that, which is strictly the Subject of our present Dispute.

He declares upon this Occasion, with all possible Seriousness, that he hath not writ, or dictated, or advanced; or, directly or indirectly, had the least Part in the writing or publishing any Paper, which hath appear'd in the World, in any Form, from the Time of writing the Enquiry, and from some Time before that, to the 20th of January 1728-9. He makes this Declaration, and for that Space of Time, particularly with a View to Papers printed in the London Journal; in all which he hath been utterly unconcern'd either directly

or indirectly.

Far be it from me to question the Truth of fo folemn a Declaration. I give entire Credit to it; and I freely own that he hath Reason to complain of Me for infinuating, at least, that he had a Hand in the London Journals. The little Share I have had in the Paper War hath not given me many Opportunities of knowing the Combatants; and the Productions, on one Side, gave me little Curiofity to enquire after the Authors of them. But I found it univerfally affirm'd, and no where contradicted, that this Gentleman had a Hand in the Weekly Papers just mention'd. The Persons, who recommended these Papers, countenanced the Opinion; and were glad, perhaps, that so considerable a Name should give them an Authority, which might supply whatever else they wanted. Nay, I found L 2

found amongst those, who were acquainted with this Author, and who profess a particular Regard for him, fome, who were angry at him on this very Account; some, who were forry for him; but none, who doubted the Truth of the Fact. What may have given Occasion to so general a Concurrence, he can best tell. I urge these Circumstances only to shew, how I was led into an Error. It was indeed Error, not Malice. But still I think myself obliged to take this Occasion of asking his Pardon; and I do it with all possible Scriousness, as he made his Declaration, and from the Bottom of my Heart; because I am as much convinced, that he neither abetted, encouraged, nor paid the Authors of these Papers, as I am that he was not himfelf the Author of them.

It cannot be imputed to me, that I have any Thing to answer for, on Account of the personal Severities, which this Author, in a very pathetick Manner, complains of. We must acknowledge, and we ought to lament, that our fublick Papers have abounded in Scurrility. One would be tempted to imagine, that the Saturnalia were held all the Year round in Britain; for those, who can do nothing but rail, have had their Encouragements to write; and I am perfuaded that this Gentleman's Candour will oblige him to confess, that nothing but a thorough Contempt hinders Complaints from being made against the Writers of his own Side, much better grounded

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grounded and supported by much stronger Instances, than he can produce against the Writers of the opposite Side, in his own, or in any other Cafe. For my Part, I should be extremely forry to have it faid of me, with Truth, that I had rail'd at any Author, inflead of answering, or even in answering his Book; and less than any would I be guilty of this Crime, for fuch it is, towards one, who defends, with fo much Uniformity of Conduct, the Liberty of the Press, that Corner-Stone of publick Liberty. He, who will support what burts bimself, because be thinks it the Support of the whole Liberty we enjoy, shall meet with nothing from me, but that, which he deferves from all Mankind, the utmost Respect, whenever he leaves me the Power of shewing it, confistently with the Regard I owe to Truth and to my own necessary Defence.

He will not, I hope, think it inconsistent with this Respect for his Person, or with that, which I have for some of his Writings, if I cannot bring myself up to have the same for his Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great-Britain; or for his Defence of this Enquiry. He appears to have a paternal Fondness for the sirst of these Treatises, which amounts even to a Partiality; the more surprizing, because it is found in one, who can boast so numerous and so fair an Offspring. I should not have attempted to draw him out of an Error, which he seems to indulge with

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fo great a Satisfaction, if he had not made it necessary for me. Since he hath done so, I will offer some Observations on the Enquiry

itself, before I come to the Defence.

The Circumstance, upon which he seems to triumph a little, (that the Enquiry was not answer'd) he will permit me to say is often a very equivocal Proof of the Merit of a Book. The same Mouths, it seems, which pronounced the Enquiry to be a mean and despicable Performance, have more than once express'd in Print their earnest Desire that some able Hand would answer it. From what Mouths he took this, I know not. But surely the Testimony of those, who desired some able Hand would answer what they judged to be mean and despicable, is an odd Testimony for him to quote; since it could proceed from nothing but a Design to ridicule him.

Though the Enquiry was not answer'd in Form, yet I believe that several, perhaps all the Points, on which his System lean'd, were occasionally examined, and sufficiently restuted by you, Mr. D'ANVERS, and by others. If no more was done, I take the Reason to have been plainly this. The ministerial Air of Authority and Information, assumed in it, made even those, on whom this Air did not impose, judge that it was prudent to wait till Time and Events should open the Scene a little more; and as the Scene open'd, they perceived that the Enquiry was daily answer'd, in the most effectual Manner, to their

Hands; so that the Author might have waited all his Life, perhaps, for fomething more of this Sort, if he had not thought fit to seize an Opportunity of defending it, not more worthy his Notice, than several others before given him; and if my Respect for him, and my Desire to stand sair in his Opinion, had not

determined me to make him a Reply.

As to the Effect of the Enquiry, which he thinks fo confiderable, that it awakened Multitudes out of a dull and languid State into Life and Vigour; and that it was not found to procure Slumbers either to those, who liked it, or to those who disliked it; I, who was most certainly one of those, who either liked or disliked it, can affirm with the greatest Truth, that it did not procure me Siumbers, it did not keep me awake. Some of the Facts advanced in it, were strange and surprizing; but then they were destitute of any Proof, except the strong Affirmations of the Author, and Collections of Circumstances so extremely trivial, that they became burlefque, toon as they were ferioufly apply'd. A bare Exposition of any real Danger from the Pretender would have waked Multitudes into Life and Vigour, though the Enquiry had never been written. But I apprehend that so many Pages spent on Wharton's Rambles, Ripparda's Chit-chat, Hear-fays of what one great Man writ concerning what another great Man faid, three Muscovite Ships coming to Spain, Embarkations, which were never made, and L 4 Armies

Armies, which were never affembled, could have no other Effect, than to compose Multitudes into perfect Tranquility, and to confire the Opinion of their Security on this Head. Any Surmifes of an Engagement, on the Emperor's Part, to affift Spain in the Recovery of Gibraitar by Force, could provoke no Indignation (whatever elfe it might provoke) nor cause any Alarm. We knew Gibraltar to be impregnable to the Spaniards. before Rifferda declared it to be fo; and what Affishance the Emperor could give them towards reducing this Piace, unless he had in his Service tome of Mr. WALLER's winged Troops and Pegasean Horse, we were not able. to differer. As to the Emperor's real Engagement in this Article towards Spain, and as to the Engagements of Spain towards the Emperor, on the Article of trading to the West-Indies, we soon knew what they were; and with this Knowledge our Alarm ceased. What was faid in the long Differtations, about the Oftend Company, caused likewise little or no Emotion in us. Our Interest was plainly not that of Principals, till the Dutch had the Address to make us so, by their Accession to the Treaty of Hanover; and the Conduct of our own Court, who beheld, with fo much Indifference, the Rife and Progress of this Company, had taught us to be indifferent about it. These Considerations and many others, which I omit, hinder'd the Enquiry from having the Effect, which this Gentleman's paternal

paternal Fondness, makes him believe it had. The Part, if I may have leave to say so, was over-acted. But still I see no Reason that he has to be concern'd, because one Way or other the End of writing it was answer'd. The Enquiry was the Book of a Day, like some little Animals on the Banks of the River Hypanis, which came to Life in the Morning, sulfill'd all the Ends of their Creation, and died before Night.

There is a Point, on which the Author and Defender of the Enquiry values himself and his Book very much; I mean the strict Regard to Truth, which he affures us he obferved in writing. Now though I am ready to agree that this Author has always a great Regard to Truth, yet I affirm that I could write a Book as big as the Enquiry, fill'd with nothing but Demonstrations of his Errors in Matters of Fact. Too much Confidence in the Informations he received, too much Haste in composing, and above all that Fire, which is apt to over-heat the Imagination of polemical Writers, must have caused these Errors. It is impossible to account any other Way, how a Gentleman of nice Honour, remarkable Sincerity, and even exemplary Piety, instead of making his Propositions constantly the Refult of the Evidence he found, upon a thorough Examination, true, should, thro' a whole Book, have constantly fuited his Evidence to a certain Set of Propositions; and how Facts and Dates, as stubborn Things as they

they are in the Hands of other Men, should

grow foft as WAX under bis Touch.

But it is not my Defign to enter into a Difquifition of this Sort. It would flew ill Nature, which I hope I have not; and it would be now of no use whatever. I must however defend myfelf, as unwilling as I am to offend bim; and therefore fince he contradicts what I faid, viz. that he had been given up in every material Article of the Enquiry; I think myself obliged to prove it. How easy are fuch Words as thefe, fays our Author, but how hard to support them? Now I do affure him, that theje Words, as far as they may be thought barsh or impolite, will at no Time fall eafily from my Tongue or Pen; but he will find that it is easy for me upon this Occafion to support them. I will confine myself to the four great Points of Danger, arifing from the Vienna Treaties, and mentioned already. Let us fee whether he has been given up in them or not.

According to the Enquiry, we were in Danger of losing not only our East and West-India Trade, but many other Branches of the British Trade, by the Privileges supposed to be granted to the Emperor's Subjects, and from the Enjoyment of which Privileges we are debarr'd. Nay, it was very strongly infinuated that even the Ruin of Britain was involved in this Point. If this had been the Case, and if the Treaty of Vienna had thus settled the Matter, there would have been Oc-

casion for all the Outcries, which we meet with in the Enquiry, and for still more. our most knowing Merchants gave up this Point, as foon as they read and confider'd the feveral Claufes; and it is notorious that the contracting Powers declared, as foon as they heard of the Objection, that their Meaning was not to give these Privileges to the Imperial Subjects above other Nations; and that they would explain the Text accordingly, if any Ambiguity made it necessary. But in Truth there was little or no Ambiguity in the Matter, except what the Representations of it occasion'd; for without entering any deeper into it, let us observe that the Answers, which this Author gives to the Objection, which he was forced, from the Notoriety of the Thing, to make to himself, are evalive and fallacious; for fince the fame Liberty of entering the Stanish Ports in the West-Indies, in case of Distress by bad Weather, or for Refrest.ment, is granted to us by the Treaty of 1670, as is granted to the Imperial Subjects by the Treaty of Vienna, does it follow that more is granted to them than to Us; because the Liberty granted to us hath ceased for many Years? If we have not made use of the Liberty, the . Fact affirm'd is nothing to the Purpote. we have been denied it, fuch a Denial is an Infraction of the Treaty of 1670, and proves that we have had Injuffice done us by the Practice of the Spaniards; but doth not help to prove that we have had any done us by

their Concessions to the Emperor, with whom they may keep this Article, perhaps, as little as they have done with us; and who is not likely to have the same Means of obliging them to it as we have in our Power, when-

ever we please to employ them.

How the eighth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht came to be quoted, on this Occasion, is to me marvellous. That Article is made general to all Nations; but was particularly directed against the French; who, even at that Time, continued to obtain Licences to fend Ships to trade in the South Sea, as they had done all the War. But the Treaty of Utrecht confirms the Treaty of 1670; and the Stipulation, that no Licence, or any Permission at all shall, at any Time, be given to the French, or any other Nation whatfaever ---- to fail, traffick, &c. to the Dominions subject to the Crown of Spain in America, cannot furely be construed to deprive us of the Right of going into those Parts, in the Cases allow'd by the Treaty of 1670. This seems so clear, that I may pronounce the Gentleman given up, on this Head, by the most knowing Merchants, and by every Man, who can read and understand what he reads.

But I may go farther; for it appears even from the 5th Article of the provisional Treaty itself, (which is said to secure us from the dangerous Engagements contain'd in the Treaties of Vienna, with relation to Trade) that the King of Spain never understood to grant, by

by the faid Treaty, any Privileges contrary to the Treaties confirm'd above; nor to give to bis Imperial Majesty any greater Advantages than these enjoy'd by other Nations in their Commerce; his Imperial Majesty adopting for bis Subjects the above-mention'd Declaration, made in the Name of his Catholick Majesty. And it is very observable that this Article seems to be inferted in the Treaty, merely upon the Surmises of the Ministers of France, Great-Britain and Holland, who have PRETENDED (as it is faid in the Introduction to it) that in the Treaty of Commerce concluded at Vienna, on the 1st of May, 1725 --- there were divers Clauses which clash'd with Articles of several Treaties of Commerce, anterior to the Year 1725, &c.

If therefore the natural Sense of the Vienna Treaty itself, as well as the Declaration of their Imperial and Catholick Majesties, as soon as the Objection was first started, and their Offer to remove any supposed Ambiguity in this Article of the Vienna Treaty, were not sufficient to satisfy us; what farther Satisfaction shall we receive by the provisional Treaty, in case it should be accepted, which contains only the very same Declaration?---But this hath been sufficiently explain'd al-

ready by your Correspondent Raleigh.

As to the Oftend Trade, he thinks that I myself cannot be against him, unless in the Degree of the Importance of it. Now this is the

the very Point, upon which he must be given up, in this Case, if he is given up at all. I never heard that any Man was wild enough affirm that the Trade, carry'd on from Oftend, was of no Consequence whatever to us. But the Question is, whether that Trade, be of that Degree of Importance to us, which he represents. He asks, who of those I oppose bath declared against him in this? I answer, the very Person I quoted in the Passage he had before his Eyes, when he ask'd this Question. He fays in the Enquiry, that our East and West-India Trade will be ruin'd by the Oftend Company; that they are so already, in some Degree; that the Contagion will spread to other Branches; in short, that this Trade will carry Riches, Strength, and naval Power from Us to the Spanish Netherlands. What favs Publicola? The Oftend Trade, about which fuch a Neise bath been made (he must mean by the Enquirer, fince the Enquirer made more Noise about it than all the other Writers put together) was more the Concern of our Neighbours, both by Treaty and Interest, than our cren. I appeal now, in my Turn; and I appeal to the Enquirer himself. Is not one of these Representations directly contrary to the other? Does not Publicola diminish the Consequences of the Offend Trade to us, and treat it even lightly? Does not be magnify it, in the strongest Terms, and make our All depend on the Obstruction of it? Does

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Does not Publicola, an Author whom I op-

pose, give him up?

We are now come to the Danger, much infifted upon in the Enquiry *, of baving Gibraltar wrested out of our Hands by Force, (if it be possible) unless we will basely yield it up; and this Danger is grounded on a supposed + mutual Engagement between the Emperor and King of Spain, contain'd in a secret offensive Treaty. The Writer of the Enquiry confefses, that the Imperial Resident read to some of our Ministers the Words, which he faid were the Contents of the Article, which his Master had enter'd into, relating to Gibraltar; the which implied, that his Master had engaged to use his good Offices for the Restitution of Gibraltar: Now from hence, because this Resident read all that related to this Point, and did not shew the whole Treaty to us, any more than we thought ourselves obliged to shew to the Imperial Ministers the Treaties of 1721; (which we made at Madrid with one of the Parties. between whom we were at that Time Mediators in the Congress at Cambray;) from hence, I fay, the Writer I am answering concludes that the Truth of what he imputes to the Emperor stands confirm'd; but this offensive Alliance hath appear'd hitherto no where, except in his Writings; and the Articles relating to Gibraltar, in the defensive Alliance between the Emperor and the King of Spain, is furely

^{*} Page 57. † 34, 35.

contrary as possible to all that he hath advanced. By that Article it appears, that the Spaniards affirm'd a Promise on our Part to restore Gibraltar. In Consideration of this Promile, the Emperor declares he will not oppose this Restitution, if it be made amicably: that if it be necessary, he will employ his good Offices, and even his Mediation, if the Parties desire it. 'Till therefore the Enquirer can shew another Article between the contracting Powers in the Vienna Treaties, about Gibraltar, this must be reputed the fole Article of that Kind, and by Consequence a flat Contradiction to all, that he hath faid on this Occasion; so that if his own Side do not give bim up in this Case, both they and he will be given up, I fear, in the Opinion of every other Man in Europe; to which I shall add (fince the Observation lies fairly in my Way) that every Man who knows any Thing of the Interest of Europe, knows it as much the Interest of the Emperor, that Britain should keep Gibraltar, as it is the Interest of one of our Allies, that we should lose the Possession of this Place; and yet we have been taught by some profound Statesmen, to apprehend the Emperor's Efforts to take it from us, and to rely on the Affiftance of France to preserve it to us.

I have referved to the last the greatest of all those Dangers, which are represented in the Enquiry; and that is the Danger of the Pre-

tender.

It is there affirmed, * that one express Article of the Alliance, between the Emperor and Spain, contain'd an Obligation in Favour of the Pretender, and a Stipulation to make the Attempt for him in England, before opening the War in any other Parts. Nay, this Author was fo well inform'd of all these Proceedings, that he gives us the particular Engagements, which the Pretender, in return, took towards the Emperor and Spain. these Things are afferted in the strongest Manner, as founded on positive Intelligence; on Intelligence from more than one Person; on undoubted Intelligence, and such as could be entirely depended on. Now I suspect that the Enquirer would think me very impertinent, if I should seem to question the Authority of his Intelligence; and yet I verily believe, that I have better Reasons to do so, than he had to depend upon it, when he writ the Words I have quoted. But we will wave faying any Thing more on a Point, on which it is proper for neither of us to speak plain. His good Opinion of the Intelligence communicated to him will not give it the Stamp of Infallibity; nor will my bad Opinion destroy its Credit. The World will therefore judge, or rather has judged, of the Validity of what he does not explain, by the Force or Weakness of the other Circumstances, which he enlarges upon; and by observing whether

^{*} Page 52.

the Course of Events hath justify'd this boasted Intelligence or not. I have just mentioned above the chief of these Circumstances; and notwithstanding the great Respect I have for this Author, nothing shall oblige me to treat them more feriously. I will shew him however, that the Course of Events hath destroy'd all the Use he pretended to make of these Circumstances, and that it has contradicted, instead of confirming his Intelligence. He fays, * that the vigorous Resolutions taken, and the Preparations and Dispositions made by Great-Britain, Suspended the Execution of this Design. The Spaniards found themselves obliged to fend Part of their Ships from Cadiz and St. Andero to the West-Indies; and the Muscovite Ships returned home. — Very well: The Event does not yet justify the Intelligence; but that is accounted for. The Execution of the Defign was suspended for the present. The Design went on then; and the Preparations for an Invasion by Consequence. It must have been so; for we find in the Enquiry +, that the Design thus Suspended was afterwards prevented by the Appearance of a British Fleet on the Spanish Coaft. Now let me defire you, Mr. D' Anvers, to take the Trouble of turning to Sir John Jennings's Letter, dated August 10, 1726. and made publick here; in which you will find the Spaniards fo little prepared to invade

^{*} Page 51.

tes, that when he came on their Coast, they feem'd to be in the greatest Consternation; that all the Troops they could affemble did not exceed three thousand Men; and that

these were in very bad Condition.

I ask now, is the Intelligence of the Enquirer, upon this Head, supported by any Thing but his own Affirmation? Is it not contradicted by the whole Course of Events? Does there appear the least Reason to believe that he had a fure Foundation to build upon, when he made fuch bold Affertions, and of fuch a Nature? The secret offensive Treaty, which he talks fo much of, has never appear'd, nor any Footsteps of it; and many People are apt to believe that it never existed any where but in some People's luxuriant Fancy. The feveral Treaties made at Vienna in 1725, between the Emperor and Spain, have been long publick; and when it was observed, some where or other, that nothing was contain'd in them like what the Enquirer had afferted, the Enquirer was given up. He was faid to be mistaken. The Article, in favour of the Pretender, was faid to be in fome other Treaty; and afterwards in no formal Treaty. It was not a Treaty. It was an Engagement. This may be call'd, by fome ill-bred People, Shuffling; but fure I am that it must pass for a direct giving up of this Author; who will find, perhaps, if he pleafes to enquire into the Particulars of what pais'd on this Occasion, that the Person, who gave M 2 him

him thus up, had some Share in setting him to work.

After this, it is hardly worth Notice, that the Author of the Observations on the Conduct of Great-Britain, has given him up likewise; for the utmost, which this Writer ventures to say, when he comes to speak of this Engagement, afferted by the Enquirer to be contain'd in an Article of a Treaty, is this; our Apprehensions were that there might be Engagements in favour of the Pretender. Let the Enquirer consider again, whether I was in the wrong to advance, that he had been given up even by his own Side.

Having justified what I prefumed to advance concerning the Enquiry, I come now

to the Defence of it.

The Gentleman begins this Defence by stating the Case (so he calls it) as he did in the Enquiry; and then he proceeds to take Notice of what kath follow'd fince the Date of that Book; that is to fay, he represents the Matter in Dispute, just as it suits his Purpose; leaving out many Things necessary to fet the whole in a true Light; afferting fome Things, which have been never proved; and others, which I think never can be proved; making what Infinuations, drawing what Conclusions he thinks fit; and, in a Word, begging the Question in almost every Line. It is hard to conceive for what Purpose this is done. The Reason given, I am sure, is not a good one; fince the principal Facts and Reasonings,

ings, upon which the Strength of all that can be faid must be founded, are so far from seeming to be forgot, that they feem to be the only Things remember'd, or thought of at this Time, and are the common Topicks of almost every Conversation. There must therefore be some other Reason for this Method of Proceeding; and I can guess but one. This Method may perhaps be thought proper to catch unwary Readers, and to give a particular Biass to their Minds, with which they are to read and to judge of all that follows. I could make use of the same Art; and, without being at much Pains, draw up a State of the Case very contrary to that, which he hath drawn, and at least as plausible. But I think the Proceeding too unfair to copy after it. I have indeed no Reason to do so; since, very indifferent to all other Confiderations, I feek nothing in this Dispute, but the Discovery of the Truth; and therefore as I will receive nothing but what is supported by the Evidence of Fast, and the Force of Argument, fo I will not prefume to attempt imposing any Thing, void of both, upon others. Besides, this Gentleman undertakes to consider what I have advanced, either against any Thing, in which he can be supposed to be concern'd; or upon any Subject of Debate, (of this Debate he means) which appears to him to be of Importance; fo that if I am able to refute all that he objects to me, in the Defence of this Enquiry, I refute all Objections, M 3 of

of any Importance, to what I have said in my former Letter to you; and then I imagine that his State of the Case will do him no great

Honour, and his Cause little good.

The first Point, on which I am attack'd by the Defender of the Enquiry is, on the Turn, (so he calls it) which I have given to the very Beginning of this whole Scene. He means the Vienna Alliance.

Let us fee therefore whether it is He or I, (for one of us may, perhaps, have done fo) who hath endeavour'd, in treating this Subject, to turn every Thing to the Service of

some other Cause than that of Truth.

In the Enquiry, he represented the Vienna Alliance, as to the Manner, and as to the Matter of it, to be one of the most astonishing Phænomena, which ever appear'd in the political World. What Surprize to fee two Princes, Rivals almost from their Infancy, two Powers, that could hardly be kept within the Bounds of common Decency towards one another, privately running into one another's Arms, as he expresses himself? What a Surprize to fee the Emperor abandon the Mediation of Great-Britain and France; to the first of whom he and his Family owed so many Obligations; and to the last of whom, in Conjunction with the first, he owed the Acquisition of Sicily, and the other Advantages of the Quadruple Alliance? What a Surprize to fee Spain abandon this Mediation, just in the Moment, (as my Adversary has extremely

extremely well observed) when the Interests of the Duke of Parma were in Agitation; Interests, which Spain had extremely at Heart; and in the supporting which, the had Reason to think herself sure of Success against the Emperor; because the Mediators had taken fecret Engagements with her to favour these Interests, by one of the Treaties made at Madrid in 1721? What a Surprize to fee Spain do this, and in doing it, not only forego the Advantages, which the Mediators had procured and were to procure for her, in many Respects; particularly in that favourite Point, the Succession of Don Carlos; but make fo bad a Bargain for herself at Vienna, that the Emperor, according to this Author, and indeed I think according to the Truth, gain'd every Thing, and particularly the Guaranty of his own Succession?

All this, it must be confess'd, appear'd wonderful, and excited a strong Curiofity to know what were the Springs of fo great, and, according to these Representations, so sudden a Revolution of Counfels and Interests. here we were dropp'd. The Enquirer spent much Time, and took much Pains to shew what did not occasion it; but I have not obferved, that he pretended to shew what did; unless he meant, that we should take, for Causes of it, those terrible Designs, which he imputes to the Emperor and the King of Spain. Our Ministers, who seem to have foreseen so little that France and Spain might break;

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break; and that the Negotiations, then on Foot, might be thrown into Confusion, or take fome new Course, by this Rupture; grew it feems prodigiously alert and fagacious afterwards. They did not foresee what happen'd; but they discover'd strange Mysteries of Iniquity, conceal'd under this Transaction, when it bad bappen'd; and these Mysteries we find pompoully unfolded in the Enquiry, with all the Improvements and Embellishments, which the Author's luxuriant Fancy could bestow upon them. Now supposing these Discoveries to have been real, the Things io discover'd can be look'd upon no otherwise than as Circumstances of the general Meafure; the Measure, which the Emperor and Spain took, of treating by themselves and for themselves; and therefore they wanted to be accounted for as much as the Measure itself; but upon this Head, I fay the Enquirer gave us no Satisfaction. Far from explaining to us what might induce Spain to take fuch a Refolution, at that particular Point of Time, rather than at any other; he did not afford us the least Hint to guess, why we should take it at all; and yet so strange an Effect must have had some very considerable Cause; too confiderable certainly to be abfolutely a Secret, and even beyond the Reach of Conjecture.

This remarkable Defect was, I believe, felt by every Person, who read the Enquiry; and therefore, in the Progress of the Dispute, the

Writers

Writers of the fame Side thought it incumbent upon them to affign some Cause, which might appear proportionable to fuch extraordinary Effects; and which, at the same Time, might not be inconfistent with what their great Master, the Enquirer, had advanced. The Task was not easy; and indeed they have fucceeded accordingly. Some laid the Caufe of all in that inveterate Rancour, which they supposed the Court of Spain to have conceived against us, on two Accounts; the Promise made by Lord Stanbope about Gibraltar, and the Defeat of the Spanish Fleet in the Mediterranean. When this was exploded, and I think it was fo as foon as examined, they had Recourse to another System; a very. strange one indeed, for it declares that the Emperor, France, and Great-Britain, the three contracting Powers with Spain in the Quadruple Alliance, acted the most perfidious Part imaginable in that whole Proceeding: fuch a Part as Ferdinand the Catholick, or Lewis the XIth, would have startled at. The Succession of Don Carlos was, it seems, * a Point, which all the Powers of Europe strenuously opposed, which the Emperor, who had already obtain'd his Defires, in the Affair of Sicily, could not be for; to which the French were averse, which Great-Britain had Reason to oppose and prevent; and which it was plain that the Spaniards could

^{*} Pritifs Journal, Jan. 4.

never carry in a Congress, where every Party was an Enemy to their Intentions. Surely nothing fo extravagant; nothing fo infolent as this was ever yet advanced! If you, Mr. D'Anvers, had presumed even to infinuate any Thing like it, I believe you would have been profecuted with all the Severity possible; and I am fure you would have been given up by all your Friends. Neither can I conceive how the Enquirer, who is so zealous an Asfertor of our Honour in the Observation of Treaties, could pass by such an Imputation as this, without darting his Thunder at the impious Head, who devised the Slander; unless he thinks it an irremissible Sin to account for any Thing in Contradiction to himself; and a venial Fault to accuse Great-Britain and France, as well as the Emperor, of something worse than a Violation of Treaties; even of making them with a Defign to break them; and of obliging a Prince, by long Negotiations, and by a War, to accept Conditions, which they never intended should be made good to him.

Amongst others, I presumed, at last, to account for this great Event upon Principles, which I believed to be true, notwithstanding all that I read, in the Enquiry; and which I still believe to be true, notwithstanding all that is said against them, in the Defence of the Enquiry.

The Defender begins with quoting two or three Passages, which relate to the sending back

back the Infanta, and the Point of the fole Mediation, out of my Letter to you; and then, without disproving the Facts, or so much as mentioning the Argument grounded upon them, he pretends that the whole is hypothetical; and thinks it would be a full and fufficient Reply to me, to frame a Scheme on the other Side, and to oppose Supposition to Supposition; and one arbitrary Interpretation of Appearances to another; after which he proceeds to frame fuch a Scheme; partly on Facts, which he would have us believe true; and partly, as he fays himself, from his own Invention; and this he thinks proper to oppose, in a ludicrous Manner, to the Account I have given.

Now, if it shall appear, on Examination, that I have built upon undeniable Facts, and have reason'd justly, instead of building on Suppositions, and giving arbitrary Interpretations to Appearances, this Author's Smartness will turn upon himself; and, instead of shewing that I deserved no Answer, he will only have shewn that he was unable to give

me a good one.

Let us enter into this Examination.

I affirm'd, and I do still affirm, that from the Death of the Duke of Orleans, the Spanish Ministers were full of Fears and Jealousies about the compleating the Infanta's Marriage with the King of France. Neither do I find any Thing urged in the Defence of the Enquiry, to destroy the Credibility of this Fact.

Indeed,

Indeed, if it was proper to descend into Particulars of fo delicate a Nature, it would not be at all difficult to demonstrate, from a Confideration of the Change, which was made in the French Ministry, and of the Difference of personal Situations, Interests and Views, that altho' there never could have been Room for fuch Fears and Jealoufies as thefe, while the Duke of Orleans had lived, yet there was great Room for entertaining them, under the Administration of his Successor. But this is These Fears and Jealousies increased not all. and strengthen'd daily, in the Minds of the Spanish Ministers; and if this Author pleases to enquire, I believe he will find, or else his Prompters deal very unfairly by him, that the Delay and Excuses of the Court of France about performing the Ceremony of the Fiancialles, which Spain expected should have been perform'd foon after the Time, at which the Duke of Orleans dy'd, confirm'd, in the highest Degree, the Suspicions already taken. The Ceremony of the Fiancialles would have fecured the Marriage. What other Effect then could Excuses and Delays in this Affair produce, but that, which I have mention'd?

The Enquiry * says, that the Resolution of the Court of France, relating to the Infanta, did not come, no not in Suspicion, to Madrid, till March 8. N. S. 1724-5. If he means the particular Resolution of sending her back at such a determinate Time, that is nothing to

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the Purpose, how much soever the Affirmation might impose, when it was made use of at first, and before this Matter had been sufficiently canvass'd. But if the Resolution of fending the Infanta back, at some Time or other; in plain Terms, the Resolution of not compleating ber Marriage with the King of France, be meant; then, I fay, that I might very justly have set this Affertion down in the List of those, which are made in the Book without a strict Regard to Truth; for it is undeniably true, that the Spanish Ministers, in foreign Courts, entertain'd this Suspicion above a Year before that Time. It is equally true, that feveral Months before that Time they spoke of this Measure, as a Thing they expected; and I add, that feveral private Persons, at least, writ from Madrid, in the fame Stile, to their Correspondents in other Countries. Of all this I am as fure, as I am fure I now hold a Pen in my Hand; or that a Pamphlet, call'd a Defence of the Enquiry, is now lying before me; and therefore neither the Authority of the Enquiry, nor any better Authority can perfuade me, that the Suspicion of a Design to send the Infanta back from France did not come to Madrid till March 1724-5; because it would be absurd to believe, that the Ministers of that Court were less inform'd or less jealous about an Affair, of this Importance, than private Persons; or that the repeated Advices, which must have come

come from the Spanish Ministers abroad, made

no Impression upon those at home.

This Fact is, I think, pretty well establish'd; and the others I am to mention will occasion no Dispute. They are these. The Spaniards * first took the Resolution of throwing off the Mediation, and of treating at Vienna in Nov. 1724; and Ripperda's sull Powers were sign'd, according to the Enquiry, on the 22d of that Month; that is, about a Year after the Death of the Duke of Orleans. Soon after this, the Negotiation was begun; but the Treaties, in which it terminated, were not sign'd till the last of April and the first

of May, 1725.

These, I presume, are Facts, and not Suppositions. Let it now be consider'd how I argue upon them; and whether my Reafoning be nothing more than an arbitrary Interpretation of Appearances, as the Author of the Defence hath rashly pronounced, but not The Sum of ventured to attempt to prove. my Argument is this. Since the Spaniards expected that the Infanta would be, a little fooner, or a little later, fent back from France, they expected to find themselves, a little fooner, or a little later, obliged in Honour to shew a due Resentment of this Affront; to fend back the Princesses of the House of Bourbon from Spain; and to break off that Correspondence, which had subsisted between the two Courts, from Spain's Accession to the

Quadruple Alliance; and which had been fo intimate, during the Life of the Duke of Or-They could not foresee how long this leans. Rupture might last; because they could not foresee how soon a Change would be made in the French Ministry, and Satisfaction be given them for this Affront; but they could not fail to foresee, that if this Event should happen, during the Congress of Cambray, fomething worse than the Affront would follow, and they must remain in the most abandon'd Condition imaginable; broke with one Mediator; not fure of the other; the Emperer in Possession of Sicily; and the reciprocal Condition, in favour of Don Carlos, not effectually fecured to them. These Things are fo intimately and necessarily tied together, that I can as little discover how it is possible to allow the first Fact, which regards the Suspicions and Expectations of the Spaniards, and deny the Consequences, which follow; as I can fee how it is possible to contradict, with the least Appearance of Reason, a Fact so publickly known, supported by so many Circumstances, and justify'd by so many Consequences as the first is. The probable Arguments employ'd in the Defence, and which, it may be pretended, will ferve to prove that though the Fact were true, and the Suspicion I have infifted on, was entertain'd by the Court of Madrid; yet that it did not produce the Effects of throwing Spain into the Engagement she took at Vienna, will be consider'd presently. Thus

Thus far then, as we have a Deduction of Facts, not of Suppositions; so we have a Thread of consequential Arguments, not a Rhapfody of arbitrary Interpretations of Appearances. The Case is fairly stated; and no imaginary Scheme is offer'd to be imposed for Truth. The Probability, which refults from this State, is confirm'd, and I think turn'd into Certainty by the Event. By the State above-mention'd, it was probable that Spain would take Measures, in Time, against the Distress, to which she must foresee that she stood exposed. Accordingly, the Spaniards began to treat at Vienna, before the Infanta was fent from France, (which is a Fact allow'd on all Hands) that they might prepare for the worlt; and when I add, that they delay'd concluding their Treaty, or that the Conclusion of their Treaty was delay'd, till what they fear'd harpen'd; what do I affirm more than what my Adversary allows? He had faid, at first, that the Treaty of Peace was fign'd at Vienna, before what Spain fear'd from France was known there. He has corrected that Affertion; and has faid, that as the Treaty of Peace was agreed to at Vienna before what Spain fear'd from France was known at Vienna to have happen'd; fo it was fign'd before the Refusal of Britain could be known there; that is, the Refusal of the fole Mediation. The first Point then is yielded to me. The Spaniards did not actually fign at Vienna, till the News came thither, of the

the Infanta's being actually sent from France; though they had settled and agreed their Terms with the Imperialists, on the Knowledge that she would be sent away. On the second Point, all that I urged, as Fact or Argument, stands in the same Force it did before; for I desire this Author may not be indulged in a Liberty I shall never take with him, nor any one else; the Liberty of carrying my Affirmations, by strain'd Constructions, farther than the plain and natural Import

of the Terms I employ.

