

RELIGIOUS PROGRESS,

ITS

CRITERION, INSTRUMENTS, AND LAWS.

BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF

SERMONS

PREACHED IN THE

CHAPEL OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

BY

JAMES MAC IVOR, D.D., M.R.I.A.,

LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN;
 RECTOR OF ARDSTRAW, DIOCESE OF DERRY;
 ETC. ETC.



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TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN IRELAND,

The following Pages,

CONCEIVED, IT IS HOPED, IN A CATHOLIC SPIRIT,

ARE OFFERED,

WITH PROFOUND RESPECT,

BY

ONE OF THE LEAST DESERVING OF THEIR NUMBER.

P R E F A C E .

NO one could be more sensible than I am of the faults of the volume now at length offered to the public. I have laboured to make it in some sense worthy of its subject, yet I fear that my pains have been often misapplied, and that the endeavour to render it accurate and full has only made it laboured and unreadable. It is in the form of sermons ; and about half of it was actually delivered in the Chapel of Trinity College, Dublin—the first six as Donnellan Lectures for the year 1855–6 ; the last two as exercises for Theological Degrees. But only the *first*, *fifth*, and *seventh* [except the portions of the *seventh* included within brackets], with about the first half of each of the others, appear *precisely* as they were delivered. The rest has been added, slowly and laboriously, for the sake of the more thoughtful students, but I fear only rendering the book heavy and repulsive. The second volume, I must hope, will be less scholastic and more cheerful. It seemed necessary to establish one's bases in the first.

The subject of Religious Progress involves, of course, many of the most difficult and searching questions which religion raises. And these could not be discussed

without a large amount of criticism. But I have avoided this as much as possible. Criticism, however fashionable, is but little entitled to respect, especially if it proceed, like most of the German criticism, on negative or dualistic bases. All that class of thought, even when it attempts construction, can only end in self-destructive or nihilistic verbiage, for in fact it starts from such. But it is a mistake to suppose that other systems are at all amenable to its "desolating negations," unless, like Bishop Butler or the Scottish schools, they have admitted wittingly or unwittingly, some of the false axioms of the system. I trust I have shown that all the great positions which go to construct religion or Christianity are free from its contagion. And I trust my readers will also see that Metaphysics, as such, may be as positive, as reasonable, and as certain, as any inferior science. I have, therefore, tried to cut off disfigurements with as searching a pruning-knife as I could handle. And finding it necessary, for distinctness' sake, to fasten on the tenets of individuals, I thought it better to state their names explicitly, and quote their actual expressions. It is strange that, during the delay in getting out this volume, and *after the strictures on them were in print*, a very large proportion of those I have named have been removed beyond the reach of controversy. Comte, Buckle, Parker, Ferrier, Sir William Hamilton, and now, last of all, the acute and accomplished Mansel, have, one by one, been peacefully withdrawn to where the wicked cease from troubling, and where the weary are at rest. However extreme my difference of opinion may have been with any of these great or good men, I trust the tone of my remarks would not have offended them, and will not

offend their admirers. In fact, it was because I did hold them in high respect, and supposed their authority would justly influence others, that I mentioned them at all. Besides, one position—indeed, about the main position insisted on in this volume—must, so far as it is accepted, remove the bitterness from controversy, by destroying the undue importance which has hitherto, as I conceive, too often attached to orthodoxy as such. It has been maintained by many writers, chiefly Protestant, and is still a belief with multitudes, that “right opinions in religion,” which they call “faith,” are essential to Salvation,—or, in the language of Article xviii., that “we shall be saved,” not by Christ, but “by the Law or sect which we profess,” *provided that sect be the proper one*. I have written very unpersuasively, indeed, if I have not satisfied my readers that no kind of faith or knowledge, or even of Bible, Church, or Sacrament, has the slightest effect on one’s eternal welfare, *except so far* as it truly sanctifies his heart, by filling it with the love of God and man. The other opinion, as even the Article points out, sets Orthodoxy in the place of Christ; and becomes a real idolatry or idealatry, converting our true doctrine into our false God.

If this one truth, or truism, can be impressed to any extent, the pains spent upon this volume shall have been richly rewarded. And I have just received (October 7th, 1871), an important piece of intelligence which bears directly upon it. I am informed that the Committee appointed by the Irish Church to revise its Prayer-book has just resolved to recommend the omission of the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed; making no other change in that important symbol. This course, I believe, will gladden the friends of Truth

and Progress everywhere ; and will offend none whom it is not a mercy to offend. I have remarked upon those clauses ; pp. 290, cxi, *notes*.

Another remark, perhaps, should be made. I write upon Religious Progress, but I have made no attempt to prove that such a thing exists. I have assumed it, described its steps and phases, pictured its details, and pointed out its Instruments and Laws ; but I have not paused anywhere, to ask whether this be Advance or Retrogression. I have given a Criterion, however, which may be universally applied, and what it determines in respect to each particular it will determine also of their sum. Does that step develop the human faculties? Does it develop the highest of them? Does it tend to keep the highest highest, and to reduce the lower to just subordination? Then it helps to discharge religion's Function, and to bring about her Harmony. And none of us will doubt, I think, that any such is genuine Religious Progress, and works the work of God. There are many, no doubt, to whom the whole idea of Growth, Advance, Development in Religion, is distasteful, and abhorrent from the very nature of Truth. And I remember the time when it was so with myself. But this was the time when I had been taught absolutely to shut my eyes upon whatever, even indirectly, seemed to threaten a fixed circle of traditional dogma, which they called "The Gospel;" and which, as being miraculous and above reason, it was all the more meritorious to hold fast the more Nature and History, and even the Scripture, as read by the eye of sense, seemed to contradict it. It is BUTLER'S ANALOGY, I think, which commonly breaks this idol, striding as it does across the Course of Nature,

without belonging to it. At least it was so with me; and I trust this volume has absorbed the spirit of that Admirable Essay, and carried on its positions to a farther stage. It has long now been an axiom with me that "any given development-theory may be mistaken—that is in detail, and more or less—but any theory of Christianity or Nature *which is NOT a development theory*, is false from end to end." It is not like the grain of mustard seed, or anything else in living Nature; it is not like human life, or any thing else in Social Providence; it is not like Christ Himself, or the Historic Church which is His Body, or the Bible itself which is its Record, or any thing else *that we know*, in the Higher Life of Grace. It has nothing in it of Life or Birth, or New Birth, of Genesis or Regeneration or Resurrection; nor can it cohere with them. It does cohere with Neo-Platonism, or any nihilistic or self-contradictory system of Idealism, or any scheme of "Being which is the same as Non-Being,"—and to such it may be relegated.

It seems strange even to myself that I have not noticed the two most popular and able books which have appeared on this subject within our time, or, perhaps, ever in English—Dr. Newman's Essay on Development, and Archer Butler's Letters in reply. Professor Butler and his Editors begin their labours by noticing an incident of the 17th century, which they naively repeat. The learned divine, Petavius, (R. C.) wrote a book in favour of development, which drew out a great many answers; especially one from the English Bishop Bull, which gave such satisfaction to the Gallican Church, that, synodically assembled at St. Germain-en-Laye, they voted their formal thanks to Bishop Bull, and for-

warded them through Bishop Bossuet, "for the services he had rendered the Catholic Church." *Mutato nomine*, the story is repeated. The advocate of the Immutable Church argues for Development; the Champion of Private Judgment comes forth as his antagonist. Nor does the oddity diminish on a perusal of the books. Dr. Newman spends the greater portion of his time in proving his theory, that the Church was intended to develop, authoritatively and normally, as it did in fact; and so far his arguments are rational, or, as I conceive, unanswerable. But he then proceeds to deduce from this a vindication of the most abnormal and inconsistent doctrines of peculiar Romanism. Professor Butler, for fear of being driven to admit the abnormal inferences, denies development altogether; and at last persuades himself that, Minerva-like, "Christianity was born full grown" (p. 400)—he does not say whether on Pentecost or before it, but many passages [*e. g.* p. 62] seem to imply that it was in the primeval paradise;—for mankind has been only corrupting the truth ever since! It is as if two persons disputed on the right of private judgment. One affirms it, and reasons for it, as we should say, unanswerably; and then illustrates his independence by walking backwards, standing upon his head, and in several other peculiar fashions "doing as he pleases." The other, for fear of being driven, logically, to do the same, denies the right of private judgment altogether.

There is but one other remark which I feel inclined to make, chiefly for the sake of emphasis. In contending for Progress and unlimited Advance, I have contended

also for Ceremonial, and Discipline, and Serfdom, and some still earlier stages of historic growth. But is not this inconsistent? Are not these an anachronism in the year 1871? and to attempt maintaining them, is it not positive Retrogression? To which I answer, No! This is the very point on which the Enlightenment and Doctrinaireship of the day goes wrong. The world is not a single advancing line or column, but a Cosmos, Constitution, or Co-existence of things *in every stage of advance from its own highest downwards*; and, in order to progress, each of these needs the treatment con-natural, not with the first line, but with its own actual position. Specially, the Human Family is like an individual family, and contains every age from the grandsire to the babe. Are all these to be treated alike? Or is the highest to disparage and destroy the lower, or the things needful for the lower, in order to exalt itself? Is it to banish school discipline, and nursery rule, and childish indulgences, because itself has put away childish things? Communism virtually answers Yes; and so does that Upper Communism which calls itself Enlightenment, and Advanced Liberalism, and, perhaps, Philanthropy or Philosophy; but plain good sense and family affection will teach a different lesson, and one much nearer to the Catholicity of Christ.

May He direct us aright, individually, and on the whole, to prepare for His Appearing!

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SERMON I.

DEFINITIONS AND CRITERION.

“Reason is Natural Revelation, whereby the Eternal Father of lights and fountain of all knowledge communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: Revelation is Natural Reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away Reason to make way for Revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope.”

LOCKE, *Essay on Understanding*, iv. 19. 4.

SERMON I.

DEFINITIONS AND CRITERION.

1 TIM. ii. 5, 6.

There is one God, and one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus; who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time.

EITHER to the careless or the thoughtful observer of human life, no fact seems more obvious than that we were made to worship the Author of our being—that man is not only an intellectual and a social, but also a religious creature. True, both in individuals and in masses of men, our religious sentiments are often found benumbed, and our religious principles degraded: but so are found, too often, all our sentiments and all our principles. True, our religious interests are often habitually neglected; but so, too often, are all our interests, both trifling and important. Religion, in these respects, forms no exception to the rule of all our endowments, of mind, body, and estate: He who gave them to us left them in our power, to disregard and to abuse. He has not, however, given us power to destroy them; and, though personal wants may more absorb, or social ties enchain us, that side of our being which contemplates the Unseen will still assert its right, and enforce obedience to its claims. Other parts of our nature may be more frequently in view, this can be as little mistaken, and is, in fact, as seldom repudiated. And how large an influence it has ever exercised upon mankind—how common it is for it to subjugate all other ties, to assert unduly its own pre-eminence, and sometimes to press this to an unsparing des-

potism—it needs but a glance to show or to remind us. The pilgrimages of Lough Derg, the march to Utah, the den of St. Honorius, the pillar of Simeon Stylites, the altars of Diana, the groves of Hertha, the fires of Moloch, or the car of Juggernaut, are but specimens of facts lying broadly upon the face of human doings, which indicate how deeply congenial with man's inmost self is even the extreme inquiry of the heathen king—"Where-with shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the most high God?" "Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body"—aye, and my body itself—"for the sin of my soul?"

Such facts as I allude to are sometimes quoted with a different aim, as calculated to disparage religion by exhibiting it hostile to the other best interests of humanity. They would bear the inference, perhaps, were they examples of its usual and normal operation. But such they are not, and are never asserted to be. They are perversions and corruptions, or, at best, extremes and exaggerations of them—excesses, which prove, at all events—and this alone I use them to prove—the existence and strength of those emotions, affections, or sentiments regarding things divine; in fact, of those *spiritual sensibilities* from which they spring, and whose injurious exuberance they represent.

This mode of inference is familiar to my hearers, and there seems no possibility of evading its force. If it be urged that in certain stages of society these sensibilities are dull and dormant, and almost non-existent:—We reply, this is only in the lowest stages, and may be there expected. Equally undeveloped in the same stages are all the better characteristics of our race. Creatures unreligious, unsocial, inhuman! We pretend not to adopt as our criterion of MAN the most deficient of mankind. If it be said, again, that, in the next stages, society is duped by an interested priesthood, to whom are due those gigantic monuments of craft and superstition which oppress the childhood of nations:—We ask, again, *whence* this priesthood? And whence its power? And whence its capacity to sustain itself, in spite of the absurdities or enormities to which it leads, and of all the reasonable and unreasonable opposition it is certain to evoke? Such

bodies exist only by virtue of the needs they satisfy; and their astonishing vitality and strength is, even at this day, an unexpected proof of the solidity and permanence of those principles of our nature to which priests minister, or on which they trade; and by the aid of which they habitually dominate over many things worse, and frequently tyrannize over some things better than themselves.

And if it be said, in fine, that these things are doomed to change, for that society manifests its capacity to outgrow them, and so foretells its own emancipation:—We reply, in fine, that, without disputing either the fact or inference, which yet some of the wisest would dispute, both may be, and yet may not imply any decline in religion itself, or any substantial disregard of its requirements. All the phenomena point in an opposite direction. For, on what ground is it that any advanced community has ever rebelled against ecclesiastical sway, or renounced its guidance? Never from any professed dislike to essential piety, but always in the name of some higher spiritualism. Because they have attained, they say, to some truer consciousness of God and self than they find the established priesthood to embody; that the ceremonial and vicarious no longer satisfies their personal sense of an equal and all-pervading deity; and the distant, occasional, and external bond is superseded by the requirements of that ceaseless and searching scrutiny. Men have alleged this; and though they may not always have reasoned or have acted right, there is every indication that their profession has been sincere. And he that will dispassionately compare the thought, and pains, and self-denial which are actually given to religious concerns in the different grades of humanity, will not doubt that these are immensely the greatest in its highest phase,—that the intensity and extent of man's worship have risen with its elevation, and that all have advanced together with himself. A characteristic of semi-civilization, its tendency to aggregate and occasional display, may at first impose upon the student; but soon the reflection returns, that, as miles of palace and pyramid, however grand as individual things, dwindle into insignificance before the results of that diffused industry which universalizes the comforts of ci-

vilized life; so the enormous temple, and vast assemblage, and costly hecatomb, will contrast but poorly with that diffused devotion which would fain see God everywhere, and serve Him with our all,—which would realize eternal things as already present, and act, and think, and feel accordingly,—make the soul and body the temple of His Presence, and the unreserved sacrifice of all our living powers our reasonable service. There are few, indeed, who realize such aims—few in any stage even deeply in earnest to reach their own ideal; but one of the most marked features of a higher stage is the *diffusion* of this earnestness. An inert and heedless population can relegate discussion to the cloister or the school, and depute worship to the consecrated proxy: in proportion as a kingdom of heaven is formed, it preaches itself downward to the poor, and each one struggles with a felt personal responsibility. This throws up varied, and often repulsive and opposing forms. But what of that? Uniformity attracts the theorist, and overawes the devotee; but life and nature love it not, and Unity rejects it. Development, even by antagonism, is fruitful and manifold. These varieties are at once a proof of energy and a form of it; and, considering how seldom the unusual meets a just recognition from the preceding and dominant against which it is likely to protest, are no disproof of its beneficence or fundamental unity. He is a foolish son, but still a son, who dares to say, I go not; and even the emphatic denial of the most natural claims does not always proceed from the greatest insensibility. Theoretical Epicureans have been often noted as among the most superstitious, sometimes known as not the least religious of men; and those who have received the harshest appellations—sceptic, infidel, atheist—both from others and themselves, have often proved deserving of some kindlier name. Under our Father which is in heaven, wilfulness and waywardness not seldom correct and compensate themselves: the persecutor is surprised into the Apostle; and the puny strength and narrow honesty which vaunts its own rebellion, finds itself out-embraced by that firm, forbearing Sympathy whose partial glimpse it might mistake or dread, but whose fuller vision is irresistible.

I have dwelt so long, perhaps unnecessarily, upon so very

plain a matter as the actual existence of religion in the world, because a startling tenet, and on startling authority, meets *in limine* him who would treat of its progress. Can it ever end in non-religion? Having advanced within historic times, so the representation goes, from an humbler to a higher Polytheism, and thence to Monotheism, will it be a farther advance to find ourselves in Atheism? Having sought and worshipped God first in inanimate matter, or in some element or type of it; thence in animated nature, or in some idealized concentration of its powers; thence having felt ourselves His offspring, and built up our best ideal from that image or far-cast shadow of Him which we suppose ourselves to be,—will it crown this progress to correct ourselves, and say, “There is no such thing. Worship was but a dream, and it has vanished with the night. God is not. Man is, himself, Man’s only deity.”

The answer to so plain a doctrine must itself be plain. And if the phenomena be, on the whole, such as I have described, the answer is not only plain, but as conclusive as the nature of the case would seem to admit. If forms of religion arise out of a real side of man’s own nature, we need not fear for their permanence. Were they all destroyed to-morrow, on the day after mankind would begin to reimpose them on itself, each nation, or section of a nation, that form congenial to its views, connatural with its own stage of development. And if the religious side of our nature be like all its other sides; if its faculties expand by exercise, and its ambitions grow upon that whereon they feed; there results something like a demonstration, that, whatever form or absence of form the highest cultivation may prefer, the reality of man’s Religion, the intensity of his devotion to that which he will recognize as its suitable Object, his own self-abandonment and self-prostration in the sense of the Infinite, the yearning of his feelings towards the Universal Sympathy, the complete projection of his calmer soul towards his best Ideal of the True, the Great, the Good, will be ever in proportion to the intensity of his own nature, and his attainment of all these lofty qualities themselves. If what impels us upwards be a spark we bear within, we need not apprehend that it shall ever reach that “region like itself”

in which the Heathen moralist supposed that it might rest. The higher the finite can be expanded, the better it will know its finiteness, its nothingness, in the presence of that from which it rises and towards which it springs ; and we need not fear that he who, in obedience to that aspiration of his essence, "has borne aloft, mid snow and ice, the banner with that strange device," will ever abandon his ambition and renounce his being, descend to the valley, and sit down among the rustics, contented with them and with himself.

To use the incomparable language familiar to this place :— (1) If man have really affections of which God is the natural object, towards that object they will reach, and short of it they will not rest ; and (2) if those affections obey the common law of our nature, be educed by exercise and formed by cultivation, it is incredible that the highest culture should end either in their annihilation, or in their transference to a most finite and comprehensible object, and one already sought and cared for by recognized affections of our constitution.

The Atheism of Comte, then, if Atheism it be, seems to contradict, not the phenomena merely, but the basis and origin of those phenomena, that human nature from which they spring. It surprises rather by its integrity, than by its novelty ; and in looking at it closer, we should not fail to recognise, as in any of the thoughts of the good or great, lineaments very different from that repulsive garb in which those thoughts have often clothed themselves. For what is this aggregate of humanity, in which he supposes that our wish to worship will find repose, but a generalization towards which pure science directs its icy reverence,— the anthropomorphism of an expanded mind, driven, in its own despite, to worship, while rebelling against prevalent religious forms, which might well be distasteful to less simple and elevated souls than his?

But it was not chiefly for the purpose of indicating the natural reply to Comte, that I have dwelt so long upon the most obvious religious facts ; but because it is from them we must derive our definitions both of the nature of Religion itself, and of that Religious Progress, its Criterion, Instruments, and Laws, of which I am to treat.

I have derived these phenomena in general from an internal, a psychologic source. It does not follow from this that I deny, historically, an external origin to the principal existing parts, or to any of them. Things the most natural to us are, in fact, taught externally to each ; and almost all that is implied by the word "cultivation" sounds to us of external help. Whether, besides the aids which we can mutually afford, the human race, as a whole, has received supernatural guidance, is not precisely the same, though it is an analogous question ; and on it I am of course prepared, with every Christian writer, to maintain the most distinct affirmative. I believe the proof to be overwhelming : it will fall to my province, in one aspect, to vindicate that proof—but I will here observe that both the proof is weakened, and the belief itself discredited, by being pressed too far,—by being extended, on the one hand, to too many particular things ; and, on the other side, by the evidence for, or even the existence of Religion itself being made to depend upon *any external* revelations. Religion, surely, is equally from God, whether he teach us from within or from without. That which He has written in the fleshly tables of our hearts, we should as distinctly recognize *to be His*, where we can distinctly decipher it, as those lines He has imprinted in any other book whatever. The reading of those hieroglyphics may indeed require a key, which the Maker can alone supply ; but no key can claim a higher origin ; and that which would interpret the voice of God may not pretend to supersede or nullify.

Human religion, then, rests immediately upon a human basis — *God has made us so*. Had he not made us so, no such thing would be, or would be possible, among us. Things external to each man, or family, or nation, or to the race, may elicit, develop, direct, and, within certain limits, mould and form the operation of these native powers ; but it is this moulded operation which constitutes the thing ; and the result, however artificial, does not become religion, except in proportion as it has become natural, in the same sense as man's art or science or morality is ; and the ultimate and sole authoritative appeal, in each single case, is an interrogation of the formed, or unformed, nature of the individual.

As this is our starting point, and as, in the present state of religious inquiry, much depends on the distinctness of our elementary conceptions, I must solicit your attention to a somewhat more minute examination. What is the nature of these faculties I have claimed as contemplating the unseen, or which Butler calls "affections having their object in God"? He describes them, in general, as "all those regards, all those affections of mind, which are due immediately to him from such a creature as man and which rest in him as their end," enumerating severally "love, fear, reverence, ambition of his love or approbation, and delight in the hope or consciousness of it." This takes a wide range, resting on the emotional side of our nature; but grasping, by implication, most of our powers. Butler does not analyse or reduce them, but simply asserts the phenomena as exhibited in the maturely developed character. But it is an obvious remark, that the sentiments themselves, when thus viewed as formed results, would vary with each stage of that development; and my subject obliges me to present them as in process of formation, beginning with their earliest stage.

A vague sensibility to the Unseen, Unknown, then, lies at the bottom of the scale, and first indicates, in the early childhood of individuals and of the race, the psychologic base of *man's* religiousness sensibility,—a which enters as an ingredient into many sentiments; is the main element of some; but is not absorbed by any, nor by their aggregate. It still remains in the background of the most formed characters, very much in proportion to their intensity and depth, and adds its influence to the last. It is less specialized or formed, more rudimentary, than what we call superstition, of which it is evidently the basis. It shows itself in Fear or Awe; but it is not true that fear¹, or at least painful

¹ "Thus the Athelsts who derive the origin of religion from fear, first put on an affrighted vizard upon the Deity, and then conclude it to be but a mormo or bug-bear, the creation of fear or fancy. More likely that the opinion of a God sprung from hope of good, than fear of evil: but neither of these is true, it owing to being the imposture of no passion, but supported by the strongest and clearest reason. Nevertheless a natural prolepsis, or anticipation of God also in men's minds preventing reason—this is called in Plato and Aristotle a vaticination."—*Cudworth*, ch. v. 39.

fear, predominates. An *attractiveness*, seen in Wonder, Reverence, the deeper Curiosity¹, Hope, and the first indulgences of Imagination, exhibits its less vivid, but more constant operation.

There may be nations, as there certainly are individuals, in which the religious sentiment has not advanced beyond this stage. This, however, is that to which any teacher of definite religion would or could address himself,—that which can alone procure him listeners and disciples.

To this sensibility Nature and Providence appeal from earth and sky, from birth and life and death, eliciting emotion, reverence, reflection, and religious act. And the effect of each appeal, at least until the sensibility has been fully awakened, will be, in a very great degree, measured by its *strangeness*. The more near the exhibition comes to the unheard, the marvellous, the miraculous, the greater the effect,—simply, as it appears to me, in consequence of its strangeness, its *freshness*; for the sensibility is passive, and the impressions grow weaker by repetition. The most astonishing miracles, as they are in themselves no more wonderful than the commonest things around, so they would manifestly produce as little effect if they were equally common. Were thunderstorms as usual as day and night, they would be as little heeded; were resurrection as frequent as birth or death, it would find as insensible spectators. And thus the acknowledged practical efficacy, and the more disputed theoretic value of miracles², as aiding a religious teacher, seem equally to arise from this, that they are a new, and therefore fresh appeal to our religious sensibility; and, conversely, their observed effect evinces the existence of the sensibility itself.

Of this sensibility, as marking an epoch of growth, one farther remark seems needful. Earnest men in other stages are apt to undervalue, and general thinkers to overvalue it. Its indefiniteness is displeasing to the one; but this very vagueness is acceptable to the other: for it easily adapts itself to their own

¹ Exod. iii. 8, 4; Acts, vii. 31.

² Bp. Butler, Part II. ch. i.—It is a *savage* nation that would be least affected by what we call miracles, and would least require them. Almost every characteristic of the new teacher is to them miraculous, and produces a religious effect. Similarly, anything very new to the less cultivated classes elicits religious exclamation and sentiment.

idea ; and its want of speciality and definite relief gains it credit for purity, and innocence, and absence of error. How far dreams of golden ages, and *proofs* of subsequent decline, are influenced by this, it is sometimes curious to observe.

But such vague religiousness is only a basis wherefrom to start ; it implies and demands its own cultivation. Direct instruction from without may communicate an impulse ; or material prosperity, nurturing the general growth, may afford it such power, that it will gather itself up and strike forward an advance. As it moves out, it finds or makes for itself some mode of expression ; it associates with that mode, and a form or forms of religion result. Around these the other faculties of man are exercised ; and it is in combination with them that the religious sentiments are henceforth to be traced and described.

My hearers are familiar with the analysis of those powers,—that they too arise from vague rudiments, the original matrix in each case being sometimes barely discoverable behind the prominent operation of faculties successively built up out of various combinations. The order of dignity being the inverse order of succession : inasmuch as each arises from the combined action of its predecessors, and the last formed must represent the complex of the constitution. The most universal element, perhaps, being intellectual processes, chiefly in the form of perceived or conceived results ; while the most vivid and distinguishing ingredients are often emotions, or purely corporeal sensibilities. All that can be demanded for the religious sensibility, and all that in fact takes place, is that it should blend in these processes, that it should affect the other elements, and be affected by them in turn, according to the common laws. The other elements represent the seen and felt ; this speaks for the unseen, and, as it were, makes it felt also. It is therefore not without appropriateness, that, in combination with the simplest intellectual processes, it is sometimes spoken of as the religious *sense*. In a farther stage, emotions and affections being involved, we speak of religious *sentiments* ; and ultimately, including the whole balance of the constitution, of the “religious *conscience*” :—of which when we are asked for an analysis, as distinguished from

the purely moral conscience, if there be any such thing, we have to reply that it is simply the common conscience in which the religious side of the nature is duly involved, and occupies its natural share. And when we are asked again, -What is the natural share?—we reply that in the earlier stages each part struggles for itself, and each must be contented with its turn of gratification or of excess: but in proportion as the constitution is formed, and the nature harmonized, the recognition of the religious element implies its own predominance, complete, peaceful, and pervading. The unseen and the seen are both alike to God. The religious relation is universal, and the reflecting man must find or make it so. His Psychology gradually builds itself into an organized Theocracy.

Thus, the account that is to be given of each man's constitution is strikingly parallel to that which must be given of the constitution of each human family, of each community, of their aggregate, and of the world they occupy. Man is the microcosm of the sphere in which he dwells. Arising from it, and influencing at least its higher parts in turn; each results from each, and one is the reflex of the other.

From the same account must manifestly be derived our classification of the varying religions which evolve themselves from our nature in its various stages, and, perpetuating themselves, coexist side by side, stereotyped, as it were, for our observation. Thence, too, we must ascertain their relation to that Religious Progress which, you observe, I am assuming to be a patent fact, much too obvious for dispute or demonstration.

The classification then will be, *first*, those of a *vague* religiousness; of which the patriarchal state—as represented, say, in Job, or culminating in Melchizedek—is our ideal. *Next*, those of a *definite* religious form; where the religious sensibility is associated and bound up with certain particular things; of which Judaism is the appointed type, culminating in the Advent of Christ. And *finally*, those in which the felt religious relation would fain *universalize* itself, and see all things and do all things in the light of God; of which our type is pure Christianity, or the aspiration after the teaching and example of the Lord Jesus Christ;—this

being the Attained Perfection of the prior Dispensations, explicitly recorded, idealized to us by the Resurrection and Pentecost, and to culminate in His Second Appearing. All human religions are shortcomings of these, or various intermixtures of them. The humbler Paganisms bear the same relation to the first, that its more cultivated forms do to the second, or that existing Christian religions do to the third.

This will be more distinctly seen, when the remark is added that no community is uniform and homogeneous, any more than the human constitution is. Coexistence takes place, not only side by side, but in an internal sense. Each community comprehends members in every stage of development, from its own highest downwards. Christendom has its Christians, it has its Jews and Pagans too. Theoretic Christianities have a large infusion, self-imposed, of Judaism; the later intellectual kind predominating in its Protestant Churches,—the earlier, more ceremonial and outward, in its Greek and Roman forms. And practical Christianities are no less capacious of continued or invented Paganisms, against which the theoretic commonly struggles, but to which it sometimes ignominiously succumbs. This is because overgrown infants and mature children still compose the mass, despite of book or minister. They have their religious needs, and will have them satisfied, and will find or make creeds and priests accordingly,—a successful priesthood being always sufficiently near the people to insure a predominant sympathy, only sufficiently before them to sustain respect, and intelligently lead ambition. If it be too far in advance, it will be like the ark of Jehovah among the Philistines; it may prostrate Dagon, and mutilate his image, but it knows not how to take his place. It will afflict their gods, but it may neither improve their religion nor help themselves: it is apt to return alone, and leave a void behind.

All this has its counterpart, as it has its cause, in our psychology. For the rudimentary elements out of which our definite faculties arise are not absorbed by them. They coexist beside the formed sentiments, continue to add their influence, and are susceptible of their own special gratification to the last; just as the purely vegetable, the purely animal, and the distinctly mental, co-

exist in our physiology. In passing through inferior kingdoms, it is not merely the results that man bears with him. Existing types, nay living elements of all that has preceded, are comprehended in his being; and his past still asserts itself the permanent basis of his future. Hence the sympathy with which the highest ever responds to each simpler and humbler grade is genuine and unaffected. He still bears their representative within, and the fellow-feeling is complete. Yet it is only occasionally, and under guard, that a finite creature can indulge his humbler sympathies. We cannot afford to give ourselves off to our lower selves, or to those beneath us. Their too much companionship would leave neither time nor energy for that which our own calling imperatively claims. And the community which habitually descends to its lower members impedes, if it do not insensibly degrade itself. The exercise of universal sympathy is reserved for God. Him it neither impedes nor exhausts. He is everywhere, and everywhere alike. For us, finite creatures, by whom things must be attended to in parts or even one at once, we shall best advance each other and the whole by habitually urging all our energies towards the highest that we know. The Catholic Church may have a soothing for every sorrow, and a cup of cold water for every weak disciple; but it were an ill mode to discharge its mission, in the society of these little ones to forget their Master. Onward! still onward! is the sacrament we are sworn to follow. We each bear within a standard above our present selves, and our whole nature commands us to spring towards it. Something whispers—we shall not attain—yes! but we shall attain; attain still farther than we see. The standard, in truth, will elude us. It has risen higher still. But so has our ambition to reach it, so has our strength to spring, and the effort is repeated. “To be again frustrated”—nay, not frustrated: the standard is not grasped, indeed; it was a vision from on high, and earth shall never comprehend it. But in the continued effort man has been born again, and developed himself out into the felt presence of his God—has risen with Christ, and then found all things new—eternity around, and the kingdom of heaven within him.

And the mission of the Church, and of the race, is identical

with that of the individual,—to expand itself towards the realization of Deity,—to attain at once the greatness of its being, and the knowledge of its nothingness, in the sense of God. And if it be asked, what result, what boon, what happiness is this? the answer is plain,—he that looks to religion for any other happiness than what arises from the deepening, strengthening, and elevating of our powers,—the intensifying, refining, and sustaining of their exercise,—looks for that which neither religion nor anything else will ever give. These are our being, not the results of it—ourselves, and not our accessories. If religion effect this, it effects all it promises, and is itself its own reward. And that among the agencies which energize humanity religion stands pre-eminent, notwithstanding all the turbulence, and strife, and partial miseries which crowd around its history,—notwithstanding all its furious hate and fiery persecution, its absurd mistakes and its insane fanaticism, its unforgiving jealousy and its all-forgiving charity, its insatiable ambitions and its untold resignation,—*nay, by means of all these things*, is a fact too patent to be misconceived. Every thing else that man holds dear,—human reason, human feeling, human life,—it can denounce and sacrifice by turns, yet intensely it stimulates, profoundly it sustains, distinctly it tends to harmonize them all. In the formation of each individual man, in the formation of each society or nation, in the formation of the race, it has played no secondary part; nor is its mission done. Religion! What else has so contributed, what else will so contribute, to the sum of human being?

Man and his religion have progressed together. These repulsive concomitants have been characteristic of certain phases of the march; natural characteristics, I grant, considering what human nature is; and he is sanguine of our speedy perfectibility who ventures to predict that even the worst of them will never be repeated. But the progress is undeniable, and the tendency is clear. The hope is surely justified from induction, even had we nothing more sure whereon to build, that the whole will gradually accept the impress of the highest part. War is great, but peace is greater. Fierce and strong are the passions of the race; but the calm majesty of goodness can overawe them all. The

contending elements are clearly destined to be subject—may we not even see something of the kind—to a collective sense of the considerate and the just; and an aggregate conscience, a moral one, a religious one, shall judge and rule and harmonize mankind.

To educe, then, and educate the faculties of man, in fact his spiritual creation, is the function of religion. Its manifest tendency is towards their HARMONY. And it is in this latter word that we place the *critterion* of its progress; at least in any given “dispensation;”—in that latter word, so as we do not disjoin it from the others which indicate its function. For that were a premature harmony, and a manifest perversion, which would attain its end at the beginning, by crushing those elements which it is not expanded enough to comprehend, and which are too real and independent to be ignored. By strangling, for instance, the reason, or shrivelling the heart, or even by forgetting to bless the material advancement of mankind. No, we must expand them *all*. Whatever springs not from depth of earth will parch and perish in the light of day. Those that are of God will reach towards Him; with Him they will agree, and in His presence will learn to agree together; and it will be a pleasant sight when brethren, long estranged, shall dwell together in unity.

That harmony, then, of things within us and without, which would attain its end by the courageous development of each and all—in the faith that what is really the best will prove the strongest too, and be able to assimilate the rest—is the end of our religion, as religion identifies itself with the end of our being. Here is our goal; this is the criterion of our progress. Whatever tends to this is helping the work of God, whatever impedes or frustrates it is of the adversary. To this end let us address ourselves,—an end not easily or soon to be attained—not greedy of immediate fruit, tolerant of present differences, patient of present contradictions and never-ending disappointment,—full of a sublime inseeing which makes the future present, and among all the shifting discouragements which give not of that promised land whereon to plant one foot, can yet rejoice to see His day, and take possession with one’s grave,—one which has need to fall back upon a higher type than the father of the faithful, if it would

not be discouraged and faint,—must consider Him who endured such contradiction of sinners against himself,—who, when he could no longer bring men with him, could die before them, be lifted up from the earth to draw them after Him, could bridge a chasm with his body, open a passage through the veil his flesh; and yet who never allowed even the joy that was set before him to absorb one throb of that *present* sympathy which was always fresh for the humblest and the worst—“Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me; but weep for yourselves and for your children,” for the days which now approach—“Father, forgive them; they know not what they do”—this of his willing executioners—“*To-day* thou shalt be *with me* in Paradise”—this to the criminal whom His demeanour encouraged to believe himself “in the same condemnation.” Here then is our end, that all men should be made like Him. To speak the language to which we fain would rise, and which embraces at once the within and the without,—the realizing of Christ, the assimilation to Christ; Christ in his true humanity; Christ in his human exhibition of Deity. In the individual, that Christ be formed in us, the hope of glory:—in the world, the universalizing, elevating, adorning of that Church which He has wedded to Himself; the establishment of that which is his body, the fulness of Him who filleth all in all.

I am to treat also of the *Instruments* of progress, and I will here briefly classify them. They are all in a certain sense externs to Humanity; yet they are not religion, nor are they ours, till they have made their home within.

The universal Cause, then, of all spiritual progress is the Spirit of God. While describing human religion as arising from human nature, I hope the youngest here did not misunderstand me to speak as if I thought that the least of it could arise or live without His prime and constant inspiration. All that I have alluded to, so far at least as it is good and commendable, springs from Him and is sustained by Him, and is in fact His ordinary operation. So, in Scripture language, is even Life in general; from the highest spiritual “motives” or effect, down to the physical *vires vivæ* of mere motion. He breathed at first on the chaotic elements, and creation evolved itself; not all at once

complete, but in a series, in successive Works and Days. And the latter stages of that primeval scale were surely not the less *His* work, because, by his present energy, each successive result was made productive of the next—because Light is efficient in physical and physiological formation, and doubtless, also, through the cerebral, in psychologic too; nor because each grade of being is caused unconsciously to labour for and work towards the next; nor—as even in the beginning it is briefly indicated—because God said “Let the sea bring forth,” or “let the earth produce,” each its own inhabitants. These, and such like secondary laws of production, indicate, not the absence of the Lord and Life-Producer, but the *modes* of his Omnipresence.

More eminently, more characteristically to us at least, He breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul. On that new formed soul He breathed again, and spiritual creation evolved its reflex life,—again, not all at once complete; but in successive dispensations as before, and which repeat, as before, both in the individual and in collective history, the fundamental analogy that each stage, as it matures itself, prepares for, and produces the next. Through several nights and days has this creation passed, and some dispensations yet to come it consciously expects. From the first to the Second Adam, by steps and periods variously prepared; from the first to the second coming of Christ, by preparations which our own times witness and exert. All these results producing, and all these means administering that self-same Spirit, distributing severally as he will; the modes of his presence analogous or identical, so far as we can see, throughout the realms of life; self-harmonious through the octaves of being, so far as man has range to compass the varied voices that he hears.

Some things more eminently than others we speak of, and perhaps we cannot but think of, as being the Spirit's work; namely, the *highest* things we know; the most “godly motions” and “spiritual energies” of Life; the “inspiration” of Prophets and Apostles; most of all, the Generation and Resurrection of Christ; the Pentecostal Regeneration and future Resurrection of Mankind. But as there is only One God and One Spirit of

God, this special reference can only be true *by way of eminence*. What God's Spirit does *eminently*, to our esteem, He does not do *exceptionally*, he does not do *exclusively*; and we must guard the language of our more recent theology, lest perchance it react upon the thought, and we lose what neither the Scriptures nor our mother-church intended we should lose, and find a blank in our reflections which it may require pains and care to fill. I speak not merely of that *religious* sympathy with *Nature* which animates each psalm, and prophecy, and parable, but of those distincter and more obvious concords which vibrate through our souls when we each pray, as indeed to-day^a we prayed, for "the inspiration of that Holy Ghost," not to confer on us some exceptional and extraordinary gifts, but for the commonest, most elementary of our spiritual wants; "to *think* that which is right, and to perform the same;" "to have a right judgment in all things;" "to cleanse the thoughts of our hearts, that we may perfectly love Thee, and worthily magnify thy Holy Name."

And the Spirit it is that teaches thus to pray: and we have learned, and have had aids to learn. There are those who have few helps to learn, and yet who pray. And there are those who "cannot pray," and yet the Spirit helpeth even their infirmities, though their yearnings be scarce articulate. Whatever *feels* after Him, that comes from Him; and it will not disparage the highest privileges we enjoy, if we never forget that in that ultimate presence there are first who are last, and the last first.

Religion, then, is the work of the Spirit; of course, so is the progress of religion,—his so-called ordinary operation administering its ordinary and usual growth; the so-called extraordinary having relation to its extraordinary advances, those *steps per saltum* which are, I am presuming, a patent fact in the history of mankind. I said that this is in some sense extern and foreign to us. Alas, that we should be so unconscious of our origin, so forget the rock whence we are hewn. But so it is. The language of Scripture is, that He "strives with man;" is "quenched, resisted, set at nought;" we repel Him as an enemy, or at best entertain Him

^a Preached on the 5th Sunday after Easter.

as a stranger and a guest. This is the language of Scripture ; it is also the common language ; it expresses the thought and feeling of mankind. I cannot gainsay it ; and I am not here to refine upon it, or seek to fritter it away. Will it reconcile the facts, if I shall ask—in being strangers to the Spirit, are we not equally strangers to our better selves ? In sinning against Him, do we not sin against all that is deep and high and pure within us ? Brethren, these things must change. We must cast from us all that hinders ; put off the old man with his deeds ; be born of the Spirit ; be crucified and die in all that resists it, and live the life it gives.

This, then, is the Primary Cause of Progress ; for it is the primary cause and essence of Religion itself. We descend thence to the Secondary ; and I mark as special a Psychologic, a Historical, and a Literary Instrument,—being all Modes of the Spirit's operation, and bearing, each in its partial sphere, relations analogous to those which the Spirit sustains to things in general.

The Psychologic is, of course, that side of our nature which testifies to us of God through all the stages of our individual life, beginning with our first religious sensibility. As this may sound vague and awkward, I will sum it up in one word, which seems to me, in its fundamental sense, to express it exactly, the word Faith. Faith, used not in the "ecclesiastic" nor in the "doctrinal" meaning, as indicating our connexion with any "church," or our acceptance of any "creed" ; in both which senses it is often and properly applied ; but used subjectively, or personally, as naming a class of faculties of our own nature, and which I would define as the Consciousness of the Invisible, or a *realizing sense of God*—of God, according to each man's best idea or conception of him ; and so, both in itself and its effects, varying with that conception—in other words, varying with the individual's own state of cultivation ; but, in all stages, and at all times, evidencing the unseen, giving it a present and substantive reality in the play of motives, and sway of conduct, and building up of character. This is personal, subjective, and, as I believe, justifying and sanctifying and saving Faith. It is long the extern and intruder of his inner life, until man has learned to know himself. What has the

unseen to do with us? is the feeling of the earlier born and robuster powers, which know it from afar, and instinctively recognize that, if admitted at all, all young and meek and gentle as it is, it is admitted to be king. We will not have him to reign over us! Shall all we indeed, father and mother and brethren, bow down and make obeisance unto thee? Come, say the more hasty, let us slay or banish him, and we will see what will become of his dreams! Yet the infant Christ will still be born, and grow, and gradually assert his reign, subduing and assimilating all things to himself. This mighty working, the kingdom of Christ within us, making us conscious of what is and is to BE, is the personal or psychologic instrument of progress.

The Historical or National agency is, speaking broadly, the Church; more precisely, it is a particular race of men, the family of Abraham, separated from its cradle in the childhood of nations for the special purpose of learning religion, and then teaching it to mankind. From it have undulated successive waves of religious culture; the greatest being that represented by the Christian Church; a vigorous adopted child, which now enjoys its heritage, while it performs its work. Yet is not the parent stock cast off; nay, it still exercises essential functions, if it were only in this, that it mysteriously stands by, endorsing the mission of its child and delegate, and verifying the Bible of its powers. To this hour, too, a stranger and pilgrim, as its father was; witnessing for Abraham's God, and impressing the name of Abraham's SEED, not the less mightily because unwittingly or unwillingly, upon mankind. A peculiar people called to a peculiar work, and not to be absorbed into the body of nations until that work is done, and the climax reached which the apostle designates as life from the dead. This is the national religious instrument.

And as there has in these last days, and especially in our own times, evolved itself a New World of spiritual activities, an Empire of Literature, I am not wrong in recognizing there too as a central Sun, a focus of special energy, the mysterious Bible of Abraham's race; the record and mirror of all Jehovah's nation has yet been caused to learn or to foresee. A panorama of human religion, in type, through its successive stages, including glimpses

from futurity. Scriptures of universal sympathy—each man will there find his own ideal fellow, struggling upward in the race and failing not of his reward. Scriptures of universal guidance—each man may there see delineated the stages of his own pilgrimage, so that he may verify his present, and see the pathway to his next. These three pre-eminent and mysterious agencies, Faith, the Church, the Bible, are, each in its several world, the Individual, the Nation, the Republic of Letters, the Spirit's leading Instruments of Progress.

To the Laws of Progress I can at present barely allude; of course, they arise very directly from within; in fact, they group themselves around the two fundamental facts I noticed in our psychology, combining in their organic base:—

I. That of Growth or Development; each stage arising naturally out of the preceding one, by the combined action of things without and of the force within. This does not exclude external aids; rather, it supposes or demands them. Nor does it imply that the series shall be, of necessity, equable or constant; to the exclusion, on the one hand, of partial retrogression and decay: or, on the other, of extraordinary advances, marked epochs, steps *per saltum*, with accompaniments as extraordinary as themselves. The whole analogy of life suggests the opposite expectation.

II. The other fundamental fact is the Co-existence of several types in the world at large, in each nation, and in the individual; what we may call a Simultaneousness of Religious Stages. Hence all the confusions; for while they act upon, these do not always recognize or understand each other; they long despise or fear, suspect or hate each other. The reconciliation of these strifes within, is the problem of the individual; without, of the universal church. Here it is that sympathy has play, and should mature itself to love; forbearance and toleration should advance to harmony; and the unity of the Spirit, if it do not produce an exact uniformity of the letter, which some believe in, though I cannot see it, either in the future or in that which is to evolve the future, will certainly cement us all together in the bond of peace.

III. And it would help, both theoretically and practically, to this, if we would bear in mind the nature of that Unity of the

Spirit, as distinguished from any identity or similarity of Form, or Uniformity of the Letter. These are not only to be distinguished, but to be opposed. Things incapable of life are uniform, but the Unity of the Spirit is the Unity of Life, and makes each finite thing to clothe itself in varied forms and phases, according to the law of its being and the exigencies of its sphere. Beneath each of these facts, then, Growth in varied stages, and Co-existence of related though dissimilar parts, we recognise another fact, the law of Unity,—the unity of life, organic and individual, the only unity we know,—a unity we attribute to every individual thing in which we recognize organic life, as firmly as we ascribe it to ourselves. The life itself manifestly producing its own varieties by its own pregnant energy; and, as it marks off its individuals, defining its unity for each.

I pass thus lightly over the laws, because I wish, in conclusion, to dwell briefly on one point, without which all that I have said might seem not only essentially to omit, but essentially to contradict the truth. What is the relation of all these religions to Christ? I have quoted His words, and I have used His name; but have I not made Him one of many? have I not forgotten His unique and exclusive claims? I trust not.

I have spoken of Christianities as if there were several—compared and classified them with other religions, as if their differences were mere matter of degree and growth, the elements mixed, and the transitions easy. And I suppose there are few here to question that, in so doing, I have spoken according to the actual fact, as it stands visible in the world. Yet, on the other hand, the whole tenor of Scripture and its positive statements are equally clear and absolute. It will acknowledge for Christ no graduated share, no help, no like, no fellowship whatever. "There is one God; and one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus." "Neither is there salvation in any other: for there is no other name under heaven given among men, whereby we may be saved." "I am *the way, the truth, the life*: NO MAN cometh to the Father, BUT BY ME." In the overwhelming plainness of this language, the whole apparent difficulty rolls itself away. The relation of Christ to man is Universal,

Final, Absolute; is independent of man's religion, of his knowledge, of his will. He is something Objective, if we may use such words, or Ontologic in relation to the race. If it were not so, then Jesus would not be Christ; or Christ would not be God. But, being so, then these religions, or forms of religion, have precisely the same relation to Christ that they have to God; only more "mediately" to our esteem, as He is *the* Mediator, and the one only Mediator between God and man.

This is so palpably the theory of Christianity, that there would be scarce room for the question asked; were it not that corruptions of our faith have spread or left a confusion, in thought and language, between the Objective and Subjective in religion, through which we must distinctly mark our way.

And about our simplest means of doing so will be, that I ask my youngest hearers to remember their Church Catechism; and to identify the former, or objective side of religion, with the "finished work" of God the Son, which is in its own nature Universal, Final, long ago Complete—"Who *hath* redeemed me, and *all* mankind:"—and the second, or subjective religion, with the "continuous operation" of the Holy Ghost, which is obviously present, partial, discriminative, and progressive—"Who *sanctifieth* me, and all the elect people of God."

It would seem difficult to confound things so extremely different; yet are they for ever confounded, and the gravest errors thence ensue. It is most needful for us to be on our guard. Obviously it is only with the latter that my subject of religious progress has any direct concern. In no other is any progress possible. I have, therefore, described religion solely from its subjective side. I shall continue to do so, with what distinctness I am able. But as the confusion alluded to will meet us at every step, I propose to devote one sermon to objective religion. It shall be the third, as appropriate to Trinity Sunday. Meantime I will develop the distinction a little, placing it in such form as our present controversies seem to need:—

- I. *Objectively*.—Christ is the *atonement* for human guilt—"the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world"—for "sin," that is, as

distinguished from "sinfulness"—for formal and forensic guilt, as distinguished from the willingness to sin again. He is so, and always was so. In fact, the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world had already, in the Eternal Now, exhausted the condemnation, and "redeemed us and all mankind" before there was a man in being. And Christ is this ransom, in whatever time, degree, or mode revealed, or whether revealed at all,—whether or no any man has ever known of it, or heard, or hoped, or "felt after" it in the yearnings of his soul.

Subjectively.—By the operation of the Holy Ghost, men have yearned after it, and heard and known of it, though in all conceivable degrees; and have sought to live accordingly; and this, in the sense of our subject, is Human Religion.

II. *Objectively.*—Christ is the "resurrection and the life."—"He tasted death for every man," and so exhausted in his own person that penalty and antagonist, and made himself the second Adam—the second head and founder of the race, in whom all shall be made alive, as in the former they all die. And He is so, independent of man's knowledge and desire; though no man had ever known or cared—though all men should desire the contrary.

Subjectively.—Through the operation of the Holy Ghost, speaking in every language that man has ears to hear, men have known and cared, and hoped and feared, and sought to live accordingly—and this, again, is Human Religion.

III. *Subjectively.*—Human Religion proceeds from the Holy Ghost; certain intimations afforded to the intellect; a certain ideal standard of good and God held up to the inmost soul; and each man's whole self stimulated to reach it.

Objectively.—The Holy Ghost himself proceedeth from the Son, purchased, or purchased back, by his reconciliation,—is the procurement and gift, as well as the Paraclete of Christ; and in all that he holds up before the

individual or the race, he but takes the things of Christ, and shows them unto us.

To sum up, in the language familiar¹ to this place:

Subjectively.—Human religion is “human regards resting in God as their object;” and so dependent both on the nature of “the regards” and of “the object,”—varying both with the character of the worshipper, and with the attributes of God, as conceived by him, and so presented to his regards.

Objectively.—Christ is *the* manifestation of the character and attributes of God,—manifestation, both in the totality of His Creation, and in the perfectness of its highest part,—Image of the Invisible God, and First-born of Every Creature.

In the language of “Mediation,” Christ is Emmanuel,—God with us; God in creation; God in the finite; “God in things:” so defined to a point or points, and pressed home on our regards as to reach and command all forms of human consciousness.

Thus the unique and exclusive, as distinguished from the pre-eminent claims of our religion, lie not in its subjective, but in its objective side; not in the mode or degree, but in the *matter* of its Revelation; not in Patriarchism, Judaism, Christianity, but in Christ—not in our *knowledge* of Christ, or in the modes whereby we received or wherein we embody and perpetuate that knowledge, but in the finished Work and ultimate Being of Christ Himself—Christ, not in what He *taught*, and taught but to few, and to these very imperfectly, reserving his instruction till they should be able to bear it from the Paraclete; but Christ, in what He *did*, and did alike for all—in what He *is*, and therefore is to all. This Christ it is who stands alone, unique, and exclusive, refusing participation while comprehending all: the *explicit* BASIS of historic Christianity, the *implicit* BASIS of all human religion. Vaguely intimated to the patriarchs, more distinctly signified to Judaism; and truly “felt after,” and sought, and therefore as truly found, by every earnest soul that ever sought the Father; for there is no other “way” to the Father, but by

¹ Bp. Butler, Sermon. xiii. and xiv.; Anal. I. iii., II. 5, et *passim*. See note A.

Him; nor any Mediator between God and man, except this man, who "gave Himself a ransom for all," though only "in due time," and in diversified degree and manner "testified" to any.

In this mediation, ransom, redemption, all mankind are equally interested, and in it they are all alike secured. And this, be it noted, *reduces, for all mankind, the practical question of religion to the purely subjective one, that of personal religious cultivation.* We shall all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ. For this He has prepared. Our preparation is the development and formation of such a character as shall, naturally as it were, place us on the right hand or on the left,—the attainment of that holiness, without which none shall endure the presence of that holy Judge. For this end he has sent us abundant help—churches, doctrines, sacraments, and books—not the same to all; but what he judges to be suitable, and therefore sufficient for each. Eminently He teaches us in these dispensations of Christendom,—most eminently by that written and *printed* Word, which, by its own diffusion, will enforce its own interpretation. But not alone by it He teaches, but by every book of truth—by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God—by those lines which have gone into all the world, and those sounds which undulate to the ends of the earth, as truly, though not so fully, as by the articulate thunderings of the law, or the harmonized distinctness of the Gospel.

Various, indeed, are the opportunities of each; and quite as varied the mode in which these opportunities are used. We shall stand before a Judge who has marked and chronicled them all. Every idle word will be remembered there; and there, too, will no diligent endeavour be forgotten. Those who have obeyed His most distant intimations will be accepted, as though obedient to Himself; and those who did it not to the least of these His messengers, judged as having done it not to Him.

It is a subjective thing—a matter of motives, habits, and character. The rule lies in the nature of mind—in the nature of things; may we not say, in the nature of God? at least, we have it from the lips of the Judge himself that this will be the nature of the Judgment.

SERMON II.

FAITH.

“This capacity for progress is connected with another element in Man’s Nature, which it is difficult to isolate and define, but which interpenetrates and blends with his whole physical character. ‘The Soul,’ it has been remarked, ‘is that side of our nature which is in relation with the Infinite;’ and it is the existence of this relation, in whatever way we may describe it, which seems to constitute the distinctive peculiarity of man. It is in the desire for an improvement in his condition, occasioned by an aspiration after something nobler and purer, that the mainspring of human progress may be said to lie : among the lowest races of mankind the capacity exists, but the desire seems dormant ; when once thoroughly awakened, however, it seems to grow by what it feeds on ; and the advance once commenced, little stimulus is needed, for the desire increases at least as fast as the capacity. In the higher grades of mental development there is a continual looking upwards, not, as in the lower, towards a more elevated human standard, but at once to something beyond and above man and material nature. This seems the chief source of the tendency to believe in some unseen existence, which may take various forms, but which seems never entirely absent from any race or nation, although, like other tendencies, it may be deficient in individuals. Attempts have been made by some travellers to prove that particular nations are destitute of it, but such assertions have been based only on a limited acquaintance with their outward observances ; for there are probably none who do not possess the idea of some invisible power, external to themselves, whose favour they seek, and whose anger they deprecate, by sacrifice and other ceremonials.”

CARPENTER, *Human Physiology*, p. 17.

SERMON II.

FAITH.

ACTS, ii. 16, 17.

This is that which was spoken of by the Prophet Joel : And it shall come to pass in the last days, saith God, I will pour out of my Spirit upon all Flesh; And your sons and your daughters shall prophesy.

I ENDEAVOURED in my last discourse to classify the religions of the world, and to define their relations to each other, and to God. We distinguished broadly between their *objective* and their *subjective* side; identifying the former with what the Church of England calls *Redemption*, or the Finished Work of the Son, which is, in its own nature, Universal, Final, long ago Complete; and the latter, with what she calls *Sanctification*, or the Continuous Operation of the Holy Ghost, which is evidently Present, Discriminative, Partial, and Progressive.

Subjectively, all religion is simply *culture*—the soul's aspiration after God, nurtured and educated by "means of grace." Both the internal and the external endowments being in Scripture language, the "gifts," "dispensation," or "graduated distribution" of the Holy Ghost. To this minister all religious forms, formulæ, rites, and privileges. All Creeds, Doctrines, Sacraments, Priesthoods, Churches, Bibles, are for Sanctification, *and for that alone.*

Objectively, all Sanctification rests upon Redemption, and presupposes it. The very idea of approaching God presumes the hope or belief that He has *somewhere* the means of reconcil-

ing the felt discrepancy, and rewarding the faithful seeker. Thus all religious hope and effort rely upon God's MERCY in the last resort; however that mercy be revealed, and however much or little its revelation be understood. Of its existence He has written at least one testimony, in our hearts, too deep for even false religious tenets to destroy. And this "implicit" faith, or natural sense of things, duly educed and nurtured by the historic training of mankind, the highest revelation but renders "explicit" in the "Lamb slain before the foundation of the world;" who had, therefore, *a priori*, redeemed us all; or, more generally, in Him by whom all things were created, in whom all things consist, and in whom all things are, or are being, reconciled, "whether things in heaven or things on earth."

Of this Ransom, and the Mercy that evolved it, God never left Himself without a witness, nor mankind without some intimation. The face of nature reads it out in pregnant parables to those who have ears to hear; the back-parts of Providence, as He passes by, proclaim its attributes in its effects; the deep yearnings of our own nature, in vaguely, yet truly, seeking, always as truly find; the prophet's insight can discern it in all these things, and in itself, and his poetry clothe it in living oracles; while the church, or churches, can embody it in facts and symbols, and work its recognition into the hearts and practices of men. But it must not be confounded with any of its intimations, nor with their sum, nor with any system or embodiment, however justly built thereon. It cost more to redeem our souls, so that they must let that alone for ever. They all belong to subjective religion, and are the administration of the Spirit, whereas *it* is their FOUNDATION, and other basis have they none. In all that the Spirit ever "signified," or "testified," or "reminded," before the day of Pentecost, or since, "He but takes the things of Christ, and shows them unto us." "All that the Father hath are mine." Even God's Spirit can have no other things to show. All that any church, or man, or angel has taught, or can teach, is but some gleam or shadow of it.

But with this objective side of religion, or as some might wish to say, its ontologic base, my subject of Religious Progress

has no direct concern. For this admits no progress, nor addition, nor variation. It rests immanent in the resources of Deity—unique, universal, total, as incomprehensible by creation as is the Incomprehensible Himself. Even in its point of historic revealing, always transcending statement, and wrapping itself round with the incommunicable attributes. But as it is very often confounded with subjective religion, and the gravest errors thence ensue, we must, for distinctness' sake, place the two sides in broad contra-position. On next Sunday, then, I will treat of objective religion, as appropriate to the day. All the rest of my Sermons relate exclusively to Sanctification, the varied operations of the Holy Ghost, whose most signal outpouring we this day¹ commemorate.

Among the large “gifts” or “means” which He administers, I distinguished *three* as pre-eminent, a Personal, a National, and a Literary Instrument; and the first I described as Faith—using the word, not in its doctrinal sense, as indicating any creed, symbol, or collection of tenets; nor in its ecclesiastical sense, as denoting church membership, an individual's connexion with any particular, or with the Catholic “household of faith;” but in its personal or psychologic sense, as naming a principle, or set of principles, of our own nature. I also analysed those principles from their first appearance in a vague religious *sensibility*; thence, comprising intellectual processes, as religious *sense*; including emotions or affections, as religious *sentiments*; and, finally, as included itself in the formed constitution, but with a recognized and pervading supremacy, as the religious *conscience*. And on its analysis rested its definition, that it is a “realizing sense of God”—of God, according to that idea of Him which is actually attained by the individual in each stage of his own advance. With that idea, therefore, it varies; somewhat in its own nature, vastly in its effects. But in all stages, and through all variations, it preserves its fundamental character of realizing the Invisible—making the unseen and hoped-for felt, and making them tell among all the combinations of passion and of thought in which the life is spent, and the character of man is formed,—

¹ Preached upon Whit-Sunday.

a potent talisman of awe, and energy, and act,—a mighty disturber, and no less mighty calmer of the soul,—often the sustainer of most unmerciful deeds, sometimes a pretext for the worst; but generally a deep and permanent incitement towards all that one conceives of as the better and the higher—the True, the Pure, the Good.

Let us scrutinize its mode of operation. By its definition, it witnesses for the unseen, places it beside the seen, and strives to obtain for it a proportionate regard. So far as it effects this, it effects an enormous change. In its celestial light all things are judged anew; and what before was everything, soon ebbs in the esteem. The orb that bears us through the sky is large and beautiful while we regard itself; but when, standing in it, we look out upon the firmament, and search the opening heavens, how quickly does earth decline! In proportion to the power of our instrument and our conception it shrinks, and almost disappears, until it is fain to ask back some new regard by being seen in its just relation, as one point in the manifestation of God. Then it becomes beautiful again; and *more*—it is one with the rest; and the one appointed us: it is good and holy; and we would fain walk here with Him. So in our microcosm, when faith looks out, and the invisible comes in, what a wondrous transformation must ensue! Sight and sense and sentiment, emotion and affection, friendship and ambition, all our external relations, and all that we call “self,” if they cannot reconcile themselves with it, and take their places again as its agents and instruments—its friends, and brethren, and sons—why, they must be sacrificed, and die.

Its immediate effect, then, is self-renunciation in the sense of the Infinite—a self-abasement in respect to our power, knowledge, righteousness, and every sense of worth; which yet does not crush farther than into conscious contact with the one abiding source of all real exaltation. Round this, and in its regenerating light, it more than constitutes all things again.

Two men sought God: they knew that he dwelt in the temple, and thither they went to pray. One was pious according to the fashion of his day—a leader of the religious world, a teacher, probably, of the religion then divinely instituted, and one who,

according to the not easy standard of his order, practised what he taught. Even in the temple and its act of worship, he can say, and of course truly, as he believed, that he had kept his sacred duties, and not been careless or godless, like so many in the world. But did this man see God? Nay, in the very act of acknowledging and seeking to commune with that awful presence, all the poor man saw was his own miserable self—I do so and so—I am so and so—and I thank thee that I am not like the rest.

Not so his fellow; his sense of the unseen is too real and overpowering to allow him to approach; *but it is also too real and overpowering to allow him to stay away.* Something had struck into him a sense of God he could neither resist nor escape from, and it drives him here to seek relief. Perhaps it was some sin; some crime not unfamiliar to his class. He had wronged the fatherless or widow. The cry of bereavement aggravated kept ringing in his soul, until he felt it knelling God's vengeance for the deed. The Father of the fatherless had seen it too, and more than it whereof the memory awakes, and is come down to judge. Where could one fly that vision, once He made himself be felt? Night could not hide, nor day obscure it; the voices of men could not drown, the worship of Mammon could not absorb it; from above and around it gazed in on him; from sleepless depths within his being it gazed up at him, gathering all memories and fears into a gloom that might be felt. "Clouds and darkness are round about Him:" "there goeth a fire before Him, and burneth up his enemies on every side." This spectral darkness had reached him, and he knew that it scarcely veiled the Eternal Indignation. Whence could some gleam of mercy pierce it through, and somehow relieve his soul? He thought of the temple—a mercy-seat was there. But this was for the good, or for the purified. He was a publican; and, among publicans, a sinner. While in such state of mind, half-frenzied, half-benumbed, a respected neighbour passes, going to his devotions, pious, peaceful, self-content, and perhaps invites him too. Half-mechanically, perhaps, and perhaps musing on the miserable contrast which also occupied the other's mind, he follows to the house of God; but not to enter; this he could not do; and so, afar off in body, and afar

off in mind, and not daring to lift up his eyes to Him he almost feared *to see*, he smites upon his breast, and cries for mercy to the sinner. And He whose Spirit led him there, and whose sympathy had all the time been nearer than he thought, could tell that "this man went down to his house justified, rather than the other: for every one that exalteth himself shall be abased, and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted."

The two men saw different things inside, as well as outside, that temple of Jehovah. One man performed his devotions, and he saw—his devotions and himself. The other saw the Invisible, and this left him nothing else to see: in that vision himself was lost, and all that would lift itself between was utterly abolished. The one was a worshipper, but not of the Invisible. His true religion, and careful service, not being mixed with faith, became his false god—not an angel to lift him higher, but an idol to prematurely satisfy, intercept heaven's light, and mislead and deaden his aspiration after good. The other, from his very necessities, sees something farther than all this. Naked stands he, outside or inside the temple, before the indignant Father who had marked all his sin. What could he do, or whither might he fly? Into the bosom of that inevitable, unapproachable, all-jealous, and all-good, he must cast himself perforce: *for what else could he do?* And that deep mercy fails him not. In the sense of an ineffable forgiveness, he finds his momentary resting-place and lasting renovation—goes forth convinced of this, that if God be everywhere, and everywhere jealous and indignant, he is not everywhere implacable. There is mercy with him, that he may be feared, and purifying pardon, and redeeming love; and he who has been caused to feel them all, descends from the worship-temple to his home and duties in that larger Temple which Jehovah fills, relieved, forgiven, elevated, baptized into a permanent sense of his severity and goodness, His nearness, His sympathy, His help.

This I conceive to be an example of faith in the sense defined; and that it indicates, as would any well-marked case, a crushing sense of sin which gathers round some perception of mercy, and there is lost, while the sense of mercy realized takes its place, and fills and regenerates the soul—the sin being felt to be al-

together our own ; the mercy to be altogether God's ; nay, in vivid cases, to be almost or altogether God—as if the clouds and darkness that surround His throne had forced us into the direct perception of the Love which there inhabits. And if it be strictly true that “ we live and move and have our being in God,” there seems no reason to question that faith's affirmation is as strictly true. In its purity of heart it does *see* God. All our powers rest in God unconsciously ; here is one point, and about the distinctest, *where our consciousness does meet our Maker*. We are sensible of, intelligent of, our correlation with the Infinite. Through the personal gift of the Holy Ghost, “ our communion is with the Father and the Son ;” and we are made “ partakers of the Divine Nature, escaping the corruption that is in the world through lust.”

But this man *was* a sinner. True ; this is the true reason why he felt it so. Perhaps he was not a greater sinner than many others, of his own, or of other classes, who took it less to heart—perhaps not a greater sinner than this contented Pharisee. Tried by some outward standard, he may have been or doubtless was,—the Pharisee insinuates as much. But what of that celestial light which searches out and justly judges all, requiring of each according as it gave ? The Pharisee may have been exempt from grosser sins, or from that social wrong-doing to which *his* order too could condescend ; but if he had the faith of this poor publican, would he not have felt himself condemned by the first *letter* of the law ? would he not have seen himself an idolater in the house of God, defiling with false worship, both that temple to which he came to pray, and that living tabernacle wherein he had set up his abomination, to darken, poison, and pervert his very holiness and love ? And would not this have plunged him at once into just such a conflict as the publican's,—less demonstrative perhaps, but far more anguished and abiding, in proportion to his own steadiness of character and higher cultivation ?

We each bear within us a rule of right which God has given, and we each always fall short of it. Many things whisper to forget and be at ease ; but a spirit of fire from the unseen kindles into vividness both the righteousness and the transgression, and brings us guilty before God, with a deep, true, discriminating judgment.

Had the publican been the most perfect of men—had he been Paul the aged, or John the beloved, or the man after God's own heart, or Noah, Daniel, or Job, it had been all alike—the higher he had been cultured, the higher had his standard risen, and the keener and truer had been his sense of his own wrong-doing, both of omission and of act. You all remember the experience of Paul—offence or bewilderment of the calmly learned, instruction and delight of every struggling soul, who finds imaged there only his own warfare gilded with the rainbow light. Paul truly was a sinner; some of his sins are pointed out, and others might be inferred. But is it because he was a greater sinner than the most respected of his day, than Caiaphas or Gamaliel, or the best and most conscientious of his fellow pupils, that he cries out,—“Wretched man that I *am*, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” Shall we go back to the experience of David, and analyse some Psalm? David too was a sinner,—a great sinner. The world of his own day, and the world of ours, are keen to point this out. But is it because he was a greater sinner than Doeg the Edomite, or Joab the son of Zeruah, or Saul, or Jonathan, that the Church learns to breathe his burning utterance? Nay, but because, like Paul, he too was a chosen vessel, good and holy above the standard of his day. Or shall we go farther back, to the Patriarchal dispensation, and glance at its elaborated ideal, the point of whose story men seem to miss? “Consider, then, my servant Job,” says even the Upper Testimony, “a perfect man and upright, who feareth God, and escheweth evil.” Yet to this balanced righteousness God comes nearer still, and what is the result? Hardly that he sins, but truly that he knows his sin. The deep trials of life, and voices which speak from heaven, touch him to the quick, and search his being through. Wisdom and goodness comfort him in vain, and sympathy itself is maddened by what it cannot understand. “Thou chargest God unjustly,” reasons vainly the religious world. “Dost thou still retain thine integrity? curse God, and die,” shrieks wildly the love that would fain find help in suicide. “Thou speakest as one of the foolish women speaketh: Shall we receive good at the hand of the Lord, and shall we not also receive evil?” is the patience of the Patri-

arch which fails not of its reward. In due time it comes. A deeper inspiration from without and from within reveals the Infinite in nearer vision, and the sense of sin appears. "Before I heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee, *wherefore* I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes." "Curse God, and die," is the weak impulse of despair; "bless God, and live," is the patience of manly piety; "see God, and let self die" in that all-compensating, all-renewing vision, is Faith's higher righteousness, into which, through these deep waters, the prime integrity of the Patriarch has been baptized.

We set this down, then, as the prime effect of faith—self-abasement, self-renunciation, in the sense of the greatness inconceivable; and this applies to every region of the soul. In respect to religion, it is a sense of sin, of ill-desert, of moral defect and failure; taking occasion, perhaps, from some violation of God's law, but truly arising from a nearer perception of Him and the requirements of His holiness. And this, though bearing with it its own more than compensations, is always deep and real in proportion, not to the lowness, but the elevation of the character; for in that proportion rise both the standard of right and the sensibility to wrong. As long as the moral sense demands but a few occasional acts, it is not hard to satisfy, and the other powers will let it have its turn. Presently it becomes more pervading and more exacting, and it must war to win its own. But when it demands the living sacrifice of all the living powers to an ideal ever present and ever rising in our midst, then must we not cry out upon the body of this death, and cast ourselves on Him?

And here we must pause to note one unique exception in the annals of the race, if that be an exception which, by illustrating its reason, confirms or even proves our rule. The sense of sin is plainly the first correlative in morals of the sense of God, illustrated as such in every page of the Scriptures and of every Christian liturgy, and responded to by the experience of every Christian life; and it would be easy to parallel our sentiment in the inner life of every great and good man, of any nation, whose full biography has reached to us. Among good men it is in fact universal, and is plainly the counterpart of the "ambition to be

good," and measured by its intensity; just as all the other ambitions—after gold, after power, after knowledge, after fame,—expand with each attainment, possess always a greater reach and breadth, and with these a greater sense of defect and void, and crave with a more unsatisfied, because a more capacious thirst, each after its appropriate object. When they cease to do this, they cease to live. All our powers, in proportion to their vitality, develop by exercise, and strengthen by absorbing that whereon they feed; and as each higher vitality gathers into it the humbler, it absorbs their appetites as well, and points the "longing" in its own direction. Thus, as all the appetites turn our face toward the future and our back upon the past, and as the constitution meanwhile builds and defines itself, the religious ambition, the "hungering and thirsting after righteousness," as it finally takes the lead, but renders explicit the mission of the whole, and defines itself as the highest part of the universal ambition, or upward impulse of creation's life;—its sense of defect being measured by its zeal and knowledge, by the distinctness with which its finite powers discern and long for the communion of the infinite. And yet there was one finite being to whom the sense of the infinite gave no feeling of extinction; one great man to whom it gave no humiliation; one good man in whom it wrought no sense of sin.

Whatever be thought of our generalization and analysis, this fact at least is clear, that the sacred writers thus regarded the sense of sin with respect to men in general. Yet four of these writers—or shall we say, for argument's sake, if any wish it so, *many* more of these writers, and those of the plainest and least scientific, the least anxious for abstract consistency or harmonized statement—have given full biographies of one individual. They have set him before us in every mood, in sorrowing sympathy, in social converse, in indignant sarcasm¹ and fierce invective, teaching, conversing, soliloquizing, praying, uttering involuntary exclamations of suffering or of complaint; and yet there is not found in all the compass of his story one single word which im-

¹ E. g. Mat. xi., 7, sqq.; Mat. xxiii.

plies *his own acknowledgment* of a sense of sin. I speak not of sinlessness itself—this has been disputed, so let it pass for the present¹—but of that sense of moral defect which our analysis shows to be the counterpart of our aspiration after God, and to characterize in the highest degree those whom others might justly judge to be the most perfect of men; as indeed the language ascribed to God assigns it to Job himself. Had the authors of the Gospels modelled their Christ upon the ideal of the Patriarchal, of the Jewish, or of their own dispensation, as they at least read the Scriptures or approved their own experience, they would surely have included this trait; for they conceived it to be not a blemish, but an excellence, as in truth it is, in creatures generally—index and measure of the purest spiritual intensity. And their fidelity to a trait which is a refined departure from their known models and prepossessions, their latent yet burning sympathies, may well be noted among those unexpected coincidences which mark the self-consistency of truth. No simpler account will ever be given of this paradox in literature, than that these four men or forty men plainly told what they had seen and heard, and what they implicitly believed. Nor will any simpler explanation be given of the fact itself thus unconsciously recorded, than that Christ desired no righteousness, because he needed none; he felt no ill-desert or shortcoming, because he had none; he had no religious ambition, because he already possessed all good, all things in God. The light that falls upon a finite thing casts a shadow, whose gloom is measured by the luminous intensity. The finite that was here in contact with Deity cast no shadow round itself; for it dwelt in the centre of that light unapproachable, was the sun of righteousness itself, the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world.

But Christ is our Example also; at least, our Climax; the Ultimate, which should exhaust our analysis, and verify our rule. What this feature marks explicitly is that the sense of sin is not essential to religion *as such*, but is relative to some aspiring, militant, and rising grade of it; and as this is, or ought to be,

¹ See Sermon IV., Second Series.

the case with all mankind, at least in the judgment of the Christian Church, her definition of religion, as given, say in her baptismal formula, is confirmed even by the infinite she tends to, as a curve seeks to approach its asymptote. More generally, the sense of sin, like any other *feeling* of defect, marks a state in which the desires transcend either the capacity or the possession, and the "wishes" are the predominant feature in the "will,"—an unbalanced and manifestly a transition stage of being,—a state whose constant effort is to be born into something beyond our actual; what common language has named "nature," and the Church, on her higher platform, "represents" by baptism. The extremes or limits of such a state are, on the one side, that the desires be so feeble that they never overpass their actual gratification, and are in fact indiscriminated from the powers; on the other, that the ruling desires be so strong, that without effort they absorb the rest, and breathe their spirit into all the faculties; and the perfection of each, that the ruling powers be those which promote the permanent well-being. The first we see in lower nature, conversant with good and ill, but without a reflex or self-knowledge of them,—accepting its pleasure and pain, as fate or destiny, without self-approbation or self-reproach. Its perfection we imagine in "the natural man"—man before the fall—exercising dominion over lower nature, but incapable of dominion over self; unconscious of any need for, or of any obligation to it. This state of humble yet stable equilibrium man has left behind, in pursuit of a knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, whose perfection he will realize in the unseen. An image of it, however, has been exhibited—One not hungering and thirsting after righteousness like us, but whose meat and drink it was to do his Father's will; whose "self," though distinct and personal, is never in collision with the highest will—"nevertheless,¹ not my will," however pure

¹ It should be remembered that Christ's obedience and piety were *active*—"I come to do thy will;" and this also for our example—"by the which will we are sanctified." Mr. Mill is wrong (Essay on Liberty, p. 90), in thinking that *passive* obedience is either a Christian or a Bible virtue. Resignation itself is not a virtue, except so far as it is accompanied by the sense that our utmost has been done, and is being done; else it degenerates into Fatalism. The knowledge of the times, however, is reserved even from the Son—Mark, xiii. 32; and so, *to the active*, it becomes a farther part of righteousness, to wait

and holy, "but thine be done;" "the zeal of thine house hath eaten me up;" "a body hast thou prepared me; lo! I come to do thy will O Lord; I am content to do it; yea, thy law is within my heart." The first Adam had "innocence;" men in general have virtue; the Son of Man had both. The first man fell before the first temptation, trifling as it was: we battle through it as best we can, and scarce emerge, tarnished, scarred, and mutilated; while its utmost furnace could but attest His purity—"holy, harmless, undefiled," and, though the immediate expression of Heaven's sympathy with the unrighteous, "separate from sinners." To us, however, the centre of religious life is in its aspiration; our world and body have no abiding city, much less has our psychology; we seek to the Unseen; even the Gospel Beatitudes are for those the most who truest feel their need. We set down, therefore, the sense of sin as faith's first effect and prime correlative; not as being itself religion, but as its earliest index, from the very darkness of its shadow; and its "good" is that it is an engine of movement; it will not allow itself to be made an "end," nor endure the sins which cause it.

For, in assigning a high value to the sense of sin, the preacher must guard his younger hearers against a disastrous error,—one which repeats the Pharisee's self-worship without even such mitigations as it might plead. For, what he bowed down to and trusted in, was at least himself in his best phase, in the careful and conscientious discharge of his religious duties. And if this leaden image benumbed all higher aspirations, it did not degrade him below himself, perhaps rather tended to keep him to the standard that it marked. It did not at least lacerate and profane his sensibilities, and destroy his self-respect, by parading his inner nakedness before his fellows. Yet this is possible, and this takes place by a simple mistake regarding the sense of sin. What if the publican, instead of bathing it away in that untold communion,

patiently God's time; and it is on this that Christ's "temptation" hinges. The nearest approach to an impatient longing for the proper time seems Luke, xii. 49, sqq.; but this indicates no more than his *sense* of the heavy burden his patience had to bear. There seems no more pregnant line of thought, than to dwell on our Lord's refusal to teach the Greeks who had come up to the last feast, and the reflections which it leads him to think aloud and generalize, John, xii. 20, sqq. See also Note B.

and descending pure and cheerful to his house, had striven to perpetuate the feeling itself; should love it as something laudable, trust to it as something blessed and "redeeming;" nay, should dress it up in exaggerated language, and lead it out upon occasion to receive the adulation of himself and fellows; brethren would this be true religion? Would this be a sanctifying process? Would this nurture all sentiments that are modest, or manly, or pure, or delicate, or lovely, or of good report, or could they long survive it? Draw a veil, I intreat you, my younger brethren, draw a veil round this holy of your holies, if you would cherish the abiding of the pure and gentle Spirit. The sense of sin, remember, is the correlative of the sense of God; in the feeling of His presence only is it felt; to Him alone it springs, to Him is its outpouring due. Reserve the expression of it for your most secret intercourse with Him; and then, be simple—tell it in the simplest words—they will be, doubtless, strong enough. And beware of forcing it by looking at your sins,¹ reflecting on your enormities, and presenting exaggerated pictures of them to yourself, in order to produce it. This is quite alien from its genesis. Not from the sight of self does it arise, but from the sight of God. Looking at self is just that which would intercept from you, as from the Pharisee, His judging, purifying gaze. The feeling, as it does arise, will force an utterance as real and anguished as itself—a cry, not for its continuance, but for relief from its horror and wretchedness—for the burial of this body of death, and its removal from our sight.

And the Humility itself which it initiates is no mean or grovelling sentiment; it is towards God that it is felt; and the diffused and reflex sense of it is the Christian's "grace," not his de-

¹ Whatever value this process may have, in the training either of a Jesuit or of a Wesleyan, for instance, is due not to a sense of sin or a sense of God, or to any operation of *faith*, as such; it is a *legal* discipline; it is, *at best*, the obliging one, upon authority, to lash and lacerate one's inmost self. Even supposing that this has its value on occasion, and this I greatly doubt, except when the soul can feel that it is neither self nor any man who has imposed it, what does a *system* of it become? Or how could the soul sustain or compensate itself, except in a legal and Pharisaical pride, which would dry up all the fresh springs of good? "Voluntary humility," by the very force of the term, is one of the most harsh and offensive forms of "pride."

gradation—that subdued and sober dignity which rejoices with trembling to feel itself the temple of the Lord, and, projecting itself outward, truly honours all men as bearing the same image, both in their person and in their calling; with a chastened and modest estimate, then, it respects others as it respects itself, and is the basis, not of the low, but of “the becoming” in character.

Quite as obviously is faith the basis of “the truthful,” “the upright,” “the just,” “the honourable”; these are all forms of its directness and simplicity. There is here no room for subterfuge; all things are open and clear in His abiding presence; all are done, and felt, and thought of as in His sight; and uprightness, downrightness, directness, singleness of eye, and speech, and heart—in a word, “fidelity”—are its immediate and natural expression. In fact, this substitutes for “self,” not that “impartial spectator” merely, nor even that nearer “man within the breast,” to whom the philosophers bid us have regard, but something more simple and pervading, more easy and more high—to which, indeed, philosophy had reverently approached—not merely the outward ever-sense of “thou God seest me,” but the realized ever-consciousness of His in-dwelling in purity, and power, and love.

But we are moving too fast; and have already begun to view faith, not in itself alone, but in its combination with the other elements of character. We must note, then, that faith is not itself any of these virtues, much less their sum; but it is the inspirer of them all. It is the leaven of their action, the salt of their freshness, the moving essence of their energy, the greenness of their growth, the power of their productiveness. Could it die within us, then quickly were all dead. Had not our being one constant side, which ever drinks afresh from the fountain of all life, and draws up water from the stony rock, and manna from the sky, quickly were our pilgrimage exhaust. Oft are we unconscious whence our vitality ascends; our humbler being knows it not; our middle life feels after it; scarce up the summit of the mount is the explicit prophet seen, who waves the magic wand, and makes at once man’s mission and God’s mercy manifest. Then, later on, when *an end* has been attained, we can hardly hear, and scarce begin to understand, how it had been some implicit

faith¹ and hidden gospel that had blessed men all along—how, in the birth-stage of the nation,² the clouds and sea had been a baptism into Christ; and the rock that followed them, and the daily bread from heaven, were “angels’ food,” only communion they were then “able to receive” of the one true bread of life—nay, how the darker clouds and deeper sea we call the Fall of Man had also been a birth-stage³ of humanity, its infant-baptism into Law, and Sin, and far-more-abounding Grace around a first consciousness of Christ. In fact, brethren, we grow upward from below, as does all nature, as do all our powers and thoughts and words, as does all history and all destiny of man. The highest explanation will but render explicit the real principles of all.

In any well-marked feature of our character and motives, especially on their religious side, it is easy to find Faith—in Fear, in Hope, in sense of Duty, in Trust and Resignation, in Patience and Perseverance, in all noble Aspiration, and all self-denying Effort. Into all these it largely enters,—so largely, that it is easy to mistake any of them for it, as indeed is often done⁴; and then the other effects are deduced from it by slightly confused analysis, and the very pardonable paralogism of substituting the thing itself for the thing as faultily defined. But its essence lies behind them all, in the realizing vision of their common origin. Next to it, if we could imagine a perfectly innocent state of the spectator, would stand, perhaps, the attraction and reverence of *Wonder*. Next to it does stand Fear or Hope, according as disease or health predominate for the moment in the half-developed organism. With all the others a certain amount of Experience is consciously combined.

It is a graver error to confound Faith with its attachment to some “object,” such as a doctrine, a sacrament, or some external promise. For then the righteousness of faith becomes, not that pervading uprightness and love which the transforming sense of God evolves, but some measured adherence to certain stipulated terms, or a reward for complying with some [supposed obnoxious] conditions; for “receiving” some [doubtful] rite, or

¹Argument of Rom. x. ²1 Cor. x.; John, vi. 80, &c. ³Gen. iii. 22, &c. ⁴Note B.

“believing” some [doubtful] formula. As we not only grow up from below, but are led and tutored from without, all these unquestionably have their place,—in certain stages make even the most prominent and effective parts of “religion.” But religion ever feels itself imperfect and “enslaved”—“under tutors and governors”—until it is able to command, nay, until it has absorbed them. And, at their best estate, they are plainly but the righteousness of the law or ordinance,—as distinguished from the righteousness of faith, which springs spontaneous from behind their source, and ever regenerates the Law itself, and ever lifts our hope beyond its holiest utterance.

Other serious mistakes are also made—as when men would freeze Faith into a benumbed acquiescence of the intellect in some supposed “infallibility,” of some system of authority—formulated or unformulated, living or dead,—which is at best but the abrogation of one part of our nature at the supposed requirement of the rest; or when abrogating the intellect, in another form, by actively superseding it and usurping its functions, they would specialize it into some “spiritual faculty,” able to discern ideas or truths itself, exempt from intellectual criticism; or, in a still more subtle and fashionable form, dividing the things of “faith” from the things of “reason,” as independent of each other’s faculties; *neither* side, in fact, being held amenable to any aggregate judgment.¹

¹ I here class as similar what their several authors seem to think most different. But if Mr. Mansel really have some machinery, whether of “Faith” or “Revelation,” for receiving spiritual enlightenment not amenable to the best criticism of reason and philosophy, I do not see how it differs, specifically, from Mr. Newman’s “Soul,” or Mr. Parker’s “Spiritual Faculty,” or from “The Spirit” of the “Local Preacher,” who excuses me, charitably, for “not being able to discern” what he does; or how it can differ, generically, from the Infallibility of “the Church,” represented by the P. P. or C. C., or the *semper, ubique, ab omnibus* of some undiscoverable unanimity; or from the infallibility of “the Bible,” as represented by some Exeter Hall popularity, or Evangelical tradition, or by the twelve “orthodox elders,” whose “faith once delivered to the saints” keeps in godly fear the “godless reason” of the Manse. All these things have their value, I freely admit, else they would not be found among “the powers that be.” But I insist that they are all of the nature of “the law,” as contradistinguished from the “righteousness of faith, and spirit of prophecy.” Nor do I deny that Mr. Mansel has such means. I only insist on the proper classification. See Note A.

Brethren, faith is not any of our formed powers, more than it is any of our virtues; nor does it supersede or injure any. It inspires, refreshes, and sustains them all; breathes into them its own fidelity, simplicity, and force; and helps, while it requires them all to do their utmost and their best. It will combine its affirmations with the "intellect" in forming "ideas," as it will with the "emotions" in forming "sentiments," or with the more complex "judgment" in forming "opinions;" but it possesses no exemption from the aggregate judgment, as it has no separation from the aggregate well-being of the man: it is a *part*, only, of our nature; and until it can harmonize itself with all, it must be treated as a part. And there is no part which is so anxious for this harmony, and so willing to combine with all. It sees God every where, and so its vision of the invisible blends all in that almost conscious unity. *Whatever*, then, in the name of either religion or faith, declines the best scrutiny of the intellect, or shrinks from the comprehensive judgment of the whole, needs to shrink from it. Both its fear and its love of the rest should lead it to reconsider and amend those specialities which offend the body.

There is no word in the language which exactly expresses faith's action on the powers at large. Perhaps "incitement" is the best; but it belongs too much to its exciting, as "comfort" does to its sustaining influence. The best Greek word is *παράκλησις*, exhortation, encouragement, reproof, entreaty, consolation: described from the within, it is inspiration, aspiration; hunger, thirst, ambition after good; zeal to do one's best, combined with quietness, confidence, assured steadfastness, "returning, and rest," in proportion as this is done; and, underlying even the most intense and distressed struggle, a peace that passes understanding. It is the Prophet of the constitution, individual or collective, not its Priest or King—insight, leading energy, and prime impulse, true, instinctive, and discerning, rather than regular working or achieved result. Thus is it the psychologic organ of the Paraclete; and when any crisis or concentration marks their character, its functions are found identical with those of the promised Comforter; its first effect "a sense of sin," arising (2)

from the felt contact of "the Righteousness above," into which it more deeply baptizes; "judging," (3) as it proceeds, all the other powers and especially the highest—breaking down, by a severe "discriminating" action, the idols that *have* satisfied, and obliging all that would "oppose" to "get behind it," as it marshals the powers afresh, and leads them to higher war.

But these latter functions we shall see best by tracing faith in its "combination." For this some distinct example is requisite; and I chose the Publican's, as appearing sufficiently appropriate. In filling up its outline, I endeavour to add no traits which might not naturally arise, as we may see them every day illustrated. Our Lord seems to have taken the picture from common life, and any vivid example of religious struggle would exhibit similar features.

Remembering, then, that its essence is a crushing sense of sin which in time gathers round, and is lost in, some perception of regenerating mercy,—one first observes that our Lord calls this complex effect being "justified,"—using the word, as I conceive, in its purely subjective sense, to denote that achieved change of moral status—that transition step in the sanctifying process—that decided pass-over into the permanent sense of reconciliation with God, which is about as familiar a fact in religious biography as is religion itself; sometimes marked as vehemently as here supposed; often rapidly attained by persons of enthusiastic or forceful character; realized by a slower growth in a longer period by the generality of believers. Our Church almost defines the word in this subjective sense in the 13th Article, where the phrase "works before justification" is set forth as synonymous with "works done before the grace of Christ and the inspiration of his Spirit,"—that is, obviously, "the grace of Christ" as "brought home to" or realized by the individual. It is "the thing signified" in baptism and circumcision², and is often named also "regeneration," "renovation," "new birth," and latterly "conversion," or even "repentance," *μετάνοια*. The words are not so important, provided we discriminate the thing. And what is essential to bear in mind is, that the change itself is a purely

¹ John, xvi. 9, 10, 11.

² Col. ii. 11, 12, 13.

subjective one, a stage of sanctification. Nothing else is wrought either by the Spirit or by Faith. But many of the words are ambiguous; having more or less of an objective or redemption sense attached. Much controversy, as well as much necessity for it, has arisen from this ambiguity¹, and hinges on it still.

On another remark we must insist—almost too obvious, were it not sometimes forgotten. The “perception of mercy,” round which this man’s “justification” hinged, had no *explicit* connexion with Christ. Had he been asked to explain, doctrinally, the felt harmony between God’s justice and the mercy accorded him, he would probably have connected it with the services or sacrifices of the temple. The *name* of Christ, in all likelihood, would not once appear in it, nor any allusion to that Son of Man whom they knew not standing in their midst, and picturing, perhaps from before their eyes, one led by a way that he knows not, and redeemed at a cost whereof he is not aware. This “mystery” is “revealed” to us. A “type” or “veiled form” of it was sufficient for the publican. He is, therefore, to be added to the cloud or line of *examples* of the 11th Hebrews—elders who, with more or less than Abraham’s knowledge, were yet children of Abraham’s faith, and justified accordingly;—or to that other class whom our Lord describes, who will come from east and west, and north and south—from Ethiopia, and Nineveh, and Sodom—and sit down with Abraham in the kingdom, while its own children are cast out²; or to that remaining class, those in whom, when he came, “he did find faith on earth”; not in the children of the kingdom merely, though it was among them he ministered; but out around its borders too—in some Samaritan³ leper returning to give thanks, or Samaritan merchant showing pity to a Jew, or some Roman soldier entreating mercy for his slave, or some Syrophenician peasant craving compassion for her child,—among these, aliens in blood, and worse than heretics in creed, the unerring sympathy could find a faith for which his eye and heart searched Israel in vain.

¹ See Note B.

² Matt. xii. 41, *sqq.*; Luke, xiii. 24, *sqq.*

³ Luke, xvii. 16; Luke, x. 38; Matt. viii. 5; Matt. xv. 21, &c.

It may be only a question of words; but it is well to be distinct. It is clear, then, that the faith which worketh righteousness, and is accepted of God—which, believing mercy and seeking to do good, obtains what it believes—is prior to and independent of: *first*—any visible church-membership whatever;—and,—*next*—any assigned amount of doctrinal enlightenment;—in brief, of any Church or any Bible, such as we define these words. *They* minister to *it* quite as truly as it to them: they embody, enlighten, sustain, and render it productive: *it* is their antecedent in history, and their quickening power throughout. The institution of the first Church in the Father of the Faithful was so regulated, we are expressly told¹, as to render this explicit. And the Author and Finisher of our faith makes it equally explicit in regard to the new dispensation. When He spoke this parable—when He approved or disapproved the various examples of faith—His own Church was yet in abeyance. Not a word of the New Testament was written. And there was not one of even His chief Apostles who had the dimmest² conception of what is to us the elementary “doctrine” of Justification by Faith, or, at least, of its connexion with His death. The faith, then, which justified the publican, and which justifies generally, is personal or psychologic, not “doctrinal” or “ecclesiastical” faith;—not the degree of one’s light or privilege, but one’s faithful following of what he has: and its connexion with Christ is that implicit and universal one which binds all indications of God’s mercy with the “One Mediator between God and man; Who gave Himself a ransom for all, *to be testified in due time.*”

We have next to notice that this “new birth,” “renovation,” or “conversion” of the publican, was a *transition-stage*, and implies a state of comparative contentment on either side of it. Such an overwhelming sense of ill-desert could not last long. No man could bear it: it would drive to some act of madness and despair, or else would soon wear out the sensibilities, and harden and degrade the character. Nor could the succeeding rapt state of the emotions be long sustained, or healthily indulged. It would

¹ Rom. iv. 9, *sqq.*

² Luke, xviii. 81, *sqq.* See note B.

leave neither power nor zest for the appointed duties of our life. It must soon adapt itself to a lower level, in harmony with the best general state it found possible to maintain. It is, then, clearly a transition-stage; and the effect of faith before us is that concentrated exertion of the Spirit within us and without which lifts the moral standard, and the individual with it, from one vital platform to another,—a being born again of the Spirit, analogous strictly to our natural birth—that rapid stage of growth which finds or makes for itself permanently new conditions. One instance of that *step per saltum* which, I am assuming, is a patent fact in nature, pervading all her process in great and small—the birth-stage of her progeny—as obvious, perhaps, in her astronomical and geologic genesis, as in the multiplied formations and transformations of organic life; patent also in social movement, and prominent in the history of the Church—the exodus of nations, or that moral exodus we call a revolution—the calling of the patriarchs—giving of the law—consecration of the temple, or, most of all, the change of dispensations to the Church—marked and singular epochs, when religious or social energy concentrates itself around some point or line, and makes a transition spring; giving, not a new direction merely, but an altered character and permanent elevation, to the march of human kind. The crisis of one such transition—and we may suppose the greatest—we commemorate to-day; when the Pentecostal Comforter came down in power upon Jerusalem, not without an anguished struggle, and garments rolled in blood, and Judaism passed-over into Christianity. The old dispensation descended into death, and that new Church was born which has already baptized the world into no mean foretaste of His kingdom.

We have, then, *three* stages to consider both in the individual and the world—the preceding, the subsequent, and the transition-stage—of which the last-mentioned is the most characteristic, and in fact does but evolve the latent principles of all. Our whole life is one transition-stage—one pilgrimage from unseen to unseen—one educating, educating, one “being-born” from what we know not, into what we scarce know more than that it shall be some higher life above. Whatever crisis or compression will make

this most patent to our consciousness will best illustrate to us the nature of the whole; and the words which describe it, though perhaps too vehement for common use, will be themselves an embodied prophecy, and for ever preach down to us the spirit of our calling.

During the very agony of the crisis some effects will be produced unlike the usual. When the occasion is large, and demands them, they will be extraordinary or miraculous; of which the analogy¹ is, that any natural power, concentrated beyond a certain degree, will show a tendency to pass into a higher form, producing new and unlike effects, and throwing off singular scintillations around its line of chief intensity; and to such wonders of convulsed nature the wonders of higher nature naturally compare themselves. But generally its features will differ in degree only from those which mark the insensible processes of life. From their very vividness, however, they generate the language which describes their gentler analogues; and a practical fallacy lies here, for the terms are too high-pitched and angular to express "the usual," and become misunderstood and mistaken. Felt to be true in the crisis, and seen to be true in the integration of the movement, they are no longer recognized as being true in its small elements, and when applied partially become false—when applied throughout, either provoke denial, or degenerate into shallowness and cant, which produce their easy reactions. Those, for instance, who have passed sharply through such well-defined transition, speak of it always in terms which the rest of men deem extravagant or untrue. The change itself, and the means which wrought it, are in their eyes amazing, marvellous, almost or altogether miraculous; and the contrast between the preceding and succeeding states is something immense or infinite: it is a "state of nature," as opposed to a "state of grace"—of nature, in this worst sense, that it is "the creature" forgetting, ignoring, resisting "the Creator"—it is a state of "utter darkness," of "carnal-mindedness," "of wrath," "of enmity," "of death in trespasses and sins." And expressions equally extreme

¹ See Sermon II., Second Series.

describe their present participation in the "peace" and "confidence" ensuing. Now, good taste will always understate itself, and veil its strong deep sentiments as much as it fairly can. But even "the world" will pardon, or almost reverence this language in those whom it feels sincere. And then, when men remember that it is the language of the Scripture, and deliberately adopted in Church formularies as applicable *always* to us all, even the careless will occasionally feel the impressiveness and authority with which it "doth represent unto us our profession"—"to die *daily*" "unto sin, and rise again unto righteousness, *continually* 'mortifying' all our evil and corrupt affections, and daily proceeding in all virtue and godliness of living." Nor is it hard to comprehend definitely within their statement *all* the stages of our life. They, on one hand, who most sincerely denounce the state of nature will always be the freest to confess that it deserves the denunciation *only in proportion* as it had really resisted the state of grace; as it had been truly made cognizant of the Better, and had consciously refused it. "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world; and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil"—the responsibility being proportioned to the light, and the condemnation to its refusal. "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin, but now have they both seen and hated both me and my father"—the sin being according as they had seen and hated. More generally—"By the law is the knowledge of sin:" for "sin is the transgression of the law:" but then it must be "the law," not merely as written on two tables, or printed in some book that we have never seen; nor "the law" as understood and preached in Jerusalem, or London, or New York; but the law as brought home fairly by God's providence and grace to the knowledge of the individual. Or, most generally, "He shall convince the world of sin"—"of sin, because they believe not in me"—in ME, that is, not in some doctrine-formula—not in some true or untrue statement *about* me, not known before, not formulated even then perhaps, perhaps not formulated yet—but of myself—of ME:—*me*, in whatever veiled or fragmentary form—in whatever vague, yet real intimation, "I and my Father" have been pleased to send of that "true

light which lighteth *every* man that cometh into the world"—that best true light of each, each either obeys or disobeys: his fellows may mistake; but there is always One who knows, and He alone is judge.

The state of grace, again, into which a more select number have been lifted up, is it a state of security and content? Is it enough for its participants to abandon the former sins, adopt the new habits and forms of speech, make themselves "at ease in Zion," and bless God that they are not as other men are? Fain is the religious world in every age, and fain its strictest sect, thus to persuade itself; and fain to call its shibboleth and form of good the righteousness of faith. But is it not just such as these that the half-clothed prophet will see through, and Christ's sword of divisions sweep from end to end?

Brethren, judgment always begins at the house of God, and searches close and far. We divide things into classes as best we can. But our demarcation is rude: different lines of classification cross each other, and our marks mislead ourselves. Every social aggregate, "world," Church, or section of a Church, subdivides itself naturally into certain grades, each with a class ideal, a standard of speech, and thought, and practice, congenial to itself. Into some one of these classes every man is born; and being taught its "truth," and trained in its observances, finds it just as easy to comply with its religious as with any other of its requirements, and finds it just as natural. This is that individual's "state of nature"—baptized or unbaptized—circumcised or not. In proportion as the class ideal is high, and has been wisely taught him, has he been highly favoured, and may grow in grace and in favour with God and man. But life itself is not level, especially the higher life "that true light" gives. In proportion as any one is touched by it, he is little at ease in this state of nature: he must find better. First, with a modest and reverent earnestness, he learns all he can, and does what he is taught. Presently he has exhausted the class ideal in whole or in part, and begins to read it out beyond itself into higher senses and more exacting requirement. When he finds this no longer possible, he must, after some keen struggle, pass it by, and either

try some other existing ideal, or make one for himself. Throughout the whole of the progression, *so far* as he had been true to himself and to the highest light God gave, he had been led by the Spirit of God, and his righteousness was the righteousness of faith. Wherever he had swerved from it, for whatever reason, he has "resisted" grace, and "received to himself damnation." Few indeed are so graciously dealt with as to be led equably up this ascent. But if one were, his whole course had been one state of grace. Generally—among religious men—one deep transition¹ marks their course: sometimes violently—most often silently, and *then most happily* passed through: when they have come to feel the inner sense of what they have been taught; or when, if their time and circumstances need, they have been obliged to break it through, and find or make some other.

But even without tracing the individual, and taking the classes as they stand, he who remembers that there is but one Father, and one Son, and one Holy Ghost, and that *of Him*, and *to Him*, and *through Him*, are *all things*; and that *He is like*

¹ Even to the perfect this transition seems a law. In Christ it is represented by the Temptation; when, having passed perfectly through childhood, boyhood, and the life of a private man, "fulfilled all righteousness" at John's Baptism, and received the Upper Testimony thereto, he is "led out by the Spirit into the wilderness," to initiate his higher calling by a crisis-conflict. And a still deeper trial, conflict, and transition, closes his ministerial "pilgrimage." Viewing Christ as the concentration-type of humanity, the period before the Temptation represents man before the Fall. The second Adam has up to it the same innocence that the first Adam had—that is, the perfect balance of the direct spontaneous powers: but in the second Adam the powers themselves are so far different, and the higher powers, intellectual and moral, possess such pervading predominance, that the equilibrium is stable—the balance is not disturbed by temptation. Adam and Christ, then, have a certain likeness; only the first lost in weakness what the second retained with power. This difference is unmistakeable, whether or no we connect it with a supposed spiritual development of mankind, carried on through the intermediate dispensations, and now, in the fulness of time and of preparedness, rendering a higher type of humanity pertinent and available. How far the direct and spontaneous life of Christ was "unconscious" or "unreflex," we cannot tell; but these are the words which would express it of others—say of Joseph or Samuel in early life; or, perhaps, of Job up to the time of his temptation. The after or reflex life begins with self-denial in deference to authority. This appears early in Christ's life, as in his "going down and being subject to" his parents, *after* he had shown his consciousness of "My Father's business." It is brought to a crisis in the Temptation, and again in the garden. Its perfection is sustained and pervading *self-surrender*—not merely or chiefly *pas-*

Himself in all places of His dominion : will know that all His gifts must bear the impress of the Giver—must comprise all in one scheme of Providence, and find them analogous and close akin. “The state of nature,” then, in its wide theologic sense—that “into which every man is born”—is but God’s lower “gift,” a lower state of “grace.” The state of grace—that into which “ye must be born again”—is but the state of higher “nature,” a higher “being-born.” The same discriminating severity and goodness sustains and rules them both: the same Spirit of Life animates them both, dispensing as he will; leading men through law, and sin, and grace, and higher law, and deeper sin, and far more abounding grace, into the nearer consciousness and higher image of God. In each many are called, and few chosen; but they who are most penetrated with the spirit of the first will soonest rise into the second; and they who have most absorbed the spirit of the second will the deepest feel its transition-character, and groan within themselves, waiting for some higher adoption and redemption of the body. The difference is, that in

sively [this is the perversion “fatalism”], *but actively*. Christ comes not to submit to, but “to do thy will, O Lord.” And it is by *this* will we are “sanctified.” Nationally, the pre-temptation state is the Egyptian, or pre-Mosaic stage, from which they pass into the learning of reflex righteousness through a transition-crisis, often described in the same language as Christ’s, or as the individual Christian’s; and they seem as much alike as “the national” and “the individual” can be. The distinctive effort of the Pentecostal, or post-Judaic dispensation, is to inspire the Sanctification-machinery with the first-fruits of life and immortality; not looking back, but looking forward, to *our own* coming of the Lord.

In applying the word “type” to any of these things, people sometimes seem to think that they explain away, or escape from the *literality* of the facts themselves. With such, I need not say, I have no sympathy. Such types would be no types, but mists or falsehoods. Naturalists call a “type” any form that is perfect in its grade. So far the language of these Sermons, and what I conceive is the language of Scripture, agree with them. But there is, besides, a pervading Analogy in Nature, from her lowest to her highest: so that any perfect form and its history will “parable” multitudes of other things both above and below itself. A distinct reference to this analogy is always *included* in our use of the word type, exact *literality* on all sides being supposed. In the same sense, the word “allegory” is used by St. Paul; and I have occasionally done the same, when I thought it could not be misunderstood. The *basis* of allegory, type, and parable, when justly used, is the *literality* of their humblest sides—their *power*, as Sermons, depends on how closely they depict the key-processes of nature.—See the Second Sermon of the Second Series.

this higher state there is a higher life evolved: not a more peaceful life—far from it—intenser in its sin, as in its blessedness; but, on the whole, higher, purer, better, more firm in its apprehension of the Unseen—more quenchless in its hungering after righteousness—in its thirst for the waters that well beneath the throne. And this life, simply because it is higher, *assumes* the headship, demands the allegiance, exacts the regard and reverence of all that it can reach: and because it is a breath of pure and holy love, it calls on all to follow where it leads, and denounces with all its indignation every one who disregards its voice. That men do hear and heed its call, are sensitive to its Better, all unseen and only hoped for though it be, and unable to resist its attractiveness, once it makes itself be felt, is the elementary operation of Faith.

And this renders explicit what is always assumed *somewhere* in any definition or treatment of faith—ITS PROGRESSIVENESS—the connexion between its “Unseen” and its “Hoped-for”—the function men always assign to it, of turning our face *towards the future* in Expectancy and Effort. True, it is too much the habit to attach this expectancy of faith to some definite external Threat or Promise. These are truly needed both in temporal and spiritual education; but they belong to an early stage of culture, and the “heir” is expected to outgrow them—not that they ever cease to be literally true, but that “the constant fear and love of God’s holy Name” absorbs them, reduces them to a subordinate place, or is willing to leave them altogether out of view—seeks first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, let what may be added. “Though he slay me, yet will I trust him;” “Whom have I in heaven but Thee: and there is none on earth I desire in comparison with Thee;”—until such as these are reached, love is imperfect, and fear is mean; the heir of all things still needs the treatment of a slave. In any case, however, faith looks forward and upward, and calls religion on. Even those who dislike a gradual progressiveness, or who even insist upon degeneracy, admit the hopeful attitude of things upon the whole; for they limit the degeneracy to certain periods and conditions,

and look for mighty changes and eternal discriminating compensations, ending *somehow* in the triumph of the good.

Without this progressive and creative element, faith itself were fatalism—without the hope, it were trembling and despair. Including them, faith becomes the highest angel and energy of life; and it seems possible to show that even in the past and present of creation there is no general degeneracy, except that whereof faith itself is the correlative and compensation;—that as the natural decays, the spiritual is renewed, and renewed at *its* expense, by gathering in to itself the vigour and fatness of the natural. God has not to wait for great transitions in order to show his love and power. His judgments *are* in the world, and His Spirit and His kingdom too. The same principles that will rule, rule; and we have only to sum up a result to determine the *character* of the moving elements, and discern that the death we die daily, nay, hourly, instantaneously, truly sustains or generates a higher life. You are, doubtless, aware that this is true in the minuter physiology¹; but it is also palpable to common observation both in the individual and in the world. Who does not notice that, as life runs on, the mental powers predominate and exhaust the natural? and who that grows in grace does not feel himself progressing on the whole, however it be with his inferior self? Who can doubt that the aggregate Christian Church, with all its faults, is a higher organism than the Jewish? or who will deny that the cities, nations, churches, Bibles, which now mainly constitute the vital activities of earth, are a vast advance upon the gigantic Animation of the Lias, or the Vegetation of the Coal? Brethren, God is Creator; He “causes things to grow”—to grow upward from below—upward, into the nearer consciousness of self and Him; and Faith, with all that it engenders, but stands, or rather works, *creates*, at the head of this progression. God always makes his creation to create; and ever

¹ As in vegetable or animal *growth*, for instance, or in *nutrition* generally. It is not by simple addition that vital products grow—at least any above the lowest. The small elements are continually being broken and worked up into higher forms. By insensible *transformation of tissues* animals and plants are “formed.”

to create the better—the last to be the heir of all the ages; the successor to be the superior; the Son to be the Lord. Faith is conscious that it is called to fellow-work with Him; and doubly conscious of the forward spirit that animates his work.

It is, perhaps, only another mode of saying this, to note that Nature's ambition ever tends to better itself *in kind*. Each form of it will first make great exertion to gratify itself on its own plane; but as soon as it discovers a higher, it will freely sacrifice all to gain it. This seems, indeed, the nature of Life as such, from its humblest *vires vivæ* up; and round this its apparent paradoxes, and the destructive distillation of its crucible, explain themselves away. The Physical Forces seem correlated¹ by this law, the large rude "motions" refining themselves ever more and more, until the fact that they are "motions" passes beyond our ken, and is only inferred from their analogy: thence they pass into the physiologies, emerge into consciousness in the "emotions;" into morality in the deliberate "motives;" all, I, for one, believe, following the same law, up to the highest "godly motions" which "the same Spirit" operates. And con-natural with the "forces" are their "products," the formations and transformations their processes evolve, from the heavens His Spirit garnished, or the fluid atmospheres He moves, up to the churches he has built, the Bibles and men he has "inspired." Indeed, there seems ground for surmising that all "motion"² itself is the correlative of a formation or transformation, in which

¹ Groves,—Correlation of Physical Forces. (See Lecture No. I.)

² Animal motion, for example, is produced by the "combustion" of certain elements of the formed tissues; *others*, both muscular and nervous, being formed to take their place; formed ultimately out of the *food*; and the general effect of the organic change is to develop the nervous at the expense of the sanguine—the sanguine at the expense of humbler organic compounds, and so on, down to the inorganic—a just proportion in this development being essential to health. Our opportunities of observing physical motions are so partial, that except where *friction* limits and changes them, it is not in our power to predicate any particular result;—but whoever ponders over what is known of the past physical history of our Planet, in connexion with such views as Mr. Groves gives us of its forces, will be apt to believe that the movements of its winds and tides, for instance, are as truly correlated with its history and present estate as the circulation of our blood is with ours, and so down to minuter movements.—See First Sermon of Second Series, and Notes.

something newer and better is always made out of prior product, and part of the force passes up into a higher form; part of the force and product being degenerated, and left behind, to be presently taken up and carried on by subsequent waves of Power. So that Nature is continually "being born" into a higher life—continually refining and defining herself into the more concentrated and conscious, at the expense of the more diffused and bulky, and less conscious form and force. But however this be as a universal statement, the law is certainly true in respect to ourselves, and those large processes which approach ourselves.

Observe, for instance, how vegetation greedily absorbs whatever it can digest, and then patiently pours out its plenty at the feet of animated nature;—observe how the higher forms of animated, and especially of human life, complacently consume the animal abundance, though, with what seems at first a hypocritical delicacy, concealing the process from themselves;—observe how each highest "world" in science, in religion, and in taste, will mercilessly subdue and sacrifice whatever offends itself;—and observe how, in each, even that counter and more rude progressiveness which "the prophet" symbolizes, while truly ministering to each of those worlds, as he wars among them, will, in his own fashion, do the same—denounce, and sometimes sacrifice in turn, and, at all events, will sacrifice freely his own part therein, and all his lower self, in worship of the higher good he sees. And, on the whole, this process of ever "living into" a higher life at the expense of the lower, is what men always approve and love the most: so that it is always the highest *love* that will most firmly say—"Whosoever will come after me, and hateth not"—aye, literally *hateth*, if hate be requisite—"his father and mother, and sister and wife, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." We all *do* this every day and hour; we cannot live without it. The meanest ever sacrifices his mean "goods" to his own mean ideal;—and this is, after all, the salt of his poor swinishness—the best morality and only religion that he has. Higher up, in proportion to our vigour and nobleness, all we sought and cherished is proudly, feelingly, and not without some consciousness of God, laid down on the altar of home,

of country, of honour, or of some still holier name. The war-horse snorts his fire, and "says, Ha ha, and laughs at the snapping of the spear," or the roar of the artillery; and the noble youth who sits him calm and firm, and feels the softest memories of the home he left, or of the home he hoped for, to nerve his battle zeal, and inspire his soldier sense of Duty with some deep tinge of Heaven's approval too—directs he not both steed and rider the way that both should go? And when, with cool frenzy, they rise above themselves in an almost enjoyment of the fray, and, if need be, pour out all at once in one red gurgling stream, what do they both but compress into one half-hour the real principles which permeate their veins? The educated blood of fourteen or forty generations sends them there, so naturally, to die, and adds one undegenerate item to its Honour and its Love. And as, in a longer, higher battle-field, magnanimity bows itself to learn and do what only greatness can, and with Catholic heart and giant industry is fain to toil unseen, and, in the sense of its own shortcoming, hide from the one hand what the other does:—peradventure it may follow footsteps well beloved, and leave some fruit behind;—what could some providential publicity and martyr's crown for such a soul, but concentrate into an easy climax the common life he lives? To that man Eternity is a present thing: "He *hath* eternal life, and that life is in His Son." To it is devoted all he has and is. He is crucified with Christ, and behold he lives. He is dead, and his life is hid with Christ in God. Self-sacrifice, that is, the sacrifice of the lower self to the continual higher—of the past and present self to the ever rising better—is his very Spirit of Life. And in him is seen what works unconsciously in others, that "He who saves his life loses it; and he who loseth it saves it to life eternal."

With regard, then, to morals and the *movement* of life, our principle is clear. The vision of the Unseen is the organon of progressiveness and hope;—and faith's vision thereof is but the explicit seeing of what had worked less consciously below. It is easy to show the same in what seems even the *stationary* side of life—that which throws us out on each present platform of great-

ness and enjoyment. Take, for instance, the æsthetic in all its forms. What is the word or spirit of its genesis? This same sense of the Unseen, and our attraction to it, in some conviction of its surpassing excellence. On the physical basis, perhaps, of its outcomprehending the visible in every way that we can measure or conceive, we feel it to "transcend" in every sense, and keep ever building up its loftier ideals, towards which we ever project our highest self by the mere outward impulse of our spontaneity. We do this, not merely on the whole, but in every most fragmentary effort of our production and enjoyment. We can see nothing, hear nothing, but in the very seeking to comprehend and to admire, without a thought of criticism, we *somehow* throw ourselves into its beyond. As truly as our bodily and mental vision run out to the invisible—led first, perhaps, by simple curiosity—so truly do all our powers outrun all objects that they find, and lose themselves, and love to lose themselves, in the half-seeking some unfound excellence. Often, too, they see in part, and then they toil to appropriate and embody it, and ever partially succeed; but, in the effort, the powers are generated which ever pass the past, and in the hoped-for¹ only are at home. This vague Invisible that bears us in its bosom looks in on us at every pore, and draws our being out on every side into its Beautiful, and True, and Good; and, long before we know or notice it, has already baptized our soul and body into the communion of the One Constant Envelope and Ever-present Centre of it all.

How suicidal is it, then, in any analysis of our life, practical or theoretic, to attempt excluding the invisible² as such, and our attraction to it! This would slay, not religion merely, but humanity itself. Up to a certain level we might "imitate," as also does the brute. The highest visible should be our god. The

¹ There is a story told of Thorwaldsen, the sculptor, that a friend, seeing him one day dejected, asked the cause. "My genius is decaying," said he. "What do you mean?" "Here," answered the sculptor, "is my statue of Christ. It is the first of my works with which I ever felt satisfied. Until now, my idea has always been beyond what I could execute. It is no longer so. I shall never have a great idea again."—*North British Review*, No. 68.