In Opposition to Publicola, I shew'd that the Manner, in which he affirm'd the Treaty of Vienna to have been fign'd before the Reus al of the Mediation was known there, did not refute Raleigh; on Account of some posfible Circumstances, there mention'd. Now this Author has been forced to leave the Proof, drawn from those possible Circumstances, just as he found it. There is no Proof, fays he, but the bare Possibility here insisted on. I say more. The Argument is as strong against bim, as against Publicola; for even after the Advantages taken over Publicola, for not expressing himself clearly, this Author has, for Reasons easy to be guess'd, express'd himself in a Manner liable to the same Objection. The Peace was fign'd, he fays, before the Refusal of Britain could be known. What! before it could be known by certain and direct Intelligence; or before it could be known in Form, after the tedious Round, which

which this Resolution was to take? That is not explain'd; and yet that was the fingle Point, on which any Thing could be faid to the Purpose. In short, we pursued, with great Steadiness, our wise Maxims of neglecting Spain, and of adhering closely to France; infomuch that those, who wish'd us no good, were perhaps heard, when they infinuated that, far from contributing to ward off a Blow fo much apprehended by Spain, we privately abetted France, in her Defign of breaking the Match, and imagined by that Measure to establish an irreconcilable Quarrel between the two Courts. The Spaniards, as well as the Imperialists, had Reason to believe, from our whole Conduct, that we should not accept the fole Mediation, which had been offer'd to us; and was it then strange that the former, neglected by us, provoked by France, should press the signing this Treaty, without waiting long for our Answer; or that the Emperor, who got so much by the Bargain, should confent to it?

Having been thus led to the Affair of the fole Mediation, which I had hitherto omitted to fpeak of, in order to avoid Confusion, I shall consider it here, as far as this Author has made it necessary for me. In my Letter to you, Mr. D'Anvers, I dwelt a good deal upon it. I placed it in every Light, and debated all the Merits of the Cause, as well as I was able. Now, if what I urged was absurd

and nothing to the Purpose, this Author should have shewn, in general, that it did not deserve a more particular Answer. If what I urged was clear and strong, as some People imagine it was, this Author, who declares himself, in every Point, of a contrary Opinion, should have had the Goodness to examine and resute my Arguments. How it happens I know not; but this great Master of polemical Writing hath, in every Instance, upon this Occasion, avoided to enter into the Argument. He hath dwelt on the Outside of Things, and hath generally cavill'd at Circumstances.

I have just now given a strong Instance of this; and I lay hold of the Opportunity to tell this Gentleman, that I am no Apologist for Spain, tho' he endeavours to fix that Character upon me by an Innuendo, so very fine, that I was for some Time at a Loss to find out his Meaning. I neither founded to Arms against the Spaniards, two Years ago; nor am, at present, an Advocate for bearing their Delays and their Infults. I neither aggravated, two Years ago, the Depredations and Hostilities committed in the West-Indies, by the Spaniards; * and those Violences, by which the whole Commerce of Jamaica hath been well nigh destroy'd, and the Trade of that Island reduced to a miserable Condition; nor do I

^{*} Enquiry, p. 60.

now fosten in their Favour, and call these Outrages and Losses by the gentle Name of ** Inconveniencies attending a State of Un-

certainty.

But to return. Having given an Instance of this Author's cavilling at Circumstances not material in the Dispute; I shall now give some Instances of his affirming over again, by way of Answer, what had been resuted before; and when I have done this, I shall have taken Notice of all that he says, upon the

Subject of the fole Mediation.

First then he says, that the Knowledge of the Negotiations going on at Vienna was a just Reason to decline this Offer, which he supposes to have been a mere Piece of Mockery. But he does not so much as pretend to say a Word, in answer to what I insisted upon, as an Advantage in accepting this Mediation, even supposing it offer'd to us without any Design that we should concern ourselves in it. He does not pretend so much as to controvert what I urged, to prove that the worse Opinion we had of the Designs carry'd on at Vienna, the more Reason there was to catch at this Offer of the Mediation.

Secondly, he infifts, that we could not accept this Mediatiou, with a due Regard to our Alliance with France; and he supposes, that this Reason will be thought just by all those, who do not think the Breach of Faith,

^{*} Defence, p. 13.

and the Violation of Treaties, Matters of no Concern. Here again is another charitable Innuendo. But let it pass. It would be easy to strengthen all that was faid, on this Subject, in my Letter to you, by shewing the Difference between fuch a Stipulation as this of a joint Mediation, and the Covenants, which Princes and States enter into with one another, about their mutual Interests. there is no need of it; fince this Author, who thinks fit to infift on this Point, hath not thought fit to answer any one of the Arguments, urged by me, to prove that France could not have complain'd of us, if we had accepted this Mediation; and yet there were fome Dilemma's laid down, which feem'd to deserve a Solution.

Lastly, he pretends that I affirm'd, against the most publick Facts, and the plainest Appearances, what I said to shew that our Acceptance of the Mediation must have been agreeable to France; and yet what I said was founded on publick Facts, and the plainest Appearances; which he has not touch'd, because he durst not deny them. It is really very strange, that so considerable an Author should continue to write, when he can neither find out new Arguments, nor answer the Objections made to old ones.

Having now dispatch'd the Point of the fole Mediation, it remains that I say something to those probable Arguments, (if they deserve N 3 that

that Name, which I have civilly given them) by which this Gentleman pretends to destroy what is, I think, establish'd on the solid Foundation of Fact and Reason, concerning the Measure taken in France, after the Death of the late Duke of Orleans, to break the Match with the Infanta, and the Consequence of that Measure, the throwing Spain into the

Hands of the Emperor.

Now the first of these Arguments is, that the Court of Spain did not mention this Affront from France, as any Inducement to the Transaction at Vienna; and that any such Mention would have been inconfiftent with other Declarations made to Mr. Stanhope at Madrid. Very well. It is then an establish'd Rule, that we are not to believe a Court has Motives for their Conduct, which Motives they do not oren, altho' we have the strongest Reasons imaginable to believe such Motives true. Another Rule, which this Author would do well to establish at the same Time, and which is founded on as much Reason as the former, is this; that we are to believe all the Motives, which a Court thinks fit to give out, to account for their Conduct; altho' we have the plainest Proofs imaginable that these Motives are falfe. Such Logick as this was never introduced into Politicks, I believe, before; and I am perfuaded that you, Mr. D' Anvers, will excuse me, if I spend no Time in answering it. Let me desire you however, before I leave this Argument, to turn to the 13th

13th and 14th Pages of the Enquiry, where you will find that the Enquirer says, the Imperial Ministers at Cambray, at London and at Paris, talk'd the very Language, which the Defender of the Enquiry says the Spaniards were always ashamed to make use of *. Nay, the Enquirer adds, that, upon the first publick News of the Vienna Treaty at Madrid, the Discourses of many were taught to run that Way, and to dwell upon that same

popular Topick.

The second of these Arguments is this. If the News of fending back the Infanta from France, and of Great Britain's refusing the fole Mediation, had both come to Madrid, before Ripperda was fent from thence; even this could not have really been, and would not have been pretended to have been the Motive of what was afterwards done at Vienna. And why, pray? Because when the News of our refufing the fole Mediation did come, the Court of Spain acknowledged it to be a reafonable Proceeding. This, you fee, is built on the Principles laid down in the last Article, and deserves no farther Notice. But on the News coming to Madrid, that the Infanta was fent home, he confesses that the Court of Spain might, by Such Circumstances, be induced to try what bonourable Terms the Emperor would come to. This Concession goes farther than he is aware of; for I defire to know if

it is reasonable to believe that Spain would have treated with the Emperor, when the Case had happened, why it is unreasonable to believe that Spain did begin to treat with him on almost a certain Prospect that the Case would bappen; which is the great Point we have been contending about? Ay, but Spain would not have treated with the Emperor to hurt Holland and Britain, because Spain had been hurt by France; nor would the Emperor have enter'd into a Treaty to hurt them, who had no Part in the Affront to Spain and never injured the Emperor. Again; much less would the King of Spain send a Minister to Vienna to enter into and finish Treaties, which should hurt other Nations, upon a Suspicion that France would hereafter affront him. I could make feveral Reflections on fome of the Expressions in this Place; and on the Turn, which the Author takes, of putting fome very odd Arguments into my Mouth; and what is still more, into the Mouths of the Emperor and the King of Spain. But I forbear; and content myself with faying two Things which will effectually blunt the Point of all the Wit employ'd in this Paragraph, and fully answer the whole of what is faid further upon this Subject, in the Defence of the Enquiry.

First then; as far as I am from being, or pretending to be, a Master in Politicks, (which Degree this Writer seems to have taken long ago) I never imagined that the Affront,

Affront, confider'd merely as an Affront, precipitated Spain into all the Engagements she took with the Emperor; though, by the Way, he mistakes very much, if he thinks, as he fays, that he may deny new fresh Resentments to determine the Conduct of Princes, exactly upon the same Grounds, as I have deny'd that old stale Resentments have this Effect. I imagined, what I faid, and what I proved was, that this Affront, confider'd as a necesfary Breach with France, at least for a Time, would throw Spain into such Circumstances of Diffress, as she was to prevent by all possible Means; and that therefore Reason of State determined in this Case; though no doubt the Affront, at the same Time, provoked the Spaniards. Thus I am confiftent with myself; and the Author might have spared himself the Trouble of writing this elaborate Paragraph, if he had adverted to my Sense, instead of playing with my Words.

secondly; as to the Emperor, our Authoris guilty of begging the Question; for the Emperor will insist, as he has insisted, that his Engagements were not Engagements to injure any Body; that he enter'd into no offensive Alliance; and that when he exacted from Spain the Guaranty of the Ostend Trade, and of his Succession, he exacted the Guaranty of nothing but of that, which he judges he has an independent Right to establish and secure. As to Spain, it will be likewise said, that when his Catholick Majesty treated with

the Emperor, he never meant to hurt other Nations, but to fecure his own Interests; that if his Guaranty of the Ostend Trade hurts the Dutch or us, he is forry for it; but could no more avoid that Engagement than he could feveral others, extremely disadvantageous to himself, and into which he was however obliged to enter; because he was obliged to purchase the Emperor's Alliance at any Rate; that therefore we must not blame him, who opposed the Establishment of the Ostend Company, whilft he could do it, without any Support from us; who never gave his Guaranty to it, till he was forced to do fo, by the Necessity of his Affairs; into which Necessity he was falling for above a Year together, without feeing the Hand of Britain once stretch'd forth to hinder it. Such Answers as these would certainly be given; and, in the Mouths of the Imperialists and the Spaniards, they would be just.

If, after all that has been faid this Gentleman is unable, upon my Notions, to account for the King of Spain's resolute flying from the Mediatorship of France, I am sure it is not my Fault. A few Sacrifices did indeed help to pacify Spain, and to reconcile her to France; and a few Sacrifices might, for aught I know, have reconciled our Quarrels; or, which is better, have prevented them. But as no one can foresee now when such Sacrifices will be made here; so neither could Spain, at the Time when she fent to Vienna, foresee

foresee when such Sacrifices would be made in France.

Upon the whole Matter, and to conclude this tedious Article; if the Way, in which I have endeavour'd to account for the Refolution taken by Spain to abandon the Mediation of Cambray, and to treat at Vienna, be not right; I should be glad to know what the right Way is. No other, which this Gentleman, or any reasonable Man will venture to support, has been yet pointed out. But I apprehend the Account I have given to be a just one; because it is built on Fact and Reason; because the Event hath, in every Respect, confirm'd it; and because it shews not only why Spain broke with France, and apply'd to the Emperor; but why Spain enter'd into these new Measures; after the Death of the Duke of Orleans; which it cannot be pretended she ever thought of doing, while that Prince was alive. If now this Account be a just one, many melancholy but useful Truths refult from it.

But I need not point out these Things. The World will discover them, without any Help of mine, and will judge how well the Enquiry hath been vindicated, by the Author

and Defender of it, upon this Head.

The next Point, upon which my Reasonings and Imputations are to be try'd at his Tribunal, is that of Gibraltar; and here he sets out, by accusing me (not in Terms indeed; but in a Manner almost as plain) of Lying; of direct, premeditated Lying. I will keep my Temper, though a Field large enough is open'd to me; and though the Provocation is not a little aggravated by the folenn Air, with which this Accusation is brought; by the Pretences to Patience, and Meekness and Candour; and by all the Appeals to God, with which my Accuser hath, in several Parts of this Treatise, endeavour'd to captivate the good Opinion of Mankind, and to establish his own Reputation, that he might make sure of ruining that of others. He calls to my Mind the Character of Mopsus in Tasso's Aminta.

I will have the Decency not to translate the Verses into English.

It is not necessary that I should say much about the fealousies, which this Author seems to complain arose at one Time, lest Gibraltar would be given up or artfully betray'd into the Spaniards Hands; nor about the vigorous Defence of it, which was made afterwards. Thus much however I will say, that when Sir fohn fennings was call'd home, with all the Troops embark'd on Board his Squadron, just before the Siege, and even from the Neighbourhood of Gibraltar; when the Spaniards were suffer'd,

fer'd under Sir Charles Wager's Eyes, to transport by Sea many Things necessary for the Attack of the Place; and when it was known that the Town wanted almost every Thing necessary for the Defence of it, People stood a-gaze, and not without Reason. The Cries of the Nation precipitated at last the Supplies; and the Vigour of the Garrison

made a glorious Use of them.

I come now to the Accufation, brought against me by this Writer. I said in my Letter to you, that the Spaniards ground their present Claim to the Restitution of Gibraltar on a private Article in a Treaty, made with them in 1721, stipulating the Contents of a Letter to be written by the late King, and on the Letter written in pursuance of this Ar-This is the Fact. The Accufation is, that there is no fuch Article in the Treaty; and many Words are employ'd to cut off all Pretences of Excuse, and to pin the Lye upon me. Now I defire it may be observed, in the first Place, how very exact and knowing a Critick this Gentleman is; who, after pronouncing with fo much Emphasis, that be bath read the Treaty himself, and finds no one Article belonging to it, which hath the least Relation to this Subject, proceeds to mention the Treaty, and quotes a wrong one. No Man would have imagined that fuch a Stipulation could have been supposed to be in the defenfive Alliance between Great Britain, France and Spain, of the 13th of June 1721, who

had known that there was a distinct private Treaty, of the same Date, between Great-Britain and Spain. But this it feems was a Secret to my Accuser; tho' the Treaty had appear'd printed in the fourth Volume of ROUSSET'S Collection, when he committed this Mistake. It was of this Treaty I meant to fpeak; and the Reason why I express'd myfelf in that Manner was this. I have had fome Years by me an Extract of this very Treaty, which was long kept a great Secret, and for the keeping of which Secret there is an express Provision in the fixth Article of it. When the Treaty became publick, I found that my Extract of the several Articles was exact; and therefore I gave the more Credit to the separate Article, mention'd in the fame Extract, as belonging to this Treaty, and stipulating the Contents of a Letter to be written by the late King. The Letter I never faw; but the Account I have had of it by those, who have read it, agrees with my Extract. All this induced me to think that there was fuch a feparate and more private Article, belonging to this private Treaty; nor was I at all surprized to see the Treaty come abroad without this Article; knowing full well that Treaties often appear, when the fecret Articles belonging to them do not. ----This is a true State of the Case; and will, I believe, sufficiently justify me for what I writ. But I have not yet done with my Accuser. Let it be, that no fuch private Article, as I

was led to suppose, does exist, or was ever executed. Will he venture to fay that no fuch Article was drawn up, as he expresses himself about the Treaty of Pacification? Will he venture to deny that if our Ministers were afraid to fign fuch an Article, and therefore did not fign it, the Reason, on which the Spaniards were induced to recede from this Point, was that fomething equivalent should be done; and that this fomething was his late Majesty's Letter to the King of Spain? I appeal, in my Turn, to the lowest Observer, as well as the highest, who hath gone about to deceive Mankind; this Author or I; this Author, who conceals from the World what he knows, or might know, with all the Means of Information, which he has in his Power, and what fets the Matter in quite another Light than he hath represented it; or I, who, having not the fame Means of Information, fell into an undefign'd Mistake; which does not alter the State of the Case, in favour of my Argument; fince if the Spaniards accepted of this Letter, which was writ in lieu of the Article, which was not fign'd; their Pretenfions (and nothing but their Pretensions are under Confideration here) will be still the fame.

As to the Letter itself; what I affirm about it is, that the Spaniards pretend it is a positive Engagement to restore Gibraltar to them. That this should be allow'd them, I am as far from agreeing as this Author can possibly be; but that

that the Letter is sufficient to keep up their Pretensions, I affirm; and that in Fact they do keep up their Pretensions, on this Foundation, is notorious. Was this Gentleman to dispute the Point with the Spaniards, he might comment as much, and diffinguish as subtily as he pleased, on the Terms of the Letter: the others would infift, that it was given them as an Engagement; that if they had not received it as fuch, they would not have departed from the Articles; and I doubt they would be apt to infinuate that we could not have found a more proper Caluist than himself, to distinguish us out of our Obligations, amongst their own Schoolmen, or amongst all the Sons of Loyola.

To speak seriously; it were to be wish'd extreamly, that the Spaniards had not had this Colour for persisting in their Demand of Gibraltar; or that it had been by an express and clear Stipulation taken from them; since it is certain that the Right and Possession of Gibraltar is nothing less than ascertain'd to Great-Britain by the Preliminaries as they stand; and consequently that all Claim of Spain to it

again is not extinguished.

I contradict him in his own Words, though none of the properest; and I will prove, in what I am going to say, either that he does not at all understand the Matter he talks so magisterially about; or that he attempts, in this Instance, to deceive the World, by giving wrong

wrong Interpretations to fome Things, and

by concealing others.

If then, although the Letter of the late King hath given the Spaniards a Pretence to claim Gibraltar, this Claim is effectually barr'd, and even extinguish'd by the first general Words of the fecond Article of the Preliminaries; how comes it to pass that Gibraltar was not specifically mention'd, in order to prevent any future Chicane? It will be faid, I know, that as the King of Spain's Accession to the Quadruple Alliance vacated any Promife, which my Lord Stanbope might have made; fo the King of Spain, by consenting to these Preliminaries, has vacated any Engagement of this Kind, which the Letter may be supposed to contain; and I, perhaps, shall be quoted again as one, who must necesfarily see the Force of this Argument. But this Author must not judge of my Eye-sight by his own; for I fee a manifest Difference between the two Cases. My Lord Stanhope's Promise is said to have been conditional; all allow that it was verbal; and I think it is allow'd likewise, that the late King never confirm'd it. The fimple Accession of the King of Spain to the Quadruple Alliance, might therefore be thought very justly fufficient to put the Matter, at that Time, out of all Difpute for the Reasons given by me, and quoted by this Author. But when the Preliminaries were to be fettled, the King of Spain's Claim to the Restitution of Gibraltar rested on an Engage-

Engagement, or what he took for an Engagement, enter'd into by the late King, and under his Majesty's own Hand. Besides, this Engagement, or Promise, whether valid or not valid, had been infifted upon as valid, in a formal Treaty, and had been made the Foundation of the second Article in the defenfive Alliance between the Emperor and the King of Spain, which relates to Gibraltar. It required therefore fomething more to put an End to a Claim, founded in this Manner, than to a Claim, founded on any Promise that my Lord Stankope could make. These Confiderations could never escape the Penetration of that most able Minister, who negotiated the Preliminaries; and therefore I conclude, first, that the Spaniards would not confent that Gibraltar should be mention'd specifically in the second Article; and, in the next Place, that they could refuse to consent to it on no Reason whatever, but this one, that their Pretenfions to Gibraltar would be kept alive, if it was not mention'd specifically, notwithstanding the general Words, so much infifted upon by this Writer. He has not therefore answer'd my Demand; nor shewn in the Preliminaries an Article, which is indeed as express and effectual a Confirmation of our Right to Gibraltar, as if the Word Gibraltar had been put into it. But he goes on, and observes, that the latter Part of this second Article greatly strengthens the former; because it is there stipulated, that if any Thing

Thing shall have been alter'd with restect to Rights and Possessions, or not have been put in Execution, the Alteration made, or the Thing not executed, is to be discuss'd in the Congress, and decided according to the Tenor of the faid Treaties and Conventions; that is, in his Sense, according to the Tenor of the Treaty of Utrecht, and of the Quadruple Alliance; for he mentions no other, except that of Baden, which hath nothing to do here. Now, fays he, nothing, either as to the Right of Great-Britain to Gibraltar, or to the Possession of it, bath been at all alter'd; nor bath there been any Non-execution, &c. From whence he infers, that our Right to Gibraltar is not included in this Description of Points left to be discuss'd in the Congress. But how could he avoid feeing that he affumes for granted the very Thing disputed? No Alteration hath been made in our Right to Gibraltar, fays he; therefore this Right cannot be discuss'd. An Alteration hath been made in this Right, fay the Spaniards, by a private Engagement taken with us in 1721; therefore this Alteration is to be discuss'd at the Congress. Who doth not see, that whether this Right shall be found to have been alter'd, and what the Alteration imports, are by this Preliminary to be discuss'd and decided at the Congress?

I think, I have now shewn what I undertook, and what this Gentleman challenges me to shew; that is, I have shewn those general Words in the Preliminaries, upon which the

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Spaniards

Spaniards may found a Pretence for reviving their Demand of Gibraltar; or, to speak more properly, since they have never ceased to make it, for continuing this Demand. But I have undertaken something more; and therefore will proceed to shew what this Gentleman was ignorant of, or what he conceal'd very unfairly, because it is decisive against him.

I think he could hardly be ignorant that the second Article of the Preliminaries not only recalls the Treaties of Utrecht and Baden, and the Quadruple Alliance, as he quotes the Article, but likewise all Treaties and Conventions, which preceded the Year 1725; which latter Words he does not quote. Perhaps, he judged them unnecessary. If he did io, he was much mistaken; for by the 5th Article of the Treaty of 1721, between Great-Britain and Spain, it is declared, that all the Pretensions of both Sides, touching Affairs not exposed in the present Treaty, and which Pretensions are not comprehended in the second Article of it, shall be treated of in the future Congress; which was at that Time the Congress at Cambray. Now let it be observed, that the Affair of Gibraltar is not one of the Affairs exposed in this Treaty. Let it be obferved also, that the Pretension of the Spaniards to Gibraltar, is not one of the Pretenfions comprehended in the second Article of it; and then let any Man deny, if he can, that, in the Intention of Spain, these Words were

were relative to the Pretension, which she acquired by the private Engagement, taken in the Letter so often quoted. If the Letter gave her a Right, as the infifts, it gave her a Pretension certainly to claim that Right, and this Pretension is carefully preserved by the Treaty of 1721. I do not fay among other Pretensions; for I think I may venture to say that all other Pretensions are specify'd in the Treaty; even that relating to the free Exercise of the Roman Catholick Religion in Minorca; and therefore these Words seem to have been fingly apply'd to the Pretensions of Spain on Will not the Spaniards now infift, upon these Foundations, that they enjoy'd, in 1721, a Right to demand the Restitution of Gibraltar, by Virtue of Conventions then made; and that the fecond Article of the Preliminaries preserves entire, to all the contracting Parties, whatever Rights, as well as Pofselfions, they had by Virtue of any Treaty or Conventions, antecedent to the Year 1725; and that therefore the first general Words of the second Preliminary preserve to them the Right of demanding the Restitution of Gibraltar, as a Right acquired by Conventions made before the Year 1725; whilst the last general Words of the fame preliminary Article preferve this Right as an Alteration made in the Treaty of Utrecht and in the Quadruple Alliance?

How little Weight foever the Defender of the Enquiry may allow to these Observations, O 3 which

which would I doubt have some in a Congress, yet he must allow that they ought not to have escaped him, or to have been conceal'd by him; fince they do certainly affect the Merits of the Cause, on which he has so pofitively pronounced Judgment, without any Regard to them. But I am almost ready to ask your Pardon, Mr. D'Anvers, for saying fo much on this Point, when there is another more clear, and more decifive still behind. Is it possible our Author should never have heard of a certain publick Instrument, containing a Declaration explanatory of the Preliminaries, made by the French Minister at the Pardo, on the 4th of March, 1728, and accepted and confirm'd by himself, and by the Imperial, British, Spanish, and Dutch Ministers on the fixth of the same Month? If this Instrument hath ever fallen into his Hands, and it is in every Body's else, did he never read these Words in it, that all Pretenfions, on all Sides, shall be produced, debated, and decided in the same Congress? The Difputes about Contrabands, and other Complaints made by the Spaniards concerning the Ship Prince Frederick, and the Disputes about the Restitution of Prizes, which Articles are taken Notice of in the Introduction to this Instrument, are, by particular Clauses in it, referr'd to the Discussion and Decision of the Congress. To what Purpose then were these general Words inserted? To what Purpose was it stipulated, that all Pretensions what soever

what soever (among which the Pretension of the Spaniards to the Restitution of Gibraltar must necessarily be included; since, whether ill or well founded, it is still a Pretension on their Side) shall likewise be reserred to the Congress; and that his Britannick Majesty shall be obliged to stand to what shall be decided upon the whole? But I forbear to press this Matter any further upon the Gentleman; since it would be, in some Sort, like stabbing him on the Ground.

I proceed to the Article of blocking up the Galleons; which is the last, upon which I am attack'd in the Defence of the Enquiry. And here I must observe again that he is very far from entering into a Refutation of the Arguments advanced by me to prove, that feizing the Galleons was a Measure liable to no Objection, and in every Respect preferable to that of blocking them up. He observes indeed, upon Mr. Hofier's Letter, that the Treafure had been taken from on Board the Galleons, when our Squadron arrived before Porto Bello. Now, without making any Reflections on the Intelligence brought from on Shore to the Admiral, and taking it for granted that all this Treasure was in Time removed out of his Reach; it will still be true that this Circumstance proves nothing in Defence of the Measure taken to block up the Galleons, and not to feize them; fince whether they would have the Riches on Board them or not, when Mr. Hosier should arrive, could not be 0 4 known

known, when his Instructions were drawn. If all these Riches had been actually at Porto Bello, when he came thither, he would have had, in Effect, nothing more to say to the Spaniards, than what the Orders they had received ten Days before from Old Spain imported; which was, that they should se-

cure the Money in the Country.

The fingle Point, infifted upon to justify this Measure, and which the Writer pronounces to be fufficient, is that the contrary Meafure, that of feizing the Galleons in Port, with all their Treasure on Board, if it had been practicable, would have put Europe into a Flame, by putting all the Proprietors of those Riches, whether French, Dutch or Spanish, into the greatest Uneasiness. At the fame Time he allows that taking these Ships, if they had attempted, by Force or Stealth, to come out, had been reasonable. Sure I am it is enough to fay in reply to this, that as to the Uneafiness, which such a Seizure might have given the Spanish Proprietors, it deserved no Confideration; that the French and Dutch Proprietors would have believed, or ought to have believed, their Effects as fecure in our Hands, as in the Hands of Spain; especially in a Point of Time, when they were, by Treaty at leaft, engaged on our Side in Opposition to Spain; and lastly, that the Distinction between feizing the Galleons at Sea, or blocking them up in Port, as if one was, and the other was not an Hostility, is very manifeftly

manifestly a Distinction without a Disserence; to prove which, I dare appeal to every Man in Britain, whether he would not esteem the Hostility as great, and the Insult greater, if a Spanish Squadron should block up Portsmouth, than if it should cruize in the Channel and take our Ships at Sea. The Gentleman cuts the Dispute short, by referring us to the Observations on the Conduct of Great-Britain; and I shall really join Issue with him, by referring, on my Side, to the Craftsman Extraordinary; in which these Observations are fully answer'd, and treated as they deserved to be.

Having mention'd the Galleons, our Author could not avoid taking fome Notice of a Question I ask'd, in answering Publicola, and which he allows to be very material. His Answers to it deserve a short Reflection or Since the Galleons are coming home, hath Spain renounced those Designs, which cur Fleet was fent to the West-Indies to prevent? Thus he states the Question; and his Answer is, truly I can't tell; nor can any one in the World, who is not in the Secrets of the Court of Spain. A little afterwards he asks the same Question; has the King of Spain renounced his Projects; that is, those Designs which our Fleet was fent to the West-Indies to prevent? His Answer is, yes undoubtedly, as far as Articles ratify'd by him can bind; and as far as any contracting Powers can be bound by Treaty to one another. Let us fee what

what is urged between the first and the second asking of the same Question, to produce such a wide Difference in the Answers. The King of Spain hath ratify'd the Preliminaries, in Consequence of which the Siege of Gibraltar is raised. Orders are sent to restore the South-Sea Ship; and he has promised, that the Effects of the Galleons shall be deliver'd. hath therefore renounced his Projects by Treaty: but whether he hath renounced them in his Heart; whether he will go on to act an open and bonest Part, that is more than our Author can tell. It is more likewise than any one will defire, that he or those, for whom he is an Apologist, should pretend to tell, or be answerable for. But let us see what they are answerable for; what has been really done by Treaty; what we have obtain'd to make us fome Amends for the rotting of our Ships; for the Loss of so many thousand Lives, and for the Depredations and Hostilities, which this Author founded so high formerly; and which were carry'd on with redoubled Vigour, during the pacifick Blockade of the Galleons .---The Effects of the Galleons are to be deliver'd. I congratulate the Dutch and the French upon it; but especially the latter, who have such immense Wealth on board them. Our Share is, I fear, a fmall one; too fmall to bear any Proportion to the Expence we have been at, or the Losses we have sustain'd .-- Orders are fent to restore the South-Sea Ship; but the Claims of the Spanirads either on that Ship,

or on any Account, are preserved to them, and referr'd to a Congress, by whose Decision we must abide; and nothing is stipulated, which may fecure to our Merchants a just Recompence for the numberless Seizures and Captures of their Effects and Ships .---- The Siege of Gibraltar is raised; but the Right to the Possession of that Place hath not been effectually put beyond Dispute. The Obstinacy and the Chicane of the Spaniards have prevail'd fo far, that they preferve, even by the Preliminaries, a Pretence for bringing this Right to be decided in the Congress; and I shall be glad to hear what Ally we have there, on whose good Offices we can depend for fecuring to us the Right of possessing, and the Possession of this important Place.----Upon the whole, I am extremely forry to find, that I was fo much in the Right, when I advanced that no Man could fay, with Truth, that the main Things, in Dispute between us and Spain, were yielded to us before the Return of the Galleons; unless he reckon'd our keeping Gibraltar, and I might have added the procuring Satisfaction to our Merchants, not among the main Things in Dispute, but among those of less Importance.---- I say very fincerely, that I had much rather have been refuted.

It appears, I think, from what hath been faid, that the Author and Defender of the Enquiry has not only been given up by his own Side, but even by himself, in several Particulars;

ticulars; and feveral other Points, which were infifted upon, in the Enquiry, and have been disputed in other Writings, are either not mention'd at all in the Defence, or in such a slight Manner as plainly shews the Author's Consciousness that he cannot support them, though he is very unwilling to give them entirely up; so that the Author gave a very partial Title to his last Production; which can be justly call'd, at best, a Defence only of some Points in the Enquiry; and is, more properly speaking, a Recantation of it, with

a few particular Exceptions.

But now, Mr. D'Anvers, what shall I say to you in Excuse for so many and such long Letters? the best Thing I can say, is to assure you, and I do it very solemnly, that I will trouble you with no more of them. The Gentleman, to whom I have now reply'd, may enquire and defend, as much as he pleases, without any farther Molestation from me. When I began to write on this Subject, I meant nothing less than the filly Ambition of having the last Word in a Dispute. I saw, like every other Man, the publick Distress. I thought I difcern'd the true and original Cause of it. The Affectation, which I obferved to turn us off from this Scent, fortify'd me in my Opinions, and determined me to examine what was alledged against them. I have done fo; and if in doing it, I have contributed in any Degree to open the Eyes of my Countrymen, on their true, and on their

their mistaken Interests, I have obtained the sole End, which I proposed to myself. I love and I hate; I esteem and I despise; but in a Case of this Moment, I should abhor myself, if any Regard to Persons, any Consideration, except that of Truth, had guided my Hand in Writing.

I begin by asking Pardon of this Author for an Injustice, which I have done him thro' Error, not Malice; and I shall conclude with assuring him, that upon whatever Principle he may have treated me, as I think I did not deserve, I lay down my Resentment with my Pen, and remain in Christian Charity

with him.

I return to the Business of my low Profession in Life; and if I was worthy to advise him, I would advise him to return to that of his high Calling; to feed the Flock committed to his Charge. That I may the more effectually perswade him to take a Resolution so much for his own Honour, and for the Advantage of the Church, I will exhort him to it, in the Words of the Apostolical Constitutions, with some very little Variation, in order to render the Passage more applicable.

Sit autem Episcopus turpis lucri non quæsitor, præsertim de Gentilibus; malitque detrimentum capere, quam inferre. Non sit

- " Let a Bishop then not be fond of ma-
- " king his Court for "Gain, and especial-
- " ly to the Gentiles.
- " Let him rather re-

avarus; non maledicus, non falsus Testis, non iracundus, non contentiosus, non negotiis, litibusque secularibus implicitus; non quo alio sponsor, aut in causis pecuniariis Advocatus. Non ambitiosus, non duplicis sententiæ, non bilinguis; calumniæ & maledicentiæ non cupidus auditor; non Hypocrita, fallaciis vanis non utens. Quiæ bæc omnia Deo funt inimica, Dæmonibus grata.

Constit. Apostolic. Lib. II. Cap. 6.

" ceive than do an In-" jury. Let him not " be given to evil " fpeaking, nor to bear " false Witness. Let him not be wrath-" ful, nor contentious. " Let him not be en-" gaged in the Bufiness " and Disputes of the " World. Let him not " he ready to answer " for others. Let him " not be the Advocate " of private Interest " in publick Causes. " Let him not be am-" bitious, nor double-" minded, nor double-" tongued. Let him " use neither Simula-" tion, nor Dissimula-" tion in his Conduct; " nor vain and falla-" cious Sophisms in his " Discourse. For all " these Things are " hateful to God, and " pleafing to the Dea vil.

I am,

Mr. D'ANVERS, &c.

ON

Good and Bad Ministers.

HILST a wicked and corrupt
Minister is weighing out Panegyricks and Dedications against just Satires and Invectives; or, perhaps, is numbering his Creatures, and teaching them their implicit Monofyllables; whilft he is drawing out his Screen, and providing for a safe and decent Elopement; or, it may be, comforts himself with the Hopes that the publick Joy, at his Removal, will drown all future Enquiries; or that he shall keep sweet a good while longer, till the Worm feizes his Carcass, and Posterity preys upon his Memory; it may not be improper to turn your Thoughts upon the Reverse of his Character, and to enquire by what Marks a good Minister may be found out and distinguished; or, fince he is only a Creature, by what Arts, and in what Method, he may be form'd and brought into Being. A People who are running the Hazard of a Death-bed Repentance, want nothing fo much as a good Minister; and

and a bad One dreads nothing more than an bonest Successor, who comes after him without treading in his Steps; takes his Place without giving into his Secrets; and will not be won by a Share of his Rapine to partake, at the same time, of his Crimes and Corruptions.

We know the mighty Hand, that is to form this Creature, and that the Breath of our Nostrils is to give him Being; but it is no Prefumption, no Infringement of the Right of Election, to trace out a general Character of many just and worthy Candidates. It is no Nomination, no Defignation to a particular Office, to describe a good Officer at large with all his Qualifications and Endowments. Neither the bonest Labourer. who discovers the Mine, or digs out the Ore; nor the skilful Artificer, who purifies, refines and weighs it, can in any Sense be faid to incroach upon the Authority of Those above him, who are appointed to make the last Esfay; to shape and mould it; and all These are Friends to Cafar, who finishes the Work, and gives it his own Image and Superfcription.

Let us then imagine a Number of Men, featter'd up and down a great, wife, and difcerning Nation; in their Descent noble and generous; sull of the Virtues of their Ancestors; in their Temper affable and sweetnatured; educated in the Knowledge and Study of our Constitution, its Laws, Settlements, Dependences and Interests; always faithful

faithful to the Crown, when confistent with their Duty to their Country; fonder of the Substance, than the Outside of Religion; easy in their Fortunes; Lovers of Mankind; more careful to preserve, than to aggrandize a Family; making Virtue the Foundation of their Friendship, and Merit the Title to their Favour; Preservers of the Freedom of others, as well as of their own; delighting rather to be thought good than great; pleased with any Opportunity of making their Fellow Creatures happy; just in all their Dealings; moderate in their Pleasures; true to the several Trusts, which have been reposed in them; watchful over the Accounts of others, and ready to fubmit their own to a full and impartial Inspection; not servile when out of Power, nor imperious when in it; studying more the Propriety of Oratory, than its Ornaments and Garniture; and speaking rather to the good Sense of others, than to their Passions or Interests; not solicitous for a Place, because they want it, but because the Place wants them; fo keen in their Refentments for the Publick, that they have no Room for those, which are personal; well acquainted with the most noted Characters and Transactions of late Years, indifferent in their Choice of publick or private Life, but careful to adorn both; and looking on the Revenue of an Office to be fo far publick Money, as it is intended for the Support and Dignity of that Office, to which it is appropriated.

priated.---- Men of this Character, Stars of this Lustre, are still stuck in good Plenty up and down our Hemisphere. The Changes of the Weather may sometimes hide, but cannot extinguish them. Their short-lived Obscurity is indeed their Advantage; for by This we know what it is to want them, and their Insluence. Their Brightness is try'd, and distinguish'd from Meteors and false Fires. The Regularity of their Courses is more observed; and their Glory, when it breaks out again, becomes doubly recommended.

Imagine now a Man, of this Order and Character, advanced to the Ministry. Suppose him not well acquainted with the Course and Dependence of many of the Offices and Branches of Trust under his Direction; and for that very Reason not over-forward to preferibe for Abuses, or admit of Corruptions upon the Plea of Custom; yet whilst it is natural for him to find out, or to place in these Offices fuch Men as most nearly refemble himself; he could never want good Intelligence both at home and abroad; clear and faithful Accounts. The Eyes, Hands, and Feet, which he borrow'd from others, would be fo much like his own, that he could not fail to fee clearly, act fairly, and walk uprightly. Such a Minister would with Pleafure meet a Senate, chosen as himself was, by the fame Marks and Qualifications. He would encourage fuch a Choice as his best Security ;

Security; and when the boni & legales Viri de Vicineto are return'd to Parliament, as well as upon Juries, the Electors do alike confult their own Honour and Interest. A triennial, or septennial Bribe, as ill-spent as it is illgotten, makes no Amends for the Loss of Credit and Reputation, which are the Support of Commerce; and it is as easy to prove, that the Corruption of some Boroughs is the Cause of their *Poverty*; as to prove, that their Poverty is the Cause of their Corruption. But to refume my former Subject .---- The Marks I have pointed out, and the Rules I have laid down, are of fuch Use to the Publick, in the Choice of a good Minister, that where only one of them (the Character of common Honesty) hath been attended to, and the rest have been barely guess'd at, or left to wild Chance; fuch a Choice has very often been more beneficial to a Country, than a Choice made upon the very Brink, or even from the Bottom of that horrible and dreadful Gulph, commonly call'd profound Policy .---I shall illustrate this Truth by one remarkable Instance, which I hope is too remote and farfetch'd, to be haul'd and wrench'd into modern Application. The Grand Seignior is faid to walk abroad very often incognito, and to have his Out-lets and Conveniencies, both in the Camp and Seraglio, where he can overfee the Assemblies of his Domesticks and Officers, and be his own Spy upon their Actions and Conversation. Listening one Day to the grand

grand Minister of his Kitchen, in a full Affembly of his own culinary Subalterns, closely debating the present Juncture and Posture of Affairs, (when Discontents ran high, and the general Voice laid the whole Blame upon the Prime Vizier) he heard the grand Master, then in the Chair, fometimes threatening Juflice, and denouncing Vengeance; brandishing his long Knife at the Close of every Period, fometimes shaking his Stew-Pan with --- Oh! He could toss up such a Dish of Politicks !--- And every Menace, every Period concluded with a Wish-That he was Prime Vizier but for one Month only .- The Grand Seignior took him at his Word; and, in a few Days, advanced him to that high Post next himself. Where all are Slaves, this Advancement was by no means furprizing. 'Twas a meer despotick Humour and Frolick; and perhaps done with a Defign to punish his Vassal's Presumption, by setting his own Knife to his Throat, upon the first false Step, or Mismanagement in his Conduct. But the Man was honest, and the Master agreeably disappointed. No Minister ever fill'd that Station, for many Years, with greater Honour and Reputation; or was better beloved both by Prince and People. He fed the Empire, as he had done the Emperor, with good, wholefome Diet, well cook'd and garnish'd. He strew'd Plenty every where, and feem'd, by his Conduct, to understand perfectly well that fine Maxim of Cæfar,

Cæsar, which deserves a whole physical, moral, and political Essay, fully to explain it— Let me have Men about me that are sat.

If Chance and Incident, or Caprice and Humour, can go thus far in the Choice of a good Minister, who at first setting out only stumbled upon good Sense, and common Honefty; what will not good Sense and common Honesty do, when join'd with those other noble Qualifications, of which I have given a Detail, and when mark'd out and distinguish'd by a regular and judicious Choice? They have made the Reigns of Minors, and of Monarchs, never out of their Minority, glorious and flourishing. They have transtorm'd Queens into Amazons, and confined the Faults of a foft and vicious Prince to a few Apartments; made them Darlings of their People, and their People happy under their Government. But where a Prince, truly wife and great, and good in himself, is surrounded by a Multitude of fuch Counfellors; to how amazing an Height, and to how many Generations may he extend his Grandeur and the publick Felicity?--- Such Minifters, under a Monarch, the Father of his Country, will confequently confider all his Subjects as Princes of the Blood, (so a merry Writer of the last Age call'd them) or, in the inspired, royal Style, as Flesh of his Flesh, and Bone of his Bone; not in a natural Sense; for Adoption is better than Nature. Such Ministers will put out the Revenues of their Master P 3

Master to Interest in the Pockets of bis Subjects; then, with a --- non rapui sed recepi, recall them upon a real Necessity. Such Mi-nisters will raise a standing Force, so very numerous, that it shall take in all the landed Gentry and trading Commons of a Nation; and perhaps 5 d. a Day is not fo good Encouragement, as when Men fight for their All; for they fight for their All, when they fight for a Prince, with whom they have but one common Safety and Interest. Such Ministers will not suffer the Law to be made the Back-Sword of Justice, which cuts only on one Side. They will not score up a War to the Reckoning, when the good Company have not had it in; nor palm a Truce upon us, with all its Accidents, for the real Body of a folid and lasting Peace, by a new political Trans-or-Consubstantiation. In short, they will not, like some old Roman Minions and Favourites, make a Statue of their Master, and then fly to it for Refuge.

OOOOOOOOOOO

ONTHE

Policy of the Athenians.

Hoc illud est præcipue in Cognitione Rerum salubre, ac frugiserum, omnis Te Exempli Documenta in illustri posita Monumento intueri; inde Tibi, tuæque Reipublicæ quod imitere capias; inde sædum Inceptu, sædum Excitu quod vites.

SIR,

T is so common a Failing to think that every Thing, which particularly affects us in Reading, will equally please and entertain others, that I hope you will excuse the Fondness of a young Student for an old Story, which I have lately met with in the History of Greece; and I fancy it may prove as agreeable an Amusement to others as it hath been to myself; but if you think otherwise, the Use it will be of to you in lighting your Pipe will make you some Amends for the Trouble of reading it.

Darius Hystaspis is the first, I think, who is mention'd in History to have been posses'd with the wild Ambition of universal Empire;

P 4

and

and in order to carry on this chimerical Defign, he made feveral unfuccessful Expeditions into Europe; where he was inform'd that Greece, which then made a very confiderable Figure in the World, would probably give him no fmall Opposition in his projected Conquests; particularly the Athenians, who with some of the Islanders, their Confederates, had given him a mortifying Instance of their Boldness and Resolution, by daring to affift their Colonies, in the leffer Afia, in their Endeavours to shake off the Persian Yoke and recover their antient Liberties. This was look'd upon as fuch an Affront to the Power of the grand Monarch, (as he is styled by the Historians of those Times) that nothing would fatisfy him but the intire Conquest of Greece; to which he was likewise continually solicited by Hippias. Son of the famous Tyrant Pifistratus, who upon being expell'd by the Athenians for invading their Laws and Liberties, had fled to Darius for Protection and Affistance to recover his Tyranny.

The Monarch, however, to give some Colour to his Quarrel with the Grecians, sent to the several States to demand Earth and Water from them, as an Acknowledgment of their Homage and Subjection to him; requiring, at the same Time, that the Ather

nians should restore Hippias.

Athens and Sparta, the most considerable States in Greece, fired with a just Resentment

ment at this haughty Demand from a free People, took his Messengers and threw them into deep Pits; telling them that there they might find Earth and Water for their King Darius; who, being enraged at this new Provocation, sent his Generals Datis and Artaphernes, with an Army of above one hundred thousand Men, to revenge such an open Desiance and Contempt of his Power, with Orders to bring the Athenians Prifoners.

It is well known that *Miltiades* with a very small Number of Men, animated with the glorious Love of Liberty, routed these numerous Forces at the famous Battle of *Marathon*, and for some Time secured the Liberties of *Greece*.

Darius, being very defirous to recover this Difgrace, employ'd all his Endeavours, with the Power and Riches of the Persian Empire, to make Preparations for a fecond Attempt; but dying before they were compleated, he left the Profecution of this Defign to his Son Xerxes; who, having raifed the greatest Army, that ever appear'd upon the Stage of the World, (being faid to be some Millions) march'd with them into Europe over a Bridge made cross the Hellespont; but before he enter'd Greece, he again experienced the Courage and Bravery of the Grecians, by the Stop that was put to the Progress of this incredible Multitude, with a very inconfiderable Number of Men, under Leonidas, at the País of Thermopylæ; which the Persians gain'd, at last, by the Treachery of a fugitive Greek, who led them a private Way over the Mountains to surround the Grecians.

The unexpected Success of this small Body with the Victory, which the Athenians fingly gain'd, foon after, over Xerxes's Fleet, would they hoped have been a fufficient Encouragement to the confederated Grecians, who had enter'd into a grand Alliance against the Persian, to have continued firm to them, in the Defence of their common Liberties; but when the Athenians proposed to attack the Persians, in order to prevent their marching into Attica, the Spartans with their other Allies, either from Treachery or Cowardice, or a Mixture of both, in a very shameful and infamous Manner refused to march, and deferted the Athenians, leaving them to struggle with those unequal Numbers, which it was impossible for them alone to resist; yet placing their Happiness in their Liberty, and their Liberty in their Valour, (as Thucidides expresses it) they did not even in this Extremity despair; but their Virtue and Courage taking new Force from their Distress, they abandon'd Athens to the Fury of the Persians, having first transported their Wives and Children to their Friends in the neighbouring Islands, and refolved with their Fleet, without any other Affistance, to conquer or dye, in the Defence of their Liberties.

This glorious Refolution, with their Knowledge and Skill in naval Affairs, which they had very happily cultivated, enabled them to gain an intire Victory over the Perfian Fleet. This fo terrify'd the haughty Xerxes, that he fled with the utmost Precipitation and Confusion to the Hellespont, and pass'd into Alia in a little Boat; and the Forces he left under his General Mardonius, to continue the War, being some Time afterwards intirely routed at Platea, Greece was absolutely freed from all farther Fears of the Perfians, folely by the Virtue and Valour of the Athenians; who, forgetting the former ill Treatment of their Allies, had besides the additional Merit of leaving Athens a fecond Time exposed to the Plunder of the Enemy, under Mardonius, rather than make a separate Peace with the Persian, who offer'd to render them full Satisfaction for all their Loffes in the War; to pay them a vast Sum of Money; and make them Sovereigns of all Greece; but they generously refused to be instrumental in enslaving that Country, which they had so bravely defended, and preferr'd the glorious Title of the Deliverers of Greece to all other Confiderations.

We may now look upon Athens in the Height of its Glory and Prosperity; and they would, in all Probability, have continued to be the last flourishing State in Greece, if they had been Masters of any Prudence, and improved the Advantages, which now

lay open to them; but fuch is the Uncertainty of all human Felicity, that we foon find them, by their foolish Conduct, gradually lofing all the Benefits of their amazing Successes in the War, till they, at last fell under the Power of that State, which owed its Being and Preservation to them. Athens therefore may be truly faid to date its Ruin from the Day of its Triumph over the Perfians; for prefuming upon her great Merits and fignal Services in defending and preferving the common Liberties of Greece, they grew haughty and infolent to all the neighbouring States; and wholly neglecting the Care of their own Affairs, they took all Occasions of intermeddling with those of their Neighbours; too often promoting Differences, in order to make themselves the fole Arbitrators and Umpires of them; by which Means they were generally fo unfortunate as to increase the Number of their Enemies, instead of making new Friends. But that, which raifed the greatest Resentment against them, was their pretending to prescribe Laws to the Trade of all Greece, and endeavouring to exclude the Megareans from any Share in it. This was made the Ground of the War between Them and Sparta, which was not a little offended at the imperious Manner, in which Athens claim'd the Right of holding the Balance of Power in Greece, which they were certainly in Poffession of, and might have long and cafily

eafily kept, if they could have been content with the Thing, without affecting to make a vain Shew of it, and thereby shocking the other Powers of Greece, equally independent with themselves; for nothing would have more effectually fecured the Superiority they aim'd at, than making Use of the great Reputation and Credit, which they had defervedly gain'd, by interposing their good Offices to reconcile the frequent Differences, which arose amongst the several States of Greece, ever jealous of their own Authorities : but whilst the Athenians kept within the Bounds of Moderation, the other States shew'd upon all Occasions the greatest Deference and Respect to their Mediation; and the whole of their Policy confifted in interpofing their Force, in Cases of Necessity only, to prevent the Weak from being unjustly oppress'd by their more powerful Neighbour; and in avoiding, as much as possible, to make themselves Parties, much less Principals in their Quarrels.

Such a wise Conduct would have given them Leisure and Opportunity to enjoy the Fruits of that Peace, which they wanted to recover the Losses and ease the Burdens of a long and heavy War, supported chiefly by them, and carry'd on at a much greater Expence of Blood and Treasure, than they had suffer'd at any Time, since the Foundation

of their State.

It is certain that they were under the happiest Circumstances to have effected this. foon after the War; for their great naval Power, which made them the undisputed Masters of the Sea, made them likewise equally esteem'd and fear'd by their Neighbours. To this we may add the Advantages of their Situation, and Knowledge in all maritime Affairs, with their numerous Ships and the Benefits of their Colonies abroad; which might have enabled them to improve and extend their Trade, the only true Source of Riches, beyond any other Nation, and would have foon put them into fuch a flourishing Condition, as would have deterr'd the most powerful of their Neighbours from entertaining any Thoughts of disturbing their Tranquility; and much more from entering into Projects of humbling, or fubduing them.

But they had the Misfortune for several Years, to groan under the Government of a Set of Ministers, who were too intent upon their own Interest to have any serious Regard for the Welfare of the Publick; though that was the constant Subject of their own Praises; and the better to carry on their selfish and mischievous Designs, and divert the People of Athens from looking into their Conduct, they not only promoted continual Dissentions amongst them, under the different Dissentations of Favourers or Oppesers of the former Tyranny of Pisistratus; but they likewise engaged them, on one Side or the other,

other, in every Quarrel, that arose not only in Greece, but in Asia and Places at the greatest Distance, upon the smallest Pretences of ancient Alliances, or Kindred with their Ancestors; by which Means they wasted their Strength and Riches in many fruitless and unnecessary foreign Expeditions, for no other Purpose than to make a Parade of their Power at Sea; and which had no other Effect than to encrease the Envy and Jealousy

of their Neighbours.

To support such extraordinary and extravagant Expences, they were obliged to raife almost as great and heavy Impositions, as they did in the Time of the Perfian War, to the great Decay of Trade and Impoverishment of the People; and though this was colour'd with the specious Pretences of extinguishing all Remains of the former War, and fettling a folid and lasting Peace; yet it did not prevent the frequent Murmurs and Complaints of the Publick; nor were there wanting Persons, who vigorously and honestly opposed Measures, which were so visibly destructive of the true Interest and Safety of Athens; Measures, which it would have been impossible to have continu'd, if the Heads of the Faction, who got Possession of the Government, had not found Means to delude the People, from Time to Time, with the great Advantages they were every Day to receive from an universal, establish'd Peace, by which they were to be deliver'd from

all Apprehensions of the Return of Hippias, or any of his Descendents; and the Balance of Power was for ever to be secured to the Athenians; a Notion which had been so successfully propagated in Athens, and so much intoxicated the Minds of the People, that there was no Imposition so gross, which their Leaders could not pass upon them, under this Pretence; and it was the never-failing Argument for silencing all Oppositions, and removing all Objections to the most chimerical Projects, or unreasonable Propositions in their publick Assemblies.

Athens was daily languishing under this unhappy Management, which would have brought certain Ruin upon her in the End, without the Calamity of the Peloponesian War; for nothing prevented it, but the continual Struggles of her great Men to supplant one another. This kept them in some Awe, and restrain'd them from doing all the Mischief, which they had both in their Inclination and Power; so that the Preservation of Athens, for some Time, may be said to be owing, in a great Measure, to the short Continuance of those in the Administration.

But Cimon, Aristides and Tolmidas, with feveral other considerable Men of real Merit and Abilities, who, notwithstanding some Failings, had done their Country very great and eminent Services; these Men, I say, happening to go off the Stage, very near one another,

who first subverted their Constitution, and then erected to himself an arbitrary Power, which ended in the Destruction of Athens.

He was a Gentleman of a private Fortune, but unmeasurable Ambition, which made him stick at nothing to advance himself in the State. For this Purpose he set out on the Foot of Liberty, and courted the Affections of the People, by pretending a Zeal for their Interest upon all Occasions; but when he had once made himfelf confiderable by these Methods, he threw off the Mask, and treated them with the utmost Insolence; by Turns betraying all those, who trusted him, and knowing no Friendships, or Enmities, but fuch as favour'd, or opposed his corrupt Purposes. He gave a very remarkable Instance of this, with Regard to Cimon, a noble Athenian of great Parts and Integrity; but one, whom Pericles hated and constantly opposed; for keeping him under that Subordination, which became his Station and Character. Yet Cimon afterwards falling under a Profecution from the People, he fcreen'd him in the publick Affembly, and then made a Bargain with him, to share the Government between them; but took an Opportunity to revenge himself in the Ruin of his Son Lacedæmonius, after his Father's Death.

As he was Master of great Volubility of Tongue, with a Knack of speaking plausibly

in publick, and had join'd to this a very daring and confummate Affurance; so he knew perfectly well how to improve them to his own Advantage, in supporting any Proposition, right or wrong, as it best suited his present Purpose; for nothing was more common than to see him in one Assembly with great Zeal consuting his own Arguments in a former one; and he never scrupled to contradict the most certain Truths, or to affert the most notorious Falshoods, in order to carry his Point, though sure to be discover'd a few Hours afterwards, having al-

ways an Evafion ready at Hand.

But notwithstanding the great Opinion, which he feem'd to entertain of his own Eloquence and Cunning, he was convinced they would prove but a very feeble and shortlived Support to him, without some better Affiftance. He therefore made Use of all his Art and Contrivance, to work himself into the Administration of the publick Revenues; in which he had the good Luck to fucceed, after the Death of Ariftides; who, having been long Treasurer of Greece, did not leave Money enough behind him to defray the Expences of his Funeral.----Happy had it been for Athens, if Pericles had fucceeded him in his noble Qualities, as well as Employment. But his Character was the Reverse of the good Aristides, and his Administration one continued Scene of Rapine and Profusion. Thus did he establish his Power

on a much more lafting Foundation than his Predecessors, by applying himself to the Foibles and Vices of Mankind, which are too often the furest Hold upon them; for though it is not to be imagined but that many Corruptions had fprung up, during the former Disorders and Weakness of the Government; yet some Remains of the Modefty and Virtue of their Ancestors had hitherto restrain'd the Athenians from an open and avow'd Prostitution of their Integrity; but Pericles, by the licentious Distribution of Bribes and Bounties amongst the People, foon extinguish'd all Sentiments of their former Honesty and Love of their Country, which he treated as the most ridiculous Fanaticism; and all the Endeavours of a few to oppose this Torrent of Iniquity were the publick and standing Jest of his Conversation.

This extravagant and unnatural Flow of the publick Money by Degrees introduced that Spirit of Expence and Luxury amongst all Ranks of Men, under the mistaken Notion of Politeness, which consumed the Estates of the best Families in Athens, and soon made them so necessitous, that forgetting their antient Honours and the Dignity of their Birth, they were not ashamed to become the known Pensioners of Pericles, living in as abject a Dependence upon him, as the meanest of the People.

Thus

Thus was univerfal Corruption spread over the whole State; and, to compleat their Misfortune, the very Money, which was referved for the Necessities of War only, was spent in debauching the Minds of the People, and what was design'd for their Preservation, turn'd to their Destruction.

As Pericles was not qualify'd by his Rank to be of the Assembly of the Areopagus; (the great and supreme Judicature of Athens;) so to remove every Obstacle to his Ambition, he employ'd all his Art to undermine their Authority, and by Degrees drew all publick Business of Consequence to the popular Assemblies; where, by the Assistance of Bribes, Pensions and Employments, which were all at his Disposal, he was secure of carrying every Thing almost without Opposition.

This, together with the scandalous Disrespect, with which Pericles affected to treat them upon all Occasions, and their slavish Submission, at the same Time, to all his Orders, falling in with the general Depravation of the Times, soon brought them into the lowest Contempt with the People, and destroy'd all Regard for that antient and august Assembly, which had for many Ages been the Bulwark and Desence of the Constitu-

tion.

After this fatal Blow to a State, which made the proudest Boast of its Liberties, and had ever shew'd the greatest Jealousy of any Incroachments upon them, Pericles obtain'd almost

almost as absolute and uncontroul'd a Power as the Tyrant Pysistratus himself; which gave Occasion to the calling him and his Creatures the new Pysistratides; for though it is well known that the Archons had the Exercise of the regal Power, yet we scarce read of any Thing but their Names, during the whole Ministry of Pericles; to whom all Applications, both at home and abroad, were constantly made; and he scarce left them the Shadow of Sovereignty.

But in the Height of this Prosperity, he was not a little disturb'd with the Threats of a War from Sparta; the Seeds of which, as is before observed, were sown soon after the End of the Persian War, and ripen'd into Action by the monstrous Conduct of Pericles, who by Turns provoked their Resentment, and courted their Friendship, in the most ig-

nominious Manner.

It would be tedious and unnecessary to enlarge upon the particular Differences, which had, from Time to Time, arisen between them, and increased the Animosities of the two States.

Many Endeavours had been used, to put an End to this uneasy Situation of Affairs; in which both States were under the Inconveniences and Expences of an actual War, though no formal Declaration had been made of one, and the Interruptions the Athenians found in their Trade, with the Continuance of very severe Taxes, occasion'd many loud

Complaints amongst the People; to quiet which a fort of Ceffation was agreed upon for five Years. This, however, lasted but a very short Time, the old Grudges breaking out again into new Hostilities; in the Pursuit of which both Parties being tired, a Peace was made between them for thirty Years, though it lasted between five and fix Years only, which were chiefly employ'd in forming new Alliances, in order to be prepared for War; each Side being very fensible that the Articles of the Treaty were only patch'd up for the present, but were not a sufficient Foundation for a lafling Peace; and accordingly they were very negligently observed on both Sides; but it was the Misfortune of Athens always to lose Ground by these short Intervals of Truce; for their unhappy Behaviour had irritated many of their Neighbours against them; and their confederated Subjects took the first Opportunity to chuse new Protectors, and free themselves from the grievous Impositions, which the Athenians had laid upon them, under the Pretence of raifing Supplies for the War.

Pericles, well foreseeing the fatal Consequences, which an open Rupture with Sparta would be to his Affairs, neglected no Endeavours to prevent it; and it is, not improperly, faid that the Age of Negotiation then began in Greece. Ministers and Ambassadors were seen continually posting not only over all Greece, but even in the adjoining Kingdoms of

of Macedon, Thessaly and Thrace; both Sides endeavouring to engage them in new Alliances in their Favour; and Pericles was not ashamed to court the Friendship even of the Persians, to whom he had formerly profess'd so much Enmity and Hatred, by putting the Ballance

of Power in their Hands.

He did not make a much better Bargain for his Country with some other of their Allies, who owed their Preservation to Athens, and pretended the greatest Friendship for them; yet being in Hopes of an Addition of Power and Wealth, by the Diminution of the Trade of Athens, and the Decrease of their naval Strength, in Consequence of it, they very faintly supported the Interests of the Athenians, and remissly discharged the

Obligations of their Alliances.

Pericles, to remedy these growing Mischiefs, endeavour'd to gain over to his Interest some of the neighbouring Powers, by the Proposition of certain wild and impracticable Projects; fuch as joining the Forces of Athens to theirs, and making new Accessions to their Dominions, by altering the Dependencies of some of the leffer Principalities of Greece; but this Scheme gain'd him nothing but Shame and Contempt; fo that after much Time and Labour had been spent in these fruitless Negotiations, he had Recourse to the fame Methods abroad, which he had found fo very fuccessful at home, and back'd all his foreign Transactions with the Offers of a round

round Sum of Money; by which Means he engaged many of the lesser States of Greece to lend their Names, at least, to his new Alliances, and kept some of the savourite ones in constant Pay, under the Pretence of making good their Expences, in keeping Troops to assist Athens upon Occasion, though they never raised one Man more for their Service.

As he could not treat in the same Manner with the greater Powers, he made his Application to their Ministers, whom he judged by himself, and endeavour'd that Way to gain them to his Interest. Most of them took his Money; and, perhaps, excused themselves by their Intentions of neither doing him any Good, nor their Country any Harm; for they only amused him with Intelligences of pretended Secrets, many Falshoods, and Things of little, or no Confequence.

By this infamous Management, Athens was made the common Tributary of all Greece and the neighbouring Powers; not only to the great Waste of the publick Treasure; but, what was worse, these mean Condescensions from a State, which had for many Ages made so considerable a Figure in that Part of the World, lost them all their former Authority, and brought Athens into

the utmost Contempt.

However Pericles endeavour'd, from Time to Time, to varnish over the present State of Affairs;

Affairs; continually amufing the People with Affurances of the Successes of his Negotiations abroad; and even the Perplexity of them was of Benefit to him; for it help'd to divert the Publick from looking into his Conduct; his Creatures, upon the least Offer at it, crying out that Divisions at home would give the greatest Encouragement to the common

Enemy.

The present Uncertainties gave him likewife fome Pretence for supplying his vast Expences, either to carry on Engagements to prevent a War, or for making the necessary Preparations to begin one; and thus Arguments were never wanting to fleece the People, who in vain complain'd of the great Profusion of the publick Money, without any Account having been given of it by One, who had for fo many Years the fole and abfolute Disposition of their Revenues; whereas it had ever been usual before his Time for the Prytanis, who were a Committee of the Senate, annually to examine the publick Accounts, in the most folemn Manner, being sworn upon the Altar, before they enter'd upon that Office, to discharge their Duty with the utmost Impartiality, Fidelity and Justice to their Country.----So careful have all wife Governments ever been to preserve this Branch of the Administration from Corruption; well knowing that without it all other Precautions would be vain and ineffectual to support the Liberties of a free People.

As Pericles fell under the general Cenfure of the People, on this Account, fo he did not escape being several Times charged in the publick Assemblies with the visible Corruption of his Management; which once went to far that Dracontides, as Plutarch informs us. carry'd a Refolution, or Decree, for impeaching him of embezzling the publick Treafure; but Agnon, one of his Creatures, by the Alteration of some Words, render'd it ineffectual; and by these little Arts and Shifts, which too many of his Dependents in the Senate were always ready to countenance and support, he baffled all Endeavours to obtain any Account of the immense Sums, which he had fpent, during his Administration.

But it would have been impossible for him to have flood the general Clamour and Demand of the People for bringing him to Justice, if he had not had Recourse to a new Artifice, which no Minister before him had the Assurance to attempt. This was a Proposal for allowing him ten Talents for Secret Service-Money; which, though no very great Sum, yet as it was understood, and even acknowledged by himself, to be the Wages of Iniquity, it was giving a publick Sanction to Corruption, and was a Precedent, that at once quite overturn'd all the antient Checks and Controuls, by which their Ancestors had, in the strictest Manner, guarded against the Embezzlement of publick Money; the Disposal of which was, by this Stroke, put into the absolute

absolute Power of him, who was at the Head of the Treasury; for under this Cover, he had the most unlimited Scope to supply any Expences, under Pretence of the publick Service.

One would think that nothing more could have been defired to gratify the most insatiable Thirst of Power and Dominion; but such were the extravagant Expences of Pericles, in unprofitable Negotiations abroad, and fatisfying the craving Importunities of his Dependents at home, who always rose in their Demands in Proportion to the Difficulties, in which they faw him engaged, and the Want he had of their Service, that though he fear'd no Repulse to the most unreasonable Demand of new Supplies, yet being conscious himself of his exorbitant Expences, he began to be ashamed that the People should see what Money he confumed. He therefore refolved to make one bold Step more, to fecure himfelf of a Fund, which would at once fully answer his Purposes and conceal his Profusions. This he put in Execution, by feizing upon the facred Treasure at DELOS, which was deposited there by the common Consent of the States of Greece, to be kept inviolable, never to be touch'd but in Case of the utmost Extremity, and that not without their unanimous Advice and Confent.