² See Note C.

brute has something still above, so he may still progress. Man's highest present self must be a finality to him. Hope, ambition, aspiration, consciousness of calling and of mission, for him are at an end. Humanity becomes an Atheist, and is extinct. But because it is not so—because God has made us sensitive of Him, even where He shrouds His face,—because man finds everywhere in good and ill something that whispers more, and finds even on the level an ideal everywhere to surpass his actual—an ideal that grows beneath his vision, till it carries him out beyond his mental firmament, and draws his deep aspiring thitherward, and causes him to wander and to wonder there in some felt contact with what not eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor heart of man conceived, and ever brings him back again from that third heaven, striving to whisper what he saw;—therefore is man no Atheist: God has made us in a higher image; and therefore is man a man. And thus again our hope and calling read themselves out to us even from the speechless adulation of the brute; and our own religiousness defines itself again as but the explicit pointing of the universal ambition or upward energy of Creation's Life,—religiousness, though it but seek to that cold ideal which Science, or *Æsthetic*, or Theology can feel,—much more, religiousness, if it be in that intenser realm where Heart and Conscience live, and Duty, Power, and Passion wrestle, and all with Reverence, and Fear, and Hope, and holy Love, conspire.

True, in its humbler stages, this aspiration was not conscious of itself: it was not, therefore, the less direct or true. So far as it did its duty, its God rewarded it unknown—enabled it to surpass itself, and blessed it as it did. True, in its middle region, it oft mistook itself and Him; and always its God chastised it for the same—gratified its wish, perhaps, and sent leanness withal into its soul. True, in the best of men, generally, it is but a latent and half-conscious force; and in the generality of men it is so indistinct, that they need help to enable them to express it, and barely recognize its broader forms when said for them by Church or Bible. It is a most real and growing force, notwithstanding; and though ignorant and easily misled, a deep and powerful incitement to all good.

And, brethren, after all, who does "know" God, or who can utter that unutterable Name? Can we? False gods can easily be conceived, comprehended, and defined; but is it not always the highest religion which knows THE UNKNOWN to be God? Does any of us believe that our highest "image of the invisible God" is other than our *image* of that Unknown?—our highest conception of God other than our "concept" of the Inconceivable?—our truest definition than our defining of the Indefinable? or that the highest WORD that could declare Him were other than some uttered word OF God? Then do we worship, NOT GOD, but some small god or gods—some idol of the hands, or head, or heart, which it needs Faith to see beyond, and the Paraclete to judge.

And here appears the relation of Faith to Worship: for faith seeks *to God*—worship serves around *some image of God*. These things are not opposed; there is no "contradiction," at least, between them, but the strictest Analogy; else could not the one be in any sense an *image* of the other. The Invisible "transcends" the visible, not in the sense of "contradicting," "violating," "negating" it; but simply by surpassing it beyond measure both in degree and kind. The infinite is still more "positive" than the finite. It comprehends all positives, and out-comprehends their real and apparent contradictions. True, it is undefinable; because it is too large for us, or for any creatures to define: "incomprehensible," for it is too great for creatures to "grasp round." We are finite; we must be content with parts. Whatever is beyond the parts we can grasp is vague to us, and is intended to give to us that vague reverent wonder, fear, and love, which underlie religiousness. But we have no firmer conviction than that the parts are true parts *of the whole*, partially expressing its principles; and that the whole is the true likeness and actual manifestation of the most positive and firm of all conceivables, *if any one* were able to conceive it,—the I AM THAT I AM. There are who write differently from this; and there is no point on which it is more requisite to be distinct. I therefore repeat—the Infinite is neither the contradiction of the finite nor its negation, but only its transcendent analogue,—

transcendent in transcendent ways both of degree and kind ; yet so as to leave each finite a differential of it, on whatever plane it has attained ; just as our own *present* time, a certain unit composed of past and future, is a differential¹ and a likeness of the *ever-present*, the “eternal now.” Even were they contradictions, it were a paralogism in us to say so ; for the affirmation could not be *logically* made without our first making “the infinite” a “term,” the “inconceivable” a “concept.” But they are not contradictions—God forbid. We see darkly, in parts ; but we are firmly persuaded those parts were intended to reveal to us the true nature of the whole and of Him it manifests, so far as we can bear it. And we refer those parts to a certain centre, whereby alone we can either understand or *notice* them—ourselves, *His image*. There surely can be no stronger affirmation of analogy than this.

Towards the *inconceivable*, then,—inconceivable, simply from its surpassing greatness ; never to be *comprehended*, but only *apprehended* by creation,—towards this positive and real inconceivable faith aspires, and at times obtains glimpses which more than satisfy *it*, and leave behind a continual sense of the unseen. But worship is more steady and prosaic. It is not the prophet, but the priest. Its function is to assemble the powers generally, and especially the humbler powers, and embody their action in sustained religion around a leading line. These require, obviously, a definite object—an object by no means too distant, else could they not reach it, or be assimilated. And faith sees this with acquiescence—nay, it will command it. It sees God always, everywhere, and commands all things to worship Him ; each with all its best. But it requires that they shall worship *Him*, and not the things themselves. So it always stipulates for *two conditions in the object of worship* : *First*. It must be always the best—not only the best conceived, but the ever-ascending “best-conceivable.” *Next*. It must always be viewed in reference to the inconceivable beyond, so as to carry on the regards to it.

These conceded, faith will endorse worship with all its dependencies—will underlie, embrace, and rise above it ; inspire it,

¹ Note A, 4, p. viii., *sqq.*

and lead it on. And this is legitimate, and the only legitimate worship—centre and expression of Embodied Religion.

True, that *to* which worship is directed is some *object*—some “idea” or “image,” εἶδος, or εἶδωλον. So that in a certain sense Mr. Carlyle may truly say that “all worship is idolatry, and the worst idolatry only more idolatrous.” But surely there is little wisdom in applying this harsh term to the worship faith approves. Reserve we it for that which faith condemns; and it finds plenty to condemn. For worship is often content with itself and its εἶδωλον, even when it should not be. It and its priest are often willing to make their “truth” a finality, admire their past, stereotype their present, and view even progress as degeneracy. Then faith becomes a fierce Iconoclast,—the more it loves, the more it will denounce. It will die, or it will lead on;—nay, Prophet ever, it will die, that it may lead on, and teach from cross or sepulchre. Severe and searching, then, is its assize as it judges among the gods; and there are first last, and last first, among them, as among their worshippers. To the carving of Phidias or Praxiteles it will prefer some very modest altar of the people’s sacrifice. To many an elaborate form or formula that once was living oracle—to many a prince of the Apostles, now become a prince of this world, will it say, “Get thee behind me, Satan, thou art an offence to me.” In many a reed shaken with the wind it will discern the spirit and power of Elias;—in many things and persons, nearly as despised and rejected as their Master, it will discern the little ones of Christ. “For judgment,” like Him, does it “come into this world, that they who see not might see, and that they who see should be made blind.” Who is it that will accept *its* insight, and follow on with it? Who is it that will, if need be, give up all and follow it?—all, temporal, ceremonial, doctrinal, if need be—and “go out, not knowing whither he goeth”? Nothing else is of faith—nothing else is of Abraham, or of Christ, or can be its disciple. Easy to speak of, brethren—very hard to live. But let us more definitely apply its two conditions.

First, then, all *dead* images, graven, molten, or *conceived*, faith distinctly disallows: these are no fit image of God. *We*

are His offspring. To something *living* "we should believe the godhead to be like." For this reason Judaism excluded all manner of similitude, and gradually abolished such from the worship of the people. But later on they set up mental images, and worshipped them;—their national call, their Biblical system, their doctrinal system, their ceremonial system, all became so many deities, to which they bowed them down, and said, "Save me, for thou art my god." All venerated finalities—all dead infallibilities, immobilities, immutabilities—all unliving inspirations, revelations; "the letter" and "the form" as such, would do well to remember the example. The letter and the form, when justly held and used, are still, as they always were, among the most necessary and most precious gifts of the Spirit. Without them there would be, practically, no Spirit: they are the ministrations of the Spirit. But we must keep them ministries, not make them lords; revere them as ministering spirits, not conjure them into "evil angels among us," or false gods. And when, sometimes, in our well-meant gratitude, we would bow down to any of them, whichever is God's highest angel will most distinctly say, "See thou do it not; for I am thy fellow-servant, and of thy brethren the prophets, and am sent to minister unto thee."

Let, then, these lofty messengers remember that they are Apostles, and let them preach, "the kingdom of heaven is at hand;"—let them forget finality, and turn their face towards the coming Better—the gentle, resistless Better, which will be always born among themselves, and be a babe at first, and will receive at their hands nurture and admonition, and always look to them for the true bread of life;—let them always expect this better, and love and worship it, and call it Joshua and Lord. Lowly, always, comes the first-begotten into the world: let all the angels worship Him; and let the truest know Him first.

What, then, is a just image? What will faith allow? The only living image of God we know is man. To man we must render whatever service—*through* man whatever worship we would pay to God. Religion can but inspire Humanity,—Humanity can but project *itself* towards religion. "Himself and his neighbour"—this is the highest that any man can serve, whe-

ther he remembers God or not. And he that loveth not the seen, how loveth he the unseen? "Honour all men," and "love all men," "heartily as unto God." "He that loveth Him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of Him." "He that receiveth you, receiveth me; and he that receiveth me, receiveth Him that sent me." "Inasmuch as ye did it, or did it not, to these little ones, ye did it not to me." Our faith must live itself into works; our duty to God, into our duty to our neighbour. Even when it seems to command differently, as when particular things must be sacrificed to some aggregate or ideal, as to country or Church, this is only as some higher organon of good to those they comprehend. To sacrifice any living thing to any dead idol or ideal whatever, is, in the eye of faith, the climax of idolatry.

But this "all men" is large and vague; it sounds of that "aggregate Humanity" which philosophers love, and universal philanthropists are always regenerating on a sudden. Faith, however, sees farther than all this, and renders its loving energy *positive* and productive by bringing it to a point. "Thou shalt love God with all thy soul;" this is the first and great command; and the second is *like*, namely, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"—just regard for self being presupposed. And who is my neighbour? asks the doctor of the law, anxious to "justify" himself in the presence of a calm searching eye. "Your neighbour," replies the story in a homely truism, is simply "your neighbour"—your individual neighbour—the person near you—the person nearest you—that portion of aggregate humanity with which God brings into contact, ever so casually, your power to help; and your duty to your neighbour is that portion of your Universal Philanthropy *which you can specialize into act*.

In this "defining" of vague good into positive productiveness lies the function of "religion," and its assimilating power; and herein lies its own assimilation to all true productive powers. It brings the rudimentary capacity to a point, passes it into a new *form*, and round that line multiplies its good.

Thus, practically, younger brethren, notice, Faith defines the love of God into the love of man; and the love of man into the love of those near us—of those nearest us; and who are they?

remember always, brethren, those in your own home! First, "Honour thy father and thy mother"—first and simplest "nearness," and nearest image of our relation to the sky; first commandment of the second table; first commandment with promise; source of all the social evolution; sole well-spring of its good. Observe it in letter and in spirit, brethren, "that thy days may be long in the land, in *every* land, which the Lord thy God giveth thee." And, Fathers, remember you, too, that God visits still the sins of the fathers upon the children, aye to the third and fourth generation; and in other worlds than this. True, it is only *through* sanctification and culture that He will visit them. But what is there, brethren, that does not depend on *them*?

And Faith's method with "worship" is the same. It makes us crave to worship; then leads us half consciously to the right object, and beyond it; and *then* enables us to describe the process. True, the object will be anthropomorphic; and will, in fact, be "man." We cannot help this. We know no higher. But faith insists it shall be the best—the best conceived; the best conceivable. So we are carried out at once to an ideal Man, or an ideal Humanity. Philosophers also can see this, and can lead us to the vague; but, unable to bring us back, they are apt to lose themselves and us, and presently to shut their eyes on the realities of things, and be content with the "reality" of "knowledge." Here again faith and nature divide for them their infinite; gather the bewildered seeking into positive productiveness; and round some first-born of every creature create anew from chaos. Faith sees God everywhere—in the humblest "matter" as in the highest "knowledge;" and commands all the powers to worship Him,—not, however, until it has, historically, provided an altar whereon to combine their offerings, and make them partaker of their sacrifice. Scarce had "the man become as one of us, to know good and evil"—scarce had humanity been born into the consciousness of spiritual things, before it was made conscious that it bore in its womb—in the womb of the family and of the wife—that SEED round which its aspirations grew, and whose Hope was already sanctifying all. Already in its living

light does the Woman become the Wife—the Wife, the “Mother of all living.” The house becomes the Home, and the Family the Church, not without a Sacrament in the centre of its Happiness; and Society, ere it left its primal Paradise, had already bowed, wondering, round some Infant Christ. In its widest diffusion and degeneracy, this prime impression of Emmanuel—of God *somehow* present in Humanity—has never left the human breast.

Let men explain it how they will, the human race originated *somewhere*. And to about the place assigned, its main sections can even now be traced. From its cradle, then, it brought down this; and each large successive wave brought with it a distincter notion of the Hope that hung around its origin. For Providence left it not to be diffused in mist. Round a sustained family line, with not unsuitable concomitants, which rendered that family the undenied source of the Religion of the world, the promise of this Seed is ever more and more defined, until, in no unsuitable time and in no unsuitable form, at least so we believe, God’s sympathy with Man in all his good and ill—God’s actual *presence* in human life and *death*—embodied itself in that perfect Son of Man whom we can love and worship—whom we can love and follow, aye, to beyond the grave. For, behold, lest we should rest in any Seen, or believe in any created finality, and so slay even in our thought that constant aspiration to the Unseen, this ideal man has been removed from sight—removed, not merely as all men are—removed, but not until he had impregnated the human conception, both in intellect and hope, with a new ideal, which bears the same relation to humanity now that the prior implicit Christ bore to mankind before Pentecost; not until he had brought life and immortality to light, and made Himself seen and felt as the resurrection of the dead; nay, not until He had exhibited in His own person, both before and after His crucifixion, some gleams of that resurrection-glory into which we also shall be transfigured and transformed. This is the image, εἶδος, or ideal of the Christian Church; not something which brings us out into the philosophic vague, and leaves us there vainly clutching some misty concepts of partial “perfect men,”

or some still more metaphysical non-entity of an aggregate manhood; but an actual son of man, who passes through all our life, endorsing all its honest callings, and challenging throughout both our tenderest and our manliest sympathies; and who then makes himself the visible and tangible first-fruits of that future life to which, in spite of all our sins, and in spite of all our refinements, we ever intensely aspire. This is our best; our real and our best; our best conceived; our best conceivable; our best, that ever carries us out beyond itself into the Inconceivable of all.

And this is no new discovery of the nineteenth century, nor was it a new discovery in the first. It was then, indeed, more defined and declared, and thence diffused; and is now, doubtless, better understood than in former days. But it is the real hope and thought that humanity ever carried in its bosom; and whatever prophet or poet would most distinctly tell it out, would also most distinctly tell it home to the heart of every man. And men have said it long ago. Paul's or John's most balanced statement,—“Beloved, now are we the sons of God; and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that when he doth appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is”—what, after all, but definiteness does it add to the faith of the Jew a thousand years before—“But, as for me, I will behold thy presence in righteousness, and when I awake up after thy likeness, I will be satisfied with it”?—and does it even add much definiteness to the faith of the old patriarch—“I know that my Redeemer liveth; and that He will stand in the latter day upon the earth: and though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God; whom I shall see for myself, and mine eye shall behold, and not another”? True, we use these living words with a more full intelligence than those who heard them first, perhaps than those who spoke them. Else had all farther revelation been for nought, Christ's Paraclete been useless, and God's creation standing still; but are they not in substance, and in moral force, the same as the most definite truth we have? Again, these were but individuals—very singular individuals—the “great occasional prophets” of old days.

True, but this is just the distinguishing feature of the dispensation Pentecost initiated. The old times had a great occasional prophet, who stands out colossal as we look back. Our times have a diffused and pervading *spirit* of prophecy—the Paraclete who had inspired them all. “For this is that,” says St. Peter—“*this* is that which was spoken by the prophet Joel; and it will come to pass in the last days, saith God, that I will pour out of my Spirit upon *all* flesh. Your sons and your daughters shall prophesy; your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams: and on my servants and on my handmaidens will I pour out of my Spirit, and they shall prophesy;” that is, not barely predict, but have that vivid sympathy, or communion with God and things, which gives insight always, and ready instinctive act; and gathers itself into true foresight and surprising power, as the conjuncture and need demand. And this Spirit of prophecy, not the temporary endowment of a few, but the inheritance of all:—“Repent, therefore, and be baptized,” continues Peter, “for to you is the promise, and to your children, and to as many as are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call.” More compressed, indeed, and overpowering in the crisis—more demonstrative of violent and singular effects,—yet still only the crisis-demonstration of that same Spirit of Life who *abides* with Christ’s Church for ever. And the extraordinary gifts—which, my younger hearers remember, were not confined to the Apostles or officers, but given, as they were promised, to the body of “believers” according to the measure of the “faith” of each—gradually sank into the ordinary gifts by which the Church was ruled, extended, edified, as “naturally,” I doubt not, as did the agitated emotions of the publican calm down into the subdued and sober energy with which he addressed him to the duties of his calling.

The relation also of Pentecost to the literal claims of Christ must not be overlooked: it is the “evidence” of the last of that Series of Facts on which the Christian doctrines rest—I suppose the only evidence which the nature of the case admits. Christ’s birth, life, death, and bodily resurrection, also his ascent to, and disappearance in, a cloud, could all be “testified” by adequate

“witnesses.” But who is to attest anything beyond? Who or what is to certify us that his “ascent” was his acceptance in heaven; his standing on the right hand of power; his being invested with the executive of God? He says himself, indeed, “All *power* is given unto me in heaven and earth; go therefore,” &c.: but this is his own assertion only;—should there not be “two witnesses” to establish the crowning fact of all? The literal reply to this is—“But tarry ye in Jerusalem *until* ye be endued with *power* from on high.” Even the common gifts of the Spirit are partially suspended for a season; and then, after this marked period of suspense, He who was “to the right hand of God exalted hath shed forth this which ye now see and hear.” The definite outpouring of *power*—power visible and undeniable—in fulfilment of the definite promise, thus connects the past and future, the visible and invisible of Christ; at once redeems the promise, and *proves* that He has *power* to send. The power thus poured out, and thence distributed, is the Life of the Christian Church.

Thus markedly in its historic crisis, as insensibly throughout, “the Testimony of Christ is the Spirit of Prophecy,” the Inspiration he sent down;—“inspiration” in the largest sense, as common men, or even heathens, would use the word,—the possessing, or being possessed of a manifestly “supernatural power;”—not principally a doctrinal inspiration—at least not so at first;—like all true natural powers, the highest-natural *acts* first, describes afterwards, and much later on philosophizes or theologizes—seeks to generalize its statement in abstract and balanced propositions. It was a moving energy, physical and moral, centering round a supreme sense of Christ’s presence in them; casting round it minor miracles as fragments of itself, and verifying its general character in its palpable results; at first, overpowering to the individuals—some thought the hundred and twenty were full of new wine; probably followed by exhaustions and reactions, and taking some time to settle to its conscious and definite mission; the predominant feeling being one of joy in Christ, as it were, overflowing the capacities.

And the sudden outpouring of it relieving ineffably the

gloom, and sin, and sense of sin, of that *community* which there "sat in darkness" well deserved—of that true-hearted brotherhood which had yet sinned more deeply than the publican—was in the same, or rather in the analogous technical sense, its "justification"—its "new-birth of the Spirit"—its great transition-step into the estate of grace. Thus, in the aggregate historical sense also, was "Christ slain for our sins, and raised again for our justification;" and so is he made of God to us Wisdom, and "Righteousness," and then Sanctification, and, on the whole, Redemption.

I have thus resolved Faith, brethren, as surely I ought to do, into the individual incitement, conviction, testimony of Christ's Paraclete, to whom this day is dedicated;—not forgetting, also, this truth or truism, which the services of to-day very carefully bring before us, that the feast of the Paraclete and Pentecost is not the feast of one day only in human history, but is the characteristic feast of all Creation's LIFE. Observe how selected Psalm and Lesson¹ lead back our thoughts through earlier creations of the Holy Ghost: first through all the pride and beauty of the Jewish ordinance, and polity, and law; then spread them out beyond the patriarchs—beyond all human and all living kind—into the widest operations of that Breath who garnished the heavens, and garmented them with light, and moves all things that move, and animates all things that breathe, from the wind that bloweth where it listeth to the highest impulses "of every one that is born of the Spirit;" so that, having lifted us into some wide communion-sense with God's half-conscious Universe, she may concentrate our loving intelligence upon the greatest of our own Birth-days. For "this is that day of the Lord to be remembered" by the Christian Church and all its progeny in their generations for ever,—the day on which the histories and destinies of the present world were born,—the day when Religion made its Exodus, and reached the stage on which it

¹ Proper Lessons:—Morning, Deut., xvi.; Acts, x. 34. Evening, Is., xi.; Acts, xix.
 Proper Psalms:— „ „ xlvi. and lxviii. „ „ civ. and cxlv.

still expands,—the day when, amid long preparations and expectancy half-conscious half-exhaust, God's Providence passed the old world into the new world, and sent the regenerated Church upon its new progression,—feeble, bewildered, and helpless at first; yet with some mighty power to grow, and with an ever-deepening intelligence, from that day to this, of what it all has meant. *Flens animal, ceteris imperaturum*:—true of the human infant—truest of the infant Church!

Let men ponder over it, and explain it how they can,—let all the philosophies stand round and see,—let all the theologies dispute or worship in some outer court,—let all the philanthropies compare their anodynes and gossip where they will,—the fact is patent now, and makes itself be seen. Some more costly and more vital energies wrought Mankind's Regensis. This is the day “when the children came to the birth, and there *was* strength to bring forth,” though strength there was no more. When what all the law and all the prophets could not do, in all the lifetime of their dispensation, its lifetime *and* its death did do, and the Second Baptism of Man—by the Spirit and by fire—took place. When all the insight, and energy, and self-sacrifice, and high and pure ambition, that God had gathered into the Jewish dispensation, culminated and pointed itself in Christ; and having passed him through the grave and gate of death, came back again and spread itself out in the explicit feeling of his power. When “the virgin the daughter of Zion,” whom the Holy Ghost had long made conscious that she had conceived a son—nay, that she had conceived *the* son of Humanity's long Hope—bare “that holy thing” that was conceived in her, and gave him to the world, that men might see in larger likeness the lineaments of Israel's Ideal and of Israel's Lord. True, she survived not long her effort—that Beautiful Form with which God had blessed Israel, and to which He had wedded all his manhood and his heart,—Zion itself, city, and temple, and law, and ordinance, and priesthood, and holy service, and consciousness of meaning and of mission—all gave up their vitality to this, and sank into the grave. But let the nations of the

modern world, who have absorbed her spirit, and no small share of his, look back to this, and from her travail trace the well-spring of their life. All their highest inspiration and instruction—all that has most impressed its elevation and goodness on the civilization that they prize—dates back from this dark Pentecost. Well may they still send from east and west their Magi or their Kings, to reverently offer presents, and at this second cradle of Mankind, although even then a sepulchre, adore the rude beginnings of Christ's kingdom upon earth. And aged Israel, too, who wanders yet, widowed, homeless, and disconsolate, heart-sick and heart-sore, fretting, hopeless, over all his sins—aye, his sins against her he loved—unreconciled to fate, and grudging to their own offspring the blessing that he cannot choose but give;—what of this Patriarch and Prophet of the nations, to whom the children cry, “Go up, thou bald-head; go up, thou bald-head”? What does he still on earth? Courage, old man! your mission also is not done! God has preserved you still in life, and it is not in vain: cursed still is he that curseth thee; and blessed he that blesseth thee. Strange is the literality, Old Wandering Jew, that you still impress on that strange Old Prophet of the Books you have thrown out before you on the world; and strange the growing allegory into which you force us to read back your battle-anthem, or your simple shepherd's tale: and some of the plainest statements of its most recent pages reverently bid you, Hail. “I would not have you ignorant,” writes St. Paul to the Imperial City of the Gentiles, that “blindness in part is happened to Israel, until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled: and then *all* Israel shall be saved;” and saved amid such a farther transition into good as shall pale all those that went before: “For if the first-fruit be holy, so shall the lump be holy: and if the casting away of them be the riches of the Gentiles, what shall the receiving of them be but *life from the dead*?” Vain is it to expect thou wilt grow young again, and either work or worship like these rude vigorous sons. The Reuben of them is unstable; the Levi is still a fanatic; and he and his brother are men of blood. Thy soul will not come into their secret. Scatter them in Israel: it is

best so. Where is the Judah whom his brethren shall praise, and who might sometimes whisper mysterious hopes of one whose dreamings surely have not died away? Hast thou still a nearer son, though distant—though yet in exile or imprisonment? and will some dearth of higher sustenance force thee and thy sons to find him out? and wilt thou go down to him, and fall on his neck and kiss him, and see all reconciled, and prophesy to us all our destinies again before the nations bury thee, and hold some great wondering lamentation round thy grave?

Brethren, nothing *definite* in the future is revealed to us: it were not, perhaps, “the future,” if there were. But the principles of the future are in the past, and in the present, and everywhere around: and however we picture our expectations—whether in the calm language of philosophy, or in the implicit prophecy of nature’s, or of human nature’s allegoric rings, the characters of this day’s festival throw out the principles to view.

First, then, definite creating, and creating anew, around a central historic line, is God’s method in the world,—a line ascending from the humblest nature, and identifying itself with the humblest life, and gathering all the powers around, and developing and regenerating them; and carrying them consciously out beyond and above themselves, until they pierce the heavens, and a cloud receives them out of our sight; while round the base of this last line, again, a new and loftier power begins, and works, and spreads, and presently is known to be but the loftier spirit of itself;—this is the outline of its history.

This line of sustained energy is partly natural, partly supernatural; and it is a mistake in theology, an error in religion and morals, to be anxious to separate these by a broad distinction. There is none, in fact; they melt into each other insensibly; and the point of demarcation is different for each spectator, according to his own knowledge and sensibility. What is essential, both for theology and religion, is, that it should outcomprehend us all, so as to rise above and “command” us at our highest, go below, and lift us kindly from our lowest;—“drawing us with the cords of a man”;—and this is what it does.

That its aggregate power *and history* are correlated with the general vitalities of earth down to its physical *vires vivæ*, even to a dependence upon the actual *mass* of our planet, I, for one, do not doubt. There must be the same connexion between them that there is between God's Providence and His Grace; and from a sufficiently comprehensive point of view, they must make one self-harmonious history. Any attempt to divide them is semi-gnostic, and rests on Dualism.

The general mode of its operation has been to propagate itself in successive undulations, natural and spiritual, from near the centre of the old continent; the western waves continuing fresher, humbler, of slower growth, and later maturity: those to the east being more rapidly and less perfectly developed. Where the conditions were unfavourable, each degenerated: where favourable, they gathered themselves into approximate results around the leading line. These partial developments excelled the central one in some respects; yet so as to leave to the leading family a position analogous to that held by "faith," or even by "conscience," in the individual constitution. Even before "the desire of all nations" had come, the religious supremacy of the Jew was as distinct among the nations as is that of Christianity now among its few competitors.

Each wave from the centre made or marked a stage on which men lived, and worked, and left their work behind: and each stage, like each individual, as it matured itself, felt the coming impulse, and was obliged to turn its face towards the better. Even in humbler nature there is this physical expectancy and self-devotion;—floration and fructification show even a *gladness* to spend and be spent in producing the future. This, rendered explicit in higher life, and self-conscious in our spiritualism, is the leaven of our activity and rest, and energetic principle of our progression. With us it is Faith, or the sense of the Invisible and impulse to it. Nothing else than The Invisible is higher than ourselves. For the same reason, its action is not by "imitation," but "inspiration." Even our "examples" we first "idealize," and *must* do so, before we follow them. Man, so far as each is penetrated by this Spirit of Life, puts forth whatever

might and goodness there is in him—his best and only offering to the author of his being—and looks to Him for what communion of His good He sees fit to give. Insensibly, unconsciously almost, this energizes the placid flow of life; and round any crisis it gathers itself into force, and makes its essence known—proves itself the Birth-Angel of Humanity—hinges upon Pentecost two periods of the world—upon an individual pentecost two periods of one's life—nay, carries us through life and death, and out beyond them both; makes the present the isthmus between two Eternities, and, as we tread it, bathes them all in the Celestial Light.

SERMON III.

OBJECTIVE RELIGION.

"He interposed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had appointed should otherwise have been executed upon them; or in such a manner as to prevent that punishment from actually following, which, according to the present laws of the divine government, must have followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such interposition."

Analogy, ii., 5.

"It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory reader, that it is in any sort affirmed, or implied, in anything said in this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general redemption, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life."

BISHOP BUTLER'S own note on the above passage.

SERMON III.

OBJECTIVE RELIGION.

COL. i. 15.

The image of the invisible God ; the First-born of every Creature.

MAN seeks to worship God, and God is inconceivable : it is obvious, therefore, that in sustained religion some Intermediate Object is supposed. And it appeared from the analysis of worship, that two conditions respecting its Object are indispensable. First, It must be the best that can be conceived by the worshipper, his "best conceivable ;" and next, it must always be viewed in reference to the Inconceivable, so as to carry on the regards to Him. These seem both to be implied in the first clause of my text, which sets forth Christ as "the image of the Invisible God." As such, He accepted worship while still on earth ; and now, that He is no longer visible, men form, by means of creeds, doctrines, or more humble symbols, some idea of Him, or of God in Him, through which they define their worship of the Supreme. And if He were altogether omitted from the mind, some other idea should be substituted, round which the regards might centre and be exercised, and find it possible to rest. All religions exhibit this necessity, and the slightest spiritual endeavour will at once develope it in the mind. No other process, evidently, is within the reach of man, perhaps of any finite being. We saw that faith itself, whose definition is that it always seeks to realize the invisible, must accept this as legitimate, and the only legitimate worship. And we refused¹ to allow the term "ido-

¹ To Mr. Carlyle,—Heroes and Hero-worship, p. 190, sqq.

latry" to be applied to worship, *so far as it consists with faith*,—that is, so far as it satisfies these two conditions. Even in worshipping Christ, we are, in a certain sense, image-worshippers; for He is the "image of the Invisible." But the *English* word "idolatry" involves the connotation "falsehood:" whereas, if what we believe of Christ be true, the worship paid to Him is the most just that is competent to man, nay, competent to any creature.

This point the services of to-day¹ bring formally before us. We reached it, on last Sunday, less directly, from its *subjective* and also from its *historical* side. We seemed² to see that no object is fitted for human worship, except some ideal Humanity, or some ideal Man; as all the philosophies half consciously evince. And we traced, perhaps with some surprise, how, what human nature "requires," even these being witnesses, human history long ago has found,—God's providence having supplied, from the infancy of the race, an ideal Son of Man, in whom the race ever finds itself regenerated; round Whom, while still unseen and hoped for, man's earliest affections and religion sprung; and to Whom, now again unseen and hoped for, after having brought life and immortality to light, the highest spiritual energies of the modern world aspire. Thus have Nature and Grace long solved for us the problem which (strange to say, yet happily perhaps) philosophy has not yet ceased to moot, and rendered practical, positive, and productive, those principles of spiritual craving and supply which we only now begin to understand as matter of abstract speculation. And thus, in religion as in other things, the direct has preceded the reflective action of our powers; the most perfect "theory" is but the most perfect "view" of fact; and even prophecy itself, instinctive or philosophical, is but the intelligent "seeing" of those pervading processes whose roots are in the past, whose present issues gird us round, and carry us on into the future world.

But this OBJECT, so long foreseen, so variously sought after and prepared for, and now so widely worshipped, will it maintain its pre-eminence? Will the worship of God in Christ con-

¹ Preached on Trinity Sunday.

² Page 68, sqq. See Note C.

tinue to satisfy the intelligent aspirations of mankind; or must some other Image of the Invisible be sought, which *will* continue to satisfy, so that "worship with the understanding" may continue, and with it the whole machinery of religion, and religion itself? These questions force themselves upon our cognizance, and both Church and Scripture have taken pains to provide an answer. When I say "satisfy," I do not mean, of course, that our worship is bound to free itself from all serious difficulty, or to answer, or half answer, all the fair questions that God has given us the earnest curiosity to ask. Such expectation upon any other subject were a folly beyond which the exigencies of life have quickly carried us; and we do not imagine that our religious concerns should be the most comprehensible, or the least mysterious of our affairs. It is, however, among the most important, and mixes itself up with all the rest; and it is essential to its claims that it should so convince us on the whole as to reduce the difficulties to a subordinate position, and make them subserve its professed purpose of discipline. And it will always do so, I conceive, Faith and the Invisible being supposed, if our two conditions be adhered to,—if our image be truly our best conceivable, and if it be felt not to "intercept" our regards, but to carry them on to whatever we recognise as the ultimate centre of Unity and Being. At least, it will do so when another class of difficulties has been fairly met, to which the second clause of my text and the whole context direct our attention.

For, as reflection grows, questions will gradually arise,—first, as to the *adequacy* of our Object of worship; and, presently, as to the *reality of its Mediation*. Is it truly an *Intermediate* Object? a real Mediator between God and us? truly correlated with the Infinite on one hand, and with us upon the other? "A Mediator is not of one," but must belong to both: is our Object, or is anything, competent to this twofold relationship? More generally, is anything really intermediate between anything and God? Is He not the ever-present Origin and Cause of all? What room, again, does this attribute leave for the individuality of things? and what does His Spirituality allow for their solid material *Objective* Existence? Thus, to question the

nature of worship is but to question, in its central point, the nature of our being, and our own correlation with God and things. Inquiries into the nature of our Object quickly inquire into the nature of Objectivity: to ask the reality of mediation soon asks the reality of "media," the reality of "things." And though we might not at once be led to the generalization, or discern the connexion, we should quickly find any central ambiguity or anti-thesis¹ to diffuse itself in general contradiction and uncertainty, threatening universal scepticism.

To Asiatic Greeks, therefore, long exercised in such abstract speculation, St. Paul goes on to define the position of his Object of worship, identifying Him with the widest reality of things, and with a connate headship over them:—Image of the Invisible God, and first-born of every creature. For by Him were all things created, both in heaven and earth; in Him do all consist; and in Him shall all be reconciled. We are little competent to criticise such terms, or to form any such conception, however great our interest in making the attempt. Creation itself is incomprehensible, as well as He who made it; and this "idea" plainly asks us to combine them both; at least, it asks us to endeavour. Not often does Scripture lead us out so deliberately beyond our range: and it must have grave reason when it does. It seldom dwells on abstract or ideal topics; never, perhaps, alludes to them without an express regard to our practical necessities. And this is manifestly its purpose here. Occasional, yet distinct intimations that He to whom we are directed as the centre of our adoration does sustain some such unique, universal, and exhaustive relationship, are what no thinking man can deem superfluous. Sections of the Christian world plainly require them now as much as did Paul's converts at Colosse.

The word "first" in my text has, I suppose, little immediate reference to time, further than as time itself is comprehended in that "to-day" which is repeatedly applied to the Son; or in that "Everlasting Now" in which we are fain to express time's comprehension in eternity; the rude, inadequate language con-

¹ See Note A.

fessing the weakness and incompetence, but not any inconsistency of thought, for our own "now" truly comprises a certain elementary duration of time. And still more rude must be our attempt to conceive the whole meaning of the text; but, unfolded in the context, and supported by similar passages, it seems to say such as this, that Christ is at once the basis of Creation and its archetype; felt and rested on throughout, and "felt after" by each creature in proportion to its consciousness; rendered, and to be rendered explicit in its attained perfections: some Being in whom all different planes or spheres of being meet or shall meet, and find at once their "type" and origin; having distinct and assignable relations to all, each in its own plane of being. His relations to us are largely set forth in Scripture. His relations to others, slightly touched on in some passages, more fully explained in others, are in our context declared to be strictly analogous to, or identical with, those he sustains to us. And these relations at once resolving themselves into the attributes of Deity, He thus becomes the Manifestation, Expression, Word, or "Image of God."

I will read the passage, beginning from v. 13:—

“ Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son: In whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins: Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature: For by him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him: And he is before all things, and by him all things consist. And he is the head of the body, the Church: Who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead; that in all things he might have the pre-eminence. For it pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell; And having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself; by him, I say, whether they be things on earth, or things in heaven. And you that were sometime alienated, and enemies in your mind by wicked words, yet now hath he reconciled, In the body of his flesh through death, to present you holy, and

unblameable and unreprouceable in his sight; If ye continue in the faith, grounded and settled, and be not moved away from the hope of the Gospel."

I have read so much of this important passage, not because it contains anything new or peculiar in its individual statements. These occur repeatedly elsewhere; and are often implied when not expressly said. But here, as in some parallel passages, addressed to similar hearers, they stand together connectedly, with an obvious intention to prevent error, or to rectify mistake. St. Paul evidently weighs his words, balances his thought, takes pains with his exhaustive enumeration, and, in one essential part—the hinging point, probably, with his hearers, as it is with many besides—he reverts to and repeats it, asserting the most marked attribute of the Son as co-extensive with the universe—creating all things, sustaining all things, *reconciling* all things.—*All things*, “in him, I say,” he *here* reiterates, lest some misconception should creep in, “whether they be things on earth or things in heaven.” To Him in whom such attributes are found, surely, “every knee should bow;” and faith itself may be assured that the worship which reaches Him falls not short of the Invisible.

To these stupendous relations the Church often directs our thoughts; as formally to-day. It is wise in her, and necessary. They lie deep in Christianity, and are its felt as well as its professed foundation. But not in Christianity alone: as truly, though less distinctly felt, they underlie religion at large, are involved in its idea and definition, and evolve themselves in all its manifestations. Their explicit statement gives its form and force to doctrinal Christianity. Their ceremonial embodiment did the same for Judaism. Their vaguer intimation was the hope of the Patriarchs. While various Paganisms, gathering what light they could—from the face of nature, from human hopes and fears, from traditional and other directer means of grace,—and groping their way in mist, were yet not left without what the Object of their half-conscious longings judged to be a sufficient witness of Himself.

St. Paul, in the metropolis of Heathendom, could not see that they were Atheists; such charitable discovery was reserved for

other times. He thought he could discern the opposite. Beneath all the "too much superstition," which wrung his soul, and forced him up to speak his Gospel in their midst, he could find the place and words which told that God had written His name within their hearts, in more indelible fire than all their worst idolatry could hide, all its multiplicity exhaust, or all its beauty charm to rest; and in that modest formula which integrated while it ignored their worship, and pleaded their ignorance while it confessed their sin, he could read the Incommunicable Name of Him whose Messenger he was:— "I saw an altar to the UNKNOWN GOD: WHOM therefore ye ignorantly worship, HIM declare I unto you." And so he unveils that mystery, long hidden, however intently sought; and now made manifest, as motive of their repentance, and instrument of their preparedness for a judgment throne, before which Heathendom and he should stand alike.

Following the invitation of our Church, let us endeavour to grasp firmly the main statement of these relations. Our exposition of them will be limited, of course, to the definite side which any such idea presents to us; and we will allow ourselves only in such immediate inferences as we seem able to state with some firmness and consistency, as well as with some authority. It will quickly lead us beyond that definite side, and we will feel our subject everywhere to transcend our powers; but this will not prevent our holding steadily whatever we can make out. For doctrinal religion, and especially the doctrine of to-day, while dealing more expressly than other sciences with what passes beyond our range, claims no right, in consequence, to speak ambiguously of whatever lies within it. We are conscious, indeed, here, more immediately than elsewhere, that our reflections run out, as all reflections do, into that ocean where all thought is lost. It is one function of religion to keep us ever conscious of its nearness; and when the mind wanders vaguely, the wavering language will mark the "limits of our thought." But we are not the less confident of the directions and properties of our lines, because of their dimly perceived relations with infinity. Nay, we use these very relations to verify our farthest inference, or to

point our first conjecture. In religion, if anywhere, we begin with facts, broad, definite, and forcing general attention. These must determine our main positions. And we shall be no more uncertain of any result we can discern, because of its felt contact with the inconceivable, than we shall tread our own planet with more uncertain steps because our intelligence has been educated to discern its boundless yet close encircling firmament. We may be as certain of our "truths," as we are of our own existence, or the existence of any thing. Yet look at existence itself, and seek to know its mystery! What one conception more defies our powers? Whom does it not force back upon his most elementary faith in "being;" the intellectual form of our simplest faith in God; our necessary *and glad* reliance upon that ultimate Base and Energy, which we can neither see, conceive, nor understand?

On the most cursory inspection of the passage I have read, the *three* following propositions seem unmistakeable:—

I. It is a total misconception of the nature of Christianity, to treat it as merely a system of doctrines, connected with Christ as Teacher, and affecting only His professed disciples; in the same sense as Judaism refers itself to Moses, and Islam to Mahomet. Besides and beneath any claim it makes in this respect, it affirms itself a scheme of facts, and Christ the agent of them; a system of things, and Christ the basis of them; of things and facts wherein *all* men, Moses and Mahomet, Abraham and Adam, are alike involved, whether they have any knowledge of the facts themselves, or not.

And when we are asked what these "things" are, as distinguished from doctrines, we reply, in the language of this passage, they are, "Creating," "Sustaining," "Reconciling;" which last—inasmuch as we know positively from Scripture, and positively from reason and conscience, that no one could enjoy the felt presence of God, or even endure it, except in proportion as his own soul were conformed thereto, and loved the holy and the good—must mean, in the first instance at least, *Objectively only, as establishing or re-establishing our relations with God.*

And when asked to define more particularly what these reconciled relations are, we reply that, as enumerated in Scripture,

they come chiefly or exclusively under three heads—Atonement, Resurrection or Future Life, and the gift of the Holy Ghost. Christ “has redeemed us and all mankind,” first, from “guilt;” next, from “death;” and, lastly, has “bought back” for us the presence of the Paraclete.

a. Christ made the atonement, or propitiation for the sins of the whole world; in the possibility of which, as also in its necessity, mankind has ever deeply believed; whatever superable or insuperable difficulties we have the sagacity to discover in it, considered as a matter of theory. Atonement for “sin,” observe, as distinguished from “sinfulness;” for guilt incurred, or crime committed, or amenability to law, as distinguished from the willingness or the wish to commit such crime again. In this latter sense, God forgives no sin, not even an “idle” word or thought. In His utmost mercy, “He will by no means clear the guilty.” And even in our eyes, He ought not. He were not Holy, if He did. What father or friend would, in this sense, forgive an injury, even against himself, or, who would not find his very affection to the transgressor directly to intensify his indignation? God’s mercy to sinners, in this sense, is simply the loving correction that, through repentance and discipline, can make us great—the forbearance and care which find time and means, and sometimes very terrible means, of causing His purifying goodness to be felt. Nature forgets nothing, and forgives nothing. She is conscious of an ascending scale, however, and bids her chastisements to make us climb. The broken limb, or broken fortune, will not return to us again; but some higher health and better riches may. So in our higher life, too, God’s forgiveness is always more than forgiveness. Whom He forgives, He sanctifies. Even in remission, He “creates,” and elevates. The “unprofitable” is “guilty” in His sight; and Himself, He will not work in vain. No bare forgiveness and forgetfulness with Him. He is no Epicurean, and no Stoic quietude. But misery, and remorse, and repentance, are in His hand, and He makes *these* to work out loftier good; converts His real chastisement into real blessing; causes His children to “enter into life maimed,” if requisite, and builds upon our expe-

rience of His pervading judgment, a nearer knowledge of Himself. Our God is a purifying, or a consuming fire, a very careful and very jealous God.

Thus, we note, for "sinfulness as such," for "the spirit of sin," for "resisting the Spirit of good," for "the sin against the Holy Ghost," there is no forgiveness either in this world or in the next. But for "committed sin" there is; for guilt and condemnation, and the just sentence of "the law," there is abundant ransom. Christ has taken it all away, having nailed it to His cross. Sinfulness, and sinfulness alone, thanks to His atonement, does and shall inherit misery. Repentance and regeneration enter into life.

And, be it specially observed, the Scripture statement is not merely that Christ *taught* atonement; that He revealed or authenticated the *doctrine*: others have taught the same doctrine, both before His time and since; and truly taught it, for there *is* atonement. But Christ *made* the atonement; He *is* Himself the sacrifice He offered. Herein He stands alone.

b. Christ procured "future life" for all mankind:—in which also, whatever the theoretic difficulties, men, in proportion to their developed humanity, have always earnestly believed. Scripture does not exactly define *how*, but affirms broadly that He "tasted death for every man;" and so, it seems, exhausted in His own person that penalty and antagonist, rendering it "consistent" in God, if we may so speak, to more than continue life, by restoring to each a higher than His forfeited existence. Thus, "through death, he destroyed death and him who has the power of it"—"abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light;" and thus He is the second Adam, the second head and founder of the race; "in whom all men shall be made alive, as in the former they all die."

And we observe, as before, it is not merely that Christ *taught* a future life, that he illustrated the "doctrine" of it. Others have done the same, with more or less of error as to the *mode*, with perfect truth as to the *fact*; for there is a future life. But Christ has made the fact, has procured the future life. "We preach *through Jesus* the resurrection of the dead." "I AM the

resurrection and the life." "By man came death; by man," by this man, "came the resurrection of the dead." Here again Christ stands alone.

c. He sends, and ever sent, the Holy Ghost to prepare men for that future life; to give intimations of it, and assimilate them to its requirements; enabling them to realize, as present fact, that Eternity and Him who dwells therein. This, in fact, is the function of His *παράκλησις*, Faith. Under its influence, "the life we now live in the flesh" is our resurrection¹ life, the "thing signified" in baptism.

And it is not merely, as we observe, in fine, that Christ taught "that there is a Holy Ghost:" any man may do the same; and many did both before His time and since. Nor is it merely that He imparts Him, in a derived and instrumental manner, as at least *some* other men have done. But that He has procured and sends him—sends Him as from Himself; as, in the nature of Being and order of Operation, "proceeding from the Son." So that, since the day of Pentecost, He is Christ's Paraclete, and the abiding of the Paraclete is Christ's own presence with his Church; and, equally, before the day of Pentecost, it was the "Spirit of Christ which was in the prophets, and testified of the sufferings of Christ, and of the glory that should follow." Indeed the whole teaching offices of the Holy Ghost are that He "signifies," "testifies," or "reminds" of Christ. All that the Father hath are Christ's; even God's Spirit can have no other things to "show."

From the beginning, then, it was the Spirit of "God in Christ" who laid the foundations of the earth, and stirred its life and breath, and nursed its growing consciousness:—indicating ever of that hidden mercy to whoever has ears to hear; pre-signifying the coming Gospel to those who might understand its vision; and, *on the strength of its anticipated work*, leading men upward by the one sole way of life. As the time draws near, historically, to verify the anticipation and redeem

¹ Compare the last paragraphs, for example, of the Baptismal Service, or the Collects for Circumcision-day and Easter-even, with such passages as Rom. vi., Eph. ii., Col. ii. 10 sqq. and iii. 1 sqq., 1 Pet. i. 21 sqq., &c.

the Promise, attention is fixed upon it, and the formal dependence of the Spirit upon the Word is made explicit. "It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the Spirit will not come to you; but if I go away, I will send him unto you." And when the crisis has arrived, some of the most prominent operations of the Spirit are suspended, from the Pass-over till the Pentecost, in order to mark in history, by a real and symbolic interval, this objective or ontologic relationship. When He had ascended on high, He obtained gifts for men, even this indwelling; and shed forth, as visible first-fruits of that "all power which was given Him in heaven and earth," graduated portions of "the mighty working whereby He subdues all things to Himself."

Let us pause a little on these stupendous claims, and the unique position they assign to Christ—a position essentially unlike anything that is even alleged in behalf of other religious teachers, or from anything involved in the mere idea of *teaching* at all. Obvious as this is on the face of Scripture, or of the Christian creeds and worship, men sometimes forget or confuse it; so let me insist on it more fully, if only by way of repetition, in each of the three respects I have mentioned.

Others then, besides Christ—hundreds before and millions since His time—have taught "the efficacy of repentance towards the remission of sins:" so also did Christ. So far the difference is in degree only, and all alike have taught the truth, for it *is* efficacious. But Christ also professes to have given it its efficiency; "to have made it of the efficacy that it is." Here the difference is not in degree only, but totally diverse in kind.

This efficacy is one consequence of the atonement, and other consequences have been discerned. But the whole doctrine of the atonement stands in the same position. Others besides Christ have taught that there is sufficient mercy *somewhere* with God; have preached, more or less precisely, ransom and reconciliation for penitent sinners: and all who have so taught have taught the truth, for there *is* such mercy, reconciliation, and remission. But Christ not only taught it; He claims to have *made* it, to have *been* it, to *BE* it:—"to be the propitiation for our sins and not for ours

only, but also for the sins of the whole world,"—or, in Church language, "the one only sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction, for the sins of the whole world," from its beginning to its end—for the sins of those who taught, and for the sins of those who heard, and for the sins of those who never distinctly either taught or heard, but who may have been left to infer it, or to hope for it, if only by reading the hopefulness of their own nature into the nature and providence of things.

And this determines some very anxious questions for mankind; such as the nature of sacrifice, and of religious rites in general. These can have, to the worshipper, only a subjective or sanctifying value. Christ's exhaustive atonement has left them no other office. He has satisfied the courts of heaven, and left nothing to be reconciled but the consciences and character of men. All other priests and offerings can but signify of Him and His, and preach them home to human cognizance.

Thus, the Jewish sacrifices and services were express "allusions" to the great Paschal Offering; symbols, foreshadows, prefiguring intimations of it. This, as Bishop Butler insists,¹ the Scriptures plainly declare. Of course the same is to be said, though less distinctly, of the patriarchal sacrifices; and by parity of reason, of all other sacrifices whatever, including those of the Heathen world, though less definitely appointed, though more corrupted generally, and, even when purest, less clearly understood. Corruptions, indeed, have been abundant always—in Paganism, in Judaism, in Christianity itself. And their effect is always to diminish or destroy the subjective value of the ordinance. But faith might always see in it, pictured with a rude effectiveness, the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and the necessity of its forgiveness, together with some intimations of its mode—intimations which must have found a deep correlation in the human consciousness, or sacrifice itself had never been so popular, so widely diffused, so carefully preserved, or carried to such extreme. And, in fact, the rite has always both expressed and cultured the conviction that sacrifice—or rather self-

¹ Anal. II., ch. 5, sect. vi.

sacrifice,¹ for the worshipper was always made in some sort to *partake* his offering,—lies deep in the nature and constitution of things; and that God himself is present with us, “feels with us,” sympathises with us, in all our good and ill; yea, even in life and *death*. And cultivated men have said this explicitly enough,—acknowledging, besides, what sacrifice especially symbolizes, that we must live a higher life out of even the death² we die. Faith might discern all this, and did. Corruptions disfigure and obscure the lesson. And the easiest and most fatal corruption is always that which perverts the rite itself, by making it an end and “*opus*,” instead of a sign of something signified; which would assign to it an objective or redemption-value, and look to it as some atonement or compensation for sin, instead of making it effective for sanctification as the solemn sacrament of repentance and renewal.

It cannot, then, be too broadly impressed that objective value, ransom and reconciliation, reside in one perfect sacrifice, and in one alone. “The Lamb slain before the foundation of the world” had already “redeemed us and all mankind,” before there was a man in being; and so left to all other sacrifices no other function than to preach Himself, to prefigure, commemorate, and impress that half-hidden mystery, and work its recognition into the hearts and habits of mankind. This makes them centre of the Worship and Education of our race. And this is function for them enough. “One sacrifice once offered” has relieved them of all other office; “has perfected for ever them that are sanctified,” and placed us all in such a position that, “what doth God require of thee, O *man*, but to love mercy, and to do justice, and to walk humbly with thy God?” All else that God requires, He requires at the hand of “the Man who is God’s fellow,” and who is able to answer the demand.

¹ Even in very humble superstitions one meets acknowledgments of this. For example—The great sacrifice among the North American Indians is a dog. “Why is this?” asked an intelligent traveller. “The dog is our domestic companion, our dearest and most useful animal,” an Indian said to me, ‘it is almost like sacrificing ourselves.’—*Kohl’s Kitchi-Gami*, p. 60.

² See Sermon II., page 51, &c.

Christ, then, and His sacrifice, stand alone; and these have wrought Redemption. All other priests, rites, and victims, as well as all doctrines, sabbaths, creeds, and Bibles, work Sanctification only; and, among them all, that is the most potent sacrament which best fulfils this end. Let them all "be done for edification." And, as the Son of Man is Lord of them all, not they of Him, His Church, too, is entitled to follow his example, and "has authority" to regulate and decree them. But that "objective reconciliation"—or, as it seems lately the mode to call it, "justification"¹—which, on whatever grounds, men deem requisite in the courts of Heaven, no church can reach or touch. "The wine-press of the wrath of God," Christ "trod alone, and of the people there was none with him." He bridged the chasm, however, whose yawnings all men feel; and now, in Him, the Creator and Creation are "at one."

Similarly in respect to the *second* point:—Others, both before and after Christ, have taught the doctrine of a Future Life; variously, indeed, and with a mixture of error, as to the mode,—some conjecturing Metempsychosis, some relying on a "Metaphysical" Immortality of the Soul, and some anticipating the Christian and more natural doctrine of Resurrection from the dead—but truly as to the main doctrine, for there is a future life in fact. The amazing claim of Christ is that He has procured or made that fact:—that, by "tasting death for every man," He has redeemed men from death, and made Himself "The Resurrection and the Life;" that He has "abolished death, and brought" not the doctrines merely, but "life and immortality" themselves "to light." Others have taught the doctrine: Christ supplied, or Is the BASIS of the doctrine. He wrought out the fact which makes the doctrine true—true in His own lips, and true in theirs, whencesoever, by the operation of His Spirit, they may have gathered its intimations.

And, similarly, in respect to the *third* point:—Others besides Christ have taught "that there is a Holy Ghost;" "that good men are under the secret guidance and influence of God's Spirit," and

¹ See Note B.

have truly taught, for so they are. But the basis of their truth, that which renders their teaching true, is the Procession of the Spirit from the Son, or from the Father through His Eternal Reconciliation.

This relation of Christ to other Teachers, or rather of Christ's Work and Being to Teaching in general, of Redemption to Sanctification, of Objective to Subjective Religion, is familiar to us from childhood, and is about the most broadly marked feature of the Christian formulæ. Theological writers, however, do not always keep it closely in view, and great confusions follow. Even Bishop Butler allows himself to lose sight of it in one particular. He insists upon it, firmly and explicitly, in respect to our first point, Atonement, which is plainly the key-doctrine, and perhaps includes the rest. But in regard to the second point, or Future Life, he is not so careful. In deference, apparently, to the Greek culture, he omits Resurrection, and throws the weight of argument on Metaphysical Immortality and the doctrine of Continuance; thereby, as it seems to me, injuring the symmetry¹

¹ The law of Nature herself is never mere Continuance, but Birth and Growth, Genesis and Regeneration, rapid and self-conscious in proportion to the elevation of the organism in Nature's scale. The Uniformity and Immutability which our Neo-Platonism worships is to be found nowhere; but everywhere Change, Formation, Transformation, death-in-life, and out of death renewal: nowhere fixedness, but everywhere Creation. And though all force be essentially different from matter, and though the higher vitalities transcend, and, in every sense, command the lower, yet there is no force known to us which acts independently of matter; or otherwise than *from* and *through* matter. And we have no reason to believe that any force ever will act differently. With what new forces matter may be "inspired," or what shall be the properties of our "spiritual bodies," we can form little or no idea; but there is no doubt, that the naturalness and sound philosophy of the Christian doctrine of the "Resurrection of the body," is growing, and will grow upon the intelligence of the world. I, for one, believe it will prove a key-point to future science, as it has been all along, if a foolishness and rock of offence, a bulwark also against the empty vapouring of a philosophic blunder.

Though in the centre of the Alexandrine culture, which was essentially neo-platonist, though indebted to it, and acknowledging their obligations, the Apostles firmly insist, that to deny "Christ come in the flesh," or "Christ risen in the flesh," is the spirit of Antichrist. And how justly they judged it—in respect, say, to the subject of this third Sermon—may perhaps be obvious from this remark, that unless matter, as such, be *included* in the highest manifestation of God, it will be no longer possible to maintain the Unity of things; and we must either deny matter or deny spirit, or allow our timid Platonism to be developed by Manes. The Theological form of the blunder, is, in fact, to

of his system, and certainly not doing justice to the plain teaching of Scripture and the Church. This seems the one defect in

deny the Son altogether; for, other Manifestation of God, or Life, or Spirit, or Being, than by matter, form, or what is commonly called "Substance," there cannot be, so far, at least, as we know or can conceive.

The Philosophical, or scientific form of the blunder, is to affirm a force, or centre of forces not acting from or through substance, or even matter; which, I repeat, so far as we know, is not, and cannot be. What about "spirits?" some one will say. We know too little about them to say anything. But the common notion, both Christian and Pagan, has always invested them with individuality, with a distinguishable, though variable form, and with a highly refined or sublimated matter. If any one have any better idea, let him produce it and its evidence. What about "the will"? Our will—on any definition of it, and much nonsense is often talked—acts from our own organic base, and through our organism; without it the *action* of the will, at least, is nothing. What about God? God, so far as we know, always makes his creation to execute His behests; acts from the basis of existing things, and through existing things, towards the new result. This is, in fact, the meaning, with us, of Manifestation or Action. True, behind all God's self-manifestation in varied form and force, there is the Ultimate Unchangeable: but to refer to God in this sense as an immediate cause of phenomena, obviously, results at once in Berkleyism. Finite and individual things, and Matter and Force in their totality, are virtually denied existence. This is, again, Theologically, to deny both Son and Spirit by way of exalting the Father.

It will be observed that the language of these Sermons is conceived on the hypothesis, first, that our individual microcosm truly *images* the macrocosm, as far as we can know or notice it, of which, indeed, it is *our* only measure; and next, that both microcosm and macrocosm are essentially *tripartite*; our own (1) "force," (2) "form," and (3) "identity," being both our image and our "Communion" or participation of (I.) the Spirit, (II.) the Manifestation, and (III.) the Ultimate Origin of things. Our possession of each of these three parts is attested by immediate and unvarying "consciousness," sustained by every possible confirmation. Either in the microcosm or macrocosm they are unresolvable into each other; and, when taken together, they present an exhaustive analysis of things. They will be referred to, more fully, farther on. Meantime, even a young reader might notice what a blunder it would be to confound together these three elements, or to exclude any one of them from that highly complex Unity, "ourselves." To exclude the body, for instance, from our totality, because, forsooth, "it varies from day to day," whereas "we are conscious of our own identity;" or, *a fortiori*, to exclude the mind specially, or the forces generally, for the same reason, because it and they vary much more rapidly, and more completely than the body does. And this is Bishop Butler's error. It is not that he insists on "Continuance"—his arguments here have real force; there is, in truth, *more* than a continuance underlying all our transformations—but that, presently, confounding continuance with our felt identity, he excludes, on the strength of it, our "variable body" from "the living being ourselves," and thereupon argues our "immortality:" quite ignoring the resurrection, or rather excluding it, and gliding into the feeling, that as getting rid of our bodies would advance us in the scale of being, so becoming cumbered with bodies again should be a degradation. And much of this But-

his admirable book ; and it has done much, if I mistake not, to mislead modern speculation, and perpetuate a "vain philosophy."

ler takes, word for word, from the Greek philosophers, whose learned antipathy to matter and to body quickly led them into an undisguised duality. He has been followed in it by much of our own philosophy ; especially the Scotch, which, having excluded the body from "self"—following Butler—and all force, as such, from Creation—following Hume—(a "cause" being *merely* the succession of phenomena), has left itself the agreeable alternative of nihilism or self-contradiction—the German Platonists having preceded them in the same course, and much more brilliantly, without the aid of Butler.

Butler's initial proposition, "that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our state in infancy or in the womb, is but according to the analogy of Nature,"—is that which belongs to his system, and is what he should have been contented with expanding in his first chapter. His Greek metaphysics only confuse this, or contradict it. For instance, he presently finds himself asserting that living powers are neither acquired nor lost! Have we not acquired our living powers since infancy or before it? did Butler believe in the Platonic pre-existence, in the invariability and eternity of "ideas;" that all "learning" is but "remembering" what we always possessed, and so forth? "We have no more reason to think that a being endowed with living powers ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them." Does no one lose his memory, or his imagination, or his locomotive, or his digestive powers? Or, even, extreme as the case is, does not a stone acquire powers? Cannot a stone, even without changing its form, be made to acquire and retain magnetic and other physical forces which it had not previously? and cannot the *elements* of a stone be made to acquire all the living powers possessed, say, by blood, and nerves, and brain? The prescription is this—pound the stone; digest it chemically; supply it, in a soluble state, to vegetable organisms until they have "digested" it too; and, lastly, supply it in this form to the human organism, to be digested there. These four laboratories, the mechanical, the chemical, the vegetable, and the human, acting in this order, will have wrought the transformations sought, and the elements of the stone will now possess the highest vital forces. Man was formed of the dust of the Earth: and all men are formed of it still. In fact "dust we are;" but dust which has acquired, at the Creator's fiat, these wondrous living powers. Besides, all the organisms of the earth, animal and vegetable, have arisen from its dust: and this "dust" has been formed, itself, by existing agencies, out of Earth's "crust," that is, ultimately, out of solid or fluid "rock." So that the primal "stone" of our planet has already acquired a great many living powers. This half-cooled *aërolite*, the Earth, is a very different "Earth" now from what it was when first launched into History, and it may attain some new forces still before its crust is broken, and its present histories wound up. What new forces we shall ourselves attain, here or hereafter, is known to the Creator only. But it is according to the analogy of Nature that vast transformations should await us, bringing vast accessions to our living powers; and all that Scripture and the Church teach of the resurrection of the dead falls in with that Analogy.

Throughout the chapter Butler confounds the first-named of our three elements with the whole, or specially with the third; as such phrases as "we, i. e. our living powers,"

In other respects, inferior writers, also, often mistake or obscure this fundamental relation; and we are all doubtless too careless

render patent. Reid and Brown would say, "we, i. e. our mind;" making the mistake more pointed—especially as they go on to identify the mind with "our personal identity." But it seems to have been a perception of what I insist on, that force always acts from and through matter, which caused Butler to lean to, or almost adopt Leibnitz' idea of the soul being an atom or monad which might survive dissolution. It is hard to guess what truth there may be in this, or how far it falls in with what St. Paul seems to teach (1 Cor. xv., 35, sqq.), that our life and experience here mature some germinal principle round which the spiritual body shall be raised. Any attempt to speculate on such subjects in the present state of our knowledge would, probably, be worse than fruitless. We know too little of our natural body, perhaps, to render the plainest statements about our spiritual bodies either credible or intelligible. How incredible, until of late, was the circulation of the blood; with what harsh incredulity do clever and good men still treat more recent discoveries. Yet, how may the knowledge of some most simple fact illustrate things thought most mysterious, or inexplicable. And how incapable are we of forming any judgment whatever on things which perhaps are nearest to us, and, perhaps, concern us most.

For instance—who will tell us whether it be with the dust of the earth or with the dust of the atmosphere that we are most nearly related, and from which our future organization will arise? We have a near relation to the first: from it we arise, and to it return incessantly. The food which builds and renews our organism comes up from it, and thither do we return continually the used-up particles of our frame—or rather PART of them—for some, and, probably, the most highly vitalized particles do not return to earth, but pass out, gasiform, into the atmosphere (whence we draw our "ghost," *anima*, *πνεῦμα*, *σπῆ* or vital breath), and constitute what I have called its dust. How easy to imagine bonds established or recalled between "us," and those which were once our most living, perhaps, our "normal" elements. But who will tell us anything, or who will guess us anything; except, indeed, the palpable nonsense we sometimes hear?

Again, the particles which thus pass through our organism and the organisms which prepare for ours, do they return to the earth and atmosphere the same as they were before, unaltered by their history? Are they not susceptible of impressed habits, habits, physical education? The particle of carbon, for instance, which has graduated in the four laboratories above mentioned, is it the same in its polarities, and molecular movements, and affinities, that it was when an element of the dust or stone? I do not believe it. In its main qualities it is unaltered, doubtless—it is still a particle of carbon; and the mere chemist may be able to detect no difference. It behaves in his solution like any other particle of carbon; only it may be the first or last to separate or combine, of which he can take no note. But, try it in physiology, and in the higher crucible the higher differentials will appear. One will be nutritious and agreeable, the other a poison or miasma. One will take kindly to its place and work; the other will mar the tiny mechanism, will retard or accelerate the fine fly-wheels till it generate a local irritation or a fever. What is the physical base of "habits," and where does their analogy terminate? Why should not separate atoms of earth-dust have their history as well as those of star-dust, or of any social aggregate? and why should not, in all alike, the "character" be a



and indistinct. The temptation is great, besides, to partially confound our own special "Christianity" with "Christ," and to share

function of the antecedents? I firmly believe that it is; and that small fragments of this law are being discovered for us daily, even by the chemists; but who will teach us anything definite, although, if the law be true, the whole theory of agriculture and dietetics must depend upon it? In manure, in food, in medicine—to go no higher—the chemical composition is only the beginning of the fact—the physiologic "state" must next be known—where were the elements last? what have they done? what are they now fit for?

Again—wherein does consciousness reside? Pace the Hamiltonians, this is plainly a graduated thing, and in varied degree and kind is diffused through our organism along with the vitalities themselves; a reflex or self-consciousness being possessed only by our highest or reflective parts. So that in our own small commonwealth also, "those who think must govern those who toil," though the working classes have their ambitions and enjoyments too. Suppose, now, the intensity and grade of this diffused consciousness to be increased, and a tinge of self-consciousness and individuality given to the humbler elements, what a tumultuous, and yet a higher life our little world should lead! How constantly would its Menenius be required, and how much harder it were to combine the vigorous action and happiness of each in the theocratic Royalty of conscience! How far is this the problem that is being solved in the individual and in the larger world? And how is it that we are to affect the process through the humbler elements, seeing that *all growth is from below?*

Again, the preservation of our individuality seems about the question that most vitally concerns us. Yet, there seems a longing after "impersonality" in cultivated minds, which is not discountenanced by some expressions of the Bible. Some trifling extension of our powers might easily reconcile both. The explanation of *memory* is that "the past" has truly left its traces in our organism, and these the vital stimulus kindles or rekindles into consciousness. Suppose now an increase of memory included in the intensifying of our diffused consciousness, as before imagined, so that each particle should always remember or feel its own antecedents, the marks of which it bears, and we shall have at once an image of how it is that "lively stones" can be bullded into an aggregate Body, the Church, and how the rendering of one's felt individuality indelible might consist with our finding our highest happiness in the very endeavour to merge it in self-denial, self-sacrifice; in all that patriotism, or any form of society requires of us, trains us to, and rewards us for, and which is summed up in that ultimate expression, Love. The increase of memory is plainly that which has gradually lifted us above the brutes; and, as the Greek allegory paints, has generated all our mental powers, our experience and morality. Such increase of memory would multiply these an hundred-fold, perhaps generate new classes of them: some increase in our anticipatory processes would rapidly work still more unimaginable transformations. It may be noticed, besides, that the *history* of organization has been to concentrate and educate the diffused sensibilities; to gather the sensibility to light and sound, for instance, into the gradually-formed eye and ear, to gather nervousness into nerves, nerves into ganglia, and ganglia into a brain; or generally to gather the longings and gratifications into organs, in the exercise of which the rudimentary are transformed into higher forces, especially as directed by a central organ. And, at a certain stage, this process seems to impoverish the humbler

His unique and solitary attributes among the things that bear His name. One obvious ill effect of any such confusion is, that it ren-

members; we have less of diffused consciousness, of instinctive sympathy with nature, and perception of the tendencies of things around, than brutes, or even plants, perhaps; at least, we seem to have less, perhaps from our attending exclusively to our higher powers. But this cannot be the ultimate state. Surely the higher powers will be diffused from these centres again; at least, if they be not, the analogy between the body individual and all bodies social, and specially, the Church, will fail in an essential particular. The Jewish Church, for instance, gathers its inspiration upon the prophet, the pentecostal diffuses this spirit of prophecy; and this is but the type or well-marked case of the historic action of all bodies politic. What is the action in the body organic, or how shall our own spiritual body be like the Body that it images?

One listens to one's fancy, sometimes, and tries to ask an intelligent question, if only to make clear to one's self how profound is our ignorance about our living powers in every respect, save one, that they too have their Genesis; that in the aggregate, as well as in the individual, they are in process of being made; "being born;" "being caused to grow;" to grow upward from below; having ever, as every organism paints them (a stalk of wheat, for instance), their roots in earth, while lifting their head to heaven. They are not eternal in any sense that concedes to them individual existence. In whatever sense they are finite things, they have their beginning and their history, as well as their "natural stint and bound." True, we cannot "define" their beginning, nor the beginning of anything, either in time or space, or individuality. No line we can draw is "fine" enough for that purpose, even if we could draw it right, which we know we could not. This grain of wheat, when does it begin to be a plant? when did it cease to be part of another plant? The food or the breath I swallow, or the thought I am looking for, when and where do they begin to be a part of me? We cannot mentally define; we cannot conceive the boundaries. But I have a certain form and force—these have their boundary; and with myself, both in my identity and my totality, have had a beginning, caused by other forces acting through other forms. And to assert the eternity of the forces or the forms, because we cannot discover their exact beginning, is the same wisdom as to assert their infinite magnitude because we cannot define their boundaries. Each assertion, by way of doing them honour, denies their existence as individual things. To assert, with Sir William Hamilton, that "our inability to conceive the beginning of anything is our notion of a cause," or "the only possible notion of a cause," out-Platos Plato; is a virtual denial that we have any idea of force, power, or cause whatever, and is about the extremest utterance of a vain philosophy.

"But the other line of talk is all vain fancy." Then let no one mind it. If there be any "parable" or true analogy in it, it will find ears to hear. "And even if true, it is low, physical, earthly, and savours of novelty and materialism and infidelity, and all the -ys and -isms." Just so; in the eyes of the Platonic Orthodoxy that hunted St. Paul from the Areopagus for preaching Jesus and the resurrection. Any natural doctrine like his, however, is sure to grow, and will come back again. And let it be noted that the Bible is the one Book that is true to matter throughout, material genesis, material prosperity, material resurrection and regeneration; and whose very highest Word of Life is One whom eyes have seen and hands have handled, aye, after His resurrection. And if it did not

ders our worship of Christ ambiguous and its ground uncertain; and, then, the doctrine of to-day becomes not a guiding light, but a source of weakness and apprehension. It is a lesser evil that it leaves us open to egregious misrepresentation; and writers who ought to be well informed have the hardihood to charge the Christian world with "descending below the modesty of Mahometans and Jews, and, Pagan-like, by way of honouring their religious teacher, making him a God." But this is a stupid calumny; and, notwithstanding our manifold corruptions, seems a carelessness almost incredible in the face of the Christian Creeds and all the leading rites and documents of Christendom.

It is not as a teacher that any religious regards are due or paid to Christ. They would be due and should be paid, in the estimation of the Church, had He never personally taught at all. His teaching is, indeed, of transcendent excellence, as all allow, and is one element in our proof of his unique pre-eminence; or, at least, it is one of those consistencies which verify His claims. But so little is it true that in this respect we worship Him, it is not even true that, from His personal instruction either the Jewish or the Christian Church, considered as a doctrinal system, derives

so, I for one believe, that it could not consistently, i. e. truthfully and scientifically, insist upon the Unity of God, or on any fundamental Unity in things.

It will be obvious that I have been objecting to Platonism, rather than to Plato. All honour be to *the* sage and preacher of antiquity, although his latent duality and disparagement of matter were unquestionably the germs of "the philosophic errors." Even these have an easy explanation, and one scarce discreditable to him—for matter, truly, is our antagonist; meaning, by matter, what they did mean by it, and took it as the extreme and type of—our lower as contrasted with our higher powers, our body as compared with our mind, our mind (intellect, imagination, passion), as compared with conscience. In this rude way of speaking, even the Platonic errors preach the truth, at least to the most of men; and the language of Holy Scripture does not disdain the machinery. If any one, however, think of applying the form of expression to any scientific purpose, let him take St. Paul's own definitions of the flesh and the spirit, as in, say, Gal. v., 19, sqq., or of his desire to be "absent from the body," as in 2 Cor. v., 4, and he will not go astray.

It is only the High that can, without loss of dignity, descend; only the Strong that can afford to embrace his enemies. Platonism could not do this, any more than Abraham could comfort Dives, or cross the "great gulf fixed." It needs the Incomprehensible to out-comprehend us all; and the Father to love us all, and turn us all to good. Where is the WORD that represents Him best?

itself at all. Moses wrote the Law, and Mahomet the Koran ; but it was Christ's disciples, and in the next generation, who wrote the Gospels and Epistles, and it was the almost unnamed body of His Church, which, centuries later, pronounced the Creeds and digested the system. To Christ's Spirit, promised to guide us into all truth, Christianity's doctrinal development and coherency are due. And His own teaching—which is not in any shape of a dogmatic system, but that true sympathy with men and things, that keen perception and just judgment which discerns, instinctively, the truth existing everywhere, and can read it out from every thing alike in human life or physical creation—represents that ultimate model which it is the Church's aim to reproduce, rather than any system of truths and rules, which are machinery for producing it.

Christ, as a religious teacher, as in any other of His human relations, is our Example : not merely that ideal “ wise man ” or “ perfect man,” or “ man within the breast,” which sages might labour to conceive, but that actual model which as historically realized it is our living ambition to approximate. But Christ, as the Image of the Invisible God and First-born of Every Creature—Christ in that Being whose Universal relationship reaches all men and things alike—Christ in that balanced manifestation of God-in-things which brings Him within the measure of our cognizance and the contact of our regards—Christ as exhibiting the Divine Severity and Goodness actually *present in*, and actually sympathising with, all our good and ill, nay, all our life and death—Christ in that Embodiment of patient Purity, Intelligence, and Love, which without effort embraces the meanest thing that is, and, without effort, stretches back thence into the bosom of the Father, and is, equally with Him, Eternal, Incomprehensible, and God—this Christ is the Object of our Worship.

Christ, not as some special deity of Christians ; not as some small god of some small Christian sect, or of some minute subsection ; not as having said or done or suffered something affecting us alone, and conferring special favours upon a narrow few in return for our narrowing our mind and heart, and forcing our-

selves to profess a "faith" we only half believe—but Christ "who hath redeemed us and all mankind," though we alone have been explicitly taught the doctrine of His Cross: Christ as the "one full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world," though we alone, this day, or though *none*, should partake His sacrament: Christ as "the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world," though the rest of the world but vaguely hopes, or wistfully feels after the mercy on which its destinies are hung: Christ as "the one mediator between God and man, who gave Himself a ransom for all," though yet but inadequately "testified" to any: Christ as, in fact, the God of all and the Lord of all, though the residue of men but "ignorantly worship HIM WHOM" the Christians name, and whom "in part" they "know."

I insist so broadly on our simplest and most familiar truth, brethren, because it is needful even for our day. Strange is it that in the nineteenth century, in face of our massive creeds and liturgies, intelligent writers, viewing Christianity as it were from without, should so mistake our first idea and misconceive our worship. Stranger still, and, alas! far more to be deplored, that, even in the nineteenth century, in the body of the Church itself, ideas and practices should be harboured which make this egregious misrepresentation of "popular Christianity" almost to seem the truth. Yet is it not so, brethren? Look around and see. Is not our fundamental doctrine everywhere obscured, by men's misplacing the doctrine itself, and mistaking the rites which embody it for the thing they signify; confounding the Cross with the knowledge of that Cross, and elevating, in its several parts, Christianity into Christ? Is not the distinction between objective and subjective everywhere lost sight of, and the redeeming value of that universal reconciliation supposed to be diffused among the services which can but convey its knowledge? So that teaching and the processes auxiliary thereto, instead of leading us upward to Christ and God, are, in some greater or less degree, deified themselves, and the regards which are due to Christ alone, as being due to God alone, are intercepted by, and distributed among, the things which bear His name.

It is easy to see this fault in others, brethren; harder to notice, more distressing to suspect it among ourselves. Yet where may we not find it?

Does not one man believe or half-believe that his baptism and church membership have washed away "original sin," and placed him among the true seed of Abraham, in a relation essentially different from that of all uncircumcised? Does not another seem to think that his reverence for the Bible, and his knowledge of it, will compensate for many a shortcoming, and gain for him some imputation of a righteousness he has not? Is not another convinced that his hearty adoption of the Christian doctrines—"justification by faith," say, or any other segment of the circle of exegesis—has "justified" himself objectively, and given him a title to the righteousness of Christ? Does not another imagine that his mysterious knowledge of the Divine decrees has decreed himself into some condition of salvation, almost or altogether independent of all historic agencies? Do not, even among ourselves, men seek to the Sacraments, as *ipso facto*,¹ conferring "grace," and giving to themselves or their little ones a title, or a half-title to stand at the right hand of judgment? And so on, through all the parts of that Church machinery, the germs of which our Lord appointed, and which His Spirit has amplified and administers for our subjective reconciliation, our nurture and admonition in the Lord. And is not all this virtual idolatry? Does not each one trust himself, in whole or in part, to these ideas, forms, or formulæ? does he not believe in and bow down to them, and rest

¹ And do they not, *ipso facto*, confer grace? Answer—*yes* and *no*. They confer grace and "save," so far as they sanctify: no more. So far as they "harden" they confer not grace but "damnation," that is, essential and eternal loss. There is no doubt, however, that they generally do sanctify much more than it is the custom to say. The outward historic Church is a civilizing agency of enormous influence. Our baptism practically expresses the moral differences between us and heathendom. Even the hypocritical respect that is paid to the ordinances by the religious world, is a powerful assimilating engine. In this sense, the outward Church is "eminently" the creation of the Holy Ghost, and our baptism into it is a baptism by "the Spirit." Compare the baptismal form with 1 Cor. xii., 1-15. In this sense, then, the Sacraments do, perhaps universally, confer grace. As to redemption, or atoning grace, efficacy they have none: no more than our circumcision or non-circumcision, or the descent from Abraham, or the slaying of a paschal lamb.

on them his secret hope, investing them, even outwardly, perhaps, with superstitious reverence? And so our "means of grace" become means of mischief—Bibliolatrics, ecclesiolatrics, gnosiolatrics—and men eat and drink of them eternal loss. What should be living angels to help us ever higher as they point us to the Highest, become dead idols and intercept our communion with heaven's light; misdirect, or, at least, prematurely satisfy and benumb our aspiration after good, or pervert even our natural sense of goodness and holiness itself. And do they not, in practice, mislead our charity and zeal, break up our bonds of brotherhood, offend and injure the little ones of Christ, and whisper peace, peace, in many a heart where there should be deep misgiving?

Indeed, this confusion seems the main root of all the evils with which Religion itself, considered as a mixed and imperfect institution, is fairly chargeable. Who would object to it if it were, universally, the aspiration after our Unseen Highest, "binding us together," as we strive, in brotherhood and help? But if we allow our Highest to be lowered to, and confounded with, His own partial manifestations, will not virtual Polytheism and Idolatry result, with all their moral misdirections? our Deity divided into partial and one-sided deities, each of them, perhaps, in some respect below our better self, and ourselves divided into hostile camps; religion the cause of strife and pretext for our degradation. And more, perhaps, than pretext; for how easily can each of us make out of our own partial god a devil, transform our sacrament of communion into a war-oath of division, perhaps convert our humility, and charity, and catholicity, into pious pride, intolerance, and exclusiveness, or, like the Pharisee, make our own true religion our "abomination," and change what should be the highest bread, into the most potent poison of our life? If the light that is in us be darkness, how hopeless is that darkness! If the salt has lost its savour, wherewith shall it be seasoned?

We may well be thankful then for anything, though it were but an adversary's taunt, which forbids us to narrow or confuse our Christ, and throws us back on the broad doctrine of to-day

for reproof, correction, and instruction in righteousness. There is one God and Father of all, and one perfect Image of that Invisible, to mediate between Him and us, and enable us to apprehend His attributes. Other words and things may signify of Him, and lead us up to Him as He leads us to the Father; but we must view them all in reference to Him, and Him in reference to the Invisible, so that all may minister to us a true communion with the Incomprehensible, and make us perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect; and so along with every knee, we too may bow to Christ, and worship Him as Lord "to the glory of God the Father."

The Church does not, indeed, profess to understand all the mystery of the Image of the Unseen, nor to think that "God in the finite" is more "comprehensible" than "God." But it is much more apprehensible, and what she thinks she apprehends she does her utmost to explain. There are who think the explanation more mysterious than the fact; perhaps because it obliges them to ponder a little on the fact, and to attach *some* meaning to the now familiar words we use. But however this be—and I will not now pause on any abstract difficulty—no one, now, outside the Church, and no one inside of it, is entitled to mistake the position she assigns to Christ, as Manifestation of ALL the Attributes of God,—both of Severity and Goodness,—in Nature, in Providence, and in Grace,—in all material and all spiritual Creation—that in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily; that in fact, He is Emmanuel, "God in things," "God in creation;" and His human nature but the climax of our own; "God in our own Creation," defining by its perfectness so much of the divine perfections as to command all forms of human consciousness, and be available for intelligent and assimilating worship. Available, for the present:—His "ideal," now, as He stands at the right hand of God, sufficing for our present wants, as His earlier ideal, borne in Humanity's womb, sufficed for earlier and less spiritual dispensations. When that which He has exhibited shall have been even approximately reached, in the general body of the Church, then, I suppose, it will be time for Christ to come again, to initiate some still higher kingdom and

loftier dispensation. Meantime, as engine of man's assimilation to the true requirements of Jehovah, we preach this Emmanuel, —Christ in all creation; for “by Him all things were made, and without Him was not any thing made that was made”—Christ in all subsistence; for “by Him do all things consist”—Christ in all judgment; “for the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son, that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father”—and, especially, for it comes nearest to our heart, Christ in out-comprehending mercy and universal reconcilment; for “all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to Himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation: to wit, that God was in Christ reconciling *the world* unto Himself; not imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed to us the word of reconciliation.” We preach the objective, as engine of the subjective, reconcilment. God reconciled to us and to all things in Jesus Christ,—creation's part remains; and, “as ambassadors for Him, we entreat you, in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God.”

And this is effective machinery. The Church has done much, already, to vindicate her promise. And as she grows up, herself, to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ, she works also no small regeneration in the world. The action of the cross on ourselves, and through us on things below ourselves, is patent and intelligible. Morality is inspired anew, armed with sword and shield, and trained to victory; heart and intellect are disciplined, expanded, and invigorated. Industry, all civilizing arts, and material prosperity are honoured, multiplied, and blessed, until many a wilderness blossoms like the rose, many a morass and mountain teems with corn and wine, and the very Earth itself yields up new forms of wealth in fabulous abundance. Thus the face of things is gradually changed, even by the outer kingdom of the cross, and of the increase of His government and peace, we see no end as yet. We are told it has an analogous, or, at least, a reconciling action on things above ourselves. How this is we cannot tell. We do not know “the thrones, dominions, principalities,” of whom the apostle speaks. So far as

they know us, they know, doubtless, our Redeemer too. The powers of darkness were gathered round His Agony, not merely as spectators, any more than men; and they too, perhaps, knew not what they did. The Universal Reconciler, no doubt, knows how to make them learn its mystery. We are told, indeed, that *by the Church* it shall be known to them: and at this we wonder. It were as hard, perhaps, for the Church itself to comprehend its own action on things above itself, as for the grain of mustard seed to understand the parable of its growth; or for the loaves and fishes to discern the miracle of the five thousand, or of the three, they fed. This much, however, is clear to even our intelligence, that the regenerating efficacy of the cross depends upon the recognition of Emmanuel there. If Christ be not so high above them all that they look up to God *through* Him, He will not be the centre-point of their regards, nor medium of the Unknown, to them, any more than to ourselves.

It is a theoretical canon, therefore, of the utmost generality, and far nearer to practice than it seems—to *beware of dividing the attributes of God*—of dividing them, even between the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. “Such as the Father is” in His Ultimate Unchangeable I AM; “such also is the Son” in His Graduated Manifestation of Being; “and such the Holy Ghost” in the Exertive Energy of all the Life God gives. It needs not that the unlearned Protestant should aggregate all attributes that are forgiving and beneficent upon some Sympathizing Son, to the disparagement of some more Just and Jealous Father. It needs not that the learned Romanist should aggregate all attributes that are careful and loving and refined and delicate and beautiful, in some feminine ideal of the Deity. It needs not that either should deny the indignant attributes of God, and assign them to some independent author of physical or moral evil. From the Father all things come, in Love; through the Son they are manifested all, in Grace; in the Fellowship of the Holy Ghost they are communicated all. And the process which divides the character of God is a polytheism, scarcely, if at all, disguised. The Son who is worshipped to the disparagement of the Father is a separate God; the “Mother of God” is a fourth

person, besides or above the Trinity; and so is any Devil who can overreach or frustrate the purposes of the Eternal.

But such abstract errors would not arise, or, at least, would not be avowed, except as the secondary growth from practical corruptions; and these always connect themselves with our immediate Object of worship. Here, then, let us take especial pains; and it becomes a practical rule of the highest import—to *beware of narrowing our Christ*; lest we divide Him off from God, and separate ourselves along with Him; lest our Image of the Invisible prove an unlikeness to the Judge and Father of us all, and those who have preached His name and wrought His miracles be obliged to hear from His own lips, “Verily, I never knew you: depart from me, ye workers of iniquity.” The danger lies chiefly, I am convinced, in our confounding the subjective with the objective, and mistaking some partial truth of His for Him. And the caution which forbade to the Jews “all manner of similitude” is surely, in its spirit, as needful among us. We have not graven or molten images, I admit, but are we more free from images *conceived* than were the Jews of our Lord’s own day? or do we need their example to make plain that intellectual religion has its idols as truly as æsthetic, or as still humbler worship; and that these—though they be the just machinery of the true religion; circumcision, national call, temple-worship, doctrine, and the Bible—may be as fatally misplaced, and may as fatally pervert the judgment and the heart, as could the altar of Bethel or the calves of Egypt? Nay, the worshippers of Baalim persecuted the prophets, one by one as they arose; but it was the worshippers of the Sabbath, the Scripture, and the Passover, who filled up the measure of their fathers’ sin, and crucified the Christ.

All this is written for our learning, and it seems all easily understood. Alas! that it should be so easily forgotten! Let us thank, then, even our external controversy, if it force us to discern. Would such misrepresentation of our religion be possible, not to say plausible or popular, if it had not some likeness to the fact? Turn we our indignation upon ourselves, and let it work repentance and Divine revenge. These are not needless, brethren, in

the most Protestant and strictest sect of Christendom. Or, let us, in all mournfulness, take warning by another example, the central one of Christendom, all great and glaring before our eyes. Our Lord in instituting His Sacraments seems to have taken peculiar care to identify their outward part, or "sign," with the simplest and most universal of Nature's blessings—"bread and wine," the sustainment and comfort of our life, and "water," the one essential element of every vital process—apt emblems of Himself; but who would think that blindness could mistake these signs of Him for Him? Yet what is the fact? The extreme case may well startle us into watchfulness, and charity, and care. By a simple transference of objective value to a subjective process, sustained by logical deduction from undiscriminated words, the minister of the largest Church in Christendom first makes, then worships, and then—the fact is too shocking to be less figuratively expressed—then "receives" his God. Paganism has seldom surpassed this, and the indignation of every other Christian community is abundantly deserved. At least it would be so, were they without sin themselves. But, alas! it needs little discernment to perceive that the fountain of the Romish error is not confined to Rome. What community that looks within, and intelligently and justly judges its own too palpable procedure, will be the first to cast a stone at her—all flagrant though her transgression be? When will it be, my brethren, that a Church, our eldest sister and our nurse, which almost feels her own ideal Magdalen to be her type, shall find herself at the feet of her Lord, and, bathed in the light of his forgiveness, shall arise to sin no more?

II. The next proposition to be noted as lying broadly in my text and context, I have largely anticipated. It is,—That this is no scheme of facts involving man alone, and terminating there—dividing itself off, and isolating man along with it, as an anomaly in the works of God. On the contrary, it pervades creation, and bears its essential characters throughout, from the lowest of things up to the highest of things,—each, of course, according to its own power of appreciating the need and the reconciliation.

Whatever it be, therefore, to the "thrones, dominions, princi-

palities," of which St. Paul could speak, we shall certainly not violate his idea by finding its graduated tokens wherever we can, in all that falls within our cognizance. Thus, within our narrow range, if man be built up from the bosom of lower nature; and religion from the nature of man; and Christianity from the nature of religion; and if all these "consist" in Christ, as truly as they are moved by the same Spirit who imparts Creation's Life—then are we entitled, or we are *required*, to find throughout, not merely the energising Spirit, but the sustaining and manifesting Christ;—throughout; not merely in scattered and isolated emblems, but in the connected character, the discerned tendencies and purpose of the whole;—throughout; but in a certain order; in dispensations preparing for and rising above each other towards His headship visible;—throughout; but not confusedly throughout; lines of direction are given, and converge towards an apex. On these lines Nature is "constituted;" on them she works, and ever more and more defines herself, as she develops into History. Her *vires vivæ* are wrought into vitalities, her vitalities into conscious and self-conscious life: her rudimentary substance is elaborated into form, her forms ascend and approximate their Archetype; until by the time her Chaos has become a Cosmos, she finds the image of her Maker at her head, and herself the consecrated Temple of His Presence: her motive forces have been wrought up into emotions, her emotions into deliberate motives; the very lines of direction, her primal sympathies and sensibilities, crushed back upon themselves, and rendered self-conscious, have become Intelligence and Love; self-love has discovered its real happiness, and passed into self-rule and self-denial; aspiration and insight have discerned the invisible, and found their home therein; Nature's vague religiousness has been gathered into definite religion; Creation's Pantheism has been educated into Theism, and built up, and rendered effective in an organized Theocracy.

True, this end is not attained as yet, and there are tumults by the way. The mode and tendency are clear, however; successive approximations have been reached; and glimpses of the end have been already seen. The six long Days of the Natural

Creation found at last a Man "to have dominion" in his Maker's name. The first long period of the Sabbath Genesis reached the King upon the Cross, whom we aspire to serve. His Resurrection and the Pentecost instituted a second Sabbath and higher kingdom of the Unseen. *Its* regeneration works, its ideal rises, and the Great Vision grows distinct of Him sitting upon the Throne, in the fulness of the dispensations, and all things gathered unto Him in heaven and earth, and all things gladly subject to Him, and Hell and Death vanished in the Eternal Indignation. And, true, this end, like every end that we shall ever see—if indeed it be an "end," and not the integration of the movement—is but the beginning of some farther end, in attempting to conceive of which all finite thought is lost. But we know Whom we have believed. In revealing an Image of Himself He has revealed His real character, and though He slay us, we will trust Him now. All farther Dispensations will but unveil some further heights, and depths, and breadths of the ultimate Unfathomable Love.

This is the Scripture outline of the nature and purposes of things. The whole should interpret for us the parts, yet it is not easy always to bear the whole in mind. It may not be useless, therefore, towards the exposition of Nature's or of the Church's Book, if I should vary the expression somewhat; and I will first note that, obviously, all the "laws" of Nature, Providence, and Grace, throughout this scheme, are but the "modes" of God's creating, caring, and creating anew. I assume, of course, that there are "laws:" "God is not the author of confusion, but of order, as in all the churches of the saints." And as He is, doubtless, "like Himself" in all His authorship, there will be a pervading Analogy throughout, and the pregnant Parable, with its successive and ascending, yet *all* literal senses, must be the principle of its Exegesis; as it is the principle of its formation, and of any language in which we may attempt to describe it.

I may next notice, that while Creation's *dynamique*—her forces generally, natural and spiritual—are to be classed as the "operation" of the Spirit, the *Zωοποιός*, or Creative Energy—Crea-

tion's *forms*, her attained results, in proportion to their perfectness, will all "typify" the Son: approximately represent the Archetype; in a veiled and emblematic manner, on their several planes of being, "declare" the character of God and things. And whatever is most truly natural, though but in the humblest grade, whatever most truly embodies the spirit, and illustrates the process of its own creation, will also most truly "parable" the highest kingdom of the Pentecost.

Thus Light and Sound, which announce, as their correlatives, "formation" in the heavens, and tell of Suns and Planets born; and the granite Rock which crusts our own planet's seething chaos, and sustains all its kingdoms, all generated from itself, are prime and constant "types" of Christ. After them, Earth's organic kingdoms, from its lowest to its highest—from the creeping lichen or scarce visible palmella,² in which the decaying rock

¹ This will be *proved*, as I conceive, in Lecture I. It and many other physical analogies are assumed in the Sermons, not in order to rest any moral or religious doctrine on them, but partly as exposition of Scripture, and partly as further instances and illustrations of the principles insisted on. The proof, in this case, depends upon the hypothesis, that when matter, gasiform or not, is heated till it become luminous, part of the heat passes into, or "merges itself in" light, and is no longer operative as heat, at least in the same degree. This conceded—and it is no longer doubtful—it follows that mere motion of a "fluid atmosphere," supposed non-luminous, would generate light, and would, simultaneously, cause the "waters" to agglomerate. In any undulation, heat is given off along the crest of the wave; if the motion, and consequent heat, be so intensified that the crest is rendered luminous, part of the heat then merges itself in light, and there is no longer enough of "latent heat" to preserve gasiform, the "elements," "waters," "fluid atmosphere," or "chaos." Light is emitted, and Formation has commenced. So that Gen. i. 2, 3, is, to the best of our present knowledge, a just and accurate account of the Genesis of Worlds.

² A genus of Confervoid Algæ, very common on damp walls in shaded places. "Among the Palmellaceæ we find some of the simplest forms of vegetable life, where the organization is reduced to the condition of a single microscopic membranous vesicle, enclosing nitrogenous contents, ordinarily tinged with chlorophyll, and containing starch. Such we have in the *Chlorococcum vulgare*, which forms the dryish-green powder upon palings, trunks of trees, &c. This form appears to multiply only by the subdivisions of its cells into two or four new ones, which separate, and repeat the process. It is a somewhat doubtful plant; but if a distinct organism, it is the lowest of the algæ. Advancing a step, we come to a number of genera not yet well defined, in which the membranes of the parent cells soften into a kind of gelatine during the process of subdivision, and hold the new cells together in groups of definite or indefinite form. Among these are *Palmella*, *Glæocapsa*, and others of like nature, in which at present no zoospores have been

begins to be born anew ; or the mustard-seed with its gigantic growth ; or the corn of wheat, which, rather than abide alone,

discovered. In *Coccochloris*, a process of conjugation occurs. Side by side with *Chlorococcum*, as regards organization, stands the genus *Protococcus*, in which, in addition to the vegetative growth by subdivision going on in damp air (the cells being held together more or less firmly into a gelatinous crust), the contents of the individual cells are set free by solution of the membranes when placed in water, and emerge as ciliated zoospores, endowed with active motion. These genera also exhibit a *resting* form, characterized by the increased thickness of the membrane of the cell, and a change of the green contents into a brownish, reddish, or even crimson colour."—GRIFFITH and HENFREY, *Micr. Dict.*, Art. CONFEROIDÆ, cf. SARCINA, PRIMORDIAL UTRICLE, &c.

The dubiousness of these early cell-formations, the interchange of function in them, or even of animal characters, such as apparent choice and active locomotion, with those of vegetation or even of mere chemistry, is very noteworthy. It always impresses one with the conviction that these are the beginnings of life, that hereabouts lies the transition between chemistry and physiology. Nascent things are plastic and indeterminate. The internal *vis viva* is weak and pliable and dependent, the external forces influential in comparison. Whether each of these primal cells shall come to nothing, or to what it shall be *specialized* ; whether it will generate a lower or a higher alga, or lead to something higher than an alga ; what stratum of that humble society it shall pierce and make good its footing in, for itself or its progeny, seems largely contingent upon circumstances. And whence have themselves originated ? have they *all* arisen from spores or cuttings, and have none come up from the kingdom next below them ? I doubt it much. I know not why we should resist the first broad impression that they give—that these are instances of God "creating" still as on the third Mosaic Day—saying still, before our eyes, "Let the earth produce, or let the sea produce" the life with which each teems. There is, throughout, this plasticity in Nature. She is a *vis creatrix*, a generating, forming, and transforming power. This is the nature of life. And the microscope but reveals, in a new horizon, the standing miracle that our eyes have become accustomed to, and familiarity dreams it has explained away. The working of our own microcosm must image it abundantly. Who will tell whether this particle of carbon I eat will become bone, or brain, or muscle, or hair, or a "zoospore, endowed with active locomotion ;" no : I should say a spermatozoon ? How trifling, and yet how immense the difference ! What if a palmella or an oak had devoured the same particle of carbon ? Does Nature do nothing like this in her larger laboratory ? Assuredly she does. But when her scale is large, she takes also larger time, and works out her silent transformations as insensibly as our own small life flows on. These, and such as these, seem the beginnings of her being born ; nature nascent ; or rather her embryology, her unformed, unpronounced conceptions ; tentative and dubious organizing, rude, insignificant, incessant, but of a wondrous "pushing" and productiveness ; the continuance, probably, though in degenerate condition, of the same processes that worked more freshly and favourably in our planet's earlier days. Nature's vigour and ambition have long passed on to higher work than the creation of gigantic zoospores, and nursing them to tree-ferns and sauri.

Mr. Darwin seems to think that all the forms of life upon the earth may prove redu-

will fall in the earth and die, that it may live again an hundred-fold, and be followed by its progeny; or the corn of

cible to three or four, or even, ultimately, to one original type. Very probably; but that one will be something below a primordial utricle. From the humblest beginnings we all have come; and we are all clay in the potter's hand, and being shaped by Him into something "not seen as yet." The plain statements of Scripture, the analogy of common nature, and the geologic history, all alike forbid the idea that the beginnings of life were in any highly organized, or perhaps very definite form. Time and circumstance, the co-operation of all the forces active in our planet, specially combining with the upward energy of life in each, have made things what they are.

It is curious to note how the Platonic tinge which has long prevailed in the scientific world, derived from the Greek culture, mutilates the thought and spoils the language even of those who combat its paralogism. "The origin of species . . . by preservation of favoured races." Why, this is an Irish Bull upon the title-page. What ever *originated* by *preservation*? not even the Hibernotaur: it needs the *vis creatrix* somewhere even to generate a blunder. I am afraid that *merely* preserving the best races of palmellaceæ would not originate either palm-trees or the prince of naturalists, within a reasonable time: and men would take a long period to degenerate even into fauntails. From minute and simple cells, however, differing little in appearance, most varied creatures are, in fact, produced; by the constant operation, that is, of God's Creative forces. Mr. Darwin's Preservation is no better than Bishop Butler's Continuation. Both words begin by omitting the essence of the fact, namely, creation *present*, and end by affirming an untruth. Neither our souls nor our ideas have continued *ab eterno*, as Plato thought, and thought demonstrable. They have truly been "born," and are "being born," let "philosophy" stand never so aghast. And the most favoured races are *not* preserved, Mr. Darwin! What has become of the most favoured races of the Lias, for instance, or of the Chalk? Nay, but better races have been generated—by the accumulation of small *improvements*, as you well describe—to take their place, or much more than their place, in the upward march of life. And it is not for "subsistence" merely that things struggle here—they struggle for much more, and on the whole attain it. Life is ambitious, pregnant, productive. It seeks first to expand and multiply itself in its attained forms or strata; next, on the basis of that abundance, it aspires to better itself in kind. It succeeds in both directions; but the latter predominates in length of time.

And she works her mighty miracles, too, not always slowly, and by integration of insensible change, but also violently sometimes, by compression of her forces round a transition-crisis, or in singular points around her highest line. For this is an error in Mr. Darwin's interesting, and, as I believe, on the whole, unanswerable book. He affirms and argues on the maxim, *Natura non facit saltum*. He could assert nothing more contrary to fact. If indeed he means, as he does mean, that Nature does not spring from one distant point to another, without passing in some way over the intermediate space, he is right enough. But what does "leap" in that fashion? The Hibernotaur, perhaps; nothing else, except the mediæval angels, and their feat is not authenticated. But Nature is full of instances of the *step per saltum*, the decided transition or transformation-crisis, the birth-stage—"that rapid stage of growth which finds or makes for itself permanently new conditions." Every formed organism, from the *Protococcus* up, seems to

wheat which yields itself to be consumed by vitalities above its own, and sinking its own individuality, lives on in them, and

pass through two or three of them during its individual existence. If there be any truth in the astronomy of Herschell and La Place, suns and planets do the same. Mr. Darwin labours in vain to obliterate the chasms of the geologic series, caused, probably, by those cosmic revolutions. And even in inorganic chemistry, the law of definite proportions seems to indicate no more than that in the formation of molecules the same *per saltum* process rules. Nature's infant-plasticity does not last: she loves to define and declare herself in "form," and exerts herself to reach some *resting-stage*, whereon, presently, she develops herself anew. She loves her forms besides, individual and specific, and does not lightly change them, or allow them to be confused; though she adapts them gently to the changes round. If any refuse to be adapted, she "breaks the die," and carries on a fresher.

Another oddity the semignostic perversion of our "terms," has entailed on Mr. Darwin's book. He thinks he is arguing against, and disproving "Creation," all the while that he is demonstrating it, as it were, by the very dissection of its process—showing how it is that God *creat*, or "causes" species "to grow," as he causes individuals, by the co-operation of external and internal forces gradually working out results, and making each result the basis of some new beginnings. This is the only sense in which I ever use the word. It is its fundamental meaning in all our languages, and, as I believe, is the only sense that can cohere with Nature, with common sense, or with religion, with any Christian creed, or any chapter-of the Bible.

Cresco-bi, I grow; *creo-avi*, I cause to grow. *γίνομαι*, I come into being, I become; *γεννάω*, I cause to become, [*γένεσις*, *gigno*, *genui*, *generatio*, *genius*.]—*κρ* *præcidit*, *initium fecit*, *produxit*, *genuit*; *κ* *filius* [*feo*, *fui*, *fore*, *futurus*, *secundus*, *fatus*: *φύσις*, *φύσις*, (*φ*)*νίος*, sometimes digammated in Homer]; and *natura* itself [*gigno*, (*g*)*nascor*, *gnatus*, *natus*] something intermediate between *about-to-bear* and *about-to-be-born*. All this class of words expressing an idea fundamentally different from that of *am*, *sum*, *εἶμι*, *ἰδὲ ἰδὲ* or Being absolutely. Both facts being patent to consciousness; the former being first noticed, as outward and obtrusive, the latter being the prime affirmation of reflection.

Is it in any other sense that we "learn to believe, first, in God the Father, who hath made *me*, and *all* the world;" or in "one God, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible?" Do these mean that God has made *us* and *all* things individually "out of nothing," or made us miraculously, i. e. in the learned-vulgar-miraculous or sign-from-heaven fashion, without natural and appointed antecedents, and without each its place and history in His great growing scheme? Nay, it is not thus that God creates, or that He ever has created, so far as we know, anything whatever—certainly not Man: Adam was "formed," not out of nothing, but out of the dust of the earth, as are all Adam's progeny—certainly not the trees of Paradise: "out of the ground the Lord God caused these to grow," as He caused "the cedars of Libanus which he has planted," and every tree that ornaments His earth—certainly not the creatures of the earth, or of the sea; these God did not make out of nothing, or make somewhere else and place in their future habitat—having first "adapted" them to be "preserved" therein, with a very "designing" and small-scientific foresight, which has only this small over-

climbs up Nature's scale;—from these lowest kingdoms up to the highest upon earth—the Jewish Church in its totality, and all

sight, that neither individuals nor races *are* preserved therein, but die out and give place to better. Not thus, I say, did God make them, but He commanded earth and sea each to produce its own (Gen. i. 11, 20, 24, &c.), and to keep on producing them, adapting them ever, by the very producing process, to their own changing estate and variable requirement. And not thus, in fine, did God create the earth and sea themselves, but gathered them together from the "waters" or "fluid atmosphere" His Spirit set in motion; gathered, by the same cosmic agencies, doubtless, that are still at work generating just such suns and planets as our own, and still altering and reforming ours. This is the Genesis of things, as our Old Book declares, as natural history and natural science every day better illustrate, and as Mr. Darwin in one department truly and successfully expounds. So God created things, and so He creates them. He is, as He always was, Creator; He changes not—"He worketh hitherto" as every true son works, especially the Lord of the Sabbath, regenerating the generations of The Working Week: the natural creation still proceeding as before—not with the same intensity indeed, part of its force has passed up into the spiritual; but leisurely and quietly, it still does, as it were, a Sabbath-day's work, or walks a Sabbath-day's journey, in the Service of the Tabernacle, while it makes each Sabbath a *resting-stage* from which to start anew.

Let it be a definition, then—"All kinds of making, producing, forming, transforming, generating, regenerating—and especially the initial steps of them—are simply Creating, when used in reference to the Maker of us and of all things visible and invisible." A more special sense applies this meaning to the first formation of each thing. These all centre round the conviction, that God "causes things to grow;" and this is the just and dominant meaning of the word in Scripture, in nature, and in common sense. It is the common language, too, and the religious or theological usage ought to differ from it only by making the reference to God explicit. Mr. Darwin, probably, will have no objection to creation in this sense; nor will he regret that the language of our Creeds, Catechisms, prayers, and firesides, as distinguished from that of our semi-theology, is reasonably accurate after all. And he will find, besides, if he take the trouble to search, that the meaning of Creation which he rejects is a novelty and a Gnosticism—unknown to Scripture and the Church, and only an endeavour of Neo-Platonism to compromise with Christianity, and to speak a language which its own dualistic "eternities," or either of them, essentially refuse. So it seeks to convert God's continuous action into a few occasional, or into one spasmodic act; and by way of doing Him honour, would bow Him out to the beginnings of creation, or one step farther; allowing Him, however, to "interfere" sometimes to show it a sign from heaven, without which how could it believe? "The question of miracles," i. e., interference-miracles—writes one among ourselves—"is the question of questions—it is the question of a personal God," i. e., of a small, arbitrary, and "wilful" person, who must "meddle," or this great Nature would find she could get on without him. The Omnipresent Father, causing all things, providing all things, bearing all things, and making all work out His purposes is no Person at all in its theology; to say nothing of Son or Spirit.

Even Mr. Grove's careful language presents the same anomaly. He opposes "creation" to "annihilation," and contends that neither, so far as we know, is possible. In

that represented it; or higher still, though yet but being built, the Christian Church which wonders what it means as it aspires

his sense of the words one admits his conclusion without difficulty: all forms are built out of prior elements, and all force out of prior forces, more or less transformed. One even concedes to Sir William Hamilton, that it is inaccurate to speak of the original crude material of things—that mentioned (suppose) in the first verse of the Bible—as being produced out of nothing. “God produced all things from Himself;” or, in theological language, the Eternal Word is of the substance of the Father. But, admitting this, we cannot at all dispense with the words creation, annihilation, or causation. An army is annihilated when it is utterly destroyed *as an* army, although the bodies of the men may manure the fields. Railways have been created within this century, though iron and steam existed long ago. Light was created when matter, whether gasiform or not, first became luminous, though motion, and I suppose heat, preceded its emission. The forces at present operating might, by compression (suppose), generate a new force; and this would be called a new creation, though themselves were absorbed and lost in it. This is common language, and it is sufficiently scientific. In the same sense that finite individual things *exist*, they have had a beginning, whencesoever the elements of their form and force have come. The total of the forces which form each are its creative forces, whereof itself is one. This one, or rather the highest part of it, in the highest organism, grows to be self-conscious, reflex, and deliberate, and is what we commonly call our “will:” the aggregate determination of our powers, wherein the reflective dominate. Any one force is a “cause,” so far as it is truly operative in producing an effect. “Creation is the Act, Causation is the Will of God.” True, if we understand it right. Better to say *Action*; for though all God’s action may be to Him one act, yet to us it is continuous, and seen and felt in parts; and though God be the ultimate, and perhaps in the strictest of all senses the immediate, Cause of all, yet to us all force acts from matter and form. As Mr. Grove insists, all force that we know is inseparable from matter; in the theological form, all creation is by the Son, and by the Spirit proceeding from the Logos. As we try to grasp Totality either in time, or space, or circumstance, we perceive the Continuous to merge into the Simultaneous—Time to be our differential of the Eternal Now, and ourselves and ours to live and move “in God.” But we must think and speak “in parts” notwithstanding, and must resolve even our own totalities in order either to consider or to deal with them.

The most ingenious illustration of the unnatural sense of the word creation is Mr. Gosse’s *Omphalos*. This gentleman is a believer in all the uniformities; but he is also a student of Nature, and has faith in the cogency of reasoning—and these perplex him sadly. For while the Platonic “reason” would evince “the eternity of matter in its present forms,” which respectable hypothesis does not square with Revelation, “Experience” tends to demonstrate that other unbearable idea—“the development of all organic forms,” *aye*, “out of gaseous elements.” So in his perplexity (p. 128), he re-discovers for us creation, and this solves the dilemma. After this fashion:—“The arbitrary will of God gives each thing an unnatural, or rather preternatural commencement,” so that they come into being, all at once, out of nothing, full-grown or half-grown as the case may be, and with the “marks” about them which would, indeed, be “signs” of a previous history only for this *deus-ex-machina* creation, but which, now that it is remembered, all prove simply—nothing. Things look, it is true, as if they had taken years, centuries, Mosaic

to be His Body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all—these are the present embodiments of God's goodness among men : good

Days to grow ; but they have neither grown nor been caused-to-grow ; they have only been—created. The mere "fact of creation stultifies all the conclusions we might form from such premises, since it does, *ipso facto*, contradict every such thing as a previous history."—p. 169.

For instance, "Look at this *Agave*. Its thick, fleshy, glaucous leaves, with spinous margins, and pointed ends, are arranged in many whorls, on the summit of a stem which is scarcely visible, as it barely rises above the soil. From the centre of the crown springs the stately flower-stalk—itsself a tree of forty feet in stature—having a cluster of yellow blossoms at the extremity of its candelabra-like branches. Have we any clue to the past history of the plant ? The tall flower-stalk, it is true, is of rapid growth, its whole stature having been attained within three or four weeks. But those massive leaves ! Each of these lasts many years, and their development is as slow as that of the flower-stalk is rapid. Certainly, we cannot assign to this individual, in the very vigour of its inflorescence, an antiquity of less than half a century, and perhaps it may be considerably more"—so we might be allowed to reason only for Creation—but this included—"You are altogether wrong ! for it is but just called into existence."—p. 147.

And so with a lively style, and "fifty-four illustrations on wood," he takes us round the world, examining "bird, beast, and flower," and easily exploding all pretence on their part to one day's or one hour's existence prior to his inspection. He has only to pronounce the talismanic word Creation, and *presto*—their past is gone. He does not apply his solvent to cities, churches, books, or even to the Platonic idea ; but surely these are "things visible or invisible," and therefore have been created. Suppose then we apply it now, to St. Paul's Cathedral, say, or St. Paul's Epistles, or this new book *Omphalos*, or its author, or to the Book of Genesis, or the Christian Church ! These bear marks, indeed, of some prior history ; but, then, they are "things"!! Mr. Gosse is too orthodox to doubt the creeds, too good a naturalist to mistake the marks, and too good a logician to higgie with his elenchus. They have, then, but just comen to being : the fact creation stultifies all other inference. But have they done so much ? do they now exist ? How do we know ? Surely, whatever will dispose of one set of marks, depending on our eternal memory and reflection, will more easily dispose of another set resting on our vulgar and variable senses. Whatever stultifies the past stultifies the present, and relegates Creation to the "abyss" of negative ideas.

Thus, doubtless, Mr. Gosse intended we should reason, and so his book is an elegant *reductio ad absurdum* of his two postulates—1, [the Gnostic] Creation, and, 2, the persistence of species ; especially the former, without which the latter had never pretended any agreement with the Bible, or with fact. He deserves credit, moreover, for discerning the point of our semi-theologic controversy ; and by fixing attention on the ambiguous term, has exposed the central paralogism, and, as he classically insinuates, *rem deducit ad umbilicum*. Henceforth, any argument against growth, and for immobility, should be called the *argumentum ad umbilicum*, in his honour. But, though praising his logic, one cannot praise his physiology. His Platonism afflicts it with a cramp. "Nature is a circle, returning into itself ; Creation is an irruption into this circle." Each clause is only more erroneous than its fellow. If Nature were a circle, Creation would

in themselves, and steps to something better; they are crumbs from His table, foretastes of His covenant, rudiments of His

not break into it, but would have "created" it and all its belongings. But *where* is nature a circle, Mr. Gosse, or even an ellipse? Nay, her course is a spiral always, whether she projects a planetary system, or seeks to climb a twig—a spiral with well-marked nodes, forming the natural beginnings for each successive sweep; and each sweep—though to help our rude conception we call it a circle or ellipse—is never a *bare* circle, but a pregnant and productive one; it has been creating all along, and comes back to near the node again, bringing its sheaves with it—the grain of wheat thirty or sixty-fold, the germinal vesicle a million or a billion-fold, besides the influences it has scattered by the way. And Nature *never* returns into herself. She never replaces the same thing in the same spot of space, or time, or circumstance. "We never bathe twice in the same stream:" the spot itself is changed, and so is what would bathe there. Nature herself is on a pilgrimage, and all her sons with her. He is the truest son who is most penetrated with the spirit of her mission.

Even Mr. Grove's work leaves some feeling of disappointment: for he makes no attempt to ascertain by what law his "forces" are "correlated," or whether there be any law. His main position he, no doubt, establishes. "Heat, Light, Electricity, Magnetism, Chemical Affinity, and Motion, are all correlatives, or have a reciprocal dependence . . . either may produce, or be convertible into any of the others; thus, heat may mediate or immediately produce electricity, electricity may produce heat, and so of the rest, each merging itself as the force it produces becomes developed—it being an irresistible inference, from observed phenomena, that a force cannot originate otherwise than by devolution from some pre-existing force or forces."—*Correl. of Physical Forces*, p. 15.

But, now, is it a *mere* reciprocity that exists among these forces? will they pass into each other backward and forward, and with equal facility in each direction? Is there no natural scale or "hierarchy" in their constitution, no natural line or order in their transitions? Have they no *ambition* to climb nature's scale, so that they "prefer" to move upwards rather than to rest or to descend? I have expressed my belief (p. 60), that they have, and that *this* is the law of their correlation. It may be called the law of Ambition, Aspiration, or Ascent; of upward progressiveness; of a persistent self-denying tendency towards the higher and the better.

When we say "higher" or "lower," of course our reference is ultimately anthropomorphic. We reckon those things the highest which come nearest to our own highest parts, or which we feel to command them. So from our own, and from nature's constitution, we get, as a first approximation, the following scale of her forces—mechanical, thermic, luminous, chemical, vegetable, animal, spiritual. Whether magnetism, electricity, galvanism, be *direction* merely, or whether they be generative also, and should be intercalated in the above scale, does not appear at once. If the former—for which there seems much ground—they may prove to be but the physical beginnings of instinct and intellect, of the power of imitation, association, habit, and law, having their physical expression in direction, polarity, and form.

But whatever the details, some such scale as the above any one would draw out. Has it not its basis in fact? How should it be tested? What we should expect if it

communion; they impart of the spirit that is in them, and, with their faces thitherward, preach the coming Lord. More

were true is, that it would be easier to convert motion into heat than *vice versa*; easier to convert heat into light than to get back nearly the same amount of heat from the light again; easier to convert light into colour, or permanent chemical effect, than to reverse the process; easier to use up a large amount of digestive power in producing an ounce of protein, and a pound of blood in generating an ounce of brain, than to elicit from the smaller bulk the larger ruder force again. And this is, on the whole, the case, though nature is very willing to degenerate *in parts*; and many striking and effective processes, such as the rapid combustions and explosions, seem to depend on "degradation." Mr. Grove does not raise the question at all—rather seems to think that there is no scale or order in the correlation. But his book, like every book, seems full of instances which indicate the contrary. To take the humblest—he approves of Mr. Joule's estimate of the amount of motion that must be merged in order to produce a certain amount of heat—"a fall of 772 lbs. through a space of one foot is able to raise the temperature of one pound of water through one degree Fahrenheit."—p. 30. But, now, to reverse the problem—will a fall of one degree in the temperature of a pound of water raise 772 lbs. one foot? Mr. Grove thinks that "theoretically it ought" (p. 76), but acknowledges himself "startled" at the requisition. On the theory of a perfect reciprocity, it ought; but is this established, or is it probable? He enlarges on the difficulties with which circumstances surround the endeavour to bring about any such result; the great loss of heat in our steam-engines, the inferiority of our methods to Nature's, &c. Just so—and what has produced these circumstances, so that the forces work kindly and effectively in one direction, awkwardly and unwillingly in the other?—these very forces themselves, which in these very circumstances have written out their law. Nature climbs, and makes her forces climb, and willingly absorbs her humbler into her higher powers.

Though admitting that geology "countenances" the progressive cooling of the earth, he seems unwilling to adopt Mr. Thomson's idea, that the heat of our planet and system are being *lost* by radiation into space. There are few who will not share in his unwillingness. It were sad and hard to think that Nature is degenerating as a whole, or could die out; to say nothing of the palpable assumption of the *finiteness* of Creation. And Mr. Grove's own labours discover for us a far more encouraging account of the phenomena. The heat has passed into higher grades of force, and is sufficiently accounted for by the presence and results of the upper vitalities of earth. It is the constant effort, and almost the definition of Life, by absorption and expenditure of humbler forces to develop itself into higher. The geologist and astronomer help us to measure how far this tendency has verified itself in History.

Sir Charles Lyell, as a geologist, early discerned "that the present state of the organic world has not gone on from all eternity, as some philosophers had maintained;" yet even he has been embarrassed by the philosophic idea, and obliged to compromise, from time to time, with it and its unnatural creation. First, there have been many "successive creations;" one, our "living creation," now many thousand years old, being but the last of the series;—"creation" standing for the introduction of new forms, which have *not*, he thought, been transformed from other species.—*Elem.* ii., 487. But this conception is always threatened by his view of the silent and gradual working of Na-

pointedly, the key-processes of religion which were designed to set Him forth—the sacrifices and the sacraments; the form and

ture's changes. The coming in of new forms, and dying out of old ones, being shown to be gradual and universal, "creation and extinction," it is implied, must be so equally; as i. 200; and "the great law of change, by which distinct assemblages of species have been *adapted* at successive geological periods to the varying conditions of earth," he does not hesitate to call a "creative and destroying law."—ii. 47. But surely, this law is operative at present as well as volcanic or aqueous agency, and the Anglo-Norman "variety," and the Jamaica Creole, have been created in modern times as truly as the Dodo has died out.

In the *Principles* he argues strongly for the immutability of species, on grounds which, I confess, have always led me to the opposite conclusion. As he has modified that opinion, and almost stood sponsor for Mr. Darwin's book, his arguments need not be criticised. But I will respectfully solicit those of my own profession who insist on the interference-miracle-theory as applied to creation, and seem to think Religion and the Bible interested in the hypothesis that Nature's laws were suspended or violated in the production of each "head of a species," to ponder a little on such a passage as this; from Sir C. Lyell; while arguing *against* development:—"It seems probable that the aquatic tribes far exceed in number the inhabitants of the land. Without insisting on this point, it may be safe to assume that, *exclusive* of microscopic beings, there are between one and two millions of species now inhabiting the terraqueous globe; so that if one of these were to become extinct annually, and one new one were to be every year called into being, much more than a million years might be required to bring about a complete revolution of organic life."—*Principles*, p. 684.

Now, there have been several of these revolutions—Sir C. rather thinks *many* of them. He does not bind himself to the hypothesis of one a year, or one hundred a year, or one in one hundred years; but he *knows* that the new forms came in, not all at once, but gradually—and he thinks the above conception fairly supposeable consistently with the known facts.

Now, I ask what were all these *miracles* for? *Cui bono*? To attest some revelation, perhaps, to the Corallines, or Encrinites, or Ammonites; perhaps to the Batrachians or the Plesiosaur. Is there not some *economy* of miracles? Why do we reject the mediæval wonders, or the Marian^s visions in Auvergne, or the coat of Treves, or the blood of Januarius, almost without examination? We want a purpose—a sufficient reason for Nature's violation. Indeed, the only purpose now thought allowable is to attest a revelation. What revelation do these attest? what revelation requires this expenditure? what religion or revelation commands, admits, or could endure it? As long as it could be thought that these creatures were summoned into existence instantaneously, or within an hour or day, then the announcement upon authority of something so stupendous could produce the effects of a miracle—not those, however, on which the "evidence theory" insists. But such hypothesis is no longer tenable. The heads of species, in millions or billions, came in slowly, gradually, in long geologic, astronomic, or Mosaic days: and *now*, our conception of creation melts into something far more stupendous than any "miracle"—the idea of God's constant self-expression and patient love and care. Let us thank the geologists for exploding, in one department, however unwittingly, a sign-from-

fashion of the Temple and its services ; and the Book which translates them all into the New World of Literature—these, and such as these, as faith renders them significant of Him, are not only “ emblems,” but “ forms” of Christ, and can convey the communion of Himself. Each of them, within its little octave, is a “ word” of God to us, and has undulated from THE WORD which, from the beginning, was with God and was God.

Nor is there any confusedness or vague Pantheism in this. A certain spirit animates them all ; a certain direction they all take. And though the beginnings be, to our apprehension, rude, dubious, unpronounced, and almost chaotic, yet they tend ever to build, define, declare themselves, as they rise upwards, first into Humanity, and next into Humanity’s Ideal. All things are *from* Him, and spring from His sustainment ; all things are *to* Him, and reach forward to His Epiphany. All Nature is “ being born” towards Him ; all Creation being “ caused to grow” towards Him ; all the generations converging to His Genesis, all the regenerations to His next forth-coming ; all the dispensations building an altar to Him Unknown, whereon He is

heaven doctrine which tended to make us Scribes and Pharisees, and hide God’s great living miracle from our apprehension : exploding it, I say, by the simple delineation of what God has done. For what He has done, He does. Surely, Sir Charles ; the great *creating* law which produced these, year by year, was an *adapting* and *transforming* law—the law that worketh now.

I will add a word on the mutability of species. There is no doubt that Nature indurates her species in lapse of time, as she does her individuals. The law of habit perpetuates itself in successive generations, until each well-approved and useful edition has become a stereotype. To ask a settled species to seriously change its character, is to ask a man of fifty to become a child of five again, and grow up a different man from what he is. But the world slowly changes, and each thing must change along with it. If old-established races be able to do this, they have a great “ natural advantage,” and will hold on their course ; if not, they must die out, and give their place to others. And where will the others be found ? Lower down the scale, among the more versatile junior members, or the pushing proletaires ; in the “ ruck” or cluster that lies behind, and has pith to bide its time. In the unpronounced species—unpronounced, simply from their versatility, pliability, freshness—if they be green and strong, lies always the hope for the future generations. The prospects of each coming kingdom rest always on the little ones. As each new dispensation approaches, God must raise up, from these stones, children unto Abraham. The builders will reject the stone—it is not *secundum artem*—the new wine must find new bottles for itself. This is God’s doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes.

seen and transfigured for a moment, and then a cloud receives Him out of our sight, to wait until the educated consciousness of earth is prepared for a nearer image of the Unseen, requires a higher climax for its attained results, a higher ideal for its next aspirings. This head and origin of the vitalities of our planet, and Lord of its perfections, is our Emmanuel, God-in-our-Creation; and we believe that He is something such to every other Creature that there is.

And thus ever manifesting God, and ever crowning that manifestation as each edifice is ready to be consecrated, He is THE Temple of God's Presence and home of His Indwelling; as truly as our own constituted body is the temple of our highest life. Temple of God, first in the totality of that creation which all consists in Him; and last, in the elaborate perfectness of that Humanity which veils His holiest shrine—holiest, at least, that humanity can enter. Intermediate between these two, other courts might be enumerated, or a succession of them, beginning with "His body, the Church," and then the approaches of the Gentiles. The ground-plan of things, in truth, is but this succession of court within court, expounding the mystery they veil. And now the mystery is half-revealed. Behold, the foundations hide themselves in the figure of His Cross, and the elevation pictures aspiration and ascent towards the cross in glory. Deep rests that Cross upon the Rock, and of the Rock all is. And thence the building lifts itself, and grows and harmonizes, as arch glides over arch, and tower and dome and pinnacle and spire climb, upwards ever, with a true direction and a boundless ambition, to where He summons us Unseen.

In fact, related thus to the first-born every creature, all creation is one temple of Jehovah, and all in some degree conscious of the I AM, although a reflex and cultured consciousness inspire its highest parts alone; though only the appointed ministries may perform the service, and only the great High-Priest, and he but once, can enter within the veil. Yet even the little ones can chaunt mysterious words they hardly care to understand; few can preach or pray aloud, yet all can say Amen; and when the highest priest proclaims the peace of God, the very

air can carry on his voice, and the polished stones reverberate the highest word he says. All thy works praise Thee, O Lord, and thy saints, more conscious, give Thee thanks; the King of saints is gone to the Great Mercy-seat, to lay, and with a brother's sympathy, the offerings of all creatures there. With Him and with His Offering, God will be well pleased. He has but crowned His Father's work, and done His Father's will.

Again, the "inspiration," the life and breath of all this constituted Cosmos, is the Spirit of Christ throughout. Just as in the temple of the body, the life that animates it *all*, however its forces separately be classified—mechanical, chemical *vires vivæ*, surd and utterly unconscious, vegetable, animal, cerebral physiologies, up to that which consciously aspires to live our resurrection life—and however these, on their several planes, be truly correlated with the forces round—is yet, specifically, *human* life throughout; nay, is *the* life of the individual A or B, and the constant working of all the parts, conscious and unconscious, tends ever to build up and manifest that man; so in the macrocosm, the *ἐνέργεια* of it all, the forces which animate creation, and keep ever building it up in ascending forms, themselves transformed the while, towards the hidden Archetype, is the archetypal life, the Spirit of the Eternal, ever-begotten, ever-ascending Word—"Proceeding from the Father and the Son;" generating all God's self-manifestation, and proceeding thence in turn, as it makes each result the basis of some new beginning, and ever "shows" some higher glory of the Father. The Spirit of Christ, as truly in the humblest as in the loftiest light, and work, and word—on the first natural day, when, from motion generated, light sprang forth and told of planets born; as on the first Sabbath-day, when to emotion "tried," law and sin and grace were visible, and morality was born; or as on the second Sabbath-day, when the Pentecostal fire showed immortality brought to light, and Christianity was born; or, as when "yet once more," on another great "to-day," whereof our Births and Sabbaths are a shadow, He shall be again "Begotten" and "Revealed," and in the First-born of every Creature, all Creation shall be born anew.

Unconscious truly are the humbler powers in our great and in our little world, though they be vital, essential, and the basis of the rest—the force that circulates our blood, assimilates our food, or draws our vital breath; or, higher up, those that build our form, and generate our brain—yet on the summit they begin to find a reflex knowledge of the whole. Unconscious, too, the powers that build the earth, and light the firmament, and daily and nightly open the portals of the world; but not unconscious the growing Church that seeks to worship there, and never unconscious the Faith that saw it all to be the Home of the Unseen, and only aspired to make itself a shrine. Until towards some end, indeed, the inspiration of the Architect may be easily mistaken, feebly seconded, unwillingly obeyed; but as some wing or tower grows into form, all catch some glimpses of His meaning, and the humblest workman will think he can expound the total of His plan. Yet some features of the archetype were always visible; some that define their pervadingness at once, and repeat themselves in great and small; and the prophetic insight was able to discern them, even in “carnal” dispensations, and in the “weak and beggarly” rudiments of the world.

Thus, we are expressly told, it was Christ's Gospel which Isaiah's prophets preached upon the mountains,¹ and which the High Priest and Passover set forth² from year to year. Into Christ was Israel baptized³ in the cloud and in the sea; Christ was the spiritual food they ate and drank, and Christ they tempted when they sinned. It was Christ's reproach⁴ that Moses endured in Egypt, and Christ's “kingdom of heaven within you,” that he preached,⁵ when, holding up circumcision, he preached the circumcision of the heart. It was Christ's day that Abraham rejoiced⁶ to see, and Enoch⁷ also, and, doubtless, Adam too. Nay, it is Christ's glory⁸ that the heavens themselves declare, as day

¹ Rom. x. 15.² Heb. viii to x.³ 1 Cor. x.⁴ Heb. xi. 24.⁵ Rom. x. 5, sqq.; cf. Deut. xxx. 6, sqq.⁶ John, viii. 54.⁷ Jude, 14.

⁸ Rom. x. 17, sqq.; cf. Ps. xix. The thing insisted on in such passages seems obvious, yet is frequently forgotten. It may be well to remember that the *three* key-points of St. Paul's preaching are—1. The universality of man's need of redemption; 2. The universality of Christ's redemption, co-extensive with the need; and 3. The iden-

unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night declareth knowledge; and there is neither speech nor language, but their voices are heard among them. These lower Gospels are Christ implicit; the highest Gospel is but Christ revealed. The same fundamental principles and character pervade them all. Whatever expounds them the best, expounds Him the best. Whatever best embodies them embodies Him, and in Him but embodies the Spirit of Creation, and expresses in Form and Word what is everywhere labouring for utterance.

And whatever, in fine, could thus embody the Spirit and Power of Creation, or of its highest sections, carry its products to a climax, and make itself the apex of its builded cone, must do more. Nature's vitalities ascend in search of the Invisible. *Where shall they reach it? Where find their "object" and their "end"?* It must be *in Him, and through Him*. He must pass their lines through Himself, regenerated as they pass, out into some higher consciousness—must make himself the generating medium of some higher life, centre and origin of some more celestial light. And these new forces will be correlated with the rest. Arising from, they will react on them, and tend to inspire them with their own superiority. Naturally they would spread downwards around the cone, and in time climb it up again, to repeat the process in some point above it to which they are now related. This is barely conceivable, perhaps. Yet it seems something like the relationships affirmed of Christ. Visible apex of the dispensations past: unseen sustainer of the dispensations present, and summit of those to be. Attained perfection of the humanity we see: "quickeningspirit" of the humanity we have "conceived," and which we feel struggling

tivity of the principles on which this Gospel is administered—Jew and Gentile alike can only be justified by "faith:" and faith is always faith "in Christ," whatever be the signs or indications of Him vouchsafed to each dispensation. These positions, and in this order, are explicit in the Epistles to the Romans and Hebrews; quite as strongly, though less formally, they pervade the Bible. Perhaps the distinctest statement of them is our Lord's exhaustive picture of the "judgment"—Matt. xxv. 31, sqq.—to which I often refer. *All* are acquitted or condemned according as they had or had not discerned and done their duty *unto Him*; though perhaps the most had never heard His name! They had not been left, however, without His representatives.

to be born within us: and formal climax of what it shall attain. To Him the past converged, and in Him culminated. To Him the higher present and its future tend. We are formally baptized, on one hand, into Him whom Judaism ceremonially preached, the patriarchs rejoiced to see, paganism ignorantly worships, and the lower kingdoms implicitly obey; and, on the other hand, our baptism is our professed participation in His resurrection life, and the beginning of our assimilation to His ideal in the heavens.

III. But omitting this, or any attempt at explanation, my *third* proposition also is thus largely anticipated. Namely—that the most eminent and peculiar privileges of the Christian Church, or of its highest sections, are “of a piece” with all this scheme; not suspensions or violations of it, not a series of exceptions from, or an unlike addition to it, but simply its own highest and most conscious part.

I have argued this at length; it lies on the surface of the passage. Observe how St. Paul’s strong expressions rise without effort from their context. That reconciliation which translates an individual “into the kingdom of His dear Son, and makes him inheritor with the saints in light,” is but the same reconciliation that embraces all creation; not an anomaly in its midst, but its own magnitude and richness brought home to the individual heart. Just as the most “special” Providence is but the most universal and searching Providence “specialized” to the individual, discerned and felt by each as it was intended to be felt; or, as the most “particular” and appropriating sense of redemption—in the sacramental form, for instance, “the body and blood of Christ, which were given *for thee*, preserve *thy* body and soul,”—is but the “particularizing” of the one sufficient satisfaction for the sins of all, just mentioned in the consecration prayer;—so, generally, the most peculiar and “especial grace” is but the firmest grasp and most personal realizing of the Universal Grace.

The reasoning, the eloquence, and the practical appeal of the passage, all lie in this hypothesis. St. Paul deems not that he degrades or dissipates his Christ by identifying His relations to them with the widest functions of manifested Deity; or that

his converts should deem their privileges vanished because he affirms them to melt off insensibly into those enjoyed by the thrones, dominions, principalities above, or by the kingdoms under them. He widens his base, not to destroy, but to sustain and emphasize his climax,—ranges the field of thought, not to bewilder, but to satisfy the intellect, and concentrate both reflection and emotion on this Exhaustive Reconciliation. And this he thinks, *is* a practical appeal; that the knowledge of this Love that passes knowledge should inspire the heart and life; and the vision of an inheritance which only creation measures might lift us each above his narrow self, and enable us to catch the spirit of our calling. Brethren, Nature, and Providence, and Grace, are universal things; they stretch out above us and below; all we see of them is but one moving element. But, *like* their Author, they are *like* each other, and the spirit of one is the spirit of the whole. Only the Highest Light, however, can unveil the Mystery of Providence, or expound the Parable of Nature. He that is at home in Grace, then, is at home in all. He has the spirit of adoption; can say, Abba, Father; and though the humblest in his Father's house, and little intelligent of its economy, can "without presumption" appropriate it all, and feel that all is his.

And as to the apostle's argument:—He wrote to intelligent Greeks, himself the apostle of the Gentiles, by especial call, by birth and education, by especial taste and knowledge of their wants. Well must both he and they have known that unless he could preach them Christ in this universal and exhausting relationship, it were vain in him to preach them Christ at all. It were less than foolishness to expect cultivated men, at the risk of their position and their lives, to abandon their antecedents both of piety and thought, for some other thought that could not meet their first inquiry—to renounce all other worship, and bow down to Christ, except upon the supposition that He was no partial-god or genius like the rest, but that He truly reached and comprehended the Attributes of God, and that the corresponding relations with God's universe were all acknowledged and sustained.

Vain in St. Paul, I say, to preach any lesser Christ to the Colossians, and vain in St. Paul to preach it to himself—vain in the Church to attempt imposing any lesser Christ upon the world, and vain in the Church to attempt believing such herself. On the strength of Paul's and John's conception Christianity worked its way into the educated mind of the ancient world; on the strength of it the Church matured her doctrine, and placed it broadly in her creeds—expressing herself as intelligently as she could, and not more firmly than she required. On the strength of it she worked again among the young nations of the modern world, and built her present Christendom. To it she adheres instinctively, as the very key-stone of her faith, whether or no she can think it sufficiently understood, and it needs no great discernment to perceive that by this cardinal point, considered as a doctrinal system, she must stand or fall. But then it must be in its breadth. Its exclusiveness and its catholicity must be one. Its oneness must embrace the universe. The whole doctrine is destroyed by any partial statement of it. We can listen to no definition of God which forgets that He is the Universal Father, and to no definition of the Son which makes Him other than the Image of *that* Invisible. In peaceable or stagnant times it is possible for the Church to repeat mechanically her largest formula, with little perception of its meaning, and less conception of its need. And at all times nothing is more easy than to forget the rock whence we are hewn, and to crystallize our most catholic and living words into some sectarian Shibboleth, reversing, perhaps, their letter, scope, and spirit, and fain to explain away their first literality and breadth as some strange poetic or prophetic license. How easy is it for us, brethren, to repeat the Jewish error, and almost to believe that we honour God by confining Him within the buildings of the temple, or that we elevate the Church or Gospel by building partition walls around them or around ourselves—in hopes, perhaps, to purify thought or sustain devotion by dividing us off from the breath of heaven, and the light of day, and the sympathies of human kind! But God has agencies to shake us from our illusion, and make us feel the force of the grand old simple

words we say. The exigencies of her own position from time to time oblige the Church to "remember" both her Master and herself; and are doubtless the natural appliances by which her life and wisdom are developed, and her abiding Paraclete leads her on, or leads her back, and "shows" her the all things that Christ hath in the bosom of the Father.

Some of the topics on which I have insisted are not, I acknowledge, as familiar as they ought to be to some of the self-satisfied semi-theologies which pass themselves for "popular Christianity." It is more important that they should accord with the voice of Nature, with the massive teaching and sentiment of the historic Church, and with the general tenor and explicit statements of the Bible. And this, I believe, they do. Less than the above three propositions, for example, would certainly not reach the *requirement* of my text and context, or their innumerable parallels; and as little would it justify our creeds and worship, or the manifest theory and profession of "the Gospel." In my comments I have admitted a greater latitude, or even accepted some expressions with which I have little sympathy; but I trust I have advanced nothing not susceptible of abundant vindication. In the language of Bishop Butler's philosophy, they amount to this:—

I. Christianity is no afterthought in creation—no patchwork remedy for unforeseen disaster. It is not isolated from the "moral," it is not isolated from the "natural" government of things. It is "of a piece" with them, like them, involved in them, and an essential portion of their scheme. In fact, it is the part which expounds to us their scheme¹; working to their head in Nature's "course," standing at their head in Nature's "constitution," rendering explicit their scope and principles, and harmonising their Alpha and Omega to our esteem.

II. All difficulties² it does not profess to remove. That is, it does not profess to make the nature either of things or of their Author "comprehensible" by us. But it does not aggravate any difficulties; it mitigates them largely. For it affirms not

¹ ANAL. part I., especially chs. ii., iii., and v.

² See note D.

merely that all we see is part, and part only, of a "System," but that it is part of a Progressive System¹—of a progressive system in whose constitution the good, the merciful, predominates; in whose course, therefore, it must ever increasingly prevail. That "evil" and all difficulties are "out-comprehended" in the nature and purposes of things as they are in the attributes of Him who sustains them, and must therefore prove out-comprehended in history—must, in its working, subserve the good, and, in its total or its last result, must either be assimilated, or else be eliminated and vanish.

III. The Being in whom this reconciliation is promised is the OBJECT of our worship.² We believe Him to be God—God-Manifest; not the Ultimate, but the Image, or Perfect-Visible, of God; the Son, Word, Expression of the Father; that which brings within our ken and "defines" to us, the Infinite and Inconceivable. Not unknown in history, though as yet but partially revealed—vaguely prepared for from the first, definitely prepared for by connected and fitting "dispensations"—in due time He came into the world; took on Him the nature of man, and *therefore*³ of all mundane things; and made Himself the hingeing point of human history, and largest step in earth's progression. Carried human nature first to its living perfection, and then, through death, into visible resurrection. Fulfilled and terminated in His own person the prior dispensations, and instituted a higher one—so much higher, that in their comparison it is a kingdom of heaven,—and sent it forth to regenerate the earth. Endowed it with the Abiding Paraclete, with the certain light of Life and Immortality, and with a new Ideal of humanity and God;—all our individual, as well as our social aspirations, being intelligently pointed forward to a still loftier Future, wherein we are assured He shall be seen and known of all, and we shall be like Him, and see Him as He IS.

All this is the outward work of the Lord Jesus Christ, easily

¹ ANAL. I. vii. and "Conclusion."

² ANAL. part II., especially chs. v. and vii.

³ For our own nature contains *within itself* all earthly "natures" below its own, and is truly correlated with them as their head. See SER. I. *Second series*.

seen or demonstrated ; and we understand it to be at once the fitting expression and the guarantee of a Hidden Reconciliation, whereof we have but distant and metaphysical ideas—that He atoned for sin in the courts of heaven, and exhausted guilt and death—harmonized God’s perfections with each other, and with our wants and destinies—made Justice and Mercy meet together, Purity and Peace to kiss each other, and in their union to embrace us all. Hence He becomes to us the just Expression in fact and history of the Divine Authorship of *all* things, notwithstanding all their waywardness and sin, of the Divine Sympathy with them, of the Divine Presence *in* them—however He bears Himself to be ignored, and almost allows each one to think himself a god, while yet He holds us each in the embrace of an elastic discipline. And specially Christ is the Expression to us of this Great Principle, that God, our God, takes on Himself the responsibility of all creation *as it is*, and was, and will be ; and will and does conduct its Great Progression *through the Essential Self-Sacrifice of LOVE*. God the Father gives His Son and Word ; God the Word and Son freely gives Himself to work out this Abstract and this Historic Reconciliation.

We most inadequately apprehend all this ; or even the part which is written for our learning—written not merely in the Bible, but also in those principles of “nature” which give the Bible its popularity and power. Even what we do understand or think we do, we are apt in practice to misapply and to pervert. One class of such perversions I have borne in mind to-day. It is not needless, we see, on one side, to add with Butler,¹ that we worship the Lord Jesus Christ, not because of His having been the most eminent of religious teachers, but because of the vast relations which His Work and Being bear to us. Had he never taught at all, we still affirm that the religious regards of all

¹ *E. g.* ANAL. ii. 1, 2 :—“The Son and Spirit have each His proper office in that great dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world : the one our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier.” “And the obligation we are under of paying religious regards to each of these divine persons respectively, arises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us. How these relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes no alteration in the case ; because the duties arise out of the relations themselves, and not out of the manner in which we are informed of them.”

Creation are *due* to Him, and will one day be paid—due to Him *by us* in that form wherein he has been seen on earth, and will be seen again, carrying to its perfection our own imperfect “image” of the Deity—due to Him by all creation, in whatever form creation knows the Son and Word of the Unknown, and ultimately at least to be paid in that form wherein “in the dispensation of the fulness of times, he shall gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth, even in Him;” when before His throne “every knee shall bow of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth; and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.”

And, on the other hand, it is not, alas! needless to insist that all teaching, even that of Christ himself, and all the gifts, rites, books, or ordinances, which He and His Spirit have dispensed, belong only to subjective religion, and have no “objective” merit or redemptive force whatever. So far as they sanctify, they save; so far as they misdirect, pervert, or harden the soul’s aspiration after God, so far they impart “not grace, but condemnation,” and entail on us eternal loss. Church and Bible portray and preach the objective as engine of our subjective reconciliation. This is their lofty calling, and their permanent effect. Whatever they bind or loose on earth, will be loosed or bound in heaven. Let us all, then, lay it well to heart. And obviously there could be no more fatal error than for the church to mistake either herself or her function, much less any portion of her machinery, for the FOUNDATION on which all rests—to assign to the church’s external and appointed, or to any mental or doctrinal portraiture, the attributes of the Unchangeable. This is, in fact, the very definition of idolatry.

Lord, increase our faith. Deepen and sustain our sense of the Unseen. Lift us, each, to the Rock that is higher than I; and enable us, with an understanding heart, to realize The Image of the Invisible God, and first-born of every creature.

SERMON IV.

ISRAEL, OR THE CHURCH NATIONAL.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ Ἰουδαίους μόνους ὁ νόμος ἦν, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτοὺς μόνους οἱ προφῆται ἐπέμποντο. ἀλλὰ, πρὸς Ἰουδαίους μὲν ἐπεμποντο, καὶ παρὰ Ἰουδαίων ἐδιώκοντο, πάσης δὲ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἦσαν διδασκάλιον ἱερὸν τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ γνωσέως καὶ τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν πολιτείας.—ST. ATHANASIUS.

[It was not for the sake of Jews alone that either the Law was given or the Prophets were sent. They were sent to Jews, indeed, and by Jews were persecuted; yet they were, to all the world, a sacred school of the knowledge of God and of the social training of the soul.]

COMPARE 1 PET. I. 10, 11, 12.

SERMON IV.

ISRAEL, OR THE CHURCH NATIONAL.

GEN. xii. 3.

*And I will bless them that bless thee, and curse him that curseth thee :
and in thee shall all families of the earth be blessed.*

THIS ancient prophecy, two or three times repeated during the life of Abraham, and, on occasion of his willingness to sacrifice Isaac, specialized to his "seed," claims attention in two senses, whose lines of fulfilment cross each other, and yet are quite distinct. The first, and more obvious, relates to subjective religion, or the spiritual culture of mankind. The second, and more fundamental, relates to Man's Redemption, or what I have allowed myself to call Objective Religion, though I am by no means satisfied with the term.

Its fulfilment in the first sense lies upon the face of history, and is sufficiently acknowledged. In Abraham and his seed, that is, in the Jewish polity and nation, man's aspiration after God has developed and defined itself. Round the line of the Patriarchs, and Moses, and Solomon, and Christ, human religion has centred, and progressed, and made sure its contact with immortality. And thence it has propagated itself in successive waves of spiritual advancement, the last of which is represented by the Christian Church. Whatever blessings, therefore, here or hereafter, accrue to earth's inhabitants from a higher morality and more true religion, this sense of the promise comprehends, and thus early connects them with the destinies of Israel. This connexion I hope to expand to-day. It belongs to my subject of Religious Progress, of which I have designated Israel as the

*

National or Historic Instrument. In this sense, however, all fulfilments of the promise are approximate merely, partial, cumulative, growing, and as yet imperfect.

But its other and more fundamental meaning has no room for progress or imperfection. It has been fulfilled already, so the Church believes, completely and once for all. The very idea of human religion or its culture rests upon another conviction, and presupposes it—namely, that there exists somewhere in the resources of Deity reconciliation for transgression, some bridging of the chasm between Purity and moral guilt; and this, if it exist at all, must exist perfect, infinite, and universal. God and His nature changes not, whatever the point in history wherein each attribute may be revealed. The existence of this MERCY and its coming manifestation, in the thing signified by Isaac's offering, is what the spirit of prophecy here discerns. And the fulness of the times made good its promise in the Fundamental Fact of Christianity. The SEED of Abraham, in its singular and exclusive sense, that is, the Lord Jesus Christ, or Earth's Emmanuel, has, by one sacrifice once offered, completed for ever the redemption of human kind;—has made a perfect oblation, atonement, and satisfaction, for the sins of the whole world. He came under law, was made sin, and tasted death for every man. He thereby, whatever the logical or the ontological connexion, put away sin; exhausted in Himself, “abolished,” and “destroyed” death, and all mere penal and forensic effects of guilt; and now presents each individual “ransomed” before the throne of heaven, and “free” to receive from the Eternal Providence, whatever of judgment and mercy his individual character requires. Why such ransom or reconciliation should be needed we pretend not to explain; but that it *is* needed the Maker of all seems to have imprinted on the human heart. Christendom and Heathendom alike have felt it; and have indicated their conviction only too abundantly. That the OBJECT of our worship has satisfied this want—nay, satisfied it beforehand, and so converted its very feeling into a presentiment of, a thirsting for, Himself—is the distinctive tenet of the Church, and constitutes her Gospel.

But in this sense the “prophecy” is scarcely a prediction.

It is an insight of the Unchangeable: a vision of the character of God, and the nature and purposes of things. True at all, and it is a truth of Being; underlying the Becoming, and pervading *all* its Dispensations. And in this sense its date of fulfilment and its place in history become utterly insignificant, and disappear. Both the Agent and the Act refuse to be regarded simply as historical, and wrap themselves up in the Eternal Attributes. Before Abraham was, this seed of Abraham Is. Before Adam was, or before Earth was, "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" had established its foundations upon Himself—had reconciled its principles, and balanced all its destiny. Even while expounding those principles on earth, and affirming His own ascension or descent, He is still "even the Son of Man which is *in* heaven." In this sense, Fact, or Word, or Son at all, and He is the Omnipresent Fact and Word, in which all things consist, on the strength of which they develop into history, and by the force of which history itself is shaped into the expression of the I AM. In fact, He is the I AM in history; and behind all its variation and progression is "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." Again, we do not affect to comprehend all this: we only *apprehend* it, and that most partially. The statement comes to us upon authority, commanding while expanding our intelligence. So far as we can grasp it, however, we can perceive it to be consistent with itself and with the best idea we can form of the nature of God and things. If He were not *in* things, where else would He be, and what should become of the idea either of Him or of His image? Any serious departure from it would violate¹ our best idea, and oblige us to seek some other mediator between the Infinite and us.

¹ This is neither tautology nor paralogism. True, our idea, with all our thoughts, has been moulded from childhood by Christianity. But the Church also challenges the best idea without her pale; not merely in antagonism; she believes God is the Lord and Father of all, and longs to learn as well as teach. Will a comparison give the Church *now* less reason than it did thirty centuries ago to chant—"For their rock is not like our Rock, our enemies themselves being judges?"

But their rock is ultimately of the same nature as our own, and essays its likeness. True; it is unscriptural and unchristian in us to forget this. All the children of Noah, of Adam, and, behind all, of God, are bound to Him in covenant. Each man, so far as

But this side of the prophecy obviously belongs not to my subject. Redemption is final, and once for all; only sanctification or culture is progressive. Their continual contact, however, breeds confusion; and one is mistaken for the other. Hence most serious error within and without the Church. I have been obliged to pause, therefore, and endeavour to restate distinctly our whole doctrine of mediation. This I did in my last discourse; meagrely, indeed, yet sufficiently, perhaps, to impress on my younger hearers *two* points which are essential to any just conceptions in religion, and which I trust they will find available in practice. I will repeat them familiarly.

I. The first is the *distinction* itself between subjective and objective religion, or, as it is better to call them, following our earliest instruction, between Sanctification and Redemption.

The finished work of the Son, as distinguished from the continuous operation of the Holy Ghost; the Christian Facts, as distinguished from the knowledge of those facts, or from the symbols which convey that knowledge; the Cross of Christ, as distinguished from the preaching of that cross, or the acceptance of that preaching; the Grace of Christ, as distinguished from the means of grace, or our participation in them; Christ Himself in what He IS, and did, and suffered, as distinguished from what He taught, either personally or by His predecessors or successors; "Christ," in a word, as distinguished from either Judaism or Christianity—one would think no distinction could be more obvious, or more easily preserved! Yet where does one not find it forgotten or ignored, and the divine merits of Christ's reconciliation transferred to the acts and states of his worshippers, or to the machinery which produces them? Will it not

he is a man, is in the image of God, and therefore in the image of His Christ; and we *must* all feel and judge accordingly in the bottom of our hearts. Ah! but how to reach the bottom of our hearts, and cast out all the unclean spirits, and then not leave us empty, but cause the stronger and more natural to abide there and grow: this were indeed a Gospel. But what else does the Church intend?

On the other hand, it is most puerile for writers to keep insinuating in one breath that the Church has plagiarised from nature her fundamental thoughts, and in the next that these do not express the fundamental dictates of humanity.

mark an æra in religious progress when men cease to speak as if they were redeemed by their church-membership or knowledge, ransomed by their creed or baptism, "saved" by the symbols of their faith, or by their faith itself? All these things, younger brethren, are engines of religious culture, and belong to subjective religion. They are the instruments which the Spirit of Christ administers for our sanctification, our preparedness for that future into which, independently of all will and knowledge, "we and all mankind," not shall be, but *have been*, already, redeemed by Christ.

The absolute importance of such things it is indeed impossible to over-estimate. On them hangs suspended each man's individual destiny—his happiness or misery in that future life which Christ has procured for all. For that happiness or misery depends on each man's inmost character, and these are means for the formation or transformation of that character. This, however, is their function and their only efficacy—all other requirements the merits of Christ have satisfied. And the means of grace cease to perform their functions, or may convey "not grace but condemnation," in proportion as they are mistaken for Him, or otherwise perverted and misplaced.

Subjective religion, in doctrine, form, and feeling, is a variable thing. It alters with each individual, and with the individual life; it changes with the nation, church, and age. It has never been completely "formulated," and, I suppose, never will be. The teaching of Christ himself presents not its perfect structure, nor indeed any dogmatic form: this was expressly reserved for the abiding Paraclete. The most perfect draft that we can give of it contains, doubtless, many errors and defects; while its popular shapes are sadly deformed with inconsistency, and so mixed up with imperfections in every conceivable degree, that we are obliged to admit the comparison, sometimes even the contrast, of the better grades of Judaism, or of Paganism itself.

But objective religion underlies all this; and, when it makes itself be seen and recognised, clothes itself in different attributes. It will hear of no comparison, co-ordination, or co-partnership whatever; and affirms itself Unique, Perfect, Universal, and

Divine. It knows no other salvation; it denounces as utterly baseless all other ground of hope except that one Foundation, which it affirms *is* laid, and laid long since, for all. *It is absolutely exclusive*; whatever else man's hopes have found, or his corruptions clung to, without exception or distinction, it wholly disallows. While, on the other hand, *it is absolutely catholic*; for, in sweeping them away, it reveals its own mysterious reconciliation as co-extensive with the universe—as actually embracing conscious man and unconscious nature, as well as the thrones, dominions, principalities, which lie between us and the Throne—rejects all formal and factitious bargainings, and guarantees to every spiritual worshipper, however he call or may miscall himself, or may be miscalled by others, substantial MERCY beyond his purest hope.

Thus its exclusiveness and catholicity sustain and justify, while they require each other; and presenting in the concrete the unity and universality of God, it shrinks not from demanding correlative regards—affirms itself to be Emmanuel—God present in earthly fact; God manifest in the flesh and “circumstance” of that highest creature who represents God here—demands that those who “believe in God should believe also in Him;” requires that all should direct *through* Him the regards which seek the Infinite, and conform themselves to God in the image He reveals.

2. The second point is the *connexion* between objective and subjective religion; involved, indeed, in the preceding statement. This—the one underlies the other; is its permanent foundation; as some might choose to say, its ontologic base. The Christian facts, fully recorded and gradually understood, are the basis of the Christian doctrines. The same facts, elaborately prefigured, and more dimly apprehended, were “the thing signified” in Judaism. And the same facts, more vaguely written in the parable of Nature, in the yearnings of the human heart, and in the forbearing discipline of Providence, aided no doubt by traditional information, were “the thing felt after,” in the philosophic reasonings, in the Unknown altars, in the untold sacrifices and self-sacrifices, and in all the other “unconscious prophecies of Heathendom.” Christ is the foundation, not only of explicit Christianity

but of all true subjective religion, existing or that ever has existed on the globe. All this latter comes from the good Spirit of God. And that Spirit is Christ's Spirit. All He shows to the human race, nay, all He *has* to show, is but the fulness that Christ hath in the bosom of the Father. Whatever truth pervaded their feeble utterances—and the truest apostle would not be the foremost to disparage them—emanated from “the Sun of righteousness;” and, reflected or refracted as it might be, was still of the same nature as the light of our noon-day. He is, in fact, whether men know it or not, “the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world.” He is, however men may call the parts of it they see, *the way, the truth, the life*, by whom alone *any* man cometh to the universal Father. “There is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time.”

Churches should propagate and enforce that testimony—should be the exponents of that Mystery Revealed. But they are under an immense temptation, alas! to obscure the relation that they bear—to make *themselves* “the way,” instead of Christ, and to substitute themselves or some portion of their machinery for Him. What Church is there, brethren, Jewish or Christian, home or missionary, Roman, Greek, or Protestant, which has not yielded to that temptation? Let them well beware of it. There is no more fatal error. I will not pursue it to detail. Is it not obviously the spirit of *Antichrist*, making one “sit *as* God, in the temple of God,” almost fancying that one is God? Among Churches, then, as among individuals, let those humble themselves who would not be abased. Let them take up the cross—their own cross—that symbol *self-renunciation*,—if they would follow His footsteps, and regenerate the world for Him—if they would edify His Body; nay, *become* His Body and His Bride. And one broad truism should help to keep us straight—*Churches are for sanctification, and for that alone*. All else their Lord has done. So far as they sanctify, they save; no further. So far as they harden or pervert the moral character—and it is easy to do both—so far they but enhance man's condemnation; in fact, so

far they sin against the "Spirit of Good," and have done the irremediable wrong. Let them, then, rejoice with trembling; and, instead of each "communion" seeking to proselyte, to rule over, or to destroy the other, and to aggrandise itself in the eyes of "the religious world," let them exhort and help each other to do their Master's work; each, that portion, *kind*, or function of it that each is best able to perform. So will the Body grow from that which every joint supplieth; and so will Christ's kingdom come, and a mighty Temple soon be ready for the dedication.

More generally, by having redeemed us and all mankind, Christ has left for all mankind one sole consideration in suspense—that which He sends His Spirit to administer—our creation anew in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, in such an image that we may be able to see Him as He is, and to enjoy or endure the vision. All other considerations, such as *a priori*, or essential difficulties in "forgiveness," or variation in our abstract relations to God, however such thing can be, He has satisfied and removed, and removed for all alike. "He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world:" so that, "if we confess our sins, He is faithful *and just* to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness;" and so that, whatever may appear to the contrary, and on whatever authority, "there is no respect of persons with Him; but in every nation," and in every "Church," "he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted with Him." Peter and Cornelius, Paul and Mahomet, Abraham and Moses, and Balaam and Balak, the men of Jerusalem, of Athens, of Rome, of Nineveh, the Queen of the South and the Magi of the East, and those they left at home—Christ has redeemed them all; and now one thing, and one thing only, is "required" of each—"to do justice, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with their God." As in Adam all these die, so in Christ shall they all be made alive; and shall stand before His throne, and be judged according to their deservings, and receive in their body the things done, whether they be good or evil. And among both the last-first and the first-last of that all-balanced scrutiny, we may well understand that there may rule at first one predominant feeling

of surprise, that they had each viewed in such a different light, and perhaps called by so different a name, the tokens of that Presence which had borne with, and tried, and taught, and disciplined, and, in the end, had accepted or rejected each. Lord! when saw we *Thee* among us, and did, or did not, as we ought? Alas! brethren, is it not always as it was once—"He came to *His own*, and *His own* received Him not?" There are, however, those who are born of the Spirit, and they know Him from afar.

And this relation of Christ to all religion, or to all religions, is but, after all, a particular statement of His relations to all things that are. In Him they all consist; in Him they all are and were created; and in Him they all are or are being reconciled. He is, in fact, the Manifestation of the I AM: the BEING in the Becoming; in-our-Becoming; Emmanuel; God in our own nature; the Expression in humanity, and *therefore* in all mundane things, of the Eternal Son or Word. He who hath seen Him anywhere hath seen the Father; and he who is truly conformed to Him is conformed to the brightness of His glory and the express image of His person. And everywhere may He be seen, if only in that which may everywhere be seen—the beginnings of our own humanity. This now "knows itself" with awe to be some image of God, and, feeling its nakedness, is fain to hide in His higher humanity, as, with some nascent intelligence and sublime ambition, it springs up towards The Image of the Invisible and First-born of Every Creature.

With these remarks, I turn finally from THE OBJECT of our worship and from objective religion, and resume the direct treatment of my subject. And, it will be remembered, I have rather assumed than made any attempt to prove that there is a Progress in Religion—that God's good Spirit has been conducting an aggregate religious culture or Education of Mankind. He who doubts it may well ask himself the meaning of the Christian Church, or of the dispensations which prepared its way. I have described its nature and classified its Instruments; of which we consider the historical one, to-day, in the National or Historic Israel.

Thus we find ourselves examining the first meaning of my text, and are in presence of another Fact, second only in magnitude and importance to that from which we have just turned. I said also more obvious, that is, to the historian generally; for the exclusive attention we pay to the other may have rendered it less familiar to our thought. Let us note its outline.

That a single family should be marked off, from the earliest, and continued in a certain isolation until the latest periods, in order to energize and lead the religious culture of the world, is surely, if it be a fact, about the largest fact in history. That this nation should have been conscious of its calling from the first; should have announced and repeated it in a series of prophecies, ancient and unmistakeable; should have toiled habitually to realize its thought, generally succeeding best where it least expected; proving the most influential where most disparaged or despised; and achieving its grand successes by its own almost annihilations; these cohere with the main fact, and enhance its impressiveness. And then the details spring into memory and significance; that series of narratives whose graphic power and depth of feeling no familiarity can lessen—sin and struggle, and discipline and psalm, repeated ever in ascending phase—mixed with strangeness, yet well authenticated on the whole; and ending at last in the rejection and death of that Mighty Personage whose name is now the talisman of earth's regeneration—all this, put together, becomes not merely the central and most cardinal Fact of history, but its exponential and transition line. It is more than history. We are made to feel a Mysterious Presence, and must put our shoes from off our feet. Not unlike Nature or Providence throughout, and never violating its sense of unity, yet clearly rising above nature, and lifting us along with it,—here, if anywhere, is Nature in contact with the Supernatural, and History itself becomes a Revelation. The more we consider this burning bush which yet is not consumed, the more we shall discern the I AM in Israel, and in the world it has illuminated. And we shall cease to wonder that the prophetic insight, not in my text only, but throughout the volume, finds it possible to combine the aggregate and the individual "Seed,"

the national Israel with the world-wide Son of Man. They seem indeed as much alike as any aggregate could be to that Individual. At least, the envelope, though but an earthen vessel, was no unfitting vehicle for the precious light it bore. The Scriptures frequently speak of both as one; and they encourage us to carry on the like identity to Joshua or David or Josiah; nay, to every individual who truly bears, or *strives* to bear His image; much more to the Church at large. But we must recall the history.

And, in order to reduce discussion, I gladly accept the eloquent admission of one who would fain force us to treat him as an adversary. In the present half-popular attempt to lower the Jewish Scriptures from their mysterious pre-eminence—reaction, perhaps, of our own semi-agnostic bibliolatry—its early history could scarcely escape unchallenged; and Mr. Francis Newman has sought to effect for it what others have attempted for many historic myths—to strip off the fabulous, and present a credible narration. He almost persuades himself that he succeeds in the details; but when he comes to review the whole, and looks back on the strangeness and value of what he had endeavoured to dissipate, his hardihood gives way. The particulars he can resist; but the general impression of his subject overcomes his criticism, and extorts from his better Soul these remarkable words, which conclude his “History of the Hebrew Monarchy:”—

“We have seen this monarchy rise and fall. In its progress the prophetic and sacerdotal Elements were developed side by side: the former flourished for a brief period in its native soil, but was transplanted over all the world, to impart a lasting glory to Jewish Monotheism.” “Those who saw but one side of the nation little knew how high a value the retrospect of the world’s history would set on the agency of this scattered and despised people. For if Greece was born to teach Art and Philosophy, and Rome to diffuse the processes of Law and Government, surely Judea has been the well-spring of religious wisdom to a world besotted by frivolous and impure fancies. To these three nations it has been given to cultivate and develop principles characteristic of themselves: to the Greeks, Beauty and Science; to the Romans, Jurisprudence and Municipal Rule; but to the

Jew, the Holiness of God, and His sympathy with His devoted servants. That this was the true calling of the Nation, the prophets were inwardly conscious at an early period. They discerned that Jerusalem was as a centre of bright light to a dark world; and while groaning over the monstrous fictions which imposed on the nations under the name of religion, they announced that out of Zion should go forth the Law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. When they did not see, yet they believed that the proud and despiteful Heathen should at length gladly learn of their wisdom, and rejoice to honour them. In this faith the younger Isaiah closes his magnificent strains. Addressing Jerusalem—Behold, darkness covereth the earth: and thick mist the peoples. But Jehovah riseth upon thee: and His glory shall be seen on thee. And the Gentiles shall come to thy light: and kings to the brightness of thy rising.”

Mr. Newman makes little attempt to resolve either the “calling” of this nation, or its own consciousness of its calling, into any more general or familiar laws. Both facts he freely acknowledges; but even this eloquent passage is far from doing them justice. My text, for instance, may remind us how early the consciousness commenced. Long before “the younger” or the older Isaiah; long before the Zion, or Jerusalem, or the prophetic or sacerdotal development; before the Law, or the Passover, or the Nation, or even the Patriarchs themselves; repeated often in every form; sometimes in poetry that might rival Isaiah’s strain; sometimes in grand and simple prose:—thus my context:—“Now, when Abraham was ninety years old and nine, the Lord appeared unto him, and said, I am the Almighty God; walk before me, and be thou perfect. And I will bless thee, and make thy name great, and thou shalt be a blessing. And I will bless them that bless thee, and curse him that curseth thee; and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed.” Nor was this the first.

Nor does his cordial affirmation of the fact itself affirm more than a single section of it. For the influence of Israel upon the world’s religion is not like that which Greece conferred on Beauty and Science, or Rome upon Jurisprudence, when they communi-

cated one grand impulse each, and then melted into the body corporate of nations, to share the mixed result. Israel has been a permanent source of illumination to the religious consciousness. Successive emanations have issued thence, nor is the fountain yet exhaust. Once, twice, thrice, have signal impulses gone forth, and the nation has lived to sustain and enforce them. Even now, marked off more mysteriously than ever, a stranger and a pilgrim upon Earth perforce, it still bears up upon its lonely way, keen, constant, persevering, if dishonoured and asoiled, with its life still vigorous, and its mission manifestly incomplete,—being fitted, one might easily imagine, were there no more sure word of prophecy to tell, by its amazing ordeal, for some future impulse which the world, meantime, is being fitted to receive.

Nor is “the Holiness of God, and His sympathy *with His devoted servants,*” the only or the largest lesson that Israel has learned, or that it is now teaching to the world. Nor, though it be the largest which Mr. Newman himself has firmly grasped, is it the largest that he yearns for. With a pervadingness and intensity that Mr. Newman shrinks from—amiably, indeed, yet not without a moral and religious cowardice whose logical expression is duality—both past and present of that despised nation proclaim aloud, “God is the Lord of *all* the earth; sing ye praises with understanding.” It is hard for us to realize that “all” in the sense of the Bible and the Christian creeds, and harder still to “theorise” it; but Mr. Newman will do them the justice to acknowledge that they never falter in commanding us to do so. When this “adversary” shall have been totally subdued and assimilated, “the lasting glory of Jewish Monotheism” will be more complete.

The national Israel is to be considered in two points of view. As called I. to *learn* the true religion, and II. to *teach* it to the world. Both functions it has been discharging for near forty centuries; the first mainly in the first half of that period, the second, chiefly in the latter. Yet the functions often interchange, or coincide. During its training and growth in Palestine, Israel often impressed, sometimes influenced the nations. And now,

the rebellious remnant, all scorned and scorning as it is, not merely impresses mysteriously the past, but doubtless learns while it teaches, as it did in Babylon before. But the functions in general are broadly distinguished, and each produces its appropriate result. The first is now represented by the Bible, the second by the Christian Church. Its Book is simply a record of its training, a continuous register of its line-upon-line instruction, along with the appliances which had enforced each lesson. By recording these, with some surprising faithfulness and skill, ere other nations had learned to write at all, Israel not only has given to the world its Laws and Psalms and Prophets for what they each are worth, but also, what is still more important, a *type*, or elaborate EXAMPLE of consecutive training, available for nations, churches, individuals. But as the Bible is now an independent instrument of religious culture, and has been classified as such, I will reserve its consideration for next Sunday, and only now observe that the New as well as the Old Testament was written by Jews exclusively. I mean by persons who were born Jews, and who always continued so. No Gentile ever composed a line of it. Although the second volume, indited while "the nation" was trying to cast itself away, the national Israel may be said to have repudiated while it wrote.

The other great product of Israel is the Church; a vigorous and enlightened Son, whom also Israel may be said to have repudiated while it begat. A son of many tribes; son and successor, during its insanity; a strong engrafted branch, which now enjoys its fatness, while it fulfils its office. Yet is not the parent stock lifeless or cast away. Still preserved most strangely, mysteriously, miraculously,—the historian can say no less,—it even now sustains towards both Church and Bible certain functions, which if not very obvious, honoured, or even recognised, are yet in the highest degree essential.

Its production of Church and Bible, and the functions it sustains to each, is doubtless the largest fulfilment of our promise, the largest blessing Israel has conferred upon the world. Mr. Newman and ourselves are almost excusable for attending to it too exclusively. But it is by no means the only one; and our appre-

ciation of it will not be injured by our glancing at the minor impulses which issued from Zion ; at once preparations for and anticipations of explicit Christianity, as well as blessings in themselves. One, indeed, has been subsequent to the Christian era—the religion of Mahomet—a sort of bastard-wave of Christianity itself; or rather of mixed Judaism and Christianity, combining with, reforming, and assimilating the religions of the East, and comprehending their largest truths in one imposing *but unprogressive*¹ lesson. On the obligations of Islam to Judaism I need not here insist. Like our own, they are sometimes not grudgingly acknowledged; and, like our own, the debt vastly transcends the acknowledgment. In fact, the Moslem of Syria are not farther removed in direct descent from Moses or Solomon or Zechariah, than is the Catholic of Spain or the Mormon of Utah, or than at least some sections of professing Protestants. Which of them all is farther removed from Christ than is the Jew of Jerusalem?

In seeking Israel's influence before the time of Christ, our data are less satisfactory. The world's want of books leaves us dependent on the Jewish Scriptures; and these seldom praise the nation's doings, or seek to gratify its pride. Indirect confirmations, however, become available; and I will set down

¹ I mark this as "the essential difference" between Islam and *every* grade of the religion of the Bible. We may concede the Koran to be superior in *some* respects to the Pentateuch, or even to the Psalms—that is, Mahomet supposes, and legislates for, a more advanced society than Joseph, or Moses, or David—and we do concede that Islam was superior in doctrine and morality to the corrupt Christianities it conquered; but then it involved no progressive element; and so the humblest Christianities have passed it by, and it is now an incubus.

Moses places his nation in a posture of Expectancy towards the continual prophet, which grows into a yearning for the Messiah, and a continued advance to meet Him. The Messiah expressly reserves his teaching for the Abiding Paraclete, and places His Church in a still intenter attitude of hope and preparation towards "His coming again." But what *provision* for the Coming Better does Mahomet make? There are who would fain ignore this feature in Christianity. They ought to worship Mahomet. All who "despise the day of small things," who talk of "the Immobility and Uniformity of Nature," and of "Christianity being born full grown," should turn and bow towards the East. We who believe that Nature and Grace are both Creative, and that Christianity is like a grain of mustard-seed, will hope to pass them by.

nothing that is not well supported by, at least, historic probabilities. But we must bear in mind the position I contend for. I have no wish either to disparage the other religions of the world, or to derive them all from Palestine. The Bible countenances no such narrowness or self-conceit. Abraham was not Adam or Noah; and God left not man without religion for several thousand years. In fact, God's covenants with the real or supposed parents of mankind, and His revelations to them, are recorded in the Scriptures; and Abraham's own separation from existing religions, or his reformation of them, is the beginning of his story. His mission was to energize, enlighten, and amend them; to centralize their aspiration, and lead forward their advance towards one and a second appointed climax. Both himself and his seed, therefore, we must conceive of as learning from others as well as teaching them, and willing to adopt and assimilate as well as to confer. Thus, circumcision itself was probably borrowed from Egypt. Thence, too, still more probably, were derived, later on, the framework of the Mosaic institutions and many of its details; and thence, chiefly, through Alexandria, so much of the Grecian culture as the New Testament has consecrated, and, along with the Septuagint Bible, has utilized for the Creeds and Church. Sacrifice by fire, Abraham probably brought with him from Ur of the Chaldees, however specially there preserved; and thence, the later Jews certainly borrowed the bulk at least of their angelography. Other instances will occur; and our Lord's own biography does not disdain to symbolize and to remind us of them—in that he too "was called when a child, out of Egypt," and brought up, where he had at least *occasion* to expand both his reflections and his sympathies, in the Syrophenician borders of "Nazareth."¹

¹ The prediction, "He shall be called a Nazarene," Matt. ii. 23, is not found in any of our prophets; but its idea was very familiar to the nation's mind. It is most touchingly expressed in "the blessing on the head" of Joseph, Gen. xlix. 26, and Deut. xxxiii. 16. In fact, it is the very idea of the nation itself, which was a Nazarite from its birth, as well as Samson or the Baptist. Ultimately the idea is the same as that of the Sabbath, or of any sanctification or consecration—the separation of one for the sake of the rest—i. e. in order to *give* the idea of holiness, which, when formed, can *then* be generally applied so as even to sanctify "the common and unclean."

A general remark upon religious impulses should here be made. It is not those who coincide in the leading opinions of any movement who are alone indebted to its influence. Not by agreement only does development proceed, but also by independent rivalry, and by direct antagonism. In the spiritual world also, perhaps, action and reaction are equal, and, though opposite at the point of contact, equally creative of diffused activity. Even light and shade are produced together, are illustrative of each other, and are perhaps equally requisite for things. It does not follow, for example, because Abraham and Melchizedek only occasionally met, that therefore they were of little service to each other. Nor does it follow that, because, of Hobab, and Balaam, and Jannes and Jambres, and Elihu, and Job, some may have declined intimate union with Moses, and others certainly opposed him, all or any of them were disobedient in this higher sense to the impulse Moses gave. Similar remarks apply to the whole course of the history, and might be illustrated, in modern times, by any of us, on the greatest as well as on the smallest scale.

To begin with the beginning, then, Abraham stands himself connected with a considerable religious impulse in the East. Many traditions exhibit this; for example, those preserved in the Koran. The Scriptures represent him as an influential Pilgrim and Prophet, known in Chaldea, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, and genealogically connected with most of the nations around Palestine. He reforms worship; acts and preaches righteousness; and institutes religious rites, especially one which, thenceforth at least, signifies the separation of a religious society as such; in fact, the first formation of a Church. Into this he introduces his family of many nations, and his remote dependents. Now, either this is history or it is extremely ancient historic myth. In either case all that we contend for is proved; and with nearly equal directness. For such a myth embodies the ancient and popular impression; and the impression in this case is the largest part of the fact itself; it marks him as the centre of a religious impulse. Others, we will suppose, may have instituted the circumcision and righteousness. Abraham must have influenced them largely,

or *their* names and authority would not have gravitated to and been absorbed in his.

Isaac's sojourn is more tranquil; Jacob's more disturbed and active; and in the next generation the habit of the family is altered, and the nomad life exchanged for the agricultural. It is now time that the family should grow into the nation; and the comforts of Goshen, and the centralizing policy of Joseph, work the transformation. An unproductive "liberty," which had already become licentiousness, is taken from them, and they are gradually brought under the yoke of a well-fed, hard-worked, severely treated prædial and industrial servitude. The virtues and vices of such a state succeed to those which made them at once respected and abhorred in Canaan; but the vegetable or physical growth of the people is remarkable. They go down into Egypt seventy-five souls; they leave it in a few hundred years 600,000 armed men, together with women and children, and a mixed multitude besides. Nor were they without a share of the "wealth" their toil had generated.

This brings us to the next religious impulse; and the prominent figure is Moses. The range of his asserted influence is less, its intensity is greater; it is higher cultivated, and more sustained. Egypt, Arabia, and Aram, are sensible of his impression; and it is not the bare institution of a Church, but also of a separate priesthood and ceremonial, of a line of prophets, and of a *written* law that is assigned to him. The CHURCH begins in Abraham, the BOOK with Moses. Here, also, the external traditions coincide; and so do some other permanent results. In fact, not only is his the most ancient of "books," but probably our very "alpha-bets" are derived from his, as even the names import.

His treatment of the nation, too, should be insisted on. In Egypt he is the native deliverer from bondage of men now nearly ripe for freedom; that is, for social and civil freedom, but not for religious. So, having tried in vain to bind them by moral forces, he puts a veil upon his face, lays them formally under

¹ Compare 2 Cor. iii. 6, to end, with the narrative in Exodus; say chs. xvii. 2, 3, 28; xx. 19, 20; xxiv. 1, 2, sqq.; xxxii. 84; xxxiii. 12, sqq.; xxxiv. 29, sqq.

the spiritual bondage of ceremonial and the Priest, and visits with extreme severity those who would insist on keeping up their patriarchal¹ privileges. This is most noteworthy. Let those mark it well who ponder on the means whereby barbarous or semi-barbarous tribes are to be elevated in the scale of nations. We all believe—I do at least—that Israel's is the "type" of a nation's training; exceptional only in its perfectness; and furnishing, not the exception to be avoided, but the exemplar to be followed. Its *method*, then, is not to cast pearls before swine, nor to expect the ear before the blade, but, taking the untutored childhood of the nation or individual, first to nurture and develop its physique, and then train it to such exercise, or gradually oblige it, if requisite, to such "work" as its unfolding energies allow. Presently it will have earned, and will be able to value and to use, one grade at least of freedom, and be fit for the higher "obligation" or "bondage" of some holier ties. These in turn will nurture and insure some higher grade of freedom; and so the process will repeat itself, like the ascending "senses" of a parable, or the ascending analogies of nature's life. I mean by "freedom" in every grade, that measured self-assertion and *correlative self-command*, which alone we can respect in others or ourselves; and which only expresses, after all, that, while developing ourselves and seeking to do our duty, and to attain our own highest visible and invisible, we have acquired besides some knowledge of self and of our sphere. He who knows not this, and cannot command himself, must be commanded by the rest—must, and "ought" to be, for their sake and for his own. He who is able to look into the perfect law of liberty will "owe" nothing to any man, except to love him as himself, and this will fulfil all laws.

The early steps in the individual training are obvious enough. When the youth has passed through his school and his apprenticeship, and has measured a little the capacities they give, he enters the higher school of his Marriage and his Profession. In these more persistent and more precious bonds he develops the higher capacities of manhood, and becomes at once Christ's

¹ E. g. "Korah, Dathan, and Abiram"—Numb. xvi.

bondman, and the accomplished freeman of the truth. The early steps of the nation are analogous, and, I confess, appear to me as obvious. At least, there is no mistaking them in Israel; nor—I say it deliberately—in the progress of *any* other nation in ancient or modern times with whose actual history we are acquainted. The formula is this. When a nation has passed with care and credit, first through the industrial,¹ and then through the religious school—both enforced, if requisite—it will be reasonably fitted for civil and religious liberty; and it will certainly obtain them: the Pharaohs may arise, but the Moses will certainly be born, and will emerge, if needful, from the tyrant's palace. More particularly, settled abodes and industrial employment—enforced if requisite—tillage, town-building, and public works, constitute the first gradation. Physical vigour and material prosperity thence result; give room and force to loftier ambitions; render possible the higher attainment they naturally aspire to; and yet must constitute for ever the basis of the Pyramid. In the case of Israel, Joseph is the master-builder who lays the Cyclopean course of masonry. Pharaoh is the selfish and short-sighted adversary who would prevent the work from rising higher. Moses succeeds in laying the second course, and in insuring the progress of the building.

That course, I have said, was ceremonial and sacerdotal rule; imposed as *absolute command*—no one was allowed much "right of private judgment" in respect to it—but by no means imposed as a *finality*. On the contrary, it did obeisance *from first to last* to a loftier ideal; and it contained within itself, in the instituted line of prophets, an avowed progressive and expansive element to which the whole constitution was commanded to bow down. In fact, that great principle which, as between Abraham and Melchizedek, was expressed by one significant² act, and with David and Solomon becomes a Psalm, is with Moses *an institution*. He makes Aaron at once the head of the priesthood, and his own express subordinate. To himself he reserves the higher position;

¹ This *order* of progression is the *opposite* of Comte's "discovery." See Note B.

² Compare the narrative in Gen. xiv. 18, sqq., with Ps. cx., and Heb. vii. See SER. IV. and V., *Second Series*.

to himself as Prophet and as representative of that line of prophets which was to be directly¹ the voice of God, and was appointed to lead the people's pilgrimage—"a prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you of your brethren *like me*; him shall ye hear in all things; and it shall come to pass that whoever will not hear that prophet, that soul shall be cut off from Israel." This progressive element which Moses "presents" in his own person—and the want of which, perhaps, he had felt, in earlier days, when he was bearing Christ's reproach in Egypt—may be said to be "the Mosaic addition" to the theory of ecclesiastical authority, or, indeed, of authority in general. While ruling the present, it must always look towards the future, and direct the whole towards the coming Better; else is it devoid of "the sense of the Unseen," and ceases to speak for God. At least if God be, as we believe He is, Creator. Let the Rulers always look for It, and always heed Its prophet; and let them take great pains to know the true prophet from the false. There are always many of the latter, and we may *almost* believe them, if we choose. But is there not always "a prophet of the Lord besides?" Let Authority hearken while his "voice" still struggles in the palace; else it will presently come back, in thunder and devastation, from the wilderness.

Many of the details of his system, possibly much of its framework, we are willing to acknowledge, Moses may have derived from Egypt. The prophetic element he added. I suppose he had before endeavoured to add it in Egypt too, following the traditions of Joseph. It was not without some trials which we may easily conceive, that the learned prince, and warrior, and favourite of the palace, was driven to look for sympathy among the despised of Goshen. Had Egypt been willing to move forward in politiqe and in religion, the separation of the pilgrim nation might not have been so soon, and would not have been so violent. That authority which in a healthy and growing state will not have "progress," will force "revolution," and does directly cause it. On it too rest the guilt and chastisement. To

¹ Exod. iv. 16; Deut. xviii. 16, sqq. See SER. IV., *Second Series*.

learn this lesson and illustrate it, in politics, morals, letters, and religion, many a Moses has been born, and many a Pharaoh lifted up.

We cannot believe that the Mosaic Institutions found a home at once, and were realized by the body of the people. The book of Judges negatives such a supposition. In the wilderness, indeed, all were obliged to obey. And this training told upon the generation that entered Canaan with Joshua. But when they had made good their footing there, they did like other men—rested on their success; made the present agreeable to themselves; and gave their “worldly” concerns as much attention, and their religious as little, as the circumstances would allow. For three or four centuries the law was rather an ideal than a fact; a “profession” which the conscience of the people honoured and aspired to, but its flesh was too weak to bear. A severe yet loving Providence gradually brings it to mind, and works it into practice. In due time, Samuel, and David, and Solomon, make the thought a thing, and write the law, not merely on two slabs of Sinai granite, but on the face of Palestine. Meantime the nation had been warring, growing, and consolidating; and had converted at least one country to the worship of Jehovah. Converted¹ it—by

¹ Any such expression will be horrifying, I fear, to the old ladies of Exeter Hall; though sometimes the missionaries themselves can speak sturdily enough: e. g. in the matter of Tahiti. One does not defend them in the particular case perhaps; yet war, even offensive war, is still indispensable for the world. Its range is, no doubt, diminishing daily. In barbarous nations every man is a warrior; in semi-barbarous, the upper classes are so; in civilized nations, only one man in ten or twenty; and these separated off for the purpose, and employed unwillingly. Yet its occasional necessity is still apparent, and its benefits conspicuous, not only in the discipline it enforces, and the fresh energies it everywhere evolves, but as a direct agent in propagating the higher civilizations.

Let any one look back, for instance, for a hundred years, and ask himself what is the most effective Christian mission we have sent to China within that time? Has it not been the Armstrong gun and the occupation of Peking? True, it cost some lives; as many, perhaps, the whole expedition, as are executed judicially in China on any given morning; at least, if Governor Yeh were a fair sample of a first-class Mandarin—his daily average, I believe, was “700 criminals, mostly for political offences.” But if Lord Elgin’s sword had, as we believe it had, the characters assigned in the text to Israel’s—if it were not only more sharp and decisive, but also more “equitable, honourable, and forbearing,” than they had known before—then it is a voice from Christendom that China can

the sword ! by a sword sharp and decisive indeed, but also far more equitable, honourable, and forbearing than the nations hitherto had seen.

understand, and will long remember and respect. Henceforward not only our anxiety to trade, but our learning, and common sense, and our language of conciliation, entreaty, and instruction, will sound quite differently in their celestial ears. The missionaries will now find that preparations had preceded them, and will reap that whereon they have bestowed no labour. Elgin and Hope have laboured, and sailors, soldiers, and interpreters have died, and the Sabbath-preachers will "enter into" the results of their skill, courage, self-denial, and integrity; for herein always "is the saying true, that one soweth, and another reapeth."

"I have always found it the kindest plan," writes Captain James Cook, "in dealing with barbarians, first to convince them of our own superiority, and by a sharp lesson, if requisite. Without this, our forbearance is generally misunderstood." Mr. Rarey gives the same prescription for the training of young horses. "Some," says he, "have not a sufficient respect for man;" and for these he generally finds "one sharp, severe, judicious cut" of his whip both requisite and enough; he "seldom has occasion to repeat it." So does God treat us. So especially did He treat Israel; and just such a sharp initiation of their intercourse was Joshua's invasion of the Canaanites. It is not that Israel exterminated them. Far from it. Whatever they intended, partly they *could not*, and at all events they did not. No broken and mountainous country, like Palestine, could be depopulated by a body of invaders. But they vanquished them in the field, destroyed or occupied their cities, and reduced themselves to a measured submission or alliance. Later on they mingled their blood and their ideas; and gradually the nations became circumcised, and were fully "adopted" into the families and tribes. Yet, until a late period, they kept up their Gentile names, apparently without discredit. There is no reason to suppose that Uriah the Hittite, or Araunah the Jebusite, or Doeg the Edomite, or Barzillai the Gileadite, held any very exceptional position in the days of David.

Of course, the warfare and other intercourse of a Christian nation with barbarians ought to be, and is, of a vastly higher character than that of Joshua with the Jebusites; but we have lost somehow the power of mingling with our inferiors, which was possessed by the ancient conquerors, and exercised with such signal benefit to the world by Israel, and Greece, and Rome. A Roman invasion of Spain, or Gaul, or Britain, implied the rapid amelioration of the vanquished race; whereas, we, whether we come in peace or war, exterminate the barbarians before our face, as we do the hippopotamus, and deer, and dodo. And our "missions," when most successful, seem only to accelerate the result. The Franciscans depopulated California. Of the tribes Christianized by Elliott, scarce an individual, if one, remains. And these are but extreme cases of what we have everywhere to weep for. It arises in detail from the extreme *difference* between the savage and the Christian man. The Anglo-Saxon cannot associate on equal terms with the Hottentot or New Zealander, and the latter cannot be suddenly elevated to an equality with him. His physique and habits will not bear it. In this case, the ancient legislator would have had no scruple in bowing before the fact, and associating them, for the time, in a condition of *inequality*; making the humbler to serve the higher; and while exercising, first, industrial, and then some higher arts, gra-

The glory of Joshua, and the wars of the nation generally, culminating in the peaceful throne of Solomon, the doctrinaireship of our day would fain, perhaps, pass by. Perhaps would shrink from seeing them, as a weakness within our lines. Not so, however, in any degree, does the Bible view them. And not so does mankind contemplate the corresponding periods in the history of other nations, or of our own. Sitting at the feet of the Bible, then, and, as I conceive, of nature, I am content to note the missionary effect of this territorial conquest in evolving and propagating the true religion. Neither those who "fled from the face of the robber Joshua," whatever the value of the inscription¹, nor those who were subdued by him, could lightly forget how "the Lord God of Israel fought for Israel;" and how, upon this visible battle-field, He had proved Himself to be the Lord of Hosts. In fact, the extraordinary success which crowned their extraordinary energy and zeal as disciplined by Moses, was *the* sign and wonder which for the time being attested the nation's

dually to acquire, first the qualities requisite for social freedom, and then the thing itself. But the doctrinaireship of our day is too wise, and too "well-principled" for this. Their theory, I believe, is an egregious blunder, and their practice a fatal injury to the quiet progress of the world. But I will revert to this again.

They make a similar mistake in respect to offensive war. By what right, they say, do we enter China or Japan at all, or New Zealand, Tennessee, or Senegambia, "against the will of their present inhabitants, or, at least, of their chiefs, who by their own law or custom have the right to speak for them?" By the same right that we enter on the morass or mountain, drain off the water, turn out the scrubs and stones, and eject the snipe and bittern—by the first command of nature and religion: to diffuse their blessings—"to increase and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it"—subdue it with tillage, and roads, and railroads, and material wealth; with cities, churches, schools, and Bibles; with tentative, and positive, and still more true philosophy; and with every successive kingdom that *ought* to "have dominion." It is the function of Law, national and international, to oversee and regulate this process, that it may work smoothly and kindly, and that, if possible, none be crushed beneath its chariot wheels (Matt. xxi. 42, 44); but no vested interest, no law or custom, no philosophy or religion, has the slightest right to obstruct or to denounce it. All "principles" which cannot co-operate with it, and bless it in their heart, and, if requisite, bear their share of its reproach, have simply forgotten themselves, and had better go back again to first "beginnings."

¹ Mentioned by Procopius as visible on two pillars near the fount of the Magi at Tangiers. Van. 2. 10. This was, no doubt, a forgery. Be it so. A forged note implies a real one, not very unlike itself. No one would frame such a tradition, if it did not fall in with the real or supposed probabilities of the case.

mission. This was its designed effect upon themselves, their neighbours, their captives, and their enemies : and in that age, at least, the more especial miracles were viewed as subordinate to this. War is indeed to be avoided; but not at every cost. There are things more precious to a man, than his silken thread of life. And these are not flimsy things, nor very easily attained. If low nations are ever to be lifted up to them, the soldier's mutual respect and self-respect, mutual command, obedience, and self-command, and that large though rude self-sacrifice which "gives himself for home," is not the worst beginning. God has made war necessary here, and it doubtless has its place. Even in its humblest form, let us concede its honour. Higher warfare may learn from its analogy besides, and long for some Joshua to breathe into us by word and act, "Be strong and of a good courage, and God will strengthen thy heart." The strongest *ought* to be the best; and they who would fain teach that God should have some earlier title than The Almighty, or that this simple and fundamental Name can ever be dispensed with, have never proved their point.

This class of influence reaches its "end" in Solomon, and round his name the traditions group themselves which show how seriously it was felt towards the south and east; while, through the Phœnicians and maritime Egyptians, it can hardly have been less effective upon the now nascent civilizations to the west and north—"the islands of the sea"—that is, the larger islands, the lesser Asia, and lesser and greater Greece. No one tradition, indeed, respecting Solomon on one side, or Sesostris, Cadmus, Minos, on the other, may be reliable; and yet the general impression they convey may be most true. Such a kingdom as we know David's or Solomon's was, established at that conjuncture upon the highway of the nations, must have produced upon the ancient world some such effects as the traditions point to. And the marvellous tales of Solomon's magnificence and supernatural power and wisdom may reflect as true a story from the east, as do now the commonplace "Phœnician¹ letters" emblazon in the west.

¹ The Φοινικῆία, or Καδμήϊα γράμματα, believed by the Greeks to have been in-

Israel's social contact with the nations requires also a remark. It is notorious that its own ideal of religion suffered from it both before and after the days of Solomon. But, without excusing this in any particular case, we must look below the surface if we would see its process and effect. For it was not the ideal as actually realized by the bulk of the people at any time which suffered, but only the ideal as existing in the minds of few—of Moses, Samuel, David, Solomon, the truest of the prophets, and most spiritual of the priesthood. And then we must remember this principle of nature's life. It is only by *self-sacrifice*, and self-humiliation, only by lowering itself to the materials it desires to grasp, that any actual Better, or any ideal Better, can reach the actual inferior, and leaven it with itself. Salt saves by contact; but then it is dissolved and half assimilated in the process. Unless "the actual better" does this, it is the grain of wheat which "abides" unproductive and alone, and, while seeking to preserve itself, submits to slow but sure decay. Unless the ideal better does this, it is a vision or a visionary, and in proportion to its strength can but disturb and terrify. No; the better must be born among us, take bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, if it would raise us into the kingdom of its aspiration. And thus did the national as well as the individual "Israel." In descending to leaven and assimilate the elements around, Israel's vital spirit was not lost. It was able to raise itself again, and bring its sheaves with it. The Jewish worship, always tarnished and often degraded by the memories and habits of Egypt, or the present contagions of Sidon, or Moab, or Canaan, was yet able to lift itself and them, to purge away defilements, and to shine the purer from its passage through the fires. And on the whole it did advance, not only by enlargement, but also in elevation, steadily, though by no means equably, from the first year of their

roduced by Cadmus, seem to have been identical with the oldest Hebrew alphabet. But neither the Greeks, nor, apparently, the Phoenicians themselves, made much use of them for another period, and until the next "impulse," p. 169 and note. Homer alludes to them *vaguely*, in the story of Bellerophon, itself a North Phœnician myth of Pegasus and Tarsus with an Egyptian tinge. His own poems were not *written* until the sixth century B. C. Meantime the Hebrew literature had been developed and matured.

passover, or even of their circumcision, until they furnished, to be offered up on Calvary, the one great Paschal Lamb who took away earth's sin. And this contact and intermixture proved at once the preliminary and cause of an immense progression within and without the Jewish mind. It was, in fact, the invasion of a higher region, and entrance on a higher war. For it raised the platform upon which Ideas and Ideals, *as such*, could be compared and strive; on which different conceptions of God and Good could meet and combat, in the audience of developed thought, and reasonably enlightened conscience. If you wish to see how Israel's Ideal behaved in this more subtle and exalted chemistry—how the Lord of Hosts could war in the conflict of the gods—read some Psalm of Solomon or Ezra, or some chapter of Isaiah, and acknowledge that *then of all times* Israel was fighting the battles of futurity, and has handed down its conquest for the spiritual heritage of man. It was an easy thing to prove that the idols of the nations are folly, and those who make them, or bow down to them, only stupider than they. It was something harder to be able to insist that “the idols are nothing in the world, but that every creature of God is good” to those who “see” Himself. Presently they trumpet, on the level of this higher Jericho, having compassed the field around, “Jehovah is Lord alone; worship Him, all ye Gods:” and gradually the assurance grows¹ into a continued Psalm that the true Elohim *are* Jehovah, Jehovah partially beheld; the Universal is the One; our *present* Living-

¹ This seems better expressed by Hengstenberg:—“The ground of the collocation [Jehovah Elohim] is always to be found in the opposition it presents against partial representations of Jehovah, in the endeavour to explode the error that Jehovah was merely the God of Israel—an error by which Jehovah, in itself the higher appellation, became relatively the lower, so that it was elevated by the addition of Elohim, though strictly of inferior import. In this collocation the name Elohim stands upon the same line with Zebaoth, the God of Worlds.”

“Partial representations of Jehovah, a tendency to overlook the absolute in Him, was extremely natural to Israel, as polytheism prevailed all around; and it was a very bold, a prodigious idea, to ascribe nothing to the gods of the neighbouring, and sometimes far more powerful nations; everything to their own God.” Hence, “that the Elohim Psalms possess, in general, a more elevated character than the Jehovahi Psalms admits of an easy explanation.” In fact, it was the triumphant application of the Unity of God to their actual experience.—Appendix to “The Psalms,” Discus. VI.

God is the Life of All. Oh! that even the Christian church had thoroughly learned the lesson.

Our retrospect now brings us to an influence exerted by Israel on the ancient world, the largest of all next to its generation of Christianity; and after it the strangest and yet most natural of all—that wrought by the first dispersion and almost destruction of the people. Scarcely had they purged themselves from idols and realized the one true God, than that severe and jealous Father casts them out upon the nations to teach what they had learned—scattering, peeling, submerging, mixing, yet still preserving them intact—so as again to expound the burning bush which has Jehovah's name within, and so is not consumed. There had arisen a division of the nation, and "Israel's" turn comes first. The Monotheism of Ephraim, less perfect than that of Judah, attains, perhaps from that very reason, an earlier maturity. At least the fiery energy of Elijah, and Jehu's unscrupulous "zeal for the Lord," had "destroyed Baal out of Israel," long before her more evangelical prophets and gentler kings had purified Jerusalem. First prepared, she is sent foremost to prepare; and the waves of that great baptism sweep out Jehovah's witnesses to the centre of Assyria, at that time the centre of the agitated nations of the world.

Judah's ordeal follows; the same chapter¹ which records how the good Josiah, with the willing adhesion of his people, had cleansed the city and the land from all impurities, records the decision unsparingly fulfilled to remove Judah's candlestick also from its place, "as Israel's had been removed," and to sprinkle its fire around. For, think you, did either Israel or Judah forget, or could they forget the lesson so long instilled, so carefully enforced, and now with a fierce yet well-felt affection burned into the nation's soul? Brethren, this is not the function of affliction, and was not its effect with them. By the waters of Babylon they sat and wept, and have preserved their song: the nations heard it, too, and not unmoved, as many indications testify. And there too Israel found, itself, the blessing of the Nazarite,

¹ 2 Kings, xxiii. vv. 25, 26, 27.

and "the precious things that rest upon the head of him whom God has separated from his brethren." We scarcely need, perhaps, the books of Esdras or of Daniel to picture for us how in such circumstances Israel might behave; but let us attend to the results. After their seventy years or more, they return from Assyria, and Egypt, and the North, not only a purified, but a *pure* nation of intense Monotheists. Neither their dumb idols nor their false gods are heard of in Israel more. And no amount of either blandishment or force can shake, henceforth, their national, their now individual faith and sentiment.

And what had they done meantime? Think you that they were silent witnesses for Him whose name and whose reproach they bore, and whose hope they cherished until they made it victory? From their own account at least, and it is by no means a boastful one, we know the opposite; and all else that we can find agrees. But there is one large confirmation of their picture, to which I must draw attention, as it is not enough insisted on—the indirect effect of the Jewish dispersion on the then religious systems of the world. One is almost startled to find that the now much bepraised reformations of religion which mark the dawn of *written* history,—as those of Zoroaster,¹ Confucius, Buddha, in

¹ Much research has been expended, and might be still, in tracing resemblances and connexions between these worthies and the Hebrew Prophets. And it is interesting enough to concoct small theories as to the meeting of Pythagoras and Jeremiah, the origin of temples to Athene-Isis, the identity of Zoroaster with Zorobabel, or even with Esdras himself, instead of his attendant. But even our *original* materials are not reliable; and if they were, and if they thoroughly sustained the premises, the value of the conclusion would be but small. When we see that, in an age of books and letters, the Apostles themselves could not keep their immediate disciples, hardly one another (Gal. ii. 11, sqq., cf. v. 1, sqq.), from teaching what was virtually subversive of Christianity, what should be gained by fathering upon Ezekiel or Zechariah the Neo-Platonism of Zoroaster, or the quietism and metempsychosis of Buddha and Pythagoras? These must have been able men and independent thinkers, or they could not have influenced their own age; and, as such, we may fairly leave them to answer for their own opinions. What the resemblances prove is, that all religions have a common root, and manifest themselves in pretty similar observances in like stages of society. What I insist on is, that a central line influenced these observances, and specially that it gave them a large impulse at this conjuncture—an impulse acting, as all impulses do, partly by agreement and partly by antagonism.

What we know for certain is to this effect:—Before 600 B. C., there were commotions in Central Asia, and a pressure of the ruder nations on Asia Minor and Assyria;

the east ; in the west, of Thales, Pythagoras, Solon, Epimenides—one by one date themselves from the generation succeeding this

changing in the latter thrones and dynasties, invigorating it for the time, and forcing it into contact with Egypt, Syria, Phœnicia, and later on with Greece. Israel, which had before this matured its written literature and law, is dragged from home by this convulsion, and mingled with its waves. Within a couple of generations, and from this centre, there propagate themselves on every side, eastward to China and Japan, southward to India and Ceylon, westward to Asia Minor, Greece, and Italy, *written literature, unknown before except in Israel*, and signal reformations of religion and society. Israel's influence, then, so far as I have claimed it, is scarcely an inference ; it is almost a patent fact. Any impulse would naturally take a different form among the older civilizations of the East from what it would when travelling westward, and would vary much with the genius of its exponents. Their date and their connexion with written literature is the most essential point, and virtually proves the rest.

In drawing our inference in respect to Greece, indeed, we are met, very unexpectedly, by the last historical authority. Mr. Grote adopts Comte's view of the human development ; and, though acknowledging that the Greeks themselves professed to have derived both the beginnings and the improvement of their religion and literature from the East, insists that the development was singularly spontaneous and internal. "Unlike the German," "the transition of the Greek mind from its poetical to its comparatively positive state was self-operated, accomplished by its own inherent and expansive force, aided, indeed, but by no means either impressed or provoked, from without. From the poetry of Homer to the history of Thucydides, and the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, was a prodigious step, but it was the native growth of the Hellenic youth into an Hellenic man ; and what is of still greater moment, it was brought about without breaking the thread of religious or patriotic tradition, without any coercive innovation or violent change in the mental feelings. The legendary world, though the ethical judgments and rational criticisms of superior men had outgrown it, still retained its hold upon the feelings as an object of affectionate and reverential retrospect."—I. 620. "The change from Homer to Thucydides and Aristotle took place internally, gradually, and imperceptibly."—I. 626.

One has no wish to disparage the independence and originality of the Grecian mind, or the sway it so long exercised over the ancient world. But Mr. Grote does it injustice. From Homer to Aristotle, that is, four or five hundred years, was indeed a "prodigious" period, if we speak of the development of the Grecian *demos* ; but it was a moderate step enough if we speak of the development of the Grecian *mind*. Alexander and Aristotle did not slay the latter. And if Mr. Grote had been writing the history of it, and not that of the *demos*, he would only then have reached his Marathon, and would have carried on his narrative with interest for another thousand years. For, in fact, the Grecian mind was the "mind," that is, the cultured and practised intellect, not of Greece alone, but of that family of nations surrounding Greece, which developed, on the north-east coasts of the Mediterranean, a tolerably homogeneous civilization known to us as the classical or ancient world. True, one form of Athenian polity was destroyed by Macedon, and another by Rome ; but the vigour and authority of the Grecian mind was not impaired by either. It easily commanded and "Græcised" both, as it did even Christianity itself. Its religious forms, indeed, were revolutionized by Judea, but the change was not unprepared for, undesired, nor without its compensations. In making itself the

event, and almost visibly trace themselves back to it as to a local origin. The coincidence, at least, is most remarkable. The more

mouthpiece, it also imposed its form of thought on European Christendom ; and in creeds, councils, and balanced doctrine, has shaped for us our "Gospel." True, the Church had also Latin Fathers, and eminent ones ; but all Latin *literature* was but reflected or refracted Greek. And what Christendom owes to Rome is not at all her doctrine, but her social machinery and application ; her vigorous propagandism, and capacity for sustained progress and systematic rule. If we speak, then, of the development of the Grecian mind, we must trace it from Homer to below Chrysostom and Athanasius. During all this period its activity and continuity were unimpaired. Not until some centuries later did it "fall on sleep," having handed down a noble heritage to another generation, whose phases, after all, are not so unlike its own. And if we thus contemplate its period as a whole, the development will, no doubt, very much resemble Comte's—not that, indeed, which Comte *theorizes* and Mr. Grote accepts, but that which Comte himself *exemplified* in his own person, as does any average, much more any good or superior man ; i. e. the first stage will be the least, the last the most, and most "positively" theological of all. And the same is true, I believe, of every average community. Men must first *grow*, as children do ; after that they must *work*, and earn a livelihood for themselves and their immediate successors. This done or doing, they *will think and theorize* so far as they have capacity, and will hand down to the next generation the best metaphysics and theology they can elaborate. The world has never yet seen the class of men whose most mature reflections were not given to religious things. This is the natural development ; and it is only by mistaking some part of a period for the whole, and by considering as one's own "development" what one had "inherited" from predecessors, that any other could be dressed up as plausible. But see Note B.

To confound the Grecian mind, then, with that of the Grecian demos, is much the same as if we mistook an undergraduate's wild oats for the whole lifetime of the man. The Greek demos lived but a little span ; two or three centuries at most ; not near the time the Roman or the Jewish demos did. And even then it was but partial ; a section, or rather a section of a section (not to say a faction) of a few Greek cities. No one denies it eminent good qualities, at least in the beginning ; nor can Mr. Grote conceal the vices which brought it to destruction. But always the Greek mind was as expansive, Catholic, and receptive as the demos was narrow, suspicious, self-seeking, and self-opinionated. The Byzantine Empire and Christian Councils were due to its continued eminence, as truly as the *labarum* was to the growing importance of the Church. It was always much in contact with the East, and as deferential thereto, as we are now to it. Most of its writers were Asiatics, and those who were not almost made a habit of travelling eastward for instruction. That it was seriously impressed and modified by the "impulse" spoken of in the text could be shown in many ways. It will be satisfactory, perhaps, to extract sufficient evidence from Mr. Grote himself. I will italicise a word occasionally.

"The names of Orpheus and Musæus (as well as that of Pythagoras, looking at one side of his character) represent facts of importance in the history of the Grecian mind—the gradual influx of Thracian, Phrygian, and Egyptian religious ceremonies and feelings, and the increasing diffusion of special mysteries, schemes for religious purification, and orgies (I venture to anglicise the Greek word, which contains in its original meaning no implication of the ideas of excess to which it was afterwards diverted) in honour of

we consider it, the more, I am convinced, we shall believe that they represent the secondary waves from this great troubling of

some particular god." [We might compare them not inaptly to the schools of the prophets, who were often Nazarites.] "Occasionally such voluntary combinations assumed the form of permanent brotherhoods, bound together by periodical solemnities as well as by vows of an ascetic character: thus, the Orphic life (as it was called), or regulation of the Orphic brotherhood, among other injunctions, partly arbitrary and partly abstinent, forbade animal food universally, and, on certain occasions, the use of woollen clothing. The great religious and political fraternity of the Pythagoreans, which acted so powerfully on the condition of the Italian cities, was one of the many manifestations of this general tendency, which *stands in striking contrast* with the simple, open-hearted, and demonstrative worship of the Homeric Greeks."

"During the interval between Hesiod and Onomakritus *the revolution in the religious mind* of Greece was such as to place both these deities [Dionysos and Demeter] in the front rank. According to the Orphic doctrine, Zagreus, son of Persephone, is destined to be the successor of Zeus; and, although the violence of the Titans intercepts this lot, yet, even when he rises from his discription, under the name of Dionysos, he is the colleague and coequal of his divine father."—I. 30, 31.

For the "striking contrast" was not confined to outward rites, but extended to the highest dogma, the definition of God and His relation to things. Their Zeus was always an Asiatic deity, derived to them from semiphœnician Crete; but the Orphic Zeus represents a "revolution." "Thus exalted to supreme mastery, he swallowed up and absorbed into himself Metis or Phanes, with all the pre-existing elements of things, and then generated all things anew out of his own being, and conformable to his own ideas." "The Cataposis of Phanes by Zeus is one of the most memorable points of Orphic Theogony. From this absorption and subsequent reproduction of all things by Zeus flowed the magnificent string of Orphic predicates about him—

Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τίτνεται,

an allusion to which is even traceable in Plato."—I. 25, and note. [Without going farther, one might compare the inscription on the fane of the temple of Athene-Isis at Sais: —'Εγὼ εἰμι πᾶν το γεγονός, καὶ ὄν, καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν πέπλον οὐδεὶς πω θνητὸς ἀπέκαλυψε. I am all that has been born, and is, and shall be; and my veil no mortal yet has drawn aside.] "Herodotus believed in the derivation both of the Orphic and Pythagorean regulations from Egypt. He knows the names of those Greeks who have borrowed from Egypt the doctrine of metempsychosis, but he will not mention them (ii. 123). He can hardly allude to any one but the Pythagoreans, many of whom he probably knew in Italy."—I. 29, note.

Nor was it without a serious contest and collision in the highest mind of Greece—

"Egypt was first unreservedly opened to the Greeks during the reign of Psammeticus, about B. C. 660. Gradually it became much frequented by them for military or commercial purposes, or for simple curiosity, and enlarged the range of their thoughts and observations, while it also imparted to them that vein of mysticism which overgrew the simplicity of the Homeric religion."—I. 492. "If, then, we look down the three centuries and a half which elapsed between the commencement of the Olympic era and the age

the waters—that the religion of the captives—its intensity, moral purity, and singular Monothesim, and especially, its sacred lite-

of Herodotus and Thucydides, we shall discern a striking advance in the Greeks, ethical, social, and intellectual. The battles of the Gods with the Giants and Titans, the castration of Uranus by his son Kronos, the cruelty, deceit, and licentiousness, often supposed both in the Gods and heroes, provoked strong disapprobation. And the language of the philosopher Xenophanes [of Colophon, author of the Eleatic doctrine of the unity of things, "God is the One"], who composed both elegiac and iambic poems for the express purpose of denouncing such tales, is as vehement and unsparing as that of the Christian writers who, eight centuries later, attacked the whole scheme of Paganism. Nor was it alone as an ethical and social critic that Xenophanes stood distinguished. He was one of a great and eminent triad, Thales [of "a Phœnician family in Miletus," chiefly known as the first author of a rational cosmogony among the Greeks—substantially the same as that of Moses and of the best modern thought—the Divine "mind" formed all things gradually, out of diffused "waters," or, as we would say, "fluid atmosphere"—see *LECT. I.*] and Pythagoras being the others, who, in the sixth century before the Christian era, first opened up those views of speculative philosophy, which occupied afterwards so large a portion of Grecian intellectual energy. Of the material differences between the three I do not here speak; I regard them only in reference to the Homeric and Hesiodic philosophy which preceded them, and from which all three deviated by a step, perhaps, the most remarkable in all the history of philosophy."—*I. 494.*

"The most remarkable," indeed, if it were "the internal, gradual, imperceptible" growth of the mind of Attica. But not so strange nor so unlike other developments, when we see how largely it *was* "impressed or provoked from without," and place it in its connexion. It came from the East along with the power of written literature; and how serious a mental conflict it involved, the martyrdom of more than one philosopher, the exile and danger of several (Xenophanes and Pythagoras included), and the unhappy tendency in the rest to separate between the philosophic and the common mind, and to adopt an exoteric as well as an esoteric standard of doctrine, only too pointedly attest. "The schools" have scarcely yet recovered from this traditional "duality."

It is thought strange that Herodotus does not mention the Jews. But at the time of his visit Israel was nowhere. A few Egyptized Phœnicians, striving to rebuild their city, is what they would appear to him had he even visited Jerusalem. The Greek reverence for antiquity easily found its home in Egypt; but it was mainly from the Phœnician, "half-brother of the Jew," and his factories in Cyprus, Asia Minor, Crete, and Sicily, that their Eastern instruction was derived. I may almost quote as an example Mr. Grote's account of the mission of Epimenides, vol. iii., 117, sqq. :—

"The century between 620 and 500 B. C. appears to have been remarkable for the first diffusion and potent influence of distinct religious brotherhoods, mystic rites, and expiatory ceremonies, none of which (as I have remarked in a former chapter) find any recognition in the Homeric Epic. To this age belong Thaletas, Aristens, Abaris, Pythagoras, Onomakritos, and the earliest proveable agency of the Orphic sect. Of the class of men here mentioned, Epimenides, a native of Phœstus or Gnosssus, in Krete, was

ature, which the world has never equalled yet, and which about this time reached its height—largely impressed their conquerors, and stirred up both thought and feeling. This would blend locally with existing opinions, condemning effete and corrupted practices, and generating better modes of thought, which would easily find system and exposition in such reformers, legislators, and philosophers.

I altogether believe it was so; and farther, as my subject almost requires of me some answer to the popular question, what has become of the ten tribes, or has the promise failed in their respect? I venture to reply thus:—The ten tribes are nowhere, except as represented in this result. Many individuals, doubtless, of the ten tribes returned to Palestine, along with the remnant of the two: the Jews of St. Paul's day conceived themselves to be not the two tribes, but the twelve.¹ But, doubtless,

one of the most celebrated; and the old legendary connexion between Athens and Krete, which shows itself in the tales of Theseus and Minos, is here again manifested in the recourse which the Athenians had to this island to supply their spiritual need. Epimenides seems to have been connected with the worship of the Kretan Zeus, in whose favour he stood so high as to receive the denomination of the new Kurete (the Kuretes having been the primitive ministers and organizers of that worship). "Such narratives mark the idea entertained by antiquity of Epimenides the Purifier, who was now called in to heal both the epidemic and the mental affliction prevalent among the Athenian people, in the same manner that his countryman and contemporary, *Thaletas*, had been a few years before invited to Sparta, to appease a pestilence by the effect of his music and religious hymns. The favour of Epimenides with the Gods, his knowledge of propitiatory ceremonies, and his power of working on the religious feelings, was completely successful in restoring both health and mental tranquillity at Athens. . . . He founded new Chapels [among them, probably, "the altar to THE UNKNOWN GOD," which formed in after days the text of St. Paul's sermon], and established various lustral ceremonies." "Moreover, Epimenides had the prudence to associate himself with Solon; and while he thus, doubtless, obtained much valuable advice, he assisted indirectly in exalting the reputation of Solon himself, whose career of constitutional reform was now fast approaching." "Both Plato and Cicero considered Epimenides in the same light in which he was regarded by his contemporaries, as a prophet divinely inspired, and forestalling the future under fits of temporary ecstasy. But, according to Aristotle, Epimenides himself professed to have received from the Gods no higher gift than that of divining the unknown phenomena of the past." [A cosmogony, for example, is a "divination of the past."]

I hope these quotations from the historian will modify the position of the social theorist, so far, at least, as my text requires. On the general question, see note B.

Acts, xxvi. 7; James, i. 1.

many individuals of *all* the tribes remained behind. Attracted by various motives, for good or evil, they mixed their blood and merged themselves socially and religiously in the general family of nations. Yet, if we are right in attributing to them, however indirectly, this religious impulse, the promise in their case has not been frustrated, but fulfilled. They were caused to attain a certain stage of truth ; and then caused to convey it naturally to the world—parents to their children, brethren to their human brethren. In so doing they fulfilled their mission, produced their appropriate result, and were exhausted in producing it. “Except a corn of wheat fall in the ground and die, it abideth alone, but if it die it beareth much fruit”—is true not of wheat alone, nor of Christ alone, but of every true and typical son of man, perhaps of every organism.

Precisely the same thing happened at the birth of Christianity. The Jews nationally rejected their Messiah—filling up thereby the measure of their fathers’ sin with their fathers’ example before their eyes: the “body” ever resisting that light divine which keeps ever transcending our best attainment. A large portion of the nation persisted in this rejection, and this portion of the nation still lives on ; if life it can be called, which prefers to abide fruitless and alone ; ignoring its place in progress, and refusing to die in hope that it may reproduce “not its like only, but its better,” or may “step,” as we all *must* step, “on footsteps of its dead self to better things.” But another section of the nation, shortly after, repented and believed the Gospel. And what has become of it? Why, it taught its truth to heathendom, and was exhausted in the effort. It merged itself in the new “Body” of his disciples, and is now nowhere to be found. It begat the Christian Church, and cradled it, and died.

But shall we continue to call it “death”? Nay, foolish man, “even the corn of wheat thou sowest is not *quicken*ed, except it die.” Such a death but multiplies the life, which shortly springs again regenerate and manifold. To those, at least, who are willing to save their life by losing it, death is “abolished,” and immortality reigneth—both for individuals and for communities. They who, forfeiting their carnal descent, begat the spiritual

seed of Abraham, were not only born anew themselves therein, but might see of the travail of their soul and be more than satisfied. Jews, not outwardly, but inwardly—no longer of Israel, but Israel itself—next after the One singular and exclusive Seed, these are the most genuine and highest offspring of the father of many nations—the Isaac in whom his seed is called—the exiled Jacob, who, far from the home his own and his mother's well-meant treachery had forfeited, repents and finds the Bethel; and in a foreign, yet a native land, begets the twelve new tribes of Israel, and more than lives in them.

Brethren, the gifts and calling of God are without repentance, and pregnant and many-sided are the designed fulfilments of His Word. The literal, that is, the humblest literal, lies at the base; but how many higher and truer senses shall raise themselves on it? As many, doubtless, as are the just meanings of that word LIFE, or of any large and common word, which, beginning with some physical fact, has learned to name for us, in a compressed parable, life's analogies and correlations; and will continue, perhaps, to name them for us when other lives and relationships of which we have but scant idea shall be developed in our being. In all, however, the Spirit of God is *Κύριος* as well as *Ζωοποιός*, not only generates, but always commands each form and word and letter. Let us obey *It* always, and cast ourselves forward always, deliberately, upon its inspiration.

I have traced the outline of Israel's history until it ceased to be a "nation." This position it abrogated, or sacrificed, in Christ. The attained climax of its calling—its Prophet, Priest, and King—its long-sought, hard-earned Messiahship and Royalty, it betrayed at the last moment, and solemnly rejected and thrust without the gate. The Gentiles took Him—gave Him His Cross, and Crown, and Title—and now they have Him as their own—He is the King of Christendom. Israel, half repentant, asked back His body, and laid it in the grave; and then, not knowing what it did, laid itself beside Him. Or, shall we say it more harshly?—Saul-like, or Judas-like, and false alike in its act and its repentance, it went, and was a suicide. At all events, what the Gentiles had done to the Individual Israel, they

did immediately after, "in that generation," to the National. The temple of Zion shortly followed the "temple of His body;" with it the city, and the whole possibility of the Law and Ordinance. The nation, meanwhile, with fanatic heroism, staked its all upon one desperate struggle with the Empire of the Iron-hand, and its existence was elided. Still there rings in history's ear, from that once favoured Palestine, a half-intellible cry—may we not say it without irreverence?—"My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" Once it was the Promised Land—and then it was the Holy Land—but such it is not now.¹ Where the carcase was, there the eagles have been gathered together.

But is this the end? Brethren, who can feel it so, even if he would? We must go a little farther, although we lack the guiding line of divinely written history. We are not, however, without prophetic intimations. I speak not chiefly of Old Testament promises. These, in their first sense, related generally to more near events; and, in their larger sense, have been so disfigured by strange interpretation, that I could scarcely quote them without discussions for which I have no room. But our Lord Himself tells how Jerusalem shall be trodden down of Gentiles *until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled*. And St. Paul, while recognising the excision of Israel, connects our Lord's "until" with Moses' magnificent synopsis of the future of his people, and expands them into unmistakable propositions, resting, I suppose, both on their authority and on his own. Their tenor is, that the success of Christianity among the Gentiles—its success in raising them to peace, and truth, and

¹ How well does Dr. Stanley describe the impression left by Palestine, and especially by Jerusalem! "At first there cannot but be something of a shock on seeing before our eyes, and under our feet, places in comparison with whose sanctity the High Altar of St. Peter's would seem profane. Yet gradually this thought dissolves, and another takes its place. These localities have, indeed, no real connexion with Him. It is true that they bring the scene vividly before us; that in many instances, as we shall see hereafter, they illustrate His words and works in detail. But the more we gaze at them, the more do we feel that this interest and instruction are secondary, and not primary. Their value is imaginative and historical, not religious. The desolation and degradation which have so often left on those who visit Jerusalem the impression of an accursed city read, in this sense, a true lesson—'He is not here, He is risen.'"—SIN. AND PAL., p. 198.

righteousness—would in the end move the Jews themselves to “jealousy,” and make them say in the words which conclude Isaiah’s picture¹—“Oh, house of Israel, come ye; let us also walk in the light of the Lord.” “And so all Israel shall be saved”—saved amid such a general outpouring of good as St. Paul designates by “life from the dead.”

I will not attempt any detailed interpretation of such words. In dealing with the past, I have confined myself to the plainest statements of Scripture, the best known historic facts, and the broadest historic probabilities. We cannot expect the future to be more minutely definite. The aggregate of the past seems sufficiently impressive; and he who will ponder on the present state of the world, and the probabilities which seem to shape themselves before us, will not find, I believe, that impressiveness to die away, or to disconnect itself from Paul’s anticipation. But our view of Israel’s influence upon Church and world would be most imperfect, if we did not go back a little, and follow the thread of one or two general observations.

And first, it lies upon the surface that the “separation” or sanctification of Israel was not for its own sake, but for ours, and for the whole. As was also our Lord’s, when “for our sake He sanctified² Himself,” that all should “be gathered together in one;” nay, all made “one, *as WE ARE.*” This is the nature of *all* sanctification. Is one hour or day holier to God than another? Is one place, or thing, or form, or person? Nay, “where He cometh, all things are; and He cometh everywhere.” But “all things” and “everywhere” are too vague for us. Religion, like speech, must be divided and made articulate, if it would be significant to us, and become an instrument of culture. Holiness must be learned by making things and persons holy, and more holy, until we reach a high ideal, and a definite sense of the Unseen. *Then* it can enlarge itself, and that Divine One will be everywhere defined. Thus Judaism “ministered not to itself, but us;” and the Jewish nation, in being separated, trained, and disciplined, became a “sacred school³ for all the world besides.” Such a calling, doubtless, has its higher compensations.

¹ Is. ii. 5. Cf. Rom. xi. with Deut. xxxii. ² John, xvii. 19. ³ See motto of this Sermon.

God is not unrighteous to forget the labour or the suffering of love, in those who minister to His saints. But their success or happiness, even here, must not be measured by a worldly, or at least an outward, standard. There is a joy and sorrow with which a stranger meddles not; a possessing all things by those who yet have nothing; and a peace that passeth understanding in those who may be the most troubled of mankind.

Yet, connected with this, another observation should be made. By insisting that Israel was selected to lead and energise religion, one does not claim for the individual Israelite any great pre-eminence in physical, in social, or even in religious character. But I do claim *some*; and it is impossible for us to allow the opposite¹ to be assumed. National, like individual religion, must be known by its fruits. It asserts a high authority; but it must vindicate its origin in its results. If it bring not forth the peaceable fruits of righteousness; if it expand not, invigorate, and refine the general character of man; nay if, upon the whole, it bless him not with plain material prosperity, and regenerate the earth around his dwelling—then it works not the works of God—its “notes” are wanting—its very miracles are of the adversary. No student of the Old Testament, or of the New, can refuse this test; and we accept it freely. We only ask that it be honestly applied. Let the Jews be

¹ As in the following strange thesis:—Disparaging “naturalness,” and magnifying “evidence,” the eminent Bp. Thirlwall writes—the italics are mine:—“In behalf of Revelation I should press for the superiority of the civilized Gentile world [over the Jews], in art, and science, and poetry, and eloquence, and every department of intellectual culture; together with all the wisdom of civil and political institutions derived from that source; and bright examples of patriotism, courage, and many other virtues; in a word, in *all respects save one*—the true religion, the possession of the oracles of God. This *contrast* between the inferiority of the chosen, in *all secular advantages*, and their pre-eminence in religious principles, seems to me an ARGUMENT *which cannot be too strongly insisted on by the Christian advocate.*” Easy yet strange *elenchus* for a gospel! Will his Lordship define for us anew the effect of “godliness” in the world, or of “righteousness” upon a nation? Will he apply his “argument” to demonstrate “the true religion” of the Zooloos or Hottentots? Or must *we* descend below their level “in all secular advantages”—and in all moral, too, “in a word, in all respects save one”—in order to “evidence” to them *our* “possession of the oracles of God”? It is to be hoped the missionaries will always use, and the Gentiles appreciate, the argument.

Alas! for the dualism that corrodes our highest mind.

tried, not by some modern or some ideal standard, which only their own advance has rendered possible, but by any measure that contemporary history could imagine fair; and then, with Moses, we challenge the comparison. The statutes that he gave *did* become "their wisdom and their righteousness," and forced the nations to acknowledge that they were "a great and understanding people." In fact, they raised the nation from being a tribe of low idolaters, of headstrong yet sensual Egyptian slaves, to a moral and religious eminence, which strangely impressed the highest sections of the ancient world. True, in ambitious, persistent, and offensive war, they were surpassed by Rome; and in ornamental arts and lighter literature, by Greece; for reasons not discreditable on either side: but they were not surpassed in the graver and more substantial virtues of intellect or heart or manners—not in manly patriotism or female virtue; not in social purity, refinement, or equity; and not in individual energy or elevation of character, to say nothing of express religion. And so, when contact and comparison arrived, the event has demonstrated. For if "captive Greece took captive her rude conqueror," a more dignified and graceful, if more sad ideal, *JUDÆA CAPTA*, captivated both. And thenceforward, amid all resuscitations of the sublime and beautiful, Judea's effort, though but a single Muse, still leads and marshals the celestial nine, and breathes her lofty inspiration into coming worlds of thought.

The moral superiority thus claimed for Israel is far, indeed, from being generally acknowledged; and for reasons not difficult to understand. Those who, honestly or not, affect the religious character, are judged in a more exacting spirit in respect to common things; and they are apt, besides, to have unsocialities and failings of their own. This hard estimate is both to be expected and desired; and its prevalence as against the ancient Jew rather tends to prove our point. But do not their own prophets denounce them truly? Yes, most truly; we do well to heed them. Israel's walk is "unequal," chequered, struggling, and unsustainable. The Apostle of the nations continually falls below himself, sometimes below his fellows. At least, he writes it so

against himself, and is pictured as the chief of sinners. But Christianity is not unacquainted with this phenomenon, nor ignorant of its meaning. They whose standard is low need not fall below it. Brutes are "free" from higher law, and free, too, from repentance and remorse; but those who are conscious of an ideal vastly *above their power*, how shall they maintain it? Yet have courage, Oh, true Israelite! Self-satisfied and balanced and "proper" heroism—such as "the world" worships: aye, even "the religious world"—is *not* "after God's own heart." At least, not such He blesses with productiveness, or makes the "father" of the Christ. Be true to the highest that He shows; as true as your true efforts can attain, and He will judge you right. Behold, it is a foreign prophet—he came from Aram, from the mountains of the East—who, when he has seen the utmost parts of Israel, bursts forth—"Behold I have received commandment to bless, and he hath blessed: and I cannot reverse it. He hath not beheld iniquity in Jacob; neither hath he seen perverseness in Israel. The Lord his God is with him: and the shout of a king is among them." "Who can count the dust of Jacob: or number the fourth part of Israel? Let me die the death of the righteous: and let my last end be like his." Blessed is he in whom the Lord "seeth," to whom the Lord "imputeth" the righteousness of faith.

For many centuries, indeed, Israel has shown scarce any moral or religious energy. Stupified and bewildered by the cup of trembling it is drinking to the dregs, "astonished and drunken, but not with wine," it seems unable to interrogate itself; its Urim and Thummim are dark, and it has lost its way. With some sort of physical tenacity its conscience holds fast the truths it had attained, and its intellect and taste find a half-mechanical activity in the pursuit of wealth. But it was not always so. Nor is the change without significance. Indeed, a glance at some outward alternations of the nation's character may fitly conclude our retrospect.

They emerge from Egypt with the common sentiments of slaves. Their strong tenacious nature receives its first impress from the Mosaic Institutions. Trained in the wilderness, and

triumphant under Joshua, they settle in Canaan in the position of small independent¹ landholders or Cleruchi. Trade is discour-

¹ This feature in the Mosaic polity has often been pointed out, and deserves to be well considered. It was not a monarchy that Moses established, though both he and Balaam foresaw the King, and could feel the Star and Sceptre it was already beginning to produce. Nor was it a government by ecclesiastics, though it did involve the separation of a class for priestly service, and commanded all, both priests and people, always to expect the prophet. But it was a democracy; about the most perfect of its kind, and based on a tolerably equal division of the conquered land by lot. I say "tolerably equal," for the division went by families, "to the more numerous the more inheritance, to the fewer the less" (Numb. xxxiii. 54); and as relationship was not reckoned strictly by blood, but included "adoption" and various degrees of "dependence," the leading families might easily, and did, secure an inheritance proportioned to their prestige. It did *not* impose what is called, improperly enough, "a strict agrarian law," but it did take pains to give and to preserve a small freehold property to every born or adopted Israelite. The "elders in the gate" administered justice, aided in certain matters by the priest. The Chief who *could* marshalled them for defensive war, and in return for victory was "judge" over a greater or less district of Palestine. Such a state of things tended most easily to royalty, as we may see even in Judges (e. g. ch. ix.), but the strenuous effort of Moses and the prophets was to prevent, or at least to discourage, and retard this development. And we may, perhaps, understand their reasons.

What Israel required at that time, and what all *low* nations require, was individual energy, boldness, self-reliance, and independence of character. Now, these are the virtues of any fresh democracy, and of the democratic element in any more mature and balanced constitution. It was, then, a just step in progress. But these virtues could not be preserved, much less improved upon, without progressing further. Energetic qualities require hard work; stagnation is their destruction. No democracy could be long-lived; and a stale or senile demos is a pitiable sight. Hideous corruption and venality overgrow the most, miserable idolatry of by-gone names and forms and legal safeguards blinds the best members of any self-satisfied and inactive aggregate. No! Society cannot abide upon a level. It must climb and build; it must unify, and know, and constitute itself, and find a central line to point its aspiration. What is to be feared for any vigorous society is that it shall find its "end" too soon, and invest some *partial* ruler with the prestige of royalty, and the power to divide or decapitate the body politic. And this is what occurred in Israel. In spite of Moses and Samuel, the people would have a king. And if the vast stride the nation made from Saul's time to Solomon's vindicate its instinct, the deep-rooted divisions visible under David, crevice yet latent under Solomon, and thenceforward only too explicit, bear out the wisdom of the Seer.

It should be noticed, in reply to some, that it was not the priesthood that ever opposed the king. The *priest*, as such, understands authority, and loves it; it is in the *prophet's* eyes that individuality is sacred. Kingship kept in abeyance, and the sense of Sovereignty seething among the people, and inspiring each individual to royal thoughts and deeds, is a grand, mysterious conception, which the prophet finds akin to the Creative Rule of the Unseen. The explicit exercise of royal functions is more intelligible

raged, foreign intercourse forbidden, and a theocratic exclusiveness or even pride is nurtured, with an intense suspicion and in-

to the priest. The statesman understands them both, and ponders on the welfare of the whole; and remembering that the strength of the edifice depends on the strength of its substantial parts, will give the prophet's principle large time and scope, and will discourage, above all things, premature completeness or display.

Democracy, then, virtual or formal, is a just stage in social progress, but an early stage—one that the nation should outgrow, though it must always cherish its principles, and give it a large and honourable operation. I believe, indeed, it is the just initial stage of every aggregate; what every society should, or must adopt, at its first formation; and every nation, after its exodus or total revolution, whenever it is shaken from its past, and thrown upon its own resources in life's open battle-field. At first it may last long, but if it re-appear later on, it will be far more temporary; it only means that society has felt it necessary to break its former organization, and start itself afresh. Its formal or avowed principle is that of a brotherhood or free association, with a recognised equality among the members, a superiority of each member over those below it or outside—the same principle exactly as that of an oligarchy, only on a larger scale. And this is what the ancient democracies were—large oligarchies, holding in subjection much larger bodies of aliens, "allies," or slaves. There were 400,000 slaves in Athens to 20,000 citizens and 10,000 aliens; 450,000 slaves in Corinth, and at one time as many in Ægina. Individual Romans had several thousand slaves; and Roman citizenship was a high distinction in the provinces. The Jewish demos was the most comprehensive of any; had fewer slaves or Gibeonites; was more considerate towards them, and more anxious to raise them into the communion of its privileges.

By natural growth in a democracy, eminent citizens, those, for instance, who had held offices with honour, would form a narrower circle, and hand down to their families prestige and consequence. And this would gradually collect and organize itself around a single line of Cornelii or Cæsars. This natural tendency of growth could easily be illustrated in any nation, though its form of government were not republican: and the modern world can see what the ancient scarcely conceived, that what democracy aims at—namely, that the individual should fairly participate in the general well-being; that the whole should serve him as truly as he the whole—can be better secured in an older and more natural form of government than the democratic. But this can only be by "diffusing the prophetic spirit," by honouring individuality, and encouraging each to earn and hold whatever place he can. Natural indolence, and many higher qualities, will sufficiently support authority. In fact, it is the greater development of the individual, and the pervading desire to continue that process, which makes the difference between the king in ancient Persia or Babylon and the king in Christendom. In being preached to the poor, the Gospel in no sense opposed or humbled Cæsar. We all now *feel* our "share" in David, and the Queen speaks for every one of us.