Such an open Violation of the publick Faith raifed the Clamours of all *Greece* upon Pericles; which he endeavour'd to palliate at first first with the Pretence of its being in greater Sasety, and the Advantages, that might be made of it, by employing it for the Benefit of the Publick; but when he saw how few there were, who had the Virtue or Courage to oppose him, even in this extreme Act of Violence, he grew bolder, in a little Time, and being pres'd upon this Article, openly defy'd them in the publick Assemblies, and with the most assuming Arrogance declared, that the Money, when it was once granted, was no longer theirs, who gave it, but theirs, who received it.

He soon after follow'd this with another Declaration; that the Necessities of the State, of which he was to be the Judge kimself, were above all Laws, and that nothing was so sacred but that even the Plate and Riches of the Temples might be seized, and Restitution made afterwards; well knowing that it would not be in his Time, nor any Part of his Concern.

This great Treasure being now wholly in the Possession of Pericles, he had no farther Trouble than to give such Account of it to the Publick as he thought sit; for any Proposal of appointing Persons (as was the antient Custom) to examine his Books, or count the Talents remaining, was opposed with the old Cant of distrusting so virtuous an Administration, as his Creatures had the Impudence to call it, and forwarding the Designs of the Enemy, by raising Divisions at home; the

the constant Artifice of those, who are engaged in Measures destructive to their Country, and are fenfible that their Actions will not bear Examination; whereas, in Truth, no Enemy is fo dangerous to a free People as these domestick Spoilers; for though Nations may, and often have been, laid wafte by foreign Invaders; yet many of them have recover'd their antient Freedom and Prosperity. as Athens itself had lately done, after all the Malice of the Perfians; whereas History affords us no Example of any Nation, that ever regain'd their Liberties, when they had tamely confented to the Loss of them, or infamoufly fold them to their Governors for the present Supply of their Luxury and Vices; but their unhappy Posterity have for ever groan'd under the Inheritance of Slavery, deliver'd down to them by their Fore-Fathers -But to return to Pericles.

His Success, which even exceeded his own Expectations, struck every honest Athenian dumb with Astonishment at the continued, abject Compliances of their Fellow-Citizens. Pericles now flatter'd himself that his Authority and Power were so firmly established, as to be out of the Reach of all Accidents. This made him so haughty and insolent, that he became grievous to his own Creatures, and the Object of universal Odium; which was not a little heighten'd by the growing Necessities of the State, and the Poverty of the People; so that the former Clamours were again remew'd

new'd with great Warmth and Violence for an Account of the Disposition of the Money which had been diffipated during his long and expensive Administration. This rouzed his Apprehensions and threw him into great Perplexities; which his Relation Alcibiades taking Notice of one Day, when he was more melancholy than usual, he ask'd him the Reason of it. Pericles told him that he was confidering how to make up his Accounts with the Publick; to which this young Profligate (who gave fuch an early Instance of the Mischies he was one Day to bring upon his Country) reply'd that he had much better confider how to avoid giving any Account. Unhappily for Athens, he took his Kinsman's Advice, and feeing no other Way to escape and divert the impending Storm from burfting upon himself, he chose to turn it upon his Country, by plunging them into a War with Sparta.

The Spartans, notwithstanding the Inclination they had shewn to begin the War, yet when Things came near to an Extremity, still express'd a Desire of continuing the Peace; and at last offer'd to desist from it, in Case the Athenians would consent to take off the Restraint from the Trade of the Me-

gareans.

Pericles, in along Speech, disfluaded them from accepting the Conditions offer'd, by telling them that though this was a Matter of no great Consequence, (as, in Truth, it was not)

yet the Manner, in which it was ask'd, made it necessary for the Commonwealth to shew their Firmness on this Occasion, in order to support their Honour, and prevent the Attempts of suture Impositions upon them, in

Matters of greater Concern.

This determined the venal Assembly for War, which was soon after begun by the Siege of Platea, a strong Town of great Importance, and the only Acquisition of the Athenians by all their glorious Successes over the Persian; which however, in the Course of the War, was scandalously neglected by the Athenians, and fell a Sacrifice to Sparta.

Some Endeavours were used to terminate the War foon after it begun by a Truce made for a Year, in order to agree upon preliminary Articles of Peace; but they were never fettled in fuch a Manner as to take Effect; and a Peace, that was afterwards concluded between them, had little better Success, the Articles being never put in Execution, or comply'd with on either Side; but the short Time it lasted was spent in breaking and renewing Alliances with their Neighbours in fuch a Manner, that it would require copying out the fifth Book of Thucydides to repeat the mutual Infidelities and Treacheries practised by Athens and Sparta, during this Cesfation, which both Sides were more tired with than the War; and all Greece, with the neighbouring Powers, being now one Way or other engaged, it was foon renew'd with with the greatest Animosity, and at last ended in the intire Reduction of Athens to the Subjection of Sparta; a Fate, which they might in all Probability have escaped, if Pericles had either had the Honesty to have preserved the Peace, by sorbearing to intermeddle, where he had nothing to do, or the Spirit to have begun the War sooner, before Athens was quite exhausted, and had lost all Credit

abroad by his wretched Management.

It ought however to be remember'd, for the Honour of that learned State, that the most celebrated Wits and Poets of Athens endeavour'd to open the Eyes of their Countrymen, and animate them against Pericles, by exposing his Conduct in fatirical Poems and Invectives, but they were too far gone in Luxury and Corruption to recover their antient Spirit, being continually footh'd in their Vices by a fet of profligate Writers, whom Pericles had pick'd up and employ'd in his Service. These Fellows were so abandon'd, that they not only made a Jest of Liberty, and justify'd all the Methods of arbitrary Government, but put their Patron in Competition with 'Jupiter himself, and flatter'd him with the Appellation of Olympius, at the fame Time that he was precipitating the Destruction of their Country.

Thus we see that the over-grown Power, Ambition and Corruption of one Man brought Ruin upon the most flourishing State in the Universe; and there are not wanting

Instances

Instances of the like Kind in History to convince us that the same Conduct will have the same Consequences in all Ages and all Nations.

I am, SIR, &c.

PHIL-ATHENUS.

OCCUPATE OCCUPATION OC

ONTHE

Power of the PRINCE,

AND THE

Freedom of the PEOPLE.

--Furono veramente tutti i Rè principio Capi, e non Rè, di Republiche, e non di regni. Ma poi il lungo uso hà fatto che i Populi si siano disposti et anuezzati all' habito dell' intiera ubbidienza, come apunto suole assuefarsi una pianta, & un corpo humano a viuere, in terreno, e sotto clime diuerso dal suo naturale.

Card. Bentivoglio Relatione delle Prov. unite de Fiandra. Lib. 3.

Writings I have taken the Motto to this Paper, was a Man on all Accounts little to be suspected of savouring the Cause of Liberty; much less of writing strongly and R boldly

boldly for it. But the Love of it is innate in the Mind of every Man; and however we may be depraved by bad Education, however inflamed by Party, Interest, or the Spirit of Opposition, yet whenever we grow cool, and are not immediately agitated by our Passions, that Spirit breaks out, and shews itself even in those, who are the greatest Abettors of

arbitrary Power.

Thus the Cardinal, borne down by the Force of Reason, and the Influence of this Principle of Nature, expresses in this Sentence not only his own Opinion, but that of all Mankind, though private Reasons may induce many to profess themselves of contrary Sentiments; nor is it impossible for fome Men, weak in their Natures and warm in their Tempers, to be either fo far seduced by the Arguments of defigning Men, or fo heated by political Contentions, as even to become in some Manner convinced, that they have no natural Right to Liberty; and that their Princes are born with a just Title to that arbitrary Power, which is always the Child of Fraud, or Ujurpation.

It is our great Happiness that his present Majesty's Dominion is founded upon a better Title than either the Jus divinum, or bereditary Right. He owes it purely to the Voice of the People in Parliament. He got it by their Favour, and will keep it by their Affection; nor is it less for the Advantage of his Family, or for that of the Nation, that

he came to the Throne upon these Terms: The Limitations and Conditions, by the due Observance of which he is entitled to it, will ferve as a certain Rule to his Posterity, by which if they guide themselves, they may depend upon the Hearts and Purses of their Subjects to all Eternity. His Predeceffors had not the same Advantages. They were bred up in a Notion that their Prerogative entitled them to do what they pleased; nor were the Privileges of the People fo firmly ascertain'd. This occasion'd perpetual Jealousies, gave Opportunities for evil Ministers to impose upon the Prince, and for seditious Persons to inflame the People. It often gave Rife to unwarrantable Acts of Power; and thus frequently exposed both the Royal Family and the Nation to the utmost Confusion:

Machiavel, in his political Discourses, lays down this Position; that no Government can long enjoy Liberty, unless it be frequently brought back to its first Principles. It is the Nature of all Government to degenerate. As it grows older, it gradually deviates and slies farther from its first Intention, which is singly the Advantage of Society; till at last it attains such a Degree of Corruption, that its Order becomes entirely inverted; and that Institution, by which the Prince was first only the Servant of the Publick, obliges the Publick to be Slaves to the Prince. For this Reason he recommends a frequent Renewal of the Constitution. The various Revolu-

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tions in this Kingdom have, in a great Meafure, answer'd this End. They have purged off the Luxuriances of Power; and though few of them have gone so deep as to bring us back to the primitive Purity of our Constitution, yet they have still preserved us a free People, when Liberty is lost in almost every

other Part of Europe.

The last Revolution has done more for us than any of the rest. I would not be underflood to speak of that, which was brought about in Favour of our great Deliverer the Prince of Orange. I mean that, by which the prefent Royal Family were feated upon the Throne. This happy Change in our Government, though it is not mark'd out by any fuch Appellation, is the most important we have had. It has amounted within a few Degrees of that Reduction to the first Principles of Government, which Machiavel recommends. Our Constitution has received a new Spring from it; and had we taken Care to guard against a few Inconveniencies, as we might have done, or used the same Caution to prevent new Dangers, as to redress old Grievances, our Liberties had been deliver'd down to our Posterity, after a thoufand Years, more fecure and with a greater Prospect of long Duration, than at the very Beginning of the Commonwealth.

The Sentence prefix'd to this Paper contains an Account of the first Powers, with which Princes were invested. It alledges,

that the present Power of unlimited Monarchs owes its Rise only to an Abuse of the first Trust reposed in Them; to which (though repugnant to human Nature) by gradual Steps and long Use, Men were insensibly habituated. The original State of Monarchy is justly described very different from what it is now in all arbitrary Governments. Kings were then no more than Chiefs, or principal Magistrates, in

States Republican and free.

It ought to give every Englishman the greatest Satisfaction to find the Constitution we now live under, fince its last Renewal, bearing fo near a Resemblance to primitive Liberty. Our Princes are now, in a great Meafure, upon the same Foot with these Chiefs, or principal Magistrates of old. They have Authority given them to defend the Laws of the Land, but not to break them. have too lately received their Crown from the Hands of the Nation to forget that it is to them only they owe it, and that consequently they can be entitled to no Powers but what are granted by them. The People must still remember that their own Hands adorn'd the Temples of their Kings, and can have Recourse to known and positive Laws, if Privilege and Prerogative should ever clash. They are no longer to be abused by the Sound of Words; nor will they fuffer themfelves any longer to be duped into an Opinion, because most of those, who have enjoy'd the Title of King, have also enjoy'd an arbitrary Sway, R 3

Sway, that therefore regal Authority must inevitably import an absolute Dominion. They justly look upon this Word as one of the many, which have different Meanings; and fignifies with us no other than a third Estate, superior to every Individual, yet inferior to the collective Body of the People, whose Advantage and Prosperity were the

only Causes of its Existence.

The Ast of Settlement has obtain'd all these great Advantages for us. That Compast between Prince and People, which has been formerly treated by some Persons as a mere Chimæra, is now no longer to be disputed. In that Ast are contain'd certain Stipulations and Conditions, under which the Prince has consented to accept, and by which Tenure only he holds his Crown. By these Means every Subject in the Nation may know the precise Extent of his Prince's Power, and the Measures of his own Allegiance; how far and how long he is bound to obey.

It would be tedious to enumerate the many wise and prudent Restrictions of this our second Magna-Charta. I shall only mention two of the fundamental Points of this publick Act, which sufficiently evince the Care and Zeal, with which the Parliament, on this Occasion, pursued the Interest of the Nation. They even seem, if we may judge from what has since happen'd, to have carry'd their Caution beyond the Bounds of absolute Necessity, or Prudence. Being apprized that the Dominions

Dominions of the present royal Family were very confiderable abroad, and not knowing how far their Tenderness for their native Country might carry them to the Prejudice of this Kingdom, they made thefe two Points the principal Conditions of their Government; first, that the King should never leave his British Dominions without Confent of Parliament; and secondly, that he should never engage England in any Broils relating to his foreign Territories. I think I may venture to fay, without any Reflection upon the Prudence of the Parliament, who infifted upon these Conditions, that they were upon this Occasion, a little deficient in good Manners; but this Error may be forgiven, as it proceeded from their Zeal, and we have fince corrected it, by abandoning those two Points, of which I have been speaking; the first soon after his late Majesty's Accession. to the Throne; the other not long ago, in that just, honourable, and ever-memorable Resolution of the House of Commons, by which we engaged to support and maintain bis Majesty's German Dominions, with the utmost Efforts of Great-Britain.

The remaining Articles of the Act of Settlement are of such a Nature, that we have no Reason to fear they will be dispensed with. I have already shewn how much it is the Interest of the Prince, as well as the People, to maintain them. I have mention'd many Advantages arising from a Settlement esta-

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blish'd

blish'd on the Foot of Liberty. They are such, that I think any Man, who endeavours to raise the Prerogative one Step higher than it stands at present, or even argues in Favour of such Conduct, either with a View to seduce the People, or to ingratiate himself with his Prince, is the worst of Traytors, and deserves the Curse and Hatred of the whole Community.

Sir William Temple, in his Observations upon the Dutch Republick, made this judicious Remark.——" That this stomachful "People, who could not endure the least

"Exercise of arbitrary Power, or Imposi-

"tions, under the Spanish Government, have been fince inured to digest them in the

" highest Degree, under their own popular " Magistrates; bridled with bard Laws;

" terrify'd with fevere Executions; environ'd

" with foreign Forces; and oppress'd with the most cruel Hardships, and Variety of

"Taxes, that was ever known under any

" Government."

The Reason of this great and general Content, under the most severe Oppression, was only this; that they found every one subject to the same Law. The Persons in the Administration could make no Advantage from the publick Calamities. On the contrary, they selt the Weight of the publick Missortunes more heavily than those, who had less Interest in the general Welfare. It was never observed in that Country, that the principal

principal Men in the Commonwealth encreased in Riches, in Proportion as the Country grew poorer, or the Publick labour'd under heavier Taxes. These Evils were well guarded against by their Constitution; and therefore they consider'd all their Missortunes as a wise and just Regulation of Providence for some important Ends, which consequently they never repined at.

The Hanover Succession under the Limitations, which I have mention'd, and on which it is founded, has obtain'd, in a great Measure, these Advantages for us. The Prince himself is now subject to the Law, and the Ast of Settlement bind him equally

with the meanest Peasant.

The Benefits of this excellent Establishment are not fo eafily discover'd, 'till some Abuses happen. But if ever a weak and corrupt Administration should arise; if an evil Minister should embezzle the publick Treafure; if he should load the Nation, in Times of Peace, with Taxes greater than would be necessary to defray the Charge of an expenfive War; if the Money thus raised should be expended, under the Pretence of fecret Services, to line his own Pockets; to stop the Mouths of his hungry Dependents; to bribe some future Parliament to approve his Meafures; and to patch up an ill-digefted, base, dishonourable Peace with foreign Powers, whom he shall have offended by a continued Series of Provocations and Blunders; if he fhould

should advise his Sovereign to make it a Maxim, that his Security confifted in the Continuance, or Increase of the publick Debts, and that his Grandeur was founded on the Poverty of his Subjects; if he should hazard the Affections of the People, by procuring greater Revenues for the Crown, than they should be able to spend, or the People be well able to raife; and after this engage his Prince to demand still farther Sums as his Right, which all Men should be sensible were not his Due; I fay, if the Nation should ever fall under these unhappy Circumstances. they will then find the Excellence of a free Constitution. The publick Discontent, which upon fuch Occasions has formerly burst forth in a Torrent of Blood, of universal Confusion and Desolation, will make itself known only in faint Murmurs, and dutiful general Complaints. The Nation will wait long, before they engage in any desperate Meafures, that may endanger a Constitution, which they justly adore, and from which they confidently expect a fure, though perhaps a dilatory Justice, upon such an enormous Offender.

These are the inestimable Advantages of our present, happy Settlement. Let us prize it as we ought. Let us not have the worse Opinion of the Thing itself, because it may, in some Instances, be abused. But let us retain the highest Veneration for it. Let us remember

remember how much it is our Right, and let us resolve to preserve it untainted and inviolate. Thus shall we truely serve our King; we shall do our Duty to our Country; and preserve ourselves in the Condition, for which all Men were originally design'd; that is, of a free People.

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OF THE

Constitution of Great-Britain.

charging others with forming Republican Schemes, when they themselves are the Persons, who in Effect, and by the necessary Consequence of their Way of Reasoning, have been placing our excellent Constitution in a most ridiculous and contemptible Light. According to them, it is no better than a Jumble of incompatible Powers, which would separate and fall to Pieces of themselves, unless restrain'd and upheld by such honourable Methods as those of Bribery and Corruption; for how is it possible for any Man, under any other Notion, to plead for the

the Necessity, or for the Fitness of Places and Penfions, or any pecuniary Influence among the Members of the House of Commons? If any Dependance or Biass created by fuch Motives, were really necessary, it would prove that the Form of our Government itself was defective to a Degree of Ridiculousness; that it was a Constitution. having a Representative of the People, which must be engaged not to represent them; nor to vote and act, as they would vote and act, if uninfluenced by private Interest, or corrupt Motives. Now, if such an Influence, or Dependence, was univerfal and unlimited throughout the whole House, the Monarchy would be absolute, and whenever this Influence prevails in any Degree, it tends to arbitrary Power. For this Reason the true Friends of Liberty must perpetually guard against such Influences; which is not fetting up a new Form of Government, but preserving the old.

Our Constitution may, in some Sense, be said to be a fleeting Thing, which at different Times hath differ'd from itself, as Men differ from themselves in Age and Youth, or in Sickness and Health; but still it is the same, and it is our Duty to preserve it as far as we are able, in its sull Strength and Vigour. I don't know a more useful Turn of Mind, and what will contribute more to this End, than that, which disposeth us to observe the several Changes in our Constitution; the Causes,

Causes, which have produced them; and the Consequences attending them. I don't pretend, for my Part, to enter far into this Subject; but will only offer some sew Observations on what hath happen'd of that Kind, during the Reign of King WILLIAM and Queen Anne, and I leave it to other Pens to remark farther back, or to continue such Remarks farther on.

At the Time of the Revolution, our Constitution received a confiderable Strength by that AET, which is called the Declaration of Rights; by which, we hope, an End is put to the dangerous Claims and Practices of some former Reigns; fuch as that of a Power in the Crown to dispense with the Execution of the Laws, as also that of keeping up a standing Army in Time of Peace without Confent of Parliament; and fome other Particulars, which are contained in that Act. I don't reckon that we obtain'd any Thing new by it; any Thing that was not our just Right before; nor does it provide such Remedies for us, or such Penalties for the Offenders against it, as might have been contriv'd; yet it is an Advantage to have that expresly declared and acknowledged to be our Right, which had once been brought, how unjustly foever, into Dispute.

About five or fix Years after this, we obtain'd the *Triennial Act*; which was an additional Security to our *Liberties*; for though it may feem, from the Reason of Things

and antient Usage, that Parliaments ought to have been either annual, or to continue no longer than till the particular Business, for which they were fummon'd, was finish'd; yet by the Precedents made of the long Continuance of the same Parliament, in the Reigns of Charles the first and second, it was become fit and requisite to enact, by an express Law, that there should be a new one, at least, once in three Years. It may, perhaps, be wonder'd that this was not taken Care of in the Declaration of Rights; for though it is declared that Parliaments ought to be held frequently; (by which might not improperly be understood new Parliaments) yet in a Matter of fuch Importance, one might have expected more clear and positive Expressions. The only Reason I can affign for this is, that that Declaration was chiefly intended to affert and affure to us those Rights, which had been invaded by King James. Now, that of holding the same Parliament for a long Term was no Part of the Complaints against his Government; fince during his short Reign he call'd but one Parliament, and that he diffolved abruptly at their fecond Seffions.

But I proceed to mention those other Acts, which King William pass'd, for securing to us free Parliaments, and consequently our Constitution and Liberties. There was one, to prevent double and false Returns; another to prevent Bribery; another to prohibit Commissioners in the Excise sitting in the House;

and by a Clause in an AET of the 12th of his Reign, which in the Act of Settlement, it was provided that after his Decease, and the Decease of the then Princess Anne, no Person, who had any Office or Place of Profit, under the King, or received any Penfion from the Crown, Should be capable of Serving as a Member of the House of Commons. passing those Lawe was certainly giving Strength and Security to our Liberties, in the most important and effential Article; for the Freedom and Independency of this Assembly is undeniably the Support of them all, and upon which the Fabrick of our whole Constitution depends. The Members of this House are the Trustees and Guardians of all we have, and of all our Posterity.

I will add one Instance more of the Advantage, accruing to the Cause of Liberty, under the Reign of that glorious Deliverer of What I mean is, his complyour Country. ing with the Defire of his People and Parliament, in reducing the Number of the standing Forces in England to about 7000 Thus we fee that as, by the coming in of King William, our Religion and Liberties were preserved from the Designs and Projects then on Foot to destroy both; so, by his succeeding Reign, he farther strengthen'd and secured them to us by good Laws. I cannot help thinking, that whenever it shall be thought proper to fet up an equestrian Statue

to the Memory of that Prince, an Inscription ought to be engraven on the Pedestal in these. or fuch like Words .-- To the immortal Memory of King WILLIAM the Third, who by a hazardous and glorious Enterprize preserved the British Nation from the imminent Danger of Popery and Slavery; and afterwards with more Glory, as fecuring us for the future is doing a far greater Good, than only once preventing a present Danger, he confirm'd and strengthen'd its Liberties by such excellent Laws as the TRIENNIAL ACT, and that of the 12th of his Reign, entitled an Act for the FARTHER LIMITATION of the Crown, and better securing THE RIGHTS and LIBER-TIES of the Subject.

It can be no Objection against setting up such a Memorial of these Laws, that the first of them is repeal'd, and that the Clause abovemention'd in the other is repeal'd likewise; for though in Deserence to the Wisdom of the Legislature, we suppose that the Repeal was for good Reasons, with Regard to the Time, in which they were repeal'd; yet we may affirm that the enacting of them, at the Time they were enacted, was for good Reasons too, and such as arise from a Consideration of the Nature of Government, the Principles of Li-

berty, and Precedents in free States.

I was induced to mention these Things at present, because some Persons are often calling upon and desying People to instance any one Article of Liberty, or Security for Liberty, which

which we once had, and do not still hold and enjoy. I defire Leave to ask them, whether long Parliaments are the fame Thing as having frequent Elections .- Is the Circumstance of having almost two bundred Members of the House of Commons vested with Offices or Places, under the Crown, the fame Thing as having a Law, that would have excluded all Persons, who hold Places, from fitting there?--- Is an Army of above 17,000 Men, at the Expence of 850,000l. per Ann. for the Service of Great Britain, the same Thing as an Army of 7000 Men, at the Expence of 350,000 l. per Annum for England; and I will suppose there might be about 3000 Men more for Scitland? --- Is the Riot-Act, which establishes Passive-Obedience and Non-Refitance by a Law, even in Cases of the utmost Extremity, the fame Thing as leaving the People at Liberty to redress themselves, when they are grievously oppress'd, and thereby oblige the Prince, in some Measure, to depend on their Affections?

But to return from whence I have digres'd, and pass to the next Reign. In that of Queen Anne a very expensive War against France involved the Nation in a heavy Debt, (which I hope will be a Warning to us from engaging hastily in another) and occasion'd the granting several Duties and Taxes, which are received by the Crosen, and charged as Funds to pay Interest on several great Sums, that have been borrow'd. This Circumstance is certainly of

no Advantage to the Cause of Liberty, as it makes the Crown the immediate Steward and Receiver of the annual Income of near fifty Millions of the People's Property; besides increafing its Influence and Weight by the vaft Number of Officers, employ'd in collecting, overfeeing and paying thefe Funds and Revenues. I must farther add, that there was a Clause in an AEt of Parliament repeal'd in this Reign, which till then had been highly valued, as what would tend very much to the Security of our Liberties. I mean that Claufe of the 12th of King William abovemention'd, by Virtue of which, after the Decease of the Queen, no Person having any Place could fit in the House of Commons. I mention this without any Defign to cast the least Reflection on that excellent Princess, who pass'd many good Laws for the Security of Liberty, as will appear from what I am going to mention; for by the fame AEt, in which that Claufe was repeal'd, there was another inferted, by which all Persons, holding the several Offices therein specify'd, were incapacitated from sitting in the House of Commons; as well as all Persons, holding any new Places, created fince 1705. By the same AET all Persons, who, after their Election into Parliament, shall accept any Office of Profit whatfoever under the Crown, (except in the Army or Navy) are declared incapable of fitting in the House, unless re-elected .---- In confenting to these Clauses, her Majesty gave us immediate Posfeffion

fession of the Benefit of them; whereas that of the 12th of King William, though it was more extensive, yet was not to take Place till a Time remote, and fo was repeal'd before it came in Force. In the fifth Year of her Reign, the pass'd the Qualification-Act, which requires that every Member for a Borough shall have 300 l. per Annum, and for a County 600 l. per Annum; a Law, which was intended to confine the Election to fuch Persons as are independent in their Circumstances; have a valuable Stake in the Land; and must therefore be the most strongly engaged to confult the publick Good, and least liable to This Law has been of great Corruption. Service to us, and is so still; though far from being effectual, but it would be in a great Measure needless, if we were once made secure against Bribery at Elections and Corruption after Elections; because the People, when left to themselves, would naturally chuse the chief and best Sort of the Gentry to represent them.

But I propose, as I said before, to pursue these Kind of Remarks no farther than those two Reigns. I will only add, that if any Part of these good Laws, which still subsist, and were form'd for the Preservation of the Freedom of Parliaments, have not their due Force, by Reason of some conceal'd Evasions, which in Length of Time may have been sound out; what can be more reasonable than to apply an effectual Remedy? Is it not of a hundred S 2

Times more Consequence to prevent such Evalions and any little Frauds in the Customs? If the Laws formerly contrived, for fecuring to us free Parliaments and frequent Elections, have been repeal'd; it is natural to defire that a proper Opportunity may offer itself for recovering what we once enjoy'd by express Law, as well as by the Nature of our Conflitution. And farther, if the publick Debts are fuch an Incumbrance and Embarassment to us, that we could not engage with Vigour in a War, even upon our own Account, and for our own immediate Interests, if Occasion required, or if they are fo circumstanced, that they may render our Liberties less secure; what can be more fit and reasonable than to make Use of the Means we have in our Hands to lessen these Debts, by managing the national Expence with all poffible Frugality, and shunning all Occasions of increasing them? Sure, no good Ally can expect that we should act for bis Interest, with less Caution than we use for our own; or that we should be more quick in making Reprifals upon the Aggressors against bim, than we are upon those against ourselves!

If the ministerial Advocates would be thought to have any Sense of Liberty, or Revolution Principles, left unextinguish'd in their Breasts, let them come fairly to these Points, without Sophistry, or Prevarication; but if, instead of this, they are resolved to drudge on in their old Road of calling Jacobite and Republican, they must expect to continue in

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the same Contempt they are at present, and only make their *Patron* ridiculous, as well as themselves.

Iam, SIR, &c.

THE

Freeholder's Political Catechism.

I have lately read a little Piece, intitled, the Free-bolder's political Catechism; and as the Duty to our Country is next to our Duty to God, I think it ought to be spread into as many Hands as possible, at this Juncture. I shall present my Country Readers with those Parts of it, which relate immediately to the British Constitution and the Liberty of the Subject.

Extracts from the FREEHOLDER's POLITICAL CATECHISM.

QUESTION.

Answer. I am T. M. a Freeholder of Great Britain.

Q. What Privilege enjoy'st thou by being a Freeholder of Great Britain?

A. By being a Freeholder of Great Bri-S 3 tain tain, I am a greater Man in my civil Capacity than the greatest Subject of an arbitrary Prince; because I am govern'd by Laws, to which I give my Consent; and my Life, Liberty, and Goods cannot be taken from me, but according to those Laws. I am a Freeman.

Q. Who gave thee this Liberty?

A. No Man gave it me. Liberty is the natural Right of every human Creature. He is born to the Exercise of it, as soon as he has attain'd to that of his Reason; but that my Liberty is preserved to me, when lost to a great Part of Mankind, is owing under God to the Wisdom and Valour of my Ancestors, Freeholders of this Realm.

Q. Wherein does this Liberty, which thou

enjoy'st, confist?

A. In Laws made by the Consent of the People, and the due Execution of those Laws. I am free not from the Law, but by the Law.

Q. Wilt thou stand fast in this Liberty, whereunto thou art born and entitled by the

Laws of thy Country?

A. Yes verily, by God's Grace, I will; and I thank his good Providence that I am born a Member of a Community govern'd by Laws, and not by arbitrary Power.

Q. What dost thou think incumbent upon thee, to secure this Blessing to thyself and Po-

Rerity ?

A. As I am a Freeholder, I think it incumbent upon me to believe aright concern-

ing the fundamental Articles of the Government, to which I am subject; to write, speak, and act on all Occasions conformably to this orthodox Faith; to oppose, with all the Powers of my Body and Mind, fuch as are Enemies of our good Constitution, together with all their fecret and open Abettors, and to be obedient to the King the supreme Magistrate of the Society.

Q. Rehearse unto me the Articles of thy

political Creed?

A. I believe that the fupreme, or legislative Power of this Realm, refides in the King, Lords, and Commons; that his Majesty King George the Second is Sovereign, or supreme Executor of the Law; to whom, upon that Account, all Loyalty is due; that each of the three Members of the Legislature are endow'd with their particular Rights, and Offices; that the King, by his royal Prerogative, has the Power of determining and appointing the Time and Place of the Meeting of Parliaments; that the Confent of King, Lords, and Commons is necessary to the Being of a Law, and all the three make but one Lawginer; that as to the Freedom of Confent in making of Laws, those three Powers are independent; and that each and all the three are bound to observe the Laws that are made.

Q. Why is the legislative Power supreme?

A. Because what gives Law to all, must

be supreme.

Q. What mean'st thou by Loyalty to the King? A. I have A. I have heard that Loy fignifies Law; and Loyalty Obedience, according to Law; therefore he, who pays this Obedience, is a loyal Subject; and he, who executes the King's Commands, when contrary to Law, is difloyal and a Traytor.

Q. Is it not in the Law, that the King

can do no Wrong?

A. It is; for fince Kings do not act immediately by themselves, but mediately by their Officers, and inferior Magistrates; the Wisdom of the Law provides sufficiently against any undue Exercise of their Power, by charging all illegal Acts, and all Kinds of Male-Administration upon their Ministers; by the great Regard, which is paid to the King by this Maxim, laying him under an indisputable Obligation not to screen his Ministers from publick Justice, or publick Enquiry.

Q. What do'ft thou mean by the Royal Pre-

rogative?

A. A discretionary Power in the King to act for the Good of the People, where the Laws are filent, never contrary to Law, and always subject to the Limitations of the Law.

Q. Is not then the King above the Laws?

A. By no Means; for the Intention of Government being the Security of the Lives, Liberties and Properties of the Members of the Community, they never can be supposed, by the Law of Nature, to give an arbitrary Power over their Persons and Estates. King

is a Title, which, translated into several Languages, signifies a Magistrate with as many different Degrees of Power, as there are Kingdoms in the World; and he can have no Power but what is given him by Law; yea, even the supreme, or legislative Power is bound, by the Rules of Equity, to govern by Laws enacted, and publish'd in due Form; for what is not legal is arbitrary.

Q. How comes it that those, who endeavour to destroy the Authority and Independence of any of the Branches of the Legislature, sub-

vert the Constitution?

A. By the fundamental Laws of the Constitution, the free and impartial Consent of each of the three Members is necessary to the Being of a Law; therefore if the Consent of any of the three is wilfully omitted, or obtain'd by Terror or Corruption, the Legislature is violated; and instead of three there may be really and effectually but one Branch of the Legislature.

Q. Can'ft thou illustrate this by any Ex-

ample?

A. The Royal Authority and that of the House of Peers were both destroy'd by the House of Commons, and by a small Part of that, in the late civil War; so that the very Form of Government was annihilated.

Q. Can you give me an Instance, where the Form of Government may be kept, and yet

the Constitution destroy'd?

A. Yes. The Forms of the free Government

ment of Rome were preserved under the arbitrary Government of the Emperors. There was a Senate, Consuls, and Tribunes of the People; as one might say King, Lords, and Commons; and yet the Government under the Emperors was always despotick, and often tyrannical; and indeed the worst of all Governments is Tyranny sanctify'd by the Appearance of Law.

Q. By what Means fell that great People

into this State of Slavery?

A. I have read the Roman History, and by what I can judge, it was by Faction, Corruption, and standing Armies.

Q. All these Things might happen to Romans; but did ever any Parliament of this Nation give up the Liberty of the People?

A. Yes. A pack'd Parliament, in Richard the fecond's Time, establish'd by a Law the King's arbitrary Power, and with Leave to name a Commission with Parliamentary Authority. Parliaments, in Henry the eighth's Time, were Slaves to his Passions, and One gave the King a legislative Authority. And there are many Instances of Parliaments making dangerous Steps towards the Destruction of the Liberty of the People.

Q. Who were the English Monarchs, who were the most indulgent to the Liberties of the

People?