It is not a true account of the difference between Israel and other nations to say that the one was a Theocracy, the others not. *All* governments are theocracies in the eyes of him who has learned the Jewish truth that "there is *no* power but of God; the powers that *be* are ordained of God." The difference was, that Israel discerned this first,

tolerance of all religions or civilizations external to their own. A most unmissionary, a most uncommercial, and unsocial nation ! These features they long retained ; yet once has each undergone a total transformation. The first, for a period only, just before the Christian era ; the second also probably beginning then, but increasing during the middle ages, and still developing itself.

The dispersion forced a contact with the nations, and induced ties and contrasts which would naturally generate a new side to the nation's conscience ; then the old prophecies would be remembered, and the pressure of foreign rule left scarce any other outlet to the nation's self-esteem ;—however it is to be accounted for—an intense zeal for proselytism marked the generations before Christ. Sea and land they compassed ; everywhere they went ; everywhere attracted the serious attention of cultivated minds, and in almost every city of the Mediterranean coast they established synagogues and collected bodies of converts and inquirers. No one thing more promoted the spread of Christianity itself. These bodies furnished everywhere a prepared access for the Gospel, and became the nuclei of its congregations. The higher truth overgrew the humbler, and the propagation of the kingdom of Christ proved the successful climax of the Jewish endeavour to proselyte the world. I know no other period when a missionary spirit has characterized the Jew.

The change in the anticommmercial sentiment is generally referred to the captivity ; by identifying them with “ their kinsmen ” the Phœnicians, it is sometimes dated earlier ; but probably without sufficient ground : at least as a national characteristic.

and then proceeded to teach it to the rest. It was itself as much a Theocracy under David, or Hezekiah, or Pontius Pilate (John, xix. 11), as it was under Moses, or Deborah, or Samson. See SER. IV. and V., *Second Series*. I may add that the account of democracy or brotherhood given above—as the just initial form of a society, and always to be honoured as a principle, even when a better form has been attained—finds its most signal illustration in the Christian Church. First, a brotherhood of twelve (Matt. xxiii. 8, sqq. ; John, xiii. 12, sqq.), and then a larger brotherhood, insisting even on a community of goods (Acts, iv. 31, sqq., and v.) ; but presently (so soon as Acts, vi.) finding it necessary to constitute itself, and create its hierarchies ; yet even these hierarchies again proving “ the great democratic institution of the middle age ”—the only mode in which the meritorious, yet humbly born, could climb the gradations of society.

It becomes strongly marked in mediæval Europe, and especially from the time of the Crusades. The opportunity, the religious excuse, the incessant persecution, obliging an unsettled life, and leaving no other outlet to self-love or to that *religious* regard for material well-being which all their training inculcated—these may all account for it. But the fact is notorious. None now is so purely “commercial” as the Jew. Others “produce;” their office is “exchange.” From the mediæval wanderer, pillaged forcibly by all, and finding how to “borrow from the Egyptians” in return, to the modern capitalist whose transferable millions amaze us most, they have originated and mainly work that system of credit on which the industry of the modern world largely and increasingly reposes. This is remarkable, to say the least; and there are aspects in which it suggests reflection.

The Jewish Monotheism regards both highest and lowest as all alike from God. The Christian Church accepts its lesson, and looks forward not merely to a spiritual but also to a social and material Regeneration of the world; and looks for them not as a sudden transformation, but as a laborious and progressive achievement. “Of the *increase* of His government and peace there shall be no end.” “The mountain of His house shall be established above the hills, and all nations shall flow into it: and He shall judge among the nations, and rebuke many people; and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; neither shall they learn war any more.” This is the result that shall move the Jews “to jealousy;” but what shall produce the result itself? The modern world has already recognised that plain commercial intercourse, stimulating and rewarding production everywhere, and binding men and nations together in the interchange of kindly offices and the discerned community of Good—is at least one large and fundamental element; and of all this class of benefit the Apostle and Priest has been the Jew. This is the form into which God’s Providence has forced for centuries the persistent energy, intelligence, and ambition of the nation He has chosen for His own. “God has not cast away His people whom He foreknew.” So eighteen centuries re-echo to St. Paul. And while imposing on them

the chastisement of falsehood, or exacting the penalty of blood, this is the work and penance He has found for them to do.

It may sound unpoetical and poor, may shock some high-sounding and thoughtless "views," to depict again the Prince of Peace riding in triumph to the Holy of Holies in unpretentious, and, despite the prophecies, in unexpected guise. And we shall all be wiser after the event. But if material causes must cooperate to social ends, and material prosperity to spiritual progress—much more, if, as I believe, they are its substantial and appointed basis—it may not be folly to pause upon this function of Israel as truly correlated with the future, as working more than it intends, and signifying more than it has said. What, if the mediæval or the modern Jew, with all his faults—and we need not picture them—bear the same relation to the social triumphs of the religion that ought to be his own, that they who compassed sea and land to make one proselyte bore to the Christian successes of St. Paul? Frustrated and broken in all the lofty aims they cherished, and cherished in the name of God—unable to collect their thoughts, or to direct their conscience, they cling almost convulsively to the humblest good¹ they know, and in bowing down to Mammon, serve the meanest god. But all the gods must worship God, and do what He intends. And if, in bringing again His First Begotten to the world, He make His "witnesses" to prepare His way, as unconsciously, and not more unworthily than they did before—history, at least, might judge it suitable. Who more fitting, since they refuse the higher work, to level the ground, and amass the material, and shape the stone, and carve the cedar-wood, and dig and lay the foundation for the next great Temple that Earth's Messiah builds?

Those who sympathize least with any such attempt to discern the process and prospects of our times, will probably appreciate better two pieces of spiritual service now rendered to Christendom by the unconverted Jew—and rendered not the

¹ If one might confess one's obligation to "the modern Epic," I would say how admirably is all this state of mind depicted, for the individual, by the author of *Silas Marner*!

less effectively because unwittingly, or, perhaps, unwillingly. Israel produced the Bible: this we all admit. His present importance in "evidencing" its "Inspiration," and in "impressing" its threat and promise, is also, perhaps, sufficiently acknowledged. But His unconscious *Comment* on the Bible; the necessity he imposes of reading large sections even of its strange and prophetic announcements in their simplest literalness, and of making this literalness, throughout, the basis of all other exegesis—this is a function more felt than noticed; and yet it is of prime importance to the Church. It would be only too easy to show, from her most honoured records of success and failure, how deeply she depends, not on the ancient, but on the literal existence of the modern Jew, for this essential service.

The other service is, perhaps, of equal value. It is well known that the Jew, though refusing "to accept the second dispensation," has never gone back to the nation's earlier sins; is free from idolatry; is free from all duality, and is, in fact, the purest Monotheist on earth. And earth, as yet, is very far indeed from having learned the fundamental lesson. Whether Christendom, as a whole, or even the best parts of it, have attained to a distinct Monotheism, there are who doubt; Mr. Newman himself can scarcely give us courage; but that much of its practice is still palpable idolatry, its vulgar opinions largely corrupt, and its philosophic theories deeply tinged with dualism, every one must know. The bodily presence, then, of common Jews in Poland, or Austria, or Spain, and the contact of their higher mind with pantheism and theistic doctrinaireship nearer home, while it accounts for their own continuance in Judaism, may have been far from profitless to us. It is curious that their favourite abodes should chiefly lie in those regions where their respective truth is most required. Is it *credible* that, in order to avoid being self-condemned, the bulk of Christian worship must still omit¹ the Second Commandment of the Deca-

¹ Not merely the mediæval churches. The Lutherans do the same. In Luther's "Catechism," as still taught in the most enlightened parts of North Germany, the second Commandment is omitted; the tenth divided into two; and instead of the fourth, stands this—"Du sollst dein Feiertag heiligen." "Thou shalt keep holy thy festival-day."

logue? or credible that our best religious theory can scarcely yet distinguish between Theocracy and Pantheism? or, seeing that it is so, can we wonder at the continued repugnance of the Jewish conscience for the name of Christianity?

Brethren, the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth; and He is the Father of all. Let all stand in awe of Him. He has wrought the lower things, and works the higher things, and will work higher still, and will have us to work them in His sight. Let us cast ourselves forward humbly upon His guidance. And thou who once didst lead, but now canst lead no more!—remember Abraham thy father, and Moses who bore thee, and the Messiah whom thou hast borne. True, thou hast rejected Him, and hast destroyed thyself, but in Him is still thy help. The Gentiles have looked on Him they pierced; look thou on Him thou hast betrayed and sold. Hast thou not yet received at the Lord's hand double for all thy sins? The nations all look down on thee: thou art nearly as despised and rejected as was thy King. "Men have said to thy soul, bow down that we may go over; and thou hast laid thy body as the ground, and as the street to them that went over. Awake, Awake! put on strength, as in the days of old; awake, and shake thee from the dust." Surely some death-sleep is upon thee. Awake, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light. Awake, and renew thy garments, and haste to the Temple that He builds, to the Judgment He has commanded. Who knows what work must yet be done, or what sentence shall be pronounced? Behold, there shall be first last, and last first. *Who* hath most truly humbled himself, he shall be exalted. *Who* hath blessed the most the little ones of Christ, even though he knew them not *as His*, shall rank the nearest to His throne.

Says not Isaiah of thee, as of thy King—

"Thy dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust: for thy dew is as the dew of herbs; and the earth shall cast out the dead"?

SERMON V.

THE BIBLE.

"It may be admitted that the elementary truths of religion, once propounded, are promptly admitted, but still in *some* external shape they require to be propounded. There is such a thing in the human mind as unrealized truth, both intellectual and spiritual : the inarticulate muttering of an obscurely felt sentiment ; a vague appetency for something we are not distinctly conscious of. The clear utterance of it—its distinct proposition to us, is the *very thing* that is often wanted to convert this dim feeling into distinct vision. This is the electric spark which transforms two invisible gases into a visible and transparent fluid ; this is the influence which evolves the latent caloric, and makes it a powerful and active element."—ECLIPSE OF FAITH, p. 290.

"WHOM THEREFORE YE IGNORANTLY WORSHIP, HIM DECLARE I UNTO YOU."—
ST. PAUL.

SERMON V.

THE BIBLE.

1 COR. xiii. 11.

When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things.

THE distribution of my subject leads us to-day to consider the Scriptures, whose mysterious pre-eminence in letters we have compared to that of Conscience among the other elements of consciousness, and of the family of Abraham among the other families of men—as being each in its several world the permanent witness for God, and engine of man's advance. And they who would assign to the Bible a lower place are few indeed. That it has been, in point of fact, and now is, in an ever-increasing degree, the wellspring of religious culture to the best portions of the world, no one can or does deny. Thence do the Churches profess to draw both their doctrines and their rites. Thence do the masses, in proportion as descending civilization brings them within the influence of letters, seek to drink the waters of life direct, with a thirst that outstrips the solicitude of their guides. And thence, too, has so deep an inspiration pervaded literature itself, that, as has been graphically and truthfully depicted, the world of letters should have lost its sun and centre could the Bible be blotted from its sphere.

Yet there are those, neither few nor despicable in Christendom, who would fain withhold its indiscriminate perusal from the multitude. There are some, even among ourselves, who be-

lieve it a source of doubtful good to many. And there are a few besides who, while acknowledging that it has conferred vast benefits upon mankind, affirm that, to some at least, its time has passed—that certain sections of the world have reached, or risen above, its standard, and must henceforth find another guide, or form one for themselves. It is only these last, perhaps, who would refuse the position I have assigned to it among the *permanent* Instruments of Religious Progress.

Now, there are no plausible, certainly no popular opinions, in which, however mistaken they may be on the whole, there is not some truth mixed up, the neglect of which by antagonists occasions or causes their partial prevalence. And these sentiments, doubtless, have their basis of truth too, which it behoves not any to despise. And when we see, besides, that among those who habitually study that book with no apparent motive except desire for good, many do find it difficult to read and easy to mistake; while the bolder confidently draw most conflicting opinions from its pages, all of which cannot be true, and some of which must be pernicious, we cannot but long for further help in discriminating its lessons, and enabling us to discern their force and application. Towards this, a just theory of the book itself, a true conception of its nature, and of the relation of its various parts, ought materially to aid. And it will contribute something, I believe, towards that theory, if we will steadily contemplate it for a little in that point of view in which my subject places it, as being progressive—a series of line-upon-line instructions—a record and exemplification of successive stages of religious and social culture, which it had helped to produce, and which it tends to reproduce—as presenting, therefore, in its collective aspect, not the homogeneousness of a single product, but the combined variety and unity of a continuous development,—a growth or life.

This conception of the Sacred Volume, familiar to us from childhood, and obvious upon its face, asserts this proposition—which is at once the fundamental canon whereby we interpret, and the basis whereon we justify it against objection—that the unity of the whole implies not uniformity, but subordination, in

its several parts : that these are to be viewed and compared, therefore, not as absolutely alike,¹ but as successively related ; and each is to be judged according to its place in the series, by its aptitude for its own time and work ; by its capacity to direct *its own* present, and to produce its immediate and its remoter future.

While glancing at its leading sections in this light, we shall not fail to observe how its own progressiveness constitutes the Bible a Paraclete of individual Progress—by enabling it to hold out to pilgrims *in every stage*, at least from its own highest downwards, sympathy, direction, and encouragement. And we may have opportunity of judging, before we close, how far they are correct who suppose themselves already to have outstripped its pillar of a cloud. We shall approach our subject most easily from its historical side. To recollect the actual origin of the Book will readily suggest all that we shall have to say respecting its nature.

In my last discourse we considered the family of Abraham as exercising a direct influence upon the aggregate religious culture of the world—an influence not proceeding in an insensible and continuous stream, at least, not merely so, but communicated in a series of distinct impressions. We shall to-day consider them as in the process of receiving the instruction which they gave. Then the several impulses will aptly mark the epochs of the training, and the Scriptures will be the record and mirror of the process itself, the various stages of which it sets before us, both in their origin and effects, from a contemporaneous, not a retrospective point of view—each lesson, as successively attained, having registered itself, as it were, unconsciously, in the History, Laws, Psalms, and Prophecies of the period. An analysis of that process of education, then, through which the house of Abraham has passed will be, in the main, an analysis of the Scriptures themselves, which were its continuous photograph, and are the engine of its reproduction.

I have assumed throughout that the dispensation under which

¹ See note E.

this pilgrim nation has existed, and the strange discipline of mingled severity and kindness it has received, is, in truth, a process of Education, and that, however unfinished, it has been in the main successful. And surely I need not occupy time by any formal attempt at proof. It is enough if we can illustrate it. Those, however, who reject our assumption, will at least acknowledge that it professes itself such from the beginning, and prophecies that it shall be such until the end—at least, until the times of the Gentiles are fulfilled, and the prevalence of the righteousness and peace Israel has flung to others shall have reacted upon itself, and led it also “to walk in the light of the Lord.” And they may notice that each later and more perfect stage, especially the last of all, much as it complains of the indocility of its generation, carefully insists on the unity of the training, and affirms its success—contrasts its own more manifested Truth with the humbler standards of the past, and yet claims this highest light, not as a departure from, but a fulfilment of, the first intention of the Law.

“The Law was given by Moses, but Grace and Truth came by Jesus Christ.” Yet, “think not,” says that Jesus Christ, “that I am come to destroy the Law and the Prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.” And yet again, How? “Ye have heard that there have been said by them of old time” such and such things; “But I say unto you” things vastly deeper; widely different; some of them even literally opposed. And yet not one jot or tittle of that law had failed, or *could* fail, in the conception of Him who judged it not failure in things or men if each had fulfilled its genuine end—had served its own generation before it fell on sleep to rise in spirit among the next—if it had so guided those who required its guidance, that it had energised a progress to overtake itself, and demand its own regeneration—if, to use the illustration of my text, it had so nurtured infancy that childhood grew, and so invigorated youth that manhood came, albeit each, in succession, should claim to rise above its past, and demand the thoughts and language congenial with its present, and needful for its next succeeding stage

And before proceeding to analyse this process, which my

treatment thus regards as the "type" of religious education, capable of being universally reproduced, and actually intended to be so, let me briefly recall to your attention the analysis of education itself:—of Education in general; that of an individual, of an individual faculty, almost of any given exercise of that faculty; for, in the intellectual as in the material creation, in educating as in forming, it seems to be the one fundamental type that repeats itself throughout.

It consists, then, to express it loosely, in "arresting the attention"—in concentrating the energies. More accurately, it consists in recalling the vague and listless capacity or rudimentary power from its vagueness, and fixing it upon a point or points. Around these it labours and is exercised; meets and associates with other capacities in a similar process of exertion; embodies itself in act; and by repeated action becomes itself expert and powerful: not a capacity merely, but a formed and educated faculty, or a class of faculties. The original capacity, however, not being all absorbed by any of the faculties arising from it—any more than the flesh and blood are by the sinews and nerves, which are surrounded by and formed out of them,—but coexisting with them, a permanent source of vigour and renewal. The point on which it is first exercised may be trivial and ill-chosen, the first grasp of it feeble, and the effort constrained and painful; still, if it be a point apprehended at all, so that the rudimentary power is truly exercised, the creative process has begun; "the infinite is divided;" the vague becomes available for production; distinct results and definite faculties evolve themselves from chaos.

I have already hinted my belief that at the very point of concentration itself the elementary energy enters into a new phase, and produces an *unlike* effect to that which is due to its activity, or presence, in the diffused state—a proposition which, I am disposed to imagine, is true universally in physical as in moral production, and which reduces the phenomena I have classed as the step *per saltum* in nature within the operation of the same laws that conduct her more equable progression.

But for the present omitting this, and speaking only of the

obvious and large appearance, I observe that the transition from vagueness to definiteness, concentration upon a point or points, is the *essence of the process*; while the *character of the result* will depend upon various considerations, among which a chief one will be the happy or unhappy selection of the prime points *or point of application*.

Another remark is also necessary. The first vague state, though unavailable and barren, and tending to dissipation and decay, has one advantage, great in appearance, however little to be coveted, over the next succeeding stage, in that it seems broad and expansive, perhaps peaceful and contented; whereas the formative process is confined and narrow, the scene of a constant effort at exclusion, and of a struggle for mastery, intense in proportion to the energy and value of the faculties involved. But, as the process works on and clears itself, this character changes again, and the original breadth and openness is more than regained. The points which at first were essential to the exercise of the faculty, by degrees become less so; it can carry its point of application with it, or can find it anywhere; it rises above its temporary limits, and widens and expands, not by dimming the outline, but by enlarging the conception and multiplying the relations, till all the vague diffusiveness of the first is as nothing compared with the conscious expansion, the deliberate comprehension of its perfect state.

In this narrow school of disciplined and restrained endeavour is each of our faculties educed—our intellect and our affections, our conscience and our love; in this, our aggregate character; in this, too, our Church and nation; and in this, our world. Its three leading stages may be coarsely marked by the words: 1. Vagueness or diffusion. 2. Definiteness; narrowness, with all the ideas of struggle, contest, and exclusion, which it naturally or necessarily suggests. 3. Comprehension; Catholicity; such as we may not, indeed, attain, but cannot help aspiring to.

The first is like the mist that clothes the mountain-top, or curtains round the sky, if we do not compare it to a still earlier stage of elemental moisture. The last is like the circling ocean, which unites while it parts the nations of the earth, and mirrors

in its reflecting bosom every feature of the heaven it touches, and into which it unceasingly ascends. And if we would picture to ourselves the intermediate stage, we might follow the process which first educes, then aggregates its tiny drops, and bids them flow in subtle streams, through all realms of chemistry, vegetation, animated life ; or makes them shine as rills and rivers in the geography of earth, and take their share in visibly creating the beauty of the physical, the interest of the economic, the moral obligations of the social world. And it is this intermediate, we are to remember, which is, chiefly or exclusively, its *productive* stage. And all the various forms of life which crowd around its water-course—the plant, the animal, the man—the rude, the mighty mechanism ; the mill, the hamlet, and the town—all are true to the analogy of nature as well as to the instincts and ambitions of their several being, when they refer not to its first or last, but to its middle period ; not to the mist or ocean, but to the divided waters, to the definitely flowing stream, the source of their vitality.

If all this be true in nature, it ought to be true in religion ; and if in religion, then, eminently so in that which we regard as **THE** religion of the world ; and its Literary Record might be expected to reflect or to expound the lineaments. Let us turn then to the Bible, and see how far this expectation may prove just.

What are the stages through which it represents the religious culture of mankind to have come ? They might be described according to various characteristics, owing to the simultaneousness and mutual consistency of the parts in any real stage. We shall mark them most simply, perhaps, according to the fundamental tenet, the conception of God Himself ; confining ourselves, of course, not to those inferences which are implied in *any* true definition of God, and may be elicited thence by those who are educated to see them there, but to those which actually were felt and understood to be involved in each at the time.

We find, then, first, a period in which there is *no* distinct conception, no definition of God ; farther, at least, than is expressed by the word “ Almighty,” the vaguest and most elementary notion of Power. His Existence is undoubted, and His Rule,

both in severity and kindness, allowed and felt; but it does not enter into the minds of men to speculate concerning Him at all. The deluging heavens are His, and so is the bow which gilds them; the teeming earth is His, and so is the desolation that sweeps it. Irresistible in Providence, both for good and ill—He is above and beneath and about them, but He is not defined off and separated in their regards. The religious impression is real, and occasionally strongly felt; but it is vague and inarticulate, unexplicit, undirected, unsustained. There is no definite culture of Him; and the world feels the want of it. This is the first stage, and lasts till the times of Abraham.

Here the defining begins;¹ but the first attempt at limitation

¹ The progression here sketched is of course only that described in the Bible—the true religion, or rather its central line, from the first promise of the Seed, or the first felt necessity for Hope, to the Seed itself. In order to trace it within the limits of a sermon, I pass lightly over the “vague” period, and omit all collateral or branching developments; but we are by no means called on to forget or to disparage either. Had we reliable materials, it would be most instructive, doubtless, to consider them, and to compare their phases and results with those realized in Israel. But the data are yet to be discovered. Man’s first rude greatness toiled to record itself in Babel-towers and gigantic structures of stone and brass, and these have proved less durable memorials than a ballad, Psalm, or eclogue, or than mystic characters etched upon a reed. By discovering these, or discerning their importance, the Hebrew muse has produced a history more ancient by a thousand years than any which can compete with it. Fragments of the others are discernible, and both the learned and unlearned mind is well inclined to magnify their merits. But when Babylon, in the time of Darius, had or could appreciate no higher scholastic attainment than how to “make its mark” in the cuneiform inscriptions, even Max Müller or the shade of Bunsen should admit that scepticism as to the pristine perfection of the Vedas, or the performances of Buddhas and Zoroasters, other and older than those known to “history,” is but a venial sin.

Without writing, and writing materials, we can have little literature; and without consecutive literature, we can have no reliable chronology. A few names and guesses are all we have in Greece itself, before 600 B. C.; and how seriously events falling within that limit might be even there misplaced, Grote instances in Plato’s misjudging the time of Epimenides by nearly a hundred years. Buddhism conferred on India and Ceylon “an alphabet and literature,” and refers itself historically to the sixth century B. C.—“admitting the absolute mystification and obscurity of every anterior legend.” Confucius is supposed to have been born B. C. 550; the most authentic book ascribed to him, the Chun-Tsien, begins its history from B. C. 722, acknowledging all previous accounts to be “unsatisfactory.” Zoroaster reformed the Magian institutes in the time of Darius Hystaspis, say 500 B. C. Both the Zend-Avesta, his supposed work, and the Vedas, contain, no doubt, very ancient fragments; but they have been interpolated, recast, and the bulk of them *composed* in very modern times; some, perhaps, within 800 years;

is feeble and child-like. It is simple, indeed, and simply true, yet weak and unguarded; most open to mistake; and easily pass-

much, probably, since the time of Mahomet. This is the generally, and I believe justly received opinion. Max Müller, indeed—on the authority of *language*, i. e. of the half dozen words we can compare—reverts to earlier hypotheses, and seems inclined to believe in some Zarathustra, more ancient than Abraham or Moses, nay, than Adam himself, *teste Plinio aut Eudoxo*, by one or two thousand years; and he regrets that Dr. Haug should confound him with the Jaradashti of the Vedas. Such inaccuracies are provoking and provokingly common even in respect to more notorious personages. Mahomet himself, notwithstanding his parchments and mutton-bones, and his facilities for correcting a small mistake, confounds Haman, the familiar of Ahasuerus and Mordecai, with a more ancient Haman, vizier of Pharaoh, and persecutor of Moses; and identifies Miriam, sister of Moses and Aaron, with a more modern Miriam, the Virgin Mary, mother of Christ.—(KORAN, chs. 3, 19, and 28.) In fact, without preserved literature, the argument from language to chronology is as precarious as the rest.

The Bible represents two extensive "civilizations" to have preceded Abraham—one antediluvian, in Central Asia, beside the Caspian, with cities, instruments of music, and workers in brass and iron—an aggregate of nationalities it would seem to have been, wherein Cain's family hold the place of Greece and Rome, and Seth's that of Israel—and the second post-diluvian, of a more massive and imperial form, centering from Babel, and touching the Indian Ocean and the Nile. The Chronology of *our* version, indeed, leaves little time for their development; but that of the Septuagint, with which agree the New Testament (e. g. Luke, iii. 36, Gen. xi. 12), and all the best modern authorities, increase their period by near 1500 years. Should this enlarged period be ever *proved* insufficient, it will be time to inquire whether the mode of speaking which begins the New Testament—"The book of the generations of Jesus Christ, the *son* of David, the *son* of Abraham," and *then* expands this genealogy by intercalating forty steps—may have admitted a similar brevity in the more distant and less important history. The tendency of discovery, historic and geological, is certainly towards a respectful estimate of very ancient times, and of a duration of the human race exceeding, perhaps vastly, even the Septuagint date for Adam. And, though the Hebrew, unlike other Eastern annals, rather shorten than exaggerate their own antiquity, there is nothing in Scripture to oppose the geologic inference.

For, in fact, the civilizations alluded to, and the whole line from Adam to Abraham are represented in Scripture, if I understand it rightly, as being itself a raised and central line, surrounded by a lower and prior humanity, which was created "male and female" on the sixth day, *before* the Sabbath, without any spiritual calling or idea, but only heading and crowning the mere "natural" and *spontaneous* creation over which they had dominion. Whereas Adam and Eve stand *after* the Sabbath, or *in* the first Sabbath-period, and mark the beginnings of spiritual creation—the regeness—*reflex* and regenerate humanity, with self-knowledge, self-dominion, self-sacrifice—all that has culminated and will culminate in Christ. Hence, they initiate tillage and forethought, property and law, marriage morality and religion, with sin and grace explicit; are born anew, by how dark and mysterious a baptism soever, into the communion of Elohim

ing off into error and perversion. It is merely that God is the God of Abraham—"I will be THY God." The true Invisible,

(Gen. iii. 22); continue thenceforth, with all their faults, "sons of God" as compared with the mere humanity around; and bear, even in their extreme of sin and of a "chastisement greater than they can endure," God's protecting mark upon their brow. Unless we read it so, we shall find it impossible, I believe, to make the first chapter of Genesis, the Sabbath, and the following chapters, to cohere. And the earliest details of the history—such as Cain's remonstrance, and his punishment, and his "building a city and calling it after the name of his son, Enos," before the birth of Seth, and when, according to "the sudden-creation theory," there were but five individuals in existence—are unintelligible or absurd. There are, no doubt, difficulties on the other side, but none at all comparable to these.

The sudden-creation theory, indeed, delights in difficulties; multiplies miracles *ad libitum*; and is little troubled at their being purposeless, mutually contradictory, subversive of the "economy" of miracles, or even of the very notion of a miracle, or of the argument derived therefrom—for what revelation could they attest thousands of years before the Bible began to be written, nay, geologic Days before a man was formed? But that theory is entitled to no respect: it is a semignostic figment, utterly opposed, so I believe, to Nature and Revelation alike. And we ought to outgrow the childishness which gives it a first acceptance; for the real miracle is vaster, a million-fold, than any sign-from-heaven it looks for or conceives. When we read that "God planted a garden eastward in Eden," or that He "planted the cedars of Libanus," we do not imagine He "planted," or transplanted them, with a spade or mattock, or that they were the less His work, because by His constant forces, visible and invisible, He "caused" their growth, and shaped them as He would. When we read that God spoke, or "said," so and so, we do not suppose He spoke in English, or in Hebrew, or Sanscrit, or with any human articulation. If He gave men ears to hear the whisperings of His Spirit within them and without, and made His work and meaning unmistakable to the first, this, surely, was His authoritative voice, and His true utterance and word. The first Adam in St. Luke's genealogy is "the son of God"—so is the second Adam in a far more especial sense. Does this exclude in either case natural and created antecedents? *Why* should it? Do we really believe such antecedents could have any *other* origin than God? Adam was "formed of the dust of the earth"—so are we all: we claim herein as high a genealogy as he—is it the less God who forms our members "day by day, when as yet there are none of them," because He forms us each by His great conscious or unconscious agencies, and with each his appointed place in His great growing scheme? Only childishness could think so—childishness, arising from our own partiality; from the necessity of our learning in parts, and dividing things off from each other in order to consider them. But we must not divide *any* thing off from the One. Our childishness is excusable or just so long as we make it temporary and subservient; but becomes palpable duality and Manichæism so soon as we make it *essential*, and persist beyond the time and place in "calling common and unclean that which God has cleansed." "In Christ Jesus all things consist: in Him shall all be reconciled"—and this is our formal answer to all partial and shortsighted difficulties.

The intervention of the Sabbath, then, between the spontaneous and the reflex man

how dimly great soever, becomes the guardian Deity of him, and of his seed: not, indeed, denied to others, however easily

admits or obliges *any interval that may prove requisite* for understanding the early development. I call it development; and with every desire not to give offence, I must insist that such it plainly was upon the whole, if either the Mosaic or the geologic Revelation is to be received, whatever our opinion may be of its details—a development; a true *genesis*; a gradual and successive “creation;” a deliberate and orderly “causing of things to grow,” from chaos to cosmos, from the humblest material up to the highest form—the same process that still proceeds, wrought by the same Creator, though its activities and interest are now chiefly centred on spiritual creation. And its forces too—for it is “the same Spirit” that operates throughout, producing Nature’s powers, and transforming them, according to a certain law, dispensation or economy, from the first physical motion that agitated chaos up to the highest godly motions that reach the throne of heaven—converting, for example, motion into heat, heat into light chemistries and vegetation, these into animal, and these again into mental and spiritual forces, as the *Κύριος και Ζωοποιός* “will.” So that the whole “growth” is very like our own—“first the natural, and then the spiritual”—the spiritual on the basis of the natural, and, in some measure, at its expense; the natural decaying day by day, as the spiritual is renewed, and gradually gathers strength to meet its great transition.

Hence it is no real objection to our theory that we are obliged to admit, and in a very pervading sense, a certain kind of degeneracy proceeding upon the globe; namely, that its humbler forces, physical and organic, are less energetic than they were—being, in fact, so I conceive, partly “worked up” into the higher forms of force, and absorbed in their production. Mother earth is no longer capable of the Titanic progeny in which she once delighted. How insignificant the present Endogens of Lancashire, for example, compared with the wondrous luxuriance entombed in its coal-seams! How despicable the present saurians and batrachians of Surrey, compared with the “monstrous elf of old that once was ruler of earth,” and that there disported in “his high sun, and billowy stream,” and has there deposited his bones! Measured on these lower strata the degeneracy is undoubted; but he will not lay it much to heart who believes that cities, churches, schools, and Bibles, with all their faults, make the Earth “sublime amends” for the want of plesiosaurs and fern-trees; who holds “better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay;” higher the erring mortal who contemplates Mont Blanc than the “monarch of mountains” he beholds; or, let us say it reverently, better the thirty years of the second Adam’s life than the 930 of the first. We do not believe in Prof. Thompson’s gradual annihilation—God forbid. Nay, if our analysis of the fact and process be correct, the absorption of lower into higher force is a true progression, and expounds one law of the Divine Economy.

And hence, without believing in golden ages, or in any general deterioration, we need not deny to Earth’s humbler forces an early vigour and development transcending all present experience. If men were—as it appears they were—contemporary with the mammoth of the drift, there is no reason for our refusing them a proportionate physique, and a slow, quiet, unanxious life of some immense duration—especially if, about that time, Earth’s meteoric and planetary conditions had attained a tolerably stable equili-

or inevitably open to this erroneous inference ; yet distinctly, in human regards, separated off to one, *and by this separation* bringing home a definite appeal to the peculiar affection and allegiance of the worshipper. Abraham and his seed respond to the appeal. They become His pilgrims, and walk before Him through the earth ; recognised, by themselves first, and then by others, as His chosen and peculiar family ; aspiring to be His people.

And the religious impression, exercised and strengthened by this relationship, quickly manifests a tendency to define itself still farther ; to associate with particular things ; to seek a local habitation and a name. Abraham and Isaac, for example, could

brum—not to be seriously disturbed again until the diluvial period, of which, perhaps, Noah's flood, with its prior violence and long years of warning, was but the central example. Many local traditions of "the flood" seem to be independent of Moses. And such a *possible* convulsion as Hugh Miller pictures could scarcely have been exceptional, nor isolated from some general transition-epoch, such, indeed, as seems marked by "the drift" itself. Nor is it difficult to imagine probable causes for such convulsions. On Laplace's hypothesis, the last "shrinking of the sun" (more than one or two such may or must have occurred since the fourth Day—see *Lect. I.*) would abundantly account for them, and for the present keener and less kindly conditions of lower life upon the globe. However this be, it is certain that these conditions are now largely reduced, are much sharper, less equable, and more trying than they were, and require a larger mental development and education to combat them successfully. Hence, it would be a great mistake to estimate the ancient races of mankind by the aspect of inferior human races now. Masses of men separated from the centres of civilization, and from mutual stimulus and help, lose their power of advance, degenerate, and disappear. Our present savage tribes are probably degenerations from races which are by no means ancient ; and when we see how rapidly the strongest of them vanishes in presence of the Anglo-Saxon, we can imagine how many intermediate types may have been lost between us and the antediluvian humanity. Connecting links may be discovered yet, and enable us to trace our lineage more precisely—but they are scarcely to be expected. Nature loves to define herself in broad, intelligible grades—breaks up her failures, and buries her abortions ; glosses over her transition crisis, her *step per saltum*, or only leaves its traces in the air ; curtains round her chaos pain and travail ; modestly hides her conception and gestation, and withdraws the birth-stage from view. It is the same in more spiritual creation. Intermediate politicians and divines are "dangerous men," with no clear position on either side. Both sides misunderstand and shrink from them. Even the prophet can do little until they have adorned his sepulchre. And, what is still more noticeable, intermediate truths themselves must disappear. What remains of the whole "dispensation" of John the Baptist, except, indeed, the initial rite of Christendom ? How natural and "practical" is the remonstrance of the religious world—"Why baptizest thou, then, if thou be *not* the Christ, *neither* Elias, *neither* that prophet?" How unsatisfactory the answer—"a voice crying in the wilderness!" or "a reed shaken by

find their God everywhere—perhaps everywhere alike. But, as the third of these pilgrim-fathers wends on his more troubled way, and rests one night upon a stoney pillow, new dreams of awe and penitence and hope float before his vision, and take form above his head. “And Jacob awaked from sleep, and said, surely the Lord is in this place, and I knew it not. And he was afraid, and said, How dreadful is this place; this is none other but the house of God, and this is the gate of Heaven.” And so that place, which is to most of men—as it is, doubtless, to God above—simply the same as any other¹ place where

the wind!” What could be more empty or unstable? Yet have courage, O true *producers*, however intermediate and ill-defined! you and your works shall not be forgotten, where sparrows are remembered, hairs of our head numbered, and cups of cold water noted down.

What instruction Abraham derived from the preceding periods, and what precise relation he bore them, farther than his being the first true “pilgrim of the Unseen,” and instituting a church pledged to follow his example, we are unable to delineate. Circumcision he is supposed to have learned in Egypt, where it existed less perhaps as a religious than a sanitary practice. Pharaoh in Egypt, and Abimelek the Philistine, are each in a position to reprove him for transgression against their common God. And Melchizedek is in a position to accept his tithes, and to sustain him with his own formal blessing and approval. Plausible traditions represent him as striving to reform the fire-worship of his native Chaldaea, and his departure to Haran as a real exile in consequence, “the first Hegira.” Plausible hypotheses connect him with the Brahmins also (or rather them with him, their name included), and so with the oldest fragments of both the Vedas and Zend-Avesta. The Bible genealogies (ch. xxv.), connect him with most of the Arabian tribes; and the traditions collected in the Koran, whatever their authority, delight to magnify the relationship.

What we should expect from theory—whether we derive mankind from Noah, from Adam, or from some prior stock—is, that the antecedent and collateral developments would run through phases similar to the Jewish more rapidly and less perfectly; more easily falling into corruption and mistake; and producing, at best, partial anticipations and approximations to its truth. And all we know coheres with this hypothesis. The prior dispensations culminate in Melchizedek; who stands as the type of “natural or essential religion,” and receives homage from all forms, rites, and doctrines—Abrahamic, Davidic, and Pauline—as that to which they “minister.” Their object is to produce a higher type or image than he; but of the same essential and undying “order”—to enable us less vaguely, more definitely and intelligently, to see God every where, and sanctify all things with His righteousness and peace—recognising, however, nature’s constitution, her higher and lower, and her “imperative” to climb; discerning the onward and upward to be the voice of God, even when slaying kings, and so converting both Pantheism and superstition into express Theocracy.

¹ “There is indeed nothing to indicate the Divine Presence; no *religio loci*, no awful shades, no lofty hills: bare, wild rocks, a beaten thoroughfare; these are the only fea-

His Presence dwells, and His good Spirit rests, is so no longer to him who called it Beth-El, and who, with many of his remote descendants, doubtless found it such.

This, then, is the beginning of cultivated religion—those four centuries in which God was the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, *the* God of their fathers and of themselves, and yet “by his name Jah was not known” to any of them—the infancy of religious growth; the nursing period of the Church; marked not by vigour or completeness, but by tenderness and family kindness—the sincere milk of the word; the flow of natural affection gently inspired and blessed. And its literary product is conformable. In idylls fresh from nature’s cradle, it tells the guileless story of its hopes and happiness, and doubts and sins and woes; and the world has sought for, but never yet has found, the eclogues that can match their simple pathos, their naked dignity, and gracefulness, and truth. The artist delights to paint or sculpture them; the poet draws back to admire and contemplate; but the family willingly draws near, and learns to love and worship at their shrine. I do not suppose that Moses

tures of the primeval sanctuary of that God of whom nature itself there teaches us that if He could, in such a scene, so emphatically reveal Himself to the houseless exile, He is with him, and with His true servants, everywhere, and will keep them in all places whither they shall go.”—STANLEY’S “Sinai and Palestine,” p. 220.

Dr. Stanley often remarks upon the commonplace character of the spots dedicated to religion by the Jewish history, and contrasts it with the Greek and Roman local superstitions, which have a stand-point in the striking features and almost inspiration of the place. “Delphi and Lebadea, and the Styx” for example, p. 231 “are so strongly marked by every accompaniment of external nature, as at once to proclaim their position as the inevitable seats of the oracles of the nation. But Shiloh is utterly featureless.”

This had an important bearing in the Jewish education. For, in fact, no “holy place” in Israel was ever designed to be so permanently. There was only *one* allowed *at once*; and, like the Ark which defined it, this was a “moveable holy place;” none else could suit a pilgrim nation. See SER. III., *Second Series*. Hence, when the reverence that was artificially associated with any of them was broken, the whole *religio loci* vanished of itself; or rather, the want of it, disappointing expectation, produces the opposite effect. Thus easily, as Dr. Stanley notices, did “the desolation foretold by Amos and Hosea reign undisturbed; and Bethel, the House of God, has become literally, Beth-Aven, the House of Naught.” And so of Calvary; of Jerusalem (note, p. 177); and of Palestine itself. For all their literality, they were but the shadow of things to come. Now they are but the deserted grave of holiness, the place where Christ is *not*; except to those who have eyes for seeing the Invisible.

was their author, but some earlier of the patriarchs ; Joseph, perhaps, or even Israel.

Presently the family has grown into a nation, and demands stronger food and harder trial, which Providence already has in store. Their land of Goshen becomes a furnace of affliction, and formally initiates that course of discipline which runs parallel throughout with their direct instruction. The people multiplied in Egypt, and drudged, and groaned, until that vigorous slave arose, who first flung his own golden fetters to the earth, and then would break the bondage of his tribe. And when he too was forced, his offers rejected and himself despised, to learn in disappointment's school, and forty years of exile and reflection—wasting his fiery manhood and all his grand endowments, tending sheep upon the hill—had matured a meeker wisdom than all the learning of Egypt, and taught him something of himself and God, he was prepared to recognise the emblem on which others listless gazed, and ready to believe that the living illumination which there displayed its type—which burned the bush, and yet consumed it not—was, indeed, no other than He said—“I am the God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob. I have seen, I have seen the afflictions of my people, and am come down to deliver them. I appeared unto your fathers, and God Almighty was I called, but by my name Jehovah was I not known unto them. Yet I AM that I AM. This is my name for ever ; this is my memorial to all generations.”

This conception of God as the I AM, Jah, Jehovah, continued existence and the essence of it ; the living God, the God of Energy and Being ; not superseding, but invigorating the patriarchal sentiment of guardianship and appropriation, marks the next epoch in their growth—suitable for the youth or youthful nation, forced—so Universal Providence has willed—out from the guarded home into the open battle-field of life. Many and manifold are the perils that beset us there. They who would bear them with manhood through the fray need a vigorous thought and a definite guiding star.

And this is precisely what the new conception gave. For, it will be readily noted, the patriarchal conception of God was too

feeble to assail and condemn polytheism. Rather, by an inference illogical, indeed, yet natural and almost unavoidable, it allowed, or supposed it. God is the guardian deity of Abraham and his seed—it does not follow from this that He is not the guardian God of every one beside. But it seemed to follow, and both by Jews and Gentiles the inference was drawn, and with it the apparent acknowledgment of other deities, at least for other men. Israel had Israel's God appropriated to itself—why should not other nations have their guardian gods as well?

But this inference the new conception ploughs up from its foundations, and extirpates without mercy. For all things living live in Him, and must be His ministers, if not Himself. Let them have their gods, then, and what do they become? Israel's is the Living God, and what are they? Why, they tell it for themselves. "Eyes have they, but they see not; ears have they, but they hear not; neither is there breath in their nostrils, nor any life at all in the midst of them." Jehovah—essence and energy of life—Jehovah is, and He is God alone. The rest are dead; they cannot live; they are figments, they are nullities, their idols are nothing in the world. They even represent nothing, except the folly of those who make them, and bow down to the product of their own laborious manufacture.

Thus this simple and vigorous conception converts Israel's God into the One God, the Only, the Universal God; and changes an insight of His nature into an insight of His rule, a foresight of His dominion, which *must* issue forth from Zion, and compass round the earth. On this conception, with its immediate inferences, the now formed religion of the nation, its doctrines, institutions, and worship, grounds itself; on this basis it registers its faith, and round this its deepening inspiration runs. Its prophetic picture becomes a present truth. It sees and feels all false worship in process of abolishment, and the mountain of the Lord's House being established on the top of the hills, with every nation flowing into it. No one can read a page of those burning prophecies without feeling that the sublime poetic utterance goes not one whit beyond the severity of the logic or the moral force of the conclusion. They but express man's native

sense of God. True, the prophets, one by one, were persecuted and slain, as is the prophet's function. But their spirit slept not in their graves. Back into the nation's heart it breathed, and if not quickly, yet deeply, wrought its change. The nation purged itself of idols; and, when God's Providence forbore to scatter, spread itself abroad—in the conviction that it was Jehovah's Witness—in that world-wide missionary effort which I noticed on last Sunday, as terminating this stage of the culture, by ushering in the times of Christ.

But, before passing on to that next stage, we must dwell a little on one or two marked features of the present. And I notice, first, the leading peculiarity of Jewish *worship*, the absence of any *image* of God, as being scarcely a deduction from their prime conception, but rather an expression of it. For such an image could not be Jehovah, nor possess any likeness at all to Him. *Its* very definition was something dead;¹ He is Life itself. Thus the idols it utterly abolishes: What connexion has the "temple of Jah" with them? But it is worthy our attention that this peculiarity did not arise at all from this, that the Jewish ceremonial disdained the help of "the material." Most strikingly the contrary. All that was cunning and costly, all that the young æsthetic could produce, was carefully sought out for its first, ungrudgingly and grandly accumulated round its latest efforts. And its ideal of worship, whether drawn by the historic or the prophetic pencil, is never tired of pourtraying, down to extreme minuteness, what it conceives due to the social acknowledgment of God. In this respect the Jewish is not unlike religion in general. It is but its "type." Which are the arts of civilization, what is the branch of science or of literature, that has not had religion present as the angel of its birth? that has not received its earliest inspiration and nurture at her hand? Religion's "admonition," indeed, is presently neglected. Most of God's sons on earth are apt, in their early vigour, to desire an independent, to fall into an irreligious luxuriance and excess, and wander far, perhaps, from home. Yet riotous living, and husks that the

¹ This is St. Paul's argument in the Areopagus. Acts, xvii. 28, 29.

swine do eat, can badly compensate to the beautiful and strong, to art, or poesy, or science, for what they leave behind. The dizzy profligacy burns itself away; the distracted and degraded one comes to himself, and is fain to remember his Father's Face again.

This connexion of the æsthetic with religion is obvious every where, but especially in Judaism, which almost knew of none that did not continue to the last devoted to the service of the Temple. And nowhere so consistently. For I desire to notice, next, that this is but the expression in worship of a still grander peculiarity which has always marked the Jewish training; and which, by anticipating the danger, has actually carried the nation pure from a still more subtle and inveterate poison than even Polytheism or Idolatry itself. I mean Manichæism, in all its forms: in its freedom from which Judaism stands pre-eminent, if not as yet alone, among the leading religions of the globe. I do not even except the Christian Church. For no observant thinker can fail to see that hardly its most advanced sections have yet been able to shake off the incubus with which the easy but fatal hypothesis of a double origin has involved her thought.

The theory of the Christian Church, indeed, its creeds, and leading liturgies, are free from dualism. But when we listen to partial and less authoritative views, we soon perceive that though here and there we may valiantly assert, we are still far from having learned the truth; still oft mistake it, or draw back from it, and admit positions which virtually deny it. Indeed, this theoretic contest seems but the reflex of our outward war. When God is seen in every thing, then, doubtless, the victory is won. Until He is seen, the details perplex us: only the total character and end are palpable to faith. It was not an unnatural thought to connect "evil" specifically with the lower forms of nature, or with the lowest. But it is a foolish thought; for, *whence* came "the lowest?" Even the lowest, if it be once separated from "the One," will soon find a higher or a highest for itself: and two Gods, or a self-antagonism in God, is the result. As long as any uncertainty in this respect remains, theology can only hide its eyes in various shades of optimism; and religion

must seek to conform itself to a mutilated conception of God, by mutilating the conceptions of self and of the world. Self,¹ when not totally repudiated, is limited to our more invisible and supposed ethereal parts ; and the world is quite as much suspected and denounced, as either independent of God or His express antagonist.

I cannot pause to illustrate this from Heathendom or Christendom. Its pictures hang not far from any of us. But before proceeding to show how the Jewish training cuts this knot or uses it, I must notice its bearing on the present Scripture controversy, and remark with emphasis that, while, on the one hand, the Bible is, I say it reverently, about the only large religious book we know which is free from dualism—on the other hand, if we who accept its guidance have yet failed thoroughly to master the perplexity, those who think that they have passed it by, stand, palpably, much lower in the scale—those, at least, who do more than criticise ; who attempt to construct, and so leave themselves open to be criticised in turn.

Mr. Newman, for instance, fairly succumbs before it. His deity is, indeed, supreme or sole, at the beginning and at the end of creation. But in all the intermediate sphere, where “will” can enter—that is, in fact, in all that comprises life, training, or religion at all, in all that much concerns or can deeply affect us—there reigns chaotic the absence of law ;² and therefore, even on his own conception, the absence of God. He cannot make them mix.

¹ It should be remembered, however, that there is a sense in which “self” and “the world” deserve all the denunciations that can be heaped upon them—that in which they “resist their own highest ;” the Better which the Spirit is always causing to be born among them. But in this sense “the religious self” and “the religious world” are the worst, because the most intensely self-satisfied, idolatries of any : and even the foremost Apostle and truest “rock” is sometimes an “offence,” and deserves to be denominated “Satan.”—Matt. xvi. 18 to 23. The principle of this sentiment and nomenclature I have tried to expound in *Ser. II.*, pp. 53 to 58. It may be briefly stated thus :—“Whatever is not of faith is sin ;” “faith” being our aspiration after the highest that we know. *This* is “from above ;” everything else “savours” of the below. Popularly, “self” and “the world” deserve to be denounced, always ; for they designate our lower and more partial, in contrast and in opposition to our higher and more comprehensive, ambitions.

² “Wherever there may be foresight of action we recognise the existence of Law,

Mr. Parker, again, does enlarge with willing eloquence on that idea, which, as he acknowledges, "was perhaps original

which implies not compulsion, but certainty. In the movements of inanimate matter all now recognise pervading Law. At the other extreme, where a perfect will resides, there is also Law, for it is certain that it will act aright; and another mind sufficiently powerful would be able to predict its doings. The habit of right action is a law made by itself for itself. But where will is imperfect, and where there is a struggle, an element of uncertainty proportionably interferes; and, instead of one Law, there are two or more Laws crossing and clashing. This is not the sphere of Divine Harmony, but of human conflict and partial lawlessness, and to look for certainty in it is very gratuitous."—THE SOUL, I. 11.

In all the region of imperfect will, then, that is in all human action whatsoever, even the Divine foresight, Providence, and Causation, are at fault, or are impossible. There can be here no "foresight of action;" and if God interfere at all, it must be as a half-blind force, incapable of calculating the result either of the other contending forces or of its own interference among them! I freely admit that much of our popular, and much of our more recondite theology, equally implies this consequence; and that to Mr. Newman is due only the fault or merit of stating explicitly what *they* involve and yet are afraid to say. I hope Mr. Newman would acknowledge, in return, that the Bible is free from this cautious dualism, and makes no scruple of insisting that "all things are of God," good and evil alike, and that all—ay, to the extremest *instance* of human or of higher guilt, the rejection and crucifixion of the Christ—but work out the precise ends intended and desired. This is, in fact, the *theoretic* purpose of that Revelation.—See Note D, end.

Mr. Newman would probably rejoin, that this is "to make God the author of moral evil, than which there can be no greater error in philosophy"—except, indeed, one error—to assign to it *any other* origin whatever; for this were to destroy, first, the notion of God, and then that of either good or evil. Evil would then be the "good" of this antagonist God; and, as He has relations with us, we *ought* to do it in order to please Him, to which we are "bound" by the hypothesis—at least on any definition of God that Mr. Newman would listen to. In whatever sense evil *exists*, God is its author, no doubt. The Devil is His creation, as well as "the world" and "the flesh;" and He knows how, doubtless, to make all of them both serve and honour Him. It follows, of course, from this position—which I take to be the doctrine of the Bible, and which is certainly the first article of every Christian creed—that evil has no "real existence," but, like largeness or smallness, is only an attribute of things, depending on their place and application. There is no absolute good but God, and no absolute evil existing. All created things are either better or worse according to their direction, use, and bearing; all moral agents (i. e. those which have a reflex consciousness), and their acts, are "morally" better or worse according to their "motives." God sends us all our good and ill: this is the first axiom of practical religion. He sends us our moral trials, too, every one of them, as truly as he sends us the skill to avoid or combat, or the strength to overcome them. Did we not believe it so, we could neither pretend to serve God in our trials, nor to honour the sacrifice or self-sacrifice of Christ. What moral significance would His Cross possess? or how, to take an earlier instance, could we understand His being "led up *by the Spirit* into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil?" True, our trials often overcome us, and then we "fail." But we only fail in the same sense that

with the Hebrew mind," which makes God "independent of matter, and transcending it." But when he comes to construct,

Nature herself is "tentative," and full of failure. Before we are entitled to name any thing a "failure" in the larger sense, we must know much more than we do know, and must know it besides to be the opposite of what we now believe. In the fullest Scriptural sense all things are by God's word, and not one word of His returns to Him void, but always "prosper in that whereto He sends it." The more we know of nature, the more we see reason to believe that she turns all her failures into use, and gathers up every fragment that remains, so that nothing is lost. And as to us, let us be true to ourselves, however imperfect; and though we fail or fall, yet no enemy need rejoice. We fall into the arms of One who has redeemed and reconciled us all; who symbolizes resurrection, physical and moral; and knows how to make our very fall, like Adam's, our baptism into a deeper trial and yet a higher life. This seems, indeed, the scope of that earliest revelation which, with a strange "unscripturalness," we persist in calling "the Fall." But on this subject, and that of evil generally, see Lecture IV., end of vol. II.

As to its being gratuitous to expect certainty or Law in human affairs, this is a strange thesis for a philosophic writer on social questions—economic, moral, and religious—especially from one who has really done so much to illustrate their laws as Mr. Francis Newman. Why write about "the Soul" at all, or attempt to classify its phenomena, except in the conviction that "like antecedents will always produce like consequents" in the region of imperfect will, as in every other region of God's works? It is harder, indeed, *for us* to estimate all the "motives" operative on our will, and to delineate our own "parallelogram of forces" than to describe some humbler mechanism; but why should it be harder for some superior mind to estimate our's than for us to judge the aberrations of a plant or planet, or to calculate the resultant of the many interfering "laws" in any physical procedure? We possess, indeed, a reflex consciousness of our own operations, at least in part; we are conscious of our own determinant motives—some of them, at least—and, sometimes, of our own resultant determination; and this reflex consciousness becomes itself a new force, to be estimated with the rest. But men do, in proportion to their capacity, measure one another notwithstanding; and the whole theory and structure of "society" depends on their being able to do so, and to do so with some exactness. It is not at all true that a man is more "wilful" than a monkey, more lawless than a fish or fern, or more imperfect, on the whole, than any other of God's works we know. Nor is he more irregular, though among his other consciousnesses he is painfully alive to his own imperfections and irregularities, and especially to his differences from other men. A trout will devour in the season some hundreds of ephemerides; and the grub of the May-fly, in unconscious retaliation, will destroy as many ova of the trout. In more complicated fashion, men and churches also worry and devour each other. Are they more imperfect or less regular because they have a higher law besides, with sentiments of shame, resentment, and affection, which surely tend, upon the whole, to make them more considerate and "kind," and to mould them into the requirements of that Law? Mr. Newman, at least, would not say yes. What becomes, then, of his thesis respecting human lawlessness? and of a great deal of similar, though more startling, talk on the part of Mr. Parker.

I have acknowledged that much of our more recondite theology virtually agrees with

his strength fails, and his system is a feeble optimism. God is limited in motive, and material, and purpose, and means—

this position of Mr. Newman. Optimist schemes in general, and all theories which resolve evil into some *à priori* necessity arising from the "nature of the case," or "the nature of things," or the "truth," "reality," or "fitness" of things, or from any *à priori*, and so-called abstract or absolute truth, idea, or reality whatever, are virtually dualist; their abstraction is an ultimate godhead. We acknowledge no necessity, propriety, fitness, or expediency, antecedent to God, or out-embracing, overruling, or determining Him. Were there any such thing, it were a Living Necessity or Propriety, and would be the I AM. In the only sense that these things *are*, they emanate from God, and are the Law He has imposed on things in making His Creation to manifest Himself. We must concede that even Bishop Butler is not free from this uncertainty—that is, in the section of his opinions on which "he does *not* argue," and on which he has *not* grounded his invaluable book. There are several indications of it in "the Analogy," and I have criticized one in the note, p. 98; but its acknowledgment is the following passage, triumphantly quoted in proof of the Bishop's latent sympathy with "the Oxford Neo-Platonists:"—"I have omitted a thing of the utmost importance, which I do believe—the moral fitness and unfitness of actions prior to all will whatever; which I apprehend as certainly to determine the Divine conduct, as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine the Divine judgment."—ANAL. II. viii. 5, cf. I. vi., note. "It seems as inconceivable to suppose God to approve one course of action or one end preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that He does, without supposing somewhat prior to be the ground of that preference, as to suppose Him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it to be the ground of the discernment."

In whatever sense we attribute *succession* or history to God, we necessarily fall into the above conception, which obviously represents Him as weighing, judging, and designing certain courses under circumstances and conditions more or less independent of Himself; carrying out, as best He can, the course thus partly at least shaped for Him; and "discerning" successively, or in plain words "learning," abstract or concrete "truths" from "somewhat" external, or at least "prior to," and independent of Himself. Such a deity is but a Sub-Agent, or first-class Aeon; such Jehovah is but Jupiter in the hands of Fate and Nemesis, established by some *Προμηθεα*, and threatened by the same. But this conception is not the Bible's, and does not content the Christian Church. The only Fitness that determines God is that of His Own Character, that is, Himself. There is, no doubt, a moral fitness really prevailing things, and out-commanding *each*. But this is because "all things are of God," and He has stamped His character upon His works. "This makes morality, then, dependent upon Will?" Yes, upon the will of God; and the perfection of our morality is, that our wills should be conformed to His. "And if God ordered some 'immorality,' this would then be 'morality,' and we should practise it?" Doubtless. Whatever the Omnipresent and Unchangeable commands would pervade Creation, and we should no more dream of disputing it than we do gravity or growth. Because He *has* written His law upon things, and given us the sense to discern it, therefore we view, and doubtless justly view, any opposite state of things as impossible or absurd; and can easily prove it, to our own satisfaction, to be self-contradictory and suicidal. The question itself involves, no doubt, "some great impropriety,"

limited by a "Perfection," he calls it, which yet he, Mr. Parker, is able to define, and the details of whose definition oblige him

and is tantamount to this: "What would be if God were not God, and Creation not Creation?" One only puts it, as one would any other *ad absurdum* or impossible case, in order to bring out more strongly, by contrast, the affirmation insisted on. And how little the Scriptures shrink from putting it so, in order to bring out the same affirmation, appears even in the crucial instance of Abraham's faith. Every Bible reader is intended to be taught that Abraham was bound to do *what he was bid*, though in violation both of natural justice and affection, and more especially of the express promise of God Himself—that is, though it were, apparently, "to make God a liar" both in Nature and in Revelation. That Abraham did not draw back from this trial, was his "obedience," "morality," or what St. James calls his "justification by works"—that, throughout it all, he never lost his insight of the Almighty—his conviction that God could and would make both his natural affection and His own promise come out right in the end—a conviction which he indicates all through, both before (v. 8, ch. xxii.) and after the crisis, by the words *Jehovah Jireh*, is the "root of his obedience," what St. Paul calls his "justification by faith."

"But Will may change; and, therefore, on this hypothesis, Morality?" No: not the will of God, by its definition. And to ask this question exposes again the source of the confusion, which arises from attributing succession, history, or change, to God. He is the Unchangeable, behind all change, and manifesting Himself by its endless, yet correlated multiplicity; just as our own small "self" is manifested by our own small series of connected variations. "But must we not, in some very real sense, attribute succession and change to God; as the Scriptures often do, and as the reference to our own supposed 'likeness' to Him makes explicit?" To this, which is the ultimate, and really difficult question, both the theory of Church and Scripture, and the analogy of our own nature, enable us to answer YES, and NO! and yet without confusion. No—when we speak of God the Father, the Ultimate and Immediate Origin of things. Yes—when we speak of God the Son or Word, God-Manifest, God-in-Creation, partaking and perfecting all its characters, "Image of the invisible God, and first-born of every creature." Much of the present volume, especially the Third Sermon with its Notes, is expended in developing this position, which surely is the key doctrine of the Church. Here I distinguish it broadly from the Oxford Neo-Platonism, a half-concealed and timid dualism, on which Bishop Butler, as I conceive, did well not to rest his argument. Any touches of it that he does introduce only weaken or disfigure The Analogy.

And I still more cordially refuse our present Neo-Neo-Platonism, foreign and English, with its duality avowed, and its self-contradictions gloried in. Mr. Mansel would probably say "this Unchangeable God is only the antithesis of our conceptions; and we can only think of it, negatively, as that which is unlike any form of our own consciousness." This I do not believe. We have as distinct a conviction—call it "conception," or not—of our own "unchanging self" as we have of any of our own variations: which latter, indeed, we only reckon *our own* by virtue of our conviction that they *partake* for the time being, our unchanging self, and are a part of its totality. We have as distinct ideas of simultaneousness, totality, integration, and unity, as we have of any succession, division, or differentiation. Our "self," or *ego*, is a true integral, comprising ex-

habitually to omit, sometimes plainly to contradict, some of the largest classes¹ of phenomena in nature.

treme diversities, in no sense contradicting them, but actually imparting to each of them its own timeless, changeless unity. And in detail, our own "now," or present time, a true integral of a discerned succession, is as distinct and positive an idea as any we possess, and is our small image of the Eternal Now, the Omnipresent that integrates all time. Our own "extension"—or present occupation of certain space, discerned to be infinitely divisible if you will—is another integral, and images to us the Omnipresent, who fills all space, infinite as I suppose it is, and expresses His own infinitude thereby. And so on with all our ideas. They are correlated in pairs, or in triplets, if one will, and in this sense are distinguished, antithetic, or contrasted; but they are not at all, either in our practical regards, or in our clearest intellect, inconsistent or contradictory. In fact, we are made in the Image of God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and are correlated both with the Begotten, the Proceeding, and the Unchangeable. Were it not so, we should hold no discussion, and pretend no intelligence of their respective attributes whatever. Everything in Nature, also, so far as it is like ourselves, which each thing is, up to its own level or plane of being, is made in the same image (see note D): else could it not set forth its Maker, nor "parable" to us His higher works. That we should conceive or perceive things so, arises, no doubt, from our necessary anthropomorphism. We have no measure of God or things except ourself; and whatever has not correlatives within us, to us is nothing. It is ultimately, I acknowledge, in our own constitution that all self-inconsistency is, of necessity, repudiated. And, conversely, any contradiction existing in things, or between God and things, so far as we could recognise it, would, by virtue of its correlatives within us, dislocate "ourselves," and destroy our own sense of Unity.

In saying that the Bible system *alone* is free from dualism, many will think me unjust to the Koran, whose profession, at least, of Unity, is sufficiently emphatic. Indeed, all men profess it in one shape or other, and at bottom cannot help believing it, if only from the half-conscious feeling last alluded to. But the question is that of theoretic consistency therewith, and herein Mahomet fails. His system is too narrow. The very unprogressiveness of Islam throws it out of relation with Nature, and, however signal a step it may have been itself, condemns it to become in time a fatalism, an incubus, a dead-weight obstruction to the march and growth of things. Theoretically, dualism is involved in the much-lauded first Article of his Creed—"There is one God, neither begotten nor begetting." The limitation destroys the assertion, by cutting off God from the largest and nearest fact we know. *Whence* is Sonship, if God have not Sons, and if we, and all, are not in the last resort His offspring? The negation of Sonship is ultimately the negation of Genesis, Creation, Progression; of Nature and Higher-Nature; of any Being-Born. And it would be easy to show how, in the reflective East, this abstract omission told upon practical affairs; beginning with the mystery of marriage, the social expression of Unity-in-diversity, and the key-point of all morality.

¹ The *step per saltum*, for example. Also all those facts or states he is pleased to consider imperfect, especially in morals and religion, such as slavery and ceremonial, or the analogues and reproductions of the Jewish system in general. Of our Lord Himself, Mr. Parker speaks most highly, often reverently. Yet even He shows the weakness

Comte, on the other hand, does seem to attain consistency ; but it is only by professedly excluding from his Encyclopædia all those phenomena or quasi-phenomena¹ which he acknowledges

that Mr. Parker can deplore in instituting the germs of ceremonial and authority for His Church ! The fact that both Church and world have found them useful, and that we are learning new and unexpected lessons respecting their necessity, ought to suggest some second thoughts to a believer in Universal Providence.

1 . . . “ la philosophie positive, dont la plus haut ambition est de decouvrir les lois des phenomenes, et dont le premiere caractere propre est precisément de regarder comme necessairement interdits a la raison humaine tous ces sublimes mysteres [sc. la nature intime des êtres, l'origine et la fin de tous les phenomenes] que la philosophie theologique explique, au contraire, avec une si admirable facilité, jusque dans leurs moindres details.”—PHIL. POS., vol. i., p. 10.

“Necessairement interdits !” And this after acknowledging (p. 9) that philosophy of *any* kind would have been impossible to man, had not this very theologic tendency “heureusement” relieved him from “a vicious circle,” and given him a “natural issue” for the exercise of his faculties. Strange that the birth-angel of philosophy should be so great a stranger to us, and forbidden *ever again* to influence our powers ! It is this endeavour on the part of the Positive Philosophy to exclude the matrix of religion which leaves it justly open to the charge of being atheistic, and *therefore*, as I have endeavoured to show (pp. 63, 64) suicidal ; for the same regard to the Invisible is the basis of all hope and effort that deserve the name of human.

Fortunately for Comte himself, and for the world's experience, though at the expense of his philosophic consistency, the same birth-angel, religious sentiment, though only on the basis of a scarcely defensible affection, broached his own elaborate circle of positiveness, and set him, in his maturer years, to the task of constructing a religious system, and making himself its prophet. He only succeeds in proving his own piety, earnestness, vanity, and simplicity of character, and his deficiency in that prime requisite for a prophet, originality or creative genius. His object of worship, “the ideal of aggregate humanity, represented as a female figure,” is but Our Lady of Paris in doctrinaire habiliments. And his laborious ritual is but the calendar of Notre-Dame, denuded of its historical associations and its hold on the real sentiments of the people, but garnished, very symmetrically, with ideal relations instead.

The cardinal question, after all, is the *reality* of the religious sentiments—does a side of our nature “feel after God ;” are we really *sensitive* to the Unseen and Infinite ? In the beginning of the first Sermon, therefore, I have stated broadly the phenomena on which we rely, and discussed the sentiments themselves more minutely in the second. Their *existence*—admitted by his first classification, as well as by the whole purpose of his later efforts—is at once the practical and the formal reply to Comte. To consider any questions “interdicted to the reason,” towards which a side of our nature really *inclines* us, violates the first profession of any Philosophy, especially of the Positive.

And the same course is the formal reply to the new Scoto-Oxonian Platonism, which coincides quite precisely in the above position of the Positives. Mr. Mansel's interdict of religion from the realms of philosophy and positive science is only less mild and calm than Comte's, and the reason alleged only more palpably “untheistic” and self-contradict-

to out-embrace his limits, and which men have ever deemed the most significant of all: all those suggested thoughts and feelings of the Infinite which they have ever prized as their supremely best. Yet, even so, he cannot rest secure. The Unseen still haunts his vision, peering through the curtain of his dark, and he is fain to find a counterpoise. But his frozen generalization scarce inspired himself, and could not long content him. He, too, has a human heart. He needs to worship, like us all, and needs an Object too. And though it be immaterial and unliving, his friends and pupils have not admired his substitute for ours.

How, then, was Israel tided over this initial difficulty? How was it enabled to attain and to preserve a conception which, Mr. Parker thinks, was "perhaps original" with the Hebrew mind? Why, by the same simple mechanism that marks the course throughout—so simple and obvious, in fact, that we scarcely notice it. In history, the material precedes the spiritual; in creation, is its antecedent and its base. And the training merely preserves the order of nature. It causes God to be known *in the present* before it opens up the vista of the future. And it opens up that vista carefully; sparingly at first, and always with judi-

tory—"Because the Infinite cannot be positively apprehended in any form of the human consciousness." How, then, do we pretend to speak of it? Oh, by "faith" and "negative thinking"—these being *no* forms of human consciousness, of course; and "negative thinking" being the thinking of that "to whose object we do *not* attribute existence!" As to our vulgar "faith," i. e. that body of [supposed] truths, or [regulative] "truths" (note A, p. xxxii.), and the reasons, or *quasi* "reasons" for them—about which one preaches, but which one does not "cognise," and must not "criticise," for they are neither "rational" nor "in themselves *true*"—this corresponds, as nearly as possible, to Comte's first "theological evolution," which *his* maturer state can pity and forgive, but *ours* must cower to in abrogation of our understanding. This, surely, is a "vain" and un-English, as well as unphilosophical "philosophy."

Science, in any department of nature, is the exact and orderly statement of her facts; and *philosophy* is the endeavour to correlate those facts, to discover their mutual bearing, and restate them in their just connexion and proportions. Our sentiments are to us the most important *facts*, and our religious sentiments about the most prominent and commanding of any. Why should not science do her best to state, and philosophy to expound them? Where has God separated between His higher and His lower works? or why should we dis sever them? Whatever religion shrinks from science is so far mistaken, erroneous, or imperfect: whatever science *contradicts*, or whatever philosophy *excludes* religion is, by its very profession, self-condemned.

cious pains. It claims the present and the material first, and has God thoroughly recognised in them before vaster conceptions and more distant realities are allowed to bewilder or to overwhelm the mind. The Father of Heaven and Earth deals with His children here as any prudent parent deals with his—he sets before them the present, for that is all they can conceive; makes the pain and pleasure which they *can* feel the agent of their formation for that future which they gradually become able to discern; and makes the prospect of each nearer future prepare for one more distant still; in the confidence that, when the future comes, it will not confute his care. The moral as well as the logical vindication of such a course being this, that the future and the present are not unlike—that they are identical in principle, and analogous in form—that the God of one is God of both, and both are the genuine expression of His will.

Just so God trained His national child—by keeping the order of His works; the present present, the future future, and Himself the God of both. Temporal promises encourage the Patriarchs, and material prosperity rewards them; vast temporal blessings and temporal judgments no less vast are the explicit sanctions of the law throughout. And though, as the stripling grows, he is allowed to learn from experience the distinction between the more immediate and the remoter consequences of conduct, yet the principle is never repealed down to the last dispensation of the Spirit. “Verily, I say unto you, there is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my sake and the gospel’s, but he shall receive an hundred fold now in this time, and in the world to come life everlasting.” “Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.”

This marked feature of the Jewish training is sometimes spoken of as “peculiar” to it, in the sense of being “unlike” the present dispensation and the general government of God. And this is true in a rough way, so far as the declared *definiteness* of the rule, and the *immediateness* of the sanction. But only so far. And here, too, only of the earlier part of the process to which it is

requisite, and of which it is in fact the essence, as any one perceives in the individual analogue. But no parent, while causing immediate reproof or praise to attend on obedience at a certain stage, feels that he is thereby *departing* from the principles of life, but only defining and pointing them in order to engender a result. And, indeed, the highest experience will cause us to doubt whether even the definiteness be an exception to the usual operation of those general or universal laws which express the divine economy. For, does not each act or thought of ours stamp itself at once, and irrevocably, upon our destinies, by stamping itself, at once and for ever, upon ourselves? We are, ourselves, the result of our experiences. All we have done, or felt, or suffered, or enjoyed, we bear it with us. Their integral we bear into the future, determining, while we suffer or enjoy, all that the present or the future brings. But this is a refinement, perhaps, which we cannot suppose the early Israelite to make, or to be influential except upon the reflections of the sage; and I desire to abstain from all inferences except those actually drawn from their successive precepts, and broadly operative at the time. And it is clear that they did, from the earliest period, generalize the inference involved in the temporal sanctions of their law, and read it into their widest experience of men and things. "Behold, the righteous shall be recompensed in the earth: how much more the ungodly and the sinner!" "I have been young, and now I am old, and yet never saw I the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread." "Righteousness exalteth a nation." "Them that honour me I will honour; and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed."—These are, in fact, their prime theory of the moral government of the world. Their psalms and proverbs are an enlarged comment on this doctrine, and their history its current illustration. And it is but the expression, in reference to government, of their theory with regard to God. Whatever other worlds they knew, they knew no other God. All the earth was His. Those who were His would surely possess, and they only could enjoy it. And when the future makes itself be seen,—when other worlds become visible to faith, and the spiritual can announce its laws; it may repeat, enrich, enlarge, but it cannot

alter this fundamental verity.—“Godliness is profitable unto all things, having the promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come.” For, the one God is the God of every world that eye of sight or eye of faith discerns; and He is, doubtless, *like Himself* in all realms of His Dominion.

And as this is the formal confutation of dualism, so its early inculcation is the only safeguard against it. By this means was Judaism saved at first by the recognition of God in the present—the comprehension of the material within the spiritual, arising from the fundamental tenet of its creed. And each invigoration of the conception of course strengthened the conscience against its contagion, so that it has never made any practical impression upon the nation’s mind. Adverse agencies, both material and spiritual, the Bible admits or insists on, and warns or denounces accordingly; but, though they be gods or lords, yet are they all alike comprehended as created servants in the dominion of the Living God. From those which tried the patience of Job, to those which banded together to compass the sufferings of Christ—whether thrones, or dominions, or principalities,—they are all alike ministering angels, the worst ever the slaves and drudges of the better, doing what they are required to do, and producing simply the result intended and desired.

Thus, in the Hebrew training, was Manichæism anticipated and nullified; and we have seen how Polytheism, as a theory, was excluded or destroyed: but we have yet to consider Polytheism *as a practice*. For it is too well known, alas, even by Christian examples, that theoretic monotheism does not necessarily exclude abundant practical idolatries. Yet from idols the Jewish worship soon became singularly free. To this result the interdict of material images, doubtless, contributed largely. But this was a negative advantage, and owed its positive effect to a singularity in the details of the system which our analysis of education throws into significance.

We have seen that religious education consists in the concentration of natural religiousness upon a point or points; and have noticed how the growing strength of the sentiment will de-

fine and localise itself, and the worship become associated with places, persons, things.

Now, this is also the analysis of how polytheism evolves itself from a vague and weak monotheism. For one vast Invisible is too wide to be available; and when it variously locates itself, the god of each different place or thing, whether called by a different name or not, embodies different associations, and gradually becomes a different god.

And nothing is more striking than the mode in which the exclusive unity of the Jew forced or found its exclusive expression, and localised itself in their promised land before the nation entered it. "Take heed to thyself that thou offer not thy burnt offerings in every place that thou seest; but there shall be a place which the Lord shall choose in ONE of thy tribes, to place His name there. Thither shalt thou go, and there only shalt thou worship." Other religions acknowledge holy places. Moses limits the place to *one*; or rather to *one at a time*. Others allow the religious sentiment to be dissipated upon points—this vigorous unity concentrates it all upon a single point. And thus, while Paganism could multiply its Baalim and Ashtaroth, its Hercules, or Venus, or Apollo; while professed Christianity can multiply its Madonna, or Crucifix, or Christ; there could remain to Judaism, as time rolled on, but one Jehovah—He who had chosen Jerusalem to place His name there. All others must be His ministers; or they are nothing. The true Elohim must be Himself.

Around this unity of place the fundamental unity gradually embodies itself, and enforces its singleness in all the envelope of worship. One mode is insisted on, as well as one place, and one organised family set aside for its performance. All the details are elaborated with jealous minuteness, and the approaches and associations guarded with stringent and unsparing severity—things unmeaning or puerile in the eyes of many: but education cannot proceed without *some* positive institutions; and they who appreciate the value of Israel's result ought to justify the patient carefulness from which it sprang.

And around this extreme definiteness and exclusiveness, the

narrowness and intolerance of the system, no less extreme, exhibit their repulsive perfectness. Coherent with this, socially and politically, came the theocratic despotism requisite to enforce such centralised relation. Again, things objected to thoughtlessly enough by those who hold the Unity of God and His Providence of Earth, and feebly defended by those who fail to see in them the natural or necessary concomitants of certain stages of man's advance, whereof, in fact, they are essential parts. I would gladly dwell on them, did time permit, especially as our adversaries have singled them out for assault as weaknesses within our line; thereby demonstrating, so I conceive, that they have not yet transcended, but are still behind our light. For that is no true progress which would force the end on the beginning, and seeks to silence or invert the order of nature's own diversified, yet analogous or unique procedure.

The effort is indeed well meant which would put an end to slavery at once, and banish to some other sphere despotism, and exclusiveness, and intolerance, and antagonism, and war. Well meant, but puerile indeed! God has patience with all these things; and we, whether we can see the reasons of it or not, perforce must copy or submit to His. These things will not vanish at our incantation: they will not be banished or buried so long as they are needed here. And they *are* needed by each section of the race so long as they are connatural with its actual attainment, congenial with those virtues it has learned to honour, and those faculties of mind and heart it has learned to use. Existing everywhere that men are struggling onwards and realising an advance, Judaism exhibits these things *in type*; pointed and perfected in order to secure the results we trace, and recorded for our ensamples, upon whom many distant ends have come. Those who would fain repeat this progress or extend it, will do well to lay its principles to heart. If, indeed, there were neither barbarism nor semibarbarism existing on the globe, the intermediate stages might be more readily disused; but if God have given us, along with men and women, also the infants¹ of

¹ The above, or the more formal statements in the fourth *Sermon* (p. 159, *sq.*, and note, p. 168), with their implied vindication, or even recommendation in certain cases, of

His human family, and has laid on us the duty or necessity of their contact and their care, then the position changes, and doc-

“slavery,” will seem monstrous, no doubt, to our present popularities, and will offend many, besides, whom no preacher is willing to offend. But what can one do? A new Gospel is set up, contrary to our old Gospel, and to the common course of nature and experience, and, after vast pretension and an extended trial, is working out most miserable results for the world, especially for those it desires to benefit. It is time to speak as distinctly as we can. The subject is too large for detailed discussion in a foot-note, and I respectfully refer to Note F, of this volume, and to *Lect. III.* and the concluding *Essay*, of the next. Here I entreat attention to the position in the text, as involving—is it not so?—the key-point of the argument.

No one doubts that man was intended to grow up to Liberty—social, civil, and religious; no one doubts how great a blessing each of these is in turn to those who are fit for it, who can value, and know how to use it; no one doubts that each is as signal a curse to those who are unfit for it, who only misunderstand and abuse it, and to whom it only means idleness, licentiousness, continuance in barbarism: and no one can doubt, in fine, that many sections of the human family, occupying—in Australasia, Africa, inland America, much of Asia, and perhaps some of Europe too—the largest, and naturally most productive portions of the globe, are still in this condition. The question is not, what has reduced them to this estate?—they have been born into it, and neither they nor their local ancestors have ever been much better—but how are we to deal with them, such as they are? Are we—

1. To *leave them alone*, allowing them to obstruct or refuse the natural progress of the world; or rather to degenerate, as they must and do, separated from its central lines and its gradually developing appliances for the “deepening contest with nature?” or—

2. Are we to *exterminate them* before the Celt and Saxon, and complacently to call this “colonization,” and “civilization,” and “Christianity,” or “the spread of England’s empire,” or the “manifest destiny of the race?” or—

3. Is it possible *both to improve and to preserve* them; to elevate both their *physique* and their *condition*—enabling them, in time, to mix their blood with, at least, the lower strata of their conquerors, and to contribute their substantial qualities, if only in tropical and arctic regions, to the general advance? The first alternative is what men sometimes virtually reply, when pressed in argument. The second is all that Anglo-Saxons have been effecting since this new Gospel came into vogue, or that can be effected, so I believe, under its inspiration. But the third is the only real question, and is, doubtless, what all aim at and desire. So our inquiry comes to mean—*How* can this be done, or how shall it be attempted? And the contending theories may ultimately be reduced to almost a single word. The one says, Give them Liberty—the other and older says, Give them Law.

The doctrinaires and philanthropists virtually preach, “Liberty is the first of blessings, whether it be the last or no—it is its own best *Preparative*, protection, and guarantee. Give them Liberty, all other blessings will follow in its train.” The more ancient experience says “Nay; surely, these people *have* liberty enough; far more than they know how to use. Australians and Zulus are not much oppressed by king-craft and priest-craft—by a national debt, standing armies, lordly bishops, or a strict confessional. If

trinareship is at fault. The proselyting Pharisee and the philosophic Sadducee are blunderers alike—it is the Patriarch and the Lawgiver who have discerned and have enacted “Christ.”

liberty, civil and religious, were the one panacea for man's degradation, surely the most barbarous ought to be the most civilized nations of the world, for they have enjoyed it longest and least-disturbed. Liberty is, indeed, a pearl of great price, but is *not* good for swine: like every other gift of God, it has its place and correlation, and is either a blessing or a curse, according as its place is kept. *Its natural Antecedent and just Preparative is Law*: just as youth and the schoolmaster precede manhood, or as the Old Testament precedes the New. Restrict, then, the ‘natural liberty’ of the uncivilized, and lay them under law. Find those who can go among them, and induce or *oblige* them to lay aside their indolence and internecine strife, and to earn their bread and multiply their comforts by man's vocation—Toil. Oblige them to grow corn, cotton, silk, sugar, tea, coffee, wine, palm oil, and indigo; to maké roads, ships, harbours, towns, fortresses, mills, prisons, palaces, and immense cathedrals. Under the defined and multiplying relations which will thence gradually arise, their faculties and experience will be developed; they will grow up to liberty's estate; by God's Providence they will surely obtain it, the more insensibly the better; and they will have wherewith to enjoy it, besides, while blessing the world at large.” This is, as I understand it, our old and common doctrine—the Gospel according to Abraham, and Moses, and Paul, and Christ—suited to human nature, vindicating itself in human history, and refusing all duality whatever. The other, I have been long convinced, is but an easy and fatal blunder: a mushroom-gospel; a hasty “gourd” which may teach church or prophet, but cannot help the Ninevites; a dualism which recognises God in a certain stage, grade, or class of things, indeed, but omits Him from the rest.

According to the principle of classification developed in this Sermon, mankind may be divided into—

1. Those (tribes or individuals) who have *not yet entered* the definite or legal period—who still enjoy their untaught, unused, and unproductive liberty. The deliverer of these will be the Joseph who can go before them, and by rough looks, if requisite, oblige them “*all to bow down and make obeisance*” to himself and Pharaoh.

2. Those who *have entered*, and are battling through it. Their hero is the man who can mature them and enforce the justest Law, build the surest Throne, or dedicate the holiest Temple and most effective Ceremonial.

3. Those who have reached, or nearly reached, the Liberty wherewith Christ has made us free—who, having learned the Law and absorbed its meaning, have become a law to themselves, and now diffuse its Spirit; not injuring “one jot or tittle” of the law—such “shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven”—but spreading a righteousness that transcends it. Such men make their very bonds no bondage, and it is the interest of all to relieve them from interference, as far as possible. The hero of this estate is the man who “edifies”—who, whether in a public capacity or not, suppressing self, works the largest insensible advance in the solid welfare of the community. Among the labourers there are last first, and first last; and the Lord of the harvest is able to forgive us all our blunders—nay, even to turn them into good, if only by the practical development their antagonism gives to things more solid than themselves.

One would sometimes think that even the pulpit of Boston or the press of Paris believes that all sections of the human family advance, or have advanced, by a simultaneous and equable progression; and that because a certain few have reached undoubted truth, therefore all the rest are ripe for its reception. But it is not so: the world is larger and more varied, and Providence is wiser and kinder than we think. Let us learn of His patience and His ways; and if He have given us precious things, let us find how to apply, *on whom* to bestow or force them. And the experience of the world will endorse for us this general rule, that there is no gift more hurtful to any individual or community than that blessing which is just beyond its wants and its capacity to use. "Even the heir, so long as he is a child, differs in nothing from a slave, though he be lord of all." This is the social state connatural with his growth; and if it be withheld, his present and his future shall both be marred together—childhood distorted, and manhood exhausted in a bitter prematurity. And the family is the germ of the society. Its analogy is true throughout. Liberty, in all its forms, social, political, religious, is for those, *and those alone*, who have grown up to liberty's estate. To all the rest it is either unintelligible, or it is licentiousness and dissolution. If we, then, would spread its blessings, and roll back every form of despotism before its sweeping tide, one way is natural and one way only possible for success. Prepare the way before its face, and then it will quickly come. Improve *the men*: raise the individuals: make them fit for liberty, and it will then glide in as insensibly as the transitions of life. Foster and guard the individual advance, keeping ever the material first, the spiritual and the universal will follow of itself.

The vindication, then, of the institutions of Moses will rest—

I. On their synchronism. Considering the times and the state of the nations round, were they the best things known? And on this broad ground Moses rests them: "What nation is there so great, which hath statutes and judgments so righteous as all this law which I command you this day."—And,

II. Upon their fitness to carry on the work of man's regeneration. Were they not merely the best at the time, but the natural

mode of producing the better? Was its advance not a finality, but the just stage or step of progress? Such it professéd itself; and such, surely, it has proved itself. Behold, we have been baptized into the results of it.

Let us follow on to these results; for I am dwelling longer than time allows upon the Middle-Jewish—not the least instructive, if the least attractive, period of the course.

The definition of God, then, which Israel had attained, and round which its middle stage revolved, was the "Jehovah of Sion"—the Living God who dwelt in Jerusalem. But was it there only that He dwelt? He was defined to it. Was He therefore denied to every place beside? Nowhere else was He to be worshipped; nowhere else was He therefore to be found? As with the Patriarchal, so with the Living God, the false inference was practically drawn, and pertinaciously retained; and the strictly defined became a narrow, an exclusive, deity. Yet His pure worship had nurtured too vigorous a faith to be for ever content with this. The dispersions of His people, and their zeal and piety, had made Him widely known, and necessitated the enlargement of the idea itself. When proselytes of Ethiopia, and Crete, and Antioch, and Rome, had their God at Jerusalem, if a Samaritan had not sought, some other Gentile quickly would have attained an answer to what must have been the question of the time. Yet not without historic elegance or local fitness is it

¹ "Above them, as they talked, rose 'this mountain' of Gerizim, crowned by the Temple, of which the vestiges still remain, where the fathers of the Samaritan sect 'said men ought to worship,' and to which, after so many centuries, their descendants turn as to the only sacred spot in the Universe; the strongest example of local worship now existing in the world in the very face of the principle THERE FIRST announced, *that the sacredness of local worship was at an end.*"—STANLEY'S "Sinai and Palestine," p. 242. Yet the last sentence is too strongly worded. It is not the *sacredness* of local worship that is at an end—few seem to feel this more heartily than Dr. Stanley himself; I have quoted one instance, p. 177, note—but only its *predominance* over a more pervading sacredness, and over our right to realize this latter "where'er" we can. I endeavour to state the principle more formally in Note D, 9. In our Lord's language it is the question—which shall predominate—the Temple of Zion, or "this temple" of the body? or which shall be Lord—the Sabbath, or the Son of Man for whom it was made? For, the answer does not terminate in Christ, but extends to all who are "like Him." We are to "know that our bodies are the temple of the Holy Ghost," and called on to hold fast

that at Jacob's well a woman of Samaria asks of a mysterious stranger: "Sir, I perceive thou art a prophet. Our fathers worshipped in this mountain, and ye say that in Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship?" "Woman, I say unto thee, the hour is coming, *and now is*, in which neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, shall ye worship the Father. God is a Spirit: and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." "Neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem." Where, then? Our Lord does not say, but He implies it. Wherever God is; and this is everywhere; *for* GOD IS A SPIRIT. Now, no one had ever denied this. Much that men said or thought of Him might plainly imply it; yet no one had said it so before. That God *has* a Spirit by which He garnished the heaven, and sustains the earth, the agent of His mighty will, and holy as Himself, was familiar to their thought; but that God *is* a Spirit, is new to them, and is our Lord's enlargement of the Jewish conception of Jehovah.

And what is "a spirit"? It would be easy to refine upon it; but its broad popular acceptance, as something *everywhere*, unconfined, all pervading, which is implied in the context, and pertinent to the discourse, evidently gives us all we need. To express it, then, by its physical side, omnipresence, all-pervadingness, is that which our Lord breathes into the definition of the Living God. Do my younger brethren judge this too simple and physical, too unspiritual, to come up to His expression. Let them think of it again. The Jehovah of Jerusalem—that severe and jealous God, who would not be worshipped except with clean hands and a pure heart, and in all the care and pomp and beauty of holiness—that God is everywhere; above, about,

our liberty "even in respect to Sabbath-days, which are a shadow" of that into which we "enter." But, on the other hand, the Church, or any branch of it, has a perfect right to mark off holy places, persons, times, and things, for the edification of her members; and her "positive institution" is binding upon all, dominant over those who have not reached the highest truth. Those who have must, indeed, when needful, assert their liberty; but it is a great mistake to suppose that, so long at least as we are in this tabernacle, we can ever dispense with the observances which are correlated with it. Our Lord evidently *loved* the Temple. It was towards *its* expenses that He approved "the widow's mite;" and almost the only formal Act of His momentary Royalty was to purify *its* courts and re-affirm *its* sacredness.

below, and *in* them. "Where'er they seek Him, He is found; And every place is hallowed ground." Yea, and where they seek Him not, *there* too He is. The ground beneath, the air above, the voice of men around them, is holy with His all-searching, inevitable presence. Could faith realize this, brethren, were it far from seeing the Invisible?

And do we aspire to higher spiritualism? It is well, and it is easy. Let us carry the same idea with us into all other worlds that are—intellectual, social, political, religious—He pervades them all; and he who sees Him there, and bows his head and heart, he is His spiritual worshipper. It is not always easy, brethren; for He is not visible there any more than in the physical, except to the eye of faith, and it is not easy to *walk* by faith. But he who will thus walk through all these worlds—in all the ties, and duties, and temptations, and enjoyments, and distresses, and thoughts, and businesses—and find Him near, and seek Him closer still, these are they who worship Him in spirit and in truth, such as the Father seeks to worship Him. And he who will conceive of God as present in all these things just as distinctly as He sat between the cherubims, he shall have exhausted this one side of the New Testament conception of God.

One side, but one side only; for there is another, of which we have been gradually losing sight; the present importance of the others have overshadowed it. This God, who is everywhere in sternness and in mercy—is He everywhere impassive to the sufferings He inflicts, or the gladness He bestows? Knows He not how to care or feel for those His life sustains? Whence, then, do *we* know how to feel for each other, or even for ourselves? Our emotions and affections, our most intimate and highest life—whence is it derived? Has it some other Creator, some origin diverse from Him? Pagan thinkers believed it so, and have largely influenced—not, indeed, the creed nor the common sentiment of Christendom, nor the masses of the people, whom, indeed, even in Paganism they never reached—but its philosophy, and its professed theology. Almost in our own time it was necessary for Butler to prove the reality and dignity of our own affections, and to disprove the notion that they are "a sign of weakness, and

what a perfect being ought to be without." And then Philosophy grew humbler; and it is the modest Hartley, who asks with even a grand simplicity, "How do we know but that, as God is in a certain sense everywhere *present* with His creatures, so in a certain sense He everywhere *feels* with them?" thus presenting the conception, and suggesting the expression which completes our definition of all that we yet have learned of God—that He is not merely the Living but the Loving Spirit—the all-pervading Energy, the all-pervading Sympathy—from Whom creation has its Life and Love—in Whom it has its being.

And is this some recent discovery—sagely drawn by philosophers from principles established with laborious pains? or is it some cautious embodiment of the truth contained in Spanish or in German Pantheism? or is it some new development of the Christian Church, which is able in her nineteenth century to express deductions from her principles which she had always felt, but did not "know" before? If any one say yes! I shall not care to question it: there are many ways of finding truth, and many ways of proving it, and these, doubtless, among the rest. But my present subject is the Bible. Is *it* silent on such a conception? Did Paul and John know nought of this, or did Christ withhold the statement of it. To repeat these names, brethren, is more than enough; for the youngest who hears me is well aware that this is the very truth of which Paul and John *were* the Apostles, and that Christ is that Truth Himself—not so much the teacher, as the expression, the manifestation, the Incarnation of it. For aught we know, so far as our relations with God are concerned, Christ's sufferings and death need never have been historically exhibited at all. But, being exhibited, this is the truth they teach—God's sympathy with man, with every man, the weakest, most ignorant, most sinful man that is—"That God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them." "Scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die. But God commendeth His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." "Herein is love; not that we loved God, but that He

loved us, and gave his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?"

This, then, is the very basis of the Christian Church; and the nought-repelling, all-embracing, all-purifying Love of God is *the* peculiar truth which it is her commission to impress. But the Christian Church is like the Jewish Church: it has to learn, as well as teach; it also is a progress and development. Yet observe, brethren, in this signal instance, what we might parallel, I suppose, in almost all its parts, what is the true nature of its development. It is not, or at least not yet, a development *from* the last stage recorded in the Bible, but a development *towards* it. It is a repetition, in fact, of the Jewish culture on an advanced scale, and under wider and more complicated circumstances—a higher cycle, a larger year, around the Sun of Righteousness—the calling not of Abram, but of Abraham; the organization of, not a family, but family *of nations*, to walk in the footsteps of the Elder Israel towards a second Advent of its Messiah. How the Church has been obstructed, how it has warred, and how it has sinned in the discharge of its mission—how it has exalted its priest, and trained its Levite, and rebuked or blessed its temporary king—how often it has slain its prophet, and then paused to learn his truth and canonize his name—and how often it has denied its Christ, and then repented bitterly, with tears—is a large subject to allude to. But this is its theory, and this is its history in brief. That considerable sections of its members are already able to appreciate, and thirsting deeper to drink in the last-taught lessons of the Jewish page, is the measure of the Church's present success, the earnest of its consummation. Doubtless, when these last lessons have been learned, some higher truth will be revealed, of which the gleams and prophecies will then be understood.

And let us observe, in fine, the mode in which the Scriptures operate on the Church and on the world. They simply hold up this Pilgrim's Progress before its face, that it may follow in his steps—describe each stage graphically and truthfully, because contemporaneously—and with an inspiration which is clearly but

a part of that which produced the step itself—and present the whole together; so that each may therein find his place for to-day, and direction for to-morrow—at once sympathy and encouragement; confirmation in each step, guidance towards the next, and stimulus, and strength, and spirit to proceed. Many profess to follow in that Pilgrim's steps, but he alone does follow who progresses as the pilgrim does. To stop *anywhere* is to renounce our calling. Our very best, it ceases to be good, if it be not made a footstep to the better. "I count not myself to have apprehended," says the great Apostle: "but *this one thing* I do, forgetting the things which are behind, and reaching forward to that which is before, I press towards the mark and prize of our high calling." "Covet earnestly," he says, in our context, "the best gifts: and yet I show unto you a *more* excellent way"—What were these best? He had just been enumerating them—"first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healing, helps, governments, diversities of tongues"—all that the Spirit has given us, in fact—the constitution of the Church itself, and those who administer it, and all the ordinary and extraordinary endowments with which He has "enabled" their ministrations. These, or the best of these, are the best gifts. Is there anything better than these? Yea, brethren, these are all engines for increasing *knowledge*, and thence confirming *faith*, and thence refreshing and sustaining *hope*; and all these ends, each in its order, is better than the means. And is there anything better still than they? Yea, once again, he says, even these are among "the childish things" which our maturity shall overpass: for "whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away;"—nay, Faith and Hope themselves shall but a while "abide" as steps to the Imperishable—for there is a greater still than they—a nearer yet, and truer, Communion of the Unknown. Around them all there sweeps, and behind them all there comes, that "Wondrous LOVE whose height, Whose depth, unfathomed, no man knows"—whose pure and holy Light both far and near we see—and *this* shall "never fail."

And this is the end to us ; for this exhausts our being. Our knowledge can suggest, our faith can see, our hope aspire, no higher. In proportion as it is perfect, and perfectly realised, is our perfect bliss. For this is what expands our own being—let us say it firmly and reverently—out into the Being and the Bliss of God. “Beloved,” says the Divine, “let us love one another ; for love is of God ; he that loveth not, knoweth not God—and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God ; for GOD IS LOVE.”

This, then, ends our progression ; and here it is in brief :—

First, The Almighty ; the Vague Invisible ; of whom we scarcely think, and whom we regard or dread as little as we may—then

God, as *Our Father* ; the God of the family ; object of the father’s worship, giver of the mother’s tender care ;—

God, as the Living God, by the standard of whose jealous purity we must battle our way through life ;—

God, as the Pervading Energy, the reflection of whose face we gradually learn to see, as we attain each eminence, and are able to look around ;—

God, as the Pervading Sympathy, who was with us when we knew it not ; who had yet sobered and deepened every joy, and made even the bitterness of grief delicious, in proportion as He caused it to draw us near to Him.

First, it is wide, indeed, but vague and feeble ; and our childhood almost heeds it not.

Next, it narrows itself as it gathers up its force, and concentrates its inspiration on the actual purpose of our life.

Then it widens itself again, expanding with the Spirit of Catholicity, until it sees the gleams and feels the pulses of the shoreless ocean of the Love of God. Into the Sabbath of that Eternal Bosom it is fain to cast itself and there be born anew.

When each of us has known Him thus, then shall we have finished our course with joy.

When the world shall have known Him thus, then will it, too, look up for that which is to come. And what He will bring with Him no one knows. With what new resources its Redemption will endow the world; with what new capacities our spiritual bodies will invest ourselves—this is hidden in the mystery untold. "It doth not yet appear," brethren, "*what* we shall be: but we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as HE IS."

SERMON VI.

A GLANCE AT THE CHURCH CATHOLIC.

“ To the spiritual despotism of Rome in the middle ages may, indeed, be traced a long series of errors and crimes, of wars and persecutions. Yet the Papal dynasty was the triumphant antagonist of another despotism, the most galling, the most debasing, and otherwise the most irremediable, under which Europe had ever groaned. The centralization of ecclesiastical power more than balanced the isolating spirit of the feudal oligarchies. The vassal of Western and the serf of Eastern Europe might otherwise, at this day, have been in the same social state, and military autocracies might now be occupying the place of our constitutional or paternal governments. Hildebrand's despotism, with whatever inconsistency, sought to guide mankind, by moral impulses, to a more than human sanctity. The feudal despotism with which he waged war, sought, with a stern consistency, to degrade them into beasts of prey, or beasts of burden. It was the conflict of mental with physical power, of literature with ignorance, of religion with injustice and debauchery. To the Popes of the middle ages was assigned a province, the abandonment of which would have plunged the Church and the World into the same hopeless slavery. To Pope Gregory the Seventh were first given the genius and the courage to raise himself and his successors to the level of that high vocation.”—SIR JAMES STEPHEN, *Essays*, p. 55.

SERMON VI.

A GLANCE AT THE CHURCH CATHOLIC.

MARK, iv. 28.

First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear.

I HAVE traversed in outline one large division of my subject, having treated, with what fulness the time allowed, of the Criterion and Instruments of Religious Progress. There remains the period of this one discourse for the examination of its Laws. These I classified under two heads, corresponding, one to the advancing, the other to the conservative element, which are each, and each equally, essential to sustained progress, and involved in its idea. The first comprises religion's aspiration and effort; the second, its peace that passes understanding: the first its onward energy and ambitions, its activity, industry, productiveness; the other, its more passive and refining virtues,—patience, long-suffering, self-denial resignation, joy.

The first class of laws relates to "succession," and is best expressed, perhaps, by the words Growth or Development, whose conception is not merely that the consecutive states arise from, and are produced by each other—a continuity which would equally be found in retrogression, decay, or almost in stagnation—but also that each succeeding stage should be, in some sort, larger, higher, better than that from which it sprang—should carry on to some farther, and on the whole superior, end, the momentum it has inherited. This is obviously the nature of Growth, and, I am disposed to believe, of Life in general, in all its created manifestation or embodiment. "It runs in cycles," it is true—in Days, periods, generations—with each a declining,

as well as an orient phase : but the cumulative endowment of the past tells always upon each nascent future, and tends to make the last-born Son the fitting representative as well as heir and lord of all.

Thus, as we read in Genesis, the physical, vegetable, animal evolutions,¹ arose successively upon the globe ; then, and on their basis, the Sabbath-kingdoms ascend in order—Patriarchism, Judaism, Christianity—and consciously expect a higher kingdom still. This process our individual life repeats in miniature ; first our *physique* expands ; then, and on its basis, higher physiologies ; and lastly, our more spiritual and reflective powers. Communities also repeat it in longer periods, proportioned to their scale ; each developing first its ruder growth and material prosperity, and then its more refined and moral influences, ere it hands down its name and its attainment to posterity. “First the physical, then the humbler, and then the higher spiritual”—this is the *order* of creation, so far as our experience can discern. We do not pretend, of course, that the forward tendency is always realized in each particular, to the exclusion, in any abundance, of partial retrogressions, corruptions, or destructions—though, doubtless, it knows how to make these too subserve itself, and will vindicate the Universal Parentage even in those who fail. The retrograde movements of secondary stars are involved in the general, nay, in their own advance ; and if all things “consist” in Christ, and shall in Him be “reconciled,” the celestial scheme is no less balanced and beneficent, nor is its total progressiveness the less assured. Nor do we contend that the process is equable, to the exclusion of large breaks, unexpected transitions and transformations, with singular points, and strange concomitants, transcending our analysis. There is a *step per saltum* in nature and in the supernatural—a crisis-epoch, with its accessories—an evening, and a sun-burst to Creation’s Days. Its indications are abundant everywhere—the more sud-

¹ “And God said—*Let the earth bring forth grass,*” &c., Gen. i. 11. “Let the waters bring forth the moving creature,” &c., i. 20. “Let the earth bring forth the living creature,” &c., i. 24 :—and the earth and sea *did* “bring them forth,”—and SO “God created” them.

den and violent changes in physical procedure; the birth-stage in organism; Exodus, conquest, and revolution among nations; earthquake and upheaval upon earth's crust, and the like convulsions in its atmosphere; on a larger scale, the chasms in geologic history, and one should add, if our present cosmogony be true, "the shrinking-stage" in planetary genesis. Without disputing that their principles are at bottom the same as those which conduct the more equable progression, I have classed all such facts as "the *step per saltum*," in nature—its religious analogues being, "conversion" or the reformation-crisis in the individual, and the change of Dispensations in the Church; the processions of her Law and Gospel, the successive Advents of her Lord—rapid and marked periods of transition, with "anticipations" and accompaniments as "extraordinary" as themselves.

And all the above, whether resolvable into precisely the same laws or not, may, I think, be included in the words Growth or Development, and describe one side of Creation—its facts considered as successive.

The other class of laws relates to "coexistence," and may best be summed up, perhaps, in the old words Constitution or Cosmos—graduated and orderly correlation. It seeks to expound the more perplexing fact of the heterogeneousness of things, their contact and collisions. Its leading thought is this—Nature's movement is not a single process, but a coexistence and co-operation of many processes—in fact, of all the different processes her history has evolved. On reaching some higher, she does not therefore intermit her humbler operation and production, but carries on all simultaneously, though absorbing into the higher a part of the force that had worked lower down. Hence, existing things are not one series, but a multitude of related series, interlaced with, variously affecting and dependent on each other; every organism and the whole "consisting" of elements which are in every stage *and phase* of advance, from its own highest downwards.

Thus, geological formation, to go no farther back, did not cease when vegetable life began, nor vegetation when animals appeared; nor these, again, when Law, and Sin, and Grace were born, and

Nations, Bibles, Churches began to claim dominion. The humbler kingdoms still produce as heretofore; though, doubtless, with abated energy and originality—part of their force having passed up to spiritual creation. And these, such varied kingdoms, not merely “coexist,” they truly *co-operate* and perform essential functions for each other. The higher lead, refine, and rule the lower; the lower nourish and sustain the higher, are their permanent basis, and perennial source of power. This interdependence binds and correlates, as I believe, all force and all production, from the highest spiritual influence down to the humblest *dynamique* of mechanism and mass, as truly as the animal lives upon the vegetable force; the vegetable upon still ruder *vires vivæ*.

Our own constitution images it in miniature. Our mental powers repose upon our animal, our nerves, and blood, and brain; these upon our nutrition and vegetable growth; and these, in turn, upon still humbler chemistries, down to the mechanism that draws our breath, circulates our blood, or builds and moves our frame. From dust we came, and dust we *are*, however fearfully or wonderfully made. Nay, to the last, our least organic or even gasiform material is as essential to our action, perhaps to our existence, as our highest hope of heaven; and if the Christian, as distinguished from the Pagan, theory of our “future life” be true, the dependence will be perpetual. The same correlation rules in the separate sections or strata of creation, when viewed apart, or even in those of our mysterious “self”—for example, in our mental powers when compared together, or in the several departments of our psychology. Thus, our moral nature is a constitution slowly developed around the slowly built up authority of conscience, and our intellect a symmetry similarly evolved around our growing sense of Unity,—both of them fed and freshened continually by the prime sensibilities from which they have been formed, and on which, to the last, they rest.

It is the same in social things. Every community, in proportion to its advance, is a constitution developed by its history. A certain amount of homogeneousness—of vague “liberty, equality, fraternity”—each society may start from, or must assume,

as its initial state, its momentary chaos ; but as soon as it begins to act, its latent tendencies or necessities will tell. It must differentiate and constitute itself. It must on the moment elect its authorities, if but by chance ; then gradually it finds, by trial, its hand, and head, and voice, or develops them by exercise out of rude material, and learns to assign each element within the body corporate that place and function which befit the whole. Thus, society learns to know itself, as it learns to be itself, and, like humbler nature, becomes a cosmos unawares. Each, as it looks back, discerns its "beauty," reveres and loves its "form," and with some feeling of its purpose admits that it is "good." But presently a higher spirit makes man dissatisfied with "rest." He looks forward to the Better ; aspires to meet the Coming, and to worship the Unseen ; "finds fault" with whatever *is*, and at nature's bidding, undeterred by every hazard, aye, even by the certainty of death, springs up insatiate into the communion of the gods, to find in time a higher Cosmos there.

Thus, always, "Nature builds a Constitution ;" or rather she *has* a Constitution, which she always tends to make explicit—her "Course" being her Constitution developed into history ; her "Constitution," at any time, being her past Course and present tendencies compressed in a tableau.

These laws aim, it will be observed, at expounding *more* than mere "succession and coexistence." In their view all existence is life and operation ; all coexistence, co-operation ; and all succession, more or less of effect, and change, and transformation. They believe not in some bare "continuity of living powers ;" nor in some mere "succession of unproductive cycles," each no better than the last ; nor in any Independence, Immobility, or Uniformity of Nature, as these words are now employed. Nature is but being-born ; being born into the manifestation, and so far the likeness of its Maker. What pervades it is not infallibility, but aspiration and implicit prophecy ; not finality or self-completeness, but growth and growing purpose, and hope and love of the Coming, and faith in the Unknown ; not immutability and iron form, but order, and analogy, and parable, and *Word*, significant ever in ascending senses to those who have

ears to hear. Her incessant change runs not in one unchanging round, nor is it, on the other hand, void, random, or capricious, but orderly, full of meaning, and animated by one great growing Purpose that pervades and dominates it all. Nature herself ascends, and calls on all her children to ascend; she ever betters, refines, and elevates herself towards the nearer consciousness and truer image of the Divine. In a word, these laws believe in *Creation*—Creation, not in some unnatural, occasional, spasmodic sense, whose time is past, whose *dynamique* is dead, whose very "notes" are more than doubtful, but in *Creation present*—as present as the Creator—the actual exhaustless energy of the Unchangeable—the constant self-expression of that Living God, in Whom Nature and all her sons live and have their being. Things are being "caused to grow," are being created, and created anew, by the One Sole Author of *ALL*, towards the ever more and more explicit Manifestation of Himself.

Religion, these laws affirm, and Religious Progress, but stands at the head of this Self-Revelation—Nature's highest and most conscious part—her growing consciousness of second-birth—Nature becoming Higher-Nature in its felt communion with the Invisible—Nature's most expository part besides; that which best discerns the Universal Sacrament, and best can feel and illustrate the all-pervading principles.

Christianity, they add, is but Religion's highest and best expository part; that which unveils the mystery which kings and righteous men, nay, prophets and angels, too, have laboured to explore; that which "declares" the Deity whom Science, Art, Philosophy, but ignorantly worship, yet whom purity, and piety, and faith, have never failed to see.

The Church, in fine, but heads this Great Progression, which the Bible inspires, describes, and justifies—strives, within, to grow up to Christ; strives, without, to regenerate the world as its preparative towards the Great Regeneration; strives, intellectually, to decypher that name *JAH* which utters at once the Being, the Force, and the Becoming, and, whether perplexed or no, falls back on the higher name of *LOVE*, as it pictures to itself some final consummation, wherein the Unseen shall be Seen, and all Creation understood and reconciled.

But ought I, in the brief period that now remains, attempt the farther discussion of these extensive Laws,¹ and their distri-

¹ Five (or six) "laws" are enumerated in the above sketch :—

1. Creation or Nature is a progress, a development, a gradual being-born, a "being caused to grow."

2. Its order is "first the natural, then the spiritual;" first the spontaneous, then the moral; or, more fully, first the unconscious, next the direct-conscious, and then the reflex-conscious development.

3. Its form is "secular," *αἰώνιος*, *eternus*; "it runs in cycles," and divides itself off accordingly in time, space, and product—a cycle being, not an arbitrary section of nature's continuity, but a well-marked period, with beginning, middle, and end—such as a day, month, year, generation, or dispensation, with each its own sphere or orbit, and its corresponding product.

4. *Natura facit saltum*; *sæpe, sed ordinate, haud fortuito*. Nature's movement includes a birth and transformation stage, a violent crisis or transition epoch, by which, in fact, she passes from period to period, from one stage or platform to another.

5. Nature builds a constitution; tends ever—within each cycle and its period, as well as on the whole—to arrange her elements in a certain hierarchy and gradation around an explicit sense of unity.

To which I add, for distinctness' sake, as a sixth law, though it may fairly be thought involved in some of the others—

6. Her tendency is towards the Better. Our definition of the better being, of course, anthropomorphic; we reckon those things the highest which come nearest to our own highest qualities, or which we feel to be above them—the highest attribute we discern at present being Love, or intelligent, self-sacrificing, and yet assimilating sympathy.

These form the subject of the second course of Sermons. By calling them laws, I mean to express my conviction that they are constant and pervading tendencies of things, modes in which the pervading substance and pervading force tend always to shape themselves to our observation—modes of God's action, supposed universal and self-consistent—that they are always operative, therefore, along with other "tendencies" known or unknown, and always produce their *proportionate* effect, although no one of them may express the whole resultant, or even its dominant character, in each particular case. Just as gravity may seem to be overpowered by growth or temperature, but yet is, to the more attentive eye, as conspicuous in every shape and movement of the plant or cloud as it is in either the rising or falling of the tide or bullet or balloon. If this be true, they are "laws of Nature," or "laws of God," in the largest sense in which the term is used; and the main affirmation of these Sermons is that they are true in Religion also, or rather true there *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, as it is nature's highest and most conscious part, and can best understand and illustrate "God's natural and moral government of things." Thus, their discussion is but an endeavour to render more distinct, and, as the Hamiltonians say, articulate, the draft of Nature and Christianity with which Bishop Butler has endowed the world.

There is an ambiguity in the word "law," which often misleads. We may use it of the mind of the legislator, or we may use it of the resultant facts, the mass of precedents which indicate that mind to subjects or observers. It is in the latter sense that it

bution into that form which would be convenient for elucidation? I trust that those who hear me will say, no! Abstract

is used in all the sciences of observation, whose laws are therefore merely classifications of facts, or partial digests of this mass of precedents. This is at least what they are intended to be, but there is always a reference more or less felt to the mind of the legislator. Else had they never been called "laws." And this, when not noticed, causes great confusion, especially in those writers who affect to exclude it; for then the laws themselves, whether written in a code or gathered directly from observation, become invested with some strange potency, and perhaps some "real existence."

I may take an example from Mr. Buckle, in hopes that those of higher repute for orthodoxy and accuracy may discern its blunder. Having gathered, from statistics, perhaps, some social law or "general fact," Mr. Buckle straightway concludes that this fact is "powerful" enough to supersede its own actual antecedents. For instance, he thinks that "even the number of marriages contracted annually is determined, *not* by the temper and wishes of individuals, *but* by large general facts, over which individuals can exercise no authority. It is now known that marriages bear a fixed and definite relation to the price of corn; and in England the experience of a century has proved that, *instead* of having *any connexion*"—hear ye this, young men and maidens!—"with personal feelings, they are simply regulated by the average earnings of the great mass of the people."—Hist. of Civ., p. 29. Similarly he derides the folly "of attempting to diminish the crime of suicide by legislation," because he has found, from statistics, that "in a given state of society a certain number *must* put an end to their own life. This is the general law, . . . and its power is so irresistible that neither the love of life nor the fear of another world *can avail anything* towards even checking its operation."—*Id.* pp. 24, 26. This is very absurd; but where may we not match it among those of high repute? God is the one sole Legislator, and the one ultimate and immediate Executive. Facts, if we can read them right, are the directest expression of His will. Wise and prophetic insight may discern those facts, their key-points and tendencies, and may record them in a Book or books. Such record, and knowledge of it, and faith in it, are then new facts, and add themselves as "causes" to the whole subsequent development.

But are the above six statements "laws"? Does nature exhibit or obey them? Let each reader judge. To many they will seem, as they do to me, patent truisms, which no one can deny without denying the plainest and commonest facts, and involving himself at once in self-contradiction and absurdity. Yet they are frequently forgotten or denied by writers of importance, and it becomes necessary to assert them formally. Indeed, our fashionable neo-Platonism will deem them singularly dangerous and untrue; but as its "truth" is as far as possible removed from nature, and chooses to balance itself, when pressed home, on essential self-contradiction, its protest will not be distressing to believers in common things. It will protest also in the name of religion, perhaps; but I fear its fulcrum is too unstable for effective leverage. When writers so intelligent as Mr. Gosse must vindicate for us "creation," in their view of it, by denying to any and every existing thing any created antecedents whatsoever—note, p. 121—when writers so learned as our late Archer Butler must oppose "development" by insisting that Christianity was *not* like the grain of mustard-seed, but, Minerva-like, "was born full-grown," and that any other "idea" of it is most disparaging to its Author—on Romanism, pp.

views on any subject are only valuable in proportion to their capacity of descending to detail, and invigorating our grasp of in-

399, 400—or when writers so orthodox as Mr. Mansel will maintain deliberately that “either the *formation* or *progressive development* of theology as a science is *impossible*,” and will denounce all attempts at it—including, of course, all the Creeds, Councils, Catechisms, and Confessions of Christendom, to say nothing of their various Expositions, or of Donnellan or Bampton Lectures—as being “either Dogmatism or Rationalism, or that monstrous compound of both which can only distort the Christian doctrine while pretending to systematize it”—we may well be excused for relying on some commoner “common sense,” and less pretentious orthodoxy. Yet they have their influence in the world, and we must wrestle with them accordingly.

Even the more modest and substantial inquirers into nature are misled by their “idea,” and might be benefited by the recognition of some formal truisms. Mr. Darwin, for instance, or even Sir C. Lyell, is driven to write as if he were opposing “Creation” and the Bible, to his own great distress no doubt, from his non-recognition of our *first* truism. Again, under the impression that a *saltus* means some monstrous fragment of Mr. Gosse’s notion, Mr. Darwin actually denies so very obvious a truism as our *fourth* law, and, by way of sustaining his denial, goes to explain away the large chasms in the geologic history. He might as well explain away the intervals between the planetary orbits, or the facts of birth and marriage. Again, Mr. Mill, Sir G. Cornwall Lewis, and most writers on social and political subjects, appear seriously confused by their non-recognition of our *fifth* law, and speak as if they thought that society as such could tend permanently to democracy. In one sense they are right enough, namely, that every true gospel will always preach itself downward to the poor, and tend to make the humblest members of each community partake, nay, consciously partake, the material, intellectual, moral eminence which its highest members can attain. But if they mean that, as society advances, its working can become less complex and less “constitutional,” or its form less “kingly,” they make, as it appears to me, an extravagant and unnatural hypothesis. If society be natural, it must “constitute itself” in ascending grades, as nature does; and in any cultivated society no outburst of democracy, or even acceptance of it, is possible, except as the temporary reaction of some pertinacious blunder on the part of the powers that be.