A. The great King Alfred, who declared that the English Nation was as free as the Thoughts of Man; the glorious Monarchs, Edward

Edward the first, Edward the third, and Henry the sifth, who would not let his People swear to him till he had an Opportunity of swearing to them, at his Coronation; and the immortal Queen Elizabeth, who declared it by Law High Treason, during her Life, and a Premunire afterwards, to deny the Power of Parliament in limiting and binding the Descent, or Inheritance of the Crown, or the Claim to it.

Q. When were these slavish Maxims of hereditary, indefeazable Right, and Prerogative,

Superior to Law, first introduced?

A. In the Time of James the first; who by endeavouring to establish them, laid the Foundation of all the Miseries, which have since happened to his Family; and it is the greatest Security to the present Branch of it, that such Dostrines, which sow the Seed of Jealousy between the King and his People, are by the present Establishment quite exploded.

Q. What didst thou learn from those Hi-

Stories?

A. That a King of this Realm in the full Possession of the Affections of his People, is greater than any arbitrary Prince; and that the Nation can never be effectually undone but by a wicked Parliament; and lastly, to be thankful to God that under our present and most gracious King, our Constitution is preserved intire, though at the same Time there are many Circumstances, which call loudly for Vigilance. Q. What

Q. What are those?

A. Such as have been the Fore-runners and Causes of the Loss of Liberty in other Countries; Decay of Virtue and publick Spirit, Luxury and Extravagance in Expence, Venality and Corruption, in private and publick Affairs.

Q. How comes there to be a Decay of publick Spirit, when there is more than usual a

Defire to serve the Publick?

A. If a Defire to live upon the Publick be a publick Spirit, there is enough of it at this Time; when Extravagance makes People crave more, and the Administration of a publick Revenue (perhaps treble what it was before the Revolution) enables the Crown to give more than formerly.

Q. What do'/t thou fear from this?

A. That fuch as ferve the Crown for Reward may in Time facrifice the Interest of their Country to their Wants; that Greediness of publick Money may produce a slavish Complaisance, as long as the Crown can pay; and Mutiny, when it cannot; and, in general, that Motives of Self-Interest will prove an improper and weak Foundation for our Duty to our King and Country.

Q. What would'st thou do for thy Coun-

try?

A. I would die to procure its Prosperity; and I would rather that my Posterity were cut off, than that they should be Slaves; but as Providence at present requires none of these Sacrifices,

Sacrifices, I content myself to discharge the ordinary Duties of my Station, and to exhort my Neighbours to do the same.

Q. What are the Duties of your Station?

A. To endeavour, as far as I am able, to preserve the publick Tranquility; and, as I am a Freeholder, to give my Vote for the Candidate, whom I judge most worthy to serve his Country; for if from any partial Motive I should give my Vote for one unworthy, I should think myself justly chargeable with his Guilt.

Q. Thou hast perhaps but one Vote of five hundred, and the Member perhaps one of five hundred more; then your Share of the Guilt is

but [mall.

A. As he, who affifts at a Murder, is guilty of Murder, so he, who acts the lowest Part in the enslaving his Country, is guilty of a much greater Crime than Murder.

Q. Is enflaving one's Country a greater

Crime than Murder ?

A. Yes; inasimuch as the Murder of human Nature is a greater Crime than the Murder of a human Creature; or as he, who debaseth and rendereth miserable the Race of Mankind, is more wicked than he, who cutteth off an Individual.

Q. Why is enflaving Mankind murdering

buman Nature?

A. Because Mankind in a State of Slavery and Freedom is a different Sort of Creature; for Proof of this I have read what the Greeks

Greeks were of old, and what they are now

in a State of Slavery.

Q. What is become of the Heroes, Philosophers, Orators, and free Citizens of Greece? A. They are now Slaves to the great Turk.

Q. What is become of the Scipio's and Ca-

to's of Rome?

A. They fing now on the English Stage.
Q. Does not the Tranquility, occasioned by absolute Monarchy, make the Country thrive?

A. Peace and Plenty are not the genuine Fruits of absolute Monarchy; for absolute Monarchies are more subject to Convulsions than free Governments, and Slavery turneth the fruitful Plains into a Defart; whereas Liberty, like the Dew from Heaven, fructifieth the barren Mountains. This I have learn'd from Travellers, who have visited Countries in both Conditions; therefore, as I faid before, I should reckon my felf guilty of the greatest Crime human Nature is capable of, if I were any Ways accessary to the enflaving my Country. Though I have but one Vote, many Units make a Number; and if every Elector should reason after the same Manner, that he has but one, what must become of the whole? A Law of great Confequence, and the Election of the · Member who voteth for that Law, may be both carry'd by one Vote. Great and important Services for the Liberties of their Country have been done by ordinary Men. I have read that

that the Institution of the Tribunes of Rome, or the whole Power of the Commons, was owing to a Word spoken in Season by a common Man.

Q. Is it not lawful then to take a Bribe from a Person otherwise worthy to serve bis

Country ?

A. No more than for a fudge to take a Bribe for a righteous Sentence; nor is it any more lawful to corrupt, than to commit Evil that Good may come of it. Corruption converts a good Action into Wickedness. Bribery of all Sorts is contrary to the Law of God; it is a heinous Sin, often punished with the severest Judgments; it involves in it the Sin of Perjury, as the Law stands now; and is besides the greatest Folly and Madness.

Q. How is it contrary to the Law of God?

A. The Law of God faith expresly, Thou Shalt not wrest Judgment; Thou Shalt not take a Gift. If it is a Sin in a Judge, it is much more in a Law-giver, or an Elector; because the Mischies occasioned by the first reach only to Individuals; That of the last may affect whole Nations, and even the Generations to come. The Pfalmist describing the Wicked, faith, his Right Hand is full of Bribes. The Prophet, describing the Righteous, tells us, he shaketh his Hands from bolding à Bribe. Samuel justifying his Innocence, appeals to the People, of whose Hands have I taken a Bribe? Then as to divine Vengeance, holy Job tells us, that God shall destroy

destroy the Tabernacle of Bribery. Achan's Avarice, who had appropriated to his own Use the Golden Wedge and the Babylonish Garment, brought the Judgment of God upon the whole l'eople, so that they fled before their Enemies, till the Criminal was discover'd and stoned to Death. The Leprosy adhered to Gehazi (the Servant of Elisha) and his House for ever, for taking a Bribe from Naaman, a rich Minister of a great Prince. Therefore he, that taketh a Bribe, may justly expect what is threaten'd in holy Writ: He shall not prosper in his Way, neither shall bis Substance continue; bis Silver and Gold shall not be able to deliver him in the Day of the Wrath of the Lord.

Q. Why is he, that taketh a Bribe, guilty

of the Sin of Perjury?

A. Because he sweareth.

A.B. * do swear (or being one of the People call'd Quakers, IA.B. do solemnly affirm) I have not received, or had by myself or any other Person whatsoever in Trust for me, or for my Use or Benefit, directly or indirectly, any Sum or Sums of Money, Office, Place, or Employment, Gift or Reward, or any Promise or Security for any Money, Office, Employment or Gift, in order to give my Vote at this Election; and that I have not before been poll'd at this Election. Q. What

^{*} This Oath is enjoin d in the late glorious AA, for preventing Bribery and Corruption at Elections.

Q. What thinkest thou of those, who are bribed

by Gluttony and Drunkenness?

A. That they are viler than Esau, who fold his Birth-right for a Mess of Porridge.

Q. Why is taking a Bribe Folly, or Mad-

nefs ?

A. Because I must refund Ten-fold in Taxes of what I take in Elections; and the Member, who bought me, has a fair Pretence to sell me; nor can I, in such a Case, have any just Cause of Complaint.

Q. What wilt thou fay then to the Candi-

date, that offers thee a Bribe?

A. I will say, thy Money perish with thee! As thou art now purchasing thy Seat in Parliament, I have just Reason to suspect thou resolvest to sell thy Vote. What thou offerest, and what thou promiseth may be the Price of the Liberties of my Country. I will not only reject thy Bribe with Disdain, but will vote against thee.

Q. Is not the Justice of a King sufficient

Security for the Liberty of a People?

A. The People ought to have more Security for all that is valuable in the World, than the Will of a mortal and fallible Man. A King of Britain may make as many Peers, and such as he pleaseth; therefore the last and best Security for the Liberties of the People, is a House of Commons genuine and independent.

Q. What meanest thou by a genuine House

of Commons ?

A. One, that is the lawful Issue of the People, and no Bastard.

Q How is a Bastard House of Commons

produced?

A. When the People by Terror, Corruption, or other indirect Means, chuse such as they otherwise would not chuse; when such as are fairly chosen, are not return'd; when such as are return'd, are turn'd out by partial. Votes in controverted Elections, and others not fairly chosen set in their Places.

Q. How may a House of Commons le-

come dependent?

A. When the Freedom of voting is destroy'd by Threatnings, Promises, Punishments, and Rewards; by the open Force of the Government, or the Insults of the Populace; but above all by private Insluence; for they, who are arm'd with the Power of the Crown, have many Ways of gratifying such as are subservient to their Designs, and many Ways of oppressing such as oppose them, both within the Bounds of the Law.

Q. Can a King have a more faithful Council than a House of Commons, which speak-

eth the Sense of the People?

A. None; for they will not only give him impartial Council, but will powerfully and chearfully affift him to execute what they advise.

Q. What are the Marks of a Person, wor-

thy to serve his Country in Parliament?

A. The Marks of a good Ruler given in Scrip-

Scripture will serve for a Parliament-man; Such as rule over you shall be Men of Truth, hating Covetousness; they shall not take a Gift; they shall not be afraid of the Face of a Man, Deut. xvi. Therefore I conclude, that the Marks of a good Parliament-man are Riches with Frugality; Integrity; Courage; being well-affected to the Constitution; Knowledge of the State of the Country; being prudently frugal of the Money, careful of the Trade, and zealous for the Liberties of the People; having stuck to the Interest of his Country in perilous Times, and being affiduous in Attendance.

Q. Who is most likely to take a Bribe?

A. He, who offereth one.

Q. Who is likely to be frugal of the Peo-

A. He, who puts none of it in his own

Pocket.

Q. You feem by this to be averse from chufing such as accept Places and Gratuities from the Crown. What is your Reason for this

Partiality?

A. I am far from thinking that a Man may not ferve his King and his Country faithfully at the fame Time. Nay, their Interests are inseparable. Mr. Such an one, my Lord's Steward, is a very honest Man; and yet if I had any Affairs to settle with my Lord, I would chuse my Neighbour for a Referee rather than my Lord's Steward.

Γ 2 Q. Why

Q. Why is Frugality of the People's Money

so necessary at this Time?

A. Because they have run out much, and are still much in Debt. My Father and I have paid our Share of one kundred Millions, and I have heard there are near sity more to pay. I grudge not this prodigious Expence, as far as it has been the necessary Price of Liberty; but as it would grieve me much to see this Blessing ravish'd from me, which has cost me so dear; so on the other Hand I think it expedient to save, now the Affair is over, and the Government settled.

Q. Who are those, who are so careful of

the Trade of the Nation?

A. Such as are willing to keep it from all vexatious Interruptions by Inspections, entering into Houses, Seizures, Suits; and the Oppression of Tax-gatherers, as much as possible; such as are willing to take off the burthensome Duties, which encrease the Expence of the Workman, and consequently the Price of the Manusacture.

Q. But as you have a Freehold, would you not be willing to be excused from paying two Shillings in the Pound, by laying Excises up-

on other Parts of our Confumption?

A. No doubt but every landed Man would be glad to be free from paying two Skillings in the Pound; but, at the fame Time, I would not raife, by another Tax, two Shillings in the Pound, nor one Shilling in the Pound for a Perpetuity; for Parliaments,

ments, who have no more to give, may be disappointed for the Redress of their Grievances. Besides, I would not be deluded by an Impossibility; for if my Tenant has any new Tax laid upon him, I am assaid he will not pay me so much Rent; so that the new Tax must still affect Land. Then it is utterly impossible to raise by Excises what shall be equivalent to two Shillings in the Pound, without the Ruin of Trade; for the Excises, which are settled already, generally speaking, raise double the Duty on the People, of what they bring in to the Government.

Q. How can'ft thou prove that?

A. By Experience of Jeveral Excises, as of Leather, Candles, Soap, &c. Whatever is brought into the Publick by those Excises is raised double upon the People; therefore if a Million of Money, or what is equivalent to two Shillings in the Pound, were levy'd by Excise, it would be two Millions upon the excised Commodities, which must destroy every Subject of Trade in Britain.

O. Why do'st thou insist that a Knowledge of the State of the Country is a necessary

Qualification for a Parliament-men?

A. Because this is a Qualification, of late, very much unheeded. I have heard that there are many Corporations, which never saw their Members.

Q. Is then a Writ of Parliament only a Conge d'Elire for a Bishop, where the King nominates?

T 3 A. God

A. God forbid! The Crown is never to meddle in an Election.

Q. Why is affiduous Attendance so neces-

fary?

A. Because a Parliament-man is intrusted with the Lives, Liberties and Properties of the People, which have often been endanger'd by the Non-Attendance of many Members; because, if Representatives do not attend, I may have a Law imposed upon me, to which I had no Opportunity of giving my Assent.

Q. Thou hast prudently and justly resolved to promote, to the utmost of thy Power, the publick Tranquility. What are the Advan-

tages thou proposest from that?

A. All the Advantages resulting from political Society depend upon the publick Tranquility. Besides, by publick Tranquility, Armies, which are a Mark of Distrust of the Affections of the People, may be disbanded.

Q. Why do'ft thou not love Armies, in Time

of Peace?

A. Because Armies have overturn'd the Liberties of most Countries; and all, who are well-affected to Liberty, ever hated them; because they are subject to an implicit Obedience to their Officers, and to a Law of their own; because they are so many lusty Men taken from Work, and maintain'd at an extravagant Expence upon the Labour of the rest; because they are many Ways burthensome to the People in their Quarters, even under

under the best Discipline, especially in dear Countries; because there are so many Preserments in the Hands of designing Ministers; and lastly, because the King will never be deny'd an Army as great as he pleaseth, when it is necessary.



ON

Bribery and Corruption.

CICERO, in the fecond Book of his Offices, highly commends a wife and handsome Rebuke, which Philip of Macedon gave his Son Alexander, for foolishly attempting to gain the Affections of the Macedonians by BRIBERY. He wrote his Son a Letter upon it in these Words. " Quæ te, ma-" lum! Ratio in istam spem induxit, ut eos " tibi fideles putares fore, quos pecunia cor-" rupisses? An tu id agis, ut Macedones non " te Regem faum, fed Ministrum & Prabito-" rem sperent fore?----Tully makes this Remark upon it. -- " Bene Ministrum & " Præbitorem; quia fordidum Regi. Melius " etiam quod Largitionem Carruptelam effe " dixit. Fit enim deterior, qui accipit, at-" que ad idem femper expectandum paratior. Philip was undoubtedly the greatest Prince

of his Time. He was wife, artful and fortunate. The Advice of fuch a King, while he was forming the Mind of a young Prince who afterwards gave Law to the World, deferves our Regard. This wife King had obferved in his Son many noble Principles, the Seeds of Greatness, but ill conducted through Youth and Inexperience. Alexander was young, valiant and generous; but an Excess, or Misapplication of Valour and Generosity, often leads to the greatest Inconveniencies. That his Generofity might take a good and useful Turn, he writes him this short, but important Epistle. "What Notion is this, " Jays He, that you have got in your Head? " Can you imagine the Fidelity and Affection " of the Subject are to be acquired by Bri-" bery and Corruption? Or is this your Mo-" tive, that the Macedonians may not con-" fider you as one, who is to be their Sove-" reign, but a Minister to their Extrava-" gance and Corruption. Tully's Observation is equally fine. "'Tis " fordid and mean, fays be, below the Dig-" nity of a great King, to court the Affec-" tion of his People with base Bribes. True Love and Esteem are built on a quite different Foundation. " Largeffes, or the giv-" ing of Money, as the Jame Author ob-" ferves, is Corruption itself; for the Re-" ceiver becomes a worse Man, and is al-" ways apt to encrease his Demands."-----

This Maxim of Philip is certainly one of

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the wifest in the whole System of Politicks, and likewise consistent with the strictest Rules of Morality; that a King giving Bribes to his own Subjects renders himself mean and sordid; that he never gains the true Affection of one Person by it; that he subjects himself to the arbitrary Will and fantastical Government of such Prositutes; and that his very Crown is at their Disposal to the * highest Bidder.

The Immorality of it is likewise evident; for fuch Proceedings, when generally known, debauch the Morals of a whole People. The fame Depravity and Corruption soon find their Way from a Court to a Cottage; and, in Proportion to the Distance, is to be traced in a greater or less Degree through every private Family; fo that in a short Time the very Name of Virtue may come to be loft in fuch a Kingdom. It is very probable that Philip might not regard this Maxim in the moral View; for, if we may credit the Greek Hiltorians and Orators, he was not apt to guide his Actions by the Rules of a nice Morality. He is generally drawn by them as cunning and defigning, and though a warlike Prince, no Man knew the Weight of Money more than he, as well as how and where to apply it. His usual Method of Bribery was to buy an Enemy's General, and fometimes a convenient Town or Fortres; by which Means he artfully avoided risking

^{*} See Wolfius and Gravius apon this Paffage of Cicero.

his own Glory, and the Lives of his Subjects. He carried it so far, that just before the decifive Victory at Chæronea, the very Priestess of Apollo at Delphi was strongly fuspected to have been tamper'd with by that Prince; for the Confederate Army, who were then going to engage, for the common Liberties of Greece, could get no Manner of Encouragement from her; fo that Demosthenes, who well knew the Avarice of Priests and their juggling Tricks, might eafily guess that Philip had secured the Oracle. At another Time, a grave-looking Demagogue of Athens, who had long bawl'd at the exorbitant Power of the King of Macedon, was at length prevail'd upon, and took the Reward of his Treachery with great Complaifance.

These were the successful Arts, which he used abroad; and by such Intrigues he often defeated the strongest Confederacies of all Greece. His Administration was wise, dreaded abroad, and respected at home. What Occasion could he have to pension his own Subjects? Their Love and Esteem was founded upon the real Conviction of the Excellency of his Government, and not upon that flippery Foundation of Corruption. He kept them honest, by not tempting them to be otherwise. Even in a just Cause, a Gift perverts the Mind; and, as Tully well observes upon this Place, "the Receiver immediately " becomes a bad Man, and is always expect-" ing greater Bribes." The Plunder of a whole

whole People is scarce sufficient. To this Honesty of the Macedonians, confirm'd by their King, is to be attributed their true Greatness of Mind and personal Courage. The Name of Barbarians, which the over-wise Greeks were too apt to bestow upon their Neighbours, now left them, even by the Confession of those very Greeks, who, in a general Assembly of their several confederate Republicks, soon after placed Alexander at the Head of that grand Alliance, which gave him and his Macedonians the Empire of the World.

From the whole it is clearly evident, that an unpension'd Subject will give the wiseft Counsel to his Prince, and will always continue the most faithful to him. It is the true Interest of the Prince to have such about him, as will not flatter him, and be Slaves to his Passions, for the sake of his Money. The greatest Danger, that can happen to a Prince will arise from such of his own Servants, as from their own corrupt Principles should fell him and his Counsels to the common Enemy. Treason is too often the fatal Attendant upon Corruption. A Government may be conducted with the greatest Security without employing these pecuniary Arts at home; for a wife Administration will always stand upon its own Legs, and support itself without the Assistance of Gold. It can raise a whole People, almost from a State of Barbarity, to the Height of Greatness and heroic Virtue



ON

LIBERTY

And the ORIGINAL COMPACT between the

PRINCE and the PEOPLE.

Salva Libertate fidus.

IN all Governments there are, either exprefly or tacitly, certain Conditions between the People and their Rulers, which in Conscience they are both bound to preserve. In the more arbitrary Kingdoms, the Traces of an original Compact are less discernible; and by Length of Time, Destruction of Records, or the Artifice of Princes, the Monuments of ancient Liberty may be destroy'd; or, which is worse, the Minds of the People prepared to imagine that either they never had a Right to Liberty, or that it hath been cancell'd by Prescription. These Doctrines have been always inculcated, with great Art, by designing Princes; and, upon the Strength of the Invation of their Predeceffors, most Kings afterwards think themselves justly entitled to the same Powers, which those, who went before them, had notoriously usurp'd. In order to preserve their arbitrary Sway, they are reduced to maintain

tain an Opinion, which draws after it great Danger, and is the strongest Invitation to the Attempts of their ambitious Subjects. Opinion is, that Princes are in themselves SACRED, when once they mount the Throne, though the Means, by which they

rose to it, were ever so flagitious.

The Princes of Antiquity, particularly the heathen Emperors, used to deify themselves. with a View of obliging the People, from a religious Reverence, to submit patiently to their Extravagancies. The Jus divinum, and Sanctity of Person, which some of our late Monarchs have ascribed to themselves, were but Copies of this Original, and calculated to the fame Views; but the People have been wife enough, in these Kingdoms, to explode fuch dangerous and inquisitous Superstitions. It is, indeed, amazing that they could ever have prevailed at all amongst us.

Nobody can be fo weak, or fo wicked, as to deny that the Prosperity of Mankind is one of the great Ends of Government. We are all obliged to promote it in our private Capacities; but it is a Duty more peculiarly incumbent on the Governor of a People. If he therefore should play the Tyrant, and pervert his Power to the Destruction or Misery of a whole Nation, his Crime is infinitely great, even much the greatest, that Man is capable of committing; and yet, according to this blasphemous Position, the worst of

these is still facred and inviolable.

In whatever Light we look upon these abfurd and dangerous Sentiments, we may easily discover their weak Foundation, and monstrous Tendency. But it is very happy for us that there is not the same Occasion to explode them, at present, which there hath tormerly been; though, at the same Time, they are not so totally eradicated, nor are the Attempts to revive them so inconsiderable, as not to deserve our Attention in some Degree. The People in general are grown too wise to entertain them any longer; but it is with Astonishment we observe that Princes have not likewise seen their Error in

the Propagation of them.

We have already taken Notic of the Encouragement, which fuch Doctrines have given to the Ambition of private Men. That Law, which ow'd its Rife to the doubtful Title of Henry the seventh, is sufficient of itself to stimulate hot Spirits, without the additional Incentive of a general Conscience concuring in the Opinion there made legal. This Law declares in Effect a King de Facto to be a King de Jure, and instantly annuls the Right of the precedent Prince by the Establishment of the Person, who obtains his Seat. Upon this was grounded the Advice given to Cromwell by some of his Friends, that he should declare himself King; and upon this likewise is founded the Opinion of feveral Writers upon those Times, who imagine that he would have maintained the Crown

Crown in his Family to this Day, if he had follow'd that Advice.

But there is still a farther Mischief in it, not only to the People, (for that is evident enough) but to the Prince himself. If he attempts to ground these Sentiments in the Minds of his Subjects, he must either fail, or fucceed in his Undertaking. If he fails, the Consequence must necessarily be the total Alienation of the Hearts of his People; for the very Cause of his Miscarriage must be a Discovery that, by giving Way to such Opinions, they make themselves his Slaves; and at the same Instant that they perceive the Consequence, they will discover the Cause to be an arbitrary Intention in him, which will always make them jealous of him.—But if he should succeed, it will only make him prefume too much upon that Success, and lead him on, by the paffive Principles of his Subjects to push such Measures as will bring Ruin upon his own Head; for Conscience, when hardly press'd, will rebel against Principle; of which we have had Instances enough in our own History.

It was the Dependence upon these Principles, strongly inculcated and artfully spread in the Reign of King James the first, and propagated with the same Assiduity by his Son, that brought King Charles to so tragical an End. It was a Presumption upon the Patience of the People, that engaged him in so violent an Exercise of the Prerogative.

It was this, which induced him to govern fo long without Parliaments; to raise Money upon the People, contrary to Law; and to fupport an evil Administration, however odious to the People, from a very wrong Persuasion that they were useful to him-iels. Thus, I say, he sell a Sacrifice to that Principle, which he had so large a Share in raifing himself, and proved a memorable Example of this great Truth, that Princes generally find their Ruin in that, which they fondly think their strongest Security. We cannot but lament the cruel Destiny of that unhappy Prince, and we know how to acknowledge his private Virtues; but it must be confes'd, at the same Time, that he owed his Misfortune to his Fault, and that he had never fuffer'd, if he had never aspired to more than was agreeable to the Conflication, over which he prefided. If he had expected the Allegiance and Duty of his Subjects from no other Motive than that, from which it is only due, a Return of Protection and a just Administration, he might have lived and died in Peace. Nay, he might even have gone fome Lengths with Safety. But endeavouring to force their Confciences to Submission, he only ripen'd the popular Discontents. If these Discontents had been kept under by no other Force than that of Convenience, they would have shown themselves sooner, and the Causes of them might have been early removed; but the long

long Forbearance of the People, upon these Principles, encouraged him to proceed farther in the same Steps, till he had sour'd the Minds of the whole Nation; and thus the Poison became universal, at the same Time that the Disease was intolerable.

King James the Second had a better Fate, though his Conduct deserved a worse. The Calamities of his Father could not deter him from walking in the fame dangerous Path. That desperate Example was too weak to bridle his Lust of Power .---- May this be a Lesson to all succeeding Princes not to defire the Temptation!----May it be an everlafting Instruction to all People never to give it to their Prince !--- This Temptation was the same that had undone his Father. It was an Adherence to the same false Opinion, which his Brother and Himfelf had labour'd to encourage from the Restoration to that Time. They were carry'd higher, at that Æra, than they had ever run before. He rely'd fo much upon them, that when those, who were Friends both to him and the Publick, advised him, in the Career of his arbitrary Measures, to act with more Caution; he told them that he knew the Conscience of the People would keep them quiet.—How far he was mistaken, and how fatal his Error hath proved to himself, if not to the Nation, the Experience of what hath fince happen'd fufficiently demonstrates. It would be unnecessary to birng

bring any other Examples of the Distresses occasion'd to Princes themselves by a Thirst of unlimited Power. There cannot be a Truth more fully verify'd by a continued Series of Instances, in all Ages. I have here particularly mention'd but one of the Means, which are used to attain that unwholesome kind of Sovereignty; but the same Hazard attends all other Methods, by which the same End is to be pursued. The Danger lies not fo much in the Manner of the Attempt, as in the Attempt itself. It lies in the Manifestation of a Design to invade the Liberties of the People; and if once they discover such a Design, unless they are funk into the lowest State of Corruption and Pufillanimity, they will endeavour to shake off an Authority, fo plainly levell'd at their antient Rights, and fo contrary to its original Defign.

Most Princes are inclined to imagine, and taught from the Cradle to believe that these, who argue in this Manner, are Abettors of Faction and Enemies to them. No; they are Enemies to the Growth of Prerogative and arbitrary Power; but, by being so, they prove themselves the best Friends to the Constitution of their Country, and confequently the soundest Subjects to a Prince, who hath no Designs against the Liberties

of his People.

The whole Tendency of these Discourses is to inculcate a rational Idea of the Nature

of our Government into the Minds of my Countrymen, and to prevent the fatal Consequence of those slavish Principles, which are industriously propagated through the Kingdom by wicked and designing Men. He. that labours to blind the People, and to keep them from all Instruction, may be justly fuspected of bad Intentions; but he, who makes it his Bufiness to open the Understandings of Mankind, cuts up all Faction by the Roots; for it is effential to Wisdom and Knowledge to support an equal and good Government.

Having justify'd our Endeavours in this Manner, we may venture to speak with Freedom upon that original Compact between the PRINCE and the PEOPLE, which we mention'd at the Beginning of this Paper; but to infift much upon that Head would be more necessary in Countries, where Liberty is totally loft, and its Footsteps erased, than in this, where that Compact hath been fo lately renew'd with the present Royal Family. Yet it is sometimes proper even here to touch upon this original Right of the People, that no Man may think the late Contract we have mention'd unjustly framed; but our principal Bufiness is to ground our Arguments upon the known Conditions of our present Monarchy.

Our Constitution, as now establish'd, is founded on a most excellent Model. We have all the Advantages of a brifk Execution from

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from the monarchical Part. From the arifirocatical all the Conveniencies, which are to be found in that Form of Government; and the Mischies, which usually attend it, where it is absolute and unconfined, are in a great Measure blunted by the Power of the Commons. This is the democratical Part of our Constitution. Their Share in the Ballance is vastly great, as it must be in all good Establishments; and thus we partake of all the Benefits and Securities to Liberty, which result from these different Kinds of Government.

It hath been observed, indeed, that our Work was, in some Measure, left impersect upon the last great Change of Affairs; nor is it furprizing that in a Time of fuch Confufion, and from the Variety of Opinions upon these Points, some Errors, or Omissions, might have happen'd. Yet we may with Pleasure affirm, that besides the Advantages, then procured, we likewise obtain'd the Power of redreffing any farther Grievances and Abuses, which might be then overlook'd, or might hereafter arise in the Administration of Government. Our Princes are now made fenfible that they are exalted, not for their own Convenience only, but for the Advantage of the People, and therefore will never refuse their Confent to any Laws, which may be found necessary for the Happiness and Security of their Subjects. As they know that their Prerogative was fettled only with that View,

View, there can never again happen a Contest between us, upon that Foot; nor can they entertain the Thought of preserving any Branch of it, which may in suture Ages, by various Accidents, be render'd repugnant to the End, for which it was created.

The Duty of the People is also now settled upon fo clear a Foundation, that no Man can hefitate how far he is to obey, or doubt on what Occasions to resist. Conscience can battle no longer with the Understanding. We know that we are to defend the Crown with our Lives and our Fortunes, as long as the Crown protects us, and keeps strictly to the Bounds, within which we have confined it. We likewise know that we are to do it no longer. The Part we have all to act, on every publick Occasion, is plainly laid down before us; and as the Bieffings of Peace, Plenty, and Liberty will always fecure to his Majesty the Allegiance of his Subjects; so, on the other Hand, the Dangers, which constantly attend all Advances to arbitrary Power, will I hope preserve us from any fuch Attempts for the future .---- In short, as we have the Happiness to live under an excellent-Constitution, so it is very much in our own Power, by a proper Conduct, to fecure the Enjoyment of it to Ourselves, and to transmit it to the latest Posterity.

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THE

Case of DUNKIRK,

CONSIDERED.

T is of so great Importance to this Nation that Dunkirk should continue in that demolish'd, ruin'd Condition, to which it was reduced in Consequence of the Treaty of Utrecht, that we cannot be surprized at the great Uneasinesses and Complaints, since the Publick became acquainted with the Progress the French have been suffer'd to make towards restoring that Port and Harbour.

The Confideration of this Affair hath been brought into Parliament; where, tho' it has not met with Cenfure, it has not met with Approbation. The Wisdom of the Commons did not think fit, in a Conjuncture, represented to be so critical, to speak in Form on what has pass'd. They contented themselves, for the present, with thanking his Majesty for the Instances he made to France. The Issue of this important Affair is still depending, and may probably occasion a farther Enquiry.

In the mean Time, it must be of Service to inform the Publick, more particularly than has been yet done, of the whole Transactions hitherto relating to it. My Intention

there-

therefore is, agreeably to the Title prefix'd to these Papers, to state, as exactly as I am able, the Sum of what has pass'd in the Disputes about the Demolition of Dunkirk, from the Treaty of Utrecht to the last Session of Parliament; and to make fuch Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain and of France, as feem to my best Judgment obviously and undeniably to result from the Series of Facts.

I do not fit down to write with a Defign to flatter or to asperse any Person whatsoever. But I shall follow the Matter before me, and according as I am led by it, I shall commend or blame with all that Freedom, which the Subjects of this Kingdom are still in Possesfion of, and which I hope we shall never refign, as long as there remains a Tongue to fpeak, and an Hand to act in Great Britain.

He, who attacks a Minister, or any other Man, without furficient Foundation, is certainly guilty of a very great Crime. But he, who attacks with Fact and Reason on his Side, is so far an honest Man and a good Subject. His Writings are no Libels. That odious Term belongs to those, which are

publish'd against him.

Who I am that undertake this Talk may, perhaps, be the Object of some Peoples Curiofity. But that is a Matter of no Importance to the Merits of the Caufe. Let them examine the Facts I advance, and weigh the Arguments I employ and the Observations I make,

make. If the first are not founded in Truth, and the others in Reason, let them triumph in my Defeat, whoever I am. But if the first will bear the Touchstone, and if the others preponderate in the Scale, let them not submit to me, but let them submit to Truth and Reason, by whomsoever presented to them.

I do not apprehend that any of our political Writers will be in the Case of triumphing on this Occasion; and I am very fure that many of them will not submit even in the other Cafe. When Argument fails, they have recourse to their usual Topicks of Ribaldry and Adulation. I shall very probably be a squat, fair Gentleman in one Paper; a petit Maitre of Fifty in another; and Somebody else in a Third; for each of these Authors supposes the Man he writes against to be the Person he has the most a Mind to rail at, or is best paid for railing at. Ministers will be Heroes in all; the profoundest Statesmen; the most disinterested Patriots; and our flourishing Condition at Home, as well as the noble Figure we make Abroad, will be the Subject of much Declamation.

Now all this will do little Hurt and little Good, either to the Persons scratch'd or to the Persons tickled. But it would do a great deal of Hurt to the Publick, if it should divert, in any Degree, that national Spirit, with which the Case of Dunkirk ought to

be confider'd.

Among all the Artifices, which are employ'd to keep Mankind from feeing and embracing the Truth, no one is more gross, and there is but one more prevalent, than that of turning their Eyes from Things to Persons. If a false Heart, a foul Tongue, and a Front of Brass can create Prejudices against the most innocent Man alive, the bare Suspicion that such a Man is, of an Opinion, shall be urged as an Argument against it, and on that folid Foundation it shall be establish'd that Two and Three are not equal to Five. But this is not all; for as Prejudices are applied to this Purpose, so are Partialities. In Cases, where private Honour and publick Justice are both concern'd, the Consequence of hurting a Man, in whose Favour we have been made to entertain an habitual, though groundless Partiality, is fometimes press'd as a Reason for complying: with neither. These Mischiefs, like many others, are chiefly to be found where Parties have long prevail'd; and it often happens that they continue to have some Effect, even when the Parties subsist no longer, and among those, who have all the same Views, because they have all the same Interests.

Whether any Attempts like these have been lately made to influence particular Men in the Case of *Dunkirk*, I shall not determine. But it cannot be amiss to warn against them at all Times, and especially when we

fee so much Pains taken to keep these Prejudices and these Partialities alive.

I have now done with my Preface, which may be thought perhaps too long. I wish it could be thought unnecessary.

THether the Demolition of Dunkirk does, in a great Measure, secure exactly * Seven-ninths of the Trade of England from the Power of France at Sea, as it has been afferted, I shall not trouble myself to calculate, neither shall I examine nicely how far this Port may justly be deem'd our Rival in Time of Peace, by supporting some confiderable Branches of the French Manufactures, and by carrying on a Trade to the West-Indies, which has been insisted upon likewise. In general it will not be denied, that the French have annoy'd our Trade, and promoted their own extreamly, by the convenient Situation and other Advantages of the Part of Dunkirk.

To make therefore a true Judgment in the present Case, it is sufficient to lay a Foundation, which sew Men will attempt to controvert, and which no Man can controvert without exposing himself to Ridicule, or to something worse than Ridicule, to the Abhortence of every honest Heart.

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^{*} See Sir Richard Steele's Writings about Dunkirk in the late Queen's Reign.

The Foundation I mean to lay, is contain'd

in these Propositions.

First, The declared Sense of the British Nation, at the Time of making the last Treaty of Peace with France, was, that Dunkirk should be no more either a fortified City, a fortified Port, or even an unfortified Harbour.

Secondly, France confented to the Demolition of Dunkirk in this Sense, and engag'd never to restore it again in any one of these

Respects.

These Propositions are fully proved by the oth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht; by which Great Britain required, and France consented, that all the Fortifications of the City of Dunkirk should be razed; those towards the Sea in two Months, those towards the Land in three Months. Thus far the Article Ripulates the Demolition of Dunkirk, as a fortified City and as a fortified Port, and if no more had been intended no more would have been faid; but the Article fays a great deal more; it fays expresly that the Harbour Shall be fill'd up, and that the Sluices or Moles, which ferve to cleanfe the Harbour, shall be levell'd. The naked Harbour itself was therefore to be destroy'd as well as the Fortifications towards the Land and towards the Sea. After all these Stipulations follows this express Condition, That the faid Fortifications, Harbour, Moles, or Sluices be never repair'd again. So that France

France has never had, fince the Treaty of Utrecht, nor can have, while that Treaty fubfifts, any more Right to open, or by Reparation to help to open the Harbour of Dunkirk, than she has to rebuild the Fortifications of that City, and to render it in every Respect what it was before the Demolition.

The late Queen Anne was fo folicitous to have this principal Part of the Article, for fuch it was then esteem'd, effectually perform'd, that when she fent her Commissioners to Dunkirk to fee the Demolition of that Place executed, the gave them the most particular Instructions imaginable on that Head. They went not only to fee the Moles, and Jettees, and Keys, and Shuices demolished, but they were to fee the Stones belonging to them, even the Stones of the Keys for Shipping and unshipping Goods, thrown into the Canal or Harbour, the more effectually to spoil the Same, and render it impracticable for the future. They were to fee the Channel of each Sluice fill'd up with Earth from the next Rampart, till it was made level with the Streets. Nav they were to see the Road, which lies before the Entrance of the Harbour, spoil'd as much as possible, and the Reasons for this particular Instruction is there given, to prevent as much as possible any Ships coming in for the future.

The late King of France had tried, by his Ministers at Utrecht, and even by a di-

rect and strong Application from himself to the late Queen, while the Treaty was in Negotiation, to have the Rigour of the Ninth Article, in some Degree soften'd. He did not defire that any Thing, which had been erected to fortify the Town, or make and preserve the Harbour, should be spared, but hop'd and press'd that the Queen would allow one Shuice to be left, which had been erected, as it was then pretended, by the People of the Country, before he fortified the Place, to carry off the Waters, and fave the Low Lands from Inundations. Even this Application proved fruitless. The Article was infifted upon, and was accordingly pass'd without any Exception.

Not discourag'd by this, the Inhabitants of Dunkirk sent over a Deputy, who was warmly supported by the Ambassador of France. Several fresh Instances were made, and all Endeavours were used to move the Queen's Compassion, by desiring, as a Grace, what they pretended no Right to by Treaty, that the Shuice of Furnes at least might be preserved, to carry the Waters off from the Country, and to preserve the Town from Filth, Stench, and the Consequence thereof,

Infection.

But the Queen, who was refolved that Dunkirk should have neither a fortified Port, nor even a naked Harbour, knew by the Reports of her Commissioners, that Mr. Armfrong, one of their Number, absolutely denied

nied the Necessity of preserving those Sluices, in order to discharge the Water of the Country. She was inform'd likewise by the Report of the faid Commissioners, that if any of the faid Sluices remain'd, it would be impossible to prevent the Harbour from being kept open; whereas if they were all destroy'd, a small Space of Time would effectually fill up the Harbour. She continued therefore inflexible, and besides several other Answers to the same Effect, given to the French Ambasfador, and to the Deputy of Dunkirk, upon these Occasions, a Secretary of State was order'd, upon one of them, to write to the British Minister at Paris, to acquaint that Court, that the Queen will infift that, by the Treaty, all Things are to be destroy'd, quæ eluendo Portui inserviunt, which serve to cleanse the Harbour .- That no Distinction is therein made of what contributes accidentally and what directly to this Purpose .--- That the French Ministers had insisted at Utrecht to have such an Exception inserted in the Treaty; that it was positively refused, and that they submitted .-- That under a charitable Pretence of Saving the Country, the French would fave the Harbour ---- In fort, that he must let Monsieur de Torcy feel, and by him the King, that the Queen fees plainly the Correspondence between his Officers and the People of the Town, who are unwilling to lose their Harbour.

I might descend into more Particulars; but these are, I think, sufficient to establish the two Propositions advanced above. The Intention of the late Queen, and of those who negotiated, by her Orders, the Treaty of Utrecht, was to destroy Dunkirk for ever, not only as a Fortress, but as a Sea Port. To this the French submitted, though with much Reluctancy; and in this at least the Ministers at that Time were seconded by the Voice of the whole Nation. Even those, who opposed that Administration, were ashamed of some weak Attempts made to depreciate this important Article of the Utrecht Treaty. They foon took the other Part. They founded high the Confequence of it, and the Necessity of executing it with the utmost Rigour. They were so far from thinking the Demolition of the Fortifications to the Land and to the Sea sufficient, that the Mole and Harbour were call'd by them, and I think rightly, the Terror of the British Nation. In a Word, they afferted boldly, that nothing less than the total Destruction of the Harbour, as well as the Demolition of the Fortifications could answer the Expectations of the British Nation.

Such was the Issue of the first Disputes about Dunkirk, a little before the Death of the late Queen. The French were obliged to proceed to a total Destruction of it, after having in vain employ'd a Multitude of Artifices and a Multitude of Pretences to avoid

the strict and full Execution of the Treaty of Utrecht in this Point.

They turn'd themselves therefore to another Method, and began to cleanse and widen the Canal of Mardyke. The Pretences for doing it were the same as had been urged in order to save the Port of Dunkirk, under Colour of saving the Country from Inundations. But the plain Design of this Work was to open a new Harbour at Dunkirk, and a new Communication with the Sea.

As the Work proceeded, this Design became every Day more evident, by the Breadth and Depth which were given to the Canal of Mardyke, and by the enormous Size of the new Sluice, larger than that at Dunkirk, and vastly beyond any Proportion that could be pretended necessary for carrying off the Waters, or even for receiving Fisher-Vessels, and other small Craft.

As the Defign became more evident, the Representation against it became more frequent and strong. But the French drew the Affair in to Length, by the common Arts of Negotiation, and in the mean Time pursued their Enterprize with all the Vigour and Dispatch imaginable; till the late King, resolving not to suffer such a manifest Violation of the Treaty of Utrecht, sent the Earl of Stair to the Court of France, soon after his Accession to the Crown.

This Minister proceeded on the Principle established at first, and hitherto not once departed

parted from. The true Sense of the Treaty of Utrecht, fays he, in one of his Memorials, and the Intention of Great Britain is, that Dunkirk shall never have a Port again. From whence he argues, that fince the Port of Mardyke is in its Use a Port to the City of Dunkirk, as much as the old one was, the King of Great Britain would have liked as well to have had this fubfift, and only the Name of it changed, as to fee another Port, larger and more convenient, open'd at a League to the Westward.

The Answers, which the Court of France made to all these Representations, were very far from giving Satisfaction, but the Firmness which the Earl of Stair shew'd, and perhaps the declining State of Lewis the XIVth, prevail'd on the French Councils to stop the carrying on these Works; probably with the same Views as they have acted fince, to quiet the present Clamour, and to

begin again upon the first Occasion. Such was the Issue of the second Disputes about Dunkirk, when the late King of France died. The French neither departed from their Pretentions, groundless as they were, nor ruin'd the Works they had made at Mardyke. They kept one alive, and only

suspended the other.

The late King, therefore, inftead of dropping this Affair, continued to push it, and to shew that he was determined, at any

X Rate, Rate, to have another Sort of Satisfaction

than he had yet received.

This Satisfaction he obtain'd foon after, by a Provisional Agreement made with the Minister of France at Hampton-Court, in the Month of September, 1716, and inserted in the Triple Defensive Alliance concluded at the Hague between Great-Britain, France, and the States-General in January, 1717.

The Duke of Orleans was now Regent of France. His political Interests led him to defire the Friendship of the late King. This Disposition was cultivated and improved on our Parts, and the Union between the two Courts grew to be extreamly intimate. But as Great-Britain and France acted in concert like Friends, fo they acted together in those Days like Equals. If we used their Help, we lent them ours. The Dependence was at least mutual, and when our separate Interests came into Competition with theirs, far from fearing to affert our Right, left we should disoblige our Friends, we treated with them like an independent Nation, who knew that it is, or may be always made the Interest of France to keep Measures with Great Britain, as much as it can become, at any time, the Interest of Great Britain to keep Measures with France.

This appear'd very remarkably on the Occasion we were mentioning. The Regent was not, I suppose, more scrupulous than

the late King of France, nor less desirous of regaining any Advantage, which had been lost, or given up; and yet he was forced to yield to all that we insisted upon, for the effectual Execution of the Ninth Article of

the Treaty of Utrecht.

His late Majesty did indeed at this Time consent, that the Canal, open'd at Mardyke, should subsist, for carrying off the Waters, and for the little Commerce necessary to supply that Part of the Country with Provisions. This was a Concession which had not been made before, and which the French had not strictly any Right to expect. But surely it was wife to make it in the Manner, and on the Conditions, on which it was made.

As long as a King of France had the plaufible Pretence of faving his Subjects from drowning, or starving, to cover his Designs, it was obvious enough, by all that had pas'd, that the Design of restoring Dunkirk, under this Pretence, would never be laid aside. The late King, therefore, in order to deseat the Design once for all, resolved to take the

Pretence entirely away.

By the fourth Article of the Triple Alliance, the great new Sluice made at Mardyke, and all the fettees erected along the Strand, are to be destroy'd, and not to be made use of for any Port, Haven or Sluice at Dunkirk or at Mardyke, or at any other Place within two Leagues Distance of either of these; the Intention of the contracting X 2 Par-

Parties, and the End, which they propose to themselves by this Treaty, being that no Port, Harbour, Fortification, Sluice, or Bason, shall be made or built at Dunkirk, at the Sluice of Mardyke, or at any other Place what soever upon the Coast, within the Distance

before-mention'd.

By the same Article it was stipulated likewise that the Digues or Jettees, on both Sides of the old Canal or Port of Dunkirk, should be entirely demolish'd down to the Strand, and that some other Things should be farther done, which might be necessary to the more compleat Destruction of the Harbour.

This being confented to on the Part of France, his Majesty consented that the little Sluice, on the Canal of Mardyke, should remain, provided the Breadth of it was reduced to fixteen Foot.

All these Stipulations were made with the greatest Clearness possible; and the most exact Specifications of every Thing necessary to render them effectual, are contain'd in

the Treaty.

Such was the Issue of the Disputes about Dunkirk, in the Time of the late King; and surely there was good Reason to hope, after the Settlement then made, that we should hear of them no more. The French were gratify'd in two Points, for which alone they contended, at least avowedly; and Dunkirk was reduced to be no more a fortified

tified Town, a fortified Port, or even an un-

fortified Harbour.

But to the great Detriment and Misfortune of our Nation, so it is, that we have greater Reason than ever to renew these Disputes. What the French were not suffer'd to attempt by that Administration, which Sir Richard Steele call'd the French Administration, they have been lately suffer'd to do. Instead of not executing one Treaty fully, they have publickly violated Two. They actually enjoy the Benefit of the Canal of Mardyke, which was indulged to them, that there might remain no Colour for ever opening that of Dunkirk; and in the midst of this Enjoyment, they have open'd, they have repair'd that of Dunkirk, and contrived their Work fo, that whenever they shall think proper to finish it, Dunkirk will be at once a better Harbour than it was, when it stood the Glory of France and the Terror of Britain.

I proceed to the particular Facts, which

support these general Allegations.

Col. Lascells, one of the Commissaries appointed to see the fourth Article of the Treaty of 1717, fully and effectually executed, continued at Dunkirk till the Year 1725, that memorable Æra, when the Treaty of Hanover was made, and from whence so many Things, which will not be easily or soon forgot, are to be dated. How this Officer came to be recalled, just in that X 3 critical

critical Point of Time, has not been explain'd. Perhaps we may begin to guess at the Reasons, when we have gone a little

farther in the present Enquiry.

It is agreed on all Hands, that whilft he continued at *Dunkirk*, the old Port and Harbour remain'd impracticable, as by *Treaty* they are to remain; and that the little peddling Trade, which the *French* had there, was carried on by very small Vessels, and through the Canal of *Mardyke* alone.

About two Years after he had been recall'd, Rumours began to spread, that the Port of Dunkirk was open'd again. These Rumours were confirm'd by several Persons, who had pass'd that Way; and our Ministers, even without receiving any Intelligence from Abroad, could not be ignorant of the Truth of the Fact, since it appear'd by the Entries at the Custom-house, that Ships were continually going and coming from the Port of Dunkirk.

As the Works for repairing this Port advanced, the Trade of the Place, and the Noise about it encreased. Nay, these Works were carried forward in so publick a Manner at last, that it became impossible any longer to forbear concluding, either that our Ministers had not been able to prevail on those of France to stop this Violation of the Treaty, or else that they connived at it.

In this State of Things, and under fuch Apprehensions as these, some Members of

the House of Commons resolved to lay this Matter before the Committee of the Whole House, appointed to take into Confideration the State of the Nation. The Importance of it did, in their Opinions, deserve the most folemn Proceedings, and the Nature of it required that no more Time should be lost in stopping the Growth of an Evil, which became, by every Day's Delay, greater and harder to cure. They got therefore fuch Evidence of particular Facts, as they judged fufficient; and they conceal'd their Enquiries with all the Care they could, left the Witnesses might be prevented, by Power or Artifice, from appearing; or when they did appear, from fpeaking as plainly and fully in publick, as they had done in private. This Precaution, which is, or ought always to be taken in Cases of this Kind, was furely as necessary as ever, on the Occasion we speak of; and the Complaints, which have been made of it, are indeed below Animadversion.

When, in Consequence of these Measures, it was moved in the Committee of the whole House, that some Persons, attending at the Door, should be call'd in, to give an Account of the Condition of the Port and Harbour of Dunkirk, * * * * attempted at first to hinder this Motion from passing; but the Sense and Inclination of the Committee running strongly against him, this Attempt sail'd of Success.

The

The Witnesses were call'd in; and they gave clear and distinct Accounts to the fol-

lowing Effect;

That the Port and Harbour of Dunkirk, which had been demolish'd in pursuance of the Treaty of Utrecht, fo that the smallest Fishing-Boat could not go into them a few Years ago, are now made capable of receiving great Numbers of Ships of confiderable Burthen .-- That from fixty to cighty Veffels are frequently to be feen there at a Time; and that the Port is capable of containing more than one Hundred and Fifty----That, in order to make it fo, the Sluice of Furnes has been re-establish'd, and the Piles of the Damme, raised at the Time of the Demolition across the Entrance of the Harbour, have been pull'd up----That feveral Works, in which the Soldiers as well as other Persons were employ'd, have been carried on from Time to Time, for cleanfing the Harbour; for hindering the Mud and Sand from coming in to it; for repairing the Tettees; for preventing the Tides from flowing across the Channel, and thereby keeping it choak'd up; for making Keys where Goods are loaded and unloaded as commodiously as before the Demolition, and for procuring to this Port many other Conveniencies of Trade and Navigation ---- That an Englishbuilt Ship, which trades from Dunkirk to St. Domingo, was actually in the Harbour lying at the Keys, besides several Dutch and

and other Ships, which trade to the Weft-Indies----That Ships of Force had been built and launch'd there lately, and one particularly in January last, which sail'd out of the Harbour with twenty-four Guns mounted, and is able to carry thirty-fix-In a Word, that some of the many Works, which have been made for reftoring the Harbour of Dunkirk, are already put into as good a Condition as ever; that the Trade of the Town is by these Means very much encreased within these two Years; and that the Pilots, who lie upon the Coast, refuse to carry Veffels any longer into the Canal of Mardyke, having Orders not to do it .----That the Canal of Mardyke is brought fo near to the great Sluice, that by removing a fmall Quantity of Earth more, the whole Body of Water, which is at present carried into that Canal from those of Berg and the Moere, may be carried into the old Bafin, and into that Part of the Harbour, where the Men of War formerly lay----upon the whole Matter, that the Port of Dunkirk may now very foon, and at no great farther Expence, be render'd as good, and perhaps better than it was before the Destruction of it, in all respects, except as to the Fortifications .---- The Witneffes added, that thefe Works, which had been carried on, at first, with some kind of Privacy, were afterwards continued without Disguise, and since last August with more Vigour than before; nay,

that they were actually carrying on, notwithstanding the Badness of the Season, in

January and February last.

The Witnesses, who proved these Facts, were Masters of Vessels and others, who make frequent Voyages to Dunkirk, and who spoke to nothing but what they had had frequent Occasions of observing; so that their Evidence was, upon a very strict, to use no harsher a Word, Cross-Examination, confirm'd in every Part, and supported in the

strongest Manner.

As clear as it was, and as unquestionable as the Truth of it appear'd to be, Reasons were urged why no Refolutions should be, at that Time, taken upon it. The Chief of these Reasons were, that Col. Armstrong had been lately fent to France; that his Prefence would be necessary in a farther Examination of this Matter; and that a Time ought therefore to be allow'd, in which he might be able to return; that feveral Papers would likewife be call'd for, to shew what had been lately transacted and what Care the Ministers had taken about this Affair; and that the getting these Papers ready for the House would require Time also. These Reasons were acquiesced in, tho' it was not hard to foresee what might be effected by Delay.

The Committee, was adjourn'd; Papers were call'd for; the Committee was again put off on the same Pretences for a Fortnight;

feveral.

feveral Papers were brought; and, the Day before it was to fit again, there were communicated to the House, by his Majesty's Command, Copies of a * Letter from the D. of N. to Mr. Pointz; of an Answer from Mr. + Pointz; and of the following Order obtain'd from the Court of France.

By the KING.

HE Sieur—Capt. of his Majesty's Ships, is order'd to repair immedi-" ately to the Port of Dunkirk, there to " draw up an exact State of the present Con-" dition of the Chanel and Port of the faid " Town, and to make his Report thereof. " His Majesty enjoins the said Sieur to cause " to be demolished all the Works that may " have been erected in Contravention to the "Treaty of Utrecht and of the Hague, " Copys whereof he will find hereunto an-" nexed. His Majesty commands and orders " the Governor Commandant of the Place, " the Intendants, Engineers, and all other " his Officers and Subjects to give all the " necessary Assistance in the Execution of " the present Order, in Case of Need. Done " at Verfailles the 27th of February, 1730. " Sign'd

^{*} The Duke's Letter to Pointz and Armstrong was dated February the 12th, 1729-30.

⁺ Pointz and Armstrong's Letter to the Duke was from Paris 19th February 1729 30.

" Sign'd Lewis, and underneath Phely-

" peaux.

Our Ministers seem'd to applaud themfelves very much on the Success of their last Application to the French Court; and it was talk'd of, in a triumphant Stile, as if there remain'd no Pretence for proceeding to any farther Examination of the present State of Dunkirk. But furely this was unreasonable on all Accounts; fince if there was any Merit in obtaining this Piece of Paper from France, the Merit belong'd to those worthy Gentlemen, who brought this Affair before the House of Commons, and in no fort to the Ministers. Besides which, even upon the Supposition that France had now given us full Satisfaction, and a full Security that Dunkirk should be once more demolish'd, according to the Terms of the Treaties of Utrecht and the Hague, it was still proper and necessary too that the Committee should proceed; because it was proper and necessary to discover how it had come to pass that the Harbour of Dunkirk had been, for so long a Time, repairing without any effectual Opposition on our Parts. No honest Man, who is acquainted with the Constitution of Parliament, and who knows what the Proceedings of the House of Commons have been in the best Times, will contradict me in this. Permit me to add, that the Facility and Expedition, with which the French confented, upon this Occasion, to their last Order,

Order, administer'd more than ordinary Cause to suspect that they had never been press'd

much upon this Head before.

When this House came again into the Committee of the State of the Nation, they had before them, besides the two Letters of our Ministers and the Answer just procured from France, several of the Papers, which had been call'd for, and the Evidence of some fresh Witnesses produced by those Gentlemen, who had produced the former.

I fay feveral of the Papers which had been call'd for; because, altho' the Papers call'd for by the ** * * were all brought in; yet of those which had been call'd for by others, some were kept back, under a Pretence that they could not be found in the Offices; and others, it was said, would require a great deal

of Time to copy.

The Papers call'd for by * * * * and deliver'd in, were generally Extracts of Letters; fo that, if one were to suppose an Intention to conceal any Circumstances from the Knowledge of the House, this Method would give a sufficient Opportunity of doing it; notwithstanding which, these very Papers, impersect as they were, consirm'd and strengthen'd all the Evidence given at the Bar.

In order to be more clear, and to state the whole Matter as fairly as I am able, I shall take Notice in the first Place, of such Particulars as appear'd in the Papers, or were proved

proved by fresh Witnesses, in Addition to and Corroboration of what had appeared in the preceding Examination; for nothing contrary to it appear'd any where. In the next Place I shall give an Account of the Conduct of our Ministers through all these Transactions; for the Exactness of which, I shall appeal to their own Papers, as I shall appeal to the common Sense of Mankind for the Justness of the Observations, which I

propose to make as I go along.

It appear'd then by these Papers, that in March 1727-8, according to our Stile, the old Harbour of Dunkirk was fo well repair'd, that the Canal of Mardyke was no longer made use of; that the Inhabitants work'd at these Reparations by Moon-light; that the Trade of Dunkirk had been carried on there as formerly for eight Months; and that a Frigat of 40 Guns was fitting in that Harbour, which is faid to be in as good a. Condition as formerly, except as to the Condition of the Fortifications, Other Advices, very little posterior to these, speak of a Shice built in 1727, on the Canal of Furnes; of a new Sluice preparing for the Canal of Berg; of Engineers, who direct, and the King of France's Troops, who carry on these Works.

As this Account from the Papers agrees with the Accounts given by the first Witnesses; so the Evidence of the second Witnesses agrees perfectly with both; for they faid that the Sluice of Furnes had been open'd

open'd about August 1727; that is, about eight Months before the Month of March, 1727-8, Old Stile; that about October, 1727, the Piles, which barr'd the Harbour, had been drawn, and that there was Water enough in it for a Ship of 400 Tons. They confirm'd that Numbers of Men, mostly Soldiers, were employ'd on these Works.

Mr. Armstrong was sent, in 1728, with Mr. Constroom to Dunkirk, and his Report is dated from thence in September. This Report is in nothing repugnant to the other Accounts. On the contrary, it enters minutely enough into the Particulars of Works, which the Report agrees to be contrary to the

express Terms of the Treaty.

There are, among the Papers, other Advices of the Month of May, 1729, concerning new Works carried on at Dunkirk, and Accounts of what was done upon these Advices; but the Papers are, from May and July 1729, entirely silent as to this whole Affair; and yet it appear'd plainly by the Evidence at the Bar, which was not contradicted, that from July, to the Time of bringing this Enquiry into the House of Commons, the French continued to repair and mend the Port of Dunkirk with more Application than ever. It is therefore no Wonder if the Witnesses spoke to some more Particulars than are to be found in the Papers.

Thus have I related the Substance of what appear'd, concerning the present State of Dunkirk.

Dunkirk, as well as concerning the Works carried on by the French at that Place, fince Mr. Lascells was recall'd from thence. Some Circumstances, which I may have omitted, to avoid Prolixity and Consusion, will occur more properly in the Second Part; where I propose to give an Account of the Conduct of our Ministers, thro' all these Transactions,

out of their own Papers.

First, it appears, by their own Papers, that the very first Notice, which they took of what the French were doing at Dunkirk, proceeded from a Reprefentation made by the Pensionary of Holland, on Advices he had receiv'd from France, and which were dated the 26th of March 1728, N.S. Now the French had been at this Time, many Months working at the Harbour of Dunkirk, and the Trade of that Place had been during this Time, carried on as formerly. Did our Ministers know of this, and do nothing against it till the Minister of the States call'd in a Manner, upon them? This would be Connivance in the highest Degree. Did they not know it fooner? They took then no Care to be inform'd of what pass'd at Dunkirk, for two Years together, after they had recall'd Mr. Lascells, whose Presence had been a Check upon the French. This would be Neglect in the highest Degree. The Dutch Minister at Paris sent this Advice to the Penfionary. How came our Minister, at the same Court, not to have

as good Intelligence, or having it, not to fend it hither?

But there is another Confideration still behind; for if publick Reports did not deferve their Attention; yet they could not be ignorant that the Port of Dunkirk was open'd, because they must know, at least one of them must know, and from him the rest might have known, by the Entries at our Custom-bouse*, that Ships went daily to it and came daily from it. Neglect might keep them ignorant of the particular Works, by means whereof this Harbour had been restored. But even Neglect could not hinder them from knowing that it was, in fome Degree reftored; and that, by Virtue of two folemn Treaties, over the Observation of which it was their Duty to watch, Dunkirk was never to be, in any Degree, an Harbour again.

Secondly, as the latter Part of the foregoing Observation bears particularly on the elder, so I apprehend that the Observation I am about to make will be found to bear as hard on the younger of that Pair of Brothers, who have had so long the Direction of the Affairs of this Kingdom; for the Advices, which the Pensionary had communicated to our Court, were sent to the British Minister

^{*} N. B. The Entries of Brandies from thence were increased from 600 Tons, in the Year 1727, to above 1000 in the Year 1729; and the Entries of Cambricks from 18,500 half Pieces to above 31,000 half Pieces; and 160 Sail of Ships, from 30 to 60 Tons, were enter'd at the Custom-house from this Port in three Years from 1727 to 1729.

at Parts by the Secretary of State, on the 4th of April 1728, with Orders that he should inform himself about them, and make the proper Representations to the Cardinal, if he found them true; though it was not possible for us to have any Doubt of the Truth of those Facts; concerning which, they might have had certain Information from so many Hands, if their Attention had not been wholly employ'd in the necessary Establishment of Don Carlos.

Walpole's Answer is dated the 29th of April, N. S. and it is a curious one indeed, He fends over an Information, which agrees, in the main, with the Advices received from the Penfionary; but adds, that the Inhabitants of Dunkirk had feen, some Time ago, with equal Surprize and Pleasure, that in one Night their Port was open'd at once, by the Force of an extraordinary Tide, which they look'd upon as a kind of MIRACLE. In this French Miracle his Excellency feems to believe; and therefore most cautiously proposes to the Secretary of State, that a Person may be sent to Dunkirk to see whether what has been done there be any thing more than the pure Consequence of the Tides, before he speaks to the Cardinal in pursuance of the Orders sent by the D. of N. to him.

On the 30th of April, the Secretary writes to the Ambassador again, and sends him an Account,

Account, which his Majesty has received, fays the Letter, of the Works which have been carrying on at Dunkirk for the Establishment of the Port and Harbour there, from a Person of undoubted Credit and Skill in those Affairs. The Advices of the Penfionary are own'd to be true; and every Step, which has been taken at Dunkirk, is declared to be a direct Breach of the Treaty of Utrecht and of the Triple Alliance. Walpole is directed therefore to infift with the Cardinal, that immediate Orders be fent to stop these Works, and a Confidence is express'd that the Cardinal will take effectual Care that every Thing be rectified according to the Treaties abovemention'd. All this is enforced by some Reafonings, which would incline one to imagine, that our Ministers at Home might think it necessary, at that Time, to insist upon the Observation of the Treaties.

But our Minister Abroad did not appear much convinced of any such Necessity; for his Excellency's Answer to this Dispatch is more extraordinary than the last, and even than the miraculous Tide, which, it is pretended, open'd the Harbour of Dunkirk. He writes on the 30th of May; that is, a Month afterwards; to the D. of N. sends him some Papers, received from the Cardinal, relating to our Complaints about Dunkirk; takes no Notice of any Representations made by him, in Obedience to the Orders sent him; but says very coolly and very tenderly,

Y 2

that he is no competent Judge of this Affair,

and can fay nothing to it.

His Excellency's Temper would almost make any honest Man lose his Temper; but let us examine these Passages with all the Indisfe-

rence possible.

Walpole's Information, which he fent the D. of N. agreed with that of the Pensionary, which the D. of N. had fent him. He knew then, by repeated Advices, that it was not the Tides, but the inceffant Labour of the French, which had open'd the Port and restored the Trade of Dunkirk, with all the Circumstances already mention'd. He knew, or he might have known, that this miraculous Tide had happen'd eight Years before, long before Mr. Lascells was recall'd from Dunkirk, and neither had been, nor could be, of itself, effectual to the opening that Port. This being the Case (and it is so most exactly) on what Principle shall we account for Walpole's Doubts, Delays, and the Weight he feems to lay on that impertinent Story of the Tide?

But this is not the worst. He holds much the same Conduct, after he has receiv'd a third Information, confirming the two former, coming from a Person of undoubted Credit and Skill, believed by the King, and made the Foundation of positive Orders to him to insist on having an immediate Stop given to these Works. He was no Judge in this Affair. His Orders were not conditional in this

this Case, as in the former. Nothing but the greatest Certainty, that the Advices, which the King had received, were untrue, and that his Majesty had been deceived in them, could justify him for delaying one Moment the Execution of his Orders, Now, instead of this Certainty, what had he? Why he had a Paper, drawn up by the Intendant of the Marine at Dunkirk; for which, by the way, he had flay'd about a Month; and it happens very unluckily that this Paper, as inconfiftent, as shuffling, as evasive, and as impertinent as it is, owns not only the Truth of some Particulars, contain'd in the Advices, which were the Grounds of Complaint, but acknowledges expresly that some Works had been made to prevent the Sands from cheaking up the Harbour. Need I go about to prove that, in Consequence of the Treaties, the Harbour is to remain cheak'd up for ever; and that every Thing done to prevent that is an Infraction of these Treaties?

I proceed, in the third Place, to take Notice of Mr. Armstrong's Report. This Report is dated at Dunkirk the 23d of September, 1728, near four Months after the Transactions last mention'd, and confirms sufficiently the Truth of the Advices received.————It takes Notice of an Extraordinary Tide, which had demolish'd, in the Month of December, 1720, the great Batardeau or Digue; but it observes that the breaking of this Digue was far from opening

Y 3 the

the Harbour, fince the Sand and Earth of it, being spread by the Flux and Reflux, had fill'd the Port, Bafin, and Channel, fo that a Boat could not get in from the Seaward-----It attributes very justly the opening the Harbour to the rebuilding the Sluice of Furnes, and augmenting it with a fecond Flood-Gote-----It then proceeds to particularize the feveral other Works, which had been made, and afferts that they are all contrary to the express Terms of the ninth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, and also to the fourth Article of the Treaty of Alliance made at the Hague the fourth of January, 1717 .---- It afterwards proposed different Methods for restoring Things to the State they were in, before the French had open'd and repair'd the Harbour-----Thus far all is well; but then these Engineers (for Cronstroom joyns in the Report with Armstrong). turn Politicians; and having offer'd what they judged necessary for an effectual Compliance with the Treaties, they take on them to offer what they judge may be expedient, and not repugnant to the Intention of the Treaties; and that is, that the little Rigolle or Gut (fo they are pleased to call it, and fuch it might be then, in Comparison of what it is now) should be left to the French; and in order to preserve it to them, that the Sluice, which they had built on the Canal of Furnes, in Violation of their Treaties, should be left to them likewise. This

This must appear a very odd Opinion; efpecially when it comes from Mr. Armstrong, who was fo positive, in the late Queen's Time, that the Sluices at Dunkirk were not necessary to be preserved, in order to discharge the Waters of the Country; and that if any of these Sluices remain'd, it would be impossible to prevent the Harbour from being kept open; whereas if they were all destroy'd, a small Space of Time would effectually fill up the Harbour. But fince that Time, he seems to have been enlighten'd by Ricouart, the Intendant of the Marine at Dunkirk; who, in the Paper abovemention'd, to which this Report refers, had undertaken to do, in three Month's Time, in War or Peace, at the Expence of ten thoufand Livres, and with one bundred Workmen, more than he own'd had been done at Dunkirk in four Years.