I make no attempt here to *prove* these laws, but only to *preach* them, as involved in those fundamental truths which every Christian has at heart. There are, no doubt, many other laws discernible, and some of them as fundamental as the above. *Toward* some of them I have argued, without assuming them to be either self-evident or true. I will sketch rudely one or two of them. About the most general is, that,

A. The *mode* of creation is by compression, and subsequent expansion; the transformation—i. e., the generation of some new substance or new force, or both—having taken place at the point of extreme concentration.

A group of minor laws is involved in this, as that,—

a. Any natural force concentrated upon matter to a certain degree will cause that matter to change its state; e. g., the more obvious phenomena of liquefaction, sublimation, crystallization, and organization.

b. A natural force concentrated in an extreme degree will pass a part of itself into a

dividual things and their commonest relations. Denuded, then, of the opportunity of practical application, some classification of

new and higher form of force; e. g., "motion" into heat, heat into light, light into chemical, and these, probably, into the organic powers.

In the upper organic powers, at least, the operation of this law is quite conspicuous. The genesis of the sympathies and antipathies from the direct sensibilities to pleasure and pain—i. e. by first intensifying the latter, and then diffusing [associating] the result,—is as unmistakable as the genesis of light from concentrating rays of heat upon a piece of iron; and the most beautiful and highest fact in morals—the genesis of Love from affection or natural sympathy, intensified and crushed back upon itself until it emerges in self-sacrifice—is but the most refined example of this class of fact. The genesis of the humbler sensibilities is less obvious, from the want of a reflex consciousness attaching to them; but, so far as they are open to direct observation, they obey the same law.

c. Natural forces show a spontaneous tendency thus to concentrate and transform themselves—not only in the large and striking phenomena, but also in a constant, insensible, "differential" operation; e. g., the phenomena of evaporation, *eremacausis*, or even gravity, and the [supposed] consequent luminosity of matter as such.

It must be borne in mind, however, that only part of the lower force is transformed to higher; and this transformed portion diffuses itself, and, as it were, illumines or inspires the rest. Thus "love" is not "self-sacrifice." This were a miserable consummation; but it is natural affection pervaded and elevated by the spirit of self-sacrifice; as affection, or natural sympathy itself, is but an intensified sensibility to pleasure and pain, vivifying our common perceptions or associations of similitude and contiguity. Just as the atmosphere of our planet is not merely light, but is the original "mist" refined, by having passed part of its substance into "form," part of its heat into light, and by their subsequent reactions; or as religion itself combines with and reinspires all just proceedings below itself. And all these correlated forces of nature are continually fed and freshened from below; so that the highest powers, perhaps, of which this earth ever has been, or ever will be, the theatre, are dependent on its mass and inertia in the last resort; as the size of the human body and strength of the human nerves and brain are; and the whole history of our planet, possibly, may be a function of the first humble powers with which its Creator endowed it, and of the time and circumstances in which these have been caused to operate.

The moral and historical analogies of this law A meet us everywhere. I have expounded one in the Fifth Sermon as the Analysis of Education. Indeed, the total history of religion, and of the world, as viewed in these Sermons, is an example of it, viz., that natural religiousness, and the other true principles of humanity, were gradually concentrated into Judaism, and caused to attain a climax in Christ, through whom and Pentecost they diffuse themselves in the higher form of Catholic Christianity, which will again concentrate itself towards the second advent and some higher illumination. If it be true that the most highly organized particles of each mundane kingdom are those which "sublime" most easily, and pass out gasiform into the atmosphere, it may be that the whole history of our or of any planet is but an instance of this concentration and subsequent expansion in a higher form.

generalities, such as to-day I might attempt, might even for science be profitless, and would therefore in every sense offend

B. By using the word "differential" above (c) and elsewhere, I allude to another principle which many appearances seem to indicate, namely, that natural laws are "pervading," in the sense of extending to the minute elements of things, so that the broad results we see are *bonâ fide* "integrations" of homogeneous elements, which rest, like ourselves, on a physical base throughout.

This hypothesis seems involved in many of our convictions, and is essential to the validity of many of our common religious arguments—e. g., those of the Seventh Sermon, cf. Note A, 4, &c.—and I know no reason why it should not be true in the most searching physical sense. The molecules of our own bodies, or of anything, or even the atoms of which those molecules consist, have, we suppose, certain ultimate qualities, a certain size, form, weight, capacity of heat, certain polarities and affinities, and certain rotatory or other movements, on which their more obvious statical and dynamical qualities depend. Now, there is no reason to think that these ultimate qualities are *precisely alike* for every atom of the same class, say carbon or iron, or that they are *invariable* for the same atom when viewed in successive periods. There is every reason to suppose the contrary, and I do suppose it accordingly. In particular, I suppose that minute variations in their finer qualities can be *impressed* on these small elements, and can be *retained* by them, so that the total state and qualities of each are, like our own, a *function of its history*.

For example, plumbago, anthracite, diamond, cotton, saw-dust, turf, starch, sugar, alcohol, oil, and fat, are very different substances. But put them into the chemist's crucible, and they will all come out pure carbon, with a little of the elements of water. But who will believe that their differences are *merely* superficial, and indicate no corresponding variation in the molecular movements or polarities? Tried by certain rude and obvious tests, all Englishmen will be alike, nay, all men, all planets, or all "things;" but they have their specific and individual qualities notwithstanding; why should it not be the same with these particles of carbon? Moreover, no two common specimens, say of sugar, starch or alcohol, are precisely similar either in appearance or in active qualities. The chemist can detect no difference, perhaps; his methods are too blunt and coarse; but try them in the higher laboratories of organic life, and one will be wholesome and agreeable, the other distasteful and injurious. Now, the differences will depend generally on the *antecedents* of each specimen; on the mode in which, and the substances from which it had been prepared; and all these varieties of carbon, from plumbago or carbonic acid up to alcohol and brain, can be, and are actually "prepared" from each other, by the aid, that is, of vegetable and animal organization. I suppose that the process is analogous to that which forms and transforms men and planets, namely, that small variations are impressed on their finer qualities, and retained by them with more or less of pertinacity. So that even when the organisms are broken up the elements are different from what they were; and while vegetable and animal kingdoms, by their evanescent action, alter the atmosphere and surface of the globe, their very debris accumulates a magazine of "educated" force available for higher production—that earth-dust, in fact, and star-dust, as well as the atoms of social aggregates, are being formed and educated by their history.

against the sacred responsibilities of the pulpit. It will be thought better, I doubt not, that I should hope for some future opportunity of pursuing the second branch of my subject, and devote to-day to one or two topics of more popular interest, arising from our Course.

The very idea of Religious Progress being admitted, about one's first inquiry will relate to the present Church. What is her, and what is our own place in it? Can she, or we, correctly judge our whereabouts? How far have we come? Whither go we next? What are the signs of our times, and the key-points of our war? What mean these shakings of the earth and sky, which cause thought to many, serious anxiety to some, and challenge attention even from the inconsiderate?

C. The only other law to which I will here allude is the *law of analogy*, which is the foundation of our natural expectation of the constancy of nature; and, therefore, of all natural, and ultimately of all formal, logic. For it is not that there is any actual "identity" of two things in nature—this were absurd; nor any actual "uniformity" of procedure from day to day—this were almost equally absurd, for then, in fact, there would be no "procedure," nor growth, nor "nature." But there is a conviction in us—arising, no doubt, from experience, or rather from some indistinct feeling of the laws which regulate experience—of the orderly procedure of things, so that, when we have seen one fact, we are satisfied that in like circumstances the like fact will appear again—that like causes will always produce the like effect. Hence we (1) *classify* things in grades according to their likenesses; and, while observing the change of things from day to day, we (2) *expect* that each cause operative will produce its own proportionate, and that a like effect.

There is then no "law of identity" in respect to any phenomena, material or mental; and the common logical statement of it by the formula $a = a$ is either nugatory or false. The identity which underlies the variations of each living thing, and of the whole creation, is not a subject of science; it admits of but one affirmation, which leads no farther; and its application to phenomena of *any* kind is false. No " a " is *precisely* like any other " a ," much less identical with it; nor is the same " a " precisely like itself in any successive portions of time. Neither are any two men's concepts of any " a " precisely alike, nor any two successive concepts of any " a " by the same individual. But what is aimed at by the *law of identity* is the *law of analogy* above stated. It might be expressed, if one chooses such an affectation of mathematical exactness, by the formula $A = a + \alpha$, A denoting the whole phenomena, a (homogeneous with A) the dominant, or characteristic portion of it, and α the remaining portion, which may or may not be important in any given question.

It has two principal forms—(1) the "law of classification," or of language, which may be expressed by the formula $A = a + C$, or rather $X = x + C$, C denoting the "constant" or aggregate of qualities not contemplated in the present comparison; and (2)

To such questions the bulk of Christendom does not reply at all. It finds its present solitudes enough, and is content to receive, day by day, its daily bread from heaven, casting all its care for the future on Him whose care it is. And this modest, incurious sentiment, even on a topic of such interest, it seems needful to insist, brethren, its the just feeling in the body of the Church; not its faithlessness, but its fidelity to its calling; the quietness and confidence which are its strength, and enable it healthily to fulfil its functions. The eye, to use St. Paul's illustration, is but one member of the body, and it is but one function of the eye to speculate on our geography. All the members cannot use the telescope, nor can all understand, or much regard its startling revelations. If all were the eye, where were

the "law of existence," which is also the law of growth, of more-or-less-than-continuance, or of "insensible creation," to be expressed by the formula $A' = A + da$ or dx . Every "thing" in nature being either crescent or decrecent; the momentary change, denoted by da or dx , being for common purposes = 0, but in any general reasonings upon the nature of things the most important part of the expression. Even to common observation time will integrate it into an appreciable sum, either insensibly, or by any such compression of force as produces the *step per saltum*.

The Common Logic depends on the law of classification, of which the rules *de omni* and *de nullo* are forms, and the major premiss of each syllogism an example. The validity of the argumentation depends on the stringency with which *C* [i. e., every irrelative topic] is excluded; and the whole science or art is an exercise and test of precision of ideas. Inductive Logic depends on the "law of existence," and its aim in each question is to note the differential, and ascertain its law of increment. The latter Logic belongs to *generative*, the former to *descriptive* science.

Both forms of logic, as well as of science, are strictly "of the finite;" but they extend themselves to the Infinite also, by virtue of these convictions:—

I. That the finite is a part, each finite a differential part of the Infinite.

II. That its laws, therefore, are laws of the Infinite: each finite, so far as it is true and typical, expressing, up to its own level, the laws of the Infinite.

In generation, or successive genesis, the law takes the form of *like produces like*; remembering always that parentage is two-fold at least, and, generally, that each thing is the resultant of a vast number of co-operating causes, each of which produces its own *proportionate* effect. In morals, and in action generally, it is to be remembered also that the powers of the individual are themselves one of the co-operating forces. Each thing is itself, by virtue of its *vires vivæ* and higher powers, a true "origin of motion," and of action generally. In higher creatures there is a reflex consciousness of this originating power, and of its determinant motives; and this reflex consciousness becomes itself a new and appreciable power—it is commonly called the Will, and is perfect or imperfect according as it has or has not pervaded and harmonized itself with all the other powers.

the body ; and where, especially, the great unconscious functions whereon hand, and heart, and brain, and eye itself, rely ? Let the eye, however, be true to itself, and humbly do its best, and let every form of intellect discern the most it can. If it be single, the whole body will share the results, at least, of its illumination, and will repay it manifold.

The bulk of Christians, then, do not inquire ; nor is it needful—some sections do, however, and speak with some distinctness. Let us gather up the substance of their reply. One class is positive and confident ; charitable also, at least as regards itself. It has learned the truth ; especially the truth of His near approach ; it hears His chariot wheels, and busies itself to meet Him. It has completed its calculations, too, and can assign the year, almost the month or day, of that Pass-over whose times are hidden, we are expressedly told, from every man and angel, nay, even from the Son Himself. And when asked of the work that should precede His coming, they are equally explicit. They, and such as they, have announced the truth, and do announce it ; and this is sufficient to vindicate the attributes of God to a world that lieth in wickedness, and to bring it in guilty for aggravated condemnation. They speak as softly as they can, for men now, have tender ears, and will not bear sound doctrine ; but it is not for them to impugn the Sovereignty that has rescued *themselves* as brands. Christ belongs to them, and God “outside of Christ” is a consuming fire. Resignedly they hand up the world at large to “the uncovenanted mercies,” that is, to the pledged *unforgiveness* of *their* ideal Father.

It were a waste of words, brethren, to repudiate this *δυσάγγελιον*. Fortunately for the thoughtful, it resolves itself into a palpable duality ; and we may trust that He who speaks to us according to our folly will make its doubtless well-meant terror profitable for preparation to those who dwell on it. In themselves the sentiments are horrifying ; or would be so did we not know how shallow and vain is even the endeavour to believe them, and how much deeper and truer good men’s hearts are than the special “truth” to which they offer sacrifice. Indeed, there is a sort of Nemesis and compensation in professions. As the wick-

edest and most selfish of men can profess, and with some honesty, just, and liberal, and philanthropic views, so the very kindest and most loving of mankind will find it possible to crush, in theory, as doubt and unbelief, the remonstrances of common humanity and natural affection, and almost to persuade themselves that they believe in a Universal Father who made the most of His children for destruction, and in a Christ who came into the world *not* to save the world but to condemn the world, and that the world through Him should inherit everlasting woe. This, however, is hardly the profession of Church or Bible, and should not be mistaken by *any* for "popular Christianity."

The bold and self-electing estimate, then, is not of much account. A discouraged sentiment is much more prevalent, as well as more Christian and humane. To lament the abounding wickedness and degeneracy of our own times is not a novelty in the world, nor is it peculiar to the Church. Every society and institute that is anxious for advance, and really progressing, is apt to utter the same complaint—at least, in its own department. Bishop Butler notices that this may arise sometimes "from vice taking different turns." It may be partly owing, also, to the fact that moralizers have generally reached the querulous and senile stage, a really declining phase of the visible of life. But it has a much deeper foundation in this, that every community, as well as every individual, is in fact below its own ideal. Yet its own feeling that it is so, is by no means an unhealthy sign. While sin is in the world, insensibility were the virtue of the hardened or the dead. Our self-condemnation in respect to goodness, or industry, or zeal, or knowledge, or any other excellence—our earnest complaint that we leave undone what we ought to do, and do what we ought not—is always proportioned, not to some external measure of delinquencies, but to our own ideal of what we ought or ought not—that is, to our sense of the Unseen Holiness, and our communion of His Spirit. The sense of sin is the first correlative of the sense of God, and measures the highest aspiration. That amid the shouts and triumphs of undoubted progress which surround us, therefore, the best should rejoice with trembling, and that many should feel the plague of

their own and of society's heart, and should complain aloud, is by no means to be deplored. Is it not these, brethren, who "see" and preach to us the inmost truth? Pray we for grace to heed them.

Yet a fallacy lies very near their truth, which we must endeavour to avoid. For men are apt to place this ideal in the past—where it never was—instead of in the future, where the Spirit pictures it to quicken and direct our effort. Then, our personal sense of sin becomes, not the "falling short" of an ideal ever rising in our midst, and raising us along with it, but an historic "fall," the gradual "extinction of the spark divine amid the waves of matter." And our view of mundane history will be a continued and collective Fall, instead of God's line-upon-line instruction producing its just results. He that is highest in the kingdom of heaven will be less than John the Baptist, and John the Baptist less than any prophet who preceded him. The first Adam was the Spiritual Man, the quickening Spirit and highest Image of the Invisible; the second Adam hardly recovers and restores a portion of what the first had lost. Christianity itself "was born full-grown"—we may suppose, in Eden—and chaos itself, "dark, formless, and void," as Moses thought it, was the Golden Age when earth itself was heaven. All such ideas, brethren, are fanciful and false. It is our own just reverence for antiquity that makes them plausible, just as our developed piety breathes explicit religion into the animal innocence of childhood, feels a holy sympathy with its fresh joyousness, ignores even while it punishes all its feeble errors, and almost longs to be a thoughtless, profitless, capricious, disobedient child again. Thus, doubtless, our Father in heaven has patience with us all—the highest and lowest, the best and worst of us—but He also requires that we should use, as best we can, the understanding that He gives. And *that*, we can clearly see, was the childhood—*this* is the age and experience of the world. Did we know any actual past as truly as we know the present, its defects would be more palpable, and it should need its best excuses to receive, not praise, but pardon at our hands. Yet many of our most estimable feelings tend to obscure its ill, and invest it with a sacred halo, due to the atmosphere that surrounds ourselves.

“The child is father to the man :” so is the child’s inheritance. Mankind accumulates and elaborates its good, material, mental, moral, and hands it down influential on posterity. Humbler creatures are born at once, and thrown quickly on their own resources. *Our* nurture and, as one may say, gestation, lasts till middle age. So long are we borne in the womb or bosom of preceding generations ; while filial piety, not unmixed with higher reverence, combines with their endowment, and sanctifies what we receive. In after life, as we add our own peculiar atom to this great Sum or Capital, the contrast seems immense ; and we are almost proud to carve and consecrate some grand Ancestral Image, and boast our own degeneracy. It is the same in individual life : the boy of eight, or of eighteen, finds his father, or his grandfather, much wiser and more pious than himself. It is an easy and a graceful hypothesis that they were always so, but it is not a true one. At his age they were, probably, as thoughtless as himself, and not so carefully endowed. He receives their opinions as he does their fields, their religious tenets as he does their blessing, and is slow to disparage or to alienate either. Yet presently he adds his own exertions too ; subsoils, improves, enlarges, and toils to enhance the ancient heritage for those he loves more dearly than the past. And this is true, not of individuals merely, but of Nations, Churches, Dispensations, forms of Civilization and of Thought. These, too, run in generations or periods, which overlap, and ALL *inherit* from each other ; the moral and religious endowment long outlasting in tangible effect the other benefits received. As long as the younger feels its own inferiority to the aggregate wisdom handed down, it is just that it should bow thereto, and natural and almost dutiful, that it should mistake the ruder phases of its own progression for degeneracy or worse.

And a special cause strengthens this tendency in Christendom. For what the Church inherits *is* perfect in its kind, and is recorded so distinctly, that there is no escaping the comparison. The Jewish Church matured its training into a climax and exemplar which it is not easy to approach, and which, in fact, will not be equalled until it is time for Christ to come again. And

though the Christian Church may feel its own superiority to the Jewish as a whole, or even to the Jewish at the time of Christ, yet it is individual greatness that individuals will lay to heart; and that pattern-life, approximated by prophets and apostles, and brought home with graphic simplicity to all, is a standing ideal in the past which reduces our own righteousness to filthy rags, and shames our best endeavours. Yet Christ's example is like Himself. It came not to condemn, but to attract and help us. In casting down imaginations and every high thing that exalts itself, it means not to crush hope and effort beneath their ruins. We are intended to grow, to grow into His likeness; and though the progress be slow, and the materials rude, yet is the end approaching and assured. The world itself is destined to produce or reproduce, beneath the culture of the Church, the multiplied resemblance of that Divine Original. This is indeed the nature of her "occupation" and her husbandry, and this is the harvest field contemplated in my text.

But this will not come at once; not until the harvest time, and only in harvest fashion. Not in a continuous and uniform succession, but in the way of insensible growth, gradation, and maturity; and not without long intervening operations and proportionate results—crude, unconscious, inchoate, long profitless and unpromising, except to the experienced eye, and slowly transforming itself to attain the end required. "*For so is the kingdom of God,*" says our Lord—combining in one view the Church itself and the field in which He planted it—"so is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed into the ground; and should sleep, and rise night and day, and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how. For the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear. But when the fruit is brought forth, immediately he putteth in the sickle, because the harvest is come."

The leading thought of this parable may be found in every parable. Indeed, it is impossible to compare the Church to any operation of nature, or any attempt of man, without more or less expressing it—that the Church is not an iron level, or lifeless chrystal uniformity, but an organic life, with purpose, period,

and production, presenting stages more or less unlike each other, and connected by a deeper unity than any external similarity of form. Even mechanical processes are so, much more all higher things. The dragging of a net, the buying of a pearl, the looking for a sheep, the planting of a vineyard, the conducting of a war, the preparation for a feast or marriage, the erection of a building—the force of each picture lies in its transitions. The mass of materials; the deep foundation; the bustle, dust, and matted scaffolding; the pure and gorgeous Temple, on its consecration day, when it is wedded to the Highest Name, and the highest sentiments rejoice—what likeness is there in these successive stages, except to the eye which sees, and in the heart which feels, the end from the beginning? The evening, the night, the rising day; autumn, winter, and returning spring; the seed, the blade, the full corn in the ear; the human embryo, infant, child, and man; the cradle, the grave, the resurrection morn—where is Nature's vaunted uniformity, albeit below the self-multiplying variations of the surface her Deep Unity ever signifies itself in ever-repeated phase and in profound analogy?

What is more noticeable here is, that our Lord expressly connects the phases of His Church with the great unconscious agencies which surround it, and claims alike the unintelligent and half intelligent forces as working out his ends. And if, in this point of view, we fill up the outline somewhat, by recalling a feature elsewhere insisted on, that what we sow is not productive "except it die," and remember the sluggish winter or tempestuous spring which synchronizes with the early stages of cereal growth, we shall have as vivid a picture of the actual lifetime of the Church as ever prophet or historian drew. No one can look back upon her periods without finding them illuminated by the parable, nor any one write her history without unconsciously expounding it.

Let us dwell upon its features somewhat, especially in its early stage. What happens, then, to the seed is this:—It is covered in the earth; it dissolves and dies; the vital bond is relaxed, and the elements it held degenerate or corrupt, and become assimilated, or nearly so, to the earthy particles around.

In this very assimilation lies the reproducing power. The life, humbled but not lost, now leavens those earthy particles, and gradually includes them in a vague and loose initial organism. Presently it collects and lifts itself again upon this broader base, and while still extending itself below, carries up to light, and there elaborates the elements its own self-sacrifice has made its own. This natural and seasonable death is but life lowering itself by expansion to embrace a wider sphere. By reducing its own order, and abandoning its form, it approximates its sympathies, capacities, affinities, to the humble sections it ambitions to exalt, and dies to draw them to itself. Out of such a death life multiplies itself again; the little one becomes a thousand; and the master comes rejoicing to reap his thirty, or sixty, or his hundred-fold.

But not immediately; other stages intervene. When the process of that miniature chaos is complete, and some distinct result appears above the clod, how *unlike* it is either to what was sown or to what will ever be gathered in the barn! Were it not for its more sturdy growth and deeper green, it might be readily mistaken for the natural sward that had been ploughed down for its reception. Yet, even in this state, the husbandman knows and loves it well; and already, with stupid wonderment, perhaps, yet not ungrateful heart, has counted up his gains, and blessed the bounteous earth, and seasonable sky, and calm providing Heaven that gives his daily bread.

So is it, brethren, I believe, with every organism, and so with every social and spiritual kingdom upon earth—eminently so with that kingdom of heaven which heads its course and expounds its constitution. Every Good, and every Better that would propagate itself, must seek the actual, and must come down to seek it; whatever shrinks from this soon ceases to be good. It may awhile preserve itself in solitary, selfish dignity; but Nature is deeply violated, and will exact revenge. First she will pass it by, and then insensibly absorb its life and elements for those she better loves. The unprofitable servant is “cast out for ever,” and his hoarded talent has gone on to swell the multiplying store. Whatever, on the other hand, has the spirit of Creation and

of Christ, will save its life by losing it. What it has freely received it will freely give, at the command of natural and of higher ties. And, behold, what it has freely given comes still more freely back again, bringing to the natural its enlarged and multiplied,—to the reflex and spiritual creature its regenerated Self.

So was the Church sown or planted; so apparently overwhelmed and lost; and so it slowly rose again, and now occupies its large section of the world, and its still larger section of the world of thought. For, in proceeding to apply the parable, we must speak of the Church in two large leading senses. First, of the *personal* Church; the aggregate of individuals who compose His Body. This is the fundamental meaning; the sense primarily intended in the parable, and indeed throughout the Scripture. Next, there is a *doctrinal* edifice of which *we* often speak, perhaps indeed too often, or at least too exclusively; analogous to the former, both in its structure and its history, and, *by virtue of this analogy*, coming fairly and directly within the meaning and promise of the parable—an edifice distinct enough, though abstract and ideal; developed later than the former, and bearing to it much the same relation that our own mental bears to our bodily development, or, perhaps, that the Bible bore to the visible Jewish Church—Christianity as embracing and expressing cultivated thought.

And the “seed” of the former was the Lord Jesus Christ—His *personal influence* and example, at least, if it bear not a more literal and physical relation to Himself, which our present ignorance of physics and physiology renders mysterious or unintelligible. In the fulness of preparation and expectancy He appeared upon the earth; the climax of a long precedent organization, and gathering into Himself its calling and its power. He gave Himself for it and us, and is removed from sight—from sight; but not without establishing bonds between Himself and us, and making His unseen influence more effective than His visible had been—not without diffusing a Spirit that brings to mind His acts and words, baptizes men into the power of His self-sacrifice, and makes Himself “be born” in an ever-widening

circle of individual hearts, ever increasingly drawn up to Him again. This is the professed and the real organization of His Church. And He Himself is *with* us Unseen; administering "all power;" "dispensing" His Spirit, and "by a mighty working subduing all things unto Himself." When—by "personal influence," say, thus emanating from and organized around this typical Son of Man, the likeness of what He was shall have been reproduced and multiplied—when men, or at least Christian men, shall have approximated, or reached, if it might be so, the standard of humanity He bore—then they, and the world at large, will need a higher Ideal; and then it will be time for Him to be "revealed" again, to gather in the Church's product and launch some new Progression.

This is the theory of the Personal Church: now, what has been its history? The parable pictures it minutely. Himself—He was laid in the grave as we are—like us in all respects save one, that in His death, as in his life, His "humiliation" "knows no corruption." Even in being "sown a natural body, and raised a spiritual body," this mysterious Person draws one singular line around Himself, always transcending, yet always encouraging our analysis—a line the Scriptures sustain with a startling, and perhaps, as here, an unexpected solidity. But the exception does not *spoil* the parable, nor vitiate our argument; for the corruption is plainly not essential to the process, however it may impede, or does impair it. If we omit the "without sin," He was in all respects like us; and, in fact, it is from His own application of it to Himself, and the generalization He adds, that I have been painting the analogy. Though Christ were personally an exception, and "beyond nature" from birth to burial, there is no exception in the historic Church. It was but for a moment, indeed, and in a virgin sepulchre, "wherein never man before was laid"—yet there they truly "laid Him," like us all; His bodily presence passed away from earth; and they who in successive generations bear His name, partake His Spirit, and emulate His likeness, are successively more numerous, but of an humbler and more worldly type, until that *likeness* is almost lost, and a large, inferior, doubtful Christendom is all that stands for Christ.

It is no disparagement of Paul or John to say that they fell short of Him, nor of their immediate converts and successors to rank them lower still, and so on in a widening yet descending series. Each of those giant missionaries, doubtless, did his best—taught his best truth to all he could, and, as he finished his course, threw his mantle round his best disciples. But as, by its very success, their gospel embraced a larger field, and preached itself down below the prepared communities that Paul and Peter found, their actual best was such a best as we might readily expect, and as the well-known fact displays. Wisdom is only justified in wisdom's children; and the standard of it which the times of Constantine could appreciate, or teach, had lowered itself to just above the level of the Greco-Roman world. And then come dark and troublous times. The nations are convulsed. A civilization that had passed its prime goes down before the rude barbarians; and a tempestuous winter enwraps at once the degenerated Church and Empire and the life-struggles of coming Christendom. Affliction, whatever its effect in purifying the doctrine, or in sobering the discussions and dissensions of the Church, at least draws out its virtues,—evolves personal holiness, zeal, patience, brotherly love, humility, self-denial, and binds them closer to each other, and to Christ. *This* spirit tells; and as the time runs on, and troubles pass, and the new sun returns,—the Church raises itself again, distinct and vigorous among the products of the spring, the largest moral and organic force the nations can discern. Before it their ancient gods are fain to disappear, and Europe's fresh faith and manliness already is her own.

And yet how different a Church from that which Paul and Peter planted, and which they toiled so jealously to warn, and teach, and purify! Had they revisited the earth in five hundred or a thousand years, they had been perplexed to recognise themselves or their opinions in that gigantic growth of Judaism and paganism mixed, and mixed with elaborate theology, which loudly alleged their name, and believed itself their offspring. And yet in truth it was. The Church on the whole was right; was wise and true in its generation, and was doing its best for

its disciples and for God. The theology it had inherited from the Grecian mind, and still received on trust. The paganism it was unable to banish, though it had seized it in death-struggle, and struck it to the earth. The Judaism it had felt it necessary to reimpose, following half-unconsciously the example of the Elder Son, or the authority of Scripture. Yet into each it breathed a spirit that was distinctively its own, and was insensibly organizing and transforming all. Obeying, half intelligently, its instincts and its necessities, toiling and warring as it could, without a very distinct recollection of the past, or much perception of the future, but with a Titan's grasp of the present, it had claimed the nascent period as its own, and already begun to shape it for its Lord—had taken, if only by the superstitious force of ceremonial, awe, and morally sustained authority—had taken the infant Europe in its arms, and signed it with its cross, in token of a Regeneration itself had begun to work, and whose after life has not betrayed its sign. For look onward, another period, brethren, and behold! it has produced the Christendom we see.

It is not ours to eulogise that Christendom, nor ours to disparage it. One of its healthiest characters is, that it does disdain its own achievement, and, amid its bustle and congratulation, groans and travails together to find a higher Christ, and to impress Him on the world. Yearns and strives, in its cultivated thought, not merely for farther knowledge in every multiplied department, but also more abstractedly, for some deeper, and more balanced, and more consistent Truth. Yearns and strives, in practical regards, for a nearer likeness of the Christ, for more of purity and brotherly love and self-renunciation. Yearns to manifest in all its sections His expansive spirit too; and, moving out before it vast colonizing and commercial waves of moral and material good, would fain throw itself abroad in conscious spiritual effort, to plant His cross on every eminence, His hope in every heart. There is, indeed, much to humble and dishearten us at home and everywhere; and there is, besides, an affectation and a "cant" that vaunts its own humility. Brethren, he that knows the best, and can most justly judge the things within him and without, is always he who will most simply say

what on our knees we say, when we confess our sin. How unphilosophical is our philosophy, how much it *needs* to be disturbed and anxious, to cast about for better than it knows, and perhaps to learn from those who but receive the crumbs that fall from the children's table! How shallow is much of our piety and zeal, how self-seeking our self-sacrifice! How mean and round-about is that apparatus of "societies" on which we are fain to shift our sense of duty; which we delegate to do for us our good without morality, and perform our very "charities" by proxy, far from the milk of natural affection, or the twice-blessed interchange of personal regards! How separating, selfish, and contemptible is much of our sectional activity—how uncatholic, unchristian, irreligious! Add our palpable failures, even when our intentions are the best. Our own deficiency in abstract thought will bar our access to the cultivated pagan, and leave his citadel untouched. Our doctrinaireship and disrespect for humbler agencies will disqualify us for intercourse with the inferior savage; will cause us to neglect or break the natural bridge¹ between the barbaric and the civilized, and to exterminate where we intended to improve. How terrible is it to see our very Gospel becoming a dispensation of death, and humble nations obliged either to reject our spiritualism, or else, accepting it, to pine away beneath a fire too potent for their organism, and, in obedience to Nature's *Order*, stamping our best as premature for them. These, and such as these, are great discouragements. Yet are they all—seeing that they lead, as I believe they do, to humble effort and reflection—manifestly out-comprehended by that prevailing Hope which characters our time. Christendom is already far advanced, and is again astir. Much of what the Greek, and Roman, and the Jew could teach, she has already learned, and leavened with her life; and now she would do more—at home, would spring up

¹ That is, "association on some terms of recognised inequality," as of serfdom or slavery—see note F. I call this the "Natural Bridge;" and as a student of history I venture this thesis—*No nation known to us has ever passed from Barbarism to Civilization without passing over it.* As a believer in Nature's principles, and in the Bible, Old Testament and New, I venture to prophesy—*No nation ever will.* Notwithstanding all our missionary hopes and dreams, the modern world shows neither *instance* nor *promise* of it. To exterminate is not to Christianize.

into His nearer likeness ; abroad, would fain repeat herself upon the grandest scale, and embrace in her beneficent Gospel the whole community of nations, and nations yet unborn. Concede we to our opponents all that *they* at least can claim, and then we ask, upon the whole, has not the Church's field been a triumphant husbandry? Have not Christ's unconscious agencies, His genial Earth and timely Providence, understood it well, and nurtured it with care? Have not her life and instinct vindicated her descent, as well as the wisdom of Him who planted and promised to desert her not? Her tentative and feeble stages men or angels might mistake; her self-exaltations even the world can pity or resent. But even the world is proud of her success, and, not ungrateful for it, and not unsympathizing with it, can read the rainbow in her cloud and ponder on her Promise.

Are these vague and worthless generalities? I ask, then, for the humblest historic appreciation of past and present Christendom. And let it be distinct and *local*, and free from the hasty oversights which sometimes disfigure the comparison. For it lies not between the classic few in Attica or Alexandria, for instance, and the multitude in France; nor between the Grecian mind of Paul and Clement and Chrysostom, and the present mind of New Zealand converts, or of Irish or Russian priests—not between the maturity of one development and the childhood of a second; not between the leaves and clusters of one true vine and the root-fibres of another. Every organism requires its own time, a large organization a long time, to expand and unify itself, and to mature its periods; and we can only justly compare like parts and phases of each organic whole. Thus Christendom as a whole is to be compared with Judaism as a whole, or with the Roman, Greek, or Egyptian developments so far as they can be fairly discriminated, and their beginning, middle, and end defined. But these are large and imposing questions, in which one might lose one's way. Fortunately a smaller and more local judgment is what our present argument requires. We have only to recall the actual progress, or regress if you will, of each separate nation since it became acquainted with the cross; to recollect distinctly its past condition, and

hang the picture beside its present state. The accruing contrast will nearly measure the blame or credit of the Church.

What is Ireland, for example, now? Backward, no doubt; half civilized and half content; involving much that is deplorable, notwithstanding our popular congratulations and many estimates of advance which are shallow or mistaken. Yet what was Ireland sixteen hundred years ago? what six hundred? what one hundred and sixty? what within even the sixty of this present century? Who¹ is ignorant how large has been her pro-

¹Who, I mean, except Sir Archibald Alison? His clever anti-Hibernicism can lead him out of his way, in a formal description of India, to contradict the common impression:—"The steady, powerful rule of a central government has done as much for the inhabitants of Hindustan as the vices consequent on a corrupted manufacturing population have undone for the people of Great Britain. From the returns of commitments and crime in many different provinces of India for the last thirty years, it distinctly appears that crime has during that period diminished one-half, in many places sunk to a sixth, in the East; while it has in the same time more than quadrupled in the British Islands, and in Ireland has multiplied nine-fold."—*Alison's History*, vol. vii. p. 64.

An Irish reader feels rather nettled at this eloquent climax, and wonders whether it can be true. He calls to mind the state of Ireland at the commencement of this century, just settling from a most violent convulsion, which had rent every segment of society, and almost imbrued each man's hand in his neighbour's blood, and he soon becomes convinced that the statement is an egregious blunder. Thus pondering, his eye falls on a foot-note—"see note C;" he turns to the end of the volume, and there finds it "proved," i. e., by statistics, after Mr. Buckle's own heart, "collected by public authority," and "independent of any theory." From the police returns of those "committed for crime" it appears—so Sir A. Alison understands it—that the number of "crimes committed" in England in 1805 was 4,605, and in 1837, 23,612; and the number in Ireland in 1805, 2,644, against 24,458 in 1837; which are about the proportions given in the text. But pray, Scottish readers, what account do the same tables, as quoted in the same note, give of the progress of crime in Scotland during the same period? Why, the number was in 1805, 89; in 1837, 2,922; showing the respectable increase of only thirty-three fold! I respectfully suggest, therefore, that in the next edition the climax may run as follows:—"In England four-fold, in Ireland nine-fold, and in Scotland three-and-thirty-fold!" each statement being ridiculously false, and the "fairness" of the historian as conspicuous as his sagacity. A grain of common sense might prevent any one from confounding "crimes committed" with "commitments for crime;"—the latter being a tolerable measure of the efficiency of the police, the former of the lawlessness of the community. And if Sir Archibald Alison, or some pupil of Mr. Buckle, find it difficult to discriminate these ideas, he will help himself by remembering that there are as many persons committed for offences in the city of Glasgow in one week as there are in the whole continent of Africa for a year. What an innocent

gress within each of the periods I have named, and how largely that progress has been due to the action of the Church, or even, I will venture to add, to the *Ecclesiastics* of the Church, notwithstanding all our unseemly strifes and sectional animosities—which are here, alas! how bitter and how injurious! Still happier results than ours will be apparent everywhere, or almost everywhere, that the Church has touched. But whether this be so or not, *this* is the real question to be tried, fairly and *locally*, in every section of Christendom, in their aggregate or average—in England, Scotland, Scandinavia, Russia, Germany; in Spain, Gaul, Italy, in Greece itself. We dispute not of the doctrines that Cyril, Patrick, Columb, or Augustine taught; nor what their disciples believed or taught, or *their* disciples still. The question is less abstract; what were these nations before such came; what are they now; what share has the Church had, direct or indirect, in working the transformation? I do not deny that the Church of those times was low; that she lowered herself to reach the multitudes; or that she descended still lower in the persons of her converts. But I insist that she *did* reach them. And then I ask, has she not raised herself again, and brought the people with her? The difference, materially, socially, religiously, between what is and was, so far as the Church has mixed her influence in their affairs, is the measure of her vitality and the proof of her Apostleship.

unmanufacturing paradise Lagos or Timbuctoo must be—what a purgatory, or worse, North Britain—at least in the eyes of this patriotic and wise historian.

I have said that some popular estimates of Irish progress are shallow and mistaken. One mourns indignantly the folly which tries to persuade itself that thinning the population of a half-reclaimed country like this can be other than a disastrous fiscal blunder, as well as a most impolitic, immoral, and irreligious act. The prosperity which is now vaunted is mainly that which was realized in the years before the famine, the enjoyment of which still continues, though eaten into by subsequent calamities. The famine has cost us, directly or indirectly, perhaps a million souls. For these, I suppose, no one is fairly blameable. But our population ought to be nine or ten millions; it is under six or seven. Where are the rest of those who, though extremely poor, ought to be reclaiming the wastes, and doing, in their rough way, the rough but most essential work of the community? The mistake I allude to, especially on the part of those who have *power* over “land,” has cost us—I fear to say how many. I pray that those whom it most concerns may lay it well to heart.

It is much the fashion, brethren, on such a topic, to say things thoughtless and untrue, and often to blame the mediæval Church for what she had done and was doing her utmost to destroy. A juster estimate is now becoming general. The historian often judges her aims and conduct more favourably than she did herself, and can recognise the presence, not merely of her God, but of her principles, in many a great and many a small procedure where her own explicit consciousness may have mistaken both. He, however, who will look back, and then has need to hesitate upon the large result, knows too little or too much to be here addressed in argument.

Thus, the Church's existence hitherto has not been a bare uniform homogeneous continuity, but a Life, an organic Life, with the unity and identity, but also with the diversity, the varied stages, some conscious, some unconscious, and the large transitions and transformations natural thereto. Its identification from time to time, rests neither upon some thin and elevated line of *writers*, who are to be supposed, despite the evidence, to have believed and taught the same as we, or at least the same as the apostles—nor, on the other hand, on some formal line of public *officers*, whose several baptism, ordination, personal faith, or even the continued existence of whose supposed offices, it would be hard to prove—but in some broader and more obvious Notes—in the “more than continuity” of her growth and life; in the felt vigour of her living powers, which enabled her first to expand and then consolidate herself; to put forth her just phases and clothe herself in fitting embodiment as her times and work required. And its fuller statement is, that she has repeated, or is repeating the period of the Elder Church from which she had her genesis; is reproducing the Jewish growth, instruction, and success, in a larger and more complicated sphere, with difficulties and with advantages more peculiarly her own—a higher ideal of God and of herself, a wider and truer sympathy with man; the recorded experience of the Elder Son, embodied in a clear, authoritative Chart, and with a higher Paraclete to teach its meaning; rendered available besides by written and now by printed literature, and a generally

diffused intelligence. On the other hand, a larger and loftier work to do, and more heterogeneous, if not so refractory materials; her tribes swelled out to mighty nations, or discordant Churches; with no immediate power of centralizing her action and enforcing obedience or respect. Round such initial differences the peculiarities of the *Catholic*, as distinguished from the *National*, Church arise. Omitting them, the course of each might be described in terms almost identical; how each, in its early youth, went down into Egypt, and served "the world" in return for patronage; how each asserted itself in time, as it grew strong, vindicated its independence, and claimed authority to speak—to speak as the voice of God; how the consciousness of this high calling gradually realized itself in each, inspired their prophets with power and insight, clothed their priests with righteousness, and raised and blessed the people,—filling meantime each worldly priest with pride and arrogance, and each false prophet with the barren, dry east-wind; how each has sinned, and warred, and sinned again—as those deep Psalms and Litanies can tell—and yet progressed upon the whole; how each has persistently raised its priest, and made him serve and sanctify the growing throne; how each has mistaken and persecuted its true prophet, and yet has paused ever, as it discerned his truth, to weep repentant tears upon his grave, and canonize his memory; and how, in fine, as each becomes conscious of success, it approaches the fatal enchantment of spiritual pride, and needs some deeper watchfulness than it is easy to maintain, if it would keep on its pilgrimage, and escape the One Unpardonable Sin—if it would avoid "resting on its truth," mistaking its fair Zion for an abiding city, and so, of necessity, thrusting out its Christ, resisting its Pentecost, renouncing its "calling," and casting itself away.

We have been tracing, for the last two Sundays, the course of Judaism external and internal—the effects it produced upon the world, the effect of training upon itself. And the last we viewed as the historic type of education; exceptional, indeed, in the perfectness of its method, means, and end, but by no means exceptional in the principles involved—else were it worse than

useless to record it "for our ensamples." I believe that they are *the* principles of all education—those which always *are* employed in fact—and that it is impossible to bring up any nation or any individual without virtually adopting them. Our vague capacities must be gathered upon a point or points, and obliged to exert themselves in defined and narrow channels, if they would themselves become educated faculties, or if they would produce any result available for others. The narrow stage, with its concomitants, it is not now indeed the fashion to approve, at least in its application to communities. Hypotheses which "promise liberty" are more attractive to sciolists, and commend themselves sometimes to the hasty judgment of benevolence. And, no doubt, the immaturity of things is hard and acid; unwholesome, too, if we, mistaking it for some full-grown stage, will fain perpetuate its qualities and universalize its use. The Schoolmaster and the Law are things which, at their best estate, we aspire to leave behind. But we cannot have the end without the means. Nature's order will not be inverted; and her progressive scheme, in assigning its place to everything, assigns each also its essential functions and its befitting honour. The Jewish legal period, though it were a "ministration of condemnation," and a "ministration of death," had also its own high inspiration and its appropriate "glory." Many parts of it give grave offence; and strange are the apologies that are sometimes offered for the intolerance of Moses, the sword of Joshua, or even the separation of the Levites—resolving them into exceptional commands, and labouring to make out that they are not contrary to "immutable morality." They are no more contrary to it than the course of nature is; nor are their principles more exceptional than it. Everywhere they operate; in every community and in every individual; naturally dominating in certain stages; and always in like circumstances throwing up a similar result. In the Christian Church they reappear upon the largest scale; with a greater pervadingness and intensity, and also in a much milder form, due to the advanced Spirit of the Church and period. Those who misapprehend their

Jewish parallels despise also these features of the Church; and as the favourite "explanation" does not here apply, they find it easy to denounce them, unsparingly enough, and not without sufficient self-complacency to shelter an intolerance of their own, more intense, perhaps, and not so needful. Brethren, a Catholic spirit is something larger than any fashionable doctrinaireship or easy liberality of sentiment. It is much harder to "comprehend" *all* that is fairly belonging to the Church than to approve its most enlightened sections, or even to love its best—much more than merely to understand and praise those things which "do the same" for us. The argument of these Sermons obviously debars me from any such confined defence of Judaism, or from any such sweeping condemnation of its reproduction in mediæval Christianity. The Jewish training, I have contended, was "typical," not exceptional; a marked and pointed illustration of the principles of Providence, not a continued suspension or violation of them—an illustration fitly arising in the central line of humanity's progression, and available for the positive guidance of mankind. This defence, being general, defends also whatever fairly coincides with Judaism—that is, all acts or institutions which fairly embody, or even *strive* to embody the principles of the Old Testament dispensation. In embodying them, my argument proceeds, they truly embody the principles of the New Testament as well, and in believing Moses are truly "receiving" Christ. And this, I conceive, is the formal vindication of the Church—so far as the Church was right—in each period of her history. That she may not have thought of any such vindication at the time, or of the necessity of any vindication—nay, that she might repudiate any such apology either then or now, and prefer some less common and more exalted ground—is but another illustration of its naturalness, and so of the solidity of our position. On such principles the defence of each Church may be stated in terms precisely similar.

The Jewish and the Christian legal periods, with their accompaniments natural or necessary, are vindicated—

I. *By their synchronism.* Were they each the best institution for its own time and circumstance, considering both the nation or Church itself, and also the nations round ?

On this broad ground Moses challenges the contemporaneous world. "What nation is there that hath statutes and judgments so righteous as all this law which I command you this day? Keep, therefore, and do them: for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people."

And on the same broad ground have Protestant historians, especially those of our own time, vindicated the propriety and wisdom, nay, the greatness and goodness of the mediæval Church, even in respect to many of the acts and institutions least popular with us. Not the Church, brethren, caused the dark-

¹ I have selected a few sentences from Sir James Stephen, for example, as the motto of this Sermon—*vide* the fly-leaf. Not that I agree with every word of them, but as a deliberate estimate, by a popular writer, an intense, intelligent, and generous Protestant, of the papal domination in what is perhaps its most repulsive phase. Sir James's brilliant antitheses are, indeed, but indifferent history. They do more than justice to the papacy; they do vast injustice to the feudal system, which was quite as useful as it is in shaping and ruling that wild chaos of the nations; and they are mistaken in contrasting the two systems so broadly, for they were closely connected, and most congenial to each other. Comte shows a much truer insight in making the "military" a part of the "theological evolution." The feudal dominion was the just antecedent and auxiliary of the papal. The Normans were the sturdiest henchmen of ecclesiastical rule, and were, in fact, the Joshua and David of the Church. It is only when the ruder of the two dominations will insist on perpetuating itself, and resists the finer and higher, that collision ensues; as between Samuel and Saul, or between Moses and Pharaoh. Hildebrand and his successors, as conceived by Sir James, were in fact the Samuel of the Church, and established in *practice* the formal superiority of the spiritual power over the military chieftain. In so doing they *as yet* represented "the whole" against the tyranny of "part."

But this is hypercriticism, perhaps, of a bold true-hearted eloquence which one is proud to quote. I will add one or two passages in respect to some other of the more obnoxious features of the mediæval Church. For example—

Of the Mendicant Orders:—

"So reiterated, indeed, and so just have been the assaults on the Mendicant Friars, that we usually forget that, till the days of Martin Luther, the Church had never seen so great and effectual a reform as theirs. During nearly two centuries, Francis and his spiritual descendants, chiefly, if not exclusively, directed the two great engines of the Christian warfare—the Mission and the Pulpit. Nothing in the histories of Wesley or

ness of the middle age ; nor did Moses "cause" the bondage of Egypt, even while he was heading Pharaoh's armies, or might behold its bitterness from Pharaoh's palace. She was the light

of Whitfield, can be compared with the enthusiasm which everywhere welcomed them, or with the immediate and visible results of their labours. In an age of oligarchical tyranny they were the protectors of the weak ; in an age of ignorance the instructors of mankind ; and in an age of profligacy the stern vindicators of the holiness of the sacerdotal character, and the virtues of domestic life. While other religious societies withdrew from the world, they entered, studied, and traversed it. They were followed by the wretched, the illiterate, and the obscure, through whom, from the first, the Church has been chiefly replenished ; but not by them only. In every part of Europe, the rich, the powerful, and the learned, were found among their proselytes. In our own land Duns Scotus, Alexander Hales, Robert Grosstête, and Roger Bacon, lent to this new Christian confederacy the lustre and the authority of their names. And even when, by the natural descent of corruption, it had fallen into well-deserved contumely, still the Mission and the Pulpit, and the tradition of the great men by whom it was originally organized and nurtured, were sufficient to arrest the progress of decay, and to redeem from the Franciscan Order a permanent and a conspicuous station among the 'Princedom, Dominations, Powers,' which hold their appointed rank, and perform their appropriate offices, in the great spiritual dynasty of Rome."—ESSAYS, p. 98.

Of the spirit of the Jesuit institutions :—

"The object of the Spiritual Exercises was at once to excite and to control religious sensibilities. While aiming to exalt the soul above terrestrial objects, he was intent on disenchanting his followers of the self-deceits which usually wait on that exaltation. Though most remote from the tone of feeling which animates the gay and busy scenes of life, the book everywhere attests the keen scrutiny with which he had observed those scenes, and the profound discernment with which he had studied the actors in them. To his Protestant readers the *Evangelical* spirit of the writer must have been the occasion of great, and perhaps unwelcome surprise. It would, indeed, be easy to extract from his pages many propositions which the Synod of Westminster would have anathematized ; but that grave assembly might have drawn from them much to confirm the chief article of their own confessions and catechisms. If he yielded an idolatrous homage to some of the demigods of Rome, his supreme adoration was strictly reserved for Him to whom alone adoration is due. If he ascribed to ritual expiations a false and imaginary value, all his mighty powers were bowed down in a submissive affiance in the Divine nature, as revealed to us under the veil of human infirmity, and of more than human suffering. Philip Doddridge, one of those who have breathed most freely on earth the atmosphere of heaven, produced, at the distance of two centuries, a work which the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola might have suggested, and of many parts of which it might have afforded the model ; so many are still the points of contact between those who, ranging themselves round the great common centre of the faith of Christians, occupy the most opposite positions in that expanded circle."—*IB.* p. 109.

Of the Jesuit at home :—

"When finally invested with sovereignty, Ignatius wielded the sceptre as best be-

and life that struggled with it persistently until she organized the chaos, prepared the birth, and wrought the great deliverance. Her power and its abuses are complained of; but let it

comes an absolute monarch, magnanimously and with unflinching decision; revered, but exciting no servile fear; beloved, but permitting no rude familiarity; declining no enterprise which high daring might accomplish, attempting none which headlong ambition might suggest; self-multiplied in the ministers of his will; yielding to them a large and generous confidence; trusting no man whom he had not deeply studied; assigning to none a province beyond the range of his capacity."—*Id.* p. 115.

"In the science of social dynamics it is written, that he is the king of men, *jure divino*, who, with the sublimest purposes and the most inflexible will, exacts the most absolute submission and the most painful sacrifices. To him are drawn the feeble-minded by the instinct of obedience, the audacious by the force of sympathy, the torpid by the craving for stimulants, the sceptical by the thirst for certainties, and the unoccupied by the desire to employ their ineffectual energies. By this title reigned Lycurgus and Mahomet over nations, Zeno in the schools, Benedict in the cloister, Columbus in exploration, Cortes in the camp, and Ignatius Loyola over the host which, at his summons, gathered round him to extend the dominion of the Church of Rome over the heretical and the heathen nations of the earth."—*Id.* p. 117.

And once more—*of the Jesuit abroad*:—

"It is, indeed, true (though the truth be uttered in the contemptuous tone best calculated to provoke contradiction), that a Christianity, nominal, formal, and external, was, after all, the best fruit to be gathered, or to be rationally expected, from the rude efforts of Xavier for the conversion of the Paravas. But where is that country, and what is that time, in which Christianity has been more than this amongst the great multitude of those who have called and professed themselves Christians? The travellers in the narrow path, who are guided by her vital spirit, have ever been the 'chosen few.' The travellers along the broad way, wearing her exterior and visible badges, have ever been the 'many called.' And yet he who should induce heathen people to adopt the mere ceremonial of the Church, to celebrate her ritual, and to recognise, though but in words, the authority of her Divine Head, would confer on them a blessing exceeding all which mere human philanthropy has ever accomplished or designed. For such is the vivifying influence of the spirit of the gospel, that it can never long be otherwise than prolific of the highest temporal benefits to all, and of the highest spiritual benefits to some, in every land which acknowledges it as a rule of life and receives it as a system of worship. If Xavier had succeeded so far only as to diffuse through the East that kind and that degree of Christianity which at this day exists amongst the formalists of Europe, such a success would almost justify the papal apotheosis which has assigned to him a throne in heaven and a perennial homage on earth."—*Id.* p. 129.

It would be easy to quote more exact and balanced statements from more authoritative historians; and it would be easy to criticise some of the above passages as I did the one selected for a motto—but what I wish to impress is, the broad, undeniable truth contained in each of them, thus roughly, but most eloquently and nobly said by an intense and hearty Protestant. If we would induce mediævalists to repair what is effete or wrong, surely we ought, like Sir James, to begin by doing them *justice*.

not be forgotten that it was her *moral* superiority alone—*she had no other source*—that obtained for the Church all the power she ever had or ever could abuse. It is the same moral superiority, be it what it may, which has continued, and must still continue to her whatever influence she will retain. Men cannot afford, in permanence, to honour anything that does not do them good ; and God has made us too intensely ambitious to be content, in permanence, with any Good but Him.

II. They are to be vindicated on this still broader ground—*by their place in progress*. Were they not only the best means of reaching and ruling the present, but were they the just and natural means of producing the better? Were they intelligent and expedient husbandry—the fitting antecedents of Christ's harvest-field?

To this ground, by their common theory, they each appeal ; and the measure of success they have attained, or have brought fairly into prospect, is the world's best measure of Heaven's approbation. This is, indeed, "the natural theory of evidence," that which the moral world can feel as distinctly as Jerusalem felt the power of Pentecost, or the Canaanites the sword of Joshua. "By their fruits ye shall know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" "Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them." Religion comes to us first upon authority. It cannot wait for reasoning ; nor *could* reason judge without the antecedent practice, and at least some clear foretaste of the "tendency." But then it must continue to vindicate its character in its results. To this test both reason and sentiment will bow. Without it, they dare not be convinced. There is too much at stake. The agitation of Pentecost, with its gush of memories and first love, gave the Church a hold on Israel and on the Judaized sections of the ancient world. Presently her moral superiority "commanded" whatever was high and civilized throughout that ancient world ; and a few centuries beheld the prestige of Egypt, the fire of Africa, the versatile energy and wealth of Asia, the adult integrity and strength of Rome, and the polished intellect and tongue of Greece, all kneeling deliberately to receive

her sacrament, and pledged to do her service. By these were baptized in turn the infant nations of the North, now coming to dwell in the tents of Shem, and enlisting beneath the Labarum. These last, "so soon as they were able to learn," her priest or Bishop could catechise, instruct, Confirm; but it was her moral superiority again, and proved beneficence, that twined her round the fibres of their life, and have given her a hold on the Heart of Christendom that may be cavilled at, but will not be shaken off. The rude nations followed her at first, superstitious and overawed; but as the peaceable fruits of righteousness diffused themselves around her Gospel, they knew she led them right. Her balanced doctrine was beyond their reach. Her sacraments amazed by their strange simplicity. Her Scriptures they could not read. But as she obliterated, one by one, their foul abominations, purged their festivals, baptized their gods, breathed a higher sanctity into whatever was wise or innocent of all their holy things, and instilled as much of charity and human love as their wild hearts could bear—they felt that she had turned their faces upward, as her own face was turned, and she was to them an Angel from the sky. In basket and store, in field and dwelling, in market and court, and camp and school; in birth, and marriage, and life, and death, she blessed the nations with plain, substantial, discriminating Good, and this they knew to be the work of God. This preached down to them again, let us say it reverently, the natural theory of evidence from Christ's Mount of the Beatitudes, in a voice understood of the people, and planted conviction in head and heart. Refined and elaborate argumentation, for all its precision and pretension, might pass above men's heads; perchance might miss its way. But the mountain of the Lord's house established on the top of the mountains, and drawing the nations heavenward, or any city set upon an hill, from which the light of life streams forth—how could this be hid?

I do not deny, brethren—far from it, indeed—that every stage of the Jewish, and still more so, if you wish it, of the Christian Church, was marked in its details by fallibility and imperfection. The old Law, divinely instituted as it was,

“made nothing perfect;” and obviously with this deliberate intent, that it might be itself a prophet, and preach “another day.” Our institutions look still more distinctly forward, and, no doubt, whichever of them shall first plead its own perfection and finality shall so far have described itself as “against Christ.” Nor do I deny—far from it, indeed—that every stage has been marked by corruption also, and very often in an extreme degree. It is never the Church herself, or her true Psalmist, who will pretend the contrary. The Lord of the Church has seen it too, and, as of old, has visited accordingly. These corruptions have impeded and impaired her always; have lowered her in her own sight, and in the sight of the heathen; have cost her many a fruitful field and golden opportunity; nay, many a noble “member,” and many an ancient Church. Where are all the candlesticks of Asia, brethren, and of Africa? Where is what Asia and Africa might be? Least of all do I contend that the Church has been always true to herself and her own ideal—has known what spirit she is of—has imposed her law in the spirit of the Gospel, and comprehended with patience and loving-kindness, instead of tyrannizing in uniformity and letter. Alas! what tales can history record of *conscientious* Christendom, while it contrasts half sneeringly “the Christian religion” with “the religion of Christ,” and says with truth—“alas, Christianity, what crimes have been perpetrated in thy name!” And here again our Lord has visited us with appropriate judgment, abasing what would exalt itself, excluding what would exclude, slaying what would slay, and teaching us by many a discipline to forgive, as we hope to be forgiven.

But let us not mistake. Christ’s judgments visit each according to the light He gives to each. His royalty is a discriminating rule. They begin, therefore, with the house of God; the Temple must first be purified. But “if they begin with us,” argues the Apostle, who had himself denied his Master, “where ought they to end?” The Church, when tried by her own ideal, must lay her hand upon her mouth and cry unclean, and bow before the rod; but is she therefore unrighteous when tried by

the standard of those around her pale? Short-lived will be her power when this is rendered doubtful. Nay, the light that Christ causes to burn within her, "this is the condemnation" always; her vindication were for some *external* prophet to review her outline, and compare her with the other institutions, or want of institutions, with which she has waged war. Let this be done, and those who came to curse will bless her altogether. Listen to the church's own historian, and you shall hear but self-complaint—dispute, declension, heresy, and strife will be the burden of his page. But give us some historian from the outer world; give us an infidel, or, if you can, an atheist, and he will bow his head to her as the most beneficent of institutions. The law of the church, like the law of Israel, "made nothing perfect," we admit; but what perfection did lawlessness produce? And what else was round her border? If the institution which only *lived* by its virtue and religion fell short of righteousness, what merit, think you, did they attain who professed no fear of God or man, and who only lived accordingly? Nay, brethren, the facts of history are large, and Providence is not blind. To sit at their feet will be to revere the church as the light of those dark times, and to acknowledge the righteous judgment that has crushed her enemies and exalted her to honour. Bewail we then her shortcomings of every kind, in past and present, and watch and pray we against our own; but bless we God for her prosperity, besides. Admit we her fallibilities, mistakes, corruptions—it is *all too true*—yet is it absurd to speak as if her great vitality had been lost in any of them, or as if her inborn faith, vigour, and integrity had not outgrown them in every stage, and largely cast them off, and enabled her to bless the nations as the nations have been blessed. True, the world has seen her to desert her Lord, nay, heard her deny Him to His face! But her Lord has patience both with her and it. He has called her to repentance; and has put His name upon her, and made her the channel of His grace. Its fountains are not shallow or exhaust. Nay, brethren, death may not prevail against Christ's Ygdrasil—earth's central Tree of Life—which draws up and or-

ganizes earth's vitalities, and matures her fruit for God, her leaves for the healing of the nations.

Any particular branch, however, may be cut off. And the whole embodiment, as Judea testifies, might, by setting its heart on present life at the expense of higher, oblige its own excision, and the insertion of some fresher graft on that original stock and purpose which stands without repentance. It behoves us, therefore, not to be high-minded, but fear, and instead of self-complacently disparaging the past, and denouncing those sins and errors we suppose ourselves to have escaped, to grapple with our own temptation, and discern and love that gentle Better which ever strives to be born "within" ourselves. And this is little likely to be some popular expression. It finds fault with the present, by its definition; and the present retaliates on it. Many are the suspicions insinuated, and many the received truths with which "the builders" overwhelm it. It comes from Galilee perhaps, or has been down in Egypt, when all Jerusalem knows it should be born in Bethlehem and sit on the throne of David. In fact, in the religious world, as in every form of present good, not he who toils for and receives its highest honours is he who does its most important work. This lies *before* us always in the dim shapings of futurity. He who toils for it has long to wait for approbation. Yet thence come all aim, purpose, aspiration: nay, our very "being" and "continuance." In vain, then, does each world strive to rest upon its past. We are saved by Hope, and he who refuses to cast himself upon the future, and save his life by finding better, must lose every life, and find his best-known truth become a falsehood in his hand. The past is gone, and has brought his all along with it. But it is not easy to discern this fact, brethren, and it is very hard to live by it. Seldom, therefore, the church's popularities, almost never its balanced respectabilities, have been able to understand the prophet or to receive the Christ. *It costs them all too much.* Yet this is the essential sacrifice that He requires of each. "As my Father hath sent me into the world, even so send I you;" this is the humblest disciple's mission. "He that

receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth Him that sent me;" this is the exhaustive principle of judgment. "Woe unto you when all men speak well of you: blessed are ye when they do not, *for* so did their fathers to the prophets;" this is the practical caution of the former history transplanted to the Gospel.

In speaking of the church, I have meant of course the whole church, all who are baptized, though many branches are much unlike our own, and many have been separated from the vine, and cast out and withered. To picture their mutual relations, we must have recourse to some higher organism than wheat, and some more explicit unity than that of a corn-field; though even there might be discerned the "beginnings" of those tendencies which force a nation or church to constitute itself. A single organism, such as a vine or mustard plant, gives a distincter notion; but these also are inadequate, for want of that consciousness, or rather of those several grades of consciousness, whose growing influence on the surd spontaneous powers is about the most important fact in the workings of society. We ascend therefore, to the highest organism at once, our "self," and find ourselves expounding that constant name, parable, or illustration of Scripture which describes the church as a Body—a living growing, self-conscious Body—the Body and the Bride of Christ. Our profession, and especially our sacraments, insist on this as being much more than a figure. And the sacred writers, as indeed all moralists, often enlarge on its analogy, and argue from its principles. The field of wheat, however, may remind us of one feature in the perfect Church which our present bodies image most imperfectly, and which the historic Church only begins to realize—that a certain homogeneousness will pervade it beyond what we see now—at least, that the individual elements shall have attained not only a near likeness to the individual exemplar, but also a highly educated consciousness thereof, and of their own position and relationship. At present, each particle of our body, whether it be blood, or flesh, or bone, or brain, is indeed a human particle, has partaken of human life, and has derived from that communion certain qualities which are extremely

permanent, and the results of which, probably, will never be obliterated. But the individual particles are not intelligent of this. Even if they, or the most highly organized of them, should possess some direct consciousness—some feeling of pleasure or pain, of satisfaction or uneasiness—yet only in the highest of all, if even there except when integrated, can there be any reflex knowledge of their own communion or their place. In our spiritual bodies, perhaps, it will be different. And even here there seems some tendency towards it. Our physiologic history is a continued “specialization of functions,” and formation thereby of refined and educated sensibilities which certainly show *some*¹ tendency to diffuse themselves again, and refine the rest of the body. And it is easy to imagine this tendency increased to any assignable extent. But, however it be with our individual self, in bodies social its working is unmistakeable. By a principle whose rude expression is “division of labour,” the ascending and self-multiplying duties of the community are assigned to its various members. Habit renders these expert and skilful; and, presently, not only is the Whole enriched by the *results* of what “every joint supplies,” and by the aggregate skill and knowledge of its several departments, but their acquired intelligence and taste, besides, tend directly to diffuse themselves, and insensibly leaven the whole society with what is in fact a finer life. The perfection of this, if we understand it rightly, will be the perfect Church.

Botanists tell us that each leaf of a tree is a little image of the tree, both in its form and in its operations. If each molecule of the leaf were also an image of the leaf, and if both leaves and molecules possessed whatever consciousness we can suppose the highest man to have, this would be some picture of what the ultimate True Vine will be. Christ's Body is a temple, elaborately built up for an habitation of God through the Spirit, whereof each living stone is also a temple and a shrine, elaborately like the corner-stone, and like the whole, and specially conscious of its own indwelling. Christ's kingdom is one whose Royalty pervades its subjects—wherein the meanest feels his own participa-

¹ See note, p. 102.

tion in every office of the state, up to the throne itself. HE is that ultimate Prophet, Priest, and King; and *we*, too, are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a peculiar people—our Pentecost has made us prophets, our baptism kings and priests to God and to His Christ. This is the profession and the ideal of the Church. It is not yet a fact; but it is to be; it is in process of Creation. The *Word* of its genesis has gone forth; and God's Spirit, working effectively in every part, shapes the rude material, builds it into Form, and makes the fiat Fact. Presently the night shall have passed; the same resurrection-morn that rolls the Unseen within the visible horizon will bring to each his spiritual body; and this will be to each his image of the whole. Meantime, our "calling" is to realize this ideal—to anticipate this resurrection life—to mortify, that is, to *dead*en, our members on the earth, and, putting on the new created man, to rise with Christ into the *present* sense and *power* of immortality. The very effort to do this, in proportion as it is constant and pervading, is itself a high creative force, producing the end desired. But it is still, alas! how weak and unsustained! The highest apostle has need to cry for deliverance from this body of death, and to long for "the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body." The Church, even in her highest mind, is still but militant, inchoate, imperfect; and our present mortal body, wherein many a passion dominates by turns, and many a folly finds its place and punishment, is her appropriate image.

I have viewed the Church's *period* also as one whole, that is, from the first to the second Advent; though probably it divides itself into the days of some great Sabbath week, or the weeks of some great Pentecost. The "Early Christianity" which wrote our New Testament, constructed our Canon, and matured our Creeds, constituted, along with the culture of the ancient world, a period in itself. The Missionary energy which surveyed her future field, and, with a visible cross, rudely took possession, may indicate a second. The ecclesiastical and feudal development by which the Great Popes hurled back the armies of the aliens, and organized the elements of Europe, may fitly mark another. Then the era of the Reformation and its reactions, of the crossed At-

lantic, and the *printed* Book, marks a great transition, which reminds us of the appearance of the sun and moon on the *fourth* Creation-day. There seems a very general impression that we are passing through a like transition now, and that the immediate future of the world will show some vast advance on all preceding periods. Men now "run to and fro, and knowledge is multiplied on the earth," to an extent that hitherto was inconceivable. This is indeed the *character* of our times, and its moral results must be immense. Before it all partition walls must be prostrated; men's conceptions enlarged, perhaps with violence; *definite* sentiments and definite opinions bewildered or impaired, and a commingling, "assimilation," and "expectancy" produced, which, however high and effective in some respects, will seem to many, and will often be, in fact, a weakening of the most just and necessary bonds. Such agitation of society and threatened chaos could only be the beginning of some farther end—the genesis of some new Sabbath light, to create and lead a higher dispensation. Perhaps upon this earth; if there be before it, as millennial visions seem to indicate, some long future in its present shape,—or, if its capacity of farther progress, in this form, be indeed exhaust, the breaking up of its crust and shrinking of its elements, as once, we suppose, they shrank before, into some less bulky planet, to commence some new and some intenser history.

In like manner the Elder dispensation, too, was subdivided; and in like manner it matured itself towards the second Sabbath day. Abraham, Joseph, Joshua, Samuel, Solomon, Zorobabel, initiate minor epochs, each marked by a considerable variation in details. And each period views with increasing distinctness and complacency the coming enlargement of the nation's Spirit, though it should be by the dissolution of its frame. The theory of this connected growth and its analysis are, indeed, profoundly interesting; but for practical direction there is always this golden rule—The God of one is the God of all, and He is always like Himself—the principles on which He conducts the least are analogous or identical with those which rule the whole. It is as easy to discern them, if we are so disposed, in the little as in the great; and as hard always to "hear" the prophet or "admit" the Para-

plete as it is to "receive" the Christ. Even the transitions come not "with observation," except to those whose sympathies are in them. The shepherds, by night, could hear a voice inaudible to all Jerusalem. Wise men from the East could see the star invisible to Bethlehem. The Christian era was unheard of until centuries had passed it by. Its own apostles little knew the enormous change they wrought. In fact, the greatest transformations are often the least discerned by those in their vicinity,—such are too near, perhaps, to integrate their elements and sum up their meaning. Its "reign of terror" was almost an amusement to high and low in Paris. The plague of Athens, or of London, made men irreligious. Lightning itself is but a spark to those who are beside it; and thunder is only heard by those who occupy some focus of its curve. Nature always glosses over her transition-epoch; hides the *point* itself of almost every change; modestly conceals her conception and gestation; and withdraws the birth and death from prurient curiosity and profane and vulgar gaze. Even the shrinking of the earth which we suppose—especially if *expectation* be intense, for *event* and it are inverse to each other—may prove an "insensible" procedure to the ephemerides upon its face. Those who have "the kingdom of heaven within them," however, will know its coming from without.

And who may tell how soon? Not we, brethren; and not the angels of God; and not the Son Himself. The Father hath set it in His own power. For us to know would manifestly derange the Church's functions, and distract her duty. She is *as though she were* in the middle of her work; with vast deficiencies to be made good at home, still vaster beyond her pale. As we look back—much has been done; as we look forward—it is as nothing. And so, doubtless, it will always look. What she ought to do will multiply itself before her, as her own ideal of God's requirement rises. Many tokens "of that day and hour" are given, and we are commanded to note them well. But they are all such as verify themselves in the individual expectancy of the unseen, and were plainly intended to preach "unto us as unto all—Watch: for ye know not the hour when the Son of Man cometh." This attitude of watchful diligence is what befits

the Church and us; is that in which the faithful servant will be found when that day cometh unawares—not crying, lo here, or lo there, and gadding and gossiping about, alternately dizzied with alarm, or demoralized by disappointment, but intent upon his calling, “with his loins girded about, and his lights burning.” “Blessed is that servant whom his Lord, when He cometh, shall find so doing. Verily I say unto you, He will make him ruler over all that He hath.”

But must not large preparation precede “that day;” and, specially, must not the Gospel be preached in every nation under heaven? Yes, brethren, it must. But who may tell by what voice from earth, or heaven, or human feeling, the true message of that Gospel shall be commanded to make its way, or by what power of the Spirit made effectual? or who may gauge for the world or church, any more than for the individual, what amount of warning, and patience, and preparation, should precede the great transition? Nay, brethren, it is for us to watch; it is not for us to know. And that amazing parable, which seems designed to teach us all history and prophecy, all religion and theology at once—the story of the Prodigal *and of the other son*—may remind us even of this, that time itself may be compressed, and some intensity of purifying vision work profoundest change. One broad, deep, natural thought within the outcast’s breast, and one overwhelming vision of his father’s face, have brought the lost one to himself, and more than restored him to the arms of Home. And one gentle remonstrance, nay, “entreaty” with the elder son, is enough to melt again that more disciplined and holy, yet more narrow heart, and brings him, too, within the strong contagion of that natural joy that blended earth and heaven. All we look for, perhaps an hour or a moment will effect, when the Eternal has unveiled his Heart, and all things are “at one.” No doubt each will be rewarded *and placed* according to his works, and well-earned Terror will mingle with our Joy. But the sum of all will be some depth of MERCY such as we dare not either ask or think. And if this be the end, brethren—and what else *could* be the “end”?—surely its foretaste may inspire our energies to fellow-work therewith.

The Church, then, is as though she were in the middle of her work—"therefore she is so." Her one duty is to do it with her might. The pervading principles and true analogy between the little and the great, in guiding her aright for every day, will also guide her through That Day, make her victorious in the final trial, and distinguish for her between Christ and Antichrist. It remains, then, that we (1) *understand* her work, that we may direct her energies aright; and (2) that we cultivate such a spirit as may harmonize our efforts, avoiding distractions and collisions. And I know of no precept, brethren, more pregnant of instruction, in either aspect, than that suggested by my text. Let the Church grow up to Christ, *remembering that she is an organism*; let her cultivate her field, the world, *remembering that it is an husbandry*. LET THE CHURCH GROW UP TO CHRIST—that is, let her "comprehend" and head and harmonize the natural growth and just development of things. For *of* Him, and *by* Him, and *to* Him are all things; and the Church, as His Body, is but the organic climax into which all earth's vitalities incessantly aspire.

And its prime lesson lies in this, that we should set our hearts on "unity" as distinguished from "uniformity"—that the Church should understand and honour the heterogeneousness and multiplicity, the extreme diversity, or rather diversity-in-unity, which organic life implies. Unity is of the Spirit or Life, and its *present* bond is peace. Each living thing is one: its active, productive energies sympathize with each other, and all conspire towards some common end. Uniformity is passive obedience to some external law; when enforced too far, it is slavishness and tyranny; generalized, it is moral death; universalized, it is organic death, and loses, besides, its one ideal merit, symmetry. Life and Nature have symmetry, proportion, balance, order, correlation, constitution, hierarchy, but they have little uniformity. It is now the fashion for philosophers to praise it; but, as distinguished from Analogy or Unity, it is an imperfect or a false conception always, and a word which, as applied to living things, has scarce any intelligible meaning. Things that never lived are uniform and homogeneous; like the sand of some Dead Sea, or the gas that floats in space, "dark, formless, and void" as on the day of

chaos. But Life is creative and commanding, and expresses itself always in this extreme yet harmonized diversity.

Observe it even in one of its humbler illustrations. The Church, then, is not "wine," though even that is mixed; nor is she a grape, though it, too, is far from homogeneous. But she is a vine that beareth grapes. How various are its parts, how unlike their functions, yet how subservient to each other, and to their far-off end! Few and small are the fruit-carrying twigs, yet every part has truly served this end, and is fruit-bearing as well as they. The flowers and fruit we honour; yet this is the honour that the whole has earned, and into which the remotest function, all unthought of or unknown, nay, all unconscious too, in simple, true self-sacrifice, has thrown the total energy of all its summer life. From the humble fibres which sympathize with earth, and, twining their tendrils in her breast, drink from that great mother the milk of simple nutriment—thence to the gnarled trunk, which, surly as it seems, yet pierces its strong wood in channels numberless for the tiny streams to flow, and blesses each as it proceeds with some essential yet scarce noticeable change—up to the rich, soft leaves which open to the sun, and, drinking in celestial light, combine the ruder forces of the earth with those which breathe from heaven—all these, so various, so diverse, so seemingly or really opposed, partake a common life and common purpose, and all mature some definite result, for other creatures to enjoy and use for farther ends. In fact, this vine, in its totality, has "borne" unconsciously, as in a womb, that generous juice in which the earth rejoices—that blood of the grape which maketh glad the heart of man, and which the Son of Man, as He solemnly partook His last of earthly nutriment—nay, as He, too, attained His "end," and now would make Himself the Seed of earth's great Tree of Life—could find to be the fitting Sacrament and Emblem of Himself.

Did we take some higher organism, and were we able to expound it, we should only render more conspicuous this diversity-in-unity, and more conspicuous the folly which, striving after uniformity, only mars the unity of the Spirit, and violates the bond of peace. Nature herself has no uniformity, except so far

as she is dead. And the Church's life, even in its meanest function, is far too precious to be chrystallized. Were she but a fungus or a lichen, there would be upper and lower in her, and root, and sap, and cell, and surface. Were she but a bubble of soap and water, her little rainbow-rings would vary with the thickness of the film. But the Church is at once the largest and most complex, the humblest and most aspiring, of all organic things. There is not the "creature" upon earth, from the particle of granite rock or of the basic magma that underlies it, up to the nearest sense of The Invisible, that is not at home in her, nay, that is not imaged and embraced in her every individual. Yet ruling men would fain cut out her pattern, shape her into law and letter, strictly define her office, and hold her to her bond; philanthropists and doctrinaires would bind her to some "elevated level" of maudlin sentiment, not to say, half-cant; while half-philosophers will limit her thought and Book to some thin line of "inspiration," long since congealed into some spiritual formula into which not even reason may intrude, and freeze her very Faith, and Paraclete, and Life, into some half-paganized "idea"! Pardon we their dreamings, brethren, and *rise* we against their incubus. Burst we through their sleepy bondage, though it seem to break their Sabbath. Disprove we or dissipate our paralysis by obeying the command—"Take up thy bed, and walk." Remember we the vastness of our work—a world within and a world without to be regenerated and transformed—and throw we ourselves into it in the faith and fear of God. Enter we with courage every field that God enables us to enter, and by every door He opens; and bless and help we men in every relation of their life.

Brethren, what *is* the Church? For into this, after all, does the dispute resolve itself. Were she merely something "doctrinal"—a form of thought or *quasi*-thought, represented, say by the Articles and Liturgy, or by Creeds and Councils, or by some conventional idea of the Bible—an abstract science, or *quasi*-science, supposed to have certain efficacy in opening heaven, but little other value on the earth—then, indeed, it may safely be relegated to the cloister or the school: it is enough for it to occupy

the pulpit and amuse the leisure of the Areopagus. Christ has redeemed us all, and could teach and preach without it. Or—if the Church be merely the ecclesiastics of the Church—that class or order of men which is solemnly set aside to learn and teach her doctrines and to perform her rites—then, indeed, the body of the community may often be obliged to confine them to their duties, if only in self-defence against ignorance, arrogance, or fanaticism. But if the body of the community be itself the Church—the whole congregation of faithful men in which Christ's gospel is preached and His sacraments administered—then it is not so easy to isolate its duties or to limit its regards. Then the Church's doctrine is but its own thought, whence-soever inherited or evolved. Its concerns are whatever Christian men and women may say or think or do. And its ecclesiastics are its ministers, not its lords, however high and sacred be the functions they fulfil. True, we only name such aggregate, "the Church," in its religious aspect—in its relation to its God. But *its* God is a pervading God. Relation to Him pervades every relation, and duty, and regard. To it, then, there is no real division between things secular and things religious; more than there is between the living body and the life. Religion is that which must correct and elevate our common doings, and regenerate our present powers; or it is valueless for heaven. And the religion which can be confined to time, or place, or formula, or to any specified regards—or which can allow itself for a moment to be divided off, except for education—that is, in order, by being compressed, intensified, "worked up," to reach some higher points, whence it may, with more definite power, command and energize the rest—is no true religion. It may cohere with gnosticism or duality, but it is repugnant to the Church. It savours little of her Spirit or her Christ.

By the Church, therefore, I have meant always the whole Church—all who are baptized, Eastern and Western, old and young, civilized and barbarian, bond and free—the whole body of Christendom, such as it is—imperfect, ill-assorted, unsubdued; yet imbued with its own instincts and principles, and acting by its natural and proper organs, as God enables it to act. True, this

is a most heterogeneous aggregate, ill-marked and dubious around its borders, ill-balanced or discordant even in its central mind—there, melting off into paganism and incapacity; here, struggling against intelligent irreligion, or almost atheism; and everywhere afflicted with selfishness and folly. If it were not so, brethren, it could neither reach, perhaps, nor leaven, the common life of men. In her approximation to them, and her communion with them, lies her assimilating power. True, it has not yet attained its form or symmetry; and many members know not yet what spirit they are of. There is a real spirit, notwithstanding; a spirit that works with patience as with power; and builds up the Church, *and, in her, the world*, towards their unseen Head. The parts may forget this, or ignore it, but externs can “take knowledge of it,” that it has been with Christ; and, though they neither discern her Truth nor admit her Pentecost, can feel her unity, her purpose, and her force. Surely, *we* might do the same! Let, then, the various sections forbear to press, in the supposed interests of uniformity, their own peculiarities on those who wish them not. *Let us believe in and love THE UNITY THAT IS*; and not the less for its diversity and multiplicity. Cherish we every fresh individuality, integrity, earnestness, and loving effort. Honour we especially the great unconscious functions which, all unthanked, unthought of, sustain the highest mind. Cover we “with more abundant honour” those sections which seem to lack. And should some of the humbler members—the foot or hand, for instance, or some unwise, untutored tongue—in its half-consciousness and partiality, seek to impair the rest, or to separate itself, complaining that the eye is cold, or the heart heedless, or the brain oppressive, or that such distant functions are no benefit to it—then let the higher members show *their* higher spirit—not emulating such childish folly, but bearing their burdens, and so fulfilling the law of Christ, while they propagate His Love.

In plainer words, the different strata, sections, and divisions of Christendom, notwithstanding all their apparent or felt antagonisms, *are* members of each other, whether they think it so or not; and they do perform “essential” functions for each other, even when they know it or desire it least. The lower

sustain the higher ; the higher lead and refine the lower. The lower deepen and extend the basis on which the whole reposes ; the upper, even when against their will, present the guiding line and steps to their ambition. Some rule, some think, some toil, some preach, some teach, some learn, and some can only grow : yet there is no one function the loss of which would not be injurious or fatal to the whole. And this is true not only of the individuals of each family or sect, but also of the sects or sections when compared together. These also minister to each other, if only by balance or antagonism ; and each, if only in pursuit of its own interest or vanity, contributes to the whole the highest gift it can. The more mediæval forms, for instance,¹ mi-

¹ This is very obvious in Ireland, and perhaps in England too. The Established Clergy, deprived by law of any power of discipline, and obliged to admit to every ordinance, every one, or almost every one, who chooses, are limited in fact—so far as culture is involved—to the one function of “ghostly admonition.” We have every vantage ground for tendering good instruction and good advice, but there our power ends. This may be very wise, or very necessary for the community, but observe its consequence. While we are still formally the clergy of the nation, we are really, or rather directly, only the clergy of a part. Our immediate ministrations are confined to those who are, or who are supposed to be, *capable of following good advice* ; who can understand, and remember, and apply for themselves, throughout the week, the sound doctrine which they may or may not receive on Sunday. This is an extreme of “liberty” which might content either Mr. Buckle or Mr. Mill. But what about the classes who are still “in their nonage,” and to whom pure liberty is not the supremest boon—who are not sufficiently “a law unto themselves” either to distinguish the best advice from worse, or to carry out the best when they do approve it? And are such people few? Would Mr. Mill say so?

Fortunately for such, God has not left them dependent on philosophers. Common men are too anxious about things unseen to be content even with such a distant and extremely “proper” Gospel as the law provides them. So they encourage, by their willing audience and by liberal payment, less proper teachers, whom they find to “do them good”—the vehement Methodist, who agitates their emotions, and on the strength of them exacts considerable abstinence, diligence, and positive religious work—the rude mystic or enthusiast, who persuades them that his doctrine only is the “open sesame” of heaven and true justifying robe ; and, in the name of this, requires sometimes logically, sometimes illogically, a high standard of morality—or the Roman Catholic priest, whose mystery, prestige, and unwavering assertion, at last convince them that he has some “power of the keys” at least as far as purgatory ; and who rules pretty strictly all who are not too “independent” to go to the confessional. These unauthorized teachers are very distressing to the Doctor of Divinity and to his junior curate ; but they are of prime value to his flock—that is, if his flock be, according to the legal hypothesis, the whole community

nister to the lower members among ourselves stringent rule, and outward, ceremonial guidance. The more "independent" bodies, both in Romanism and Protestantism, minister, to a higher grade, a more intellectual and moral discipline. While some in every grade have imbibed the Love and Liberty of Christ, and impart its spirit to the rest. Moreover, a true unity pervades these all—the unity of life, the communion of the life of Christ—impalpable, indeed, to touch or vision; strongest, perhaps, where it is least felt, as in the analogous action of the heart or blood, yet professed by all, and beginning to be realized within the growing consciousness. The sense of it, indeed, is still but weak; yet it is a highly assimilating force, and far more practical and effective

within his district. His "good Christian people" *ought* indeed to be above such mistakes and extravagance, but in fact they are *below* them; and the teachers in question are quite as much ahead of those to whom they actually minister as it is, perhaps, desirable that clergymen should be. God has sent the people, in this rude form, what He sees they need. And about the largest service the Established Clergy confer on them is their indirect influence on these secondary or primary teachers, unrecognised perhaps on either side, yet not the less real and effective.

But is not much of their teaching false? Yes, partly so; all formal teaching is. But it is by no means false upon the whole; far from it. All these teachers—this, I trust, is not denied—do draw, drive, or terrify the people from actual sin, and cause them with earnestness to seek after purity and God—*all who so seek, FIND*; though not always in the way they think. These rude enthusiasts for doctrine or for church do, in fact, possess and use The Keys, and do open Heaven much more directly than themselves suppose. He is not far from each of us; and HE is no respecter of persons; every one who seeks to Him, eschewing wickedness, is already accepted in His sight; has He not found a Ransom? This of Heaven itself. And as to any kingdom of heaven on earth, "politicians" have noticed long ago that these contending "religions" are not indeed "all equally" but most of them extremely "useful." And other divines than Paley have discerned that "it is by no means true that religion flourishes most where there is least dissent." In practice they are supplementary to each other; and, with no unfriendly feeling on the average, do provoke one another to love and to good works.

This will seem indifferentism to some. I trust it is not so. But it does proceed on the position insisted on throughout this volume—that the only function of Faith, Doctrine, Bible, Church, or Sacrament, is sanctification or spiritual culture. It follows from this maxim, that whatever form of doctrine or order of men effects this best is the directest apostle and truest minister of Christ, and should rank highest in the Church. What I here insist on is, that our different communions are really supplementary to each other, and minister to different grades of spiritual want—that they are, as it were, so many "arms of the service," and *ought* therefore, while each jealous for its own prestige, to honour and sustain each other. An episcopal or hierarchical "Church" ought to be able

than the thoughtless would believe; for, even to common observation, do not the powers that be in Christendom rule us all in fact, despite our fancied "independence," and superiority to the world or Cæsar? And does not the most calm, far-seeing intellect lead us all, in time, despite our wayward vanity and special illu-

formally to retain all grades, and to find a place for every individuality. But she could only do so by having discipline for her humbler members, and a large elasticity for her half-grown sons, her wayward, wilful, vigorous, and enterprising middle ranks. If she have not, the ecclesiastical unity is less apparent, but may be quite as real. Other bodies must supply her deficiency; but they may supply it quite as fully in accordance with her spirit and teaching as if they were her formal monks, deacons, or catechists. And incidentally a most important doctrine is made prominent by this want of outward uniformity, namely, "the subordination of the priest and prophet to the king"—the subjection of the clergy and of all "religious" things as such [i. e. so far as they are "separate," and *part* only of men's concerns] to "the whole," as represented by "the powers that be."—SER. IV., Second Series. So far as "the secular" also is divided off, the religious may justly predominate against it; but "the whole" includes both, and of necessity commands each part.

In fact, by permitting such teachers, the State as fully sanctions and appoints them as if the Queen handed each of them a formal charter; and by permitting them to support themselves at the expense of the community, the State itself pays them quite as directly, nay, far more directly than if it passed their stipends through the hands of Commissioners, "authorized" to nibble at them on their way. The Archbishop of Canterbury is only the head of Her Majesty's Episcopal Clergy; very fully recognised by the State, and as fully recognising its sovereignty in turn. Cardinal Wiseman is the head of Her Majesty's Roman Catholic Clergy; very obliquely receiving, and as obliquely returning, any recognition. And Doctor Cumming, Mr. Spurgeon, and Mr. Hall, are eminent members of Her Majesty's Dissenting Ministry; very independent of the State, of course, i. e. so far as *the State* allows. The Queen grants, indeed, to Mr. Spurgeon and the Cardinal much greater latitude than she does to the Archbishop—for reasons known to herself—but she never abrogates her right or duty of inquiring what it is they teach her people, and of "visiting" accordingly. I doubt not they are most loyal and excellent subjects; and I contend, besides, that they are, *in proportion to their usefulness*, true ministers of the Church; as justly ordained as any one, quite as regularly as Paul or Apollos. The proof of their apostleship is in their work. *We* have, indeed, vast advantages over them; if we *use* these in a Catholic and comprehensive spirit, i. e. for the benefit of the whole, we shall no doubt retain them or increase them. If we *presume on* these advantages, making ourselves not stewards, but lords and ultimates, we shall presently find our ordination becoming no-ordination, and our pride a fall. In the same sense that any of us is a member of the Church [visible] of Christ, the head of the State *is* the head of that Church within his district, and of every section and subsection of the same, and rules all these in precisely the same sense, i. e. so far as *not they but he* sees fit. If any one have not the sense to see or to understand this, of course the State must keep a watchful eye upon his foolishness; but it is just as puerile of us to attempt un-Churching Dissenters as it is of Dissenters to un-State themselves.

minations? and does not some Great Heart of Christianity, if only felt as an *esprit du corps*, bind us all together, "balance" the powers that be, confirm our sympathies, soothe our antipathies and wounds, and help us to rise above our petty jealousies and worse than family disputes into some feeling of our "belief" "in the Holy Ghost, the holy Catholic Church, the Communion of

But is there no such thing as Schism? Assuredly there is. It is against this I am striving to guard. Schism is the cutting or rending the body of Christ. But every external division or section of a living body is not a Schism; it may be a natural and real division of its form and functions, as I contend these are. A body has two feet and two hands, quite separate from each other, and from the "body"; but they are also united to it too. If either of these should say—St. Paul puts the case—"I am not of the body"; and should the body be also foolish, and say the same; would therefore either of them be right? Nay, there is One who has tempered the body in a way unthought of by the most, unknown as yet to *any* of them; and He makes it grow, besides, by that which each supplies. Schism, however, is *such* a cutting or rending of the body as wounds, pains, injures it, and deranges, distracts, or impairs its functions. And to desire to do this, or to be willing to do it, or even careless about it, is the *sin* of schism. Obviously this might be committed, and often is, by the most orthodox and ruling members, or by the head itself. Even "the king," by his own "partiality," may render necessary the rending of his own royal robe. The opposite of Schism is a Catholic Spirit—that the members should have a care for each other, that each should cultivate love and respect to each, and a religious reverence towards the whole. This should bind as well the different "communions" when compared together, as the different members of each communion. In fact, whichever of them is the most willing to unchurch the rest is the nearest to the sin of Schism. Whichever most truly loves the rest and loves the Truth, and searches for it most intently [for it is *always* in its main part unknown], and most lovingly imparts it to the rest, is the truest Catholic.

The late Dr. Arnold, and others, have been anxious for some more "visible unity" than this, and have thought it might be secured by more "comprehensive," that is, more neutral and indefinite formulæ. I distrust the prescription, and I do not see its need. Surely, the Church *has* formulæ of every degree of generality, from the confessions of individual sects up to the Apostles' Creed, the Baptismal Formula, or even the name of God. The last-mentioned sufficed the world for many a century. The penultimate sufficed the Church for the next generation after Christ; the Apostles' Creed for some two centuries and a half;—and this at a time when differences of opinion among Christians on almost every matter were extreme; nay, when their *right* to hold extremely different opinions was formally endorsed by the Church. For this is the meaning of the decision at Jerusalem. It is not that the council repealed the Jewish Law. There was no such question before it; nor would any such question have been listened to. But it did decide that Gentiles, who were bound to no part of the Jewish Law or Bible—the New Testament not then being written—and also that Jews, who were "debtors" to keep the whole of it, were equally, and in the same sense, Christians—baptism being as yet the only outward bond of unity. Surely, when needful, we can always fall back on

saints?" Indeed, the very vagueness of this elastic, constant force has an important bearing in our education; for it throws us each beyond the mere letter of any form or promise upon the *meaning* of our obligations, and shapes us into what we should become by a soft, insensible, persistent pressure—an atmosphere or breath of circumambient heaven.

But the precise relationship of the grades and divisions of the Church will be more apparent when we have glanced at her external husbandry and the connected operations which constitute her work. For these, many and various as they are, must all proceed, if I am not mistaken, in an appointed Order, and this

these earlier formulae, which no one pretends have been, or could be, superseded by any subsequent developments.

No doubt, anything objectionable in our own formularies ought to be removed [such as the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed (see note D)], and removed *formally*. For, though "usage" and "desuetude" be most real methods, both of enacting and repealing laws, they cannot be applied to *part* of a public document, and their tendency is to sink that most important symbol altogether. Witness the American Church. Hasty legislation, however, either in the way of "comprehending" or "restricting,"—by any such Council, or Convocation, as could easily be called together in any part of Christendom, is little to be desired. They would most probably go wrong. What body of "respectable divines," for example, in England now, would legislate rightly on *social* matters—that is, if the Bible be right in the matter of slavery? What convocation would express itself rightly on *mental* matters—that is, if the Bible and Creeds be right in founding our "immortality" on the resurrection? What body of divines would express themselves on either the *nature* of God, or the nature of things, without "dividing the substance?" Nay, what body would not, in spite of Bible, Creeds, and Liturgies, *limit* the Attributes of Spirit, Son, and Father, to some small parts of "creation," by way of honouring God? Nay, until the modern world is more exercised in abstract thought, we are far better without its hasty legislation or its crude, well-meant reforms. Perhaps if General Councils were frequent, or Convocation powerful, discussion, and the very responsibility of judgment, would develop deeper reflection than at present comes up to the surface. But the remedy would probably be worse than the disease. That is, if the want of detailed agreement be a disease; which I believe it is not. Very much the contrary.

Meantime, surely, we may confide in **THE UNITY THAT IS**, and that has brought the Church so far. Her Lord is willing to trust to it; so is her Bible. Why should we be in haste to reverse their wisdom? The tendency, no doubt, is towards agreement theoretical and practical. Nature, human nature, Providence, the Bible, and the Paraclete are fundamentally the same to all, and tend always to render the fundamental unity explicit. But their present purpose is to make us *grow*. Any premature agreement would derange this process; any enforced finality destroy it. *Our* days, indeed, witness, in the development of "intelligent public opinion," the growth of an assimilating engine, which is only too powerful, too hasty, and too pervading. Its court is far more elastic, exacting,

is also the order of her own Constitution. It is indeed the order of nature or of growth; and the working of her own constitution must obey the constitution of things. In living stratification, as in the pages of "the Great Stone Book," the visible gradations are a synopsis of the History.

The doctrinaires of the day would fain persuade us that all men are alike, and that what is the highest good to some will be therefore good for all. But this is by no means so. Christianity, or at least what *we* call Christianity, did not bless the world except in the fulness of time and preparation. Earlier goods preceded it, and raised men up, line upon line and step upon step, to the level it requires. It is only they, I am convinced,

and overwhelming than any Book, standing Council, or armed Inquisition could possibly be. Indeed, it grows strong *too soon*. Let all add to its real intelligence—but he is not a friend to human progress who will encourage its self-esteem. Any premature potency, not to say finality in its decisions, were no mean disaster to the world. There are instances, already, and on a large scale too, of its tyrannizing not only over the best and wisest of the community, but over the most deep and solid convictions of the community itself. In constitutional growth, it is a serious error to have "the king" too soon. He cannot help being "partial." The sons of Zeruah are "too strong" for him.

What, then, is the duty of an individual in respect to Schism? Generally to abide in the communion in which he was called—to worship as his father and mother taught him. [St. Paul "so ordained in all the Churches," even in respect to a "difference among Christians," measured by the whole compass of the Jewish law.—1 Cor. vii. 18; cf. Gal. v. 3. And he conceived this decision *essential* to a just conception of Christianity itself.—Gal. v. 2, 4, 6, &c., and vi. 15.] He is to nurture, also, a respectful feeling towards other modes of worship, and to do his best to learn whatever truth he can. Should he become dissatisfied with any thing in his own, his duty is—(1.) to try and have it remedied, and (2.) modestly and firmly to *speak out his own conviction, and to take the consequences*. If they excommunicate him, it is not his fault; and there is One who will be sure to "meet" him.

And what is the duty of the different communions in respect to Schism? The same generally as that of individuals. Let each do its best to develope, ^{itself}: nurturing, at the same time, love and respect for all, especially to those *nearest* [τὸν πλησίον σου ἀγαπήσεις] to itself. Above all, let them not to be keen to "proselyte" from each other! A great deal of Schism, many bitter rankling wounds, are caused by this narrow Sectarianism. Let each sect seek the wisdom from above, "which is first pure [i. e. *itself*]", then [towards others], peaceable, gentle, easily entreated." Let each be zealous for the truth, and zealous to impart to others all it knows, leaving the results to fructify. Each will find out gradually its own sphere of most effective work, and the mutual action of such bodies interpenetrating each other will stimulate and cultivate all. This is the natural tendency, and is what generally takes place.

who have received the like instruction who can either accept or profit by its final lesson. To all the rest it will be a prematurity and perversion. What such require is some outward sacrament of Christ: a "veiled" implicit gospel to prepare for the explicit, —exercise for those ruder outer faculties which evolve, and nurse, and guard the still implicit mind.

We wish to reap: rather we wish to produce the harvest-field for angels to cut down. Then we must learn to sow. Nay, we must learn to perform many antecedent operations, far more laborious and unpromising than casting in the seed. We must find how to possess the field, and fence, and drain, and clear it; to subsoil, and plough, and harrow, and carefully prepare; lest the precious seed be lost on rock, or swamp, or brush, or roadside, and all our labours come to nought. The exact nature of the analogous processes we might perhaps mistake, but a clear chart of them from the beginning has been laid down, and is preserved "for our ensamples." The Bible pictures not only our individual Exemplar, but records at still greater length the "type" of a nation's progress from its rude, lawless, Bedouin state, until it was able to produce and propagate Christianity itself. The stages passed through by Israel, I have argued, represent the essential steps, and in their essential order, of every progress in the individual and in the world. It was by following them, as I have said, consciously or unconsciously, that the Church built up its present Christendom. It is only by following them again, I am convinced, that we can work any real regeneration in the still unchristian world. True, our higher light should enable us to shorten and compress the stages; to illumine and empower, to soften and refine the process; but its essential features and its essential order are an institution from on high.

What, then, is this order, and what are its successive steps? I will enumerate them from the beginning—using great plainness of speech, which I trust will be forgiven—

First, then, let the Church foster and sustain "the Natural Mission" of mankind—to *increase and multiply*, and replenish the earth, and assert the dominion of man over all inferior things. Let her bless this with lips and heart, for it is the true *foundation*

of every higher mission; as truly as man himself rests upon the vegetable world, and vegetation itself upon the solid earth. Let higher things disparage this, and it will eat back into their heart with leanness and a curse. Let them love and honour it as the present gift of God, and they may find or make it the simplest sacrament¹ of the very highest truth we know.

But is not over-population itself an evil? No doubt it is, when driven back upon itself in enforced stagnation, and frustrated of its farther and just developments. And so is every other blessing that God gives. "Over-religion" itself is an evil—at least in any form that the world can gauge religion—and it may be sometimes needful for the Son of Man to come eating and drinking, and apparently Sabbath-breaking too, just in order that he may teach "religion." But, brethren, what is over-population? If men be debarred from agriculture, either by their own stupidity or the folly of their superiors, *four* men to the square mile is over-population, and these four will be scarcely above the brute. If men be allowed in agriculture, but debarred of town-building² and manufactures, one hundred to the square

¹ Marriage ought to be called "the Social Sacrament," as distinguished from "Church Sacraments"—the holy communion of Society as such, as distinguished from the Sacrament of the Communion of Saints. It is eminently Christian, however; for it is the natural "anticipation" of the mystical Union that *is* betwixt Christ and His Church—or, more generally, betwixt God and His Creation.

² Surely these are truisms. Yet those who have power over their fellow-men not seldom forget or violate them; very often, I admit, with the best intentions. I will notice one or two classes of injurious interference which are now in vogue in Ireland:—

1. Some, believing the whole country to be overpopulated, use "the power of the law" to thin it, and especially to eliminate its lowest stratum. By this caprice not only is the utmost misery inflicted on multitudes of human beings, but society itself is mutilated in its roots and basis.

2. Others use the power of the law to reduce the cottiers, or small farmers, to the condition of day labourers. This is a serious moral and economic injury; deprives the poor man of his just ambition and incentives to industry and thrift; and tends to mark off society into castes, or stagnant grades, making the ascent from one to the other difficult or impossible.

3. Others, believing towns and manufactures hurtful to the community, retard or forbid their growth where they would naturally arise. By this caprice the middle developments of society are impaired and narcotized.

4. I fear I must say the same of the government interference in Education. It imparts an excellent primary education, no doubt; and this is a great boon. But it de-

mile will be over-population, and these hundred will be hardly above the savage. But if men be fairly encouraged to do all that men can do—especially if their rude efforts be smiled upon by those above them, and blessed by sanctions from the sky—the four may become an hundred, the hundred a thousand or an hundred thousand; and instead of starvation, infanticide, and internecine war, their occupations will be of the luxuries, decencies, charities of life,—and schools, courts, commerce, law, churches, books, Bibles, and mutual endeavours to multiply their good, will form the staple of their thoughts. And how shall all these multitudes be fed? Why, each town or city becomes a centre for organizing man's command over nature, and rendering the results available; while the earth itself, challenged by higher intelligence, opens up her magazines, and pours forth at the feet of her lord unheard-of stores of wealth. For millions of years she has been at work, and has economized her products, both *on* the surface and below it; and mankind, as a whole,

troys, in country places and small towns, the previously existing means of *intermediate* education, and refuses doggedly to supply *their* place. This is the greater calamity, because to ascend by means of education was about the one door which opened upwards to the deserving Irish lad of the lower middle ranks of life. Upper education is supplied lavishly by government, and lower education liberally; but that which should unite the two, instead of being increased, is actually abolished; and this at a time when all appointments in the public service are being thrown open to competition.

Is it necessary to argue against these caprices? or necessary to attack the idea, which, so far as they have any fixed idea, underlies them all—the production or “preservation” of a certain “average man,” and contented “stationary” society—a conception with which Nature and the Church have about as much sympathy as with the endeavour to keep a man always living at the age of five-and-forty, the sun stationary at 3 o'clock, P. M., or the year always fixed at the autumnal equinox. Surely, a natural and healthy society is one which, by its better members, climbs in every direction as far as it can climb; which, by its lower members, propagates itself out on the very verge of subsistence, as far as God and nature give it room; in which each member is fairly encouraged to attain what height he can; and wherein all recognise their mutual dependence, and regard and respect each other, and reverence the whole. The lower average of such a community, though not stationary, nor, in one sense, content, is in vastly more favourable circumstances than the normal citizen of any other Utopia or Republic. I am far from saying that the Irish nation is such a community; but it is a backward province of an empire which professes this ideal, and it ought to be dealt with on these principles. [I will add something in a note. See note G.]

has never yet approached—possibly never will approach—the bounds of her munificence.

Man's first mission, then, is to increase, to grow; his next mission is to *Toil*—to toil, not stupidly, or without purpose, but *in order* that he may increase and multiply, and bring forth the treasures of the earth to meet his growing wants and self-multiplied ambitions. God has laid on him this necessity to toil; and, as he obeys it in the name of God, behold, the "curse" becomes a blessing; his "natural cross" becomes his baptism into social life, and generates a whole new world of higher human faculties. As men toil, contrive, compete, in natural rivalry and help, they become themselves developed,—first in their physique, and then in their intelligence and heart. Foresight, self-denial, self-reliance, mutual reliance, are educed and cultivated, and the very grade and character of Toil itself ascends. Man's pains, and hope, and carefulness, become the fountain of his Love, and the drops of sweat upon his brow mark the generation of his Brain. He has presently amassed, not only a store which enables him to "rest," but a mind and soul to understand and use the Sabbath he has earned. Round his toil spring up, as naturally as do the trees from earth, possession, property, society, and law; and round these latter a higher class of work evolves itself, and generates what may be called the Sabbath-classes of mankind—those who, toiling more intensely, on some higher parallel, minister to his mental and spiritual growth, and cultivate man himself as man cultivates the earth. Let, then, all classes respect that prime command, "In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread." It is the beginning of man's *moral* mission, the first condition of society, and mainspring of its blessings. He who obeys it not, in spirit and in letter, shall eat no higher bread.

Let us respect it at home, brethren, as, no doubt, we all are well disposed to do; and especially let us remember it abroad. If we would generate those higher classes and higher activities among the low nations of the earth, here is our "principle" and our starting point. Without this, and in any other way than this, brethren, I firmly believe no farther progress is *possible* to man.

We may preach and pray to savages, and coax, and wheedle, and bribe, and pamper them, and persuade ourselves that we have inoculated them with outward or with doctrinal Christianity, or even impressed them with something more; but until this previous point is reached, so that they work as we do, or rather as the humblest among us work, *absolutely nothing has been done*. Nay, worse than nothing, for our Gospel does not even save them from the contact of our vices and our diseases—if its supposed acceptance be not to them a sort of disease itself. At all events, it does *not* shelter them from the others, and it *does* promote the contact; so that it is to them an *actual*¹ exterminating agency, and a far more fatal visitation than any sword of Joshua or of Mahomet could be. Ancient conquerors, in pursuit of selfish ends, or professing only the common ambitions of the earth, were able to organize and civilize barbarians. But we, with the sword of the Spirit, and a true desire to impart them heavenly good, destroy them before our face as we do strange beasts or reptiles. God forbid I should disparage the motives of our great missionary societies, or disparage the Truth they design to teach. But, brethren, must we not draw back and tremble at the palpable result? When our patients all die off beneath our too potent medicine, and we have buried, or are burying, every tribe which will admit our treatment, is it not time for us to doubt our skill? As the blood of those we meant to help cries up to heaven against our hasty brotherhood, we must pause and think. And then plain homely words of warning start into a terrible significance we never saw before. “No man putteth a piece of new cloth on an old garment; or else the new taketh from the old, and the rent is made worse.” “No man putteth new wine into old bottles; or else the new wine will burst the bottles, and *the wine is spilled, and THE BOTTLES PERISH.*”

Brethren, we are endued with *power*; more, perhaps, and more essentially, than we suppose; and we must be wise as serpents, if we would be harmless as doves. There is an order in nature and in human nature, and it will not be violated with im-

¹ See note F.

punity; it is the ordinance of God. It rests on us to understand it well. The Paraclete, now for eighteen centuries absorbed by the Christian Church, whether or no this be merely the advancing "Spirit of the Ages" centering on us, has diffused its potency, and raised us to a higher grade. We must deal with other men accordingly. What is good for us may not, therefore, be good for them. What is insensible and "natural" to us may be above their range; imparted inconsiderately, may be too violent an "interference" with them. Lay we, then, anxiously to heart the Insight, and, if we may say it reverently, the Common Sense of Him who launched our Gospel, but who did *not* destroy the law, nor ever disparage, by word or act, or long personal example, one jot or tittle of that earlier good that should precede them both—who never deemed that He was less "the Christ," or less "the Truth," when He was the infant in the Temple, or the young child in Egypt, or the carpenter in Galilee, than when He was the Preacher on one mount, the Transfigured on another, or the Crucified upon a third. "Give not, then, that which is holy to the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and," when they can—is it not a just instinct of self-preservation? "turn again and rend you." Our spiritualism, brethren, simple as it is to us, is *not good* for savages. They are far below its level. It only mocks their real wants. Imbibed perforce, it intoxicates, or narcotizes; it injures and destroys whatever organic power they have. To such we must give, with patience, those ruder blessings which emulate the Outer Ministry of Christ—which feed the hungry, clothe the naked, house the homeless, heal the sick, and call back the dying from the jaws of death. True, these are but elements or rudiments—weak and beggarly if you will. Yet are they, to those who have no higher sensibilities, both Parable and Miracle at once; and also, if discerned to come from Him, true Sacraments of Christ.

But savage nations will not work; and we cannot persuade them? True; then *make* them work: and organize their labour; and repay them thankfully, not only with material comforts, but especially with that social culture and diligent paternal

rule, which childish nations *look for* and willingly receive. Or, if your own "high principles" debar you from that office, and cause you to disdain the schoolmaster's estate, at least sustain with your prestige and countenance those who have the right, or who may obtain the right, to impart, *to all who need it*, this true foretaste of the Gospel. If they were but Pharaoh, make yourself the Joseph to that Pharaoh, and take advantage of the visitations of Providence, of man's natural affection and ambition, and of the tempting comforts of Goshen, to bring them under the tutelage and rod of the only schoolmaster that *can* bring such to Christ. And should, again, Pharaoh not remember Joseph, and not remember God, and seek to oppress and to perpetuate oppression,—to perpetuate it, first, by marring man's "natural mission," and forbidding to increase and multiply, lest they should grow burdensome or strong,—and by such other appliances as upper selfishness suggests and tyranny can stoop to—then be the Moses to that same Pharaoh, or to any other! Though he or his were the preserver of your life, and the foundation of your fortunes—though you had eaten his bread, and taught his priests, and led his armies, and are his most trusted minister—though all this were so, yet go down to the oppressed, and throw in your lot with them, and earn a share of their reproach. Yea, and break the staff of the oppressor, too, and lead out the Lord's people, all servile and unworthy and ungrateful though they be, with a high hand and a mighty arm, and, if need be, with fury poured out from the treasuries of God.

These are great and striking lessons, brethren, recorded for our learning. Perhaps the world never had more need to ponder them than now. The prerogative nation of the Christian world—may I not name England so—has "washed her hands of slavery," and labours to persuade all other nations to do the same. This has become a matter of prestige and pride to us. To doubt its wisdom is almost thought absurdity or crime. Yet many doubt it. Or, rather, we do *not* doubt it; we are convinced it is a fatal error, fiscal, moral, and religious.¹ There is a wider experience and

¹ See note F.

higher authority than her's—which indeed her own experience very rapidly, if unexpectedly, confirms. She disdains an office which Abraham, and Moses, and Paul, and Christ, did not disdain. She denounces an institution which all the wisdom of the world before had deemed most kind, most just, most necessary; and which her Bible, Old Testament and New, is careful to uphold. We reverence her motives; God will repay them tenfold into her bosom. But she has been wrong. Her generous impulse has only broken, so far as in her lay, the Natural Bridge between the Barbaric and the Civilized—has sunk that intermediate stage of gradual ascent without which, so far as we know—I say it deliberately—no nation ever climbed, without which she never climbed herself, from rudeness to cultivation. And she has seriously deranged thereby the natural progress of the world. Its upper nations can, indeed, dispense with that institution; they have climbed above it. At least, they can ostensibly renounce *itself*; neither they nor we have ever yet renounced its still substantial services. The intermediate nations of the world are more intimately perplexed and dislocated. Our interference neither guides nor helps them, except into some terrible dilemma. But the barbaric nations, in whose supposed interest this new benevolence is preached, what do we do for them? Why, we neither absorb them nor improve; we merely annihilate them. They join not civilization's advancing tide; they contribute to it no element of blood or vigour; they add to it nothing except the ground they occupy. On that ground they must remain, fenced in by some pretended "liberty," until it suits the Anglo-Saxon, with some regret and much of pomp and self-laudation, to sacrifice them to his "principles." Out, brethren, upon such principles! Ideas of doctrinaires and orators, who can only understand some single class of men—lofty, distant, and imposing; but remote from fact, unnatural, unreal, impolitic, and unchristian. Their worship is sheer idolatry. Are they wiser and kinder than God's Providence? are they holier and truer than His Church or Book? Let us follow their *ignis fatuus* no more. Man, we gladly admit, "is designed for liberty." Yes, and man is designed for Heaven! But man's road to heaven lies through the duties of the earth; and his road to Liberty lies through the

previous schooling of Civil and Religious Law, and Law's substantial predecessor, Toil. Through this has England passed; through this has every nation passed that deserves to be called a nation. Through this she must help the infant nations to pass up, if she would fulfil her stewardship, or do them any good—through this, if she would discharge her simplest responsibilities to her own barbaric subjects—through this, if she would make her present eminence confer any lasting benefit upon, at least, the *tropical* regions of the globe. Anglo-Saxons, from their physique, cannot live there *and work*. Neither we nor any one desires they should live there *and rule*—longer at least than is requisite for teaching the dusky children of the sun to put forth their own fresh energies, to work and rule themselves.

The beginning, then, of man's moral progress is the mission of toil—of toil, to be always *required* of all; to be *enforced*, if requisite, in its humbler walks; to be enforced, not as a perpetuity, but as a just step in progress; as school or training is enforced. Not that any man, or race of men, is to be bound to it in permanence, or kept in it longer than is needful; but that liberty be kept before the eyes of all as a thing to be desired¹ and earned, its gate wide open, and its access easy; that, meantime, all natural ties, ambitions, and affections, be honoured and sustained, and

¹ This is the spirit of the Mosaic institutions, as well as of the New Testament. Israelites might buy slaves freely, or sell them—no stigma was attached to the proceeding. But they could only buy their "brethren," i. e. full Israelites, for a limited time—what-ever years remained till the Sabbath or the Jubilee. Moreover, as they were instructed or commanded to circumcise all their slaves "born in their house or bought with money of the stranger," the tendency was to raise them all, through an "apprenticeship," to being true Israelites, and fit for freedom. No doubt the slaves could resell themselves, or oblige their own resale after the Jubilee was past: but the Law had broadly opened for them the door to liberty. And there was decidedly a public stigma attached to any one's continuing in the estate of slavery *when he could have been made free*. He who refused his liberty, for whatever reasons, however amiable, was to be publicly disgraced (Exod. xxi. to 6); and whoever "stole" men into slavery was "surely" to be put to death (Exod. xxi. 16). It would be hard to embody more explicitly St. Paul's social doctrine, 1 Cor. vii. 21-24:—"Art thou called being a servant? care not for it. But if thou mayest² be free, use it rather. For he that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's freeman: likewise also he that is called, being free, is Christ's bondman. Ye are bought with a price; be ye not the servants of men. Brethren, let every man, wherein he is called, therein abide with God."

the duties of masters, as of fathers, "justly and equally" fulfilled, knowing that we too have our Master as well as our Father in Heaven.

And what comes next? Not yet, brethren, the explicit Gospel. Not yet private judgment, and free discussion, and each conscience stimulated to assert the liberty of Christ. Men are fairly capable of social freedom, and the choice of their line of life, long before they are able to use the like discretion in respect to abstract thought, and what may be called the science of religion. Here they still need guidance, and must bow to, and rely upon, Authority. Moses, therefore, if he break the rod of Pharaoh, yet presently lays them beneath his own; solemnly destroys, as in the persons of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, men's patriarchal right to speak, and think, and worship as they please, or even as they were wont; and chastises with no light chastisement the murmurings of the multitude that he had "slain the people of the Lord."

The *third* mission, therefore, is Priesthood, Ceremonial, and Religious Law—the *separation* between things secular and things religious, with the formal supremacy of the latter—the subjection of the rude soldier, workman, and proprietor, to the appointed priest, and of the working-day to the now explicit Sabbath—the mission of SANCTITY as such. Of Sanctity, which, like Toil, is rude at first, and mainly dependent on this "separation," in time and place, and thing, and person; but which, like Toil, presently refines itself, institutes mental and moral differences, and higher "intolerance," and spiritual war. Of a sanctity, too, which *consciously* progresses; makes its priest look forward always to a prophet; its prophet, to some great Messiah; its ark, to a tabernacle; its tabernacle, to a temple; its temple, to some Holy of Holies, which none may see as yet—nay, of a sanctity which, beginning with outward and climbing to inward things, yet feels itself always the minister and shadow of some Pervading Holiness, which will break down all partition walls, spiritualize every secular, cleanse all that is unclean, and purge and "reconcile" creation in the searching self-sacrifice of God. Of a sanctity, therefore, which is *always* a prophet and forerunner, and which—when men would

fain perpetuate some form or letter of it, though it were of divinest institution, and would make the temple itself a higher house of bondage—will re-embody the spirit and power of Elias; thunder denunciations from the wilderness; lay with a fierce directness “the axe to the root of the trees;” discern and “baptize” the Christ, and pass on its whole Dispensation into His.