It was right, perhaps, in Ricouart to advance this extravagant Proposition; because it was his Business to furnish the Cardinal with Arguments to oppose to our Complaints; but surely it was not our Business to build, on this Foundation, such Maxims, as are established in Mr. Armstrong's Report, and as

have had too much Prevalency fince,

France, it is argued, may, in Case of a Rupture with us, rebuild Sluices, and open thereby the Harbour of Dunkirk and the Channel, as deep and as wide as formerly. But this Harbour will be of no Advantage

Y 4

to them, till the Fortifications to the Sea are rebuilt; because all Ships of War or Burthen were ever obliged, when this Place was in the best Condition, to go out into the Road, where they may be attack'd, as long as the Strand remains unfortified, and there take in their Guns, Provisions, &c. Therefore let us permit them to open their Harbour now; that is, because France will probably, in Case of a War, restore and fortify the Port of Dunkirk again, let us allow them to do Part of their Work beforehand; because they will not observe the Treaties, when they are no longer bound by them, let us connive at their breaking these Treaties, whilst they are bound by them.

But I must not dismiss this Point ludi-

croufly.

Mr. Armstrong's reasoning, which was very bad, when he first made Use of it, and which is grown much worse by what has happen'd fince (though there are Men who still insist upon it) is entirely built on supposing what is in Dispute, or rather what is

fully disproved.

For first, it is taken for granted that, in Case of a Rupture, the French will be able, in a short Time, to restore this Harbour, notwithstanding all that has been done, or can be done to destroy it. Now this is absolutely denied by several very knowing Men; and was so, in a particular Manner, by one, whose Knowledge can be no more disputed, than

than his Valour, or his Integrity; and who faid in the House that he would undertake the Digue or Damme might be so made, as not to be destroy'd, in two Years Time, with all the Expence France could bestow upon it.

But besides, how could it escape Mr. Armstrong, when he took his Hint from the French Intendant, or those who have been Mr. Armstrong's Ecchoes, that their own reasoning turns, in this Case, against them? Let it be allow'd them, for Argument's Sake. that no Ship can take its Departure from Dunkirk without stopping sometime in the Road; let it be allow'd that we can attack and destroy them there, as long as the Strand is not fortified; nay let it be allow'd that, in Case of a War, we should be able from the Road to hinder the French from fortifying the Strand. From all which they conclude that a naked Harbour cannot be of much Advantage to France, at the fame Time that they affert that it is not worth while to hinder that from being done now, which France can and certainly will do in a few Months, whenever a War shall happen.

But furely 'tis very plain, upon this Foundation, and in Contradiction to what is afferted, that nothing can be more worth our while, than to binder the French from restoring this Port and Harbour in Time of Peace; fince they cannot possibly restore it in Time

of War. The same Force, which it has been allow'd would destroy their Ships in the Road, and even hinder them from fortifying the Strand again, would equally hinder them from restoring their Channel to the Sea, by making Jettees down to the low-water Mark, to prevent the Flux and Reflux of the Tides, which fet across the Channel; from choaking it up with Mud and Sand as fast as the Sluices by their Effect can clear it. Now it is undeniable, that if we can, in Time of War, command the Road and even hinder the Strand from being for tified; we can likewise, by the same Means hinder the Jettees from being carried to low-water Mark. From whence it follows. on the reasoning of these Gentlemen, that if we do not suffer the French to do this Work, by Stratagems in Time of Peace, they never can do it by Force in Time of War; and by Consequence, if ever it is done, it must be owing to the Folly, Neglect or Treachery of the Ministers of Great Britain.

Secondly, it is afferted to be publickly known that all Ships, whether of War or Burthen, were ever obliged, when the Haven was at its best, to go out into the Road, and there take in their Guns, &c. Now it is publickly known, that all Ships of War or Burthen were not formerly, and are not even now under any such Necessity. There is at present Water enough in the Harbour for

for a Ship of 400 Tons, and the Witnesses had feen a Ship sail out of it with 24 Guns mounted. The largest Men of War, which were kept formerly on that Station, might be obliged to go light into the Road, and there take in their Guns, &c. but it is evident that Ships of Force sufficient to annoy the Trade of Great Britain, and to carry on that of France, did formerly and may now sail out and in, without being obliged to stop in

the Road.

Thirdly, the opening this Port, in the Manner it has been done, and the erecting a Stuice on the Canal of Furnes, tho' allow'd to be contrary to the express Terms, is supposed not to be repugnant to the Intention of the Treaties, and to the Ends proposed by them. Now furely the direct contrary is demonstratively plain; so plain, by the Terms of the Treaty; by the Principles over and over laid bown; by the Arguments over and over employ'd in the Disputes and Negotiations about this Affair, and finally by Mr. Arm-Strong's own Opinion formerly deliver'd, and follow'd, that it is inconceivable he should report in Contradiction to all this; unless a Report was to be made, on this Occasion, in Confequence of a Measure resolved, instead of determining the Meafure, in Confequence of the Report; which I apprehend has been the Case, on many Occasions.

When the French made the Canal of Mardyke, they cover'd themselves under the

Letter

Letter of the Treaty; and because they did not rebuild the same individual Moles, Jettees, or Fortifications, as had been demolish'd. they would have had it understood that they did not act against the Words of the Ninth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht; which are, ne dicta Munimenta, Moles, aut ageres denuo unquam reficiantur. Now when they have rebuilt one of the same Sluices; are repairing the very same Jettees; and are, in a Word, restoring the same individual Port, Harbour, Basin and Channel; we argue, in their Favour, that they do not act against the Spirit or Intention of the Treaties, provided they do not renew the Fortifications on the Strand. Mr. Armstrong, in this Report, does not indeed allow the repairing the fettees; on the contrary, he infifts strongly on the Necessity of destroying them even to the Level of the Strand; but we thall fee that he does little less than allow it in a fubsequent Report; and the same Argument, drawn from the supposed Intention of the Treaties, has been equally infifted upon, fince the Jettees have been in Part repaired, and other Works done, which answer the same Ends.

But to conclude this Observation, if there could have been, before the Treaty of 1717, any Doubt concerning the Intention of the Treaty of Utrecht, as there certainly could not; and as his late Majesty insisted very justly, and very successfully that there could

not; yet to urge this, after the Treaty of 1717, is to chicane about the Spirit of Treaties, in Favour of the French, more grossly than they did themselves in their own Favour, when they accepted the Will of the late King of Spain, notwithstanding all the Engagements they had taken by the Treaty of Partition. The fourth Article of the Treaty of 1717, is a Commentary on the ninth Article of that of Utrecht. If, after that we are still at Liberty to talk of the Spirit or Intention of the first Treaty, nothing can be ever determined by any Treaty. The Treaty of 1717 leaves the Canal of Mardyke in such a State as might fuffice for carrying off the Waters, and admitting of fmall Veffels, that there might be no Excuse left for opening, in any Degree, the old Channel, which by the fame Treaty is to be more effectually demolished than ever, in order to the entire choaking of it up: How can it be faid, after this, that the Intent and End of this Treaty, as well as of the former, is not disappointed by opening this same old Channel and the Harbour anew? I grow ashamed of infisting so long on a Point so very clear, and shall finish it by faying, that nothing could furprize or afflict me more than to hear some Persons, from whom better Things might have been expected, argue for keeping open the Harbour of Dunkirk upon any Principles, and especially on fuch as these; that it is not against the

the Treaties, nor against the Interest of Great Britain. To excuse Ministers, who have committed Faults, may be allow'd to Friendship, and to particular Obligations; but there can hardly be a more melancholy Symptom in a free Government, than that of excusing and even justifying the Conduct of Ministers, by explaining away the most important, national Advantages.

Having made these Observations on Mr. Armstrong's Report, I proceed in the fourth Place, to take Notice of what our Ministers

did in Consequence of it.

What they did was in short This. They follow'd his Advice, as far as it went in Favour of France; and there do not appear any Footsteps, that they follow'd it in taking effectual Care of those few Things, which he recommends in Favour of Great Britain.

They directed the Ministers at Paris to insist that Things might be rectified according to it; and the Secretary of State writes that this will give entire Satisfaction. Nay, they would not so much as try whether France would be contented with less than Mr. Armstrong proposed; for Walpole having given the Hint, by asking whether he should communicate the whole Report to the French, or only such Parts of it as related to the Infractions of the Treaties, he is order'd to communicate the whole Report to the Cardinal. That is, he is order'd to shew the

French at once, that we were willing to give up to them what had never been given up from the Treaty of Utrecht to this Time; and leave them a Harbour, under the sham Pretences, under which they had so long

press'd for it in vain.

What is the Return made to this noble Frankness and Generosity of ours? Why, the Cardinal, says he, has put the Report into the Hands of the Secretary for Maritime Affairs; and that in order to hinder an Eclat, Directions will be given for com-

plying with it by Degrees.

Who does not fee the Meaning of this Answer? The Eclat, that is the Noise, was already made in Great Britain, and in Holland too. It was publickly known in both, and publickly complain'd of, that the French had, in great Measure, restored the Port and Harbour of Dunkirk. Surely there could have been no Hurt in letting it be as publickly known, that they were destroying, at least, a Part of what they had done in Violation of the Treaties. This must have help'd to binder, instead of making any farther Eclat. This must have done Honour to that Court, and have given some Colour, if any Thing can give Colour to fo improbable a Story, to what has been fo often faid, and is faid even now, that the French Ministers knew nothing of the Works carry'd on by the Inhabitants of Dunkirk.

But the Meaning of this Answer was plainly to gain Time. We had shewn too much Haste in giving up, at once, a great Part of what they wanted to gain upon us; and they were willing to try if they could, by Delay, evade performing the small Part

of what we required of them.

I pass to my fifth Observation, which will prove that this is no unreasonable Refinement, or rash Judgment. What I have just related pass'd in Nov. 1728. From that Time it does not appear that the French demolish'd, according to Mr. Armstrong's Report, any of the Works they had made, or that our Ministers press'd them once to it. But though they did not demolish, it appears that they built; for in the Month of May following, a new Alarm comes, and our Ministers are once more call'd upon by the Pensionary, who sends them Account of farther Works carrying on at Dunkirk, for the Improvement of the Harbour: These Accounts were fuch, that my Lord Chefter field fays, in his Letter, the Pensionary gave great Attention to them. Let us fee what Attention We gave unto them.

They are fent to the Minister at Paris. He communicates them to the Cardinal. The Cardinal knows nothing of the Matter; but gives general Assurances that nothing, contrary to the Treaties, shall be done. Our Complaints are transmitted from Court to Dunkirk, and from thence an Answer

is returned by the *Intendant*, acknowledging in the main the Facts complain'd of, but giving Turns to them, which one would hardly imagine could pass even with those, who have so much Faith in their *Miracles*. Such, for Instance, as this; that a certain Floodgate had indeed been repair'd, but that it was one, which had not been demolish'd at the Demolition of Dunkirk; which is true for this Reason, that it was not in being at the Time of that Demolition, but hath been built since; so that the French Argument stands thus. We do not break the Treaties by repairing this Work, though we broke them by building it.

This Answer was refer'd to Mr. Armflrong, who (without any Examination, whether the French Intendant had not palliated and disguised Matters) makes as implicit and favourable a Report, as the other

could have defired.

A few Months ago, it was, in his own Opinion, necessary to destroy the Jettees, newly erected, and the Heads of the old Ones, which had been lest, and that even down to the Level of the Strand. Now, the Piles, driven at the Head of the old Channel, and pretended to be design'd only for Beacons and Moorings, may be allow'd; provided Care be taken that they do not serve for the Foundations of Batteries. The new Magazines and the new Key are not thought of any Inconveniency. All that

France is doing, and which the Pensionary laid so much Weight upon, is allow'd. The Minister at Paris hath Orders to say so; but he is to hint, at the same Time, that Care be taken that no farther Works are carried on. He may speak out in making these Concessions to France; but he must measure his Words, and not speak plain, when he mentions what we required in Return; though what we required, in Return, was nothing more than a verbal Assurance that Batteries should not be made on the Heads of the Settees, which we allow'd them to erect at the Entrance of the old Channel.

My fixth Observation is this. Though we were now brought, Step by Step, to see and own a manifest Danger, that the French might not only repair, but fortify the Port of Dunkirk; yet from the Month of July last the Works were carried forward there till the Enquiry begun in Parliament, without the Knowledge, or with the Connivance of our most knowing Ministers.

It appear'd by the concurring Evidence of the Witnesses, that they were carried forward, during this Time, with greater Application and less Reserve than ever; that the Soldiers of the King's Troops work'd at them; and that Ships were press'd, by the King's Orders, to carry Stones for this

Service.

After this, it is impossible to read, without fome Surprize, that when Mr. Pointz and Mr. Armstrong made the Representations, which they were order'd to make, to the French Ministers, both the Cardinal and the Keeper of the Seals affured them, that if any Thing had been done towards restoring the Harbour of Dunkirk to its former State. or in Contravention to the Treaties of Utrecht and the Hague, it had been done without their Knowledge and contrary to the French King's express Commands. They feem, by this Protestation, as ignorant as our Ministers were, of Things done in their own Country, and with all the Eclat possible; but even Ignorance, in this Cafe, is not very excuseable in either; for

First, as to the French Ministers. Taking what they fay, in their own Behalf, for granted, that the Inhabitants of Dunkirk have been principally active in what hath been lately done there, contrary to Treaties; yet can it be suppos'd, with the least Appearance of Probability, that Works of fuch Importance could be carried on, for above two Years together, without any Authority, or Connivance, or even the Knowledge of the French Court ?----Is it, in any Degree, credible that the Subjects of an arbitrary Prince would dare to make Use of his Troops, or to press Ships into that Service, by pretended Orders and without any real Licence?---Can we imagine that This could

be done under the very Nose, and yet without the Privity of the Governor Commendant, the Intendants and divers other Officers of the Marine, who are obliged to hold a constant Correspondence with the Ministers at Paris?----or, lastly, can it be pretended, without putting the greatest Violence on common Sense and common Reason, that even Curiosity itself, the lowest Principle of all our Enquiries, would not have prevail'd on the Ministers of France to examine into this Affair and gain the best Informations about it, after it had made so great an Eclat

in England and Holland?

I am at a Loss to find, in this Conduct, any Proof that they carry their Fidelity even to a Nicety; for it was certainly incumbent on them to be so inform'd; since it was from the French Court, and not from the Inhabitants of Dunkirk that we were to expect and require the strict Observance of the Treaties. When the French Ministers therefore would impose on us an Assurance of this Kind, fo void of all Probability, and at the fame Time give us another Affurance of their doing every Thing agreeably to Treaties; will not the notorious Improbability of the one justify our strongest Suspicions about the Performance of the other? When there are fuch convincing Reasons to question their Veracity, can we, without exposing our selves to the Contempt of the whole World, d :pend intirely on their Sincerity?

Secondly,

Secondly, As to the inactive Conduct of our Ministers from July to February last; and in order to set this Matter in a sull Light, let us recall very shortly and place their

whole Proceeding in one View.

If we look no farther back than the Year 1727, when the new Sluice, on the Canal of Furnes, was built, it is now about 3 Years fince the French have work'd at the Restoration of Dunkirk. In this Time, our Ministers have made three Complaints, and not one of these Complaints hath been made originally on their own Motion, and upon Advices of their own. The two first Times, they were call'd on by the Penfionary, and the last Time, they were push'd on by the Parliament. The Proceedings on the first Complaint ended by allowing to the French fome Infractions of the Treaties, and by defiring that others might be rectified. This is promised; but the Promise is not kept. Instead of rectifying what had been done, new Works are carried on. The Proceedings on the fecond Complaint and in our acquiefcing to these new Works, provided they are extended no farther. Even this Promise is not kept. The Works are extended farther. All Mankind know it, and complain loudly of it for feven Months together. An Enquiry begins in Parliament. Our Ministers are furprized and know nothing of the Matter. Although they had been disappointed Z 3

a first Time, they took no Care not to be so

a second.

I think that I need not explain or enforce this any farther; and therefore I shall obferve, 7thly, that as there may be fome Reason, arising from their past Conduct, to apprehend that the French Court may not be quite so exact, nor so expeditious, as we are made to hope, in fulfilling even the last Promise, which they have given us, to demolish all the Works erected contrary to the Treaties; fo there is great Reason likewise, arising from our past Conduct, to apprehend that they do not understand, on that Side of the Water, by Works contrary to the Treaties, what we do and always must understand, on this Side of the Water, by those Words; from whence it will follow that, by dextrous Management, we have brought the clearest Point in Nature to be the most intricate; and that whereas there never could have been Room for the leaft Dispute, if the Treaty of 1717 had been observed, in Explanation and Moderation of that of Utrecht, our departing from it may and must open a Source of inexhaustible Chicane.

I have already shewn how the Treaty of 1717 explains the Intention and moderates the Conditions of the Treaty of Utrecht, so as to leave the French no Colour, either from the Letter or Intention of the Treaties, for

for doing or acting any Thing more than what is there *specifically expresd*; no, not even on Account of discharging the *Canals*; draining the *flat Country*; or carrying on

their Fishing or any other Trade.

Upon this Foot, therefore, the Sense of these Words (Works contrary to the Treaties; or Works done in Contravention to the Treaties;) is exactly and invariably determined. But the French have been artful enough to improve our Complaisance for them, so as to set the Case of Dunkirk on quite another Foot; with our Ministers I mean; for with the Nation I hope and believe that impossible to be done.

On the former Foot, every Thing, which hath been done at Dunkirk, is directly against the Letter of both Treaties, and against the Intention of that of Utrecht, explain'd by that of 1717. The Rigolle or Gut, which Mr. Armstrong and our Ministers allow the French, by virtue of their dispensing Power, and the Shuice on the Canal of Furnes, to keep this Rigolle or Gut open, are as directly and as plainly against the Intention of the Treaties, as even fortifying the Town, the Harbour and the Strand would be.

But, on the other Foot, there is Room tor Chicane. The French may fay (and, no Doubt, they will fay) that the Intention of Treaties ought to be determined by the Sense, in which the contracting Parties have,

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by mutual Agreement, executed them; that as the late King allow'd them to have a Communication from Dunkirk to the Sea, by the Canal of Mardyke, so they have been allow'd, at present, to have the same Communication by the old Channel; that we did indeed once infift on demolishing their Reparations of the old Jettees; but that, fince that Time, and on Occasion of Complaints about other Works, made for improving this Harbour, we have not only expresly approved their making these latter Works, but have tacitly confented to their repairing and supplying the old Jettees, by taking no Notice of their not destroying them, nor of their making other Works to binder as effectually the Flux and Reflux of the Tides from choaking up the Channel, as the 'fettees are defign'd to do; that all this, together with the Approbation of the new Key they have made, and the new Magazines they have built, shew it very evidently to have been our Sense, as well as theirs, that the Intention of the Treaties is not to deprive them of a naked Harbour at Dunkirk, but only to hinder them from having a fortified Harbour there; that they are far from entertaining any fuch Thoughts; that they carry their Fidelity ewen to a Nicety, and have not yet raifed one fingle Battery on the Strand; till they attempt which, we have not the least Reason

to affirm that they act in Contravention to the Treaties.

This and much more, to the same Effect, may the French say, whenever they are press'd in good earnest to sulfil their last Promise, agreeably to the just Expectations of the British Nation. Nay, they certainly will insist in this Manner, if they were so press'd; because whatever Reason they may have to desire that our present Ministers should continue in Power, I can hardly persuade myself that they will, for the Sake of the two illustrious Brothers, undo entirely what they have done at Dunkirk, and fairly lay aside the Hopes of restoring that Port by Degrees, and without Eclat, to its former Greatness and Splendor.

That there is Reason to apprehend such a Conduct from them, we may judge by what we have lately heard from Dunkirk; for it is said that Mr. Lascels, with some French Officers, had been to sound the Water in the Harbour and Channel. Now to what Purpose can this be? If we are to stand to the Treaties, we must insist that there be no Water; at least, no navigable Water at all in the Harbour and Channel. If we depart from the Treaties, to what Purpose do we dispute about a Foot or two of Water, more

The Question does not turn on such Circumstances as these; whether the Port be capable of receiving 50 or 100 Ships; when ther

or less?

ther Ships of 50 or 500 Tons go into it, or out of it; whether the Depth of Water be 14 or 18 or 20 Foot, and the like; but fingly on this, whether it be made a Port to any Purpose, or in any Degree whatsoever.

Perhaps we may hear of fome fettees, or other Works destroy'd, and a sew Appearances of a Demolition; but let it be remember'd that nothing can be a just Satisfaction and real Security to us, but the reducing Dunkirk once more to that Condition, into which it was put by Virtue of the Treaties, and following them as the stated Rule between us, and France, on this Head. Let it be remember'd likewise, that whatever Satisfaction we may obtain, be it more or less, will be owing to the Parliamentary Enquiry, and not to the Care, Vigilance and Spirit of those, who are employ'd in the Administration.

After having made so many Observations on the Conduct of our Minister in this Affair of Dunkirk, I am oblig'd in Justice, to take some Notice of the chief Argument, by which their Creatures endeavour to excuse them; for though many concur to screen them from Censure, sew there are, I think, even amongst these, who presume entirely to

justify their Conduct.

It hath been faid then, that different Times and different Situations of Affairs, require different Ways of acting; which is most undeniable Truth. But as Common-place Wit diverts nobody, who hath any Wit, so Common-

Common-place Maxims impose on nobody,

who hath Sense and Knowledge.

It is true that different Times and Situations require that Ministers of State should both speak and act in different Manners; but they are never to lose their Object, although they change, in some Measure, the Manner of pursuing it. This Object is, or ought always to be, the greatest national Good. To wise and honest Servants of the Publick, all Countries will be absolutely indifferent, except their own; and by Consequence they will neither lean to nor from any foreign Interest, but as that Interest is brought nearer to the Interest of their own Country, or placed in a greater Opposition to it, by the Course of Accidents.

Now, let us apply the Maxim, thus explain'd to the Conduct of our Ministers in

the Case of Dunkirk.

That we have feen and do still fee Times and Situations, with respect to Great-Britain and France very different from those, which our Fathers or we beheld, during forty Years, is true. It is true therefore, that fince this Alteration of Times and Situations, a different Manner of speaking and acting towards France hath been requisite on our Part. But our general Interest, with Respect to France, is only thus far changed. Formerly it was our Interest to appose all her Measures, and to defy her most exerbitant Power. It is now become our Interest to have

have a Communication of friendly Measures and Intercourse of friendly Offices with her; and, instead of defying her reduced Power, to be only jealous of its growing again.

In cultivating therefore the Friendship of France, and even in avoiding all Appearances of diffurbing her, or being jealous of her, our Ministers have acted according to the Rules of good Policy. The French have held the fame Conduct towards us; and this mutual Confidence and Amity might certainly have been productive of much publick Good, without any particular Inconveniency or Mischief. It hath been so to France; but it hath not been so to Great Britain; and the Reason of this Difference is plain. The French have follow'd the Maxim abovemention'd, but without once lofing Sight of their national Interest. Whenever this hath come into Question, they have infisted amicably, but they have infifted as strongly as ever; witness the Case of Santa Lucia, that of the * Honours at Sea, and many others. Nay, whenever they could acquire fuch a Pretence, as feem'd confistent with the Terms of Friendship, they have artfully enough endeavour'd to diminish our Power, and to wrest from us these Advantages, which they know

^{*} Above a Year ago a Lieutenant of an English Man of War was broke, as it was said, upon the Instance of France, for obliging a French Ship to Strike, according to his Instructions, as she was going out of one of our own Harbours.

know may some Time or other, in our Hands, be of Detriment to them; witness the Part, which our intimate Friend, the late Duke of Orleans, acted in supporting the Claim of Spain to the Restitution of Gibraltar and Minorca.

But I am afraid it will be found that our Ministers have suffered the Transports of Friendship to carry them too far in Favour of France; particularly, in the Case now before us; for which they must be confess'd inexcuseable, notwithstanding the wife Apothegm quoted in their Behalf; unless they can shew that, by departing from a strict Observation of the Treaties, with respect to Dunkirk, they have avoided a greater Evil, than the Danger of seeing this Port restored is and must be reputed; or else that they have procured to their Country a greater Good than that of keeping Dunkirk in the State, to which it was reduced, and in which it was to continue, according to the Treaties.

If this fole Excuse, which can be made for our Ministers, will avail them little, when it comes to be tried by the Rules of Reason; it will be quite exploded, when we have Recourse to Experience, and compare the Conduct, which was held by our Ministers, in the Years 1716 and 1717, with that which has been held for these three or four last Years, as well as the Situation of Affairs at that Time, with the Situation of

Affairs, during the latter Period.

The

The Purport of the Provisional Agreement made in 1716, which was inserted in the fourth Article of the Alliance made in 1717, hath been already mentioned. The French were far from confenting eafily to make this Step; and nothing less than the Firmness, which we then shew'd, could have forced them to it. I doubt not but they would gladly have deftroy'd entirely the Canal of Mardyke, if they might have been permitted to have had that Rigolle or Gut (for there appears an Affectation in calling it any Thing but what it is, a Channel) which hath been allow'd them fince. Harbour of Dunkirk is a Tide-Harbour, and therefore liable to much Inconveniency; but this Inconveniency was, in great Measure remedied by the Situation of the old Channel, now restored, which runs strait down to the Sea from the Harbour; and hath the Road before it, in which Ships may, at all Times, get into the Port.

The Canal of Mardyke runs a great Way about, and makes an Elbow before it can descend to the Sea; and when it comes there, hath no Road across the Entrance of it; for which Reason, Dunkirk can never be of that Advantage to France, and of that Danger to us, with this opening to the Sea,

as with the other.

The late King therefore consented, as is observed above, to leave the Canal of Mardyke, reduced according to the Terms of the

the Provisional Agreement; but he was so far from giving the least Way to any Thing, which might tend to open the old Channel, that he expressly stipulated the doing of every Thing necessary for the farther and more compleat Destruction of it. Thus we see the Difference between our former and our late Conduct. Let us consider how we stood, at that Time, with France, and what was the

general Situation of our Affairs.

We were then as closely united with France, as we are now; and the Maxim of cultivating this Union prevailed as strongly in our Councils. A Storm from the North was then much more to be fear'd than now. The late Czar's Grandfather was then alive likewise. How we stood with those Princes, and what we had to apprehend from their Arms, I need not explain. At Home there were fome Remains of a Rebellion not totally extinguish'd, and a Jacobite Party still in Being. The Swedish Plot against the Government was carrying on at that Time. Alberoni was ripening his formidable Schemes, which he began to execute in 1717, and we were, in Concert with France, taking Meafures to oppose them.

Let me ask now any Man, of common Ingenuity, whether an Argument, drawn from the Situation of Affairs, to excuse some Compliances with France, might not have been urged with a better Grace at that Time, than it could be urged, for the same

Purpose

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Purpose now? He will certainly answer that it might; and yet it is urged now, not to excuse some little Compliances, but to excuse what hath been done, in direct Contradiction to the Treaties, and for giving up to France a great Part of the Advantage and Security, which we were in Possession of by them.

This Difference of Conduct is therefore not to be accounted for by the Difference of Times and Situations. It is to be accounted for by nothing, but by the Difference of Men. We had then other Ministers at Home to give Instructions, and another Minister at Paris to execute them. The Times and our Situation, in the Years 1716 and 1717, were not more favourable to us, than the Times and our Situation in the Years 1727, 1728, and 1729; and our national Interest, with Respect to Dunkirk, hath been exactly the fame in both; but our Ministers had not then negotiated themselves into an absolute Dependence on France, nor learn'd perhaps a Lesson, that it is much more easy and profitable to evade or defeat a Parliamentary Enquiry, than to govern well at Home, and to support the Interests, the Honour, and the Dignity of the Nation Abroad.

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AFINAL

ANSWER

To the REMARKS on the CRAFTSMAN'S VINDICATION; and to all the Libels, which have come, or may come from the fame Quarter against the Person, last mention'd in the Craftsman of the 22d of May, 1731.

T is impossible to have read the Papers, which have been publish'd against the Writings of the Craftsman, and not have obferved that one principal Point hath been labour'd with constant Application, and fometimes with a little Art. The Point I mean hath been This; to make all the Difputes about national Affairs, and our most important Interests, to pass for nothing more than Cavils, which have been raised by the Pique and Resentment of one Man, and by the Iniquity and dangerous Defigns of another. Nothing, which could be faid or done to inculcate this Belief, hath been neglected. The fame Charges have been repeated almost every Week, and the Publick hath been modefly defired to pay no Regard to undeniable Facts, to unanswered and unanswerable Arguments, because these Facts and these Arguments were supposed, by the ministeria Aa

nisterial Writers, to come from Men, to whom these Hirelings ascribed, against all Probability, the worst Motives, and whose Characters they endeavour'd to blacken without Proof. Surely this Proceeding render'd it necessary, at least not improper, at the Conclusion of those Remarks, which were to conclude the Collection of the Craftsman, to fay fomething concerning the Perfons, who had been fo particularly attack'd on Account of the Part, which they who rail'd at them, were pleased to suppose that these Gentlemen had in the Writings, contain'd in that Collection. This, I say, was necessary; at least proper; not in order to raise a Spirit, as it is impertinently suggested in the Libel, which lies before me; but to refute Calumny, and to remove at least some of those Prejudices, which had been raised, or renew'd, on the Occasion of these Writings, and which were employ'd to weaken the Effect of them; an Effect, which may be faid with Truth to have been aim'd at the * noble Pair of Brothers; fince it keeps up a national Spirit of Enquiry and Watchfulness, which is the Interest of these Persons, as it hath been their Endeavour, to stifle; and which it is the Interest of every other Man in Britain to preferve in himself, and to nourish in others; an Effect which cannot be faid, without the greatest Untruth, to have

^{*} Par nobile Fratrum. See the Motto prefix'd to the Re-

have been aim'd against the present Settlement; since the highest Insolence, which can be offer'd to his Majesty, is to attempt to blend his Interest and his Cause with those of his unworthy Servants, as the Tools of these unworthy Servants are every Day employ'd to do, and probably at his Maje-

fty's Expence.

Something was faid therefore by the Craftsman in his Journal of the 22d of * May, to
the Purpose I have mention'd. If he went
out of his Way, (for he ought most certainly to confine himself to Things, and meddle
with Persons as little as possible) he went
out of it on great Provocation. He carry'd
Truth and Reason along with him; and he
used a Moderation and a Decency, to which

his Adversaries are Strangers.

To fet this Matter in a full Light, let us confider what he faid; let us confider how he hath been answer'd; and, by fairly comparing both, let us put the whole Merits of this Cause upon one short but decisive Issue. It will be Time afterwards to make a few Observations on the Clamour raised; on the Reasons and Designs of it; in a Word, to detect the mean Artisice and silly Expedients, to which the two bonourable Patrons of the Remarker are reduced. In doing this, I shall neither affect to declaim, nor to inveigh, though I have before me an inexhaustible

See Letter XXIV. in Oldcastle's Remarks on the History of England. Printed for R. Francklin.

haustible Fund of Matter for both, and the Law of Retaliation to bear me out. As I am persuaded the *Men*, I have to do with, can raise no Passion in the *Person* concern'd, so I have no Need in endeavouring to raise the Passions of others.—But to proceed,

The Craftsman took Notice of those Accusations which are brought against the Gentleman he mentions in the second Place.——I meddle not with the Desence of the other, which hath been undertaken by an abler Pen.——Some of these he answer'd in general only; and yet he answer'd them as particularly as he ought to have done for Reasons of Honour, which are touch'd upon by him, and which shall be a little more open'd by me.

But there were other Points, not at all affected by these Reasons, on which no Explanation was necessary to be given by the Accused, and on which the Crastsman had a Right to demand Proofs from the Accusers. They were Points of a more determined Nature; such as admitted of no different Constructions; such as could not be alter'd by Circumstances. They were of a more publick Nature; such as the Men, who brought the Accusations, must have it in their Power to prove, if they were true; and such therefore as must be false, if the Men, who brought the Accusations, were not able and ready to prove them.

On these the Craftsman insisted. He affirm'd Propositions directly contrary to the

Accu-

Accusations brought. He appeal'd to unquestionable Authority for the Truth of what he affirm'd; and to one in particular, which should have been treated with more Respect by the Remarker, since it will outweigh, at Home and Abroad, a thousand such Authorities as those of bis Patrons. He challenged all Mankind to produce one single Proof, in Contradiction of any one of the general Affirmations.

Was there any Thing unfair, or indecent in this Proceeding? Was there any Thing in it, which could provoke the Choler of those, who are Friends to Truth and Justice? If they who brought these Accusations, had been such, an Opportunity was presented to them of convicting the guilty Man at the very Tribunal, before which his Cause had been pleaded. By producing Proof on these Heads, they had it in their Power to condemn him upon all the Rest; and if this Part of the Charge was made good, the Opinion of Mankind would have been fairly enough decided as to the other.

Iffue being joined therefore in this Manner, the accused Person must be found guilty of all the Crimes laid to his Charge; or his Accusers must be found guilty of Slander, of Calumny, and of the worst Sort of Assassina-

tion.

Thus the Craftsman left the Matter.—Let us see what hath been said in Answer to him. I pass over the many scurrilous Productions

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of those weekly ministerial Scolds, who are hired to call Names, and are capable of little more. The elaborate Libel, intitled Remarks on the Craftsman's Vindication, seems to be the utmost Effort of their and their Patron's collected Strength; and tho' I have waited several Days to see if they had any more Scandal to throw out; yet I never doubted an Instant from what Quarter this remarkable Piece came into the World.