To the half-civilized nations of the world, therefore, we must sustain the Mission of the Priest and Sabbath—must impose on them Ceremonial, authoritative Tenet, and religious Discipline. Impose them, not as disparaging that earlier good which renders Priest and Sabbath possible; not as displacing morality, and marriage, and natural affection, and honest toil, and all the ties which these involve, but as enforcing and raising them; empowering them with higher sanctions and a distincter inspiration. And impose them, not as a finality, but as the next step in progress, as school or training for a higher Sanctity. And if our own doctrinaire-ship or other difficulties disqualify ourselves from giving this Education to the nations, we must honour those who can—and sustain them with our best countenance and help—and bear our share of their reproach—provided always that they fulfil this double condition of their institution:—

1st. That they honour all humbler good, and bless it in the name of God; and,

2nd, That they foreshow the signified, and lead mankind towards it—that they make themselves not supreme and ultimate, but—like Moses, and Samuel, and David, and the Baptist, and all their works,—true ministers and prophets of the Christ, and toil to raise the people *beyond themselves* into the far-off Light and Liberty they see.

And, lastly, we must preach the explicit Gospel—free forgiveness, pervading holiness, the righteousness of faith alone, the spirit of the law, the liberty of Christ, and the full communion of the Love of God. I pause not to define these terms. They are almost too familiar, and we hardly feel their force. He, however, understands them always, *who has truly felt their need*: none others have ears to hear their Gospel except as a pictured parable, or some passing song. It is ours to preach it, therefore;

it is his to hear who can. It is ours to *preach* it; *not to impose or force it*. It cannot be enforced. It is a spiritual thing, a voice or breath of heaven. The attempt to enforce it were but to convert the Gospel itself into a law; nay, into a law which ostentatiously destroys its own authority, and bears self-contradiction on its face, for its very profession is a liberty wherein we must stand fast, refusing to be entangled in any yoke of bondage.

But this is only half the statement. Its other side is essential to its truth. The gospel is not law; but it always *supposes* law, and rests on and endorses it. The only liberty it knows is his who has absorbed the spirit of the law, and “commands” himself, *pervadingly*, to a vastly higher righteousness than its. To all others liberty is a prematurity, a delusion, and a snare. Christianity, therefore, comes not to destroy one tittle of the law, nor pretends to dispense with its essential functions in human education. He who teaches so “is least in its kingdom,” and ignorant of its economy. The Jewish Law, indeed, was never binding upon Gentiles, nor is it now upon the Gentile church. She took pains to ascertain her freedom in the first council at Jerusalem. Upon the Jews themselves it is still binding, whether they be baptized or no. No line of it has ever been repealed, except by desuetude. Whoever is circumcised is still a debtor to keep the whole of it; as Christ himself did; as did all His Apostles, and all their Jewish disciples, so long as we have history. And the present position of Israel is this, that, having made an “idol” of its letter, and sacrificed thereto its growing purpose, they are now deprived of both. God has stamped Nehushtan upon all the “gods” that once *did* save them, and now has driven themselves into a larger wilderness, to learn the thing they signified. An Unsparing Law that they cannot keep, and an Unsparing Providence, chastising its violation, are now their hard taskmasters, until they are willing to receive that Higher than Moses, whom they, in a half-allegiance to some higher than Pharaoh, deliberately thrust away.

From the whole letter, therefore, of the Jewish Law as such, the present Church is free; but not from its spirit and principles. In fact, these are her own spirit and principles; she inherits

them from Christ. By these is she too a law to herself, a source of law to all her members. In what form she shall embody them depends upon their need. She is "free" or "bound" to legislate for them at her best discretion—free or bound to reimpose the Jewish or any other law, with or without alterations, and to vary them from time to time as she deems expedient; so as it be done, not for the sake of law, but for the sake of culture—for the edifying of the body of Christ. And she has always exercised this right; has imposed *her own* Sabbath, Priesthood, Ceremonial, Liturgy, Doctrine, Discipline, and Canon of Scripture; and has varied these or some of them as she found adviseable. Her Lord gave her the initiative and pregnant germs of almost all of them. By His Resurrection and Pentecost began her Sabbath, and marked it out as not merely a day of rest, but as eminently a day of sabbath-work. By His Discourses commenced her Scripture; by His Baptismal Formula, her Creed. By the Lord's Prayer, the Sacraments, and the ordination of the Twelve, commenced her Priesthood, Liturgy, and Ceremonial. Presently the Council of Jerusalem initiates a second line by imposing the keypoints of *restrictive* ordinance. Round these beginnings the whole system of the Church grew up, and, combining with much of the Northern Feudalism, and much of the Roman Law, organized and built up Europe. Up this great framework Christians climb, and many drink in the spirit of her highest gospel, and preach what they have found. But let those who preach it remember always the wisdom of Him who preached it first. It comes not to supersede the law or any of its natural antecedents, but to endorse and reinspire them while it commands their service. It makes them all its ministers, indeed, and insists that they shall point the humblest always, and do their best to raise him beyond themselves into the glorious liberty of the children of God. But then it assigns the highest honour to the most effective servant; and it energizes and "enables" all their ministrations with a loftier spirit, and directer sanctions from on high.

The Gospel is not an "institution," therefore; it rests on other institutions, and is an atmosphere surrounding them. The effete and stagnant it does indeed burn up, but the green and fresh it

quickens and matures. Hence, it wars not with institutions as such, whether represented by the Temple or by Cæsar; the charge was *false in both cases*; but it is an unseen Royalty, which finds its subjects everywhere, and by their personal influence, and the salt of their contact, converts the kingdoms of this world into the kingdoms of God and of his Christ. We must preach it, therefore, not as subverting institutions, but as honouring, regenerating, and assimilating them, baptizing them into its profession, and imparting the communion of its life.

In time, no doubt, it will also tell upon their *form*, and cause them all to preponderate towards the spiritual. If the world last long enough, this Life, like every other life upon it, must organize and unify itself, and build its elements into some great Tabernacle—a body fitted for its soul. But it must first grasp its elements, and energize and vitalize them, ere they are fit for its purpose, or could be other than injurious. This “Stone without hands,” this power without executive, must alter and absorb all other powers, as it grows into the mountain of the Lord’s House, and occupies the earth. Whatever resists it, man or institution, will, no doubt, receive to itself damnation. Whatever falls on it will be broken—that on which it falls will be ground to powder. But it courts not, nor provokes resistance, for it comes not to destroy. It abhors strife, yields to violence, and conquers by submission. Its arms are spiritual, and whichever of its apostles takes the vulgar sword must perish by the same. But by the foolishness of preaching it reaches the inner sentiment of men, and by their inner sentiment works its outward change—trusting itself meanwhile to the great Conscious and Unconscious Agencies which underlie it and surround it, and which, led and organized by it, will build in time its just embodiment.

Eminently, therefore, the twofold condition which we have noted in every “mission,” and in every “good,” characters the Gospel:—

1. It is no finality, but only a stage in progress—a *first-fruit* of life and immortality a first Advent which comes to preach a Second—an implicit kingdom which must make itself explicit—a self-diffusing prophecy which must fulfil itself—a dissemination

of principles which must expand and fructify—the beginning of a temple which must be built and consecrated—the WORD of a New Genesis, which creates a higher Cosmos towards a higher MAN.

2. It disparages not its natural antecedents, but enforces and improves. This is indeed the fundamental character of nature and of grace. Each higher kingdom, and higher word, comes not to destroy its predecessors, but to head and crown them, while it “commands” their service. Nay, by the constitution of things, such act were suicidal; for, while each crowns, it rests on them; while it refines and points their purpose, *theirs* is the power it wields, and theirs the means it must employ. Its just antecedents in History, they are also its living basis in Constitution, and its perennial source of strength. The permanent power of each highest is measured always by the permanent power of that next below it, down to its humblest appointed antecedent. All Life works upward from below, in large, well-marked gradations; and the order of its Growth is also the order of its Coexistence. Earth’s successive periods, be they Days or Sabbaths, are also its successive and ascending Strata both in geologic and in living Nature, up to the highest Supernatural. These grades or strata are creation’s Hierarchy. By these is she built into a cone or pyramid, up which her individual living things must climb her visible mount, by imbibing whose spirit and principles they must climb the mount of the Invisible.

Specially, the gospel supposes prior institutions, civil and religious, and all I have marked as the mission of the priest. These it subordinates to itself—but does not injure or destroy; it relies on them essentially. It must find them or create them. Without their constant action, itself were unintelligible. Were it not for the long preparation of the Jewish institutes, Christ Himself had been an anachronism, and His Gospel pearls before swine. Were it not for the like patient training received by Europe from the Mediæval Church, all we call Protestant Christianity were pernicious or impossible. Were it not for the present action of the same or of analogous institutions in *every* part of Christendom, the New Testament itself were powerless except for anarchy or negation. Nay, brethren, each highest requires the lowest; and

we must learn to "comprehend" and "constitute," if we would catch the Spirit of Creation, or understand the Catholicity of the Church. The mind does not destroy the body; nor the New Testament obliterate the Old; nor God's name of Love blot out His name Jehovah, or His earlier name, Almighty. As Sanctity comes not to destroy Morality, but to illumine and empower it. As marriage and morality and law come not to impair the natural growth and enjoyments of mankind, but to organize and increase and elevate them. As man's dominion comes not to devastate the face of nature, but to tend, and plant, and beautify it, garden-like, nay, Eden-like, and elicit its productiveness. Or as vegetation itself comes not to desolate the Earth, but to clothe its solid floor with a carpet of green life, every tiny point whereof lifts up, in delicate worship, its head, and flower, and fruit to heaven, ere it yields itself to be consumed by vitalities above its own, enabling higher aspiration. So, eminently, the highest kingdom of them all comes not to dishonour or destroy, but to reinspire and bless, to correct, refine, and raise, as it imparts the consciousness of the Unknown, and helps and teaches all to utter The One Unutterable Name. The humbler might readily mistake this correlation, but the highest ought not. And the Catholic Church, planted deep on earth, and wedded to the skies, ought to be the one institution which can understand Creation's symmetry, and feel its growing purpose, as itself grows up from that which every joint supplies to Him who is its Head—the First-born of every creature,—the Alpha and Omega of all.

The outline of the Church's Work, therefore, and its essential Order is as follows:—(1) Foster Growth; (2) Encourage or insist on Toil; (3) Institute civil and religious Law; (4) Breathe into all and preach around them all the everlasting Gospel; and (5) Remember that this too is but the beginning of the end; refuse, therefore, all finality, as essentially unchristian and unnatural, and turn all faces towards the Coming Better.

In this order the Church must do her work *abroad*—remembering the extreme diversity of her materials, and adapting herself thereto. Not giving that which is holy to the dogs, nor strong meat to babes, nor pouring her new wine into incapable

recipients, but dealing with all according to the weakness, or the hardness, or the blindness of their hearts. Imparting, if only from pure compassion, Christ's loaves and fishes and material good to those humble savages who, plainly, are able to receive no other sacrament than the simplest *bread* of life. Next, imposing firm rebuke and stringent rule, as the physique grows strong and lusty, and needs them, and can bear them. Following this up with *definite* and palpable "religion," as minds become developed, and *mental habits* must be "set." And leading all, as fast as each can follow, beyond their habits, and beyond every sign, and form, and formed result, into the presence of the Signified.

In this order she must constitute her elements and maintain her work *at home*,—remembering that the like diversity of materials, and in the like relation, "coexists" in her every section or subsection,¹ from the nation or city down to the parish or the

¹ Shall I say this more fully? Obviously, then, the *first* mission comprises all those cares and duties which respect the very young—one-fourth, perhaps, of the attention of any civilized society. Our bodily wants constitute the *second*—more than another fourth. The *third* consists of the positive machinery of all higher wants—pulpit, press, school, court, or theatre. The other two are less definite, but not less real. It is they which work the incessant *improvement* in all machineries, ties, duties, charities, estates. Their common object is "the better than we see." But the first (No. 4) knows what it intends; can define its Better, and teach its outlines. Whereas the object of the last (No. 5) is the *Unknown Better*—not yet definite, but only looming in the vague; not yet the Word, but only the Spirit and power that prepare its birth; or, not yet the Second Advent, but only yet its Paraclete—*condemning* every self-satisfaction, *endorsing* and directing every aspiration after good.

The "object" of this last is indeed most "vaguely" apprehended; but it is in no *other* sense "negative" to us. There is a continuous endeavour to grasp it, or part of it, in a concept; and a very frequent success in this endeavour, which adds its result first to No. 4, then to No. 3, or 2. But to call this process "negative thinking" is a misnomer, due to a false analysis, or giving birth to one. The Unknown, or the Unknown Better, is not the "object" of any form of thinking "to whose object we do not attribute existence." Explicitly the opposite. Nothing affects us more positively, more vehemently, or more constantly. Habitually it deepens all our thoughts and feelings; in our supream moments it announces itself as a fresh inspiration from the Fountain of all "being." Into this continual Better we are being born.

But this philosophic error being avoided, and our grades conceived, their "coexistence" in the *family* is obvious, as also their co-operation and mutual dependence. And a little attention will show them as distinctly both in *social* and in *individual* constitution. I will urge one or two points which are often overlooked. Our enlightenment, running chiefly on No 4, is apt to become shallow—shrinks from No. 5, which alone can keep

family; nay, that their true analogues are found in every individual constitution. Let her teach us, therefore; to bear and forbear—to love every effort, and honour every gift, which may help the low to think, and the high to lead, and the whole body to

it fresh, and disparages the others, especially No. 4, which alone can give it permanence. Thus it falls into the errors which are best described by Quakerism. Pure Quakerism—or the attempt to dispense with institutions as such—is no doubt a sound theory for the millennium. Even here it is quite possible, or even useful, so long as it is confined to a *small* minority. A few tolerably educated people may safely trust themselves to the Inward Light alone, so long as the rest do not. The firm laws and formed habits of the whole community sustain for them an elevated level, and sustain themselves upon it. But their balloon floats merely from the greater gravity of the surrounding medium; and the sooner they could attenuate it to the consistency of their own good intentions, the quicker the aeronauts would come to grief. A permanent society without established and fitting ordinances is as impossible as an organization without organs or a circulation without veins. Quakerism itself can only maintain its separate existence by freezing part of its spirit into small artificial differences—the rest of the community supplying the more substantial and natural traditions. A whole nation of Quakers must soon recast their Quakerism, and enact just such laws as we. Institutions are the directing lines, habits, *mores* of society, along which its motive forces work. To shock, derange, or seriously impair them, were to demoralize Society; to destroy them were to reduce Society to its elements, and force inspiration itself to begin again from Chaos.

Our Quakerism, indeed, is never thorough, nor our doctrinaireship logical. Common sense obliges men's hasty "truth" to try and find its place. But we have seen much of it, and may see much yet, among those who are not Quakers. The desire to reform is often revolutionary, and mistakes destruction for improvement. I have sometimes asked, for example, of those who are most earnest in denouncing "Popery" in Ireland, what would result if they suddenly should get their wish?—suppose every Roman Catholic clergyman in Ireland could, for experiment's sake, with his own consent and that of the people, be removed at once to the Isle of Man, and an enlightened Protestant clergyman, with plenty of Bibles, Lectures, Sunday Schools, and tracts, established in his place—how long would it be before, in the plain interests of morality and public order, the priestly rule would be required again? I have been myself surprised at the freedom with which red-hot proselytizers will acknowledge—not six weeks! They will say, indeed, that it is the priests themselves who have *caused* this low state of things; but this also is a fallacy, and in its main part false. The priests have not done their best to raise the people—*who* has?—and so far they are to blame. But we were vastly worse before confession, penance, and High-mass, than we ever have been since? Nay, let us labour for improvement always; let us not revolutionize, especially at the bidding of doctrinaireship, "principles," or "ideas." Of all this class of wisdom, pure Quakerism is the type.

No doubt it is sometimes requisite to break habits and institutions, or whole systems of them, when they will obstinately refuse improvement. But wisdom will always shrink from this necessity; and, when it has arrived, will make haste to impose some better law—involving in it, like Moses, a progressive element [p. 161]. Despite of every care

progress. Not allowing us to crush each other into some fixed pattern or stagnant level, but encouraging every light, and nurturing every energy, and multiplying every endowment, and diffusing around them all "that most excellent gift of charity,

this also may crystallize itself in time, and the yoke of Moses [Acts, xv. 10] become more unbearable than Pharaoh's. Then we must find a higher Moses, and make a higher Exodus, to pass presently beneath a higher Law. All our creation "runs in cycles." We go from law to law, as from faith to faith, or from one generation to the next. The law is always as needful for us as instruction is; and the individual or the community which does not strictly maintain it in *one form, must only take the greater pains to maintain it in another.*

Thus, the Jewish and the Roman Law having been overwhelmed, the Church established her's—ceremonial and discipline for the masses, the religious orders for deeper piety and more developed thought. This raised Europe to a certain point, and then fell into self-satisfaction and stagnation. Against it, therefore, when it refused to reform itself, the modern mind rebelled. But, having achieved its liberty, what did this mind do next? Why, imposed upon itself a stricter mental and moral discipline—a severe doctrinal law or "orthodoxy," represented by the Sabbath and the "Scriptures," and enforced by terrors surpassing those of purgatory. The intolerance of these doctrinal systems is horrifying to the philosophers; yet it is patent to observation that the continued vigour of the Protestant communities may be nearly measured by the continued stringency with which they have maintained their law.

Mr. Buckle is indignant with the Scottish system, for example. He thinks Scotland, next to Spain, the most priest-ridden country in Europe! It is not fair to say *priest-ridden*; the clergy there are quite as much commanded by their own presbyteries, and ruled by the pervading sentiment, as any class in the community is ruled by them. They are only lords by being very humble ministers. But North Britain, I admit, be it praise or blame, is *law-ridden*, or *law-devoted*. It is under a strict religious system, which is not the less a "law" because they choose to call it "Gospel." This offends Mr. Buckle, and I do not defend it in detail. But any historian ought to see that it has been the permanent wellspring of the nation's energy; the cradle and nurse of Scottish intellect, morality, industry, success. Destroy it, without providing a sufficient substitute, and the grand qualities of Scotland would quickly be lost in mental confusion, dissipation, and debauch. I admit there is a serious danger on the other side, which those who love it best will do well to heed. The whole "System of Education" must itself advance. If it pretend to finality, and resist the better, it resists the Christ. It will either oblige a revolt, or else it will crush and atrophy the nation's energies, as too successful Popery has done in Spain.

Catholicity seeks to comprehend and harmonize all elements—not, however, by levelling, exterminating, or crushing into uniformity, but by loving, honouring, organizing all. And it preserves itself, not by stopping progress, or denouncing change, but by its own resolute and orderly advance. Forms, Doctrines, Ordinances, are not themselves Religion; they are but its framework. Yet it is along this framework that its life blood flows, and round it that its living Temple is mysteriously built up. Institutions are its bone and sinew. Let it maintain them carefully; and let it keep them *fresh*.

without which whosoever liveth is counted dead before Thee." *This* it is, brethren, that cements and assimilates and builds. Prophetic insight may discern the plan and purpose. Knowledge may conceive the edifice, and exhibit its elevation and its sec-

Correlated with them in the *individual* are our definite opinions, our formed habits, our specialized sentiments: and all I have urged of the social is equally true of the individual constitution. I will only notice one point which "advanced thinkers" almost always overlook, namely, that "the strength of our expansive principles is measured to the last by the strength of the corresponding narrow ones, in which they have their genesis." Ser. V., 196.

Philanthropy, for example, or general benevolence, is born of the domestic affections. These have generated, exercised, developed all true generosity, self-denial, and self-sacrifice. It is these also, or such individual affections as can best supply their place, which must always keep it fresh. Divorced from them, the sincerest generosity will quickly lose itself in fantastical ideas, and become caprice and verbiage. The Southern planter, who loves his household slave, may have some true regard for Africans, and exert himself to do them good. But the Northern Abolitionist, who cannot bear a negro in his street or workshop, what mean his "principles" or zeal? "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," is the Christian Canon of benevolence—not very pretentious, but very searching and very sound. And who is my neighbour? Father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, servant, slave—these are very near neighbours, and not far from "the first commandment with promise." But the extreme case of the "near and dear" is the one *exclusive* affection, the conjugal; and this is, in the last resort, the wellspring of them all. In proportion as this is weakened, or broken, or dispersed, all the heart affections are on the broad road to dissipation. How long, in such a case, will any wider benevolence survive?

It is the same with intellect. Our power to generalize depends always on our power to specialize, and is indeed but another form of it. Abstraction is *not* "merely non-attention to certain parts;" it is concentrated attention to certain other parts. And the parts selected for this intensified attention are determined by our *insight* or instinctive perception of the key features of the case. Nor is it in masses of statistics that truth or knowledge lies—I have quoted a couple of instances [*notes*, pp. 242, 261], and might quote a thousand—but, again, in that discriminating insight which can classify and use these rude materials, *excluding* from each aspect all that is irrelevant. Nor is it in "the general" that any truth is first discovered, though it will there be confirmed and demonstrated. Genius ranges wide; but to its true insight it is the fall of an apple which declares the orbit of a planet, or the form and genesis of a drop of water that reveals the genesis of worlds. [LECT. I., vol. 2.]. When its power to grasp particulars is gone, genius itself can neither distinguish nor compare: it is dissipated and destroyed.

Eminently it is the same with piety. This comes through the straitest gate and narrowest way; this ranges the widest, and aspires the highest; yet its power to the last depends on this very straitness, narrowness, exclusiveness. It is essentially a Pharisee or a Nazarene [p. 156]. From first to last it sanctifies itself [John, xvii. 19]; and its sanctity is separation always; and always the more intense and intolerant, the more it seeks to universalize itself, and affirms that "all things are clean to it," and will "do all

tions in detail. Industry may prepare the materials, and set them in their place. But what shall make it all a living Temple of the Lord? Brethren, in that ultimate Life of LOVE all things "consist." Let Christ's Body impart to us the communion, the consciousness, and the power thereof.

to the glory of God." Indifferentism, confusion, mental dissipation, are its abhorrence. It suspects Theism; it can bear no Pantheism, except express Theocracy. Its Universal Providence is its most Special Providence universalized. Its only universal Grace is loving Judgment, searching, purifying all. It separates itself only that it may define its efforts, and concentrate and intensify its energies, and reach some point unreached before. Then, *this point* it carries with it everywhere, and makes *it* its ark, and centre of its worship. This is in fact the theory of sanctity, and any infringement of it makes it false from end to end. The Most High dwelleth not in temples made with hands. He is as much *outside* of any temple, or Sabbath, or Book, or liturgy, or soul, as He is within it. But if we would see God *everywhere*, not in mist, but definitely, the prime requisite is to see Him *somewhere*. In the intensity which attains this, when God makes it necessary for us, the higher knowledge and higher faculty are born at once. Thenceforward, indeed, all things are new. "This temple" can find every place a Bethel, and every thing a Sacrament. It is itself both shrine, and priest, and living sacrifice. It sees God, then, in *every* place and thing, because it realizes Him in *each*. And its power to do so is always measured by the power with which it recognises that "its body is the temple of the Holy Ghost, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in it."

In general, therefore, let every individual and every community, how far soever they have advanced in the "Catholic, Comprehensive, Universal," be careful to maintain "the Definite," if they would avoid falling back into "the Vague."

I need hardly repeat that it is an error to suppose that our Lord or His apostles abrogated the Jewish law. No idea could be more false. He observed it always, and "taught men so." In fact, it was while engaged in fulfilling its enactments that He was made Himself "our Passover." After His death His disciples kept it strictly—far more conscientiously, no doubt, than the Jews who were not baptized—especially the apostles, including even the Apostle of the Gentiles. No doubt, like David, or like Christ, Paul affirmed his own superiority to its letter, and his "liberty" to break it or reverse it on what he deemed a just occasion. But we may be sure that this was a liberty he used most sparingly, both for the sake of others and himself. His last journey to Jerusalem was, like his Master's, in order to keep it. It was while strictly observing its details, and on the usual, though false, charge of having violated it, that he too concluded his public ministry. He affirms himself [Acts, xxv. 8], and allows others to affirm for him [xxi. 24], that he always walked orderly, keeping the law. He circumcised Timothy, in order to content the Jews, although his father was a Greek. He could shear his own head in Cenchrea, and tarry there—in the sight of enlightened Corinth—"because he had a vow." And in fact Paul the Apostle deemed himself to the last to be still Paul the Pharisee. "Brethren, I *am* a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee; for [the Pharisees' special 'truth'] the resurrection of the dead, I am this day called in question by the Jews." [Acts, xxiii. 6.]

I have treated so fully of the Church personal, that I cannot now speak much of its Doctrine—that “body of divinity” which forms, as it were, the science of religion. Obviously, it too has been a growth, a development from very small beginnings. Its germ, the Baptismal Formula; its trunk, the Creeds; its expansion, a goodly tree, under which many and diverse things find it possible to rest. Its progress has been slower than that of the Church personal; naturally, as it is a more mental thing: and any science justly so called is but prior fact and ruder observation refined and theorized. It is the Church’s form of thought, and, ever balancing her mental efforts, has a sort of sensitiveness of its own, as though it were her Intellect. It bears, perhaps, the same relation to our dispensation that the Bible bore to the ancient Jewish Church, and when complete may guide some future world. As yet, however, it is, like the Church personal, *only in the middle of its work*; with clear, strong, leading principles, and a spontaneous vigour which accumulates experience day by day; but in all details tentative, elastic, fallible; and very often, even in its total action, at fault, ill-balanced, and ill at ease. It has had two principal periods of activity—one, its early statement, due to the Grecian mind; the other, which is yet in its non-age, the upgrowth of modern thought. On comparing it with the suggestion of my text, one sees that it resembles not an annual, but some perennial or deciduous plant, which can rest in winter-time, and puts forth its energies in successive periods, while still preserving its central stem.

Three axioms or truisms in respect to doctrine, I trust, pervade these sermons—

I. All doctrine itself, and the Church itself, with all their appliances—priest, sacrament, or Book—are for Culture, Sanctification, Education, *only*. Redemption they cannot touch. All “abstract and essential,” all *a priori*, objective or ontologic “difficulties”—in whatever terms we should describe them—God Himself has “reconciled” in the Person of His Son. He in whom all things consist has satisfied them all. It remains that His creation realize this Emmanuel, be conformed or transformed to His image, and reconciled to God in Him. In this last alone is the province of Religion and the Church.

They denounce, therefore, all pretension of *either* Church or Doctrine to frank men into some relationship of acceptance with God, independent of their moral character; or to procure for us any positions in a future world not determined by our "fitness," or not "according to our works." All such ideas are fond and dangerous delusions, which pervert the functions of the Church, and convert her very truth into a lie.

True, the Church is "in covenant" with God—and so are all His works, each according to its grade. Her covenant is the *consciousness* of Grace, and the high calling to teach it to them all, and organize their gratitude into explicit utterance. She is no violation of Nature, therefore; but its great growing Temple, its living Priest, and its continual Prophet. She is no disturber of History, therefore; but she is the social Kingdom which embodies its Aspiration, and carries on its Purpose. She is no miracle-monger or enchantress to her children, therefore; but a great loving patient Mother—who bears us in her womb and bosom, and, having trained and taught us all she knows, and learned along with us all she can discern, lays us each with reverence in the Arms of The Unseen. And to God and Heaven she is no small pretender after deity, no petty usurper of incommunicable attributes; but she is the Betrothed of the Eternal Son; nay, she is—behold a mystery—at once the Virgin Mother of Christ's Body, and His pregnant Bride; and she looks forward, intensely, together with a whole travailing Creation, to her great Purification and Justification-Day.

II. I need not say these Sermons believe in Progress; and build their estimate of things on the hypothesis that "we are in the middle of a scheme; not a fixed, or final, but a progressive, one;" a scheme in which the Good, the Merciful, predominates both in its Character and its History. They reject, therefore, all finality, uniformity, immutability, immobility, and fixedness, in respect to all created things, visible and invisible. Creation in their conception is not one or a few spasmodic acts, but God's continuous action—the self-revelation of Exhaustless Deity—connected always, orderly, and "like itself," as it issues from the Fount of Being, but also ever fresh and new, and rising "above itself;" in some half-conscious correlation with the Ever-Be-

gotten and Ever-Ascending Word. THE CHRIST is to us, therefore, the just type and Archetype of things. He also expresses the "truth of things" to our best understanding.

This does not mean that truth is variable, in the sense that what is true to-day could ever be or have been false. But it does affirm that all Creation's truth is partial, growing, expansive, and conscious of the inconceivable. Each separate affirmation, therefore, has its proportion and its place; which it must keep, else it is *not* true. On the other hand, the smallest and most partial truth, *if it know its own partialness, and state itself accordingly*,—that is, if it justly subordinate itself to the surrounding infinite—is a true affirmation of The Absolute, and is as "absolutely" true as any truth whatever. CHRIST, then, at the head of humanity, and therefore of all earth's vitalities, and correlated with them all, drawing into Himself all their just sympathy and just aspiration, and carrying them upwards with power, through death and resurrection, into the Sabbath that befits us—in complete subordination always, actively and passively, to the Will He always felt—is Creation's Truth, so far as this planet is capable of its apprehension. More partially; His intellectual insight, if known to us on any subject, would command the human intellect, and be recognised as man's *intellectual* or abstract truth. His moral feeling, and act, and judgment, in any given circumstance, were man's *moral* truth. His sense of the refined, and just, and beautiful, in presence of any visible, were man's best *aesthetic*. His ambitions denominate man's *purpose*. He was the actual "perfect man" whom thinkers labour to conceive. That is, Christ *as He was* was all this. But even here there is no finality. "Even had we known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we Him no more." He is risen and transfigured; and now a higher humanity is being generated by His Paraclete, whose ultimate and Ideal is Christ *as He IS*. What shall be *its* lineaments and powers, "it doth not yet appear." We have received firstfruits of both, and are being-born towards it; and yet our best concepts of it are, probably, as unlike the Fact, as were the best Jewish anticipations unlike the True Messiah. Yield we to His "mighty working," and fellow-work therewith—un-

consciously we shall attain His likeness, and know as we are known.

III. I need hardly add, these Sermons believe in Unity; reject all duality, and regard self-contradiction as a proof, not of "weakness" merely, but of error. Indeed, they hold duality itself to be the most fatal of mistakes; the theoretic antichrist; the mental reflex of want of faith and of a single eye; as ambiguity and darkness in the central life. It is familiar to us with what intense indignation prophetic insight has always challenged this duplicity; how fiercely the seers have unmasked, denounced, pursued it. In their eyes any trifling, tampering, or dallying with it has always been the most loathsome of "unfaithfulness." Such as do not discern the importance of a central truth and central purity, may wonder at their pertinacity; perhaps resent it. The world, half-grateful, has adorned their tombs.

It has its plausibility, no doubt, else it could not mislead. On the surface there is much to say for it. Does not every line run out in two opposite directions? Are there not two sides, a dark and a bright one, to the earth itself, and to every earthly thing? Are not things themselves "given to us in correlation?" Does not the very separation which sanctity, or even morality, implies, affirm the like dichotomy? And is not the finite itself, by its very finiteness, parted for ever from the Infinite? Nay, this is but verbiage; look at it, and it disappears; any attempt to state it can only expose its fallacy. The two directions balance themselves around some point; *only in its relation* are they either "opposites" or "directions:" and they meet, besides, even in the infinity of our conception, which is again only a larger "point" of our own incomprehensible. The two sides, in like manner, balance themselves around some centre; only in its relation are they "sides." Our life is the centre of its own two sides; and we are ourselves the centre of all our own correlatives. They are only the nearer to and the farther off from us; the remoter melting again into that infinitude, whereof we and ours are but some "differential." That finite which *can* be "parted" from the Infinite, and has not therein its "being," is no "thing" whatever. It is a sheer nonentity, a "vain" imagination. So is any

sanctity or "moral principle" which could build itself within partition walls, believing its own "objectiveness," or that of "sin" or "evil." These are all relative to Law; not indeed to arbitrary enactment, if such law there be, but to some deep pervading Law of nature and of God. And such law there is. God will have His creatures grow—grow upward into the knowledge of Himself. This Great Command, written within us and without—of which all other laws are secondaries, and not perhaps so arbitrary as they look—develops all the difference, natural and moral. Whatever obeys or furthers it, is good; whatever deranges or obstructs it, evil. To do this consciously, is moral good and evil; to do it with explicit consciousness of God, is holiness or sin. To us, Good is the attractive force with which God leads us on; Evil, the rod wherewith He visits our loitering or our aberrations.

But *why* should there be these loiterings or aberrations? This we pretend not to explain. All *our* philosophy sits at the feet of "things." The abstract "fitness" of their being permitted, ordained, created—in relation to the Universal Cause these words all mean the same—and also their "reconcilement," as I have said, God takes it on Himself. And He has given us assurance thereof—vaguely, in our own convictions; formally and explicitly, in Earth's central Example.

Metaphysically, Christ is the expression to us of God's equal *presence* in all things—in good and evil; in life and death; in the material and the spiritual; in the seen and unseen; in the minutest finite and the utmost infinite; and of His equal appointment and equal sustainment of them all.

Morally, His Cross and sepulchre reveal this fundamental truth, or paradox, or mystery, that in its just position and just use extremest evil is the highest good; while His Life reveals the complemental truth, that the force which *places* things aright, which converts each evil into good, each good into eternal good, is identical with the just ambition of the creature and his highest sense of duty—his insight and aspiration after God.

Historically, Christ expresses the total triumph of the Good, *all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding*;—that the course

of things is so appointed as to vindicate their authorship, and to manifest even *by* all clouds and darkness, and within and around them all, the out-comprehending Grace: and—

Spiritually, or to the religious consciousness, Christ expresses the SYMPATHY of God;—that in all our good and evil, down to the bottom of our sins, God cares for us, “feels with us,” *bears* with us all our miseries, and tenders us from the Eternal Bosom the COMMUNION of a Father’s Severity and Love.

Surely, in affirming all these truths, and in giving them guarantee, embodiment, machinery, the Christian revelation but carries on the meaning and purpose of Creation, and makes explicit what God has written on the face of nature, in the conduct of Providence, and in the deepest convictions of man’s heart.

All things, then, “are of God;” and all are being educated into the knowledge and built up into the expression of His Truth. But half-done work may readily be mistaken in detail, however clear be its tendencies and end. Hence there abound, even to the best, perplexities and temptations; with law and sin and chastisement—revealing ever, to those who are “exercised” thereby, far more abounding grace. Thus even temptation and the tempter are an ordinance of God, “sent forth to minister.” And these may be anything whatever. As there is no evil which true insight and endeavour will not transform to good, so there is no “blessing” which the want of them will not convert into a fatal adversary. The highest earthly eminence, the first apostle of the Church, some angel of enlightenment, or some spiritual triumph, may be the actual Satan. And he will rest his argument as freely on the letter of Scripture, or the very pinnacle of Christianity, as on any mystery of Providence or necessity of life. Whatever it be, however, or in whatever guise, it will always yield to our universal talisman. Look through it straight. “See” *in* it Him *in* whom *it is*, and *then* command it—“Worship the Lord thy God; Him only shalt *thou* serve,”—for this, too, is written. “Written, where?” Written, Satan, in the framework of thy heart and being, and in every consciousness thou hast! It is this fire-writing which searches the joints and marrow, and gives to

every external word its significance and power. Were things without a "sense of God," they might, perhaps, be any perplexity to each other; but this conviction added, they quickly take their place, and each must minister, perforce, in kindness or antagonism, to those whom God instructs. But is not this brow-beating the intellect instead of answering it? Certainly not. The sense of God is, to the intellect, as palpable a fact as love or hate, or any fact whatever; and the instant light and order it diffuses, the power with which it builds the chaos into cosmos, is as total a satisfaction to the intellect as any it receives. So much so, indeed, that intellect is under the temptation, and often yields to it, of supposing the whole solution due to *its own* necessities, and ascribes religion's genesis to itself.

In the field of abstract thought, then, *so as it be clear and firm*, there is no place for dualism; nor is there in any other field, with the same proviso. It is only a "temptation" which every man has within him the elements to overcome. Our own constitution repudiates it, in harmony, no doubt, with the constitution of things. We disgust it in all the relations of common life—duplication in morals, ambiguity in science, dissimulation in purpose, in æsthetics any violation of the unities. Surely the conscience and the creed might well find its thought unbearable. Yet our shortcomings in practice give the tempter room. In the waves and winds, still oftener in the calm, we look aside and doubt, and presently begin to sink. Then our moral weakness reacts upon our theory, and dualism can find its advocates even in the Church. At least up to a certain point. They seldom force themselves to any definite conclusion; some power within, or want of power, forbids it. So far as their ideas form a system, or can boast historic origin, their home is in the stagnant or declining East, whence they periodically invade the Church—sometimes its morals, in waves of rude asceticism; sometimes its philosophy, in various grades of neo-platonism.

1. To "philosophers," so called, pure matter is some natural difficulty or antagonist of God, whom they identify with some abstraction of pure intellect, or pure intellect itself. What is "pure matter," or what "pure intellect," they find it hard to say.

Common men do not believe in either; nor do the Christian creeds. We know no matter which is not possessed of force. We know no force, or life, or intellect, which does not act from a material base. Matter and Force, so far as we know, are coessential and indissoluble, and indissoluble also from that Something which is behind them both—that “real Being,” whether it be pure intellect or no, whose Manifestation and Energy¹ they are, and in whose Communion they and their exhaustless variations exist and coexist.

We acknowledge, in this philosophy, pure and lofty aims, but a loftiness which, by dis severing itself from “fact,” immediately becomes self-exaltation and “vanity.” It was in express antagonism to it that the Christian creeds, and some parts of the Christian Scriptures, were developed.

2. Its representative in practice is the ruder mystic—perpetuated still in celibate, and monk, and puritan—who finds his body evil, and all the natural appliances of life so many compromises with a sin. They are “necessary,” or half necessary “evils;”—under this ungracious title the votary of an idea, with a half conscience and divided heart, accepts or refuses the beneficence of God. He means well; and so far as he does so there is One who will reward him. Nor is he useless to the world. Its crust of guilty indolence he shatters; its sleepy Sabbath he quickens and illumines; he stimulates some high ambitions, and raises a bulwark of rude self-denial which shelters many finer virtues than his own. His very errors, too, may be a needful lesson. Even goodness sometimes makes itself be known by some threatening of its contrast.

3. Christian Experience has found, in distracting passion, ill-set ambition, and unbalanced thought, a more potent enemy to its own advance, a more worthy antagonist for God, than either the animated body or the senseless mass. So, whatever force there is in the dualistic argument has gravitated to its spiritual devil. Men can find, too, “texts” in his support. No preacher will desire to weaken apprehension of such foes. But

¹ See Notes A and D.

will men find any text to make any devil other than the minister and slave of the Unseen ; obliged to eat of the fruit of his own doings ; performing for miserable hire some miserable function in God's universe, until he too shall meet, somewhere, the Universal Reconciliation face to face, and there be *no* escape—when it will be no longer fit or possible that he shall go “behind” Him, but he must fall down and worship, with whatever power of worship he retains.

4. But it is not in anything that lifts man, either in attractiveness or fear, above himself and above the known, that his fatal antagonist resides. It is in whatever makes him rest content with either, and slays his aspiration for the Higher. And *this* Satan is as pervading as any consciousness of good. The religious world can find him in religious gods as easily as the lower world in Mammon—as easily as the miser can make an idol of his gold, or the drunkard a devil of his wine. In the Church this also makes itself a system, and finds its centre in our “object of worship,” which by its definition is not the Inconceivable, but only His expression. By separating between these two, men fall into positive idolatry. And of this there are *two* kinds. We may worship either *idols* or *ideas*. If the religious world be low, its gods will be things visible—graven or molten images—first set up as representative of God, but presently receiving religious reverence themselves. Round these it will cultivate its æsthetic, and toil to make them as perfect as it can. If the religious world be higher, its idolatry will be idealatry ; its gods will be things “conceived”—Doctrines, Revelations, Rites, or Forms—also set up as representative of God ; but also presently absorbing religious reverence themselves. Round these society will cultivate its intellectual faculties, and these also it will render as perfect as it can. *By these* the spiritually-minded worship God : *these* the *phronema sarkos* worships *instead* of God ; these it serves ; to these it looks for mediation and mysterious help ; and in satisfying these it rests content, eschewing farther trouble.

With both these forms of duality, or gnosticism, we are familiar in Jewish history. Against the former a long line of prophets hurled themselves, and by their life and death abolished it

from Israel. The latter was finally unmasked by the Baptist and the Christ. Unsparingly pursued, it also turned to bay, and in defence, as it supposed, of Temple, Sabbath, Passover, thrust out their Signified into the hands of Gentiles. How the Gentiles, not knowing what they did, slew that Paschal Lamb, and have been made partaker of their sacrifice; and how they have been grafted on Israel's Calling, and now imbibe its fatness, carry on its light, and bless the world with its illumination, is the story most familiar to our ears. The Church finds herself, in truth, an enlarged and elevated Israel; with the ancient Promise and experience ever evolving and verifying themselves afresh. The question arises, is there any parallel in their temptations? Have we noted and escaped the sins which brought upon the Elder Son continual chastisement, and a complete excision? or is human nature yet unchanged, and able to repeat its doublings on our higher platform and in our brighter light? Who will make us sure? It is easy to discern Israel's idols, brethren; his own prophets have uncovered them. It is easy to denounce them too, or things resembling them, in all the outer world. But is there any mote or beam nearer to ourselves? There are always plenty of prophets to whisper "peace," and plenty always to cry "woe, woe"—it is cheap zeal and easy virtue—against the sins of *others!* "But is there not a prophet of the Lord besides," though but in prison and disgrace, to see for us things at home?

Yes, brethren, there is such a Prophet—preserved mysteriously in our midst, apparently for just such service—the appointed Witness of The One, who has ministered this special Truth to Church and world, and still does minister. Let us interrogate him in the audience of the people. The Excommunicate and outcast Israel, then, who now walks his lonely penance through the Christian Church, how must he judge the dispensation he beholds? Deprived of all his own idols, graven, molten, and conceived—shaken from all those gods in deference to whom he refused the Son of Man—obliged now for many a hundred years to worship God, if he worship Him at all, without ephod, or priest, or teraphim, or any self-coherent system, and forced by Providence to witness ours—how must he regard our worship

and our thought? He thrust out from Zion what we regard as its highest emanation—and we have believed it, and embodied it, and strive to live by it—how shines back its light into the face of one who is bound at all hazards to one simple, central, fundamental tenet—who must worship the I AM, and worship Him alone? Alas! brethren, I almost fear to say. He must in many respects admire and envy us. Yet, I am well convinced, he must as yet draw back from our invitation, and tremble at it, as in the presence of some terrible temptation.

God forbid, brethren, I should disparage the Church of Christ, or speak without reverence and fear of that Holy Institution in which we have been born. But does reverence mean flattery or praise? Not so, brethren, have we discerned her spirit, or sought to drink it in. She and we are but in the middle of our work, and bound to do our utmost. Unfaithfulness to one another is unfaithfulness to her, and unfaithfulness to God. We must judge ourselves, if we would not be judged of Him. Pray we then for the spirit of just judgment—not to believe every spirit, but to try them whether they be of God; and especially to eschew that easy censorship which, in denouncing others, tacitly exalts itself, and becomes “the accuser” of its brethren. The wisdom that is from above exacts “first purity” at home, and “truth in the inward parts.” The struggle after these will make us “*then* peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, without partiality, and without hypocrisy.” Oh, for some true catholicity to make us know our membership; so that whatever injury, or shame, or nakedness has afflicted, or is afflicting, any part, were truly felt by each of us as if it were his own.

I have insisted on the greatness of her work. The Church went down to the Barbarians, and has lifted them to light; or at least to a large appreciation of it. But has she banished darkness—has she chased away corruptions, falsities, pretences, positive idolatries? Nestle they not beneath her vestments? thrive they not self-multiplied beside her bosom? Nay, has she not solemnly ordained, and in her central worship, about the most palpable idolatry that ever shocked mankind? Can the Jew enter the temple of her æsthetic worship, and not start back

from a procedure, the like of which he never saw in Heliopolis or Babylon? Can he think of it, or hear of it, without reeling again beneath the burning sarcasm of Isaiah, and asking himself whether it is better that some carpenter, with line and plummet and ash-tree stump, or else some baker, should construct his god? Or will the theory that sustains this prodigy seem less monstrous in his eyes? The Church commands the facts of nature to be what those facts are not! Nature disregards the incantation; and the facts continue as they were. But then we are not to believe the facts, but to believe the Church; *for* the Church is final and infallible! She commands a miracle; and the miracle does not come to pass; but then we are to believe it does—*because* the Church is true! Can the Jew recollect any period when his own self-sufficiency and folly approximated this? Can he fail to remember those who had not “understanding” to deliver their souls, or say, “is there not a lie in my right hand?” Alas, the bulk of Christendom does well as yet to leave out the second commandment of the Decalogue.

We do not do it! no, not in this form. But we are part of the body of Christ which does it. There are those who would separate the Protestant Confessions from the Medieval Church; but the communities themselves have always repudiated such division, and with a true instinct insist on the unity of the outward and visible Church. The other apostles did not repudiate Peter because he alone drew his sword, and he alone followed his Master to the judgment hall, and he alone denied him to His face. Had they attempted it, they would have found that his Master did not repudiate him; and they might have been asked, besides, what better had *they* done? And this is the question for us. For the whole story is characteristic, and seems to have been prophetic. Peter's boldness but made him here again the type of the disciples, and threw into prominence the weakness and bewilderment of all. It is easy to denounce Peter's failings and Peter's sins; he carries them into act, and makes them broad and plain. It is harder to hate our own prevarications, not less real, if less daring and offensive. But think you, brethren, that all this open idolatry is without its upper

counterpart; or that "enlightened Christendom" nurtures not, and near its inner mind, things as ambiguous, and false, and dangerous as either trans- or con- substantiation. Nay, far more dangerous. For the very impotence the Church displays in her attempt to "interfere" with nature almost compensates itself, and obliges the most ignorant to lift his thoughts to the Invisible. And indeed any palpable idolatry is too low for cultivated men. It offends; but it can scarce delude them. In theory always it explains itself away. In practice every earnest soul bursts through it always, and worships One beyond. No man, even at the bidding of his Church, can bow down to a piece of bread, or ivory, or brass, as if it were Jehovah. A higher than the Church speaks out within; feels after the Unseen, and converts, in some unbalanced guise, his fetish to a sacrament. But upper gnosticism is not so easily seen through. Its principalities and powers are in many respects *above* us, and may mislead the holy aspiration. The idols which "exalt themselves" in intellect and heart, are far less easily cast down than such forms as Solomon or Gregory set up, or Josiah purged away. They are less suspected, far more loved and cherished; more Protean and persistent in their transformations, more narcotizing in their incubus, more dissipating to the highest purpose, more fatal to the soul. The lower faithlessness in Israel could slay the prophets one by one; but it could repent, and hear them from their tombs. The upper ignorance it was which slew the Prince of Life, *and in Him that whole Dispensation*. Will the Jew, who enters our highest doctrinal and intellectual temple, find us free from this? Brethren, I fear me not!

Is our "Orthodox" Protestantism a more living faith; is it less crystallized by traditional formula, fixed idea, and a complacent conviction of its own possession of "the truth," than common Romanism is, or than the Judaism was which brought Jerusalem to ruin? Is our "earnest" Protestantism farther advanced than the school of Gamaliel, which, making its boast of Scripture, Sabbath, and the undoubted Ordinance, made Annas and Caiaphas reject Christ as a blasphemer, and St. Paul persecute this way unto the death? Can the "enlightened"

Protestantism, which draws back from this extreme, maintain itself with any self-consistency? What is it but either a feeble indifferentism, unable to press any statement to its consequence; or else a narrow spiritualism, affecting to save religious light, by severing from it all other light, in some thin mystic stream unknown to nature, violating Providence, renouncing nine-tenths of the Church's Book, and a still larger proportion of her duties? Nay, does not this enlightenment virtually affirm itself as dead—its doctrine and truth complete, its "inspiration" terminated, its Paraclete already motionless, exhausted, or withdrawn?

Again, have we no finalities or infallibilities? Do we never sacrifice to them plain, palpable, unvarnished fact, or the plain integrity that would affirm the fact? Do we never use them to stigmatize inquiry or stifle honest thought—to cramp the growing truth, and try to freeze back our living Christ into some swathed-up Bambino? And are these finalities and infallibilities the less our own workmanship because we do not call them ours, but disguise them by the names of Christianity or Bible? Did Christ impose them? or appoint them? or admit them? When and where? To what point of time, or to what point of Truth, does He "limit" the teaching of His Paraclete? "He shall lead you into all truth. He shall teach you all things. All things that the Father hath are mine; therefore said I, he shall take of mine, and show them unto you." Does the Bible claim them for itself? where? Could the Jew find them in *his* Bible; or could we show him them in ours? Does any of the Creeds claim them for itself? or any of the Liturgies? or any of the great Reformations? Even if any of them did, what exposition of them could we point to that would not be *ours*? and that would not presently confute itself by its own inconsistencies and blunders, as signally as does the Roman infallibility of the Church? In general, is Christianity more final and infallible than Nature, or than Providence? Is it less anxious, less imperative than Nature that its children should always surpass the past, and be born into the Better? And does the Bible traverse this progressiveness, and forbid it to move on? It describes for us one great prior Day or Dispensation; it describes for us also the genesis

of ours. But where does it command our sun never to ascend above its rising—where does it pretend to wrap our new-born Christianity in leaden or in golden swathing bands, and command to keep it always in the manger?

Nay, brethren, our pretended finalities are all our own. They are our idols or ideas. An ever-ascending Truth and ever-teaching Paraclete are too exacting and too vague for us: we must have something more definite “to go before us,” if only back again to Egypt. The true Lawgiver, true Prophet, true Apostle, are too mean for our religion; we must shut our eyes on their humanity, and change them to false gods. We must “call Barnabas Jupiter, and Paul Mercurius, because he is chief speaker,” and make haste to worship them. The Romanist has great finalities and infallibilities to overawe the multitude, and we must have the same—so we proceed to finalize “the faith,” and to transubstantiate or consubstantiate the letter of the Bible—on just such authority as the Romanist, on just such arguments, and with just such apologies for unmitigable “defects.” Will not he also produce, as he supposes, plain Scripture affirmation for his quasi-Infallibility and quasi-Miracle? And do not we also argue—we “need” it, therefore we “have”—“it ought to be,” or “it must be,” therefore, “it is,” despite the evidence? Errors are not errors, contradictions are not contradictions, though we see them with our eyes. Indeed, to see them is irreverence; to say them is next door to blasphemy! The Truth itself must not be “criticized,” lest common sense and common reason might not discern it to be true!

How else, brethren, can any calm spectator view our Bibliolatry? Our gods are of a higher *species* indeed than Rome's, and need more intellect for their appreciation, but the two proceedings have absolutely no difference in kind. Which of them shall we offer to the Jew? Is he not familiar with them both? Shall he remember Aaron? or shall he remember those who *did* impose finality on Israel—those who paraded the Scriptures, and magnified and almost deified them, and who “searched” them too, “thinking that they had in them eternal life,” and who *only* refused, meantime, the living Truth they testified?

Once more, is our highest theory less bewildered and at war than these jarring sectaries and rival infallibilities? Can it command them by any central truth, or by *the* central truth—the unity of God—His pervading Authorship and as-pervading Law? Our Bible takes the utmost pains to impress it on us: so do our Creeds and Liturgies, our common language, our instincts, and our convictions. But has our intellect discerned it yet? Our traditional philosophy and received systems of theology, are they pervaded by it? Nay, are they not, notoriously, afraid of it or afraid to say it? They begin with it indeed, in some vague profession; but press them to any detail or consequence, and do they not immediately shuffle back, under the terror of heathenish ideas? Do they not—from fear of Materialism or Pantheism, or some other -ism, and especially from the dread of attributing to God some complicity with evil—soon mystify, forget, deny its very elements, and seek some peace with the invaders by surrendering our citadel?

Is this exaggeration, brethren? Search, then, our philosophico-theology—its morals, physics, metaphysics, and its dogma—where will you not find it weakened and betrayed by the essential Platonic doctrines, Dualism and Decline, and in vain resisting their essential consequence, self-contradiction, self-annihilation? Where will you not find dualism at first allowed, from fear, perhaps, of Pantheism; and presently dualism triumphant by mere force of logic, until at last consistency or self-coherence is no longer professed, except upon the condition of eliminating half our faculties, and imposing silence upon either “the reason” or “the faith”? Is there not everywhere allowed in morals some “origin” different from God—some origin which presently is able to resist, to combat, to overreach, out-general, overcome, and in the end confine God, at least if the Good be God, to some small portion of His works? In history and nature is not God explained away, and the Deity so dissevered from Creation that real attributes are left to neither of them? God is no longer Creator; such attributes are dead, if ever they were otherwise; and Creation no longer consists in Him, or is being born in Him, or caused-to-grow by Him into His consciousness and

form; but now, separate from God, is able to "continue," or at least, go back, "by its own unassisted powers?" Is not the Divine Nature so conceived as to "divide His substance" into three or four independent Beings, separable from each other, and each remote from "things"—nay, each inconsistent with things? For, God and "things" being first "separate," for fear of Pantheism, are they not presently, by force of logic, "external" to each other, mutually "exclusive," formal "contradictories"—so that one or other of them must be an illusion? And indeed it turns out that *both* are so. Things not having their "being" in God have in truth no "real being" whatsoever: they are not "the real things," not "things in themselves," but *only* phenomenal, apparent, unreal, false. Then he who believes not in "things" which he hath seen, how long will he believe in God whom he hath not? So we proceed in the analysis, and find that "real being" itself, with all Force, Cause, Substance, God, the Infinite, the Unseen and Inconceivable in general, are only "negative ideas"—notions apprehended merely by "negative thinking"—that is, by that form of thinking "to whose object we do not attribute existence." Such, it appears, are the dictates of "reason:" its "oppositions of science" are necessary and natural; they are "the condition of our faculties!" Yet we need not be alarmed, for there is a Faith to relieve us of its antithesis. Yes, the Faith which is *not* "rational," and which, like transubstantiation, must not be criticized—the faith whose utterances, we learn, are not speculative truths, but only regulative truths, that is, those "truths" which [*we* can discern, mark!] "*are not in themselves true, but which we must believe and act on as if they were true!*" The "truths" which we can see and acknowledge to be "speculatively false" are those into which this suprarational Faith "converts the truth of God!"

Surely this system also needs some understanding to deliver its soul, and relieve it of what it holds in its right hand. But does any one believe that it is such faith, such reason, or such truth that Christianity offers to the world? Is it such as these that we must preach back to Romanist, Mahometan, and Jew, from Cross, and Sepulchre, and Pentecost?

Brethren, I am well convinced that the vaguest Pantheism is godliness itself compared with this pretentious "revelation;" that beside it the crudest materialism is faith and science; that the extremest fetishism which degrades the Church, or the world below the Church, is more philosophical than this philosophy, and truer than its truth. The low idolater does his best to unite the humble and the high. And he *does* unite them. He goes below himself that he may rise above himself; and ONE he knows not, yet truly seeks to know, accepts his service, and to the true intention converts his very falsehood into truth. His poor fetish does inspire him with life and strength from heaven. But this self-exalting Neo-gnosticism has already inflated itself into emptiness and nihilism. Its motto is—"On earth there is nothing great but man: in man there is nothing great but mind." It may omit the adjective. There is nothing *at all* in either. Earth, and man, and mind itself, it has already along with "substance" transmuted into negative ideas. The Materialist has, at all events, some positive faith. He believes in Matter: so far good; this is a foundation. He believes also in Life: he cannot help it. And the more he uses his Intellect and Hope, the more he will believe in them. It ought not be hard to persuade him that He who has given him his present faculties can give him more and higher, and will verify for him all just anticipations. The aimless Pantheist, again, so as he be sincere, is only a religious man bewildered and at sea. His native piety and power of thought have burst or overflowed artificial boundaries, and he is now unable to define. What he needs is some clear guiding light, some truth which is *able* to command his thought and his ambition, able to build his "religiousness" into definite religion, and make his Pantheism, *as it ought to be*, the basis of Theocracy. All he says is true, and most important: any system which does not say the same is false from end to end. All things *are* of God alone; and all consist in Him alone; and He alone is responsible for all. But this is as yet only the chaos of religion. It is the fault of the Church if she have not a WORD and SPIRIT to build this Chaos into Cosmos. But the other system is formally Religion's Nihilism. By excluding

anything from God it destroys the very notion of God; on any definition it can give or take. And it does not require to add, what yet it has the hardihood to add, that the Deity of the Christian Creeds "cannot be positively apprehended in any form of human consciousness."

I disparage not individuals, brethren. I hardly blame them. If some traditional weakness have enslaved our thought, it is a just and manly service to put it to the test, and develop it logically to its just expression. And they who do so in an upright spirit, like those I quote from, are really bearing our burdens, perhaps enduring our reproach. It is fitter to lament that, unwarned by experience, our Samson has been worse than ever beguiled again; and that anathematizing his nearest allies will not now shake off the Philistines. But it did not need this last development to make *two* things manifest in Christendom:—

First, that the Church Doctrinal, like the Church Personal, is only in the middle or the beginning of her work. Her theory, as might justly be expected, is still more inchoate and imperfect than her practice. Her mind and judgment have been developed more slowly than her heart, much more slowly than her frame. She has come a vast way, and done a mighty work, by her primal impulse, her fresh instincts, her abiding sympathies; but when she would gather up her thought, describe her orbit, write down her history for the instruction of those to come, she finds she is not able. Her Science is yet faulty; her reasoning faculties are weak. She has had her Genesis; and she has described it, too, with a portion of that Spirit which gave her birth. She has made her Exodus, no doubt: the world has recognised it. Perhaps she has reached her Judges. She has not found her Samuel yet; or, if she have, he has crowned some hasty King too soon, and must look out some humbler, fresher, stronger stock whereon to rest her Promise. She has laid the foundation of her temple, and raised its walls; but she has not roofed it yet; and she has need of the severest caution to avoid some premature completion with "wood, hay, stubble."

Secondly. It is still miserably impeded and beset by its old antagonist, "the idea"—by idealist, that is, essentially, by dualist

philosophy. This does not much beguile the multitudes; it is too far above them; all that they can discern of it rather does them good, perhaps, and stimulates to mental eminence. But in our more scientific circles it is still potent for evil, and still repels the Christian Apostle from the Areopagus. God and Immortality *in matter*, or essentially connected with matter, is still a meanness and foolishness to it. It still careers above the clouds in search of *lumen siccum*, or some other *regio sui similis*—deeming still the physical solid its essential antagonist; a living body, an essential degradation; and a Word of Life that eyes could see, and hands handle, as essentially an illiterate and vulgar superstition. It is willing to forget, sometimes willing to acknowledge, that the separation between matter and God is essential dualism, and must result in the denial of one or other. It knows that the denial of matter must result in nihilism, at least in the reversal of all conviction and the logical negation of all reality. But it prefers this intellectual vacuum and its eternal forms to the admission that real things are being created, and that real souls are born. It is manifest, I repeat, that none but a hollow truce can lie between this philosophy and our superstition. Any development of thought must place them front to front, and oblige us to choose our side. We must look for some more fresh and vigorous science, though physical and earth-born, to expound for us our truth, if truth we have, and to be the David of our Temple.

The philosophy, brethren, not of the fixed idea, but of creation, that is of growth, or of being-caused-to-grow—the science, not of immobility but of nature, that is, of gradual and orderly being-born—the theology, not of some final, but of progressive and ascending Truth—are those and those only which can cohere with Christianity, or which can pretend to expound any passage of the Bible from the first chapter of Genesis to the last vision of Revelation. The material and moral progress of Europe has vastly stimulated this natural science. It begins to “philosophize,” to the intense disgust of “philosophy so called;” it grapples with many traditional conceptions, and doubts them or destroys them. It is rude and inexperienced, and commits many

oversights and errors. Yet is it, so I for one believe, profoundly true upon the whole; and it will destroy none of our traditions, except those which make the Word of God of none effect, and nullify our deepest and most natural convictions.

But, brethren, the abstract difficulties only follow from the practical. Our moral duplicity is the root of all the rest. If we can realize GOD in our Providence and in our common life, we shall find no other name uttered in our theory. It is here, therefore, we must meet the tempter; and here, or nowhere, we must vanquish him. I ask, therefore, *of the individual*, is there any man who really doubts that each fact that meets *himself* in soul or body has been sent to him by God? Is there any man who doubts that each act and word of his is caused by God to stamp itself into his being, making him, for good or evil, the sum of his own experiences? Is there any one who doubts that this *creative Providence judges* as it goes; nay, holds himself for ever to just and searching judgment, with some deep background of *MERCY*? No one does doubt it, brethren, I believe, who is able to understand the question. And he is no thinker who doubts that such conviction must interpret for us every external world, and write itself into every theory we can frame.

But many distrust such self-interrogation. We need external helps, and these are given to us abundantly in Church and Bible. True, we can only hear such, or understand them, by the light we bear within. But then they can kindle up that light, startle our very conviction into being, and enunciate for us fully and firmly, so that we *know* it to be true, the thought that was struggling to be born. We do well, therefore, to heed the living and the written Word. And I next ask do they hold any paltering with this central ambiguity?

Especially I ask it of the Bible. Has *it* any shallow timidity about assigning to God the undivided responsibility of everything that is? Knows it any variation in the statement that all things emanate from God, and all consist in God—good and evil alike—He taking on Himself their every issue and their total reconciliation? In the Bible conception, “Shall there be evil done in the city,” or in the world, “and God hath not

done it;" and done it for just reasons of His own? Is there any deceived or deceiver who is not His; or any wicked, on the earth or in the sky, who is not a sword of His, executing His behests? "Who else forms the light or creates the darkness, does the good or creates evil," except "I the Lord, who do all these things?" Is there any "lying spirit" in the mouth of all his prophets, true or false, or in the mouth of all His churches, and He hath not sent it forth, and sent it that He may take prophet, or church, or world, in their own perverse imagination, and make them eat thereof? Nay, brethren, though it be sparing of its affirmations on such topics, for reasons which every moral teacher knows, the Bible *shrinks from no extreme* in affirming God's universal authorship of things. Death and life, and good and evil, He works them all Himself.

Or, take another view, and examine the key points of its history. Does "temptation" come, then, to the perfect natural man, or to the inexperienced human pair; and is its author other than some creature "which the Lord God hath made;" or its result other than that to the believing and penitent, though sin-stained, the lie is made a truth, and a higher likeness of God born within the soul? Comes there accumulated trial upon the righteous Patriarch; and is its author other than some messenger from before the Throne; and the result other to faith and patience than a nearer insight of His face, and a nearer communion of His bliss? Does temptation assail the infant Nation, and almost overwhelm it; and is its author other than one whom "in very deed, for this cause," He has raised up and hardened—God's Example of oppression and misrule; or its result other than the nation's great Passover; its baptism through cloud and sea into Law divine and some foretaste of the Gospel? Do all temptations gather round the Son of Man, in natural weakness, moral obliquity, religious blindness, and social cowardice; and do they find their triumph in some dark hour of earth's bewilderment, when all is out of joint, and no man knows what he says, and no man what he does: except that all do wrong, and each one what he knows is wrong, in helping to crush the innocent, until the very sense of God forsakes him—and is this triumph

itself other than what "Thy hand and Thy counsel had determined before to be done;" nay, done for the Redemption and Reconcilement—for the Salvation of us all?

The Bible, brethren, from end to end, knows as little of duality, as does the bottom of our heart, or the first proposition of our Creed. True, there is a mystery in evil; clouds and darkness are round His throne. But He gives us the faith to pierce them through, and see Himself beyond. We do not pretend to understand it all, near as it comes to us, and deep as our interest is therein. Yet we are not altogether in the dark. We seem to see the explanation dimly, as in a mirror. And it amounts to this—our perplexity is but the confusedness of half-done work. We are in the middle of some great "Creation-Day"—we must wait till its "evening and *morning*" have arrived to see it to be "good." We are in the middle of some great Working Week—we must anticipate its Sabbath to see it "very good." In fact, we are being-born—not without joy and triumph—not, also, without a travail and agony in which, along with us, the whole creation groans. God is creating us; creating us out of His own Being; creating us into the consciousness of God. He is drawing out our faculties into the communion of the Infinite; first, directly; then, as they are able to bear it, crushing them back upon themselves and Him, until they emerge in faculties of higher life. Insensibly, for the most part, yet often more violently, our genesis and regenesis proceed, and always in the midst of an exacting judgment. Together with things behind us, and things before, God gradually makes us feel the great directing lines, the true "regulative" principles on which the whole proceeds. We presently discern these to be His character or attributes. We understand these as best we can, by their correlatives in ourselves; and we name them as best we can—His Commandments or His Will, His Light, His Law, His Love.

But, whatever be the explanation or its analysis, our *duty* is unmistakable. Use we our talisman throughout. See we God *in* everything that *is*. See we Him not stupidly, but according to the best Light and Law He gives; then bow we the head, and worship, and arise, and act. Each evil will transform itself

to good, and each good to higher good. Our moral victory will generalize itself, and all our theories will presently accord. Our visionary difficulties, like our real ones, will disappear, or will range themselves "behind" us. Our poor Materialism, for instance, without forgetting one truth it can affirm, will rise to a lofty spiritualism, if only around the conception of Christ's spiritual body, or our own. Our vague and listless Pantheism, without forgetting one truth it knows, will gather itself to Theism and Theocracy, if only directed by our personal experience, and our own just ambitions. Idealism itself will recognise the Ideal it has longed to worship—an Ideal not falsely pictured in the past, but truly existing in the future, whither we go to meet it—*realizing* it, meanwhile, by the power of Faith and Hope. Thus, in our own little world at least, all things will work together for good, and God be all in All. Brethren, ours is an image—why should it not, up to its measure, be a *just* image of the Universe?

SERMON VII.

IS RELIGION NATURAL?

VOL. I.

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"The heavens declare the glory of God : and the firmament showeth his handy work.

"Day unto day uttereth speech : and night unto night declareth knowledge.

"There is neither speech nor language : but their voices are heard among them.

"Their sound is gone out into all lands : and their words to the end of the world."

PSALM xix. 1-4.

COMPARE SAINT PAUL :—

"So then Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God. But I say, have they not heard? Yes, verily, their sound went into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world."—Rom. x. 17, 18.

Being part of Saint Paul's *proof* that the faith he preached is not a novelty, but is identical in kind with that preached to every dispensation.

SERMON VII.

IS RELIGION NATURAL ?

PSALM CL. V. 6, AND LAST.

Let everything that hath breath praise the Lord. Praise ye the Lord.

THIS verse terminates the book of Psalms, and constitutes the climax of its doctrine and sentiment, as well as of its poetry. Any one will be sensible of this who will either trace back the preceding context to any distance, or who, commencing in the reverse order, will throw himself *anywhere* into the plain meaning of the book, endeavour to catch its spirit, and allow himself to be carried along its stream. The Psalmist begins with particulars, and deals with them throughout; but he is continually intimating and ascending to the general; and *this* is the universal, or rather the combined universal and individual, in which he ends. In fact, the book is the *expression of human experience*, battling with the deep waters and angry waves of life, and ever, by dint of faith, and hope, and steadfast energy, raising itself above them—human experience *not at all exceptional*—which of us, my brethren, believes it so, or finds it so?—but universal, or typical to the *race*: or, rather, which is exceptional, but only in the unapproached fidelity with which it utters each depth of human feeling, reads each expression of nature's face, sympathizes with each struggle of universal life, and wrestles to be ever in more and more conscious contact with God. Strifes, perplexities, dislocations, jars, abound throughout its course; the Psalmist thinks not fear or shame to utter them, and each man's heart echoes as he hears. But the verse I have read is the fundamen-

tal note that vibrates round them all, gradually overpowers their partial discords, gathers them up, bears them with it, embodies them in its harmony, and rolls them all together in one vast wave or tide of adoration up to the foot of that throne it ever seeks, and now at last can see.

(*Strophe*)— “PRAISE YE THE LORD.”—PSALM cxlviii.

Praise Him *from the heavens*: praise Him in the heights.

Praise Him, *all* ye his angels: praise Him, *all* His hosts.

Praise Him, sun and moon: praise Him, all ye stars and light.

Praise Him, ye heaven of heavens: and ye waters that be above the heavens.

Let them praise the name of the Lord: for He commanded, and they were created.

He hath also stablished them for ever: He hath made a decree which shall not pass.

(*Antistrophe*)—

PRAISE THE LORD *from the earth*: ye dragons, and all deeps;

Fire, and hail; snow, and vapours: stormy wind fulfilling His word;

Mountains and all hills: fruitful trees, and all cedars;

Beasts, and all cattle: creeping things, and flying fowl;

Kings of the earth, and all people: princes, and all judges of the earth;

Both young men and maidens: old men and children—

(*Epode*)—

Let them praise the name of the Lord: for His name only is excellent;

His glory is ABOVE the *earth* and *heaven*.

He also exalteth the horn of His people: the praise of all His saints;

Even of the children of Israel: *a people* NEAR unto Him.

PRAISE YE THE LORD.

Or, *climax*: as in the last Psalm—

Praise ye the Lord. Praise God in His sanctuary: praise Him in the firmament of His power.

Let everything that hath breath: praise the Lord. *Praise ye the Lord.*

Our humblest instinct and our highest reflex sentiment, at once and equally, respond to this command. But in that long intermediate stage which constitutes our life and education, we often find it difficult or impossible to realize its feeling. In the intensity of the strife we lose the consciousness of our Master's presence; and must pause to listen for the sound of the trumpet, or

to catch a glimpse of the standard, that should direct our effort. One large help to us would be that the understanding, which we *must* allow to guide us in each particular step, should be ever conscious of our whereabouts, and ever keen and sure to discern the symptoms of the war. And, viewed from the side of the understanding, it is clear that the foundation tone of this typical experience, at once human and inspired, which rises triumphant to its end, involves this, at least,—a complete and unwavering conviction of the *naturalness of religion*. The only praise which God can wish for, or accept, is that which will issue from the heart and inmost being of those who offer it. To demand this, on the Creator's part, from universal nature, is to imply, or to affirm, that in rendering it nature is true to itself, and to the simplest and broadest instincts it has received from Him. In particular, it implies that man, in living to God with all the singleness of view and devotedness of soul whereof he is capable, but obeys "his own nature" and "the nature of things"—that, in conforming himself to his best attainable image of God, he is but attaining, verifying his best ideal of himself, realizing the lines of his own formation, and harmonizing himself with the sphere in which he dwells—propositions which, however they may be disputed elsewhere, resolve themselves into obvious truisms in the Christian scheme; or, indeed, in any which acknowledges God as the Author and Sustainer of Nature—the Creator of us, and of all things, visible and invisible.

The preceding discourses have been based on this conviction, and I trust it has pervaded them throughout. I have therefore defined human religion as resting immediately on human nature, and viewed it through all its length and all its variations as con-natural therewith. I have assigned to religion, in fact, no higher function and no other function than that of educating, energizing, elevating the faculties of man. And I can peer no farther into futurity, nor lay down any other criterion of its ultimate progression, than that it consists in the harmonized expansion, the balanced creation of his powers. In expressing so strongly this belief itself—whatever be thought of the elaboration attempted—and in resting in it so completely as I do, I am not conscious

that I part at all from the common sentiment or common language of Christendom, from the solid theology that builds up its systematic thought, or from that inspired volume whence we habitually draw thought, and sentiment, and word.

But there is a vast difference, as we soon learn to feel, between assenting to a proposition in general terms, with occasional glimpses of its force, and habitually refusing to lose sight of it in detail, or to acknowledge positions which virtually contradict it. And one cannot but be painfully conscious that partial Christianities, both traditional and popular, especially those which pride themselves in some distinctive excellence, often forget the rock from which they are hewn; nay, sometimes, exhibit their zeal and knowledge in the energy with which they denounce it. The existence and supposed general acceptance of some such tenets obliges me, before proceeding to educe the laws of religious progress—which must be essentially natural laws—to pause a little, and place in a broader light, and with some more definite sides, the fundamental conception of naturalness itself.

Nothing, for instance—to take an extreme case, which even the youngest of my hearers may have met,—nothing so utterly bad as that which is completely natural! Sight, and sense, and sentiment, man's body, and intellect, and affections, this world, and all that is in it, these all are God's natural enemies; they belong to Satan; and Satan belongs to himself; and these are all on their way, together, to that wide empire of ever-living death which eternizes Satan's triumph. All, except that charitable and enlightened few whose anthropomorphism can derive all this from the Will of *their* ideal Father. Such opinions seldom make much pretension to that carnal requirement, logical consistency; but so far as this conception condescends to argue, it is clear that it resolves itself into a mutilated Manichaeism—in a most shocking, and, happily, most inconsistent form. Inconsistent, for it still clogs itself, verbally at least, with the tenet of a single origin of things. Shocking, because having educed somewhere, from that single origin, a principle of essential evil, its division of things, thenceforward, is not in parallel lines, but an ever widening and ever deepening triumph of evil.

In the interests of humanity and religion, brethren, there are no words too strong to denounce such tenets; and therefore, without apology to the sacredness of this place and the sentiments which befit it, I will broadly acknowledge that Mr. Parker seems to me not to overstate the truth, when he says that this class of opinion not only makes Satan a "fourth person" of the Deity, but that it makes him vastly the most important and potent, because in the end vastly the most successful person of the four.

And having acknowledged this, I am surely free to add that such writers as Mr. Parker do egregiously misrepresent the truth, and calumniate their brethren, when they identify this unnatural and abnormal development with the doctrine of Scripture, and the common creed and sentiment of Christendom. By its own boastful confession it is confined to few; and even with that few, as is patent to those who know, or to any who observe them, it is but a superficial disease—a contagious leprosy or plague, which exhibits itself upon the surface, but against which their own better nature unceasingly contends, and which the substantial Christianity of the rest tolerates, pities, and avoids.

But even a superficial disease, brethren, is apt to have some source within; and we have already had occasion to notice that the Manichean contagion is still vigorous in Christendom. I have traced to its existence beneath the surface some other of those exhibitions which shock us most; and it will be obvious to any one who seeks, that even these repulsive tenets have their philosophic, nay, even their theologic base within our schools, vastly more respectable and careful, but not one whit more self-consistent or less practically injurious.

One of the modern forms in which it betrays itself is in the tendency to disparage that body of truth or sentiment which goes by the name of "natural religion,"—either directly, by treating it as insignificant in amount and unsound in character; or indirectly, by affecting to resolve it, so far as it is undeniably true and important, into certain supposed revelations.

Then, with regard to these revelations themselves, the tendency defines itself still more, and they are made to depend for

their *origin*, their *evidence*, and their *authority*, not upon anything natural, but on something to be separated from nature, the more distinctly and the more remotely the better. They are made to depend not merely on Inspiration and Miracle, to which, when justly understood, no one will object, but on Inspiration and Miracle with this conception of both, that they shall be the more perfect in themselves, and the better fitted to their end, in proportion as they stand apart from nature, are isolated from it, ignore, disparage, thwart it, suspend, interrupt, "violate"—the word itself men scarcely shrink from—*violate* its course.

I have long been conscious, brethren, of the unsoundness and inconsistency of this line of thought, and anxious for the opportunity of resisting it from this place, by preaching on "the Connexion between Natural and Revealed Religion"—desiring to insist on the fundamental principles of Bishop Butler, in the form and with the definiteness needful to our present conflict. This more formal discussion I had hoped would have preceded the treatment of my present subject; and the want of it has deprived much of what I wished to press of anything that can pretend to proof. I have been obliged to assume and assert, when perhaps expanded argument and copious illustration were needful; and to throw myself upon the intelligence and sentiment of my audience, to a degree that is, perhaps, unfair and unsuitable, even with such a congregation as this. I am obliged still to do so. Even upon this most important and pregnant topic I cannot linger. So, without pausing to analyse and illustrate the fallacy involved in the above descent, farther than may be seen in the delineation of it, I must be contented with resisting the tendency itself; as for instance, by reminding my younger brethren, that Butler's broad position, not only formally expressed, but manifestly embodied in the whole form and substance of his argument, is this—

I. That Natural Religion is the *foundation* and *principal part* of Christianity, though it be by no means the whole of it; and—

II. That what Revelation adds thereto is not something isolated from natural religion, or from Nature, down to its humblest remoteness, much less suspending or violating it—but is a

part of its scheme, interwoven with it, and of a piece with it; involved in its "constitution," and evolving itself in its "course;" destined to emerge, and actually emerging, at its proper time and place, as we would say, by the natural and foreseen course of its development.

In fact, the Christian Scheme through all its length, miraculous and non-miraculous, is, in Butler's conception, what it clearly is in that of all the writers of the Sacred Scriptures, old and new, *an essential part of the general scheme of things*, requiring only sufficient insight into the nature of things, and the character of nature's Author—in other words, only a sufficient amount of the Prophet's Inspiration—to see it there at any time, and to foresee its historic exhibition.

What sympathy this conception has with many of those "views" which affect to adopt or use his now popular positions, he who has any real occasion to search them out will be able painfully to judge. But they who may not see the range and bearing of Butler's thought, and the necessity of his systematic pains, may be startled to find themselves in accord with other thinkers whom they do not affect to admire. Comte also, for example, disparages natural religion. What he calls "theology" he treats with courteous respect, as having been a necessary and useful "evolution" of thought. But natural religion, by its very definition and idea, he thinks too inconsistent and self-destructive, too hollow, and futile, and preposterous, to deserve or to admit of being seriously discussed. Natural Religion, says he, with a sneer to which he seldom rises—"Natural Religion! as if all religion were not essentially Supernatural;" meaning by that word "out of relation to nature," or what we would call Unnatural. From which, of course, his broad inference is inevitable. If it be above nature, in the sense of not belonging to its correlation or its constitution, it is doomed to disappear. It must perish of itself. The course of nature will cast it out—and no where shall its place be found.

Brethren, unless our religion be *deep* in nature, and have its foundations there; and unless it rest upon those foundations through all its bulk, miraculous and non-miraculous; nature will

find this out; and, when her storms arise, and rains descend, and floods come, great will be the ruin of the house she knows not, and the God of nature will rejoice in the desolations He has made. Unless that whereon we build be coextensive with Creation, and sustain all the real elements of its existence; then our Christ is *not* the Rock of Ages, and we must seek some other foundation if we would belong to Him.

It is not indeed surprising that tenets or sentiments such as I allude to should sometimes partially prevail. That, while struggling against forms of evil, within and without, which almost overpower our effort, we should sometimes "say in our haste that all men are liars," and think that the very "foundations of the earth are out of course"—or that, while realizing the transcendent value of the Christian Truth, we should for the moment think to exalt it by depressing or denouncing all things else—is almost to be expected. But things are *not* for a moment; and we must not make haste. The Eternal Father has eternal patience with us all. The just conclusions from our premises, by whomsoever drawn, should startle us to thought, and throw us back upon our calmer selves. And then, at least, an easy reflection shows that, however well intended, all attempts to elevate theology, or honour religion, by disparaging nature, are simply suicidal. This were to pretend conforming ourselves to God by departing from His acknowledged likeness—to bless the Creator by cursing His image to His face. "My brethren," says St. James, "these things ought not so to be." As with words, and the tongue that utters them, so with things and the energy that evolves them—if the source be *one*, the streams which issue thence must *all* possess its properties, and indicate its character. The double eye is darkness; the double tongue, and double thought, and double heart, bewilderment and crime. In fact, any real definition of GOD, if we can read it right, will be found to involve all the essential doctrines of the Christian Creed. And, conversely, any of His Manifestations, if it were but a grain of mustard seed or a transaction of common life, as we are enabled to decipher it, will lead us upward to that definition and that Faith again.

If He be “*One God*,” He must be also “*Creator of heaven and earth, and of all things, visible and invisible;*” He must be their Sustainer and Reconciler also, whether so explicitly revealed or not. No amount of sophistry can conceal this inference; nor any bewilderment, as I believe, obliterate its practical conviction. In the acknowledged *coexistence* of man, and things, and their Almighty *Cause*, there must lie, somewhere, the guarantee of their profound accord. He who has evolved us from Himself has made us as He would. He who bears us in His bosom out-comprehends our being, and all its ends and accessories, and integrates our chequered nothingness into that sum which befits, while it announces, Him. His authorship being admitted, Nature becomes simply the Utterance of His Will, the delineation of as much as He chooses to exhibit of His attributes. Each thing up to its own level exhibits Him; and the whole of History, the whole Constitution and Course of things, become His total Exhibition. All the sides of Creation are but so many expressions of His many-sidedness; all the gradations of its scale, from the barest physical up to the highest conscious existence, are but the progressive and ascending steps of His self-Revelation, the gradual announcement of Himself. And the zeal with which Creation’s Life would climb this scale, and spring towards The Infinite, is but the aspiration of Existence issuing from Him, and thirsting for, and seeking, and finding its Home—its conscious Home again.

In a word, His Authorship being held, visible things become simply the *Visible of God*. And any religion which admits this must begin by affirming its own naturalness throughout. It may be the highest part, still it is but a part of Nature’s Scheme, and of a piece with all the rest. If it be forced to any exacter statement of its relation to the rest, it will find itself, so far as I can see, tending to some such definition as this, that it is the *Conscience of Nature’s Life*,—Nature’s *Direct and Reflex Consciousness of God*—its function towards the whole being the same as its function to the meanest individual—to expand and harmonize all the real elements of our life, and specially to harmonize the known and unknown in this consciousness of Deity.

Religion begins, therefore, by identifying itself with Nature. But then it must be with Nature in her highest sense and purest spirit, in her true and typical exertion. It must not be (1) with that "natural weakness" which allows each thing to fall below its type, and bids us meanly rest content with something inferior to our best. Such dereliction Nature herself denounces as unnatural, resents, condemns it, visits it with death. Religion does the same. Nor is it (2) with Nature formed, final, self-content—if such "natural" there be—willing to run in iron grooves upon some iron level, renouncing nature's pilgrimage. Nay, Nature is Life and Growth: she is always being-born. She is not only *natura naturata*, but *natura naturans; via et ordine procedens*—always aiming to surpass her past, and realize her better. With this inner and true *creative* "fire," this Spirit, or living Inspiration, Religion identifies itself. This it breathes habitually, and this it gathers up and carries on into the fire of Pentecost. Nature is always being-born: Religion, at the head of Nature, is always being-born-*anew*. Nature is always toiling to transcend herself: and on the whole succeeds. Religion is the special consciousness of this high effort, and of Him who bids it, and the special endeavour to obey His bidding. Religion also, therefore, always transcends Nature. It deems itself not only natural, but *supernatural* as well.

Religion, then, is both natural and supernatural—meaning by this latter word, not some convenient refuge for *inconsistency*; not that it is sometimes natural, sometimes unnatural, sometimes an incongruous mixture of both, according as the argument, or the inability to argue, may require; but expressing definitely this—that it *not only* affirms, and stamps with a religious sanction, the natural throughout, *not only* disallows the unnatural in all its forms, and denounces it as irreligious and ungodly, but that it goes farther still. It is itself conscious, and it believes that nature in various degrees is sensible, of an Unknown, which transcends it, not at its limits merely, but at every point along its line—is its Origin; the Base of its being; the Spirit of its life and movement; its Infinite Exhaustless Cause—that which is creating it, ever drawing it out beyond itself into Its own Communion.

Not only with nature, therefore, but also with this *more than nature*—that is, in fact, with Deity so far as it can apprehend Him—it seeks to be identified, and calls itself not only natural, but also *supernatural, over-natural, higher-natural, natural-and-more*. It is eminently natural; it is among His works, nay, fittest and most typical among them: but it is more than this—it *consciously* fellow-works with God.

It *associates* itself, besides, with certain things, according to common laws—with its own machinery and all that sustains and helps it, especially with the highest parts thereof—with the highest acts and utterances of religious men, the special Book that records them, and the special Institution which carries on their work—most especially, with Earth's Central Figure and all the words and lines that meet and change in Him. More generally, it associates itself with Nature and Providence when largely viewed, and all that is grandest, most striking, most marvellous, in either—also with whatever is most touching or most searching in them, with birth itself, and life, and death, and the prospect of resurrection. All these, or certain aspects of them, so far as they perform their function—so far as they are “signs” and sacraments to us of God, and raise humanity towards Him—Religion associates with herself, and with her supernatural.

I said “according to the common laws;” but here we must be careful. All laws are gathered from the facts, and here the facts pass quickly out beyond the common and beyond our cognisance. It is hard, sometimes, to classify the known in all its forms and forces: but here the known is always rising above itself into the confessed unknown. To higher creatures, doubtless, the whole phenomena of religion may seem as regular as any facts in chemistry; to us, however, they quickly merge themselves in the mysterious, and inexplicable. Nor is this unnatural: we and our philosophy are being-born into the Unknown—who expects an infant to understand all the phenomena of birth? Religion, in common life, is an exciting or disturbing force which we find it impossible to measure. In history, its central and most important facts stand out as “singular points,” but little amenable to science. Yet the conviction that all the

works of God constitute "one scheme" obliges immediately the inference that religious facts are, in themselves, as regular as any other; and that any seeming irregularity is due only to our ignorance. It is just, therefore, to treat of the laws of religious progress so far as we can discern them. We do not now enter on this extensive subject: we but discuss some broad preliminaries. To-day we inquire—How far is common religion *natural*? On next Sunday we shall ask—How far is common religion *scientific*? For the sake of both questions, however, it is fit to state that I believe our examination of the Laws will evince two general propositions—

First. That the ordinary laws of religion and religious progress are simply the ordinary laws of nature carried up into religion's province; and,

Secondly. That the extraordinary facts of religion are to be classed with the extraordinary facts of nature, and are due, like them, to the concentration and intensifying of its ordinary and common powers,—it being, as I conceive, a universal law of nature that the intensifying of any power beyond a certain point will cause that power to pass into a new and higher form, and generate a corresponding class of facts.

But, whether these laws or any others can be established, it is important for common purposes to insist on this—that religion, in claiming to be natural, acknowledges itself bound by the laws of the natural, so far as they will carry her; and when the natural and the supernatural come into contact, or overpass each other, it is bound by the obvious rule, to interpret, so far as it can do so, the Unknown by the known. Its contact with the higher-natural does not dissolve or weaken its contact with the natural, or give it any immunity whatsoever in regard to nature's laws.

Before proceeding farther, *three* general questions arise:—

1. How is man to interpret this visible Nature?
2. By what right does he draw conclusions from it, with respect to the supposed Invisible, which are acknowledged to be more or less at variance with the actual seen?
3. By what right does he overpass the Visible at all, and affirm *any* Invisible beyond?

The general answer to each question is given in the same word,—by the right and by the light he bears WITHIN. All rests to him upon his own nature in the last resort.

I. Man's interpretation of Nature, brethren, is essentially anthropomorphic. He has no other measure of things than what his own heart, and mind, and frame, supply. Whatever voices nature should utter, the only impressions they could give to him are those which he has ears to hear. If God spoke to us from heaven direct, we could only understand the word according to the understanding, and appreciate it according to the sensibilities we have ; and were the very WORD OF GOD again to become flesh, and dwell among us, so that all might behold His glory, He would be again as variously interpreted or misinterpreted, accepted, neglected, or condemned, as every other word of God, or as He was Himself before. Theoretically, as practically, those alone belong to any kingdom of God, who can find that kingdom within them. By its correlatives only is it known or noticed. It is only in her own children that any Wisdom is ever justified.

It is a vicious circle to say either that we may interpret Nature by Revelation, or that we must interpret Revelation by the Church ; for, how shall we interpret Revelation itself, and with what ears shall we hear the Church ?

Revelation is but another word of God, which each man hears according to his capacity to hear. Our *selection* of passages in that large book, and our view of the parts we do select, are as essentially anthropomorphic, as our view of Nature's pages : each man sees in each what his own nature enables him to see. And this would be the case, even were these books *homogeneous*, though but a single unmixed product were exhibited in each. But we have seen, besides, that the Bible is not homogeneous, any more than Nature is. It also is a growth, a development, presenting things most variously, each in its appropriate stage. So that precisely the same kind of difficulties lie in interpreting the one as the other ; and each man, even when led by the purest desire for self-improvement, chooses that portion of the Bible, and that delineation of God and duty, which is connatural with

his wants—that, namely, which just transcends himself, which is just a little above his own best conception of each. The rest is either meaningless, or it is a puzzle, a perplexity, perhaps an offence to him.

The slightest observation, either of oneself or others, will convince any one of this, as the slightest reflection will show it to be abstractedly inevitable. We are, indeed, open to receive *assistance*—first, from the accumulated observations of others which may commend themselves to us, or may direct our own reflections; or, next, from whatever will improve our own observing powers. In both these aspects the Bible is our most invaluable guide. But, obviously, except so far as it challenges and exercises our own faculties, it is to us as though it had not spoken. And we saw that its power, as a *universal* Instrument of progress, resides in this, that its own progressiveness enables it to extend to each a varied and ever ascending stimulus.

It is a like paralogism to propose interpreting Nature or Revelation by the Church. Or rather, a more obvious one; for revelation at least is a definite volume—we can read it through, and be tolerably certain of what it says; but the Church—who can be certain he has heard her voice? What Church? East or West? Mediæval or Reformed? Where is the whole “word” of any of these to be found, supposing them to agree together, or any one of them to be infallible? and, suppose it could be found, who will interpret that word to us, and bring it home to individual want with any high, not to say with any paramount, authority? The Church, indeed, does give us the largest help in interpreting both Nature and the Bible. Up to a certain point she teaches us implicitly; she always directs or rules our thought much more than we suppose. But it is a manifest perversion to speak of either Church or Paraclete as superseding individual judgment, or infringing the royalty of conscience—their function is, to enlighten and sustain them both. No doubt, a modest spirit will defer always to authority, and the unruly and offensive must be restrained. The goods and the person of each are, and must be, at the disposal of the whole; but, on the other hand, it may be the *duty* of the individual to oppose the whole; aye, to

oppose it to the death. What else did each of the prophets? what else did Christ himself? Practically, brethren, the Church to each of us, like Nature to each of us, is a little circle round ourselves; and each of us hears the voice of either, as he does the voice of Scripture, according to the sensibilities, the sense, and the conscience that he has. Each individual is final to himself, and stands in the last resort naked and responsible in the presence of his God.

[Attempts are often made, both in religion and philosophy, to transcend this subjectiveness of morality and truth. They all bear, and must bear, as it seems to me, self-contradiction on their face. All we can see or feel of *anything whatever* must be according to our powers of seeing and feeling; it can only be to us whatever they affirm. Some "Spiritual Faculty," or "Soul," or "Inward Light," or "Moral Reason," or supra-rational "Faith," or "Revelation," is often affirmed, with more or less consistency, whereby things of God are "spiritually discerned." Whatever the reality of these may be, they are only our "discerning" powers; and all the truths they can discern must be relative to them. Again, some "world" of ideas or eternal forms—some "real" world of the True, the Beautiful, the Good—is imagined sometimes, and our allegiance claimed for it; but this is obviously only our conception, and its lineaments are only those with which our "conceiving" powers invest it. Nay, says some one, "We do not 'conceive' it; it is independent of us, substantial, objective, eternal." Be it so; then, all we can "perceive" of it is by our perceiving faculties and is relative to them. "Nay, we neither 'perceive' nor 'conceive' it; we are convinced of it, and we apperceive it; it makes its 'apparition' or its 'revelation' in us, spontaneously to our spontaneity." Then it makes its "revelation" *to and by means of* whatever sensibilities, or quasi-sensibilities, spontaneous or otherwise, we have for its reception; is relative to our powers of conviction and apperception; or generally to its correlatives in us. Without them to us it could not be, and to us it must always be whatever they depict. Subjectiveness or relativity is the one condition which no finite knowledge, be it affirmative or negative, and no faith, judgment, opinion, or imagination ever can pass by.

But I am far, indeed, from admitting that this "subjectiveness" implies any doubt of "philosophic objectiveness" "real existence," or "reality." These things are not opposed; they rest upon each other essentially. *We* are objects as well as subjects; and our belief in our own real existence is, in fact, the basis of *all* our convictions of reality. He who is not convinced of it, will in vain pretend to himself that he is convinced of any thing whatever. Our permanent self, our living powers, and our actual substance, down to our material dust, all really exist, and have their being in the Eternal. These, then, are objective in the highest sense; and "to us" at least all their correlatives are as objective as they.

And I am as far from admitting that this "relativity" implies any uncertainty in truth itself, or any doubtfulness in its separate affirmations. All I have written implies or affirms the opposite. The most relative and partial truth, so far as it states itself justly, in its place and correlations—that is, *so far as it is true at all*—is also, I contend,* the absolute truth and absolute knowledge, in the strictest sense that creatures can use these terms. God is true; and in building His Creation up into His own likeness, is building it up into the manifestation and consciousness of Truth Divine. Creatures no doubt are finite—we only see or know "in part," and by means of, in this sense, "partial" faculties; yet these faculties are His sustained endowment; and whatever we do discern by them—if only on the face of nature, or in the depths of our own being—"God has showed† it to us," and we have not the slightest reason‡ to imagine that either Finite or In-

* Compare Ser. VI. pp. 315, *sqq.*

† Rom. i. 19, *and context.*

‡ The above remarks on M. Cousin's and similar Neo-Platonic systems agree with Sir William Hamilton's critique ["Phil. of Unconditioned"] in affirming the relativity of all human knowledge *and half knowledge* whatsoever—including that furnished by Sir William's own Wonderful Revelation and Mr. Mansel's Faith, as well as by Cousin's Spontaneous Apperception, Schelling or Fichte's Intuition, Kant's Moral or Practical Reason, Parker's Spiritual Faculty, or F. Newman's Soul. All we can know, believe, or receive of anything, is only what our own powers of knowing, believing, or receiving furnish us—is a resultant or a product, one factor of which is always strictly subjective. And the like must be said of every finite thing. Creation is a dynamic System, whose parts all act and react upon each other, and every act and state of each is a resultant of several factors, whereof its own powers are one.

They *differ* from Sir William and his followers in denying that there is any contra-

finite ever will or can reverse it. God does not contradict Himself. It remains, however, that we remember *always* our own finiteness and necessary partialness, and *always* do our best to learn; and that we hold all our convictions, great and small, as

riety, or at least any contradiction, between the Relative and the Absolute, either in knowing or in being—between the finite, known, conditioned, or conceivable, on the one hand, and the Infinite, Unknown, Unconditioned, or Inconceivable, on the other. Especially they differ, by denying that the latter are *merely* a series of negations, “only the negation of conceivability”—that they are mere “negative ideas,” “to whose object we do not ascribe existence.” Indeed, they regard this extreme tenet as the crowning error of Neo-Platonism, the *reductio ad nihilum* of all idealist or semi-idealist philosophy.

In Logic, Contradiction lies only between finites, and among finites, only between things known. No unknown can be made the contradictory of *any* known. To affirm it so, were *pro tanto* to affirm it also known. And this is specially obvious in respect to The Unknown. In fact, to deny the Infinite of anything is formally to condition the Unconditioned, to make the Inconceivable a human concept, to define and “distribute” the Incomprehensible itself. It is not so to *affirm* the Infinite of anything whatever. [Note A, 6.]

In Metaphysics—the Infinite, in itself, or in any of its attributes, is not that which excludes common finites, but that which “Out-comprehends,” and includes all finites as some differentials of itself. The Absolute is not that which is “out of all relation”—who ever “out of Laputa or the Empire” dreamt of such an entity, or pretended to speak intelligibly of it?—but that which includes and out-embraces all relations; originates, sustains, and enforces all conditions; and is subject to no conditions *but Itself*. And this is no mere negation, but is the most Positive of things,—that wherein we and all things have whatever being we possess. Whatever, therefore, denies “real existence” to any given finite, *pro tanto* denies the Infinite; and whatever refuses “existence” to the Infinite, refuses it to every finite, reduces all fact to phantasm, all being to nonentity, and all knowledge to nescience or illusion—as the Hamiltonian system virtually or indeed formally acknowledges, by making, both in finite and infinite, both substance and cause to be mere negative ideas, while admitting them, or one of them at least, essential to the conception of a thing. [“Alph. of Human Thought,” p. 604.] So *his* “relative knowledge,” he admits explicitly, is equivalent to either “philosophic nescience” or “absolute ignorance.” And with him too, as with the later Germans, “the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or the consummation of all true philosophy; *Scire Nihil—studium in quo nos laetamur utriusque.*” *Ib.*, p. 609.

With us, on the other hand, the “finite” is just so much of the Infinite as God gives us faculties to grasp—our *μέρος ἐκ τοῦ Πληρώματος αὐτοῦ*. Our “known” is just so much of Himself and His Self-Manifestation as the Unfathomable enables us to know. God has, no doubt, attributes numberless, of which we have no notion whatsoever. Even those of which we do know something—Authorship, Omnipotence, Power, Wisdom, Direction, Severity, Love—have no doubt an amplitude and applications infinitely beyond our ken. God is, in this sense, and always will be, The Unknown to every finite creature. Yet is He not totally unknown to any of them, nor His Real Presence unreceived,

well as our least-formed opinions, in a due subordination to that outcomprehending and sustaining Infinite, whereof we and ours are but a "nothing," a "point," or "differential" of some low or high degree.]

though few discern His Sacrament, or turn to give Him thanks. In Him they are. In the Communion of His Being and Attributes, they have their being and their attributes. In His Self-Manifestation, they "consist." By the Communion of His Creative Spirit they live and grow—yea, grow up, the highest of them, into the intelligent consciousness of Self and Him, and gradually discern the one to be a growing "image" of the other. True, all that any of them *is* and all that any of them *knows* is but some "point" or differential—some *dx* or *d²X*—and in this sense a "nothing." But only in this sense. For theirs is a true communion or participation—a real *μέθεξις* and *κοινωνία* of the *δυνως ὦν*. So far, therefore, as the least of them is true to itself, and to what it has received, it is also true to all the others and to Him—is a true differential of the Infinite, a true and typical and perhaps self-conscious point of God's Self-Revelation. And, so far as each of them truly knows—physically, half-consciously, or consciously—itself and its correlatives, so far it possesses a real and absolute knowledge of God and of His works. This surely is common Christianity and common sense, although the words be a little unusual, and their scope distasteful to our various Neo-Platonisms.

By "Platonism," throughout this volume, I cannot claim to mean Plato's own "system" of opinions, which is most inadequately known to us—if indeed it ever existed, which I doubt. We have little reason to believe that at any period of his long life Plato had matured a scheme which satisfied himself, or which he deemed coherent. His dialogues are brilliant and daring Essays, rather seeking after truth, than convinced that they have found it: and it is extremely difficult to say, in respect to their most cardinal positions, how much is or is not *εἰρυνεῖα*. But by Platonism I always mean any system or class of opinions which, when reduced to its central position, *excludes the body from the ego*. And whenever this seeks to combine itself with Christianity or the Creeds, I call it Neo-Platonism. Plato is fairly entitled to the honour of this dogma. Others before him had said something of the kind, but he tries formally to establish it, and to make it the centre of his metaphysic and theology. And it has through him largely infected one whole side of abstract thought. Few have the boldness openly to endorse his paradox, though seriously influenced by it, or by positions which imply it. Some, however, do accept it ostentatiously, and with acknowledgment of its origin—as Sir William Hamilton, "Met." I., ch. 9.

And this is the key-tenet I venture to believe—with all reverence for Plato himself, for Butler, Hamilton, and others of its patrons—which, *so far as it is operative*, always evacuates philosophy, makes it not the exponent but the antithesis of fact, and reduces it to sheer idealism, or hopeless self-contradiction. Concede this initial negative, and what objective, what positive, can be maintained? Deny "us" a body, and then, obviously, all "our" correlation with matter or with external history is at an end. So the first problem it imposes on "philosophy" is to prove the existence of an external world! A problem in which no progress is possible. All media of proof or knowledge, all "mediation" between us and it, is formally excluded. "We" can never perceive it; and we can have no "reason" for supposing it. All it can be to us is some series of our own

To say, then, that we are anthropomorphic in our religion and our philosophy, that we imagine of God, and of all Truth and Goodness, as we judge of common things and men, by ourselves—that we interpret all Bibles He has given us, written and

ideas. Still more directly the same follows of any external mental world, whether or no we include in it the deity, or even call it God. For we have here no intermediate obstacle to overcome. It is at once to us but another series of our own ideas. And presently the ideas themselves evaporate. Whatever reason excludes the body from the ego—namely, its mutability as contrasted with our felt unity—far more pointedly eliminates the mind, or at least all mental states, actions, or successions, as being far more fleeting and mutable than material phenomena—[*vide* even Hamilton, *in loco*]. These also being excluded therefore, there remains to us the “idea of a mind”—splendidly endowed indeed with *a priori* attributes, immutable, immoveable, unmanifested and unmanifestable—a great potential Nil—not unfitly imaging, however, “the Absolute Being, who is at the same time Absolute Non-Being,” and able to enjoy, it may be hoped, its *a priori* out-of-time Eternity without serious perturbation.

Our *Ego* on this aspiring system is first sublimed into “our personal identity,” next into “our mental identity,” and lastly into our impersonality, or our personal nonentity; the first by the exclusion of our manifesting self, and the other two by the sheer force of consistency and logic. This “we” may now be catalogued, and handed back to Plato: and so may everything else that “we” can reach or think of; for, obviously, all “our” correlatives in time or in eternity are as unsubstantial as ourselves. “Things,” that is, “the real things,” or “things in themselves,” are beyond the pale of consciousness; and presently Being itself, in either mind or matter, is but a negative idea, to whose object we do not ascribe existence. Thus to forget our origin is simply to forget ourselves. The scheme which denies our first and humblest self virtually denies us every self, and presently needs not reason, but the impotence of reason—not philosophy, but the negation of philosophy—to allow us to believe in anything. It originates, indeed, in good intentions—in the laudable desire to emancipate our higher faculties from the thrall of the lower; but, resting on a feeble dualism, it not subordinates, but endeavours to exclude. It would fain be a royalty, without a realm; a power, without a moment or a point of application; an eternal pyramid, without either basis or materials. “The mind” is, no doubt, in Aristotle’s sense, “the man:” that is, it is so *κατ’ ἐξοχήν*; it is his *μάλιστα*, or his *κυριώτατον*—his dominant and characteristic part, well entitled to command the rest, and to speak for him in his totality. But it mutilates its kingship and decays itself, so far as it denies its humblest members, or *dissevers* itself therefrom. Decapitation is a speedy, but very unsatisfactory method of “lifting up” the head. Bah! says the idealist, this is only “dirt philosophy.” Granted, or “dust philosophy,” at least [it need never be dirt]—I fear little else is in our power. But surely the wisdom that would exalt itself or us should begin by “cognizing” our actual condition. Dust are we; dust inspired from heaven; fearfully and wonderfully made, and as miraculously destined. This, surely, is a noble theme enough. “Divine philosophy” chose with a true instinct *γνώθι σεαυτόν* for a text; but this vain Platonism would convert even the Socratic preaching into bombast and “the clouds.”

Of course, no system involving this central negation is ever thorough. Indeed, no

unwritten, according to the Nature He has given us—implies no censure on them or us. We *can* do nothing else; all nature, after its fashion, must do the same. In fact, God, being “incomprehensible” by it, His creation can only strive upwards

such system could be either thought or stated. It is only in different stages a brilliant mist with Plato himself, a play of scepticism with Arcesilas or Hume, a pious phrenesy with Berkeley or Malebranche, a destructive distillation with Kant, or a Prospero’s mantle with Professor Ferrier. And some of these will smile at their own philosophy as they put it on or off, and admit it to be irreconcilable with things. Mostly, however, earnest men, when brought within its influence, do one of two things. Either, like Reid and Butler, they profess the school paradox in the beginning, and then totally forget it, and speak and think like other men. Or else, like Brown and Cousin, they bear it more constantly in mind, but try to dilute its consequence, and tone down their esoteric into sympathy with common thought. Their world is a *quasi* world, their self a *quasi* self, their body is a *quasi* body, their senses and their common sense are *quasi* senses and a *quasi* common sense. Thus a half consistency is gained, which lasts till critics or successors insist on being logical. And then the series of demolitions follows, which the Scottish school illustrates quite as signally as either the German or the Greek. Few suspect the source of the confusion; but Sir Wm. Hamilton, being logic-led, does trace it back to near its origin, and after no end of verbal distinguishing and scholastic classifying of methods of perception [and all in vain, too—he cannot tell, he almost admits, to what class Reid belongs, and no one could tell, I believe, to what class Hamilton himself belongs], finds himself at last nibbling back his first magnanimous concession to the *Alcibiades*. Speaking “properly” [on Reid, Note D, p. 880], his body *both is and is not* a part of himself! And on this ambiguity “proper” or “debateable land,” as he naïvely calls it, Mr. Mansel tries formally to build.

The Scoto-Oxonians, then—let us be distinct if possible—both do and do not perceive the macrocosm: that is, they do perceive the microcosm, which both is and is not external to the Ego. With them “perception proper” is but the consciousness of our own material organism; our own body is “the only immediate,” that is the *only* “object” of perception; and to perceive the external world is simply to be conscious of our material organs “as so-and-so affected.” For example—when I feel this paper or this table, it is by no means this paper or table that “I” feel, but only the *papilla* of my finger-ends, as so-and-so affected. When I hear the bell, and look out of this window at church or village, it is *not* the bell that “I” hear, nor window, church, or village that “I” perceive, but only the geography of the *punctum cæcum* or the *labyrinth*, and the operations of the *stirrup-bone* and *bacilli of the retina*—“objects” of which, I am sorry to say, my knowledge is of the least, and my consciousness or perception, so far as I can discriminate them, *nil*. Yet, according to the Hamiltonians, I not only perceive them, but “know that I perceive” them; and know besides that, in so perceiving them, I am a natural realist and perceive the external world directly—by the aid of these axioms, for example—“the dictum of common consciousness is final;” and “whatever we do not perceive immediately we do not, in fact, perceive at all!”

It is not strange that a philosophy based on such a satisfactory antithesis could develop itself at any time into contradictions wonderful. But it has the air of some

towards Him in the line of its own ascent, by climbing from one platform of being to the next; and whatever stands at the head of its continuous effort, as it has above it no visible, must, if it would go farther, frame to itself some image of the Invisible;

grim pleasantry or ultra-Socratic irony that one should apply it to religious interests. Yet, this is Mr. Mansel's exploit. He aspires to emulate Kant's *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, by a *Criticism of practical Christianity*—with the avowed motto "no difficulty emerges in religion which had not before emerged in philosophy," and the satisfactory conclusion that "either the formation or the progressive development of theology as a science is impossible," for this fundamental reason, "that the infinite cannot be positively apprehended in any form of human consciousness." Of course he means the Creeds, especially the Athanasian! These surely treat "positively" of the Infinite, and these surely are a "formation" or "development" which took some centuries to grow. But are they "scientific?" Yes, *pace* Mr. Goldwin Smith and others, I humbly believe they are [see next Sermon]; and I will here use their authority, or their *analogy* at least, to correct Mr. Mansel's ambiguous metaphysics.

Our organs, then, as so-and-so affected, are *never* the "objects," but always the "means" of perception. We never perceive *them*, by their own healthy action, we always perceive *by* them. More generally, whatever we do, we do "by" or "by means of" our body, which is our organic, i. e. instrumental or mediating self—popularly our "person," more exactly the second or "manifesting, mediating" person of our trinity. [Our other two "co-essential" persons being (1) our ultimate unchanging self; what the philosophers call "our personal identity," but which most of them "idealize" and unrealize by denuding it of what answer in our "image" to God-manifest and God-exertive; and (8) our spiritual self, or what Butler calls "our living powers." See Note D.] We see with our eyes, for example: we do not see our eyes or any part of them; simply for want of eyes, i. e. other eyes "to see them with." Their fine mechanisms and operations are truly "objects;" but they are never "the objects" [this is Berkeley's constant fallacy] of our own sight-perception. They are just the objects which "we" do not see, and never shall. Of their healthy action we have no consciousness whatever: of their very existence we learn most indirectly, most slowly, and with an astonishment at first amounting almost to incredulity. Nor do we even [*pace* the philosophers from Berkeley downwards] see what is in immediate contact with the eye, or even extremely near it. There could be no more false analysis than the attempt to resolve vision or the other perceptions into touch. Even the opposite blunder would have more plausibility; for there is every reason to suppose that in touch itself the particles are separated by distances which are extremely large as compared with the size of the particles themselves. What we do "see" are those external, more or less distant, luminous or illuminated objects, which, being correlated with our eyes, do positively affect them, draw out their powers into exercise, and cause us at once to see and to see *them*. Similarly we hear external, more or less distant, vibrating objects, we do not hear our ears, either in rest or action; we taste sapid objects, we do not taste our palate; we feel tangible objects, we do not feel the papillæ of our skin, or any other of the fine mechanicals of touch. And so on with all our organs. In each of these some one or more of our general powers

and it must draw this ideal, and rest it when drawn, for want of a higher, upon that which it conceives the highest, that is, upon itself.

Thus Christianity explicitly sets forth as our Emmanuel, and

or sensibilities are gathered, specialized, intensified, and educated. By their healthy action we perceive, *not themselves*, but those other objects, external to them, whose special qualities are correlated with theirs. Their aggregate constitutes our body, or our organic self, or our manifesting, mediating self—that “whereby” we are correlated with the macrocosm, and more or less consciously bear our part in that Dynamic System which we name the World. If then my body and its parts be *no* part of “me,” it is obvious that all its actions, affections, and correlations are severed by the whole diameter of logic from “me” or “mine;” and some other “medium” must be intercalated, *philosophicè, et præter necessitatem*, between the Ego and the external world, if such a thing there be. But if, on the other hand, my organic self be a real and coessential part of me—in such sense that whatever it or any part of it does, I do, and whatever is done to it or or any part of it, is done to me—then by its means “I” do perceive things distant, and things near—feel this table, hear yonder bell, see the village, and church, and sun, and stars—see them quite directly and immediately—as immediately, that is, as I “do” anything whatever—for all I do I do by means of my mediating self—as immediately, let us say it reverently, as God “does” anything whatever; for all He does He does by His Manifesting, Mediating-Self, His Co-essential Word, or Son—by Whom all things were and are created, in Whom all consist, in Whom all are or are being-reconciled,—in Whom, as it were, down to our “apprehension,” God reveals and guarantees to us not merely the physical or metaphysical, but also the moral and historic unity of things.

Now, I am not without hope that even Mr. Mansel, when he thinks it over, will admit that the above, so far as the microcosm at least, is sound metaphysics; that it is natural “natural realism,” and common “common sense.” It speaks the language of common consciousness, and believes that language to be in the main just. It is also, I believe, what both Reid and Hamilton intended to say; what Reid thought he had said; and what, in fact, he *did* say, only that [to the especial bewilderment of Hamilton or any logician] he had just rendered his own statement contradictory or unintelligible, by excluding his person from his Ego. In its glance at wider relationships, it is in harmony, I believe, with all we know of the macrocosm, or can conceive of it. And it is also, I will add, if only for Professor Smith’s amusement, in accordance with Creed and Scripture, or is what we call “orthodox.” At least, is free from two grievous heresies which I fear the Scoto-Oxonians must recant. It *neither* confounds the persons, *nor* divides the substance. Mr. Mansel, I grieve to say, in respect to the microcosm at least, does both.

There are who object to one’s mixing up creed and Scripture with such discussions; and I seldom do, at least explicitly. But, indeed, it is not possible to avoid it. All things *are* connected together, and no subject can be thoroughly examined without running out into these wide relationships. The commonest weight is but a near influence of planetary attraction; and no eye can be opened without, however stupidly, beholding heaven. It fact, it was the prevalence of general intelligence and such abstract speculation in the ancient world which caused much of the New Testament to be written, and

this planet's Truth, God-in-a-perfect-humanity—not as though humanity itself were a perfect thing, in the sense of being final or complete, but—God-rendering-human-nature-perfect in *every* stage, from the cradle to beyond the grave. Once our Example

specially which caused the Baptismal Formula to “develop” into the Creeds. The Christian revelation is essentially truth *in the concrete*—God’s presence in things exhibited or expressed in earth’s central example. As such it was willing to tell its Story [Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection] to the world. To a Jew it would seem natural enough; he would only require sufficient evidence. To any thorough Monotheist it could present no *à priori* difficulty. But in presence of the Grecian mind, which then, providentially, dominated thought, it was obliged to vindicate at once its Story and its Monotheism. And this it does with care; addressing itself to the “Ionian Culture,” in the writings of St. Paul, to “the Alexandrine” in those of St. John, while gladly borrowing from either whatever power of thought or speech each had. But, view it how one will, the Incarnation goes to the root of all controversies on the metaphysical unity of things [in the asserted communion of God with matter]; Crucifixion goes to the root of those on their moral unity—[affirming the complete subserviency of even conscious crime to supreme purity and triumphant beneficence]; and Resurrection goes to the root of those on their historic unity [by exhibiting the connexion between our present and our future selves, or between eternity and time]. Round this definite and positive “Story” as a centre, and with the searching Monotheism or Theocracy of the Jew as a basis or circumference, ancient Christianity built, gradually, its doctrinal Edifice—its first Creeds being sufficiently concrete, its latter creeds sufficiently abstract—sufficiently at least for any power of appreciation which the modern world has yet attained to. These creeds are at once a record of the struggle, and a monument of the Church’s victory in converting the old Greek mind, and utilizing its subtle and comprehensive powers. And it ought to weigh with us, it does sometimes weigh with Mr. Mansel, in estimating methods of philosophy, that what Christianity discerned at once, and felt throughout, to be its life and death antagonist was precisely that severance of the phenomenal and the real—that exclusion of the “Manifest” from the Ego and the Deity—which still beguiles and eviscerates philosophy. “Appearances often deceive,” no doubt, when partially and disproportionately viewed; but never when the whole is seen: else were there no truth existent; the deity itself were false upon the whole.