The whole Pamphlet is one continued Invective, and deferves no more to be call'd Remarks on the Craftsman, or an Answer to bim, than the Railing and Raving and throwing of Filth by a Madman deserve to be call'd an Answer to those, who unwarily pass too near his Cell. All, that Malice could ever invent, or the Credulity of Parties, inflamed by Opposition, receive, is assembled. Truth is disguised by Misrepresentation, and even many Things, which the noble Pair know to be false, are affirm'd as true.

But you will ask, perhaps, whether the Challenge is not accepted, and whether Proofs are not brought to contradict the plain and positive Assirmations made by the Crastsman? I answer the Challenge is accepted, and the Remarker assures us that he hath brought Proof of innumerous Instances against these Assirmations; which is the more generous, because the Crastsman exacted but one single Proof in Contradiction of any of them.

The first of these Affirmations was, that the Gentleman concern'd never enter'd into Engagements, or any Commerce with the Pretender, till he had been attainted and cut off from the Body of his Majesty's Subjects.—Let us examine the Facts which we find scatter'd up and down in the Remarks, which may be apply'd to prove, in Opposition to this Affirmation, what hath, been so often afferted, that this Gentleman was a zealous Jacobite, and an Agent of the Pretender, even in the Reign of the late Queen.

The first Fact of this Kind is this. He left the Kingdom. His high Treason, among other Crimes was confess'd by his shameful Flight.

Had the Libeller proved this high Treason, I might agree that the Gentleman leaving his Country was a Confequence; but I can never admit that it is a Proof of his Guilt. Could no other Reason for leaving his Country be given, except his Guilt, his leaving bis Country would be a strong Presumption against him. But many other Reasons will foon occur to those, who remember the Passages of that Time; and Reasons there are of a more private Nature still, which would be very far, to fay no more, from reflecting Dishonour on a Step, which is call'd by thefe foul-mouth'd Advocates of Power, shameful and ignominious. One Thing it may be proper to affure them of, that they may pretend to mistake the Craftsman, Aa4 and

and to misapply his Words no more. It is this. The Gentleman never declined a Contest with the two bonourable Patrons of this Libel. One of them was, in those Days, below his Notice; and he never found, upon Trial, that he had Reason to apprehend being foil'd by the other. But we must not yet difmiss this Article.

If the Proof we are examining proved any Thing, it would prove too much. If to decline, in certain Circumstances, a Trial; if to go into voluntary Exile, either before a Trial, or even after Condemnation, were absolute Proofs of Guilt, the Conduct of many greater and better Men than the Perfon now accused would deserve our Censure, and that of Calumniators, as vile as thefe Libellers, would merit our Approbation. Metellus and Rutilius must be condemn'd. Apuleius and Apicius must be justified.

This fort of Proof therefore not appearing fufficient, to make good the Charge, that this Gentleman was engaged with the Pretender before his Attainder, great Pains are taken, and much Rhetorick is employ'd to shew, what we shall not presume to contradict, that he ought not to have engaged in that Cause after his Attainder. Neither did the Craftsman infist on this Circumstance as a Defence of the Person accused. He fixed this Date of the Engagements mention'd in Contradiction to Those, who had falfely affirmed that these Engagements

were much more antient. But he neither urged it as a Defence, nor pleaded it as an Excuse; and yet I am persuaded that this very Circumstance had some Weight with his late Majesty, when that excellent Prince, the Mildness of whose Temper, and the Clemency of whose Nature, would have render'd him amiable in the most private Station, and made him almost adorable in that great Elevation, to which the Providence of God had raised him; when that excellent Prince, I say, was pleased on his own Motion, and without any Application from the Person here spoken of, to extend his present, and promise his suture Fayour to him.

Tho' the Craft/man did neither fay nor intend what has been objected by the Remarker to him, yet he might perhaps mean nothing more than hath been observed; and if he did mean it, he meant to inculcate, upon this Occasion, a very useful, general Truth. Let us grant that the Man, who engages against his Country, even when he has been oppress'd in it, or driven out of it by Violence, is not to be defended; that these are Occasions, wherein we ought to kiss the Rod, which scourges us, and reverence that Authority, which we think has been unjustly exercised against us. But then let it be granted likewise, that human Passions are fo strong, and buman Reason so weak, that Men, who fuffer Persecution or who imagine they fuffer it, are feldom able to keep

keep within these Bounds of heroical Moderation. They will be apt to feize the Opportunities, which may be offer'd, of refifting, or of attempting to repair the Injuries done them. They will flatter themselves, that they do not vow their Revenge against the People, the innocent and collective Body of their Countrymen, nor go about to fubvert the Constitution of the Government. They will perfuade others, nay, they will perfuade themselves, that they do not seek Revenge, but Redress; nor aim to destroy the Law, which punishes, but to prevent the Abuse of it, which perfecutes. Thus will Men, who actually fuffer, be apt to reason; and if the Case be common to Numbers, they will be apt to proceed from reasoning on such Principles, to act upon them. Wife Governments therefore have been careful to distinguish between Punishment and Persecution; have never fuffer'd the former, however just, necessary, or severe, to carry the least Appearance of the latter. Ludlow was justly punish'd. My Lord Clarendon, whom the Remarker hath so strongly yoak'd with the Regicide, was unjustly, ungratefully and cruelly perfecuted. We may pronounce, without Uncharitableness, that the former would have taken any Opportunity of subverting a fecond Time the Constitution of his Country; not from Refentment alone, but from Principle. The latter would have been moved by no Resentments to disturb that Frame

Frame of Government, which he had contributed fo much to restore. The former Example therefore hath nothing to do in this Place, and if I admit the latter, it will only ferve to shew us how Men should act, not how they do act. It will be one Example of Viriue, opposed to innumerable Instances of Frailty. Innumerable, indeed, are the Inflances of Men in all Ages, who having been driven out of their Country by Violence, have endeavour'd, even by Violence, to return to it. This is the general and known Course of Nature; depraved indeed, but buman; and fince it is fo; if we allow that they, who diffurb a Government, because they think themselves persecuted, deferve no Excuse, we must allow that those, who give Occasion to this Disturbance by Persecution, deserve very little.

I hope I may deferve fome for this Digression, into which the Remarker led me; and I return to my Subject, by saying, that neither the Crastiman hath pretended, nor do I here pretend, to excuse the Engagements, which this Gentleman took, after his Attainder, and which his late Majesty so graciously pardon'd; but that his taking these Engagements, after his Attainder, is no Proof that he was under them before; and that his going out of the Kingdom, in the late King's Reign, is no Proof that he was a zeahus Jacobite, and an Agent of the Pretender in the late Queen's Reign.

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The Libeller, finding himself unable to make this Charge good, leffens the Charge that he may fuit his Proof to it. If he cannot prove that the Gentleman was in the Interest of the Pretender, before his Attainder, he will prove at least that he had a strong Propension to these Interests; and how does he prove even this? He afferts that in the Year 1702, this Gentleman was one of the virtuous 117, who gave their Votes to throw out the Bill for fettling the Protestant Succession, &c. False and impudent Affertion! A few Pages before he pretends to have the Journal Book of the House of Commons before him. Had he it before him now? If he had, how can he affirm, in direct Contradiction to it? If he had not, how could he venture to affirm any thing concerning this Matter? The Bill for fettling the Protestant Succession, in the present Royal Family. pass'd the House of Commons in the Month of May 1701, not in 1702; and it pass'd nemine contradicente, to bring in a Bill for the further Security of his Majesty's Person, and the Succession of the Crown in the Protestant Line, and extinguishing the Hopes of the pretended Prince of Wales, and all other Pretenders, and their open and secret Abettors. This Bill was accordingly brought in, and the Person who, by Order of the House, prepared and brought it in, were Sir Charles Hedges, and one Mr. St. JOHN. In the Progress of this Bill through the House,

House, it appears that there were some Debates and Divisions about particular Clauses and Amendments; but the Bill was pass'd without any Division; so infamously false is the Affertion made by this Libeller, that there was no Division of 117, or of any other Number, for throwing out either the Bill which settled the Succession; or the Bill which was made for the farther Security of it. There was a Division indeed, of 117 against 118, upon a Clause added by the Lords to a Bill for enlarging the Time for taking the Oath of Abjuration, &c. and this happened in the Year 1702; but what Relation hath this Fast to the Fact afferted? Whether the Gentleman voted against this Clause, or not, I am unable to say; and it is to no Purpose to enquire; for the Clause regarded only fuch Persons as bad neglected to take the Abjuration Oath in Time, and provided that if such Persons had forfeited any Office, Benefice, &c. to which any other Persons had been preferr'd, the former should not be restor'd by taking the Advantage of this Act. If this pretended Proof is not another Instance of the vilest Calumniation, the Libeller himself confesses that the Craftsman's Challenge was properly made; and that there is not one Proof in the World against bis general Affirmations.

Another Fact, which is advanced and most pathetically declaim'd upon, for Reasons not hard to be discover'd, is likewise applied

to maintain the same Charge. This Gentleman, fays the Libeller, had the Impudence to oppose his present most sacred Majesty, when he demanded a Writ of Right-The Writ of Summons to Parliament. He afterwards caused the Elector of Hanover's Ministers to be forbid the Court, for no other Crime than baving demanded that Writ. And did this Gentleman oppose this Writ? Nay, did any other Servant of the late Queen oppose it? False and impudent is the Affertion. order'd to be made out the very Day * it was demanded. If the Minister who demanded the Writ was forbid the Court, was this Gentleman the Cause of it? Is every disagreeable Circumstance to be ascribed to him in an Affair which was too important not to be laid, by the proper Minister, that is, by the Chancellor, not the Secretary, before her late Majesty and her Council; and in which it may be supposed that her Majesty's Resentments were alone sufficient to determine such a Resolution? Besides, if the Minister received the Affront mentioned, was it fingly and abstractedly for demanding the Writ; or was it founded on the Manner of demanding, and on many other Circumstances, some expressed and some hinted at in the Letters, writ foon afterwards by the late Queen to her late Electoral Highness, the Princess Sophia and to his present Majesty, which lye before me in the printed Annals

^{*} Vide Annals of the Reign of Queen Anne.

of Queen Anne's Reign? Was the Reception given by his late Majesty, then Elector, to the Minister, who made this Demand, at his Return home, such a one as shew'd his Majesty's Approbation of this Measure, and his Disapprobation of what had happen'd here upon it? — I say no more.

We have now gone through all I can find in this Libel, which feems not so much as to aim at making good the first Head of Accufation, on which the Craftsman made his

Challenge.

On the second Head, the Craftsman affirm'd that the same Gentleman never bad any Commerce either direct or indirect, inconfifent with the Engagements be took after his Attainder, whilft be continued in them. Now, this Affirmation, instead of being disproved, is evaded. It is foreign to me, fays the Remarker-Is it so? - Have not all his scribbling Affociates charged this Gentleman over and over for being treacherous to the Pretender; for being engaged with him; and at the same Time a Spy and a Partifan, such is the Language they use, of the late King? Is not the flat Contradiction given to this Lye a Part of the Challenge made by the Craftsman? Hath not this Libeller accepted the Challenge? Hath he not call'd it a weak, a foolish, and a slavish Defence? May he evade it after all his boafting? Is he not bound to make it good in every Part, or to own the Charge of Calumny, which I make

on him, on the whole scribbling Crew, and on those, who pay them? What he, or they will own, I neither know nor care. What the Publick determines is evident.

On a third Head of Accusation against this Gentleman, the Craftsman affirm'd, that fince he was out of the Engagements last mention'd, he bath had no Commerce, either direct or indirect, in favour of that Cause. Now, upon this Head, though the Accufation be not given up in Terms, yet it is as little maintain'd, or supported by Proof as the last. The Libeller, indeed, calls the Gentleman, a Leviathan of Treason; displays the terrible Dangers, which would have attended the reinstating him; presumes to call it a Libel on the late King's Memory to Say that be had such Intentions; and yet dares not deny that his Majesty signified his having fuch Intentions. In short, with much Bombast, he makes the Panegyrick of his Patron, for defeating these Intentions. I shall not condescend to make one fingle Remark on this Rapfody of Scurrility and Adulation. Such Poison carries its Antidote along with it into the World; and no Man will be at a Loss to judge whether publick or private Motives determined the Servant, in this Case, to defeat the Intentions of the Master. Which ever they were, he, who can believe that the Gentleman fo often mention'd has upon him any of that Obligation, which the Craftsman disclaims for him, deserves to be pity'd

bity'd; and he who can bring himself up to affirm it, deserves to be despised. But before I leave this Article; it may not be improper, nor unreasonable to enquire, by what Criterion good Subjects to his Majesty. and faithful Friends to the present Establishment are to be diffinguish'd and known; Are all those to be reputed such, who asfumed the greatest Zeal for the Protestant Succession formerly? This cannot be: for many of the Tories have this Title: and all, whoever wore that Name, are proscribed by the System we have advanced.---Are all these to be reputed such, who were alike zealous for the Protestant Succession, and who have besides made constant Profession of the Principles of Whiggism? -This cannot be neither; fince many fuch as these are daily stigmatized with the reproachful Names of Malecontents and Incendiaries; and fince Endeavours are used, by false Deductions and by arbitrary Interpretations, to prove them Enemies to the Government, and in Effect arrant Traitors .----What is this Criterion then? I am able to discover but one, and it is this; being for, or being against the noble Pair of Brothers, the two honourable Patrons of the Remarker. Without the Merit of approving their Conduct, no Man is to be reputed a faithful Subject, or a Friend to his Country. With this Merit, and with that of a blind Submission, even they, who have been the most obnoxious ВЬ

obnoxious, may be received; and they, who have been call'd Enemies to the Government, as loudly as any others, may be inroll'd among its Friends. This Practice of endeavouring to confine the Interest of the Government to as narrow a Bottom as that of two Ministers, has been of late most audaciously purfued. It has been faid in direct Terms * that if his late Majesty had put the Administration into any other Hands, be would have been unjust to those brave Men, who had done and suffered much to ferve him; and that he would not have deferved to wear the Crown if he had not employ'd the Men, whom he did employ .----Here, again, there might be room for some particular Reflections, if I was disposed to make them. But I avoid this invidious Part as much as my Subject will allow me to do: and shall therefore content myself with defiring these bold Writers, their Inspectors and Patrons, to confider what the necessary Consequences of such Positions are. If they dare to affert that his late Majesty, would have been unjust; that he would not have deserved to wear the Crown, if he had not employ'd the Men he did employ; what might they not affert if his present Majesty should, at any Time, think fit, in his great Wisdom and Goodness to his People, to remove some of those very Men, whom his Royal Father did

^{*} London Journal May 15. 1731-

did employ? The Affertion is not even extended to Party. It would have been still indecent if he had. But is confined to a certain Number of particular Men; as if the Zeal for the Protestant Succession in the prefent Royal Family had not been directed, as it most certainly was, to the national Advantage, but had been intended, as to be fure it was not, for the Advantage of particular Men, and to perpetuate the Administration in a private Family. This is such Language, as I believe was never held before, and as no Man would prefume to hold now, if the Encouragement to it did not proceed from those, by whom it should be discountenanced and punish'd.

There is another Fact, which I must not omit to take Notice of in this Place; because though it is not one of those, on which the Crastsman made his Challenge, yet it hath been positively afferted by him, and half of it at least as positively deny'd by

the Remarker.

The Craftsman said, that the Mercy of the late King was extended to the Gentleman we speak of, unask'd and unearn'd. That it was unearn'd the Remarker thinks probable; and in thinking so he gives the Lye to all his Fellow Scribblers, who have so often affirm'd the contrary. That it was unask'd, he says is a downright Falshood. He hath the Journal Book of the House of Commons before him, and there he finds that the Bb 2 House

House was acquainted, by his late Majesty's Command, in April 1725, that this Gentleman kad, about seven Years before, made his bumble Application and Submission, &c. which his Majesty so far accepted as to give Encouragement to hope for some future Mark of his Majesty's Favour and Goodness .---- In this he exults; but here again the Effrontery and Falshood, which he charges on others, will recoil on himself. Who drew this ministerial Message, I know not; nor how far the Style of it may be necessary, according to the Forms usual on such Occasions; but the Remarker might have known, if he had consulted even his Patrons, that his Majesty's Mercy had been extended to this Gentleman two Years before the feven there mentioned; and that this Mercy did not confift in Encouragement to hope for some future Mark of his Majesty's Favour and Goodness, but in a gracious and absolute Promise of his Favour in the full Extent which the Circumstances of that Gentleman required. I may be the more bold in affirming this Fact, because the noble Lord, who deliver'd the Message I quote, is still alive, as some other Persons are, to whom his late Majesty was pleased to own that this. Message had been deliver'd by his Order, and to express his gracious Intention conformably to it.-But to proceed.

It appears most undeniably that of the three Heads, on which the Craftsman gave,

and the Remarker accepted the Challenge, the Remarker hath shewn himself unable to prove the first by any true Facts, and hath scandalously attempted to do it by false ones; that he hath given up the second; and that he hath not so much as attempted to prove the third.

Let us ask now, shall Men, thus plainly convicted of Calumny on Accufations brought fo often, and charged, peremptorily by them, expect Belief, when they endeavour to defame in any other Case? Shall they, who are convicted of accusing falsely in Cases which are plain in their Nature, where no Proof can be wanting, and where no Pretence can be alledged for not producing it, expect that the Publick should condemn any Man, and especially a Man, who is under fo many Circumstances of Disadvantage, peculiar to his fingular and unexampled Situation, because they affirm him guilty in Cases, which are intricate in their Nature, and where Reasons of Honour, of Prudence, and Decency, may all concur to impose Silence? How often have the noble Pair defended themselves, and been defended by others on this Principle; that no Man ought to charge another, unless he is able and ready to prove the Charge? How often have they call'd for Proof on this Principle, and triumph'd that it was not immediately brought? Now, although this Defence may not be fufficient, in every Cafe, where Mat-Bb 3 ters

ters of present Transactions are concern'd and where the Persons attack'd are in actual Possession of the greatest Power; yet surely it may be thought, with Reason, to be a sufficient Desence, when Matters long ago transacted, and long ago censured too, are concern'd; when the Persons who attack, are in actual Possession of the greatest Power; and the Person who is attack'd, hath none of those offensive or desensive Weapons at his Command, which Power surnishes in so abundant a Manner.

The Remarker thinks that no Reasons of Honour, Prudence, or Decency ought to Shut the Mouth of Innocence; that Shame and Guilt alone are filent in the Day of Enquiry -----When this Day of Enquiry is to come, and who is to be the Subject of it, I know not; but let him learn that there are many Cases, wherein it is not bonest, and many others may occur wherein it is not prudent, to fay all that might be faid either in Defence or in Excuse; that is, when the Desence or Excuse of ourselves must affect others, not concern'd in the Debate. In such Cases the most Innocent will rather bear the Imputation of imaginary Crimes, by keeping Silence, than be guilty of a real Crime, by breaking it; and to carry this as far as it can be carry'd, Instances might be produced of Men, who have died, rather than accuse others, whose Blood was thirsted after more than theirs.

Much hath been faid, and great Complaints

plaints have been made, of the Torture, as it is call'd in this Libel, given to another Gentleman's Actions. If, by this, be meant ranfacking into all the private and publick Paffages of his Life, and wresting every one in his Cafe, what I abhor this Libeller for doing in the Case of another. But is it really fo? Have we feen Accusations of Treachery and Ingratitude towards feveral, who are dead, and towards any, who are living, infifted upon, in the former Cafe? Has it been reproach'd to the Patrons of the Remarker, that they worm'd out of Power a Person, to whom they were nearly ally'd and ought to have been firmly attach'd by Gratitude and Friendship? and yet is that a Subject, which affords nothing to be faid? Are there no Circumstances, which might be aggravated at least? Are there no strong Colours, which might be laid? Even I should not be at a Loss to do it, if I thought it fair to do it; if I thought it honest to push any Man to a Silence, of which I might take a feeming Advantage, or to a Necessity of justifying or excusing himself by saying what, supposing him innocent, he ought not to fay. Are there no Facts relating to former Transactions of great Importance not commonly known, and yet not absolutely Secrets, which remain still unmention'd? ----In short, is it not apparent that there are Men, who accuse, indeed, when the im-Bb 4 mediate

mediate Subject of Debate leads, and prowokes them necessarily and unwillingly to it, whilst there are others, who wait for no such

Necessity, but accuse merely to defame.

It would be tedious, not difficult, to go through this whole *Invective*; to deny with Truth many Things, which are falfely affirm'd; and by giving a just Turn to others, to set them in a very different Light from that wherein the *Author* exposes them to publick View; to explain what he perplexes; to distinguish what he confounds. But I shall not take this Task upon me, for the Reasons I have given and for others, which I

am going to give.

As to the Conduct, which the Person, against whom such Torrents of Ribaldry are pour'd forth, held towards those, who were at the Head of Affairs, whilft he was in Bufiness, I shall only add to what hath been faid already, what no Man of Candour will deny; that the Heat and Animofity, which perpetual Contests and frequent Turns of Party raife, have carry'd many (perhaps the Person, who is blamed; perhaps the Perfons, who blame him) to do what in any other Situation, or Temper of Mind, they would carefully avoid; in a Word, that the just Man hath been, on such Occasions, fometimes unjust; the good-natur'd Man ill-natur'd; and the friendly Man unfriendly. Few there are, I fear, who could with a fafe Conscience take up the first Stone upon fuch

fuch a Trial. Few there are, who are blameless. But here is the Difference. The just, the good-natured, the friendly Man, returns to the Character, out of which he started. The unjust, the ill-natured, the unfriendly Man persists. The first reslects with Sorrow on what the last reslects with Triumph; and whilst one wishes undone what the Heat of Party carry'd him to do, the other is glad of the Excuse of Party, such as it is, to indulge the Viciousness of his own Nature, and to repeat unjust, ill-natured, and unstriendly Actions to the Living, and even to the Dead.

There is an Example before us, which may ferve to illustrate what I have faid .----Great Advantage is taken of a Memorial fent to the late Queen, by the late Earl of Oxford, wherein many hard Reflections are made on others; but the hardest of all on the Person here refer'd to. He is painted in the worst Colours, and accused to the Queen of the greatest Faults. Should I descend into the Particulars, I might shew that the Accusations were groundless, and point out, perhaps, the unjust Causes of Suspicions, which were taken, as well as the Motives to the writing that Memorial, which I wish had never been witten for a Reason very different from that, which the Remarker would be ready to affign. But I shall not descend into any fuch Particulars, nor give a double Advantage to the Malicious, who would be just as well pleased to have any Handle given them

them by the Living of inveighing against the Dead, as they are ready to seize, on every Occasion, that which was given them, so many Years ago, by one who is now dead,

of inveighing against the Living.

The Persons, who had the Honour to ferve the late Queen, in the last Period of her Life, have been these twenty Years the Subjects of great Clamour. If the Differences which happened amongst them so long ago, gave in some Measure, as I apprehend that they did, both Occasion and Force to this Clamour, it would be strange Conduct indeed, in those of them, who remain alive, and in the Relations and Friends of those of them, who are dead, to preserve the Spirit of Difference, and to affist in reviving this Clamour.

The Day will come, when authentick History will relate the Passages of those Times, without Regard to the partial Views of any Party, or the particular Defence of any Man. 'Till this Day does come, every one must decide, or suspend his Judgment, as he sees Reason to do, and they, who may suffer by these Judgments, must bear it with that Temper and Respect, which is due from every private Man to publick Censures; nay,

even to publick Prejudices.

But what hath all this to do with the Characters and Conduct of the noble Pair? Soppose the Men in Power, two Reigns ago, to have been Angels of Darkness; will it follow

follow that the two honcurable Patrons of the Remarker are Angels of Light? What then is the Meaning of fo great a Clamour, affectedly raifed on fo flender an Occasion as the Craftsman of the 22d of May gave; wherein little was faid, and that little with much Moderation, after much Provocation? Why are fo many Pens employ'd, and fo great Pains taken, to divert the Attention of the Publick from present to past Transactions; from national Confiderations to personal Altercations ?----The Reason is obvious; and no other Reason in Nature can be affign'd. The noble Pair have been hard push'd, on their Management of publick Affairs, both at Home and Abroad. Not only their Errors have been pointed out; gross, palpable Errors; but a long Series of Error; a whole System of cool, deliberate, conducted, defended, expensive Error hath been laid open to publick View. What I believe never to have happen'd before, hath happened on these Occasions. The noble Pair have been admonish'd in Time, and shewn the Precipice, into which, whoever led, they were both falling. The Consequences of their Measures have been foretold as early as posfible, and even whilft the Caufes were laying. Surely this Conduct, on the Part of their Adversaries, savours more of publick Spirit than of private Resentment; and yet, when they have taken Advantage of it, they have stopt short and triumph'd in their Escape,

Escape, as they did in the Case of the Irish Recruits. These very Admonitions, which gave them Time and Opportunity to do so, have been modestly attributed to private Resentment alone; though nothing can be more manisest than this; that private Resentment would have found its Account better in Silence; would have preferr'd Accusations to Admonitions, and would have waited longer to have struck more home.

Sometimes instead of stopping short, they have gone on, answering for, and being anfwered for, till the Events have justified the Predictions; till the Inconveniencies, Difadvantages, and Difficulties, against which the noble Pair had been warn'd in vain, have follow'd and increased upon them; till even their Apologists have been forced to allow fome Errors, and till they themselves have confessed their boasted System to be wrong, by changing it, and by boafting of the Change. Even after all this, they have complain'd of Clamour; and they still complain, as if there had never been the leaft Occasion for it given by them.——How their new Schemes are plann'd, and how they will be purfued; whether these able Men have fail'd hitherto, because they set out on mistaken Principles of Policy, or whether they have fail'd for want of Skill to conduct the rightest, we shall soon see.

But these are not the only Circumstances, which have borne, and still bear hard upon them.

them. ---- In the Course of these and other Disputes, it seems to have been plainly and fully proved that fuch Principles have been establish'd, and such Doctrines have been taught by the ministerial Writers, as tend manifestly to destroy the Freedom of the British Government. Such are, the Dependency (I mean the corrupt Dependency) of Parliaments on the Crown; the Necessity of standing Armies, notwithstanding the Danger of them to Liberty; and some other Points, which I need not recapitulate. It is fufficiently known how much, and with how much Reason, the far greater Part of Mankind have been alarm'd at these Attempts; which, if they fucceed, must hurt not only the inferior and temporary Interests, but the greatest and most permanent, political Interest, which a Briton can have at Heart; that of the Constitution of this Government.

As these Things have been objected strongly on one Side, so Endeavours have been used on the other, to disguise and to palliate them, or to evade the Consequences drawn from them. But these Endeavours have not succeeded. How, indeed should they succeed? As well might those, who make them, expect to persuade Mankind that Slavery and Beggary are preserable to Liberty and Wealth, as to make the World believe that these Blessings can be preserved to Britain by the very Means by which they have been

lost in so many other free Countries.

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Since this therefore cannot be imposed; fince the Minds of Men cannot be convinced of fuch Absurdities, they must be diverted, if possible, from the Subject. A new Cry is therefore raised, or an old one rather is revived. Difputes, which inflamed the Minds of Men, whilst the Affairs they relate to were transacting, and the Conflict of Parties was the most fierce, are renew'd at a Time, when they can be of no Benefit to the Publick, and when the same Motives of Party fubfist no longer. One Man, in particular, is made the Subject of new Invective. Nothing, which Malice can fuggest, and ill Nature and ill Manners utter, is omitted to render his Person odious, and to represent his Defigns as dangerous. In the fame Breath, we are told that this odious, this dangerous Man is endeavouring to come into Power once more. He stands again a Candidate for Grace and Trust. He would again administer the Publick, abandon its Allies, and facrifice its Honour. Nothing will fatisfy him but the Power, which he once abused and would again abuse; the Trusts, which he once betray'd and would again betray, These are represented, with equal Modesty and Fairness, to be his Requests; and the Hero of the Remarker, that is the Remarker's Paymaster, who administers the Publick fo righteously; who never abandoned its Allies; neither the Emperor nor France, who never facrificed its Honour to one, nor

its Interest to both; who never abused his Power, nor betray'd his Trust, through Ambition, through Pride, through private Interest, or private Pique; this Person is applauded for his Opposition to such Requests for his

just and fatal Resentment.

What Fatality there may be in his Difcernment, I know not; but furely there is a Fatality, which attends those, who indulge themselves in speaking and writing, without any Regard to Truth. How could it happen else that the Remarker should so egregiously contradict himself, and destroy in his 40th Page the whole Drift of his 39th? This bold and rash Scribbler takes upon him to marshal and to characterize insolently the Friends of the Man he rails at. If I was not of that Number myself, I should probably fay more on the Subject. This however I am under an Obligation to fay: That the Friends of this Gentleman must be such to his Person. They cannot be so to his Power. That he takes it as the greatest Compliment, which can be made to him, to have a Sympathy of Nature, and a Conformity of Principles and Designs with them attributed to him; that he thinks their Friendship an Honour to him; such an Honour as the warmest of his Enemies have Cause to envy, and do envy; such an Honour as the highest of his Enemies would be heartily proud to obtain, and have not been able to obtain.

The Friends now of this Gentleman, whom he is fometimes faid to lead, and who are fometimes faid to employ him as their Tool, just as it suits the present Purpose of Scandal to fay; these very Friends, it seems, the very Men who defend him, would never raise him above his present low Condition, nor make bim the Partner of their Success.---However they may employ him, the Remarker and his Patrons know how they mean to reward him.----Since this is the Cafe, fince they know it to be fo; For what Reason, in the Name of Wonder, is all this Buftle made about so infignificant a Tool? ---- Why so many Endeavours to raise a Jealousy, and give an Alarm, as if this Man was aiming again at Power?-----Why fo much Merit ascribed to the noble Pair, for keeping him out of it? -----His own Friends would not raise him to it,-----How ridiculous then is the Affectation of his Enemies, who value themselves on their Oposition to him?

Let the noble Pair stand or fall by their own Merits or Demerits. I dare answer to them and to the World, upon better Foundations than those of the Remarker's laying, that their Continuance in Power will never break the Spirit of this Man, nor their Fall from it excite his Ambition. His Ambition, whatever may have been said or thought about it, hath been long since dead. A Man must be dead himself, who is utterly insensible of all that happens, either to the Publick

Publick or to himself; but he, who seeks nothing but Retreat, and that Stability of Situation, which is effential to the Quiet of it, hath furely no Ambition. Now that this is the Case, and hath been long the Case of the Gentleman, concerning whom I speak, I know to be true, and I affirm boldly. He never had the least, I say more, he never would have the greatest Obligations to any Country, except his own; and yet so desirous was this Man of Rest and Quiet, that he was contented to enjoy them where Fortune had presented them to him. A little Frankness might have kept him abroad all his Life, without Complaint. Much Art has been employ'd to confine him at home, and to teaze him there. If forgetting all former Persecutions, he resented the last, would he be much to blame?

I am not conscious of having said, in this Paper, a Word against the Truth; and I am fure that I have the fame Truth on my Side, when I affert that this Man, whom the Libeller represents to be so turbulent, so outragious, and of such pertinacious Ambition, however he might have been willing formerly to have had the Obligation to the noble Pair of enjoying, by their Affistance, the full Measure of his late Majesty's intended Goodness, would decline with Scorn, after all that has pass'd, to be reinstated in his former Situation, at the intolerable Expence of having the least Appearance of an Cc Obligation

Obligation to them. Neither they, nor their Advocates, can be half so solicitous to keep him out of Power, and even out of a State of aspiring after Power, as he is determined against the first, and indifferent about the

laft.

I am fenfible that all this may appear a little improbable to the Persons I oppose. It will be hard for them to conceive that the Man, who has once tasted Power, can ever renounce it in earnest. No wonder they should think in this Manner. Those, who find nothing in themselves to rest upon with Satisfaction, must lean on Power, on Riches, or both, and on other external Objects. Nay, those, who have of the two Vices, Ambition and Avarice, the meanest in the most eminent Degree; and who would be glad to quit their Power, and to retire with their Gains, may be afraid to quit it, because they have abused it. They may be so miserable as to fee no fecurity out of Power, nor any other in it, except that precarious, that temporary Security, which is the last and useful Refuge of desperate Men; the continuing the fame Violences to maintain, by which they acquired their Power; the keeping up of Diffentions, and the embroiling of Affairs; those noble Arts, by which they rose.

But there are Men in the World, who know that there is something in Life better than *Power* and *Riches*; and such Men may prefer the low Condition, as it is call'd

by the Remarker, of one Man, to the high Condition of another. There are Men, who see that Dignity may be difgraced, and who feel that Disgrace may be dignify'd. Of this Number is the Gentleman, whom I have undertaken to defend; who possesses his Soul without Hopes or Fears, and enjoys his Retreat without any Defires beyond it. In that Retreat, he is obedient to the Laws, dutiful to his Prince, and true to his Oaths. If he fails in these Respects, let him be publickly attack'd; let publick Vengeance pursue and overtake him; let the noble Pair indulge for once their Passions in a just Cause. If they have no Complaints, of this Nature, to make against him, from whence does this particular Animofity proceed? Have they Complaints of any other Kind to make, and of a private Nature? If they have, why is the Publick troubled on this Account?-I hope the Remarker's Mask is now taken off; that the true Drift of all this personal Railing is enough exposed; and that the Attention of Mankind will be brought back to those more important Subjects, which have been already started, and to those, which every Day may furnish.

After what has been here said, the Gentleman, in whose Defence I have appear'd, can have no Reason of Honour to enter by himfelf, or his Friends, into these Altercations, and if my Opinion can prevail, should these Libellers continue to scold and to call Names,

they should be left to do it, without Reproof, or Notice. The Answer now given should stand as a Final Answer to all they have said, and to all they may think sit to say hereafter

FINIS.

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