And even Mr. Smith might treat the Athanasian Creed with more respect did he remember, what is now again becoming generally acknowledged, that any “system” of thought, or *exhaustive* treatment of things, always evolves a trinitarian doctrine. The Greek mind, for instance, had vaguely evolved it centuries before the Christian era. Gibbon’s sarcasm is, that the doctrine of the incarnation is *all* that Christianity adds to the “sublime” speculations of Plato. Even were the sneer well founded, which it is not, Christianity might accept it with much complacency; for this is the very doctrine which saves philosophy itself from collapsing into folly. Wisdom’s problem is to correlate *all* the elements of our knowledge; and especially to connect the seen and unseen, ourselves and things with God. Obviously, therefore, whatever *omits* plain, actual manhood, or runs away from matter, simply shirks the question—as completely as Mahomet does in

on the earth, He is now our Ideal in the heavens, whence we expect Him to appear again as the acknowledged centre of a higher stage of being, with the first fruits and working germs whereof He has inspired or impregnated Humanity.

excluding paternity or authorship from his idea of God. Our system is (I.) the Universal Father, whence all things emanate ; all (II.) consisting in and constituted round His Archetypal Son ; and all (III.) moved and animated by His Exertive Spirit. This, at all events, *attempts* the solution, and, as I for one believe, perfectly succeeds. The world has heard no other which has either probability or plausibility, except so far as it agrees with ours. To omit common things is, I repeat, plainly to refuse the question : to dis sever them from God is folly ; first it is dualism ; and then it is either nihilism or atheism, according as it denies or affirms " real existence" to them. If they *are* or *can be*, though but for a moment, separated from or independent of Him, whatever has made them has unmade Deity. So the real question is always the concrete one, the reality of Emmanuel in common things—or the plain story of the Apostles' Creed—the Word made flesh, and the resurrection of the body. The victory of Paul and John absorbed what was true in Platonism, and atrophied its Gnostic offshoots. In a less intelligent age the same doctrine, in its sacramental form, proved the bulwark of the Church, as many besides Hamilton have noticed, against scholastic idealism ; vindicating here again, perhaps to our surprise, the foresight of its founder. True, the rite itself has been often and hugely corrupted. Yet I have already expressed my conviction [p. 380] that the very fetishism of the Church is more philosophical than Sir Wm. Hamilton's and Mr. Mansel's [I do not say real and every-day opinions, but I do say than their] mantle-clad and stilted philosophy. The one exaggerates a real truth into shocking and irrational falsehood : the other virtually denies all reason and truth whatever.

I must say a word of Cousin, who has originated this long note. He is about the most Christian of the Neo-Platonists, and the most philosophical. He honestly seeks to include all the elements of our life ; and his success had been large were it not for the initial negative, which empties his system, leaves it at the mercy of any relentless criticism, and sets himself, from its *felt* weakness [as it sets Hamilton, Mansel, Kant, and all the philosophers, each in his own system and in his own way], to supplementalize it with some after-thought of extra-rational reality.

His Trinity, for instance, is like ours, only unreal and evanescent—The One, the Many, and the Relation between them. The last is a pure abstraction ; something less than a Platonic idea. With us it is the pervading *Zwanzig*, all Life and Force—the sum and system of efficient causes—proceeding directly from the One, mediately from the Many ; endowing variously each individual thing, and making it what it is. His Many, again, is as *mere*-phenomenal, fantastical, and false as it is with the idealists generally, or as it must be to any Ego which has no phenomenal-self, and so, no phenomenal-correlatives. It is, therefore, he feels like Plato, no true manifestation of the One ; and he is obliged, like Plato, to seek this in some mental world of the True, the Beautiful, the Good—which forms, indeed, a second Trinity—an idealized shadow of the first [pure intelligence, pure form, and pure morality or activity inspired (1), expansively and (2) concentratively by love]. This ideal world is Cousin's *Λόγος*. It is less practical, and therefore less philo-

More generally, whether in natural or in revealed religion, man, call him fallen or unfallen, so long as he regards himself as the head of that creation which is visible to him, must think, with whatever of conscious pride or conscious fear he may, that

sophical than the ideal "perfect man" of the Stoics [every human ideal is anthropomorphic, Cousin's as well as theirs], and would answer to Comte's "ideal of aggregate humanity," except that Comte intended his as an ultimate, whereas Cousin presents his as a true mediator between the Infinite and us. "Ces trois idées, suivant Platon, se concentrent en une sorte d'unité qu'il appelle λόγος. Ce λόγος n'existe pas par lui-même, mais seulement dans son rapport avec la substance absolue dont il est la manifestation (sic) ou la forme visible (sic), et il sert de médiateur entre l'homme et Dieu. C'est un pont jeté sur l'abîme qui sépare le moi phénoménal de l'être substantiel, le fini de l'infini." — "Du Vrai," ch. vii. Obviously this is but a quasi-manifestation and a quasi-visible form: this bridge is only from ideal to ideal: the moi phénoménal it connects is no more visible than itself; this mediator is but of one; it never descends to or touches the actual at all. Yet Cousin almost persuades himself that it is real Christianity. This Platonic λόγος, he notices, was deficient in being purely rational. By adding to it "amour" Cousin deems he at once connects the λόγος with the ultimate, and "completes the Christian view."

But this Christianity, he is consecutive enough to feel, is only "la philosophie Cretienne" as distinguished from "les sectes Hébreux" and other *ιδιώματα*, whose gross conceptions he would be obliged to classify as various forms of mysticism. The notion that the Logos *σάρξ ἐγένετο*, for instance, and all such "foolishness" as developed in the creeds, must be to him only the extreme case of "la mysticisme phœnoménale;" as must also any assertion that we are intended to see the Infinite in the finite, and eminently our Lord's thesis [addressed too to the *Greek* element of the Apostolic College], "He that hath seen me, Philip, hath seen the Father." Similarly he must class St. John as a "mystique sentimental" for saying, "he that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God: for God is love." And he must class as "mystiques rationnels" all of us who affirm that we worship with the understanding; or even who agree with himself, that "la raison [we say *aussi*, however, and not *au contraire*] est une communication de l'être absolu avec l'homme." We say also "through a mediator;" but our mediator is a real being, who comes down to the bottom of earth's estate, not even abhorring the Virgin's womb. In His Spirit and communion, we are mystics enough to believe that we truly receive of the divine Fulness in every faculty we have, and are truly, however obscurely or stupidly, conscious of God in all our consciousness of being.

This revived Platonism, alas, for all its intellectual vigour and its high and pure intent, is but a Neo-Gnosticism. And it is so whether it begin directly by excluding the person from the Ego; or theologically, by refusing the incarnation: or psychologically, with the Scoto-Oxonians, by excluding all knowledge and consciousness, except that highly educated reflex consciousness which "not only knows, but at the same time knows that it knows." Of course, it is easy for any logician to tear any of their schemes to pieces; and this they do readily for each other. Sir William Hamilton's claymore, for example, makes pleasant mince-meat of Cousin and the Germans; and his method of ro-

as Nature is the general expression of God, so he is himself His more particular likeness. His highest spiritual ambition must be to verify his calling; the correlative sense of sin must be essentially self-condemnation; and our deepest self-reproach can

pairing damages is still more to be admired. He agrees with Kant, for instance, that "Things in themselves, Matter, Mind, God—all in short that is not finite, relative, and phenomenal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties [which, of course, are *not* things in themselves] is beyond the verge of our knowledge." And he adds his own—"Kant has clearly shown that the Idea of the Unconditioned can have no objective reality—that it conveys no knowledge—that it involves the most insoluble contradictions. But he ought to have shown that the Unconditioned had no objective application, *because it had, in fact, no subjective affirmation*; that it afforded no real knowledge, because it contained *nothing even conceivable*; that it is self-contradictory, because it is not a notion, either simple or positive, but only a fasciculus of negations—negations of the conditioned in its opposite extremes, and bound together merely by the aid of language and their common character of incomprehensibility."—"Phil. of Uncond.," pp. 16, 17. This handsomely out-Kauts Kant, and out-Platos Plato. Similarly he out-Cousins Cousin. Cousin having argued, weakly enough, that the ideas of the Infinite and of the Finite are equally real, because as correlatives they suggest each other, Hamilton replies, "Correlatives certainly suggest each other, but correlatives may or may not be equally real or positive. In thought contradictories necessarily imply each other, for the knowledge of contradictories is one. But the reality of one contradictory so far from guaranteeing the reality of the other, is nothing else than its negation. Thus every positive notion (the concept of a thing by what it is), suggests a negative notion (the concept of a thing by what it is not); and the highest positive notion, the notion of the Conceivable, is not without its corresponding negation in the notion of the Inconceivable. But though these mutually suggest each other, *the positive alone is real*; the negative is only the abstraction of the other; in the highest generality, only an abstraction of thought itself. It therefore behoved M. Cousin, instead of assuming the objective correality of his two elements on the fact of their subjective correlation, to have suspected *on this very ground that the reality of the one was inconsistent with the reality of the other*. In truth, it will be found upon examination that his two primitive ideas are nothing more than contradictory relatives. These consequently of their very nature imply each other in thought; but they imply each other only as affirmation and negation of the same."—p. 28. The Infinite and the Finite, therefore, cannot *both* be real! As being contradictories, to affirm the one is positively to deny the other! Oh, but this is only "in thought?" Yes; but *just* thought is always the true theory of things.

I wish some one would explain the grand foundation of the Hamiltonian scheme—if scheme it can be called—"the great but unannounced axiom" on which he always *intended* to build, and which he makes the basis of his assaults on others. I confess I can find no statement of it either in himself or his followers which does not seem to me in the highest degree unbalanced or absurd. "The conditioned is the mean between two extremes—two inconditionates exclusive of each other, neither of which can be conceived as possible, but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one must be admitted as

say nothing so terrible, nothing so searching as this, that in doing, or thinking, or feeling what we knew was wrong, we had debased, degraded, violated, the image and representative of God—had defiled the conscious temple of that Presence which

necessary.”—p. 15, *et passim*. What does this mean? That the common Finite or Conceivable is a mean between the inconceivably great and the inconceivably small, or that $0 : x : \infty$, is common language, and is no doubt true in every department as well as in mathematics. [See Note A.] But *these* extremes neither contradict nor exclude each other or the mean. They are three proportionals: and, like other proportionals, the greater extreme includes the lesser and the mean. Affirming a mean between two *contradictory* extremes, seems only less rational than finding the middle point between the top of St. Paul's and the first of August, or steering a middle course between the Greek Kalends and the Golden Horn. And when this mean *is* inserted, by some Hamiltonian logic [by the principle of contradiction say, “or as it should rather be called,” he adds elsewhere, “that of non-contradiction;” or by that of the excluded Middle, which, if it be available for inserting means, should rather be called that of “the included Middle between two contradictories”]: this mean, however found, is then the contradictory of each extreme, is exclusive of each and excluded by each; while yet these extremes are also mutually contradictory and exclusive, and inclusive somehow besides of their own mean contradictory! Surely this out-contradicts the antithesis, and out-idealizes the idea. To find anything rational or anything credible in this great “Principle of the Conditioned” has always baffled, I admit, any kind of faith or reason that God gives me.

“But the above are only common cyphers or infinites, that is, indefinitely small or large finites.” Granted. And when proceeding further, both in reason and faith, we affirm **THE INFINITE, THE INCONCEIVABLE**, out-comprehending, sustaining and containing all, imparting to all of His Being and Fulness, and making all work out the manifestation of His True Character, His Ultimate Unchanging Self—we part not at all from the commonest reason and commonest faith which direct our daily life. We are correlated alike, and in the same sense, both with Finite and Infinite; we know but an infinitesimal part of either; and we may speak of the one as intelligibly as the other. We are correlated with the common Finite by all our common qualities. We are correlated with all the Infinites up to The Infinite Himself, by the fact and knowledge that all these common qualities run out so far and lose or find themselves in Him. And we are specially and consciously correlated with Him by the consciousness or half-consciousness—call it faith, reason, religion, what you will—that we are His creatures, His half-conscious, half-responsible children, bound to walk worthy of our original, and to realize His image.

Any philosophy which is willing to contemplate *all* the facts will be able, I believe, to discourse positively and instructively of both Finite and Infinite: and it will always *need* the one to reflect light upon the other. Whatever system omits *either* side—like positivism [avowedly], or idealism [virtually]—ceases to be “philosophy,” though it may contribute to some partial science. But I venture to believe no philosophy can issue in anything but bewilderment, which starts either from Plato's Initial Negative, or from Hamilton and Mansel's Initial Ambiguity.

not the heavens can adequately worship. Angels, in like manner, must picture their best-conceivable of God from their own angelic nature; and if they be conscious of that "folly," with which we are told somewhere that their Maker charges them, would, I suppose, express their sorrow in efforts and in utterance like ours.

II. But by what right does man, while interpreting the visible, first pass it by to affirm an invisible beyond? and by what process does he then invest this Mystery with *consistent* attributes, ascending up to Unity itself; whereas the visible, its supposed manifestation, is a *mixture* of things, more or less painful, inconsistent, and perplexing?

By precisely the same process as the Psalmist does, brethren, and by precisely the same right. His chequered experience, and his mode of rising from it, are in this respect, as in others, a type of the natural process; and by following it, we shall find ourselves both practically and theoretically attaining his result. This, at all events, is a matter in which practice has not only preceded theory, but in which it must always precede it. It cannot assume the facts; it must ascertain and seek to understand them; can strictly note, analyze, and balance them, and compare them with what other facts it knows.

Whatever it be, then, which affects the Psalmist, either from within or from without, He rests not in that thing, but refers it and himself at once to Him Whom he feels beyond. He waits not for some more perfect state of his own mind, or for some better definition of his God, to enable him to come more worthily or more effectively into His presence; but, such as he is, he throws himself at once on the mercy and the help he needs. He permits or encourages his joy to draw him, or his troubles to drive him, into an ever-present Bosom of Sympathy and Refuge, which he sees not, but believes. This All-presence he *realizes* to himself, and finds it at once and essentially to modify each primary element of his experience. Those of a joyful character it tempers, balances, sustains, and elevates. Those of a painful cast, down even to the deepest and most crushing self-reproach, it also meets and balances; at once affirms and compensates; and

by means of forgiveness, and hope, and help, stamped through the soul, it, even for the present, totally reverses, so that *all that is within him* can praise His Holy Name.

It is not *in the whole* that the Psalmist *first* finds God; nor is it by any generalization that he attains the thought of God; on the contrary, it is by seeing Jehovah at *each* point of his course that he entitles, while he enables, himself to see Him in the whole. By not resting on any seen, or thought, or felt; but by passing beyond each of them out into the Invisible direct, he finds himself ever in contact with, loses himself ever in, the consciousness of that ever-present, ever-realized infinity which is, in fact, the constant asymptote of each, the one constant envelope of all. Then as he gradually ascends, and proceeds to sum up his experience, any formula in which he should declare it would be at least a genuine integration of homogeneous elements—a solid statement, not omitting and ignoring, but affirming and comprehending all its own particulars.

Thus *Unity* is explicit in the conclusion, so far as he cares to say it, because it had implicitly been felt all through. The Ever-present is by its very notion unique, and only needs to be looked at to announce itself The One. And *goodness*, unmixed goodness, demanding unmixed, and total, and universal praise, is the dictum of the Psalmist's judgment and adoration on the whole, because this is what *every* element of his life had proved throughout. That so very chequered an experience should thus sum itself up into one homogeneous word may indeed seem strange, perhaps scientifically unwarrantable to some; but it is only to such as forget that they who are able to see in each particular what the Psalmist saw, have ever attained infinite compensations from the sight—that, "though sorrowful, they are *always* rejoicing;" "they have learned in *every* thing to give thanks;" "to glorify God in the fires;" "to rejoice in tribulations also;" nay, even each, particularly, "to glory in His Cross." In fact, each whole element of the Psalmist's experience is not a certain immediate seen or felt alone, but a certain seen or felt combined with a consciousness of something else, which stirs a vaster and a loftier world within. The difference thus produced, which we may

measure by his experience or our own, is precisely the difference between those who walk by sight and those who live by faith. FAITH throws forward our path to the horizon which separates the seen from the Invisible; and each perturbation of that finite sphere becomes the origin of undulations which carry out the soul into the living light of Heaven. Each point is not itself merely, but that which it creates besides; and the sum is so many varied, and multiform, and unexpected perceptions of the many-sided loving-kindnesses of God. The Psalmist, if his experience could be denuded of its "sense of God," might be, perhaps, "of all men most miserable;" but, that sense included, benevolence itself could wish no more than that all men could share his joy unspeakable, and peace that passes understanding.

To generalize the statement—if creation were not sensible of God, its judgment of itself might be on the whole essentially different from what it is; but this consciousness, or this conviction added, the interpretation of Nature and Providence varies in proportion; and he who feels it most will most intensely share the Psalmist's high prerogative, and render, while he demands imperatively, the voice of blessing from everything that Lives.

III. And it only remains to ask by what right one passes by the visible at *any* point, and assumes or allows these wide suggestions of what cannot be seen? By the same right that we behold the Visible itself; and notice it, or picture it, or remember it at all. Because God has given us the organization to do so. Because, besides having given us eyes to see what can be seen, and ears to hear what can be heard, and intellect to know what can be known, He has given us something else within which is not satisfied with these, and cannot rest in them, but ever searches out beyond every seen and known, and concept and conceivable, with an ever-growing and unquenchable thirst for that which transcends them all—by this right man rests not in the visible, but finds some Positive Invisible everywhere around—and by virtue of this, that God has made us so that our whole constitution bows down to this mysterious consciousness, accepts its impulse, submits to its authority, and recognises it as the messenger and witness from above; therefore it is that man, and with his

highest self-approval, prostrates himself to this Invisible, and seeks to worship God. And IN SEEKING to worship Him, however feeble the utterance, and imperfect the conception, he truly DOES worship GOD, and worships Him alone.

This is the worship of faith, brethren, by its definition: and whosoever offers this the best, though in other respects he were but a little one, is of the first in the Kingdom of Heaven.

It is not that the intellect finds or conceives God, any more than the eye sees Him. He is as inconceivable as He is invisible: as Unknown as He is Unseen: except to faith's insight and conviction. The process transcends the intellect as truly as it does the vision. Worship is very often genuine and true-hearted, and may be elevated and pure, where the intellect has exerted itself but little, and may scarce have generalized at all. It precedes science, and it precedes reflection, both in the individual and in the aggregate, though science will acquiesce in it as willingly and as completely as either taste, or prudence, or emotion. The unknown transcends the intellect as it transcends all our powers; but not in the sense of contradicting or refusing them. It is *always* beyond them, and always draws them out beyond themselves into its own communion. All our powers, in fact, the intellect included; are led or driven into worship by the spontaneous impulse of our life, and then, experience added, are free to confess that on the whole they have been guided right. Unconsciously at first, our spontaneous powers protrude themselves into what may be called the visible-unknown. Soon curiosity, fear, wonder, joy, imagination, hope, lead us out into some foretaste of the Invisible, and look for and drink in our first religious teaching. Yet this is only "the hearing of the ear" to us, until deep distress or high excitement comes—as when we dash ourselves against the laws that circumscribe our "liberty," and feel the clear, cold firmament, which girdles close our path, and freezes back our hot ambition; or when, without our fault, the great chariot wheels roll over us, and leave us bereaved, heart-stricken, and exhaust. Then our proved nothingness, crushed back upon itself, feels after the basis of our being, finds the eternal sympathy, and is born anew therein, not without

some strange intensity of reverence, and trust, and firm appropriation, which convert the travail into joy. Amid these "wondrous compensations" the soul "rests" a moment until faith knows itself, and religion is conceived; then from the tomb of self the *reflex* powers emerge, and expand themselves in turn, fresh, mighty, and inspired with the conviction of their author; everywhere these learn, and teach, and preach; and everywhere they find their own correlatives—a lower world, rudely responsive to their voice; a higher world, ascending ever beyond their utmost aspirations. *Both* these sets of powers have their consciousness of God—the first, in the outer Infinite, that brilliant brazen heaven in which the Indefinite takes refuge, and which returns us every look and thought, baptized into a new significance; the second, in the inner Infinite, that felt mystery of changeless Being, whence all our powers well up in the almost intelligent communion of the I AM. Between these two poles, or this centre and circumference of Being, all our existence is evolved; between these two most positive and most coherent convictions our whole mental and moral nature is being-born; by their mutual action, and in the bosom of their Unity, all creation is being-caused-to-grow.

Something of this incessant alternation between the within and the without, both in the lesser and the greater moments of our development—this expansion and return in order to expand again—is felt, I believe, by every soul. Its leading facts are prominent in every religious and philosophic theory. For Intellect observes and shares the process; and, as its own contribution, labours to improve it; reviews, criticizes, corrects, systematizes, and predicts; and then frequently commits two blunders—one, that of supposing the process in *any* stage to be complete; and the other, that of supposing the whole process to be its own. But these are both serious errors; the first a fatal one, to which Faith will not listen for a moment. Both Nature and Religion, it knows, are but in the middle of their work; they are but being-born—religion especially: "its baptism doth represent unto it its profession;" it dies daily to realize its life. And when either Intellect in any form, or Religion in any form, will insist on it-

self as some finality, Faith, in the name of the Invisible, will become a fierce iconoclast, and denounce the self-satisfied as worse than dead—will find the line of prophets to break down the idols, and stamp them into powder; will find the Baptist to tear down and trample the Ideas; will find the Christ to bring us a truer Image and a higher Ideal from the heart of the unknown.

And the other mistake is also serious. I disparage not the part which Intellect should bear in all practical religion; and I admit that in all matters of religious theory it is both workman and director. But it is neither prime material, prime mover, nor final judge. It is not in intellect's cold court that religion has its origin; nor from its blocks of ice that her living temple is built up. It is not by *any generalization whatever*, it is by *insight and conviction*, first and last, that the Invisible is discerned, is affirmed, is worshipped. Deeper, intenser, more vital energies supply the facts to intellect—the data of its theory—the data of its prophecy; without them it could not form its first conception; without them it could never correct or reform its concepts, or ever reconstruct its broken synthesis. In their fresh action is its own fresh action,* its genesis and its regeneration. A pure in-

* Two principles of great, and greatly neglected, importance in metaphysics are here insisted on:—

1. Our direct supplies the materials of our reflex knowledge. (1) We are before we know; (2) we know physically before we know intelligently; (3) we know with a direct intelligence before we know reflectively—before we (4) turn back upon ourselves to think and theorize, to note and formulate our knowledge, and to pursue it for its own sake. One would think that these *four* stages, and *in this order*, were familiar to every one; and that any theory, however it might refine or enlarge any of them, would always preserve this order and correlation. But no theory does, at least none consistently, so far as I am aware. It is *only* the last mentioned of the four, for instance, that falls within the *Scoto-Oxonian* definition of *either* consciousness or knowledge. According to Hamilton and Mansel, there is *no* knowledge unless where one knows he also "knows that he knows." The ox, therefore, does *not* know his owner, nor the ass his master's crib; and ninety-nine hundredths of our common life is devoid of *any* knowledge or *consciousness* whatever. This, as I conceive, is, in both thought and language, an enormous blunder—cognate, or virtually identical, with the exclusion of the person and the whole common life from the philosophic *Ego*. [See last note.]

Locke, I think, clearly saw and intended to preserve this order. But, in language at least, he often loses sight of it, and becomes confused accordingly. To throw the doctrine into his language—formation or growth precedes "sensation" [and does not

telligence, indeed, if there be such creature, might, we can conceive, have a religion of its own; and though cold, and bright, and calm, and almost feelingless, it would be analogous to ours. The spontaneous expansion of its energies towards the inconceivable should be its first activity. Reflex wisdom, if such it have, must be gained by the return upon the basis of its being, to find if anywhere its Maker there, and thence expand again,

always imply it either in the human or in any other subject]; sensation precedes "ideas of sensation" [and does not always imply them]; and ideas of sensation, along with other ideas, precede all that Locke calls "knowledge." But then this knowledge is only reflex or theoretical knowledge, and must be defined "the agreement or disagreement of our ideas." This is, obviously, an inadequate account of knowledge, and does not even include the most important of Locke's own categories, that of "real existence"—neither our intuitive knowledge of our own existence, our sensitive knowledge of other things, nor, by implication, our demonstrative knowledge of God's. All our knowledge, too, as thus defined, may, he admits, be purely imaginary. To be satisfied of the "reality" of any part of it, we must always descend to the process of "sensitive knowledge," and compare our ideas [not with other ideas but] with things. Locke ought, at least, to have divided our knowledge into sensitive and reflex knowledge, as the whole scheme and nomenclature of his *Essay* almost required of him. Cousin's system of first our spontaneous, and next our reflex development, is sufficiently explicit. But his German Platonism, by unrealizing the first, virtually, as Locke discerned, "unrealizes" all.

2. Our direct or sensitive knowledge furnishes not only the historic, but the logical basis of the reflex; or, rather, the highest knowledge only repeats its process in a finer form, and on finer materials. The ultimate appeal in every case is to our sense or feeling of congruity in the things compared. In physical knowledge there is merely physical correlation, communion, mutual action, or combination. In sensation there is correlation of the organ with the thing affecting it. In an idea of sensation, correlation of the organ as affected with the nervous, cerebral, or mental affection. In sensitive knowledge, a double correlation, or the last two combined, the organ being "mediator," and partaking both relations. In reflex knowledge there is merely the correlation of two ideas, cerebral actions, or mental states. But what the nature of the correlation is in each case—whether of congruity, contrariety, similarity, proportion, succession, causality, or any other relation—the appeal, I repeat, lies not to the reason, or discursive faculty, but to the sensibility—a direct and immediate *feeling* of that relation *in the concrete*. The appeal is to outer, ruder, less educated sensibilities in the ruder kinds of knowledge; to inner, finer, higher sensibilities, when the subject-matter is more abstract truth, morality, æsthetic, or religion. What we choose to call this "immediate feeling,"—whether perception, apperception, or intuition,—does not signify, so long as we discern its nature—that it is (1) the dictum of *sensibility*, and (2) that it makes its affirmation *in the concrete*.

Hume was the first to see clearly the first of these two characteristics. Indeed, this is the dogma that underlies and *resolves* his scepticism. On his own principle, that all

in some profounder consciousness. But with us intellect is a slow and late creation. It grows up from below, as does religion; slower than religion, however, and by religion's help. We cannot afford to wait for it in the common, much less in the intenser movements of our life; if we could, then its own antecedents had not been developed, and intellect would not be born. No doubt, Intelligence grows apace, tends daily to predominate, and gradually asserts its power, though cold and directive merely, over all intenser things. Men seem to feel that its do-

belief, up to the highest conviction, is more properly "the act of our sensitive than of our cogitative nature," Hume was always willing to build. And no philosophy can build a solid structure upon any other. Locke's Demonstration, the Scottish First Truths, and the Scoto-Oxonian Necessary Truths, are all only Hume's principle stated in different words; for the necessity insisted on is only a "subjective necessity," and so, like Locke's intuition, is only the ultimate dictum of our balanced and educated sensibility. Hume also perceived that all assent, affirmation, conviction, and so all reflex knowledge, is of the nature of belief or faith—which it obviously is, up to the extreme case of positive knowledge—faith in our own existence. When cross-questioned in respect to any part of it, our final answer must always be—we cannot help believing it; our nature, that is, our Maker, obliges us to rest upon it.

The other characteristic of the dictum—that it is always given in the concrete—is also important, as I may afterwards have occasion to insist. The most abstract knowledge, term, or proposition, in its genesis, and in its realization at any time, is always concrete. When we use the most general terms—man, curve, virtue, less, agreement—we always, in proportion as we think of what we say, set an individual before us; which individual we then instantly and instinctively generalize. We do this last by the same kind of process as in looking at a point we always look beyond it and around it,—in the act of seeing our terrestrial horizon we carry it out into our celestial. In fact, God having given us a generalizing power, there is no longer to us any mere individual. Each thing or aspect of a thing becomes not only one, but one of a class—an "instance," example, "sign," evidence, representation, of an infinity of things. And what we find true of one instance we believe implicitly will be found true in every instance of the class. This, which is the principle of induction, has justly been resolved, on its lowest platform, into "faith"—Faith in what is called, by a not very happy expression, the Uniformity of Nature. But it is the principle of all generalization, and of all general reasoning, and applies to all departments of creation alike, to Nature, Providence, and Grace; to morality, religion, and abstract truth, as well as to natural reasonings. Mr. Mill tries to distinguish it from the general reasoning of geometry; but, I think, he fails. What I prove true of this circle I am sure is true of every circle, that is, of every figure *so far as it is similar to this*. What I find true of this ounce of gold, I am equally certain would, in the same circumstances, be true of every ounce of gold, that is, of every substance, so far as it is similar to this. I can abstract the circle from its circumstances far more easily than I can the ounce of gold, but this is nothing to the purpose; for this abstraction

minion comes. But the essence of Royalty is a true sympathy with *all* its subjects; and it can only attain this by absorbing into itself, and making its own the spirit of those prior elements which have borne and nurtured it, and by carrying on their purpose into loftier work. If it fail to discern this Catholicity, and to embrace and feel it, it can be but some partial tyrant, or some doctrinaire invasion, without any elements of stability, or any chance of empire. If it fail to discern its own progressiveness and the progressiveness of things, it must die off into some fixed

must be made in each case, and in the same sense, to render the reasoning valid. No perfect circle was ever seen. And the same principle is equally involved in all social or moral reasonings. It would be impossible to learn or teach from experience, and the very idea of revelation itself giving us examples were absurd, except on the condition that each fact is an "instance," and an instance of fixed, pervading, unchanging laws. "There are in Nature parallel cases," and an infinity of them; and what is true in one is true in each and all,—this is the principle of mathematical and physical reasoning. Faith in the uniformity of Nature is their universal major premiss. Faith in the Unchangeableness of God—God being the Universal Cause, and the totality of things being His whole manifestation, so that nothing is or moves without Him, and "what He does in any case He does in all like cases"—this is religion's thesis, and is only the explicit announcement of the faith on which all life proceeds. This is the Universal Major of all just reasonings whatsoever. Whatever infringes it is false, whatever omits it is inconclusive or illogical.

The Minor Premiss of all reasoning will be at bottom some investigation "how far cases are alike," which they never are precisely; and hence the phrases immutability, and uniformity of nature, are extremely faulty. The Laws, Regulative Principles, or invisible Directrices of Nature's movement, are uniform, but not Nature herself. She is an incessant birth and growth, a constituted variety and change; and *never*, I believe, exactly repeats herself in any way. In every name, class, or comparison, some *Corda* is omitted [Note, p. 246]. What we do find is similarity and analogy in her, proceeding from fixed principles. Like ourselves, Nature manifests an "identity," which *when seen in parts* she does not possess, but which, she indicates, would be seen in her totality. Seen in parts, as we must see her, our highest generalization is, "Nature is always like herself;" her *Character* is invariable. This is only saying in one department what is true in all. All things are of God, and He is always like Himself in all places of His dominion. We obtain this Universal Major, in each department or in the whole, always in the same way, by the simple process of generalization, which God has made a necessity of our organization. We make each thing, in the very act of considering it, the type of a class; in other words, we make each finite a portion of the Indefinite or Infinite, and its, to us, representative portion—its "sign," evidence, or manifestation—the differential which partakes its fullness, and helps to reveal its character. These differentials we integrate as best we may, according to our best sagacity and the power of our best calculus.

idea—false itself, and, however false and unreal, a real incubus to all.

Both the practice of religion, therefore, and its theory rest, in the last resort, not merely on nature, and not merely on human nature, but specially on that “side” of both which seeks to the Invisible; definitely on that *παράκλησις*, or “incitement” of our life, which I have attempted to analyze and define as Faith,—Faith, not doctrinal or ecclesiastical, but personal; not the help or fulcrum we derive from Church or Creed, but the fresh impulse and endeavour which work and speak within; Faith, as it is illustrated and enforced, not vaguely or at random, but, so I believe, in a just and formal definition by St. Paul—the substance of the hoped-for, the evidence of things not seen—a realizing sense of the Invisible, that is, of God Himself, and of whatever, to the growing consciousness, that growing Name implies—that which, by a fierce paradox, insists ever on knowing the Unknown and seeing the Unseen—not, indeed, the whole thereof; it is not a fool; it pretends not to “grasp round” the Incomprehensible, or out-embrace the Infinite; but it does insist that it apprehends the Infinite—that it grasps as much thereof as its small being holds, and truly “knows” God by a true communion of those same attributes whereby “also it is known.”

This is, indeed, the Birth-Power and Birth-Angel of our life, now at last explicit in our religious consciousness. This it is which has created, impelled, and always compensated every life we live. This, that exacts from us our ceaseless pilgrimage, incessant conflict, and never-ending self-denial or self-sacrifice; yet knows how to steep them all in a peace that passes understanding, and to obscure our intensest misery and self-reproach with some Eternal sense of complacency and God. This it is which, in its humbler analogue of Nature’s Aspiration, has caused our humblest powers to grow. This, in its farther stage of Human Aspiration, has developed man himself, and all the works and royalties which name themselves from him. This, in its farther stage of Religious Aspiration, has wrought man’s second birth—causing him to transcend himself, though it be through sin and death, in search of the invisible, and creating him anew

in the nearer image of his Maker. This it is which in every stage thrusts out our powers into explicit worship, though in rude unbalanced guise, towards each rude unknown. This it is which has insisted always that every unknown shall be diligently sought, and reverently learned and known, and always some loftier Unknown be sought, and *it alone* be worshipped; thus summoning always all the powers, and all their products, intellect and religion itself included, to be always born anew along with it in self-devotion to the Infinite. This it is that has found for us each True, and Beautiful, and Good; and this that lifts the world towards them in ascending dispensations, as it obscures them all with the last great Name of LOVE. This it is that blesses every common life, and sanctifies the meanest gift that the meanest creature takes from that "opened" Hand, that fills all living things with plenteousness. In its eyes "the young lions, roaring after their prey, do seek their food from God;" and the savage man, who awaits the lion on his path, and pursues and slays him, and carries home the spoil to his own young barbarians, and then with some proud modesty lifts up his savage heart to his own savage god—is he forgotten by the Father of them all? Faith says, not so, brethren; whatever formed religion may affirm. Faith commands the savage man to seek the Better; and it gives the same command to the highest religion and the highest Truth of God. Every gift of every dispensation it accepts and affirms as His immediate gift and ordinance; yet it always forbids to rest in any of them, and makes the highest Son command us to "rejoice" if we love Him and love His Father, because He goes to the Greater than Himself, that He may lead us thitherward. This searching, judging, and conducting power, so loving and patient, so earnest and severe; this advancing, exacting purity which will take no excuse; this restless energy and growing purpose, which obliges us to go from faith to faith, from nature to higher nature, from religion to religion, from holiness itself to higher and ever higher holiness, until we find our Home in Him Who will accept our service, and will give us again such Embodiment "as pleases Him"—this it is which has generated worship with all its ends and accessories; and this

it is which still keeps it fresh and commanding to the world. Imbued with this spirit it is, and uttering its voice, that the Psalmist finds himself at once in communion with creation and with God; feels the universe to be a half-conscious Temple of that Presence that is burning on his lips; and while he articulates aloud, "for every thing that hath breath," Praise ye the Lord, hears responsive from that mixed and mighty multitude the half-articulate, Amen.

[But there is a still larger aspect in which the Psalmist feels himself the organ of earth's inspiration, and uttering her voice. His book is also *historical*, or historico-prophetical. He speaks not merely for his own time or dispensation; but he ponders on the past, he listens to the future, he gathers up the spirit of the ages, feels their increasing purpose, and fears not to hymn their destinies. These all issue, brethren, for the macrocosm as for the microcosm; individual experience only swells the chorus of Universal Praise. Troubles, transgressions, chastisements, abound, but a searching Mercy overpowers them all, and the end is more than peace. And yet, brethren, David witnessed barely the dawns of enlightenment. Dim and meagre is the outline he could discern, even in prophetic vision, of the Grace and Gospel which are revealed to us. He no doubt "inquired diligently" what the Spirit that was in him meant when it spake of the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow. Yet he saw not one of the days of the Son of Man, or of the Son of Man's Dispensation. Egypt or Babylon was at the head of the world to him—Jerusalem, without a temple and almost without a law, at the head of the religious world. Christendom he had not conceived—a Christian Church he never saw. The voice of nature he could hear; her deep analogies were in his heart. Some outlines, or rather some tableaux of history had come down to him in the traditions of his Church,—germs, he knew these were, and implicit prophecies of good; for he knew them to be "types" or key facts, expounding the scheme of Providence. But of "God in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them," he had but scant idea. Of that Eternal Cross and Sepulchre, and Pentecost and Paraclete which should

institute a kingdom of heaven on earth, and build men up effectively towards a kingdom of heaven in heaven, he had but the vaguest intimation. Of that Great Redemption-throne, before which, in the fulness of time, all things should bow—of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things below the earth, and all confess the Saviour Lord to the glory of God the Father—he was not vouchsafed a vision. Yet he never wavers in drawing from his own premises the *like* conclusion; and integrates the issues of Providence, as he does the voices of present Nature, into one Psalm of Trust, and Hope, and Penitence, and Praise. “The Lord is king, the earth may be glad thereof: yea, the multitude of the isles may be glad thereof.” Clouds and darkness are round about Him, and a fiery judgment rolls before His chariot-wheels; but goodness is triumphant always, absorbing or annihilating all its adversaries. Righteousness and peace are the habitation of His throne; His tender love is over all His works, and His mercy endureth for ever.

This predominance of Hope, this faith in an ultimate of love and mercy, on the part of David, is well worthy of remark—compared with some estimates of the future, which are not unpopular in the midst of our illumination, may well seem wonderful. Can it be, we are constrained to ask, that the evil has developed, since David’s time, in some still larger proportion than the good? May distincter knowledge disperse or hide the clear and broad conviction? Or may one talent justly out-shine ten? An easier explanation, brethren, is near at hand, and I believe will commend itself as true. The Psalmist was indeed without our brighter revelation and larger experience of God’s character, but then his simpler view was not perverted by our false “idea.” He had vastly inferior knowledge, but his fresh faith and feeling were not inverted by our neo-Gnosticism. He had but the promptings of nature, the traditions of his Church, scarce yet reduced to writing, and his own prophetic insight to discern their meaning; but then he had not graduated in that unnatural philosophy of which I have made mention,—that which places our Ideal *in the past*, and *obliges* us therefore to disparage every present and despair of every future; which

separates off grace from nature, growth from creation, and providence from progress; upturns history, freezes inspiration into fixedness, and converts enlightenment itself into some sad memory of man's decline.

Does it seem strange that a single theoretic error, an easy misconception of a common fact, could so invert our total judgment, and make our whole systematic thought our systematic adversary? Not strange in this case, brethren; for this is the key-fact and key-question of our life, to be answered by every man for every moment, and to impose its character on every feeling, its decision on every thought. Are we being born into something better, or are we dying down into something worse? Come we from the bright and lofty into the dark and mean, or ascend we from small beginnings into real glory? Does some birth-angel lead us on through pain and peril into joy, or does some cold destiny impel us downward, and freeze and absorb our being? No actual comes up to our ideal—we can contemplate no work of art or scene of nature, but instinctively we criticize, and imagine or half-imagine higher; there is no act or thought of ours with which a higher spirit does not incessantly “find fault,” and imperatively exact a better. Is this ideal a “remembrance,” convicting us of fall; or is it a true “creative force,” commanding and enabling us to rise?

This is after all, brethren, the one question for Psalmist and Apostle—the one question for Wisdom and the Church. Shall I pause to picture how it is that David answers it? With what imagery? on what grounds? and by virtue of what logic? Or shall I pause to contrast his vigorous affirmation, growing as it does into a fierce central paradox, with the timid shufflings of our philosophico-theology. I shall not pause on it, brethren; but I will indicate it briefly, as my Master did. “What think ye,” then, “of Christ? whose *Son* is He?” This question our Lord leaves solemnly behind Him—the last fragment or “premiss” of His public teaching—to be pondered on by the religious world. A concrete question, but the central concrete of Earth's history—our central example of the principle of things. The religious world is slow to catch or to accept its meaning: but His Church,

at least in her prophetic function, ought to understand it well. What, then, did David mean; or what believed he in calling his Lord his Son? Was David's Ideal in the past? or, being in the future, had it no connexion with his present in the way of birth, or growth, or natural causation? In labouring first for his own throne, and next for his Son's more consecrated royalty, does he conceive himself to be merely "conserving" the present, or stereotyping the past, or "reproducing" some faded likeness of a glory long gone by? Is it any such belief that kindles his inspiration, makes his tongue the pen of a ready writer, and his heart indite those startling sentences which his cooler thought perhaps could scarcely justify? Nay, palpably, round the opposite principle does his illumination grow—the conviction, namely, that his own true faith, and hope, and effort were helping to *produce* an Ideal in the near or in the far-off future, before which it was fitting that his whole soul should bow. So he ponders on the Coming Temple and its co-ordinate reign of righteousness and peace; on its Psalms and services, and its great Consecration-day; on its Royal Priest and Sabbath-Mission, and the light from heaven they should diffuse on earth, until the vision lifts him above himself, and all his words and meanings burst their temporary envelope, and find their real scope in earth's unchanging King and Priest after the order of Melchizedek. David's throne and David's son, as he surveys their mission, ascend some mountain of transfiguration, and become the Son and Throne of the Eternal. As he looks back, he sees, ever, the day of small things climbing into great—the world gathered in from chaos, man built up from the dust of the earth, his Church and race called up from low idolatry, his nation lifted from slaves and fugitives into already the beginnings of a royalty whose wonders pass his vision, and himself raised up from tending the sheepcotes and following the ewes great with young, to be the builder of its royalty and the father of its Christ. He knew growth, progress, and ascending genesis had ruled the past: was the creative spirit *now* exhaust—now that a direct spiritual mission had come into view, and summoned him to be its workman and its prophet? Not so spake the spirit of

present, past, and future, which had now centred itself on him. Nay, this he knew was God's central mission to mankind; and his own part therein had been a true step forward, which should not be in vain. His mustard seed should grow into a tree; his little one would become a thousand; the holy throne that he had helped to build was the express beginning of God's acknowledged kingdom upon earth. So he yields him to the prophetic impulse, as his work enlarges and sublimates itself beyond his aspiration; and as its central figure gathers into form, his Ideal of all that was great, and glorious, and divine in things—his very Lord and God, administering judgment and justice to the earth, behold, even It is his far-off Son, the Climax and Ultimate, the End and Product, of his own true efforts after Truth. To that Emmanuel, therefore, he prostrates himself in spirit, and hymns mysterious words:—"Gird thee with Thy sword upon Thy thigh, O Thou most mighty, according to Thy worship and renown. Ride on because of the word of truth, of meekness, and of righteousness, and Thy right hand shall teach Thee terrible things. Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of Thy kingdom. Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated iniquity; therefore God, even Thy God, hath anointed Thee with the oil of gladness above Thy fellows."

Brethren, who catches the spirit of David's prophecy? who catches the spirit of his work? He does, whoever has imbibed the spirit of nature; he does, whoever breathes the spirit of the Church. What else is Nature doing, what else has nature ever done, since the day of chaos, but, at the inspiration of her Lord, build up her ever-ascending kingdoms, and erect her own ever-ascending throne, whereon shall sit her latest, loftiest Birth, in the express image of the Father? What else does the Church, as she creates her own millenniums, and carves out each living stone of her great growing temple to match its Corner-stone, but consciously fulfil this high Ambition, and lift up Nature herself intelligently above herself to meet Creation's Dedication Day, her own great Bridal Festival? Is she not building Nature's organic and self-conscious Temple of the Holy Ghost? Is she not forming the Body of her Christ?

One *Creative Spirit* of one God, brethren, moves and animates all departments of His universe. All and each work up to an ideal—an ideal in the far-off future—an ideal they have never seen, yet an ideal that is truly *conceived* within them, is near their inmost life, and working in their hearts' best blood. All animation, as well as kingly David, all higher vegetation even, "has its seed within itself:" nothing else is fit for human sustenance. Even inferior plants, God formed them all "before they grew." The earth itself and all her solar system, it appears, are flying off towards some twinkling star; but, behold, the very force that swings them through the infinite, and generates their moments, it is a central *attraction* after all.

We conclude, then, that Religion is natural, and the most natural of things. It obeys every law and principle of nature, even while commanding her to transcend herself and realize her own ideal. This also is nature's bidding; nay, it is her *exponential* mandate. At least it is her spirit; it is almost her definition and her *name*.]

SERMON VIII.

IS RELIGION SCIENTIFIC?

“And up we came to where the river sloped
To plunge in cataract, shattering on black rocks
A breadth of thunder. O'er it shook the woods
And danced the colour, and, below, stuck out
The bones of some vast bulk that lived and roared
Before man was. She gazed awhile, and said,
'As these rude bones to us, are we to her
That will be?'

'Have patience,' I replied, 'ourselves are full
Of social wrong; and may be wildest dreams
Are but the needful preludes of the truth.
For me, the genial day, the happy crowd,
The sport half-Science, fill me with a faith.
This fine old world of ours is but a child
Yet in the go-cart. Patience! give it time
To learn its limbs: there is a hand that guides.”

ALFRED TENNYSON.

SERMON VIII.

IS RELIGION SCIENTIFIC ?

ROMANS, viii. 22.

For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now.

THE existence of religion being admitted as a fact, Theology or the scientific exposition of that fact becomes supposeable, and, in proportion to religion's own development, will always be found existing by its side—distinct from it, yet co-operating with, and generally tending to improve it; just as any other science does its corresponding Art, or as art and science do their corresponding Practice. In religion, as in every thing else, the practical precedes the theoretical, and furnishes its data; but once in possession of some data, the theoretical may be prosecuted independently, and commonly developes its own pursuit into a more refined department of practice, claiming generally to direct the rest, and able, on some narrow lines at least, to anticipate it far. Thus, some rude mensuration was the parent of geometry; and some primitive modes of reckoning upon fingers, pebbles, shells, gave birth to arithmetic and all higher calculi. Developed from such an origin, the pure and lofty science of mathematics now spreads ethereal wings, and almost disdains the hole of the pit from which it has been digged. Yet the extent to which any science can spin its web out of itself or its accumulated store is always limited, and is generally much smaller than itself believes. If, indeed, it were master of all the data on which the practice rests, the theory might never be at fault. But no human science ever is thus master; and each

frequently needs the communion of its mother-earth to repair its omissions, rebalance its effort, and renew its spirit and its strength. Even pure mathematics owes the genesis of all its highest and most recent forms to the necessity of grappling with the more complicated questions which an extended and more scientific practice brings within its range. Denuded of the opportunity or the necessity of this, even it would rapidly degenerate into laborious trifling, or would lose itself in mist. In everything, as well as in religion, the theoretical ought to repose upon the practical, and to be in the closest communion with it—should be to it, in fact, what the mind is to the living body—inspiring, exalting, and commanding that from which, notwithstanding, it draws its actual sustenance.

Like any other science, also, theology, or the science of religion, will always present two sides—an *analytic* and a *synthetic* side; each of which, even when it ignores the fact, always supposes and requires the other. Analysis searches out the ultimate elements, the individual facts or data which constitute the matter of the science; seeks to ascertain their nature, trace their variations, and define their exact relationship. Synthesis combines all the knowledge thus procured in a proportioned and harmonious statement, or what is commonly called a theory. Thus analysis is the organ of fresh inquiry, discovery, and advance: synthesis is the formal register of the truths attained, and the organ of their compact and authoritative inculcation. Analysis, working around the framework and below the foundations of the science, has little respect for formed theories, or for any authority or prestige: what it bows to is the concrete fact; what it looks for is the type or key-fact that shall explain a multitude. Synthesis values above all things self-consistency, or system; and is ill at ease, feels itself indeed convicted of insufficiency or error, so long as any recognised facts stand out anomalous, refusing its classification or its laws. Obviously, therefore, a different interest actuates, and an opposite temptation besets these two departments of any science. Especially, the one is quick to welcome any new particulars, and apt to exaggerate their bearing and importance; the other is equally disposed to overlook, disparage, or deny them. But in their normal action they not only

require, but they sustain, direct, nay, they even inspire each other, and often interchange each other's functions. Analysis, in seeking always for its key-facts, seeks also for *the* key-fact or key-relation that shall expound the whole; ascends from the particular to the general, from the general to the universal, from type to archetype, and always aspires to lose itself in some commanding synthesis; while any synthesis, even the most imperfect, as it descends fearlessly into detail, and confronts each fact or set of facts with the laws and analogies of its other classes, becomes itself a most suggestive and powerful analytic instrument. In any science, however, which has lived some time, and attained to some development, it is usual for one of these sides, and the spirit of it, to predominate by turns—the analytic, if it be making or preparing to make some large advance; the synthetic, when it has won some established position, or reached a resting-stage. And such alternation is useful on the whole, provided the dominant side remember its own partialness, and long to complete itself by invigorating the action of the other. If they fail to do so, both sides are speedily impoverished. If they could be permanently disjoined, the science were simply annihilated. Analysis becomes a miserable sceptic, always seeking but never able to find the truth, and presently losing even the desire to do so; while synthesis freezes into blind unreasoning dogma—whether or no it claim some traditional demonstration—imposing a pure incubus on thought, and strangling or crushing perhaps still higher things than thought beneath its oppressive skeleton.

Thus, in our own science of religion, the ultimate elements are the particulars of religious practice—those individual facts of conduct and consciousness which involve “regards” to Deity. These the analyst searches in detail, seeks to understand and classify, and tries to rise thence, *inductively*, to the general principles,—if possible to the one general principle which shall describe them all. His climax, if he reaches it, will always be some idea, some conception or definition of God—involving, of course, some sense or admission of our relations to Him. The synthetic or dogmatist, on the other hand, starts from that large,

suggestive Name ; first expands it in such definition as will render explicit His supposed attributes, and the corresponding relations of His creatures ; and thence proceeds, *deductively*, to apply those conceptions to the various classes of our thoughts, our feelings, and our duties. This elaboration, whether made by an individual or by many, will then, under favourable circumstances, associate itself with the whole religious practice of the community, and will itself become a part, nay, the most eminent and characteristic part of its "religion." So long as any religious synthesis satisfies, in some tolerable degree, the requirements of a community—which it will never do unless it be in every respect *above* it—men will acquiesce in it most gladly ; will love, and serve, and almost worship it ; will sacrifice to it every other consideration, even life itself. Nothing else has yet appeared upon the earth to which the highest men will yield so total an allegiance. But every community ought to grow—healthy communities do all grow—in knowledge, in taste, in intellect, in heart. Their idea of God and duty will ascend, accordingly, and approximate in time to that presented or supposed to be presented by their religious synthesis. If this latter have been "the true one"—if its fundamental conception have been just, and justly worked out into detail—little inconvenience need thence ensue. The true theory will expand and elevate itself far more quickly than men can follow it. Every proposition of its creed, every word and sentence of its liturgy—be it of prayer or praise, of friends or enemies, of good or evil—will spontaneously interpret itself into a series of ascending senses, as consistently, as smoothly, and as naturally connected together as are the different meanings¹ of the word LIFE, or the succes-

¹ I fear Mr. Jowett would regard the above and many similar passages of these Sermons as very indifferent philology. But I cannot help believing that he will some time recast his thoughts. He would fain persuade us that each word and sentence of the Bible should have "one, and only one true meaning:" though he admits that "we do not at once see the absurdity" of the opposite hypothesis.—"ESSAYS AND REV.," pp. 384, 369, *et passim*. It is indeed hard to see *this* absurdity. His own conception looks much more strange. To require from any special science that it shall define its leading terms into a single fixed sense, is just and reasonable. But to make the same requirement of any large practical book,—much more of any large religious book,—and much more to re-

sive expositions of a Psalm or Parable. Should there be some defect, however, in the religious theory—either in itself or in the interpretations and associations with which it has become invested—the consequences will be more serious. It will be partly afraid and partly unable to regenerate or to improve itself, and the march of the community will threaten to supersede or break it. First some growing inconsistency is felt, followed by doubts, suspicions, murmurings. Presently these find, if the cause continue, more definite expression. Antagonism develops itself, and men must choose their side. Mutual mistakes, misrepresentations, denunciations, persecutions follow; to issue at last

quire it in respect to not a few terms, but all its terms, is surely, in the mouth of a scholar, some amazing *εὐχθρία*. It is plainly tantamount to making this requirement of common language. And this is really tantamount to requiring that we shall have no “language” whatsoever. Every common word of every language has a multitude of meanings, or of varieties of meaning, more or less nearly and more or less regularly connected together. If it had not, it were really useless even for the purpose of bald description, much more for all higher purposes of suggestion or comparison. And to talk as if there were no ascertainable laws or principles regulating these variations or transitions of meaning,—or to say that “if words have more than one meaning, they may have any meaning,”—is surely, as coming from a University Professor of Greek, something for schoolboys to wonder at.

Let Mr. Jowett fairly apply his principle to the commonest expressions of his personal religion, or his daily walk; to “Our Father which art in heaven;” “give us this day our daily bread;” “Lighten our darkness, we beseech thee, O Lord;” “Awake my soul, and with the sun, Thy daily stage of duty run;” or to any common sentiment or proverb,—“Righteousness exalteth a nation;” or any other of those “jewels five-words-long;” or three-words-long “which sparkle on the fore-finger of all time;” or to any common sentence or word whatever,—“power, faith, force, man, mind, body, matter, thing, motion, moment, minute, large, left, right, straight, crooked”—and he differs very much from common men, or he will see that, if he wish to assist us in any orderly fashion to interpret either Sophocles or Samuel, he must begin by braying in a mortar his first conceptions of the nature of language.

The principle of scientific definitions will be stated a little further on, p. 400. The laws of the growth and correlation of words will be stated in Ser. II., second series, along with the laws of any other growth. I may have occasion to add in this volume some notes on the interpretation of Scripture. Here I only observe that the statement in the text involves, as I believe, the just principle, and a central example of it. As the character of our *life* ascends, so does our religion; as our religious *senses* open, or our religious sensibilities grow, so do the terms in which we utter them. And the result is a graduated series of senses melting into each other, and, to the highest experience, implying each other, like the successive steps or levels of a pyramid.

in overwhelming despotism, or scarce less overwhelming revolution.

Even a moderate threatening of such evils in any community should always place its religion in a posture of analysis. Those, indeed, who administer any religious system are apt to persuade themselves of its infallibility, and to ascribe any dissatisfaction with it simply to human wickedness. But larger men, who have faith in providence and nature—who believe humanity and society, as well as religion, to be the work of God, and that He wills the onward movement of them all—will read differently such signs of the times. In their eyes such growing collision will be merely a proof that the recognised religious synthesis—either in itself or its received interpretation—is incompetent to the wants of the community. It has omitted or mistaken some important element—that of growth, for example—or it has been supposed to do so. It is needful to re-examine and correct it. Needful especially to appreciate opposing systems, if such there be, and to discern the truths which energize them. Needful to introduce these in their just proportions into the established synthesis, despite of every opposition. Needful to cut off and leave behind whatever is chrystallized and dead. Needful, perhaps, in the extreme case, to abandon Ur of the Chaldees, or Bethel, or Shiloh, or Jerusalem itself, although it were the mother-Church, and to construct the whole synthesis anew. During any such process, even from an early stage, the great practical perplexity is, that both individuals and systems wretchedly mistake each other. The foes of truth are they of its own household; its friends are only Galileans. Those who think they stand for the most certain principles, because they do stand for a certain form or letter of them—for the temple, the law, the Sabbath—are just those who, by misplacing and misproportioning, are making them in that form false, and obliging their demolition; while those who would truly purify, extend, exalt them, are deemed blasphemers and destroyers. In fact, it is the two sides of the science itself which are themselves at war—only when the crisis is past, perhaps, and the battlefield surveyed, can the relationship of the combatants be seen. How startling,

then, to find that he who most fiercely denounced the accepted system, and laid his axe to the root thereof—though himself unable to construct—was its own long looked-for prophet in the spirit and power of Elias! How startling that He whom that system—though divinely instituted, and sitting, still, in Moses' seat—had itself denounced and crucified, should prove its Final King, its own long-sought Messiah! The Baptist and the Christ, like all their predecessors, and, no doubt, like their successors, too, came to their own, and their own received them not.

Such things happen elsewhere, as well as in religion. Every science and art, every large department of life, has its own alternations and transitions, its prophets, priests, and martyrs. Human nature is, in all its workings, extremely like itself. It is because religion stirs it the most profoundly; elicits, intensifies, absorbs, upon occasion, its every energy; lifts it above and sinks it below itself, that religious phenomena become the type and exponent of the rest. When we would see human principles developed to all extremes, and rendered unmistakeable, we turn naturally to earth's Crucial Example, and have the Archetype before our eyes. From it, accordingly, as you observe, I have been picturing what is, alas! too easy and too common a procedure. For, my younger hearers must remember, it is not in false religions merely, nor in false religions chiefly, that such transitions are to be expected. It is the true religion always which can evolve the largest transformations; for it has the largest vitality, the greatest range and capacity of growth. Indeed it is, among higher things, the very type of growth, of elastic, insensible, and total transformation, as it is of all life's miracles. The grain of mustard seed, or the human zoosperm, passes not through a more wondrous series of unlike forms than does, consciously, that true religion which begins with the infancy of the race or of the individual, continues his true religion, in fitting guise, through all his mundane phases, and shall be also, in some form or absence of form, his true religion beyond the skies. The form of true religion, like our own form, is but a fleeting envelope, which manifests, by its own

incessant yet correlated variations, the profound identity of what it clothes.

It was from this point of view, you may remember, that we analyzed the Bible. We saw that the book is mainly historical—that it consists of a series of tableaux, or photograms, presenting, in type, the successive stages of religion's progress—the different and ascending definitions of God which the called and central family of mankind was enabled to attain; each higher name of the Invisible being, as you remember, the centre of a synthesis which embodied itself in corresponding institutions; the attainment of each being preceded by an analytical or struggling period, represented by the predominance of the *prophetical* as distinguished from the *priestly* office; and some of the transitions amounting to a total change of form. We have also glanced at the vitality of Christendom, and seemed to see that its calling is to follow the footsteps of the elder Church—to repeat the Jewish cycle on a larger and more varied scale, with loftier endowments, towards a higher advent. Its main transitions, too, as might be expected, have been very similar to Israel's, though much less strongly marked. Some of them are indeed sufficiently striking, yet none approaches in theoretic magnitude to those wrought by Moses or Abraham, perhaps even by Joseph or by David—the great transition of all, that wrought by Christ, being of course common to the two: the birth of one dispensation, the final perfection and death-and-resurrection of the other. The first synthesis of the Church, as presented in her early creeds, has never been even seriously modified; though large reforms and reconstructions have taken place, repeatedly, in institutions and doctrines claiming derivation from them.

And this too might be expected, seeing that we inherit both Israel's experience and its work. In fact, the analytical side of Christian theology has never been so far separated from its dogma and its law as happened frequently in the elder dispensation. The higher circumstances and endowments of the Church forbade it. The greater extent, variety, and cultivation of her field; the prevalence of written and of printed literature, rendering fertile the experience of the past, and stimulating

every form of knowledge, have always exacted from the most despotic principles no small amount of care and adaptation. Add to this the form of the Church itself,—naturally or necessarily dividing into branches; thus dividing the dogmatic temper into antagonistic dogmatisms, and making always the most exclusive pretensions palpably the most absurd. And add, what to the thoughtful is still more important, that the standard to which all branches appeal, as of still higher authority than either creed or liturgy—namely, the volume of revelation,—is itself highly analytical in form—the continuous photograph of religion's work and progress *in the concrete*—and almost obliges, in every application, the widest and most searching inquiries. Thus the field and circumstances of each dispensation have been connatural with its central Endowment and its Promise. Israel had the great occasional prophet: the Church has the abiding and pervading Paraclete. This keeps ever its organic action fresh, despite the persistent efforts of those who know not what spirit they are of, and reduces to impotence men's well-meant endeavours to convert its unity into uniformity, or to freeze its spirit into any declared finality. "Yea, even had we known Christ after the flesh," it learns, with its last apostle, to assert, "yet now henceforth know we Him no more."

Still, even in it, the two sides are always strongly marked, and not seldom more or less discordant. They have predominated alternately, and no doubt will continue to do so,—the synthetical being generally more prominent in the less enlightened, the analytical in the more active and advanced communions, and in more energetic times. Indeed, in our own days the analytical spirit is unusually alert and vigorous, stimulated by many causes, chiefly by its own success; and there prevails a very general impression that it is now working out some large result—that Western Christendom, in one or both its branches, approaches a transition crisis, and is making or preparing to make some important change. I cannot say that I share very vividly in this impression, although the prospect or the certainty of it would not inspire me, I think, with any terror whatsoever. One sympathizes much with the spirit of inquiry; one is conscious

that minor parts of our synthesis admit or require improvement; and one is well aware that certain popularities, both philosophic and vulgar, which pretend the Christian name, are extremely ill-founded, and must be swept away. But all this does not amount to much. "Every branch in me *that beareth fruit*, He purgeth it, that it may bring forth *móre fruit*." No doubt, also, Christendom, as a whole, advances nearer to its Ideal as its harvest time approaches. More intelligently, therefore, it drinks in its own high spirit of liberty, and recognises its dogma and law to be, not its ultimate, but only the engine of its education. This must lower the relative importance of law and dogma; but it does not even lessen their absolute importance, so long as the millions of mankind, not to say the millions of Christendom, are still low in their non-age, and deeply need their Ministration.

But, perhaps, our law and dogma must undergo some serious alteration? This, brethren, I for one do not believe. I attribute to them no infallibility whatever—except, indeed, in the same sense that I believe the infallibility of nature and of providence—namely, that we are guided "profoundly right upon the whole," though forced to learn our most precious lessons by our own defects, and errors, and sins, and chastisements. I am ready to admit, therefore, defects and errors, and desirous to change whatever I think wrong. Nor do I shrink from indicating such, as opportunity occurs. But excellence on earth is by comparison. It is here that we must rest the practical condemnation or practical vindication either of theology or of the Church. When, therefore, I consider antagonistic schemes, and try to weigh, as I think I do *reverently*, up to my best measure, all the truth that they possess,—when I look over the opposing philosophies one by one, and see—however striking and true they are, some of them, in some respects—how miserably one-sided and short-sighted, how shallow, deficient, and false they are, even on the most prime and central questions, as compared with the parallel positions of the Christian Church—I always feel that our only real antagonists are ourselves. I am well convinced that it is only our own gross neglect and misre-

presentation of our truth that could give to such opponents either popularity or force, nay, that could have driven themselves into their well-meant hostility. The Catholic Church ought to "comprehend" all truth, and all lovers of truth. When she does not, she is untrue to her mission, and violates her name. She is not, in one sense, eclectic. She gathers not everywhere "purple patches" to make herself a motley garment, consistent only in its inconsistency. Hers should be a seamless robe, woven from the top throughout. But her deep central truth—if indeed it be what she believes it is—has surely true sympathy with every truth, and affinity with every fact. She ought to be able to recognise every honest inquiry as some scintilla of her spirit, and every true statement as some fragment of her synthesis; and while she out-embraces each with what it had not seen, should be herself enlarged and deepened, informed and humbled in the process.

Brethren, is this high estimate of Christian doctrine only some fond mystic dream? or is it only pious arrogance, some proud and ignorant ecclesiastical humility? View it not so, I pray you, brethren—either you who agree with it, or you who differ. I shall not pause to vindicate it now by observing that the Church professes at least to embody the spirit of Him who was the Truth—of Him who had sympathy with every man, and with whom every man had sympathy; and whose wont it was, with some divine facility, to read out the highest secrets of His kingdom alike from every thing He looked upon,—from the meanest process of nature, or the commonest fact of human life; from the abstrusest question of the Jewish law, or the most sublime and simple aspect of providence; from the grass of the field, the birds of the air, the perplexities of the market or the family, or the plain beneficence of earth and heaven. But it is fitting to remind you that even had it missed His spirit, which on the whole it has not—God forbid—still its synthesis ought to possess the characters I have assigned; it should be, from the mere course of history, the profoundest generalization of knowledge, the most elastic and comprehensive embodiment of thought which humanity, as such, has been able to attain. It is not merely

that the last and best of man's reflections are always given to religion. Nor is it merely that all speculation and all science, let it begin in what department of real things it may, always ascends as it begins to generalize, and, like the meanest plant that grows on earth, soon hides its head in heaven. These considerations would lead us to expect that religious theory would *somehow* embody the substance of human thought—seeing that no man and no system can rest at ease until they have, somehow, reconciled their religious convictions with whatever else they know. But now recall, I pray you, the course of history. We derive our religious theory from Israel; and you remember the history of Israel. When God called up that central family to learn and teach the true religion—when He instituted His sacred school or university for the education of mankind—He hid it not from the experience of life, nor parted it from the contact of affairs. But He planted His institution near the highway of the nations, and forced it to learn, by a very searching providence, all the truth that earth's best civilizations had attained—all successively that Chaldea and Egypt, that Syria, Tyre, and Babylon could teach. And when that ancient system chrysalized itself—when it became necessary to break the narrow envelope, and reconstruct the synthesis in such a form as coming worlds required, to what nation or intellect was this great task assigned? We forget it sometimes, but we never ought. A moment's reflection will remind us, that if the Bible present what may fairly be called the analytic of our theory, it is the creeds and councils which present its synthesis—it is these which matured doctrinal Christianity, and moulded its authoritative form. And what are they historically? Why, *they are the last great effort of the Grecian mind*. At the Christian era the ancient world was past its noon-tide. It was now the Evening of its Day, the Autumn of one Great Year or cycle of earth's history. The Roman dominion was at its zenith, the Grecian intellect was in its prime; and into these converged, and by them were absorbed, all that the ancient world had thought and done. At this time did Israel mature its product and ripen its appointed seed; and thus was the earth prepared for its social and for its intellectual reception

before the next Great Winter had set in. If God had got ready the levelled highway before the missionaries' feet in that great iron empire which made the whole world one, He had equally prepared the ready writer, the systematic thinker, and the powerful translator in that well-practised intellect which had now for centuries dominated thought, and which, sympathizing at once with East and West, had won for itself the autocracy of literature. Addressing itself to this experienced, energetic, subtle, comprehensive thought, and, not without a long-continued struggle, overcoming it, Christianity learned, no doubt, here also, while it taught. While absorbing into itself that mighty instrument, and atrophying whatever could not bear the contact of its truth, it became itself regenerate in language and in form. In this atmosphere it was, and amid these agencies that the baptismal formula grew up into the creeds, and, round them, doctrinal Christianity expanded into that carefully balanced system which has served the world till now. Whatever, therefore, was thought of by the Grecian mind—and a great many things were thought of—as well as by that of Babylon, or Tyre, or Egypt, we may be sure is not unthought of in our religious synthesis.

“But much has been discovered since.” No doubt, and much will be discovered. The modern intellect, I am convinced, is still in its non-age. It but begins to stir its giant faculties, and to show its giant promise. It only now approaches, I mean from intrinsic growth and its own points of view, those abstract and reflex questions which the maturity of the ancient culture did its best to solve. Its dominant taste as yet is more direct and physical; its present enjoyment and its work is boundless inquiry and research. Much, then, may it prosper, and much may it discover of all the works and all the ways of God—of the hyssop on the wall, the workings of society, and the secrets of man's heart, of the stars in their courses, of the intellect that scans them, and of the law or laws which each or all obey. And let the Church be ever foremost; foremost, and truest, and boldest, as the Church should ever be. If her theory be true, she will find nothing to unsettle it; though she will find all to

deepen and expand it; and will find some, in God's good time, to read it out to her afresh in some unheard significance. No name of God but virtually utters every other name; and the first and simplest we have ever said, if it were but "our Father which art in heaven," is, I suppose, the deepest and largest that ever will be uttered. If *it* be true in any sense whatever, all that ever shall be discovered either of creation or of God will do nothing but illumine it.

My present Sermons, you will have observed, brethren, are an endeavour to restate the main positions of our synthesis in such a form as the present highly analytic posture of religious thought requires; aiming also deliberately to exclude certain tenets, popular and philosophic, which usurp our name, but are, I believe, untrue and hurtful. Any one treating of religious progress will naturally describe the key-points both of its doctrine and machinery. In a future course I hope also to discuss its laws. On these two Sundays we pause to examine two questions preliminary to that discussion. We inquired on last Sunday—Is Religion Natural? can she have "laws" like nature? To-day, if only by the terms I have employed, I have already plunged you into the discussion of the second question—Is Religion Scientific? will its laws, if such it have, be like the laws which rule in every other department of scientific thought? And you will perceive I have already, by implication, answered this question in the affirmative, as positively as I did the former. Religion is natural, we affirmed, and the most natural of things. Religion is also scientific; it is the first, and largest, and most important of sciences. More precisely, theology is, and professes to be, the science of religion. It is either this, or it is nothing. Conversely, I acknowledge, it is bound throughout by all truly scientific principles.

It is, indeed, somewhat unusual to apply to religion these common scientific terms, especially in the pulpit—and some of my younger hearers may be perhaps surprised, or even offended at it. Not unnaturally, brethren; the usual reserve is wise and suitable. Even the outer courts of that whereby we worship draw around themselves a line of dignity and distance: not to

do so would almost border on profanity. But then this may be overdone, and be mistaken; and the consecrated earth which awaits our bones may be deemed of a different texture from that which sustains our life. That is no true religion, you are well aware, which is unable to descend habitually to the commonest concerns of man. And that is no sound theology which is ever unwilling to exact from itself, and to give to others, a "reason" for its hope, or which shrinks from the commonest requirements of exactitude and logic. Very often indeed does reverence for the intellectual framework of religion react injuriously on men's conceptions of it, react still more injuriously on its own conception of itself. It is well sometimes that it be brought up to plead before the Areopagus; nay, needful occasionally that its best intelligence be forced to dispute, and that daily, even in the school of one Tyrannus. And such injurious reactions manifestly afflict us now. Our adversaries treat our system and its defenders as no longer logical—as relying on authority, prestige, and fable; as thriving by ignorance, and hostile to free and bold examination. And, what is still more calamitous, we treat ourselves so; we act and speak in certain quarters as if our truth were not a mystery revealed, but a mystery concealed, and to be concealed; as if our religious synthesis must shrink from light. Nay, one hears, again, and paraded in lofty regions too, of some essential antagonism between the reason and the faith; and one almost expects to hear again, somewhere, that when an augur meets an augur, he may smile, discreetly, in his face. Not so, brethren, I trust, have we caught the spirit of this place, or of the Church in which we have been born. We believe not in her infallibility or her perfectness. She is only in the middle of her warfare and her work; doubtless, also, only in the middle of her education. But her ambition and purpose are direct and true. Though she be but a little child in the midst of the apostles,¹ she may have directness, simplicity, intelligence, great ambition to

¹ In this *printed* sermon, I should notice, is comprised the substance of *three* sermons, *as preached* in the Chapel of Trinity College.—exercises for theological degrees—an English sermon on the text, Mark, ix. 85, 86; and two Latin sermons on Rom. viii. 22; now prefixed as the key thought of the whole.

be taught, and great capacity to grow. Wherein we have left us open to such imputation from our adversaries, we repent us truly of our sin. Whatever friends advance for us such false defence, we repudiate it, indignantly, and not without some shame.

But let us well understand our own position in affirming religion to be scientific, and challenging the utmost stringency of logic for every section of theology. Religion is not only a high, but it is an extremely large and varied thing. It mixes itself essentially with every department of human life, social and individual. It rises above it, too, by profession, both morally and intellectually, in present and in future. Nay, it goes below it also, if only to affirm its lower analogues in nature, to utter their aspiration, and to "collect" their praise. Science, on the other hand, if also high, is an extremely small and narrow thing. Nay, it is only by narrowing and defining itself, by confining itself stringently to a very few aspects, and a very few relations, that it can, *quâ science*, secure its own existence. Its whole effort is to keep its conception unmixed or unapplied, and to crystallize or "set" all its terms and propositions into a single,¹ clear, bright, definite, superficial meaning, denuded of all depth or "sense," or feeling—of all pregnant suggestion, or self-multiplying power. Thus mathematics deals with figure and number; or rather with a very few of the plainest figures, and easiest numbers, and with only the simplest relations or properties of

¹ This is the principle referred to in p. 389, note—one often forgotten by men eminent in one or two departments. It is remarkable that Comte, who sees it clearly enough in respect to the distant sciences, should so often lose sight of it in regard to that sociology in which he has done so much. He seldom sees anything in Protestantism, for example, except our vigorous theoretic development of the right of private judgment. As if any among us, except the veriest *Doctrinaire* or *Comtist*, ever forgot that it was necessary to educate the "judgment" through law and order, up to "the measure of the stature" when it could use its freedom. And he bases his neglect of Political Economy, and his objections to it, on the negation of this very principle. Nay, he regards the really scientific endeavours of its ablest writers to "isolate" its aspects as an involuntary acknowledgment of the "inanity" of their science—"Car," he says, "par la nature du sujet, dans l'étude sociale, comme dans toutes celles relatives aux corps vivans, les divers aspects généraux sont, de toute nécessité, mutuellement solidaires et rationnellement inseparables, au point de ne pouvoir être convenablement éclaircis que les uns par les autres."—"Phil. Pos.," vol. iv., p. 272. Exactly—

these. Moreover, so far as the science is "pure," it deals only with pure figures and pure numbers, which exist nowhere except in the conception, and excludes everything that is physical, concrete, actual, or embodied. In proportion as mathematics seeks to *extend* itself to the more complicated even of pure figures and their relations, and much more as it seeks to *apply* itself to things—even to those whence it drew its historic genesis—do its pretensions to continue strictly "science" diminish or depart. And so with the other sciences, or subdivisions of science. Each of these isolates in thought some one aspect of real things, and treats of that aspect exclusively—divorcing it, as it were, from those other aspects numberless without which it never *is* in fact, and without which, I suppose, it is impossible for it to be. To perfectly describe any actual thing, therefore, would obviously require innumerable sciences; and it would require, besides, a higher science to correlate these partial sciences, and combine in just proportion their separate affirmations. In affirming religion to be scientific, therefore, do we mean that there is a science of religion, as one among all these sciences—that there is in fact a certain religious aspect or relation of things, or of some things, which can be isolated from all their other relations—like figure, or number, or weight, or temperature, or motion, or magnetic power—and treated thus exclusively; the treatment issuing in certain definite results, which may then be catalogued and compared with others? There are, indeed, those who seem to have this idea of religion, and who would fain require from it only this well-mannered and subordinate performance. Religion

"comme dans toutes celles relatives *aux corps vivans*." And may not, we ask, the *form*, the *weight*, the *thermic*, the *chemical*, the *galvanic*, the *physiologic* aspects of *corps vivans* be studied with advantage; and is not the isolated the only scientific study of them? Why may not, likewise, the exchangeable value of things be isolated in thought, and all the elements which influence it in open market observed and understood? Nay, the study of man's mere material welfare must be the Physics of Sociology. Political Economy, as it has been about the first, will probably always be about the easiest and clearest of social sciences. What is to be regretted is, that, in their applications, even good economists, by forgetting the extreme partialness of their "aspect," and overriding other less clear but higher and more vital "interests," so frequently convert scientific truth into social falsehood. But what science, or art, or handicraft, does not overpass its limits?

herself, however, always in proportion to her earnestness, that is, to her real existence, repudiates such conception of her mission, and in proportion always to her true humility exacts from herself a loftier *rôle*.

The Religious Relation, brethren, is Universal and All-pervading. It absorbs into itself, and makes part of itself, all other aspects and relations whatsoever. For what are all these aspects and relations of even individual things, but so many sparkling facets of creation's mansidedness? And what are these, again, but so many indications, made visible to us, of the mansidedness of Him it manifests? Nay, what are even those cold and abstract relations which mathematics on its low level is in contact with, which morality in some loftier region feels after, and which metaphysics wearies itself in attempting to resolve or guess at, but some gleaming of those great directing lines and innate harmonies, those true regulative principles or laws on which our section at least of His creation has been built, and which in their last analysis can only be some more explicit indications of the Character of the Unchangeable? But even without this last consideration, manifestly, all that scientific exposition of things to which I have alluded, if we had it perfectly, would only be our more intelligent delineation of "the visible of God," and so would come, even formally, under the very centre of religion's synthesis—our conception or definition of the Deity. If, indeed, God were some partial and distant entity—some small Christ let us say it reverently, of the baptized or justified; or some "good old man sitting on a cloud," and "interfering" occasionally for our information or our good—then indeed the doctrinaire conception of religion's "place" and science would be sustainable; so long, that is, as such a God could persuade us of His being. But if God be the Omnipresent, All-causing, All-sustaining Energy in whom all beings have whatever being they possess; from whose fulness each and everything receives and has, from moment to moment, all its substance, and powers, and aspects, and relations; if this be our conception of God, then religion's humble but high conception of herself is the only one which either science or she can listen to as just. She must *seek*, at least,

to involve herself in every thing, if she would exist in any. And whatever science is able to expound her relationships will be that science of sciences which proportions and correlates them all. Her only theory of things must be the most searching and strict Theocracy, resting on Theogenesis. All doings and thinkings, as well as all things, must be of Him, and in Him, and to Him. All sciences must correlate themselves in a unified philosophy; this philosophy must be theology; and this theology must be itself the servant of religion.

But, again, let us not mistake. This is only the beginning and end of our science, rather than its middle sections. More exactly, it is its ideal and ultimate; to be attained when any other perfection is attained—when nature and history have matured their products, and the kingdom of truth has educated all its subjects—when the ideal of practical religion is itself attained, so that we have all risen with Christ, and seek those things which are above, having deadened our members upon earth—when, in fact, thought, affection, motive, are so thoroughly pervaded with the loving consciousness of God, that whether we eat or drink, or *whatever we do*, we do all intelligently to His Glory. *When* this shall be, or whether it ever shall be upon earth, is known only to Him who shapes it. What I insist on is, that this is the only self-consistent, and therefore the only scientific or philosophic theory of things; that which must determine our perspective as we seek to correlate, in an abstract tableau, the sciences with one another, and with their corresponding arts, practices, and subject-matter—that which must, in actual life, proportion for us their mutual bearing and importance, and direct our ambition towards appropriate objects. But it does not, I grant, describe the middle period of either theology or life—it is not its “intermediate or education-stage.”¹ Both science and religion are too wise to insist that the end shall be possessed all through. It is enough for us that we obtain at the beginning a clear prolepsis and fore-

¹ These and all such expressions throughout the volume are in allusion to the theory of education, or educating, stated in Ser. V.: see pp. 195, *sqq.* In its most general aspect it is sketched briefly in the foot note to Ser. VI., pp. 244, *sqq.*

taste of it; and that we *may* obtain all through sabbath-gleanings of its perfectness, to leaven our working-week with the "latent and habitual knowledge" of what we once have seen. Our working-day itself, that is, the bulk of human life, both vulgar and philosophic, proceeds on the principle of division of labour, or, more precisely, on the principle of education. We must, in order to production, define and specialize our effort, and mark out some near and subordinate standards to guide our daily walk. Until religion have so inspired our common life that its spirit is, almost without a figure, the atmosphere we breathe, and our whole living self its temple, we must mark out for it a "temple," both in heaven and earth; we must divide off and consecrate a part, leaving the rest, as it were, profane. Religion does then become one subject among many, and must be contented or half-contented with her turn. And her prime duty in all such periods is to purify and elevate herself, that she may the sooner inspire the rest, teach them all her mystery, and in due time raise for them, as for herself, the habitual knowledge into actual. During all this time, however, religion feels herself partial and imperfect, and with an intensity proportioned to her life affirms always another day, and longs for her millennium. During all this period, too, the science of religion is partial and imperfect. It is only one science among many—perhaps young and unsignified among them—some Joseph among the patriarchs, and only in dreams, perhaps, or in occasional convictions, conscious of its calling.

Its conception being thus attained, we have next to ask how far this is mere theorizing, or, rather, how far it is just theory, and a true statement of the fact. How far does this large conception verify itself in history? Quite sufficiently, I answer; quite as fully as any other large theory we know; as even a brief consideration may convince us. Obviously, we have to glance at three stages of our science, of which the second, or intermediate stage, comprehends all our own efforts and relations. For, as obviously, all our sections of the world are now in the middle of some great working-week. Everything is divided and subdivided; religion and theology among the rest. And we

must pursue each in parts and particles if we would succeed in any.

The first stage of our science, then, should be a rude prolepsis of it—a vague and distant, but comprehensive view of the relationships involved—a sort of title-page and table of contents, before the treatment is divided into chapters. And such a prolepsis of theology, in the highest sense described, has manifestly existed long, and has performed, not ineffectively, all the functions I have assigned—has stimulated, combined, and correlated knowledge, and given to thought consistency and form. This, indeed, our present adversaries are forward to acknowledge, or even grotesquely to exaggerate. All other philosophies and sciences, the Positives inform us, owe to theology, not their correlation merely, but their genesis. The theological was the first possible and first actual exertion of intelligence, and constituted, for we know not how many ages, the whole “primary evolution of human thought.” I fear this lofty praise is barely half-deserved. So far as the statement is true, it is true, not of theology, but of religion. The latter, indeed, has been man’s birth-angel always, and it is so still. It has always elicited and still elicits his highest efforts in thought, and art, and action. But theology is less influential, and far more cold, and late, and distant. Man and science owe to it, not production, but proportion and direction. The first exertions of intelligence were expended, of necessity, on things more near and needful than any abstract speculation. Men must grow and work, and must have amassed some portion of material good, before they have capacity or time for even Sabbath-musing. During all that early period, or those early periods, which lengthen out as we examine them, religion itself was low and physical, and theology was scarcely born. No doubt its coming spirit tinged his first reflections, and made itself explicit as his civilization grew forward into form. But, surely, to call man’s early efforts in poetry, or sculpture, or war, or architecture, “theological,” because they were largely inspired by religion, or lived by the service of the temple, is about as scientific nomenclature as it would be to call the same things

“politics” or “jurisprudence,” so far as they were devoted to the service of the state, or to call them “political economy,” so far as their producing motive was their value in exchange. A theological treatise does not become social economics by the more or less profit of its publication; nor does an Armada become a fragment of theology by the mere naming of its vessels, or even by the “religious exclamations” of the crews.

Grotesque, however, as is Comte's nomenclature, his inversion of history is more curious still. This theological evolution, he goes on to say, dies out into a metaphysical or abstract evolution; and this in turn into a positive or industrial one, which last terminates the march of humankind. The direct reverse, one would imagine, must be the natural procedure. The genesis of man was not angelic in Comte's opinion, any more than ours. Man comes from the dust of the earth, and must grow upward by the labour of his hands. He must work, then, before he has much time to think; and he must think about his work before he turns back to think about his thinking. And this, assuredly, has been the course of history. Man's rudest industry came first—his most refined and abstract and reflective last; or, in Comte's language, his first evolution was the most *exclusively* industrial; his last, the most *eminently* theoretical and theological. Men first grew from mother earth, like other plants and animals; so God ordained; *thus* it was that God “created” them. But their first development, though male and female, was scarce “humanity” till God added some knowledge of good and evil, and laid on us the necessity of foresight and of toil. The knowledge at first was slight, the foresight weak, and the toil painful and unwilling. Without tools and without experience, tedious application and a long time hardly evolved some poor result. But, as this process gradually developed his resources, his faculties, and his ambitions, these all reacted on his toil, and presently, guided by religion, converted what was at first his “curse” into the perennial fountain of his blessings. Meantime toil itself ascends and multiplies both in degree and kind; the humblest must still labour at earth, or stone, or iron,

but a continually increasing section of society can devote itself to abstract and to sabbath work, and can make the results of these react upon the whole community, and each successive higher kingdom a true Gospel to the poor. Hence the most thoughtful and most religious age will always be, absolutely, the most industrial; while, comparatively, the proportion of manual to mental or to higher work will diminish always with man's own development and prosperity. Our own age, for example, we are thankful to believe the most industrial that the world has seen; it is also, I contend, by far the most metaphysical, and by very far the most theological. There has been, I venture to say, as much metaphysics [abstract reasoning on the nature and relations of things] written and studied within this century as in any three or any five of all its predecessors. There is, I am convinced, as much theology [abstract reasoning on the character and relation of God and things] thought and spoken in any year in Lancashire, or London, or New York, as there was by all mankind in any whole century of the pre-Socratic, or any five centuries of the pre-Mosaic world. I have no desire, I think, to disparage previous ages, and as little to unduly exalt our own. But until written literature, obviously, there was scarce any possible cultivation—until printed literature, scarce any possible diffusion of theoretic knowledge. And to fix upon theology as the one thing in which early times were great, and we are small—or in which they were everything, and we are nothing—is about as strange a paradox as ever disfigured philosophy, or amused the uninitiated world. Early times vanquished early difficulties, and have left to us a vast and comparatively peaceful heritage. They laboured, and we have entered into their labours. But they did not labour much at metaphysics or theology. For this they had not materials. There were giants in those days, no doubt. Colossal prophets pierced the gloom, and struck out illuminated paths for aftertimes to use. But as to those ages themselves, and their prevailing mental character, abstract speculation either about God or things is just the one subject upon which they were *ιδιῶται*—hopelessly unpractised and unlearned.

How, then, could so great a thinker so strangely invert the fact? and how could so great an error find readers or believers? By the mere neglect of two simple facts, or laws, which are essential to the right conception of any large historic question. The first, is that history, like nature, *runs in cycles*—in large Days or Dispensations—with each its beginning, middle, and end, and each its corresponding product. The second is, that these cycles, like generations or still smaller periods, all *inherit from each other*, and each starts on its own progression endowed with the products of the past. In comparing distant periods, therefore, (1) we should always compare like phases of each cycle; not the maturity of one with the childhood of another—not the evening of one day, or the autumn of one year, with morning or spring-time of the next. And (2) in estimating any period, we ought to remember its initial heritage, and not confound this with its own intrinsic efforts. Within its own period each cycle obeys what is certainly the natural “order” of creation so far as it is known to us—“first the natural, and then the spiritual.” The physical development of each comes first; after this, and on its basis, the different successions of the spiritual—first the more directly intellectual and passionate; then the moral and religious, incessantly becoming more balanced and reflective, and thus collecting themselves into the explicit theological. Every nation, community, and individual, as well as the world at large, conforms, I believe, naturally,¹ to this succession, with not much variation from the type; and no one individual illustrates it more signally in his own life than did the great founder himself of the Positive Philosophy.

Thus—to take the separate elements of the ancient evolution—the early days of Israel² were rude, and physical, and fierce.

¹ See Ser. II., *second series*.

² I take the Bible history for granted, as it is commonly read:—(1) because no serious amendment of it has yet been proved; and (2) because, even if large alterations were made in it, in the sense to which present criticism tends, these would not weaken my positions, however they might strengthen them. To prove, for example, that the early times of Israel were still ruder than we suppose, and that the great early “books” were not “written” until a much later period, would obviously strengthen the position in the text.

Its æsthetic and intellectual development begins with Samuel, perhaps, and culminates in that great spiritual effort which, amid various tentatives, produced explicit Christianity, and taught it to the world. It were surely strange to call the days of Samson and Barak, or of Caleb and Joshua, of Simeon and Levi, or Jacob and Esau, or Lot and Abraham, "theological," as distinguished from, nay, as contrasted with, the days of the Scribes and Pharisees, and sects and synagogues, and world-wide proselytism—with the days of Philo, and Josephus, and Gamaliel, of the Apostles, and the Baptist, and the Christ! The nationality of Greece and Rome is less distinctly marked, and so their phases are less broadly discriminated; but they are quite as unmistakeable upon the whole. The poetry of Greece begins early: its æsthetic and its general literature may be dated from Pisistratus, perhaps; its reflex thought from the philosophers. Its main intellectual effort, its conquest of its rude conqueror, established it as in all literary matters the recognised teacher of the Roman Empire. And its last great effort was that to which I have alluded, when, converted to Israel's truth, amid vigorous and opposing theologic schools, and a vast side growth of heresies, it matured the Christian Creeds, and impressed them deeply, if not indelibly, upon the mental progress of mankind. The Roman culture was Græcised soon, but its strong practical understanding long preserved its lineaments distinct. And its great spiritual effort also was its last—that whose remains we witness still—when, its arms being decrepit, and its martial spirit gone, yet its dignity, faith, force, virtue, and capacity to rule confronted and vanquished in the name of Christ still ruder conquerors, and built again on their prostration, nay, on their real elevation, a more imperial Rome than ever Cæsar saw. How paradoxical—one asks again—to name the days of Scipio and Camillus, and Cimon and Miltiades, or, if you please, of Romulus, or Achilles, or Hercules, theological, as contrasted with the days of Plotinus, and Julian, and the Antonines; of Gregory, and Ambrose, and Augustine; of Chrysostom, and Arius, and Origen and Athanasius! As to the modern world, it is only yet

in the middle of its growth, but, no doubt, it too will conform to the natural succession—its first efforts being the most purely physical, its last the most eminently theological. Indeed, this order is palpable already—unless, that is, we are willing to believe the days of the Crusades and Saxons; of William the Conqueror, and Charlemagne, and Alfred; or, if you please, the days of Arthur or of Thor, theological—in contrast, say, to the present days of pulpit,¹ press, and platform; of lectures, societies, and institutes; of Locke, and Butler, and Kant, and Comte; of Tractites, Rationalists, Colenzites, and Reviewers. Nay, early times were not *theo-* but *mytho-*logical: and the most mythological was Chaos. More explicit “divinity” was reserved for us; and into this we rush rapidly and flippantly enough. Already every one reads, and talks, and thinks, upon religious theory; and if all the Positives themselves will only follow the example of their chief—as indeed, notwithstanding their anger at his “inconsistency,” they are manifestly inclined or *obliged* to do—they shall have borne at least their full share in some enormous theological development.

But was there not a large amount of theology in the days of Charlemagne and Alfred? and was not this theology, *then*, almost the only philosophy extant? No doubt, a very large amount of it; in fact, *the whole theology of the old Greek mind*, inherited from the prior period, along with the logic of Aristotle, the jurisprudence of Justinian, and the Bible of Israel. But to mistake this large inheritance, or any part of it, for the native product of that early Europe were about as sagacious as to imagine that a minor had produced his own entailed estate, or that he had written, himself, the volumes of his own well-furnished library. And this is Comte’s precise sagacity, followed though it be by thinkers,² politicians, and historians. One is amazed to

¹ I believe the present estimate is, that English-speaking people listen to upwards of a million sermons a week!

² Strangely enough, Mr. Mill is not only taken in by Comte’s inversion, and thinks it profoundly important and instructive—which even in its blundering it is—but he assigns to Comte the merit of being the first to rest morals upon historical discernment. Indeed,

see that a child could be misled by it. That were a silly child indeed who could be persuaded that his Bible and Prayer-Book, or even his Catechism, Hymn-book, and Sunday School instruction, were his own development, instead of the careful production of his ancestors. He receives them at present passively, and with trustful reverence; in time, perhaps, he will aspire to understand, to criticize, and, it may be hoped, improve them, ere he impresses or enforces them in turn upon another generation. And it should be noticed that, of all the products of any period, its intellectual and moral results are far the most abiding. These take longest to grow, come latest to maturity, and even in form perpetuate themselves the most. The common food which one year produces will last a year or two. The houses, mills, and churches which one generation builds will outlast some generations. But the Science, and Truth, and Wisdom which a cycle must mature possess a more secular existence. Their leading

this is about the chief or only merit which his once ardent admirer now discerns in his system. "We know not any thinker who before M. Comte had penetrated to the philosophy of the matter, and placed the necessity of historical studies as the foundation of sociological speculation on the true footing. From this time any political thinker, who fancies himself able to dispense with a connected view of the great facts of history, as a chain of causes and effects, must be regarded as below the level of the age."—West. Rev. LIV., p. 386. But surely Mr. Mill forgets the commonest and most influential Book in being. What other form has the Bible than simply a connected view of the great key-facts of mundane history? And on what other basis does it rest or vindicate its extremely varied institutes than their adaptation [by what it claims as a divine insight] to the progressive wants of the great human Pilgrimage—each of its dispensations being calculated at once to raise and regulate the present, and to prepare for and produce the still diviner future it always discerns and worships? Whether its view or Comte's of the march of human kind be the more profound is not now the question, but only this new illustration of how easy it is to overlook the obvious. About the first axiom of theology is, that "Christianity and its evidence, and its vindication, are all alike historical:" and the very form of our Sacred Books is a series of tableaux or photograms of the supposed key-stages of man's social and religious growth. And whereas it is now said that these photograms were taken not from contemporaneous fact, but from the later camera of a more cultured memory and faith, we reply that—even if it were so, which is far from proved—our present argument is not altered. We have, instead of a chronologically earlier and more barren series of photograms, a later, more important, and more unconscious series; for Niemand zeichnet den eigenen character schaefer, als in seiner manier einen fremden zu zeichnen.

forms have often persuaded men that they are themselves eternal. This, indeed, in our sense of the word eternal, is far from true: whether there be tongues, they shall fail; whether there be prophecies, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, or any form of knowledge, it shall vanish away. Nevertheless, forms of truth are most abiding forms. And we make a foolish blunder in confounding the slow reflex wisdom which matures a lesson, with the brisk direct intelligence of the youth or youthful period which learns that lesson off by heart, and then, whether understanding it or no, professes, believes, and loves it, and seeks to hand it down untarnished.

Of theology's intermediate stage I cannot now say much—of course, all one writes is a contribution to some portion of it. I have already severely criticized its present state, and have also said something in its praise. Whatever I now add shall have a close reference to its ideal or ultimate condition. And, first, it is obvious to remark that, while pursued in parts, each part should be strictly scientific, should proceed on just principles, and feel itself amenable to all the requirements of logic. Religion itself is not so; nor is any inspiration of genius, or any other earnestness of life. I mean, they are not subject to book-logic, which is only a partial and inchoate attempt to delineate the laws of thought. They are, doubtless, in accordance with the deep logic of things. Even when most transcending scholastic formulæ they may be typical instances of the higher or less known processes of nature, and so are themselves creating the materials for some higher logic of the schools. But theology possesses no such privilege. It is the attempt to explain and theorize; and it must do this after the manner of any other explanation. And in general the different parts of theology are sufficiently aware of this. Indeed, they are often only too ambitious to adopt scientific terms and forms, and to press these beyond their legitimate sphere of application. For, it should be remembered always, a proof in morals, or a demonstration in religion, is a very different, almost an opposite thing from a demonstration in numbers or geometry. The two processes,

indeed, coincide so far as they go; but the one always includes, the other may totally omit, the determinant features of the case. Any demonstration, or deductive proof, is only a "demonstration"—a detailed and coherent exhibition to the intuitive faculties—of a single aspect of a thing. In mathematics this one aspect is the whole truth contemplated; in ethics or religion it may be only one true aspect out of ten, or one true principle out of fifty, some one or more of which may be vastly more influential on the complex result than the one specially considered. Applied sciences have much of this complexity. It does not follow, because gravity is constant and pervading, that we should stand on our head instead of on our feet, that plants grow downward, or that things are always approaching the centre of either earth or sun. It does not follow, because self-interest is a constant force, that a given action may not be determined in the main by passion or prejudice—by habit, or caprice, or indolence—by truth, or faith, or love, or honour. This complexity belongs to *things*; and human conduct is the most complex thing we know. A proof in respect to it will be of the nature of *Persuasion*, and will consist in pressing a few leading considerations, and in showing that these consist with one another and with the other principles which we approve.

The parade of logical forms, therefore, on social subjects is always to be avoided and suspected. The middle terms are always pregnant, and generally ambiguous. When they are not ambiguous, far more than one set of premises is required to sustain any grave practical conclusion. When the attempt is made strictly to define the terms, and reason from them, the conclusion, generally, is either some trifling proposition, or it is just beside the question. The matter in dispute has been virtually omitted from the premises. And hereabouts lies the besetting danger of argumentation on such subjects—the chief source of paralogism in politics, or ethics, or religion. As the conclusion is *larger* than any one set of premises, and rests only partially upon them, so in return it partially indorses and supports them. It confirms them somewhat even when the argument is sound;

much more it sustains them when the argument is weak and wavering. Its own authority, derived from independent and undeniable, but perhaps indiscriminated sources, adds itself to the considerations which seem to prove it, and franks too often what should be felt as sophistry. Little mischief would thence arise if the process terminated here. But it does not. The false premises thus indorsed, and associated with the highest interests, presently react upon the system, and prove disturbing forces of pernicious efficacy. I do not think it is too much to say that all the main collisions and derangements of theology have been due to this one source—false premisses hastily admitted on the strength of their own supposed conclusions, and historically indorsed thereby. This, I am certain, is the main cause of all our own present differences of opinion. It is indeed the very process by which religion freezes itself into petty conventionalities, cuts itself off from all that is large, and true, and vivifying, and makes that whose very name should bind us all in love together the very cause of hatred and symbol of disunion. We can never be too careful, therefore, in scrutinizing every fragment of our theologic reasoning, and never too conscientious in excluding all *ad captandum* words and cries and sentences soever. The reverse process of seeking to restore the large and pregnant meaning of our grand old terms and propositions is both difficult and unpopular.

And, as the danger lurks near the just process, so near the danger lies also the security. No inconvenience could result from a conclusion indorsing premises if the conclusion were really just, and if the premises really cohered therewith. It is only an inconsistency which can produce derangement. The golden rule, therefore, in all religious reasonings is to be certain of our fundamental principle, and to admit nothing in either premiss or conclusion which is repugnant with it. And what are fundamental principles? For, evidently, if these be ill-chosen or imperfect, our golden rule will be only a delusion. Brethren, there are no principles really fundamental but two—one at the bottom of our analysis, and the other in the centre of our syn-

thesis; and these two, religion at least will affirm, must resolve themselves into one. At the base of our analysis stands simply the concrete Fact; at the summit of our synthesis stands simply the name or the reality of God; and religion's affirmation is, that the first is but the partial revelation of the last. This, then, is the fundamental principle with which all our minor principles, whether presented as premiss or conclusion, must perforce cohere, and which all our reasonings and investigations can do nothing but expound.

This is in fact the principle of UNITY—the principle of Coherence or Consistency—the ultimate implicit principle of every science or scientific truth, how partial and incomplete soever—the ultimate explicit principle of all that aims to be Philosophy. In discerning or in enunciating it, obviously, we place ourselves in contact with the ultimate of our science, and to it I shall immediately pass on, when I have thrown our golden rule into its express theologic form. With us, then, it is the Theocratic, or Theogenetic, or Theistic principle, the ultimate principle of the UNITY OF GOD—God being the sole real and responsible Origin and Cause, and Ruler, and Conductor, and Judge, and Reconciler of all things whatsoever, visible and invisible—and Things in their totality being but His dependent and balanced Expression of Himself. And our canon is that we possess at least a firm habitual knowledge of this truth, and always seek to realize it; and specially that in all our partial treatments we admit nothing to the rank of even a tentative or secondary “principle” without discerning it to be at least not inconsistent with our Prime and our Foundation. Obviously, when we have realized it thoroughly in thought and act, and harmonized ourselves therewith, Theology shall have completed itself, and Life, to us, shall have solved its problem.

And our question for to-day may be thus stated: How near has Theology approached to such a consummation? How far is she conscious of this idea; how far has she striven to realize it; and with what success? How far does it expound to her God's Total Fact, and harmonize it to her thought, not by the

method of denials, mutilations, or exclusions, but by the firm and reverent acceptance of it as it was, and is, and shall be. And how far has it enabled her to expound it to the world in an intelligent analysis, and an exhaustive synthesis ?

Much farther, brethren, I am convinced, than what is commonly supposed. Theology, with all its faults, and these are neither few nor hidden, has always been conscious of this ideal, both on its analytic and its synthetic side : has always striven to realize it, and has always largely succeeded in its aim. In our own dispensation it has succeeded, as I conceive, not merely largely, but on the whole and totally—with a transcendent and profound, and, as I believe, an ultimate success—a success that subsequent discovery and thought will no doubt illuminate and enrich and in many parts correct, but which will never, in its main lines, need to be recast. Truth is ascertainable in morals and metaphysics, as well as in figure and number. And, though the complex questions in every department be beyond our ken, yet the simple ones are not; now, simple propositions are the basis of all truth, and prime, irrefragable positions, axiomatic when distinctly seen, must be the dividing walls and key-stones of its building.

It is not, brethren, that I claim for theology, even in its truest and most sacred parts, or that I believe it to possess, any infallibility—that is, any small infallibility whatsoever—any immunity from verbal mistake, or even from minor error. Where else in Nature, or in Providence, or in any other work of God, do we find such immunity : or why should we expect it here ? There is, however, in all the works of God, and in each of them when largely viewed, a deeper infallibility than this, which, even for the sake of science, should be made explicit. And it is to this effect, that there is, and is felt to be, in each large section of His self-expression, such a divine and living truthfulness, as not only (1) reduces to comparative insignificance its own small aberrations or defects, but also (2) throws these very aberrations into prominence, and makes *them* pointedly subserve its work, and teach its fundamental lesson.

We ask, for example, is Nature infallible?—meaning by Nature, God's total conduct and life of things in all regions below reflective consciousness. And the answer will be Yes, or No, according as we understand the term. Profoundly infallible on the whole, as it moves onward with patience and wisdom towards its far-off purposes, building itself from humblest elements into the cosmic exhibition of its Maker. But not infallible in its detail—full of defect and failure, and many an unsightliness and disproportion, and dooming its every individual product to change, decay and dissolution. And yet again still more profoundly infallible, as she insists that this her darker and more perplexing side not only shall not swamp our sense of her surpassing loveliness and her exhaustless life, but shall incite and almost force her sons to fellow-work with her in the spirit of her mission—shall induce us or oblige us to drain her swamps and reclaim her wastes, and fertilize and refine and beautify her earth, and be ourselves, along with it, in successive generations even visibly regenerated, as civilization lifts at once the workman and his work.

Again, is Providence infallible? meaning by Providence God's total conduct and life of things in all those middle regions which involve "prudence" and foresight and responsibility, or the sense of reward and punishment. Yes, profoundly infallible the more we know of it, and learn to trust its watchful care and just severity, and compensations infinite; even in the midst of our distresses and perplexities. Yet it is these very perplexities and inequalities and troubles numberless which elicit and exercise the prudence it exacts; and it is these very distresses, felt first for self and next for others, which educe and educate our own human and still larger sympathies, and make us yearn for and discern the Rule and Fatherhood of Heaven.

And, finally, is Grace infallible? meaning by Grace all those upper realms whose animating spirit is an explicit consciousness of the Unseen and longing for its Fulness. Obviously the profoundest sense of perfect Reconciliation and Purity and Mercy underlies it all, and is at once the logical and the moral groundwork of its Hope. Yet in practice its main agent and "incite-

ment" is precisely that sense of defect and sin which we have already described as the first correlative of our sense of God. Throughout our fallible humanity it is this very sense of fallibility and of actual failure that breaks our lazy self-esteem, and forces the advance. In the regions of our higher consciousness it is this higher sense of sin that seeks and finds for us, if but in tangible first fruits, the Ideal Perfect, which ever leads us on as it ascends before us into the bosom of The Infinite.

Each, doubtless, of these Great Words of God inspires us with the sense of its own infallibility as a whole—of its thorough perfectness for its own purposes and God's. But none of them has infallibility in the sense that any of its details is perfect to our esteem, or can demand or admit from us any ascription of finality. Explicitly the opposite: each is full of the inchoate, the unseemly, the injurious, and our higher life is sensitive to this, and finds therein the basis of its fellow-work with God. If, indeed, these partial shadows were the whole or the dominant part of what we could discern, we might fold our hands and die. But, seeing that all creation feels them to be only partial shadows cast by itself in the incidence of the Eternal Light, they become the very stimulants which turn our face towards it—which make Nature climb, almost consciously, into the Higher Natural; convert the ways of Providence into the paths of Grace, and make each kingdom of Grace itself prepare for and usher in a higher Advent of its Lord. In the language and idea of my text, things as a whole are not yet fully made, they are only being made; and as a whole, little as they understand, they truly *feel the process*. The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in childbirth-pain together; being born with us, and not without its compensations, into a deeply-longed-for, dimly-seen Ideal. And this sense of imperfection with which the lowest are incommoded and the highest agonized, is, after all, perhaps, *only* the birth-pang of the Better; and is, perhaps, not greater on the whole than what is needful to elicit from creation the exertion requisite.

If, then, religion and the theory of religion be of a piece with those other Works or Words, the kind of infallibility we should

expect to underlie it would be the same as theirs—only here more conscious and explicit as befits their exponential part—something profoundly just and attractive, or even resistless, as a whole, yet full of imperfection in detail, and by these very imperfections challenging our co-operation, either in ambitious antagonism, or in more ambitious help. Else how could it be itself improved along with us, or keep on advancing with advancing things? How could it be the angel of our pilgrimage, and force us to wrestle on into a higher dignity and see the face of God, except by wrestling with us “as a man,” “until the breaking of the day,” and forcing us, in a certain sense, to conquer? There are, indeed, who fondly claim, despite the evidence, for Church or Scripture some other infallibility than this, and would invest them, one or both, with a Saul’s impenetrable armour or a superstitious haze. But a true inspiration will resent these aids, and a true courage will reject them. Could the pretension be verified for either, the palpable effect would be to cut it off from the whole analogy of things and God’s general conduct of affairs. Nay it is Religion’s true and loftier praise to be in profound accord with these; to discern their meaning, drink in their spirit, and give them consciously embodiment and voice—Organic Religion marching at their head with willing and resolute self-sacrifice, though oft with failing or bewildered steps, as it works the higher life into all the varying grades and moods and characters of men;—and Literate Religion chaunting its battle-psalm of penitence and agony and hope and triumph, if not with stammering or mistaken tongue, as it utters always the best it knows; and then, as each step of the great advance is made, discerning with strange insight its key-facts and processes, and picturing the whole in marvellous tableaux for after-times to study.

Our praise of theology, therefore, if praise it be, will not rest on any willingness to shut our eyes to any faults whatever. Even in common warfare the more one values a strategic position and the interests it guards, the keener one discerns, the more boldly one denounces, any admitted weakness within our lines. With no inferior loyalty let us survey our Zion, and note the

outlines of our positive theology, both on the analytic and synthetic side. We shall claim for it no small Infallibility: we shall be content to discern its ever-fresh and ascending, perhaps its unexpected TRUTH.

The Analytic of Religion, then, is obviously the Fact—the Total Fact—the whole Visible, with all that can be seen of the Invisible, of God—all Creation and the Creator, so far as they are within our ken. And how shall we divide this vast Totality? The division usual with religious writers has just been given—into Nature, Providence, and Grace, with a definition of each. It is obviously just, exhaustive, and suggestive. Very pretentious philosophies have still much to learn from it. And the religious conviction does not forget, that these are but *our* division of One Whole; that the parts are not only connected, but “analogous and of a piece;” that they are all “of one”—the same principles pervading all; and each, up to its own level, truly revealing, to those who have ears to hear, the real character of God.

How shall we farther subdivide and examine them, and yet not lose ourselves in their detail? This is work for the physicist and the naturalist, and the socialist, and the historian, and the prophet. Religion endorses these, and inspires and commands them—bids them each to do his utmost and his best, without fear or favour. Let each see all he can of all the works of God—her duty is to learn from each and to correlate them all. And they and she succeed. But I must pause a moment on the Principle of Classification. There are those who would derive it from Enumeration or Statistics. But this is a palpable inversion; for what “kind” of things shall we enumerate? The things sought are already compared in the mind with some “type” of their class: and the discerning of this type is the classifying principle. Nature works in cycles and divides off her products, be they substances or powers, into certain grades and orders, with each its appropriate character. Scientific insight, after perhaps a brief, perhaps an extended, examination, discerns and marks this character, and sets up for itself an ideal individual as the type of the class, to which all the actual individuals more or

less approximate. All which do approximate sufficiently it calls by the same name. Hence, for an extended and even accurate knowledge of creation it is not requisite to know all its individuals. A real knowledge of the real types of Nature and of their true relation to each other will constitute, though but in outline, a truly comprehensive or even exhaustive Science of things. This, the largest experience of individuals will indeed enrich and difference, but can never supersede or alter; and scientific insight, wide as it ranges, may yet compress its dicta within very moderate bulk. Guided by these principles, explicit or implicit, and animated by the love of knowledge, of truth, or of utility, thinkers and observers have plunged into the examination of things: have digested the results into philosophic systems; and have reversed or altered these from time to time, as farther knowledge bade. To each of these, *so far as it is proved*, religion is bound to bow.

But theology, obviously, could not afford to wait for Thales, and Aristotle, and Bacon, and Boscovitch, or for those who might reverse their dicta. She was obliged to find, if only provisionally, a system of her own whereon to ground her doctrines. This she did very early in human history; and to her first sketch, through good or ill report, she adheres till now. Religion's analysis of Nature, her analysis of Providence, and her analysis of the main facts of the religious life, are all given in one large and ancient volume, the Patriarch and Prophet of the Books. And our readiest analysis of each of these departments now will naturally take the form of a comparison of the Bible outline with any other system which can claim, in whole or in part, to rival or reverse it.

Observers of *Nature*, then, have discerned that things, both in their substance and their powers, are not random or chaotic, but form a Cosmos or a Constitution, with high and low, *and the sense of high and low*, pervading them. And they divide things off, accordingly, into grades, classes, kingdoms, rising above each other from the humblest to the loftiest things we know. Man's judgment throughout this scale being, of course, Anthropomorphic. For man is himself a constitution, with the sense of high and low pervading him. And he reckons always those

things the highest which are correlated with his own highest and most commanding parts—the lowest which are correlated with his own lowest elements. And the classification is, first the *Mineral* or Geologic kingdoms, with their humble *vires viva* mechanical and thermic, but rising into higher chemistries as we approach the next great division (2) *Vegetation*. This again in ascending classes from the simplest cell-formation to those almost sensitive organs and organisms which approach (3) *Animation*. And this again in classes from the zoophyte or from sarcode, up to the approximations to humanity and to man himself. And (4) *Man*, in fine, also in ascending classes from the mere infantile races, or their barbaric degenerations, up to the highest spiritual man who consciously aspires to live the life of Christ.

So far Science. And it also discerns, or half-discerns, what is of still greater importance—that Nature is not a Constitution only but a Course; and that some relation exists between the Constitution and the Course. But here her insight is bewildered, her method wavering, and the most pretentious and “established” of her systematic teaching profoundly false. The facile hypothesis of “Science falsely so called” is, that Nature’s is a level course, with iron or with diamond grooves, whereon things run from day to day, as they have always run. And so her Logic and her “Science Pure” is each fain to resolve itself into perceptions of Identity; her Physics labours to make out Stability and Permanence; and her Metaphysics loses itself in dreams of Uniformity, Immutability, and the Eternal Fixed Idea. And, as these palpably do not cohere with any existing thing within our ken, it, first virtually, and then formally, *denies* all existing things; formally denies all substance and all force, and consecrates at last its philosophy of Nihilism by the principle of Self Contradiction.

Disregarding such inept “antitheses,” the religious insight grasped at once the salient fact that we and all things are *in transitu*—nay, with a deeper and more powerful insight, *in progressu*—that the “state” of things is a differential change which integrates itself, as time runs on, into the advancing stages of a Great Progression. More explicitly it saw that this change on

the whole was of the nature of *growth*—more profoundly, that it is of the nature of *Birth*, and is the mode wherein God brings things into being. Instead, therefore, of abhorring it as decline or failure, and mourning over some lost idea, she accepts it cheerfully, turns her face with it towards the Coming Better, and rests on it her prime intuition of the nature of God and things. Her key words are not of fixedness nor of decline, but Genesis and Regeneration, Formation, Transformation, Production, Birth, New Birth, and on the whole CREATION, or the BEING-CAUSED-TO-GROW. The Ultimate God is essentially and eternally Creator—the Ever-Producing FATHER. The Being of “things” is inseparable from their Becoming; and the Archetype of things is an Ever-Begotten SON.

She recognizes, therefore, that there is upper and lower, and the sense of upper and lower, in the course as well as in the constitution of things. And these are correlated by the simple law that things are “caused-to-grow” *from below upwards*—upwards (1) towards the Larger, and then, and on this basis, (2) upwards towards the Better. So that, as the growth divides itself off into great Days or Cycles, the successive attainments and resting stages of the Course become the ascending grades and kingdoms of the Constitution. Their order of dignity being the inverse order of their genesis; as Nature’s Ambition shows a constant tendency to better itself in kind. The humblest being first made; then, each as it comes into life being made to co-operate with all, each latest central product becomes the “heir of all the ages,” and embodies the results of the whole previous elaboration. And it follows that the most just and exhaustive, as well as the most natural, method of delineating these types, physical or spiritual, is the historic one. To describe each in the order of its genesis will describe all, both in course and constitution. For Nature’s Constitution is but the co-existence and co-operation of her types, variously multiplied and modified by circumstances, as each obeys the primal impulse to extend or to improve itself, and the weakest are forced down or used up in the struggle for existence. Thus the principles of both Course and Constitution are the same. In fact

the Constitution is but the Course compressed into a tableau: the Course is but the Constitution developed into history.

Whether the authors of our Sacred Books reasoned thus, or how far they encouraged themselves to theorize at all, does not appear. But intuitively or instinctively they took this course. And the Bible is, from end to end, simply a series of tableaux or photograms of earth's successive Products, natural and spiritual, presented in their genesis, including of course its constant prolepsis of the Better. Now, whatever be the faults or merits of the *execution* of such a plan, it is obvious that the plan itself is the true or only scientific one, and the authors must have been directed in it by a profound analytic insight. That they should have been so directed—so many of them, so various, so obviously without concert, and without any general intelligence of the plan itself wherein each effectively performs his part—is one of those large Impressive Facts which make the Bible stand out to us mysteriously as a Voice from the Unknown.

But let us follow its detail. Its analysis of Nature as such is brief. One chapter records its genesis in six or seven well-marked periods—Astronomic or Geologic Days—from the rudest chaotic elements—colourless, formless, and unsubstantial—up to the constituted World, with Man established at its head. Man, but still only the “natural” or “psychical” man, with no knowledge, or at least no fear, of God, or consciousness of right or wrong, but with an explicit sense of his own “lordship” over creatures, and of his mission to increase and multiply and replenish the earth and subdue it.

But though its formal history of Nature be brief, the Bible's love of Nature, and pious admiration of it, and confidence in it as about the simplest and most impressive Word of God, are by no means small. On this basis indeed it expands its proverb and parable and psalm and prophecy; and the culture of its heroes throughout is mainly of the naturalistic type. From its first “meaning man,” who classified and named the creatures; or its first Lawgiver, who based his main distinctions on it; or its wisest king, who knew from the hyssop on the wall to the cedar of Lebanon; or its loftiest Psalmist, who finds heaven and

earth and day and night ever declaring in every speech the Gospel of God's glory ; up to that Perfect Preacher and Archetypal Man whose addresses were commonly no more than some natural type vividly portrayed before the multitudes, and left as a premiss to be pondered on ; and who could find in the commonest seed that grows the justest Exposition of His Kingdom, and in the commonest food we eat and drink the justest Exposition of Himself.

Religion, indeed, has always the intensest sympathy with nature ; partly because their principles are in fact identical, and it is her duty to discern them and assert them ; and chiefly because man himself belongs to these lower kingdoms in the whole of his unconscious and the whole of his direct or instinctive life—that is, perhaps, in nine-tenths, or even ninety-nine-hundredths of an ordinary man's existence. But it is the remaining tenth or hundredth which constitutes our communion with the gods, and is especially Religion's care. We cannot wonder, therefore, that the bulk of her writings should be expended in expounding it, or that its history should formally occupy all the rest of the Bible. And its genesis also was by little and little ; slowly worked up out of inferior elements ; in long Days or Dispensations of which we have not seen the last. From the first Adam to the second Adam by several well marked stages described for us in Scripture: from the Second Adam as He was, to the Second Adam as He shall be seen again, by other stages through which we can but grope our way, wanting the Bible's distinct enunciation.

The Natural or Primal Man must be "created anew," in Knowledge, Righteousness, and true Holiness, after the higher image of his Creator: and his initiation into *knowledge* must come first. So, through a long period of Rest—the Seventh Day—the pre-Adamites, as commanded, increase and multiply and replenish the earth ; begin to press upon the means of subsistence, and to render necessary foresight, tillage, marriage, property, and law. Then a "meaning" man—into whose nostrils a higher spirit has been breathed—is called up into the troublous regions of Reflection ; and through the process which

is *most unscripturally*, if with a certain one-sided justice, termed "the Fall," "becomes as one of us," and institutes the higher race of "Sons of God," surrounded by the primitive mere psychical humanity. This is the outer history: the psychologic history of the same event is that now first the Three Great Correlatives, Law, Sin, Grace—or sense of duty, sense of guilty failure, and sense of divine forgiveness and regenerating Hope and Help—make their formal appearance in the human breast. By the Law, however primitive, is the knowledge of sin: and by this knowledge is the necessity for, and the seeking and the finding some inner communion with the Father of our being. This was the first step of the spiritual genesis, and is always its essential process. Higher Law enters: Sin abounds: and Grace does much more abound—such is the new-creative procedure—the cell-formation of spiritual life.

This great event happened, the history implies or says, just after earth's physiologies had reached their climax; when her vegetable and animal forces had not yet been exhausted or weakened by much production of cerebral or more recondite forms of force. With this still predominant animal the infant spiritual mingles, but not yet with sufficient directive or commanding power. Hence depraved forms of ambition and violence devastate the earth, in combination with large geologic and atmospheric¹ changes; and the next tableau shows us the survivors of these disasters—softened by affliction, and sensible of mercy and of hope—pledging themselves, under the sense of covenant with God, to at least one fundamental principle of morality—the *sacredness of human life*. "I do set my bow in the cloud,

¹ Accepting La Place and Herschel's Astronomy, and the law of distances, there must have been one or more shrinkings of the Sun since the Genesis of the planet Mercury, on, suppose, the fourth Mosaic Day. Each shrinking would, of course, concentrate its mass, and make it more a "sun;" cause it to radiate more light and *less heat*; make earth's seasons and season-rings more distinct, and her vegetation more seedy [Gen. iii. 18]; and refrigerate and clear our atmosphere, precipitating the water and other elements, chiefly perhaps the carbon, which it had before sustained as gas. The last of these shrinkings we may fairly suppose to have taken place within the human period, say towards the end of the Pleistocene, and to be connected, therefore, with the Drift. But we possess far too little knowledge, as yet, to be able to discriminate the

and I will look on it, and will remember my covenant." "And surely your blood of your lives will I require, at the hand of every beast will I require it and at the hand of man: at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man: whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed, FOR *in the image of God made he man.*"

This principle, expanded into the sense of human dignity and worth, and requiring a consequent uprightness and propriety of demeanour—this self-respect and mutual-respect as in the sight of God and as befitting His offspring—without many or any positive enactments—is the principle of the Patriarchal Dispensation as such; and is man's initiation into "Righteousness"—the righteousness of faith or insight as distinguished from that of ordinances—as we should say, perhaps, the righteousness of "principle," of a thoroughly upright and humane intention or pervading motive, as distinguished from conformity to any artificial code. The type of it is Melchizedek, king of righteousness and king of peace, and dwelling ever, as priest, in the present sense of the Invisible. A high degree in it is won by Abraham and his sons, only here it begins to be modified and commanded by the third great principle of the new creation—Holiness as such.

The fundamental idea of this is *separateness*, consecration, calling to a higher purpose. Obviously, therefore, a means to an end, and involving the ideas of subordination and sacrifice towards that end. The end will be, of course, some nearer and more elevating communion with God. And this higher vision,

periods; especially to discriminate them in Central Asia, from which our history diverges. The example of Australia, and even of America, shows that geologic periods, at least as measured in *physiology*, were not simultaneous over all the earth; but that the remoter regions lagged behind the central movement, and only present its features in degenerated types. The tribes who chipped their flints into the gravel of the Seine, or who left their shell-heaps on the shores of the Baltic, probably bore about the same relation to their contemporaries upon what is now the Caspian, as a Hottentot or Bosjesman does to an Arab, or as a native Australian does to a Tcherkees or a Brahman. That earth's physiologies, not yet distracted or exhausted by its psychologies, may have reached their climax about the end of the Pleistocene, is a natural and a probable hypothesis. Cf. notes in pp. 123 and 199; and see Lect. i., vol. ii.

by virtue of God's Unity, will then expand itself, and make divine amends for all the previous narrowness, restraint, and concentration. It is, in fact, vague religiousness, confining and defining itself in order to reach a loftier idea; which idea will then diffuse itself again as a higher gospel to the world. So that it formally initiates, and is indeed the working principle of "the narrow, intermediate, *productive* stage" of the religious life.

I emphasize the word "productive:" for, little as the thoughtless might suppose it, this principle, so cold, repellent, vestal-like, is the true creative principle of religion, external and internal—that which generates and nurtures all our higher emotions, dispositions, and ideas, as well as the habits and institutions which embody, and the arts and letters which perpetuate and extend them. It is, in fact, the principle which in our moral nature corresponds to the division and education of labour in Economics—or, by a still more just comparison, it is that which in the reflex life corresponds to the great process of *specialization of functions* in Physiology—that by which the diffused "sensibility" is gathered into educated "senses," which in part reveal and in part truly *create* to the individual the "sensible" qualities of things—in fact, the world he lives in. And it is a just account of the three early dispensations we have glanced at to say that the *first*, from Adam to Enoch, represents the religious sensibility *becoming intelligent*—made conscious of the Infinite and Self, and gradually maturing its insight into foresight. The *second*, from Noah to Melchizedek, is the religious sensibility *becoming moral*—exactng from itself repentance towards God and humanity and justice towards man. And *the third*, by far the largest and most important, from Abraham to Christ, is the religious sensibility *specialized to production*—divided off and educated into those various spiritual faculties which in part create and in part constitute the higher life of man.

Let us note what happens in physiology. The rudest organism or organic matter, vegetable or animal, is truly sensitive to *light*—and to light as infinitely varied by the action of things around—in other words, in a certain rude sense *it sees*. But what does it see? precisely what a blind man sees; no more.

It is conscious, somehow, in proportion to its general intelligence, that it is in contact with a whole world of visible qualities, of which, however, its utmost wisdom can scarcely furnish one faint idea. It is aware of the near existence of a higher life to which itself is dead. But the physiologic history is, that as organisms advance, there gradually appear, on the parts most exposed to light, one or more coloured spots which absorb the light; and, inside these spots, the nerves are minutely elaborated, so as to bring to bear upon the luminous variations a microscopic sensibility which gradually becomes the educated sense of sight. Similarly, all organisms are sensitive, more or less, to those ruder pulsations which in a certain sense are *sound*, and so may be said to *hear*—that is, to hear what a deaf man hears. But there is in no definite sense “hearing,” nor in any just sense either speech or music to be heard, until the growth of the auditory chamber and its surrounding mechanisms, which microscopically reproduce to microscopic nerves the actual pulsations, and stimulate productive creatures to multiply and vary *ad infinitum* the sounds and cadences which they enjoy.

Just so in our psychology, there is a vague religiousness—a sensibility to the Unseen and Infinite. But of what great use is this until it has been wrought up into such definite conceptions, beliefs, emotions, principles, as can direct and elevate the life? And the mode of educating it into these is just the same as in physiology—by defining and concentrating the attention, by intensifying the observation, microscopically if you will, on those attributes and dealings of God, which commonly or which specially affect us. Some great trouble or great joy—or some general providence or visitation specialized by a flash to the individual conscience, and dwelt and pondered on till it has become a true voice from the Unseen, may prove the immediate basis. Or, even without these, by a more steady and insensible growth, it may come from instruction and reflection gathering round some definite idea which has power to lift the character. By whatever generated, in this mode, a new life, with upper interests, and meat and drink which the world knows not of, truly overgrows us, and almost without a figure we are born again.

Perhaps the commonest instance of exercising the principle will furnish its simplest illustration. Men dedicate a church or temple, and go there to worship God. The logical basis of their procedure is barely this—God is everywhere, therefore He is here—His eyes and heart are on every place, and therefore upon this. He hears all voices, listens to all complaints, encourages all higher aspirations; therefore He attends to ours. He is indignant at all sin, yet willing to accept and help the penitent; fearing yet hoping, therefore, we humbly seek His aid. But the history of the procedure is, that these, which were only vague truisms, hardly even thought before, become impressed as definite convictions, productive truths, bound up each with multiplied associations which draw them into act. And the God, who was before a vague and colourless or even repulsive Omnipresence, is now enthroned as master of the heart, making the whole man His temple, and assimilating His image to Himself. While round the outer temple grow up first the external Arts—Architecture, Painting, Sculpture, which raise and decorate the building, and then the loftier products, Music, Letters, Abstract Thought, which enrich and dignify the worship.

Thus operates in common the principle of holiness; ever calling us up into nearer communion with heaven, and ever rewarding our efforts with tangible first-fruits. What the Bible details is its continuous action on that central family from which mankind has, in fact, derived the main impulses of its religious life. Discerning, by whatever insight, this mission of Israel, and the wisdom of recording it, the sacred writers set forth in successive tableaus round the principle of higher calling, the gradual development of all that we revere—the Genesis, first of the appointed Family, and its family-religion, and conscious Pilgrimage—the Genesis, presently, of church, and sacrament, and creed, and book—the Genesis and training of the exemplar Nation, and its law and constitution, its priest and prophet and consecrated throne, and growing sense of mission and Messiahship, and its almost intelligence of the coming dispensation it bore within its womb—lastly, in the fulness of time, and of the world's preparedness, its final perfection, and its death in that

attained Messiah, and its foreseen resurrection, too, into a spiritual Israel, a universal Church, baptized into the explicit consciousness of gospel immortality. On the annals of each resting-stage in this Development, the Bible does not pause; nor, indeed, does it care for annals¹ generally, as distinguished from essential history. What matters it how long the tribes vegetated in praedial servitude under Joseph and the Pharaohs; or how long and variously the factions of the demos squabbled under the tentative of judges; provided the character and results of each estate be fairly shown, and in their just relations? But the great transitions are vividly portrayed, and the principles which energised them both in friendship and antagonism; and a

¹ The difference between these, or, rather "how history ought to be written," is very well described by Mr. Carlyle, himself no tyro in the art. "The *Revolt of the Netherlands* possesses all the common requisites of a good history, and many which are in some degree peculiar to itself." "The work is not stretched out into a continuous narrative, but gathered up into masses, which are successively exhibited to view; the minor facts being grouped around some leading one, to which, as to the central object, our attention is chiefly directed. This method of combining the details of events, of proceeding, as it were, *per saltum*, from eminence to eminence, and thence surveying the surrounding scene, is, undoubtedly, *the most philosophical of any*; but few men are equal to the task of effecting it rightly. It must be executed by a mind able to look at all its facts at once; to disentangle their perplexities, referring each to its proper head; and to choose, often with extreme address, the station from which the reader is to view them." *Life of Schiller*, p. 117. Now, if the Bible has been able to do this, with any tolerable justice, not for the fall of an empire, or the revolt of a province, but for the whole course of earth's development from Chaos to Christendom—fixing on its key-points and processes; and picturing a sufficient number of exemplar men; portraying distinctly the principles at work; and describing all so simply and so vividly as to be at once the delight of children, the wonder of old age, and the treasury of cultivated effort—its claims to respect on the score of *History* will not be less than those it may advance even on the grounds of *Morality* and *Religion*. Men find in it a multitude of small mistakes; and they find it mixed besides, even when they do not dispute its facts, with legend, myth, and allegory; let all this be granted; and then let two questions be replied to: (1.) How far do these blemishes, if they be such, detract from, or obscure either the scientific truthfulness of its design, or the impressiveness and general effectiveness of its execution? and (2.) How far do they militate against the professed object of the Book [or of the Church that has written and "canonized" it], namely, to interest and to *involve* us, willingly or unwillingly, in religion; that is, in high moral and intellectual progress, and to *make* us co-operate therewith? These are the *real* questions at issue in the present Bible criticism—what any superior intelligence, looking down on mundane things, would be sure to ask himself; and what we are quite capable of asking from each other.

sufficient number of typical or exemplar men are made to live before us, illustrating the motives connatural with each stage, and approximating each in more or fewer aspects to that Archetypal Son, whom, as the nation knew, the Virgin, the daughter of Zion, had conceived, to regenerate the destinies of man.

But on this great history we cannot pause. I have already analysed it roughly, both on its doctrinal and organic side, and contrasted its teaching with some popular mistakes. A few remarks our present subject needs. The *special* value of the Jewish training *as an analysis of Providence* resides in this, that it formally declined allusion to our future life, and contented itself throughout with merely the sanctions of Providence—with those rewards and punishments which are clearly discernible in God's present government of things. It was, indeed, as Butler happily describes it, "Natural religion established by authority and made the common law of the community;" but it was "natural religion" in this sense, that it omitted the common reference to compensations beyond the grave, and built its motives on the essential character of God, His goodness and severity, as manifested here. It is not that it ever denies or doubts a future life, or says one word to disparage its natural expectancy—the more it is examined the more clearly will the opposite be seen—but it pointedly omits its fears or hopes, as unnecessary, we must suppose, or unsuitable for its immediate purpose—that of training a nation to virtue and religion on the simple basis of the present acknowledgment of God. The logical as well as religious vindication of such a course being this, that the present and all future worlds are of a piece, and their ground principles identical; or, in more Jewish phrase, that Israel's God is the true Jehovah, and that He will be ever found the same, profoundly like Himself, in all realms of His dominion.

The same thing is sometimes expressed by calling Judaism a theocracy. But we must take pains not to misconceive this term. Men sometimes speak as if it meant (1), a government by priests, or (2), a government by express "religious," that is, supposed supernatural or supramundane sanctions, as opposed, say to those of enlightened statesmanship, or a just and far-seeing

worldly policy. The last we have seen already to be untenable. Israel's sanctions were indeed religious; but then it was the religion of Providence. Its inspiration was the insight which discerned the true nature, and laws, and purposes of God. And that these should be opposed to a sound and enduring policy, or should require the sacrifice of their just and natural prosperity, would have been resented by the national mind as an implied or express duality. And the other meaning is quite as groundless. Israel had indeed a priesthood carefully ordained and carefully endowed; but, so far from being the governing body, it was formally the lowest of the three co-ordinate elements of the constitution. Above it stood, first, the prophetic office, whether represented by colossal individuals or by the later prophetic guilds or colleges; and this was formally the revealing, legislative, and progressive element of the State. And, above them both, stood the nation as a whole, and its executive—Israel itself, represented generally, but not always, by its natural heads, whether judges, judge, or king. This last, so far as he was true to his office, of being impartially the head *of all*, combined the power, and dignity, and sanctity of all, and held his "ordination" immediately from heaven. When he sinned against his office, by making himself a partial or a party king, it became the prophet's duty to rend his royal robe, and the nation's duty, in the last resort, was in its tents and battle-field.

Nay, for a much more simple reason was Israel a theocracy. Because Providence is a theocracy; because the Universe is a theocracy, and every part thereof; and Israel's calling was to learn this truth, and teach it to the world. Because they first discerned His throne and footstool, and recognised His essence, and so became "His witnesses" on earth. Alike, therefore, they were a theocracy in every variety of form and circumstance—a Bedouin tribe, a prædial race, a colonizing demos, a kingly nation, an Assyrian exile, or a Roman province—alike under Pharaoh, or Moses, or Samson, or Solomon, or Darius, or Cæsar. *They* had a King always who was King of kings, and Lord of lords, and their mission was to teach mankind His name. To them, there was no power but of God; the powers

that *be* are ordained¹ of God. And the ultimate application of their principle was, when their Messiah stood before a Roman procurator, and solemnly reminded that unjust judge, who at once proclaimed Him innocent, and ordered His execution, "Thou couldest have no power at all against Me, were it not given thee by My Father."

The *general* value of the Bible history, as an analysis of religious facts, resides in this, that the peculiar people was not an anomalous, but an exemplar nation; exceptional only in the depth of its insight and the directness of its training, and available therefore for study and imitation. True, the faults of the nation are prominent, and prominently shown; the prophets were the painters, and here as always, the sense of sin is the prime correlative of the sense of God. The very fervour of the confession shows, however, how intense the yearning after an ideal which none but themselves had dreamt of. In some parts also, specially round the birth-stage of the Mosaic dispensation,

¹ It is strange that so essential a character both of Judaism *and of Christianity* could be missed or misconceived even in religious romancing. Yet, listen to this from M. Renan ["*Vie de Jesus*," p. 119].—"Une revolution radicale, embrassant jusqu'à la nature elle-même, telle fut donc la pensée fondamentale de Jesus. Des lors sans doute, il avait renoncé à la politique; l'exemple de Juda le Gaulonite lui avait montré l'inutilité des seditions populaires. Jamais il ne songea revolter contre les Romains et les tetrarques. Le principe éfréné et anarchique du Gaulonite n'était pas le sien. Sa soumission aux pouvoirs établis, *derisoire au fond*, était complete à la forme. Il payait le tribut à César pour ne pas scandaliser. La liberté et le droit ne sont pas de ce monde; pourquoi troubler sa vie par des vaines susceptibilités? Mepisant la terre, convaincu que la monde present ne merite pas qu'on s'en soucie, il se refugiait dans son royaume ideal; il fondait cette grand doctrine du dedain transcendant, vrai doctrine de la liberté des âmes, qui seule donne la paix." Those readers who have noticed how far ideas somewhat similar prevail among the light thinkers of our day will forgive my quoting this offensive passage. Its conception of the relation between religion and government,—natural enough perhaps to an enlightened Frenchman in virtual exile in 1864 and previously; or to a Stoic "practising his death-song" in another empire,—is profoundly opposed to the whole spirit of the Bible, in Judaism, in Christianity, or in Christ. The incident he refers to (Matt. xvii. 28, 26) related not to the Roman, but to the Temple tribute; and the dictum with which he confounds it [Matt. xxii. 21] was as little "*derisoire*" as the solemn reply to Pilate. Each of them was but an unflinching *reductio ad praxim* of the well-known substance of the law:—"Render, therefore, *to all* their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour." And the first sentence of the above extract is still more grotesquely and profoundly false. No teacher ever showed a deeper sympathy with nature, or greater reverence for it, than the Lord Jesus Christ.

as round the birth-stage of our own, the extraordinary or miraculous is recorded: and this awaits explanation along with the general laws of Birth, and especially the birth of dispensations or of worlds. But on the whole, as I have insisted, the Jewish represents the natural growth and training of a nation from rudeness to high culture—from increasing licentiousness, through law, to civil and religious liberty. Other nations around them, some perhaps before, had passed through historic phases more or less similar to theirs, producing analogous results. Hence, Israel, from time to time, learned also while it taught; and hence too the spiritual, the raised and transfigured Israel was able to comprise within one Christian Church not only the elite of Judaism, but the elite of heathendom as well; and early Christianity reaped the fields on which it had bestowed no labour. And we have seen that the formed Church, in turn, when she too would realize her aspiration on the largest scale and lift

It is forgotten, further, that while Jews, in obedience to the stringently enforced *detailed* of their law, were a most exclusive and religiously "unsocial" nation, they were also, in obedience to the well-known theory of their law, its definitions, and its prime commands, the most cosmopolitan of men. They could always sincerely honour whatever "power" God had put over them, or *even partially put over them*, and render their duty to it "as unto God, and not to men," as singly as they could to any judge or king arisen from among their brethren. It is the most "religious" of their kings who, to avoid burthening his people, strips first "the king's house," and then the temple, of its treasure, and takes the gold plating of its doors and pillars, to pay "tribute" to Assyria. And his people, when carried to Assyria, were as useful and as honourable servants of the State as their ancestors had been in Goshen. At home, or in exile, the ground principle of a Jew, from Joseph, or Daniel, or Nehemiah, to the Resch Glutha, the Jewish Mandarins, to Maimonides, and, we may hope, to Disraeli, was always to serve honourably the State (not its factions) into which God had cast their pilgrimage. This double allegiance, to the detail and to the principle of their law, is alleged to have sometimes perplexed their patriotism, as in the case of Jeremiah or Josephus; but this is only the permanent and unavoidable conflict between the letter and the spirit—*δ τοῦ πνεύματος βάσανος*, the touchstone of true discernment. And any one reflecting upon this narrow training up to a Catholic result; this sanctification for a purpose, and its effect in history—how the Jews were always first disciplined, and then dispersed; trained and taught up to a high ideal, and then broken up and obliged to scatter everywhere, not their form, but their ideal,—will see a wondrous similarity between the national and the individual Israel. The nation's "fellowship" with Christ's sufferings is as conspicuous in history as it is in Messianic prediction. With its Head, it might truly soliloquize, as it contemplates its progeny, "And, for their sakes, I sanctify myself, that they, also, may be truly sanctified."

the bulk of men to something near her level, was fain to go down to them again with discipline and ceremonial—reproduced instinctively the old Mosaic method, and made again the law the schoolmaster to bring men up to Christ. All states, or empires which contain within their borders races in different stages of advance—much more, which have infant nations or barbaric tribes entrusted to their care, will do well—again and again I earnestly entreat—to lay the old example to their heart. No nation, I believe, ever has ascended, and no nation, I believe, ever will ascend except by similar steps. With the best intentions the modern world has tried another method; and experience records in lurid colours, that we have only devastated. To disorganize even in the name of liberty is not to civilize; and to annihilate, even in the name of Christianity, is not to raise.

In Christ that dispensation terminates; the dispensation that expounds Providence, or the present sense of God, as specialized to culture—the most “special Providence” being on its principles simply the most universal and searching Providence *specialized*, microscopically, as no doubt it is intended to be specialized, by the individual conscience. This insight illuminates all possible experience, compensates, rectifies, and reconciles it. Shows that all things work together for good; makes them do so, and makes us fellow-work therewith. Ever in the deepest gloom will its triumph be the most; and in fact it was in the typical hour of earth’s bewilderment and wrong, that He on whom they culminated bare the burthen, in simple obedience, into the very depth of God-forsakedness, and came back triumphant—formally reconciled the Unseen and the Seen, completed the dispensation of Providence, and passed mankind on into the next.

In Christ also, that is, in the risen Christ, begins our own dispensation; the dispensation of those who are risen with Christ, and seek those things which are above—futura no longer excluded, but formally included in our view—Life and Immortality brought to light, and made the determinant motives of human conduct. Of this dispensation the leading principle is Grace, or rather Grace Explicit. Universal reconciliation re-

vealed and preached. God-in-things reconciling their real or apparent contradictions—God-in-nature, God-in-human-nature taking on Himself the penalties of our inevitable weakness and our guilt, and rolling away from earth the fact and feeling of estrangement. This universal Grace being, like Providence, to be specialized by the individual conscience, and the sense of it sustained and nurtured by suitable associations. This is the business of the Christian Church. Towards it, as we have seen, she is variously endowed—

(1). With the experience of the Elder Church now completed and recorded ;—

(2). With the Pentecostal Spirit ; not only animating her ministrations, but also fulfilling the cycle of her Fundamental Facts ; and thus enabling her presently to understand her wide relationships, and to think out her doctrines into a comprehensive synthesis—and,

(3). With the seeds or elements of her own organization, liturgical, ministerial, and sacramental ; the concrete sources of her own spontaneous growth.

The Church has added to the Jewish Scriptures only one tableau—that of her own genesis and earliest life. This, however, is full and vivid, and furnishes, admittedly, the criteria and motives of religion as understood in Christendom. Yet is not the older record superseded. For, besides that Law and Ceremonial, analogous to Israel's, must always be imposed on those who need them—that is, on the non-age of nations and individuals—the Gospel's higher light illuminates the prior elements of Providence and Nature ; and enables us, on the principle of analogy or parable, to read them up into higher senses cognate with our wants. In fact the Christian is but the former life, with its essential strivings, carried up into the realms of Grace, and its former experience becomes spiritualized along with it. The elder Church, with all its worship, and war, and law, and pilgrimage, ascends with its Messiah a transfiguration-mount, and becomes a Christian allegory ; while every fact of common life admits of being made a Sacrament. Probably it is from this suggestiveness and adaptability of the older record that the

Christian Church has never felt the need, nor been supplied the means, of recording her own experience in any such compressed and authoritative documents as will bear comparison with the Jewish Scriptures. Her Gospels and Epistles describe her genesis ; and there the canon ends. She has indited some admirable liturgies ; she has wrought up, in the creeds, and round them, her abstract thought into balanced doctrine ; but this is her only literary work that possesses Catholic authority. She has laboured variously, and, with all her faults, successfully and well ; but she has not recorded it. Her literary activity as compared with Israel' has been great, in modern times immense ; but she has not compressed it, or been enabled to compress it, into authoritative Scripture.

Here, then, ends the formal Analytic of Religion ; vast in compass : profoundly just, as we have seen, and scientific in principle ; and, in execution, marvellously vivid and effective. All this we may surely say of it. It is common to believe much more of the Bible ; but we do well to understate our case, and all exaggerations are certain to mislead. In particular, we claim not for it any of that minute and iron infallibility which Protestantism is apt to set up as a counter-idol to the infallibility of the Church. Whether or no, such a gift, if we had it in either, would be useful to mankind, it is certain that we have it not. We must be content in each with a better infallibility—that profound and living truthfulness upon the whole, which enables each to do its work ; and to do it, I am convinced, not the less effectively upon the whole, because of those palpable defects which forbid our giving to either an otiose assent, and force us up to “wrestle” with its spirit. Nor may we again, as is often done, exaggerate the range of the Bible, as if it were man’s “sole source” of religious, or high religious light. No claim could be more contrary to its letter or its spirit ; and, on the face of history, it is palpably absurd. Nay, we have just seen that men lived and died “in faith” for one or two whole dispensations before there was a “Church ;” and that the Church lived and worked for many a century before she wrote her Bible. And the number of those whom it can directly reach, even in modern

Christendom, is but a small fraction of the whole. The Bible belongs to literature. It is God's witness and apostle in the world of letters, the patriarch and prophet of the books. Only those, then, who come within the range of letters, and derive their tenets independently from books, can claim to be directly Scripture-led. All the rest must derive their enlightenment from nearer and larger means. Comparing our three Instruments—Faith, or the personal sense of the Unseen, is the light of the individual; and must interpret for him alike Nature, and Providence, and Grace. The Church, the organic Church, is the light of the social World, the city set upon a hill. And the Bible, recording her essential facts, her costly experience, and her central inspirations, is, and I suppose always will be, the leading illumination of the Church.

It remains that we glance at Religion's Synthesis. Our Lord virtually prescribed the form of this when he prescribed the baptismal formula. For, it were impossible that men could be baptized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, without inquiring into the meaning of these words: What are these three Divine Persons? what is their relation to one another, to us, and to things in general? Addressing itself in this form to the Grecian mind, and in this form converting it, Christianity sowed its doctrinal seed in a soil at once prolific and prepared. For centuries had such questions exercised its thought, not without a straining and bewilderment which now were destined to find repose. Offended at first by the *concreteness* of Christianity, it presently recognized in this very feature the foundation itself had lost, the solid ground it had ambitiously abandoned. Wiser, therefore, now, and at once more humble and more lofty, it proceeded to think and question upon *this* basis; and, in the course of three or four centuries, developed the baptismal formula into the creeds, and the creeds into the balanced system which has hitherto satisfied the Church. This system passed down through the middle ages, or the winter of the Church, simply upon authority; and, by the multitude, it is so accepted still: vaguely bound up in popular esteem with the canon of Revelation, and partaking of its sacredness. Indeed, it is not

uncommon, even for writers who should know better, expressly to treat it so: and to claim for it, on this ground, not intelligent co-operation, but passive¹ acquiescence; not the fruitful exercise of reason, but the blind and barren receptivity of a miscalled "faith." One reminiscence of history disperses all such claims; for our doctrinal synthesis, as distinguished from what I have marked as the analytic of religion, was simply a construction of the reason; and the only inspiration it can claim is that living and most real inspiration which gradually, and amid multifarious questionings, developed it from Scripture.

How will it meet the still more varied, if not more keen and practised questionings of the modern world? On this I have already expressed my conviction. For justifying it, I believe it will be only requisite to translate our synthesis out of the language of express theology into that of the fresh and independent speculation, which, though young as yet and tentative, happily characterises our times—resting generally on physical inquiry, and reverently searching, as far as it can, into all the works of God. This I shall attempt: having first reminded you of a truism which is not yet so familiar to modern as it was to ancient thought. To inquire abstractedly into the nature of God, into the nature of things, or into the nature of man, is virtually the same inquiry. We know, and can know, nothing of either God or things, except by their correlatives within us. So far as these correlatives go, we are truly in communion with, and truly *know* them both; that is, in the same sense that we know ourselves. And beyond these correlatives, or beyond this kind of knowledge, not even Revelation could inform us in the least. God's nature, no doubt, transcends ours at every point; that is, rises above it, and goes beyond it *ad infinitum*; and He has, no doubt, innumerable attributes of which we have no correlatives, and, therefore, no idea. Therefore, and so far, God is, was, and ever will be, to all things, The Unknown. In the same sense, also, are things unknown to us; and, doubtless, to each other; either things in their totality, or even those things which come within our ken, in the infinitely major part of their qualities and relations.

¹ See Note A, towards the end.

But so far as our own poor nature does go, on either side of us, so far we do truly partake the nature and the fulness both of God and things, and may truly know both God and things—that is, things in themselves;—in the same sense, again, as we may know ourselves, or *anything about ourselves*—and more certain or more real knowledge than this what creature could aspire to?

You may have observed, then, that in describing Nature, I adopted a division of things which lies upon the surface, and is, surely, no less essential than obvious. I spoke of things in their “substance,” and in their “powers.” Now, despite the various philosophic schools, we venture to affirm the existence and reality of *each* of these; for *we* have substance and we have powers; and, if we could be mistaken in this, we may be mistaken in anything. We affirm their existence, but not their separate, or their separable, existence. On the contrary, so far as we know, they are never separate, and we have no reason to think them separable. We know no substance which does not possess some force; we know no force which does not act by and on the basis of some substance; and we have no reason to believe that any such exists. These two, then, *coexist*; so far as we know they are coessential; wherever one is, there is the other also. And there is a third coessential behind them both; for these two do not exhaust anything we know, much less the higher things. Wherever there is force, there is also “direction;” and no analysis, mental or otherwise, will ever resolve direction into force, or force into direction, or either of them into substance. There are, then, *three* coexistences or coessentials even in the humblest thing we know. The stone, the mineral, the dust, the gas; each has its substance; has some force or forces: gravity and heat, for instance; and these forces act in certain directions, and subject to certain relations and abiding laws, which are as essential and inevitable as themselves. Did we take some higher thing, a plant for instance, or an animal, we should find in each not merely substance, but several correlated substances; not merely force, but several correlated forces or “living powers;” and these not merely subject to directions, but gathering themselves into an individuality; making for themselves an organic

centre, round which those laws or directions tell, and whence the most distinctive of them emanate. In ourselves these three co-essentials are quite explicit. We have, first and lowest, our body, or what is commonly called our "person:" a substance, or an organized combination of substances, on the basis of which we live, and by, or by means of, which we act. And when we are "unclothed" of this material body we expect to be "clothed upon" with our spiritual body, some vastly more elastic and powerful organization of more ethereal substance, as the basis of our future life. We have next our series of correlated powers, physical, organic, and reflective; with which, or rather with some of which, philosophers are apt to identify our self, or *ego*, our personality, or our personal identity—not wisely, for these, though truly a part of ourselves, and a far higher and more commanding part than our body, are yet still more variable and vulnerable than it. And behind these two variable selves, or persons of our self, or coessentials of our total personality, we have also our ultimate directing self, of which we gradually become conscious as our highest and our final self; by virtue of which we can become a law unto ourselves, and by which we understand and feel ourselves in communion with The All-pervading Law and Order and Unchanging Will, whether we describe these last religiously or not.

All this, I think, would be regarded as truism, were it not for the opposite blunders of philosophic schools, which, starting each from insufficient data, and provoking reactions by vain attempts to resolve the facts into too few elements, have denied each of them in turn, and involved themselves in unspeakable absurdities. The tendency of our time is to dismiss these latter and reaffirm the facts. There may be *more* than the three elements I have distinguished; but if so, I believe they do not come within our ken; for into these three all that we know of self or things can, I think, distinctly be resolved. These three, however, we can and must discriminate; and it is because we are clearly conscious of them in ourselves that we notice their rudiments in things below us, and that we ascribe their perfection, along with all other perfections known or unknown, to Him

in whom we live. As we proceed to generalize, we soon fall into the theologic language. Under the category Substance we include, of course, all substances, material or immaterial, organized or inorganic; all the embodying, instrumental, mediating, and expressing or *manifesting* elements of things. Under Force, every active, motive, energetic, causative, *vital* principle or power, physical or organic. And under Direction, all the *regulative* principles of things, physical, physiologic, instinctive, intellectual, moral, or religious. Thus, on this system, our bodies *are* part of ourselves, and coessential with our other parts. Our body is, in fact, *our manifesting self*: that by which alone we can express ourselves, whether verbally or otherwise; it is also our *mediating self*: our sole medium of communication with external things; it is also our *instrumental self*, or that *by which* we make or do anything whatever, even, as it appears, reflect or think. The analogy, then, between its attributes and The Attributes of the Second Person of the Trinity, God-manifest, or God-the-Word, is obvious. And it is, in fact, by it that we form part of the organic Church, "the Body of Christ, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all;" more generally it is by it that we partake of His nature, and are in communion with Him, "in whom all things consist." Our living powers, again, or our vital, mental, *spiritual self*, are our communion with the Holy Ghost, or God-exertive or creative—our express Christian life with that diffused at Pentecost; our humbler powers with His less special influences, down to those which move our limbs, or which fashioned them "yet being imperfect,"—as He moveth all things that move, and giveth life to all that live. And these two parts of ourselves are in change incessantly. Each is an infinite series of correlated variations; neither is precisely as it was in any two moments of its history. Our *directive self*, however, behind them both, is, at least in some of its attributes, absolutely unchanged and one. It is the centre of our individuality and identity; and all the variations of the other two do but develope and display the ultimate attributes or character of this implicit unity. By virtue of it, therefore, we image and understand, and by it, doubtless, we are in communion with, that Ultimate Unchangeable, whose Character only

the totality of things could make explicit—the Uncaused Cause, Unmoved Mover, Uncapricious All-regulating Will; whom His Eternal Word or Son, and His Eternal Spirit do but unfold in history—the Eternal Now, whose Implicit Attributes they embody and express; render them articulate in things, operative, successive, perceptible, intelligible, communicative, and directive.

“We believe in God; and that God is, at least, a Trinity like ourselves;—explicitly, we believe in God-manifest: in God-exertive: and in God the Origin and Will and Living Law: and that these Three are One;”—this is the substance of the abstract creeds translated into modern language. Our exposition may not be very accurate, but the doctrine itself is obviously rational and attractive, nay, necessary for the solution of the multifarious questionings out of which in fact it has arisen. I, for one, believe it to be the only solid philosophy¹ on earth: that all other systems, when tested in reason’s court, are true so far as they agree with it; false, so far as they dissent. Some so-called systems do indeed make themselves easy and clear with-

¹ The prime questions are two:—(1) are *three* coessentials too many; can any one of them be resolved into the others? And (2) are they too few; is all that we know resolvable into them? To answer is “to discuss the Categories,” and in fact to construct a metaphysical system. But I must say a few words, and will make them as clear as I can.

1. *a.* The fundamental Attribute of Substance is Extension; or, if Bain and Boscovich prefer it, coexisting or simultaneous points. Space is *mere* Extension; the actual points and their positions being regarded as little as possible. Figure and Form are Extension + Directions; the directions alone being sometimes contemplated, as often in geometry. Magnitude and Quantity are Extension limited [i. e. directed, regulated] in one or more dimensions. While Number contemplates the individual points *successively*, and so connects them still more markedly with the other categories.

b. The word *phenomenal* belongs most properly to this category; for, though Force and Direction can be “felt,” i. e. in the inner Consciousness, they can neither be *seen* nor *shown*, except in their combination with Substance. *There*, however, they can be perceived directly, as in Shape and Movement, by the eye; Extension renders them phenomenal or manifest.

c. Substances are either *material*, i. e. which affect our senses; or *immaterial*, which do not. And *each* is subdivided into inorganic and organic, according to the amount of directed power it holds in combination. Inorganic matter, so far as it is known to us, may exist in three states—solid, liquid, gaseous, according to the amount of heat, i. e. molecular expansive power, with which it is combined.

Possibly, or probably, if any matter were *saturated* with heat, it would become im-

out it; but it is simply by omitting the questions to be solved. And it would be easy to point out the entanglements of others,

material, and be ethereal or empyrean substance, not sensible of gravity, but intensely sensitive to compression, so that any particle on being agitated would become a centre of undulations propagated to extreme distances with extreme rapidity. Such a substance is imagined, to convey the luminous vibrations through interplanetary space. On the other hand, the withdrawal of some heat from such an "ether" would probably freeze part of it into a gas, and so be the first stage of *material* Creation. The heat could be permanently withdrawn by compressing it into light, which, or part of which, could be again transmuted into higher kinds of force, and carry on the creative process: which process seems to be, on the whole, the endowing certain "called and constituted" elements with successively higher forms of educated force. And it is a plausible hypothesis that such elements, if saturated with higher force, such as emotion, affection, faith, under suitable conditions, might be etherealized or immaterialized in higher and *organic* forms. And such seems to be the common notion of a Spirit or Spiritual Body. We have no means of verifying such hypotheses regarding the immaterial; and one only thinks them out a little in order to define one's own conceptions.

2. *a.* The fundamental attribute of Force is Action, exertion, operation, [efficient] Causation; and its humblest physical *effect* is Motion. Motion combined with mass is Momentum; where the motion is restrained, we have reaction and Resistance. Succession is varied movement. Time is succession refined, by omitting as far as possible the successive events or moving elements; while Number relates to the elements themselves in any, yet *some*, order. Quality, or kind of force, is force defined and specialized. Mode and State are quality still farther regulated—as it were force under Law in more than one dimension.

b. The word *dynamical* answers best in this category to *phenomenal* in the former, and *regulative* in the third. "Vital," approaching to *ζωοποιός*, and Psychical, or animal, in Aristotle's large sense of Soul, or that of the Stoical *anima mundi*, express rather its upper regions than its humbler *vires vivae*. Aristotle, indeed, omits this category in his prime division into Matter and Form; but presently re-introduces or supposes it, in their union or application, under the names *δύναμις*, *ἐνέργεια*, *ἐντελέχεια*, &c. It appears among his ten categories as *ποιεῖν*, *πάσχειν*, and, in combination with law, as Mode, or state, active or passive Habit, in *ἔχειν*, *κείσθαι*. Kant's expression *noumenal* applies more fitly to the next category.

c. All the forces, I believe, from the humblest mechanical up to emotion or affection, can be generated from each other, by compression, direction, education, &c., and are in fact so generated, throughout Creation's scale—see notes pp. 128, 201, 243, &c., not forgetting "the law of Ambition" as there referred to.

3. *a.* The best general name for the third category is Law; its humblest physical application being Direction. Relation [answering in this category to Quality in the second and Quantity in the first] is a fragment of a law; like a line drawn between two points. Attribute, again, is a fragment of relation; one aspect viewed without *express* regard to any other, [all *are* correlated in fact]. In Position, Situation, and Occasion, *ποῦ*, *πότε*, the individual point is prominent, with a half tacit reference to its surroundings. Number regards the points or positions in any order; while Order is

which either "divide" things off from the Deity, in whom they "have their being:" dissevering the phenomenal from the real,

the regulation itself; and Proportion denominates a sufficient portion of the series to indicate its law.

b. The upper regions of this category are described by Will, or consciousness of innate or imposed directions. Instinct is unconscious conformity to organic law. Our own Will, our conscious self-direction, is not our highest faculty, unless when it is willingly in conformity with the discerned Eternal Will or Total Direction of things. As distinguished from appetites, desires, wishes, emotions, passions, affections, which are all, in the main, kinds of force and belong to the second category, the Will is not a force, but is the self-conscious regulation of force; and its humblest analogue seems to be the process of crystallization, wherein the powers of a substance "set" and fix its elements in definite directions round axes and a centre. I have noted, in p. 123, that Electricity, Magnetism, Galvanism, and probably other higher so-called powers, not yet discriminated, seem to belong to the category Direction [i. e. of force elsewhere evolved] rather than to that of Force itself.

A number of verbal definitions like the above ought perhaps to come at the end rather than the beginning of a metaphysical discussion; and each reader will dispute more or fewer of them according to the connotation he may previously have attributed to each expression. But he who will either consider these, or who will take the trouble of drawing out a similar or antagonistic scheme himself, will, I think, soon become persuaded that *three* are not too many, and are not too few—that the main statements of the text are, therefore, just. They all appear in Aristotle's *ten*, but in a different order, and not well analysed. Kant's categories are not classifications of things, but analyses of thought. Mill's enumeration, "attempted under happier auspices," is perhaps the most feeble and defective presented by any first class writer.

The categories are a "theory of being," i. e. an orderly statement of its leading facts. There should be added to it some "theory of knowing." The usual and fatal blunder of such theories is to confine "knowledge" to "reflex knowledge," as is quite explicit in Hamilton and Mansel, and in nearly all the Germans from the Cartesian commencement in *Cogito, ergo sum*. Those who build on it or its analogues in the sense of *SUM QUA COGITO*, obviously make the farther blunder of confounding knowing with being, and need soon a "wonderful revelation" to supplement their system. The carelessness of Locke's language, surprising in so just a thinker, has done much to sustain the first-named error. With him "ideas" are not only (1) concepts, and (2) percepts; but also (3) sensations; and (4) very often [though he distinguishes them in the beginning, and very often observes his distinction], the sensible qualities of things which give us those sensations. Then he defines "knowledge," quite differently from what one would expect from his method or system, "the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas," i. e. with one another;—instead of their agreement (1) with things [direct], or (2) with each other [reflex]. His definition obviously includes only reflex knowledge, and omits, on his own definitions—(1) "sensitive knowledge;" (2) the most important parts of "intuitive knowledge," that of our own existence, for example; and (3) all "real knowledge," or at least the proof or perception of its reality. We cannot wonder that he should have begotten, therefore, though quite in opposition

and presently denying both; or which on the other hand omit from Deity God-manifest or God-exertive with all the partial-

to the spirit and the body of his system—1. Berkeley; 2. Hume; 3. (through Hume) Kant and the later Germans; whence the now established error comes back to us.

A just system would retrace his method with greater care. For, obviously, we grow up from below, and our knowing comes later than our being. All the terms of our knowledge also grow up from below, and had at first a physical sense. Knowledge itself (*gnō-sco*, γινώσκω, γνός-ω, *kennen*. *kno-w* is but a verbal form of the preposition *ξυν*, *con*, cf. *συνιημι*, and expressed physical conjunction or communion, *κοινωνία*, *κοινός*, *ξυνός*, a meaning it has not yet completely lost. Similarly, *video* grew into *εἰδῶ*, *oida*, *wissen*, *wit*; *sehen*, *see*, into *schauen*, *scio*; *φρένες*, *renes*, ascended from the diaphragm to the regions of phrenology; *res* itself is idealized into *reor*; and *thing* itself into *think* and *thank*. But whatever the words, the fact is that pure *physical knowledge* comes first, and *continues always* to be the largest portion of our prime intelligence, which consists in the conscious or unconscious operation of our senses on their correlated objects. After this, and above it, but still involuntary, comes a class of knowledge that may fairly be called *instinctive*; bringing in a considerable amount of intellect, the operation of which, however, we notice as little, and are as incapable of modifying or arresting, as if it were the action of the heart; as little as a hawk or greyhound notices the mathematical skill with which it pursues its prey, or the "fine art" with which it "murders it;" as little as a bee or bird of passage speculates on its own miraculous capacity of directing its homeward flight. After these, and mixing with them, comes in fine, with most men a very small amount, with others a considerable amount, of the *reflex knowledge* which "not only knows but also knows that it knows," and the "object" of which is not things but thought.

The first of these is common to us with the brutes, and constitutes, as yet, the bulk of human knowledge. The second is also common to us with the brutes, and seems to consist in an unconscious, yet highly sensitive, obedience to the regulative principles of things; like that which points the sun-flower "to its god," or the loadstone to the magnetic pole. In some particulars of it, brutes excel us, and so do savages; but ours occupies a far wider and more varied range. The last only is peculiar to men, or to reflective men: our high reverence, however, and aspiration for it, almost seem an implicit prophecy of our futurity. Query? Is this what is being "formed within us?" Is this our future self *ἐν ἐμβρύῳ*?

It is, of course, our highest knowledge, and is kept, I do not say in check, but in work and gear, by the director and more prosaic faculties which constitute its base; though often, like Newton's kite, it would fain fly without a string. This, however, must be conceded to it, that it contains a whole world, subject and object, within itself. And if we be *assumed* to be incapable, upon the whole, of deciding whether we are dreaming or not, it might readily persuade us that there is nothing existing except itself,—that being and reflex knowing are identical. The opposite *assumption*, however, is generally preferred; and I *emphasize* the word in *each* case in order to make explicit what is, perhaps, worth stating here—that obviously we must take both our existence and its correlatives on trust; we live by faith in finite and in infinite, and the distinctest

ness and successiveness which, as seen in parts, these obviously imply; or which again "confound" the latter with the Ultimate

demonstration, or vividest intuition is reducible to such common-place axiom or postulate in the last resort.

These different kinds of knowledge are not sufficiently discriminated, and hence the confusions of metaphysics. They centre, of course, round that ambiguous term, "Ego," or "we." Let us, for once, mark "its" different senses by a special notation. Writing (1) in common letters the common Ego or we, [i. e. including the body]; (2) *in italics*, the Ego or *we* of Reid, Butler, Plato, [i. e. excluding the body]; and, (3) in CAPITALS, the Ego or WE of Hamilton, Mansel, and Bain, [i. e. merely that reflex consciousness which not only knows but at the same time knows that it knows—the Hamiltonian mind is capable of six simultaneous operations];—then the outline of a complete theory of knowing will go into three propositions:—

- (1). We know external things immediately.
- (2). *We* know them only by the medium of *our* bodies.
- (3). WE do not know them at all, but only imagine or conceive them; WE live in a world of our own, conversant only with our own ideas.

The essence of metaphysics is that it shall state the constituent elements both of knowing and being *consistently*; omitting nothing, and regarding any contradiction as a proof of error. That it is easy to fall into error is obvious from its multiplied disputes. These my text ascribes, in the main, to the attempt to resolve the facts into too few co-essential elements. And an instructive classification of philosophic schools would be to note which of the three elements received undue prominence, to the disparagement or omission of the others.

Thus the first Greek schools, the *physiologists* or *hylicists*, like our own Baconism, rested too exclusively on Substance; omitting law, and the higher forms of force, or leaving these, perhaps, to be supplied by the popular religion. In their ἀρχή, however they supposed, at least, lower force; and they gradually sublimed their ὕλη [water, air, the infinite expanse], until in the Atomists they approach our material idealists, Leibnitz, Hobbes, Herbart, Boscovich. While Heraclitus strove to build almost exclusively on Force; all with him is movement, flux, incessant change. He is the oldest progenitor of Mr. Bain.

The Pythagoreans were a natural reaction; insisting on Law, harmony, relation, number, and disparaging the other two; so their positions were very quickly developed by the Eleatics into antithesis, negation, nihilism. The Socratic questioning obliged all the schools to begin again, and to turn themselves to Ethics. Whereupon Epicurus developed Atomism as the basis of atheistic quietism; Plato projected the Pythagorean proportions into an imposing Idealism, which his Academy soon developed, after the pattern of Elea. While Aristotle and the Stoics made a creditable approach to the Christian theory and practice; their chief defect being, along with all Greek schools, their disparagement of emotion, affection [higher force], which, Comte-like, they regarded as "perturbation."

Christianity had barely completed her synthesis by the aid of all these schools, not forgetting Neo-Platonism, when the success of the barbarians forced her almost exclusive attention to practical affairs. What little of abstract thought she could indulge in

Unchangeable—that is, who either “divide the Substance,” or “confound the Persons,” or deny some one or more of them. But

rejected Platonism, and adopted the Aristotelian form. At least in the West; Eastern Christians found dualism more congenial to their circumstances, and allowed ideal worlds to console them for indolent submission to “evil.” On the fall of Constantinople, they brought Platonism with them into modern Europe; and by their inroad on authority, as well as by their culture, contributed largely to the new development of thought; influencing chiefly the Protestantized communities, and through them “the scientific world.”

Des Cartes begins modern philosophy, as we have noticed, from the side of reflex knowledge; attaching, as a mathematician, large importance to Law, but leaving no just connexion with the phenomenal. Spinoza carries this to its extreme. He admits substance and law, [under the name of mode], both pervading; but omitting force, and with it common substance, there is nothing left but an unliving fatalism. Locke founds the just school of natural growth, disfigured, as we have seen, by careless language. The useful Scottish school follows him with more precision of term and method, but bewildered by an idealist axiom adopted from terror of materialism. While Berkeley builds a brilliant evanescence on the pure idea; and the Germans have transcended Elea and the Academies by the development of analogous principles.

In Note A, and foot-notes, pp. 98, 210, 354, I have sufficiently criticised our semi-idealists; and I fear I must say some equally hard things of the natural or growth School, with which I have much nearer sympathy. But they *will* insist on having too few elements. Let us take for example the three ablest of them, Brown, Bain, and Mill. Brown following, but exceeding Hume, tries to admit nothing but substance; Bain will allow nothing except force; and Mr. Mill is liberal enough to try and agree with *both*.

Brown's axiom is that “nothing exists in nature except the substances of nature;” reckoning among those substances, however, God and mind, or rather minds. And he is specially anxious to exclude from real existence the category Force—with power, cause, effect, quality, property, and all other “synonyms of power,” as he admits or insists these are. Indeed his abolition of Cause, transcending Hume, is his prime philosophic exploit. He thinks he has relieved philosophy of a superstition, or of one of Comte's metaphysical entities, in removing it. He is, indeed, the father of Comte's thought, who, unlike other Brownists, actually denies himself the use of the word “Cause”; with consistent inconsistency, as Mill remarks, for he cannot and does not deny himself the use of its various synonyms.

How should we test any such “paradox of simplicity?” One mode is that suggested by Comte's endeavour, to insist that its author shall be always consistent with it; shall not allow himself, in his common language, or at least, in his *argument*, to assume the opposite. And tried by this test, Dr. Brown's is a signal failure. Not only does his common language avowedly ignore it, but not a statement could be found, even of his axiom or main argument, which does not assume or assert its opposite.

E. g. [Cause and Effect, p. 69].—“The *substances* that exist in nature are surely *every thing* that has a real existence in Nature [the italics are *his*], for they comprehend the Omnipotent himself and all his *living* and inanimate creatures.” The last italics are mine; for what does *he* know of the difference between living and inanimate

indeed most systems do profess to accept our tenet, though in various senses; and the historian's taunt is that the whole doctrine

creatures, if the "substances" be "everything" that exist in nature? Or earlier, p. 16 :— "The powers, properties, or qualities of a substance, then, are not to be regarded as anything superadded to the substance, or distinct from it. They are only the substance itself, considered in *relation* to various *changes* [the italics are mine; how does he know anything of either *changes* or *relation*?] that take place when it exists in peculiar (!) circumstances. An abstract general term is of great use; because without it it would be necessary to enumerate all the substances in which changes take place on the introduction of the particular substance of which we speak. But it is of use only as other general terms are of use—such as Man, Quadruped, Animal—not because it denotes any new substance, or *new quality* distinct from the particular substances or *qualities* already known and named, which it comprehends and briefly expresses, but because it does thus comprehend and briefly express them. We might convey the same information by enumerating all the individual objects comprehended in a general term, &c.," but this would be "insupportably tedious" and inconvenient. That is, because it is convenient to use the terms Man, Quadruped, Animal, for the various *existing* men, quadrupeds, and animals; *argal*, we may use "powers, properties, qualities," for all the *non-existent* powers, properties, and qualities in nature! So, by virtue of this well-justified permission, Brown talks with eminent vigour and freshness of qualities, forces, actions, operations, exertions, suggestions, and all kinds of mental and physical activities; in fact, no philosopher has a more just and natural, i. e. a more *dynamical* non-system of the universe.

Nor one more under *Law*. In fact his analysis of Causation itself is that it consists in Order. It is [not substances, as the axiom requires; but] invariabilities of antecedence and consequence in the series of—what? Why, first he tries to say substances, or substances in such and such "states" [as if states were not, or did not involve, qualities and regulated qualities]; but presently it is of "events" or "facts," which he vainly tries to identify with "objects"; and at last it is merely of changes, actions, operations, proceedings; just as any one would say who had never heard of Brown's theory of Causation.

The same re-assumption of the omitted elements appears when he argues loosely or closely on any matter. I take an example or two on topics illustrative of our proper subject. *a.* He resolves the evidence for an External World into *outness* and *resistance*. Outness is legitimate to him, for he allows "substances," which, as external to each other, even if not external to us, would, as Hamilton perceives and Bain bootlessly disputes, imply, mentally at least, extension. But where does Brown obtain *resistance*, which is precisely that form of force which cannot, even in appearance, be resolved into succession, series, event, or even into relation?

b. He replies to Hume's famous objection to miracles, that there is no violation, suspension, or interference with the laws of Nature, i. e. with the law of invariable antecedents and consequents; for God is a new, i. e., an intercalated, antecedent in the series, from which the miraculous consequent naturally follows. God "is the greatest of all the Powers of Nature; but He is still one of the powers of Nature, as much as any other power whose hourly or momentary operation is most familiar to us," *ib.* p. 405, and why should not He produce effects as well as any other power? Why not indeed; at least if there

was derived from Plato, with the significant exception of the Incarnation, which violates Plato's antipathy to matter. Something like

be any "powers" in nature or above it, or any "operation" possible? Or shall we read it thus, that God is not only the Universal Power, i. e. the universal substance *a la* Spinoza, but also one of the minor substances in Nature's series, intercalated or connected with the rest by the law of invariable antecedence and consequence? I shall not pursue the illustration.

c. Or, take another common-place. Reid having replied to Hume that, on his definition of Causation, day must be the cause of night and night the cause of day, "for no succession is more invariable;"—Brown rejoins to this "strange objection," p. 301, (1) popularly, that "the words" day and night denote not two particular phenomena, but a long series of phenomena, "namely, the various degrees of darkness and light, with some of the chief changes of appearances in the heavenly bodies;"—which Reid, I suppose, would fancy only multiplied the paradox; for it will now stand that each shade of light "causes" the next succeeding brighter shade, i. e. from midnight to midday, and the next succeeding darker shade, i. e. from midday to midnight;—And (2) more scientifically, that "it is the relative motions of sun and earth which cause day and night." Precisely; so *we* thought; but how does *he* know anything about "motions" or "revolutions"? Are *they* substances, as well as the miraculous events and their antecedents? "There is no one who doubts that the rising of the sun is the cause of the light which follows it, and that its setting is the cause of the subsequent darkness." No one indeed! and his "rising," not merely as an inert and powerless, but as an eminently powerful "substance," and specially famous for his signal illuminating power, since before the times of Moses.

Similar things could be quoted abundantly from Mr. Mill, who, professedly, follows Brown both in his system and in his latitude of language;—both remarkable in (1) a joggian, and (2) a writer who prides himself, and justly, on the extremely dynamical view he takes of social questions and of things in general. It is pertinent to the questions before us to notice that having first distinguished, like Locke, between sensible qualities and sensations, he then, far more than Locke, forgets the distinction, and identifies the former with the latter; also that, like Brown, he tries to identify "action," with "the presence of a mind"; as if this could help them anything. How could mind have "power," any more than body; or cause, action, motion, or anything of the kind, if there be, in Nature, no power existing? But he does add something (?) to Brown's theory of Causation. The antecedent must be not only immediate and invariable, as with Brown, but also "unconditional," *Log.* p. 409; and the *unconditionality* is this, "so long as the present constitution of things endures"! "We do not believe that night will be followed by day, under any imaginable circumstances, but only that it will be so, *provided* the sun rises above the horizon," and of course, with his present powers. The italics are his. Very good; I hope the Brownists will remember this important "condition;" lest it be imagined that they are describing the states and substances of the Millennium. And I will only note in fine, that Condition, Invariability, Order, Antecedence, Consequence, &c., are all Relations, and belong not to the category Substance, nor to the category Force, but to the category Law.

I suppose it is his sympathy with the positive and dynamical which leads Mr. Mill,

it, or rather like the ideal shadow of it, may indeed be read in Plato, or read into him; but it is just this exception or omission

without having repudiated Brown, to attach himself to Mr. Bain, at whose system we must glance. One is really surprised, in reading his excellent and instructive books, to come upon the scheme of metaphysics which he tries to shove under them, as if it were their basis, whereas it is only a startling or whimsical disfigurement. It is, in fact, Berkeley denuded of his ideas; a sheer sensationalism, striving to acknowledge *nothing* except sensations or other "states of mind." Our life consists of (1) object-consciousness, and (2) subject-consciousness, and these are *both* forms of self; and beyond this there is no real existence whatever; nay, to affirm such were a self-contradiction.

For instance; he introduces and solves the question of the external world, thus:—

"May not waking thought be itself a dream? On this question, more generally interesting than perhaps any other in our subject, the following remarks are submitted. There is no possible knowledge of a world except in reference to our minds. Knowledge means a state of mind; the notion of material things is a mental fact. We are incapable of even discussing the existence of an independent natural world; the very act is a contradiction." *Senses and Int.*, p. 375.

"We seem to have no better way of assuring ourselves and all mankind that with the conscious movement of opening the eyes there will always be a consciousness of light, than by saying that the light exists as an independent fact, with or without any eyes to see it. But if we consider the case fairly, we shall see that this assertion errs not simply in being beyond any evidence that we can have, but also in being a self-contradiction. We are affirming that to have an existence out of consciousness which we cannot know but as in consciousness. In words, we assert independent existence, while in the very act of doing so, we contradict ourselves." *Ib.* p. 381.

Or, in the language of his introductory query, (1) our waking thoughts *are* only [a kind of] dreaming; (2) we can perceive this; and perceive that (3) to assert the opposite is self-contradictory! He offers no proof of this amusing paradox. It is axiomatic to him; and a marvel of simplification. It abolishes all "ideas" or "forms," Berkeleyan, Scholastic, or Platonic, and a vast multitude of other difficulties. If one could only be consistent with it, it would save a world of trouble. But I am afraid that this is beyond the humour even of Mr. Bain. The "self-contradiction" is one in which not only all the vulgar and *all* the philosophers have *always* indulged, including himself habitually, but even himself in the very act of exposing it! Let the reader observe, "Waking thought . . . a dream!" Why do *you* imagine any difference between them? Material "things," and "an independent material world"! Why dream of such a thing, if the very thought be self-contradictory? "We seem to have no better way of assuring ourselves *and all mankind!*" What do you know of all mankind? The most momentary admission of such entities disperses the visions of Kirk Alloway or the Ivory Gate. Let us go on a little with the context to see the naïveté of paradox in exhibiting self-contradiction. "Even a possible world implies a possible mind to perceive it [he should say to create it, as a state of mind; otherwise it were a self-contradiction to perceive it], just as much as an actual world (!) implies an actual mind [for the same self-contradiction]. The mistake of the common modes of expression in this matter is the mistake of supposing the abstractions of the mind to

which renders his whole doctrine a delusion and an antagonist, or, as St. John describes it, "antichrist;" and which reduces to

have a separate and independent existence. This is the doctrine of the Platonic 'ideas,' or 'forms,' which are understood to impart all that is common to the particular facts or realities (!), instead of being derived from them (!) by an operation of the mind. Thus the actual circles of nature (!) derive their mathematical properties from the pre-existing idea, or circle in the abstract; the actual men (!) owe their sameness to the ideal man!" This is his most careful attempt to state his own system; and one must bear that system distinctly in mind to see its self-consistency. Plato believed in *both* common things *and* in a pre-existent idea of each: the former the object of the senses, the latter of scientific knowledge. Berkeley resolved the former into the latter, still believing in their permanence: when not the objects of finite minds, they were still the objects of the divine mind. Mr. Bain's analysis formally dismisses *both*, and the above is his most grave attempt to state his thesis.

Or take his last defence of it (3rd edition, note, p. 679): "I deny the ultimate nature of all three notions, 'external,' 'independent,' and 'reality.' Every one of them admits of being explained, analysed, or resolved into other notions. The idea of externality, as applied to the *object-world* [the italics are mine], is a figurative employment of the notion that we obtain in our *experience of extended things*. We see an extended object—as a field with some cattle grazing in its enclosure, and others grazing without—and by comparing all such experiences we obtain the idea of externality which we apply to the object-world, as compared with the subject-world." Again, p. 681, "To the reasons given against the adequacy of the analysis, I am bound to furnish a reply. *When I walk down an avenue of trees* the import of what happens to me is contained in these four particulars: I am putting forth muscular energy; my sensations of sight are changed in accordance with my muscular energies; the sensations of my other senses arise in the same uniform connexion with my energies; and, lastly, *all other beings are affected in the same way as myself*." Precisely; this is what common people think, and think good evidence of the real existence of "all other beings," "trees," "fields," "grazing cattle," "and all such *experience of extended things*;" whereas, Mr. Bain's second sight discerns it to be proof, for it is the only proof he gives, that the very idea of such "things" is self-contradicting.

To amuse my younger readers, I will put both the paradox and its proof into Locke's language, and leave it to their ingenuity. An idea is "the object of the mind in thought; *ergo*, we can think only of ideas;" or, in Brown's and Bain's language, "knowledge is a state of mind; *ergo*, so is its object."

Mr. Bain also, quite unexpectedly, maintains the Berkeleyan theory of vision,—that we do not directly see distance, extension, or externality; and fortifies it with further arguments and his own peculiar naïveté. The reason it is objected to is, he thinks, that "in particular two leading circumstances are left out of the account," of which he thus states the second. "The second fact overlooked is the remarkable delicacy of the appreciation of changes of *retinal magnitude*, which, for all changes of place, are great and conspicuous. This particular sensibility ranks, in point of acuteness and discrimination, *the first of all human sensibilities*. It is a combination of our two most sensitive organs—the retina and the ocular group of muscles. Whenever we desire to obtain a

visionary and misleading mists the systems of all his followers. If matter can exist independently of God, or if He be not in

delicate measurement of any quality we transform it into visible magnitude, as in the balance and the thermometer," p. 370. [The italics are his.] Now what is this? The eye *is* supremely sensitive to "retinal magnitude," and yet does *not* perceive extension, distance, or externality! Surely here is a profound antithesis. What is *magnitude*? Take it even in only one dimension or direction, and obviously it implies all three. From any one point to any other of the magnitude is distance or linear extension; to vary, even mentally, the direction of this line gives all other dimensions; and any two points give externality, for they are, at least, external to each other. If the eye perceive retinal magnitude it has, *ipso facto*, abolished the Berkeleian difficulties, and made natural metaphysics all plain sailing. And it does so. Indeed it is amazing that any one could know the structure and action of the eye, as Mr. Bain does and Bishop Berkeley did not, without discerning that it is directly correlated with all the prime attributes of external things, with all the categories, in fact, and, *if sensitive at all*, must "perceive" them. It is sensitive to light and colour, admittedly; but this is only the stimulating force: observe now its perceptions:—(1) Its retina, an extension or surface of fine nerve points, is correlated with the corresponding simultaneous points of its "field of view," and so, if sensitive, sees extension; just as the organs of touch, in feeling simultaneous points, feel extension. (2) By the fine, yet powerful muscular movements, which change its own shape and directions, as in following a moving body for instance, it is correlated both with movement and with the other form of force, resistance; and, if sensitive, perceives them both. And (3) Directions it perceives almost as immediately as colour; in following, for instance, the moving body, or in tracing the outline of any figure or any part thereof. This is the common operation of the eye, and its use; and I have no doubt that from it, and *from it first*, the ideas are themselves derived. That the other senses also teach the same; and some of them some things more distinctly [as the muscular sense more distinctly resistance, but *not* so distinctly movement; touch, distinctly extension; and not any forces, but the perceived *size* of the body, the *measures* of extension], is obvious; but it is the eye's complex combination of them all, and its amazing sensitiveness [to *them*, not to itself,] which enable it to combine their affirmations, and make it "the intellectual sense" and the type of every form of "seeing."

"But we learn to see"? no doubt; and *on this basis*, not without it. The process is slower in the human infant than in other creatures; we have a great deal to learn; and a very large brain, of which the eye has only a share; and we must learn to correlate, that all may advance in harmony. But look at this green dragon-fly, or *papilio brassica*, or *muscia quercina*; it is only half a day old; and has almost no brain, or *no brain at all*, except its optic ganglia; yet catch it, if you can! You will find it has quite distinct perceptions of movement, magnitude, and distance; and is as clever in its optical regions, as yourself, of 18 or 80 years' experience. Distance or extension, *both* or *either*, are among the prime perceptions of the eye; and if we did not get them thence, we should have great difficulty in attaining them at all. They are both parts of magnitude; and whatever sees magnitude sees them.

And this brings me to the last point I shall notice in Mr. Bain. He believes in Extension, but he does not believe that it is independent, original, or prime. He thinks

matter as truly as He is in anything, there is an end both of theology and of consecutive philosophy; for, in reason's court, there is an end of God. First dualism, and then Atheism must

he can resolve it into locomotion; as if locomotion itself did not imply it. And he proves his thesis with his usual *naïveté*, by palpably assuming the opposite. "If we next attend to the sweep of the eye over the field of view (!) as required (!) by an object extended (!) laterally, we shall find, in the same manner, that this sweep gives a most distinctive consciousness, so that a longer (!) sweep can be discriminated from a smaller; but it gives no information besides [nor is any needed]. It tells of no outward thing, so far as I can make out; certainly it does not tell of extension as Real Magnitude, for this simple reason, that extension *means* a given movement of body, or of limb. If I say that a log of wood I see before me is six yards long, I *mean* that it would take a certain number of my paces to traverse *its length*," &c., p. 371. *Pari ratione*, when you say such a thing is an "inch" long, you *mean* it would take, not one breadth, but so much exertion or movement, of your thumb to compass it. When you say one "nail," you mean so much ungular activity; a "foot," so much pedestrian exercise; an "ell," so much fore-arm velocity; a yard itself, so much "putting from the shoulder;" and a "fathom," the remarkable acrobatic feat of progressing on extended arms. And it still remains to ask where you get the idea of length, breadth, or measurement at all, as distinguished from that of force exerted, which is about the most "subjective" of all sensations? Neither the above extract, nor any other in the book, gives the slightest vindication of his peculiar "meaning," beyond the assertion, or rather assumption of it, frequently repeated. Extension, we concede, is *involved* in locomotion, or in any movement; but this is because movement is itself only an *effect* of force, and depends for its very existence on the pre-existence, or, at least, the existence of extension. And all our measures of extension, as even still their names simply, are derived ultimately not from our own force or motion, but from our own "dimensions," or the amount of space we occupy.

In criticising so sharply our *best* writers, Bain, Mill, Brown; Mansel and Hamilton; Reid and Locke; no one thinks I wish to disparage the bulk of their really valuable and instructive books. I am only objecting to the paradoxes which disfigure them; make them dispute endlessly with each other; and lower all such speculations, justly, in the estimation of the world. In fact, there is still less of infallibility in "science and philosophy" than in religion and the Church; and there also, *est opinio copia inter maximas causas inopia*. Of philosophers especially it can be said with truth that *insaniunt prope omnes*, or rather, *omnes in proprietate quadam*; and, especially, each in that hobby which he is proud to ride. The natural test for these is whether men can be consistent with them or no. If even their authors cannot use them in the street, it is surely right to leave them in the nursery. I know a national schoolmaster who solemnly believes himself to be the Paraclete; he is generally most kind and rational; and it is *only* when he presses his paradox that his fellow-lunatics smile at him, or that the ward-keeper looks austere. Any one considering what I have quoted will, probably, believe with me that our modern abstract thought has not yet escaped the nursery; and that it needs all the critical and constructive help it can obtain,—including the Embodied Results of ancient speculation.

result. From this, Christianity was saved by the *concreteness* of its creed. It affirms God-manifest not merely in the totality of things, and therefore in each of them so far as it is true and typical, but specially and signally in earth's appointed Archetype, its Lord and Christ, and central Son of Man. It was round the question of the *body* of Christ, the type and exemplar of embodiment in general, that Christianity won and secured her philosophic victory; and to it Platonism as such, that is, the Platonic dualism, has always been an essential enemy. The analogous question in our day is whether or no our body is to be included in our "ego;" and those who with Plato adopt the negative must soon lose themselves in bewilderment and nihilism. The affirmative in each question is essential to construction. Unless, following Christ, we can discern that our "body is the temple of the Holy Ghost," and live accordingly, we have neither part nor lot in Christianity; and, if the same body be excluded from our ego, "we" can have no communion or communication with any "thing" whatever.

What the doctrine of the Trinity, therefore, expresses or expounds is the real or metaphysical unity of things—that substance, and force, and regulative will, are alike real and coessential, and all alike sustained by Deity. They are real in us, and real in God; and, of His fulness, we and things "partake." In their metaphysical unity is included, of course, their historic and their moral unity. Things in their totality must be supremely good; whatever evil be, it must be subservient to good, and serviceable to it; and, however great it may be in certain things, or in certain moments, it must be "productive" of greater good, and vanish in the integration. On any system, this must be, if all things be of God. But it is, of course, this moral unity which chiefly occupies the thought of revelation and religion. That God's presence in things, while causing, also outcomprehends all evil, and must finally redeem and reconcile all things to Himself; this is the burden of the Bible's insight from end to end. And this, *as exhibited in the concrete*, wrought out and certified in the human archetype, is the express foundation of Christianity. The Church is God's minister, charged to preach this gospel of

reconciliation, and to work the sense of it into the sensibilities and characters of men. This she does, historically and organically, by diffusing the Spirit and the Life of Christ. And thus, again, while her abstract doctrine ranges as far as idealism can go, her concrete basis keeps her ever in the closest communion with the actual.

And one cannot avoid noticing that this same combination—of the widest view of things with the most concrete fact that *exemplifies* their nature—is also secured to the Church, in permanence, by the *Rites* appointed by its Founder—rites to be *observed*, whether understood or not; and so handed down as an acted parable, suggestive ever of the larger truths, as men grow abler to discern the signified. To wash in water, and to partake of food, in the name of Deity—these are the appointed signs to us, or outward representations, of the highest mysteries we know! What are the intermediate links? The associations bound up with each almost force us to discern that these most common and most natural of acts are typical instances of about the largest truths that come within our ken—the *nature of life*, and the *nature of its growth or sustentation*.

Our life, then, as “signed” to us by baptism, is a *continued regeneration*; an incessant putting away the past as dead, and rising “on footsteps of that dead self” into higher things. This is the process of our natural life, as the physiologist will show. The elements of our form and force are generated, from moment to moment, by the consumption of prior elements, which are then excluded from our organism. This process is essential for every vital act. And what “we wash away” at any time is, in fact, some portion of our former self which has passed on its energies, and more than its own energies, to create the present. Fitly, then, it “represents unto us our profession,” or the process of our spiritual life—“a death unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness;” and this not once for all, but always, “the continual mortifying or deadening all our evil and corrupt affections, and daily proceeding in all virtue and godliness of living.” We are *in transitu* down to our physical substance. From Unseen to Unseen, we pass through a moment of the

Seen; and our transition through these rough material waves is one continued Birth. Even the great transition of all, from our material to our spiritual bodies, which the full form of the baptismal rite sets forth,—and which will but complete in fact, what by faith we anticipate, and by symbol we profess, our personal identification with Christ's Death and Resurrection,—will be, physically as well as spiritually, but the last great *step-per-saltum*, the great new-birth, and rapidest transformation-stage, of a process which had been constantly proceeding.

And the other sacrament sets forth the still more striking truth, that our sustentation and growth depend upon our true *communion* with things—rest upon *sacrifice* or self-sacrifice, and consist in the “transubstantiation” of substance and transmutation of powers. This takes place in the Lord's supper, and in every supper, whether men think of it or no; it is the nature of *nutrition* throughout organic life. Our food is really changed into our substance and our powers. In order to live, we must find other living things to surrender, willingly or unwillingly, their substance and their powers to be transmuted into us. All nature *does* this from her humblest vegetation upwards, and is in fact a vast chemical and organic laboratory for the production of the better. Each living thing, having first done its best to develop itself at the expense of others, then, willingly or unwillingly, surrenders itself, and all it has elaborated, to be wrought up into higher products and carry on God's great progression. The corn of wheat that falls into the ground and dies, in order that, by gathering other vitalities into its new life, it may produce an hundred-fold; or the corn of wheat, and juice of wine, which give themselves directly to be consumed by higher life, and climb up Nature's scale, do but unconsciously exemplify her total process, embody her spirit, and obey her fundamental law. Were they sensible of what they do, they would see themselves to be performing, by organic instinct, on their humble platform, what the Christ, at the head of earth's vitalities, consciously and intelligently did. Fitly, then, did the elements, blessed and broken by our Lord,—which, even then, did, in the wider sense, “consist in Him;”

and which, on being received by His disciples, were truly changed into *their* substance, and so formed part of Christ's Higher Body, the Church,—“represent” the profound communion of things with each other, and with Him—set forth, in pictured parable, and exemplifying act, the range and meaning of that Pass-over which was being offered before their eyes, and the complete obedience to that law of love (for love is essentially self-sacrifice) which perfected the Son of God. Those who possess the spirit of nature, or of Christ, will seek to do the same. Duty to the Father of All is duty to His Family: and those who, living and dying, give themselves for It, do but yield themselves to Him.

For we must remember, always, that the sacraments are *acts*, and the commonest of acts, on which our Lord has fixed this high significance. It is *not the matter* of each sacrament, before or after consecration, which constitutes even the outward sign of it, but the application of that matter to the worshippers. It is not the water, but the dipping, or washing in water, in the name of God, that “represents” the washing away our sinful past, and rising into new endeavour. It is not the food, but the actual consumption of the food, which makes us “partakers of the altar:” makes us “one body and one bread,” and represents the process of spiritual nourishment—namely, the holding “communion” with God, and appropriating, until we share, His purity, and mercy, and love, as revealed to us in Christ. And these commonest of acts are made to signify such mysteries, in order that, having discerned them *there*, we may be almost forced to find them everywhere—to realize universally this knowledge, and make our every act a sacrament; so that, in fine, our outer life may be the sign and symbol of our inner; and our inner life be an eternal life, and lived, with Christ, in God.

And there seems to remain but one generalization more. These things in themselves, and their transmutation and growth, which make up outer Nature; this incessant birth, this by-death-passing to a higher life, which denominates her process; and this pervading ambition, and imperative to climb, which all in their fashion are struggling to obey; and this essential self-

sacrifice of love, which, in giving itself for others, finds its life again, raised, transfigured, glorified—What is the meaning and significancy of it all? Have we any statement that will comprise it all, or, as much of it as we see, intelligibly to us? Brethren! the first article of the Christian creed virtually tells the whole. God is Father, essentially and *always* Father: and this says all the rest. The totality of things must be His Son; His Son, “this day,” this everlasting day, “begotten.” The Archetype of things, in any planet, or in any sphere, must be *the* Son, who is able to be for ever true to His communion with the Father, and with all other sons; and who truly embodies, throughout His growth (for growth is of the essence of sonship), the true spirit of a Son, a SON of such a FATHER. In true communion with that Son, then, for He has been revealed to us, let us fulfil His law, and give ourselves for one another, as He gave Himself for us. We shall find, like Him, that love’s self-immolation will more than compensate itself; and God-in-things will bear Creation’s Cross, and make even the Agony and Death, and much more the “dying daily,” only the Birth-travail of Creation’s Life, and her incessant Resurrection.

NOTES.

“And thus, though some, perhaps, may seriously think that Analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be applied to show the argument from it in a disadvantageous light; yet there can be no question but that it is a real one; for religion, both natural and revealed, implying in it numerous facts; analogy being a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied, *as it is the only proof of most*, cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed: and it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings.”

BR. BUTLER, *Analogy*, II., viii., end.

NOTES.

NOTE A.—(SER. I., p. 27.)

1. THESE propositions have been expanded in the 'Third Sermon, but I hope are intelligible as they stand. By defining Redemption and Sanctification, they also define the words "objective" and "subjective" in the only sense they appear in the Sermons. It is with some hesitation I have given them a place, they are wont to cover so many ambiguities; but they have become naturalized to these topics, and some ambiguity might arise from their omission. The sense defined seems the central one intended by religious authors; but as employed generally¹ how quickly

¹ As, for example, to take about the neatest:—"Knowledge necessarily comprehends two things,—the knowing and the known. The former, in the language of philosophy, is called the *subject*; the latter the *object*."—Morell, *Psychology*, p. 2.

Now, *which* of these has *real* being? Yet in p. 3, "We may investigate either the mental states, or the *realities exterior to consciousness*, of which these states are a guarantee. And so Psychology occupies itself with stating operations and laws of mind; or, as it might be better expressed, with the phenomena of consciousness. Metaphysics, on the other hand, has to determine what reality there is in the *region of being* standing parallel with this inward phenomenon in the *region of thought*, i. e. the first the subjective, the latter the objective."

So far the words subjective and objective are used much as I use them; but observe the ambiguity as to real being. Are the phenomena of consciousness *not* in the "region of being"? So Mr. Mansel—"There may be either [Metaphysics] a philosophy of the Object of religion—that is to say, a scientific exposition of the nature of God; or [Psychology] a philosophy of the Subject of religion—that is to say, a scientific inquiry into the constitution of the human mind, so far as it receives and deals with religious ideas."—*Lecture ii.*, p. 84.

This is also much as I use them. Yet immediately after—"The general aim of all metaphysical inquiries is to disengage the real from the apparent—the true from the

do they mystify! For, obviously, my subjectivity is part of another's objectivity; nay, one's own past or present subjectivity is objective to one's present reflex consciousness; and when the word "objective" has learned meantime to connote "real existence," as opposed to "the subjective" on the one hand, and to "the phenomenal" on the other, it is easy to conceive the strange confusions and paralogisms engendered.

As used in the sermons, the word "Objective" is limited to the Completed Work and Divine Personality of the Lord Christ. And this being of universal relationship, I sometimes say, instead of "Objective," "objective to the race." "Subjective," being confined to the Operations of the Holy Ghost, is partial, discriminative, and *proportioned* to those operations. When generalized to the field of philosophy, objective, in accordance with the principles of the third Sermon, would extend itself to the "bodies," "products," "results" of creation, and to its attained totality; subjective, to its "motions," "motives," "powers," "processes," and to their sum. And this seems to comprehend the common usage. If "real existence" is to be connoted and implied, it ought, as I conceive, to be implied alike *in both*. For I believe in the real existence of both the common products and

false." Qu. ?—is "the real" equal to "the true," and "the apparent" to "the false"? And if God be the former, what is the human "mind," or "one's subjectivity"? and what the "body"? or any "external facts"? or "objectivity" in general?

Any one pondering on such as these will perceive, I think—1. That *three* terms are required. 2. That reality and being, in a very strict sense, must be affirmed of *each* of the three. 3. That we must especially guard the word "phenomenon" from the idea "false."

Three terms do often appear; but in most symmetrical confusion—e. g. "*Metaphysics* will thus naturally divide itself into two branches—*Psychology*, or the science of the facts of consciousness as such; and *Ontology*, or the science of the same facts, considered in their relation to realities existing without the mind."—*Mansel's Metaphysics*, p. 555. Is the mind itself, then, or its facts *outside* of *Ontology*? or do these "realities" mean "God;" and if so, is it exclusive or inclusive of "things"? Some idea of the "mind" or of "matter" being outside of The Infinite, held, or half held, apparently from fear of Pantheism, seems to be the root of Mr. Mansel's duality and contradictions. The half perceived result of this is, that the desire for Unity keeps continually thrusting the one or the other into non-existence. The standing perplexity is whether the finite or the infinite shall be "formally illegitimate"—shall belong to "negative thinking, and, like water in the sieves of the Danaïdes, run through as a negative into the abyss of nothing."—*Phil. of the Unconditioned*, pp. 17, 19.

common powers of nature ; and this, not merely in the strictest philosophic, but in the highest theologic sense ; the former " consisting in " The Son ; the latter being the " operation " of the Lord and Life-giver. And as the word objectivity has, of late, rather monopolized the idea of real existence, this might be a present advantage on the above nomenclature ; for, by affirming it, in a prime sense, of " body," it would turn the tables again upon our recent Platonism ; which, with its usual inversion of thought and term, has again almost excluded " objects " from objectivity, and " substances " from subsistence, under cover of making both " phenomenal," i. e. *merely* phenomenal, i. e. phantasmagoria. As common " common sense " brings back " the body " to the philosophic consciousness, " the person " to its personality, and the common " self " to its sublimated *ego* ; so will it bring back causes to causation, powers to dynamics, material substances to subsistence, and objects to objectivity ; and leave us, I hope, if more humbly more truly " philosophic " than before, and more upon our guard against the illusions of idealism.

I have used the word Ontologic once or twice, but I scarcely defend its application. If we are to retain it in addition to the others, it might conveniently describe that remote yet firm sense of " being " which we feel to lie behind the variations of *both* mind and body, and to which philosophers appear to have assigned the name of " personal identity,"—latent and unthought of by most men, yet, when noticed, always felt to be the *centre* of our totality ; almost or altogether felt to be its *origin* ; and, with or without this latter element, easily recognized as our " image " of the ultimate unchangeableness of *the I AM*. Thus defined, it is obvious, however, that Ontology could yield no scientific formulæ ; it expresses *one* underlying, pervading, unvarying *conviction* ; and that is all. Grievous mistakes have arisen in all departments of philosophy and religion from not noticing this ; for though the " reality " of " existence " obviously attaches to all substances and all force, even in their most partial and transitory " facts ; " its " unchangeableness " does not attach to *any* finite, any more than to any portion of ourselves. And the attempt to combine it with creation's best and purest " parts," leads to theoretic contradiction

and practical perversion of creation's "truth." On the other hand, when taken in their widest sense, Objectivity should furnish all the Statical, Subjectivity, all the Dynamical Science: as expressing, only *in more definite correlation*, the first, the substances of the *Κόσμος* in their momentary balance, the second, its *vires vivæ*. The one being as "real" as the other; and being related, in a general way, as Form is to Force, Organism to Vitality, Body to Mind, Nature's Constitution to her Course, or any actual Attainment to the Momentum it "manifests," and "embodies"—Real Existence underlying, and attaching to all "parts" alike,—Unchangeableness to none.

2. Thus a tripartite division seems to lie essentially in things, even in their most finite exhibition; as even the dualists virtually acknowledge, in referring their correlatives to a fundamental unity. Mr. Mansel, indeed, states it explicitly, in respect to our own consciousness. "The sensitive consciousness is thus revealed to us as composed of three elements—a permanent self, having a sensitive organism extended in space, and with successive affections of that organism taking place in time." [Metaphysics, Encycl. Brit. p. 566.] The misfortune is that this is lost sight of or contradicted. Had Mr. Mansel expressed the third element more dynamically, so as to render *causation* or force explicit; had he insisted more firmly that the two latter are given in consciousness, as part of the *ego*; and affirmed "real existence" of them both—to all which he seems nowise disinclined—we should have heard little of the warfare between Faith and Reason; and, instead of mystified contradictions, should have had a positive and productive Philosophy from his pen, as the Exponent and Minister of Religion, not its passive recipient and its foil.

For surely no analysis of human nature, short of the above, can pretend to adequacy; and if, conceding this, its principles be first applied, on the ground of Analogy, to things and their totality, so far at least as we find or believe things to be analogous to ourselves; and if next, on the same principle of analogy, they be extended to that Creator whom his Creation, in manifesting, Images—what more is requisite to restore Metaphysics

to its old position, as eminently the science of "real existence," and key science of Physical Philosophy? And what more for exhibiting, within our range, not negatively, but positively, the Finite's relation to the Infinite?

But Mr. Mansel has only half rebelled against the conclusions and axioms of the school in which he has been induced to rank himself a pupil. Its total exclusion of the body from consciousness and personality is, with him, but an ambiguous inclusion; and the result of attempting to combine the solid teaching of the Creeds and Christianity with the half acceptance of idealist axioms, might be easily anticipated. I have long believed these principles to be as injurious to science and theology, as their doctrinaire application is pernicious to social ethics and religion; and as Mr. Mansel still pledges himself at least to their conclusion, the importance of his book, in our present controversies, will plead my excuse for criticising it freely.

3. A very useful rule for the young reader of religious reasonings at present is to withhold his assent to any proposition involving the terms phenomenal, apparent, fleeting, transitory, as applied to common or to *present* things, until he has first inserted into them the idea "fact," and excluded from them the idea "false." This one canon will dispose of a great deal of vague philosophizing. The present is indeed fleeting and transitory; but when each moment of the future comes, will it not be the same? What eternity has any *created* thing, but a continuous present; or what idea have we of God simpler than the Ever-Present in time, and space, and cause? If the present be not real, *what* present will be real? If we have not faith in our own real existence, what faith can we have in God's? The negation, then, of any the humblest present is the base of essential scepticism, and virtually denies every present; as, on the other hand, the affirmation of the Ever-present affirms every present moment that He sustains. The New School, indeed, seems to have some idea of an Infinite, which not includes all the finites, but excludes them—an Eternity which does not embrace Time, but is "outside" of it; of an Infinite causation, so perfect, that it leaves no room for a beginning of existence to any finite thing;

and, conversely, whose finites are independent of its Infinite; separable from its Unity, and able, in thought at least, to partition it into shares. Its present time, for instance, is not an "element" of Eternity—not a point *in* its continuity; but some outside entity or quiddity, which actually does divide it into two. It is not surprising that such manifest duality should be able immediately to involve itself in contradictions to its heart's content. But neither is its prime hypothesis supposable, on any definition of the Infinite; nor, even if it were, would the result legitimately follow. The infinite could not be divided into "parts" by any finite; nor Eternity cut in two by any point or magnitude of time. For, let it be a line: it is a line returning into itself; its two "ends" "meeting in infinity." To bisect such a line would require, not a given point, but the diameter of an infinite circle, so as to cut it, simultaneously, in two points. Its unity is undisturbed by any single section, even were the point of section not homogeneous with, and a true element or *differential* of the infinite line itself. All such antitheses, then, as that—"2. Infinite cannot be terminated or begun. Yet eternity *ab ante* ends now, and eternity *a post* begins now. So apply to space. 3. There cannot be two infinite maxima. Yet eternity *ab ante* and *a post* are two infinite maxima of time"—and such like, which Sir W. Hamilton collects, and his friends publish as "Contradictions proving the psychological theory of the Conditioned" [Hamilton's *Metaphysics*, vol. ii., p. 527), are "oppositions of science falsely so called," and belong to a "vain philosophy."

4. I have been obliged to use the word "differential," sometimes, in order to avoid periphrasis. Most readers will perceive its meaning by the context. It signifies a minute element of anything *of the same character* as the whole; so that an "integration" or indefinitely-continued-addition of *such* elements would make the whole. Thus the differential of a *line* is the inconceivably small unit of *linear* measurement; of a surface, the minutest possible unit of surface; of a solid, the minutest possible solid, and so on; so extremely minute, however, that though treated by the mind, notation, and conditions of any problem, as entities, they are "defined" as "cyphers," or "points which have

no parts"—that is, *in comparison of* finite and assignable magnitudes.

And it is not without a grave sense of both its propriety and its *necessity*, that I have extended this to moral reasoning, as in Sermon VII. In fact, not only does the argument from analogy halt, but the argument *for* Unity breaks down; and so far as it rests in argument¹, even faith in God's Providence is shaken, if it do not hold. For example, the individual man is a differential of mankind. Who will vindicate God's moral government of the race, if it cannot vindicate itself "when it is judged" in respect to each individual? If *each* do not receive *according to* his deeds, who will prove Distributive Justice for the whole; or who will prove, or long believe in any Revelation which violates or omits it? Again, the present is a differential of Eternity. If God be not in the present, *where* is he? Who will prove, or who believe his Ever-presence? Again, this world is a differential of the Universe. If God be not in it, and if it be not His in all its good and ill, as fully and as pervadingly as Heaven or Hell can be, who will prove anything of His Omnipre-

¹ This does not mean that God's mercy or justice must be *seen* at the time, in each momentary or each finite procedure. The very name "point," or "differential," excludes this requirement. It is only as they develop into such magnitude that we can see their parts, proportion, and formula, or law of increment, that we suppose ourselves capable of reasoning on them at all. But *then* we do perceive and affirm about *their* nature. It is long afterwards, perhaps, that experience shows, as on the whole it *does* show even here, how the "sin finds one out"—how the mercy proves "twice blessed"—how every idle word holds on its desolating vacuity, and every humble effort its productiveness "in judgment." And even the moralist will write—

Kein Vergessen dieses Lebens;
Alles was ich that und litt,
That und litt ich nicht Vergebens;
Alles, alles nehm ich mit—

Expounding some such old psychologic experience as "He that sinneth against me [Wisdom] wrongeth his own soul: all they that hate me love death"—Prov. viii. 36; or as a social theory—"Behold, the righteous shall be recompensed in the earth: much more the ungodly and the sinner"—Prov. xi. 31—based, even in the context, on such as "The integrity of the upright shall guide them: but the perverseness of transgressors shall destroy them"—v. 8; cf. vv. 5, 6, 17, or 19—"As righteousness tendeth to life: so he that pursueth evil, pursueth it to his own death." So men could see and feel, not

sence—of His being everywhere, or anywhere? True, He veils His face from us—has not given us a full consciousness of Self or Him. As consciousness grows, however, He makes the Sense of the Unseen to overgrow it. And what we understand of futurity is, that He will make us highly sensitive to His Eternal Complacency and Eternal Indignation, and make them search us through.

5. I have said the present is the differential of Eternity; and I believe it is so, not merely in morals and moral government, but, with all respect to Mr. Mansel¹, in our physique and in our metaphysique, up to our highest consciousness. It takes a certain time to affect any of our “senses”—an appreciable time so to affect them as to produce “sensation.” It takes a certain time, also, to obliterate that sensation either from direct or reflex consciousness. So that, even if we omit our present sensitiveness to the actual past (as represented, doubtless, by its results in our organism), which is the physical base of memory, or our sensitiveness to the coming future, which is the base of prevision, fear, hope, &c.—even if we omit these, I say, our sense of Unity does tie up a certain amount of duration into *our* “point of time,” or

as something exceptional, and “belonging to the Jewish Dispensation,” but as God’s Law of things. And the Future, or the Total Judgment—though its integration be a mercy that transcends not our merits merely, but our hopes and fears, and all we ask or think—will yet be *strictly* “according to our works.” Mr. Mansel seems to forget this, or almost contradict it. Yet there is *no* escaping it,—no, not by the Gospel! Note how that most terrible of chapters ends, Mark, ix.—“FOR *every* one shall be salted with fire, and every sacrifice shall be salted with salt:” or, on the Mount of the Beatitudes—“Agree . . . lest . . . Verily, I say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing.”—Matt. v. 26. Or St. Paul: “Be not deceived: God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap.”—Gal. v. 7, and context.

¹ “Now Eternity, in this sense, represents no human conception at all. It cannot even be partially and approximately represented by means of the indefinite; for it indicates a condition the elements of which, from their nature, are removed from the entire sphere of human thought. To conceive Eternity, would be to conceive an Eternal Being; and to conceive an Eternal Being would be, to represent to ourselves a state of consciousness in which all phenomena are simultaneously, instead of successively, presented. But we can conceive representatively in thought only what we have experienced presentatively in intuition. To conceive an Eternal Being, I must therefore have experienced a consciousness out of Time, *i.e.* a consciousness other than human in its constitution.

momentary "now." In any crisis, or intensity of life, a vast deal more can be compressed into consciousness; so that, if it were only a mathematical plane, it can be made the plane of a *tableau vivant*, in which a long history of past and future burns with living fire; so that the "idea" of the "Eternal Now" is contradictory neither of our physics nor our physiology, nor very remote from our most vivid consciousness. True, our "image" is inadequate—utterly inadequate; so we always feel, and were evidently intended *increasingly* to feel. But to affirm that they are contradictions, or negations of each other, is an assertion as groundless as it is gratuitous. The Infinite is vague to us, incomprehensible from its vastness, only *apprehensible* in points, or differential elements; but most positive to us, and the basis of their positiveness and our own. To affirm the several finites is *pro tanto* to affirm the Infinite, which more than comprehends them all. To deny the Infinite is not to affirm any particular finite, but to deny all finites whatever. But are they not "opposed"? Yes, "distinguished," or "contradistinguished," if you will; just as one of the 960 farthings which compose a pound may be contradistinguished from the pound in its totality. If,

The term Eternity, in this sense, expresses not a conception, but the negation of a conception—the acknowledgment of the possible existence of a Being, concerning whose consciousness we can only make the negative assertion that it is unlike our consciousness."—*Man's Conception of Eternity*, p. 6. Cf. Lecture iii., p. 78.

As to either a consciousness *out of* Time, or a time out of Eternity, one objects as much to Mr. Maurice as to Mr. Mansel. This is to me a negative idea; for I conceive it false. But as to the simultaneousness of both presentation and representation; so far from thinking it impossible to consciousness, I believe it is *only* thus that relations are *ever* perceived, conceptions compared, or the very idea itself of succession formed. For it surely is an inference from two moving elements in juxtaposition; and it is only by the at least partial coexistence in the consciousness of the incoming with the outgoing element, that even their successiveness could be discerned. And, so far as I can discriminate my own consciousness, it *always* embraces a certain dynamical extent in time, as truly as my body does extension in space. Nor can I perceive how, if it were not so, the mental powers could operate, or could be engendered. Just as the Muses were the daughters of Jupiter and Memory, so the very elements of our powers spring from the coexistence of the present with the continued past of our sensitiveness; and our more inspired exertions, from their combination with an increased element of anticipation, hope, vaticination, and creative effort.

Our very plane of present consciousness, then, is a table of a certain depth, as any

indeed, one farthing be removed from the rest, so as to leave only 959, then the totality of *that* pound is broken; and my possession of that farthing spoils any one's possession of that pound. And this can be done, or conceived done, with any finite totality. But not even Mr. Mansel could conceive it done with the Infinite; for it is the problem to lift a given point, not only out of a given indefinite plane, but out of space—out of all planes whatever; so that no mathematical plane or surface should contain it. And it is the same in all other categories of being. The Infinite is the one Positive which comprehends all positives,—outcomprehends all real and apparent contradictions.

6. And as the new Platonic School is eminent in logic, it will remember this thesis. It is *only* between finites that contradiction lies, or at least can *logically* be expressed. Even if it really exist between the Infinite and any finite, or between two Infinites (supposing such), still there is no form of proposition large enough to contain its assertion. To attempt it is to make The Inconceivable a concept, and then to range it through—to make The Interminable a term, and then to “distribute” that term. The Infinite may be predicated affirmatively of *any* thing;

line we *can* draw in space is a certain rude parallelogram. I acknowledge that our effort is to refine and define these indefinitely, and to me, also, “he will be a god who is able to define;” for, evidently, on our skill in this depends our discrimination, our knowledge, and our culture. But what a blunder is it to mistake these limits, *especially when refined*, for the *things* limited—to confound our knowledge with its definitions—our estate with its boundaries—to be so taken with our wire-fence, that we must deny the existence either of our own paddock or of the wide world outside,—the latter especially must be to us either *nil purum* or *nil cogitabile!*—*Dis.*, p. 602. Nay, “things” *alone* do “positively” exist; and the one thing impossible to us is to “define”—to draw the strict limit either in time, or space, or cause. Let us deny our limits, then, if we choose; but not the things we cannot limit, nor our solid belief in them, nor our conception of them, or at least our *perception of them*, and our *conception that they are*.

But, surely, “things are given to us only in limitation;” and it is only the limits which are *positive* to us? Yes, if by positive be meant merely *definite*. And this is the *idolum fori* which has imposed on the Hamiltonian School as much as on the Positives themselves. One cannot trace any argument of theirs without seeing the gradual declension, indefinite, vague, inadequate, empty, negative, contradictory, illegitimate, false, *nil cogitabile, nil purum*. Nor can one meet any *defence* of their paradoxes without finding the process reversed, and the most express “contradiction” gradually assumed to have meant only the vague and inadequate.

and though the matter may be false, the form of the proposition still sustains itself, and the Infinite is still the Infinite, stretching out vaguely beyond our power of "distribution." But when we deny the Infinite of anything, we must take our predicate in its full extension, and so make it palpable that it is *only of our concept* of the Inconceivable we have presumed to speak,—not The Infinite as such, but only the Infinite as comprehensible—actually "comprehended" in our "term"—that is, formally a Finite. When, to take the extreme case, one says, "This man is God;" the proposition may be true or false; the term "God" still standing for The Inconceivable. But when one says, "This man, or Satan, or Jupiter, is not God;" the very form of expression marks off that "God" no longer is The Inconceivable, but only our concept of Him; over the whole of which concept we are supposed to range in thought, in order to exclude the subject from every part of it. The very necessities of language forcing us to recognize that All-embracing Unity of Whom are all things, and to Whom all, and in Whom all, with all their real or apparent, yet *always* PARTIAL contradictions *always* "consist."

7. But then we believe our concept justly to *represent* the Inconceivable, and to be designed by God as His "image" in our intellect:—true; but this is the very truth Sir W. Hamilton and his followers forget, and so we must state it at greater length. We form the best idea of God we can; define Him to ourselves in order to worship and please Him, and direct our attainment of what we suppose his likeness. And though we be conscious that this is but *our* definition, and a very poor and imperfect thing compared with what some higher creature might conceive, or what we hope one day to conceive ourselves, yet are we profoundly convinced that it is His likeness, and that, in showing it to us, He has been revealing of his glory what our poor faculties can grasp. Even ourselves, our fallen¹, sinful selves, are in His like-

¹ Gen. iii. 22; ix. 6; James, iii. 9, and context. Cf. Bishop Butler:—"Secondly—That we should learn to be cautious, lest we *charge God foolishly*, by ascribing that to Him, or to the nature He has given us, which is owing wholly to our own abuse of it. Men may speak of the degeneracy and corruption of the world according to the experi-

ness; much more that higher, better self His grace can set before our aspiration, "condescending from heaven, his dwelling-place, yet which does *not* contain Him, to fix thereon his name." If indeed God were but some formulated finite, he could have but few images; but being the Infinite, and the sole Author of all that is, manifold are his true images; as many as the many-sidedness of all His attributes. The best we can form, with all the best helps he has afforded, is that which brings his greatness nearest to ourselves, and with the deepest conviction that it is truly God.

8. As we generalize this, we find ourselves stating what may be called "the principle of Analogy;" the opposite principle of that assumed by Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel; to this effect—*we find the finites analogous to each other, so far as we can trace them; we believe the Infinite to be analogous to the Finite.* It is only on this principle that we can speak of the infinite at all, or expect to make ourselves intelligible; for, obviously, as soon as we have conceived, defined, or named the infinite, it has become a definite or finite, and is only our best representation of all that is beyond. I add this, therefore, as a *fifth* to the four enumerated by Sir William, as "the only possible opinions respecting the unconditioned" (Disc., p. 15). *The Infinite includes, sustains, and outcomprehends the Finite, and is manifested and imaged by it; it is therefore conceived by us to be analogous to the Finite, and reasoned on accordingly.*

The first clause of this sentence I believe to be the dictate both of Reason and Revelation; the second may be read either as an inference from it, or as a separate affirmation, also attested alike by Reason and Revelation; it is plainly involved, however, in the first clause, or even in the expression "image."

It follows from this principle, obviously, that our knowledge of the Infinite is "relative" only, and our judgments anthropomorphic; as they are also in regard to *every thing whatever*. We have no "measure" of either Finite or Infinite, except "ourselves."

ence they have had of it; but human nature, considered as the divine workmanship, should, methinks, be treated as sacred: for *in the image of God made he man.*"—*Sermon* vii., "On Resentment."

But that there should be any self-inconsistency, negation, or contradiction in our affirmations of the Infinite, is no more needful than that there should in our affirmations of the Finite, or specially of "ourselves." The German and French idealists have therefore blundered in attempting to build a science which transcends the relative. The Scotch and English semi-idealists have blundered worse, in affirming a contradiction between the Finite and the Infinite; and the contradiction lies in their own self-inconsistent definition of "ourselves."

9. We are finite creatures; of certain dimensions. We are conscious that all we touch, or see, or think of, runs out on one side of us into the inconceivably great; on the other, into the inconceivably minute; and we follow out on each side, curiously, until our more definite faculties fail us, and our admiration is lost in wonder or adoration. With some sense of our position, then, we grapple with what lies next us, conscious that in comprehending what we can of it, we apprehend our portion of the interminable. And in representing its series to ourselves, we name the *beginning*, *middle*, and *end* of our comprehension, the *cypher*, the *finite*, and the *infinite*; all three being strictly finite, capable of definition; nay, actually defined and terminated. Now, that these three are neither negatives nor contradictions of each other is *demonstrable* from this, that in every category of being, each higher is the integral of the one below it, each lower the differential of the one above it. The finite indefinitely added to itself gives the infinite, the so-inconceivably-great that any given finite is inappreciable in its comparison; subdivided indefinitely, it gives the cypher, or inappreciable fraction of itself. So that they are strictly *analogous*: in the same plane of being, they are proportional parts of each other; in different planes of being, they are as much alike as the planes of being themselves.

Thus, in visible magnitude, the point, in which we distinguish no parts, is our cypher; the size of our body, our natural finite; our utmost range of vision, say the milky way, our infinite—the vanishing point being as nothing compared with our body; our body as nothing, compared with the diameter of our "island universe." Conceive now a new set of faculties *added* to our

present ones, and bearing the same relation to them that the telescope and microscope do to our eyes, what would be the result? Not, certainly, that they would negative the former magnitudes, or contradict their mutual relations; but would add a new region on each side, terminating, as before, in a more distant infinite, and a minuter nothing. Our beginning, middle, and end, would then be a series of *five* terms, instead of three—all strictly analogous, so that by differentiation and integration we could pass from one to the other. All this is familiar truism in every department of mathematical and physical reasoning; what pretext is there for affirming that it is not as true in every aspect of our life, in our highest morals and religion? The child of three years old has indeed a childish notion of the Father in Heaven he prays to, and the daily bread he asks; but the cultivated man, who has reflected most on every kind of Fatherhood and Heaven, and every kind of daily bread He gives, is *not* the person who will disparage most that young child's thought, or be sorry to kneel beside him, saying the same words as he. And if the angels, who behold the little ones, and who rejoice over one sinner that repenteth, ever share our orisons, it is not likely they disparage either of these two children, or find the very same words at all unsuited to their own thoughts and need; and if some higher angel should behold the three, how would he word his reflections, except in some such phrase as this—"All thy works praise thee, O God, and thy saints give thee thanks;" or, perhaps, he too might pray, "Thy kingdom come; Thy will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven."

10. We find then things to be analogous within our ken,—we believe them to be analogous out beyond our ken,—out and out, until our thoughts have lost themselves in the endeavour to grasp the incomprehensible of all: but that even there the analogy holds, and in the most stringent sense, men are firmly convinced, and have always expressed that conviction by saying that we are not only the offspring, but the image and likeness of the Ultimate Unity, The Infinite, the God.

It is only by virtue of this likeness that we *notice* things even within our ken—that we can pretend to understand, to "like" or to dislike them. And it is by virtue of the same "analogy" that

we are, as Sir W. Hamilton finds himself surprised into acknowledging (in a note, *Philos. of the Conditioned*, p. 30) both “perceptant and recipient of Divinity,” and intelligent of what we perceive. In fact we are “correlated” with the Infinite¹ as truly as with the finite, and perceive and judge each by their correlatives in our within. God has, doubtless, attributes of which we have no notion or idea whatever. Even things, probably, have such. Ourselves, probably, have such, both in our substance and processes, as utterly unnoticed by ourselves as the circulation of our blood or its transformations. A discovery of something without us might suddenly illuminate our conceptions of its analogues within, and give a quite new view of human nature. Or an increase in the sensibility of some of our own (say anticipatory) processes might not only expound human nature for us, but might very rapidly transform us into new and higher creatures; as the increased sensibility of our nervous and cerebral development appears to have lifted us above the brutes. All this is true, or at least supposable. What follows from it is, that our

¹ Thus Bishop Butler, like all solid thinkers, vindicates our affections to the Infinite and to the finite on precisely the same ground, by precisely the same arguments; and his whole system negatives any admission of the Hamiltonian antithesis. To take the Bishop's own view of his sermons:—“The question which was a few years ago disputed in France, concerning the love of God, which was there called enthusiasm, as it will everywhere by the generality of the world,—this question, I say, answers, in *religion*, to that old one in morals now mentioned [the reality of the benevolent affections, or the love of man]. And both of these are, I think, fully determined by the same observation, namely, that the very nature of affection, the idea itself, necessarily implies resting in its object as an end. I shall not add anything further to what I have said in the two discourses upon that most important subject, but only this—that if we are constituted such sort of creatures as, from our very nature, to feel certain affections or movements of mind upon the sight or contemplation of the meanest inanimate part of the creation,—for the flowers of the field have their beauty,—certainly there must be somewhat due to Him Himself who is the Author and Cause of all things,—*who is more intimately present to us than anything else can be—with whom we have a nearer and more constant intercourse than we can have with any creature*. There must be some movements of mind and heart which correspond to His perfections, or of which those perfections are the natural object.”—*Preface to Sermons*.

How coheres any such position with the fundamental doctrine of the Bampton Lectures, that “the Infinite cannot be apprehended in any form of the human consciousness”? But Mr. Mansel admires Bp. Butler!

concept of the Inconceivable is not only *our* concept, and therefore *relative* to our powers, but that we are conscious, besides, of how poor and inadequate our conception must be. But this does not weaken at all our conviction that, so far as we do go, we are truly in the image of God; and that our own nature, so far we can truly state it, is truly analogous to His. Just as, to go below ourselves, we are superior to brutes and plants, and quite beyond their plane of being; yet, so far as they do go, they not only "image" us, but are generically and specifically identical with us; so that when we speak of a plant's "seed," and "life," and "growth," and human seed, and life, and growth, the words are not only the same, but their meaning almost or altogether identical, on that actual and fundamental plane of our existence. What rises above our own "vegetation," and is peculiarly human, is analogous to the below, and comprehends all below itself in its own dignity and power; but it does in no sense negative or contradict it; any more than, to go still farther down, does our own weight or height negative the twelve-stone weight, or the six-foot rod, on whose level we truly measure ourselves; and which we could actually replace, and often do, without denuding ourselves of one iota of our human dignity. We exist on their plane as truly as they do. We understand them by their correlatives in our own totality; and these are, however elevated, in no sense negated by their communion with our highest spirituality, to which they minister, perhaps essentially. Nor is the humble unity and identity we attribute to a plant, during its whole organic life, anything unlike our own feeling of our own central unity and unchangeableness; and if we had not this sentiment with regard to ourselves, and to things like ourselves, we should never think of attributing it to God, nor pretend any intelligence of such attribute if assigned Him by another.

11. What means, then, this modern school labouring to make out mystic contradictions between the Infinite and us; bewildering themselves and their readers with elaborate antitheses, every separate proposition of which is ambiguous or untrue; and backing these up with a show of scientific formulæ whose amphibolies any tyro in mathematics would see through?—e. g.: "5. What con-

tains infinite quantities cannot be passed through—come to an end. An inch, a minute, a degree contains these; *ergo*, &c. Take a minute. This contains an infinitude of protended quantities which must follow one after another; but an infinite series of successive protensions can, *ex termino*, never be ended; *ergo*, &c. Or: 13. A quantity—say a foot—has an infinity of parts. Any part of this quantity—say an inch—has also an infinity. But one infinity is not larger than another. Therefore an inch is equal to a foot," &c. (*Met.* ii. 527). Being two of a series of fifteen "Contradictions *proving* the Psychologic theory of the Conditioned"—*sc.*, by establishing the "impotence of reason" in respect to the Infinite—that "*thus* the Infinite itself may be proved by a wonderful revelation,"—namely, "by negative thinking,"—namely, by "thinking that to which we do *not* attribute existence"?

The nexus of the argument would be hardly clear to a schoolboy; but what would a schoolboy say to the contradictions themselves? A [finite] quantity—say a foot—has *not* an infinity of [finite] parts; but only an infinity of differentials, or "points which have no parts." An inch, ditto, ditto—as a minute does *not* contain an infinitude of [definitely] protended quantities, but only of such indefinitely minute quantities, that an infinitude of them is required to make a "defined minute." "But one infinity is not larger than another"! Who says that? Here is a new science of infinities; and a positive one, besides; and false, moreover. There is only One Infinity. The infinities of our science are defined infinities, or indefinitely large finites. And these are no more equal to each other than common finites are. The ratio of one infinite or one cypher to another infinite or cypher, is some finite quantity, depending on the *data* of each question. In any mathematical reasoning the infinities are infinite, and the cyphers cypher *only in relation* to each *a*, or *m*, or *x*; but they are no more equal when compared together than the distances of the several planets, or of the fixed stars are equal, though each be infinite in regard to mundane measurements; nor than the consciousness and common sense of philosophers is everywhere alike, although it may easily transcend the

language of flowers, the music of the spheres, or even the theorizing of a clown.

12. But is not the infinite a negative, as even the form of the word and of its chief synonyms declares? Yes. And we do deny something when we use it. We deny "limits" to "the thing": we do not deny the thing itself. *Infinitem*, or *res infinita*, means *endless thing*—not *thingless end*, or *endless end*, or even *thingless thing*. Thus we deny limits to God's attributes, not the attributes themselves; limitation to God, not God himself. Our notion of the Inconceivable is not merely negative of the conceivable; nor apprehended by that negative thinking which denies "existence" to its objects either "purely" or "in thought," but explicitly the opposite. Itself is Positive, and all that we can *see* is but its partial manifestation. What we do deny are limits—first, to the manifestation, and ultimately, to Him it manifests.

If, indeed, we have been unwise enough to identify the conceivable itself with the limits of the conceivable, and all knowledge with limitation, and all consciousness itself with our reflex consciousness *of* our consciousness; and so virtually identified positiveness with definiteness, and positive existence with definite "knowledge"—that is, if we have bespirited ourselves into sheer idealism, or beknowledged ourselves into Gnosticism again; or if we have done so in one half of our thoughts, and tried to keep the rest of them in connexion with common humanity, and life, and reason,—*then*, indeed, it is not surprising that, in proportion as we are *logical*, we should find ourselves involved in no mean contradictions, and should need some very potent "faith" to rescue us from the well-ascertained impotence of our philosophy. It is new, however, to the English public and to the Catholic Church to have its Faith vindicated at such expense, or its Reason beheaded for such a purpose. We have been accustomed to regard these as coincident, so far at least as each could go; and to require of each to be faithful *to itself*, and to do its utmost, as *its* best service to the whole. And we would be more pleased at seeing our philosophers suspecting their own axioms and definitions, than drawing back from their results under the garb of

modesty; or compensating themselves for as much as they must *feel* of those results, by belabouring with virtuous indignation, and a vast array of -isms, those who have had the manliness and integrity to follow out the common axioms to their legitimate inference. Such procedure always recoils upon itself. And if any Church or community would allow itself to be identified with the procedure, the recoil would fall also on it. I, for one, protest against the method. We should leave ourselves at the mercy of the first thinker far less merciful than Hume, did we adopt the reasoning; and we should deserve his tender mercies, did we adopt the style.

13. We must go back, then, to first principles again. And as soon as we do so, the source of the mystery will lie exposed. The Gnostic definition of the *ego* has brought it all about. If "substance"—that is plain, common, material substance—be excluded from it, all objectivity must soon follow. No object *has* correlatives in *our* ego; and it must therefore, mediately or immediately, be unperceivable by *us*. And it requires only a little more stringent logic to enforce the same of subjectivity—of all actual powers, forces, causation, mind: whatever argument will eliminate the body, will eliminate these too. And there is left behind for the ontologic personality what is at least very easily mistakeable for Nihilism. And this *must* be arrived at from the definition, in proportion as men will be logical, and are able to be consecutive. This is the vice of the Scotch School, definitely through Reid; and of the German Schools through Kant. Kant tried to save himself, as a Christian and a man, by the paralogism of a Practical Reason giving independent information, not amenable to the intellect. Schools of consecutive thinkers have dispersed the paralogism, and established nihilism triumphant. The Scotchmen have not flown so high; they have loved men, and things, and *common* life, and preferred being useful writers to being consecutive philosophers. Reid was not able to be consecutive. Stuart did not try. Brown did try, and advanced some distance towards nihilism, as the Hamiltonians can evince. Hamilton himself is Kant repeated; more distinct indeed in Mansel (*so far forth* as Mr. Mansel belongs to that school, for he has

half rebelled)—that is, reason reduced to impotence and contradiction, and ignorance or negation postulated, with the endeavour to save common things by a flourish of Faith, or Revelation, which is only a grosser substitute for Kant's moral reason in a more religious form. Mr. Ferrier, however, does something for the honour of the School, "he,"—*præfervido ingenio, Scotis ipsis Scotensior*,—"has put on his garment, like Prospero, and mounted his watch-tower, and does *not* talk like a babbler," or any other form of "idiot," and has the good sense to acknowledge the result.

"Another consideration, also of some importance, must here be noted, as tending to obviate any disappointment that might arise in the reader's mind from finding that the conclusions reached in this system are not at all times—are not indeed at any time, during his ordinary moods, and these must occupy about ninety-nine parts of his existence—present to his conviction with the force and the vivacity which he might think desirable if they were true. But this is neither desirable nor necessary; their perpetual presence would convert him from an agreeable human being into a nuisance both to himself and others. The two things should be kept everlastingly apart. All that is necessary is, that the reader should *know* that what is laid before him is the truth; it is not necessary that he should *feel* it to be so. The knowledge of it is all in all; the want of feeling about it is of no moment whatever, and ought not to be listened to for an instant as any argument against its certainty. The interests of Truth would indeed be in a poor way, and our conception of her character not very exalted, were we to allow these interests to suffer from our inability to keep our faculties at all times upon a level with her astonishing revelations." "The incompetency [to *realize* the truth instead of merely *knowing* it] is a mere accident, is entitled to no consideration, and it is not held by these very people to prejudice the truth in any other science. Why should it, then, in metaphysics? An astronomer is not always an astronomer. When he comes down from his observatory, he leaves his computations and his demonstrations behind him. He has done with them for at least awhile. He thinks, and speaks, and feels, just

like other people; he takes the same view of the heavens and the earth that ordinary mortals do. His hat is bigger than the sun. So of the metaphysician; he is not always a metaphysician. In common life he can think, and feel, and speak, it is to be hoped, just like his neighbours." "Is a poet always a poet? No. Down both poet and astronomer, and down, too, philosopher must come—down from their aerial altitudes—their proper regions—and out of these regions they must consent to pass the greater portion of their time. But when the philosopher *is* a philosopher—when he has put on, like Prospero, his 'garment;' when he has ascended to *his* watch-tower in the skies, and when he gives out the result—let him play the philosopher to some purpose, and let him not be a babbler in the land." "Are we to suppose that the *real* revolutions of the celestial spheres differ widely from their *apparent* courses; and that the same great law does not rule, and may not be found out, in the movements of human thought—that mightier than planetary scheme?"—"Institutes," p. 51, sqq.: the italics are Prof. Ferrier's.

Oh! but I thought, Prof. Ferrier! that the object of philosophy was to ascertain "the Truth;" and that the truth is *what is?* Yes, to be sure! what is "in those aerial altitudes," where one man in ninety-nine millions spends one ninety-ninth of his time, and where *to be = to be known*. "Astonishing revelations" indeed, and a *very* "great law of the *real* and *apparent*"—quite equal to Sir William Hamilton's grand practical result, which is the text of Mr. Mansel's lectures. "The celebrated article of Sir W. Hamilton, on the philosophy of the unconditioned, contains the key to the understanding and appreciation of nearly the whole body of modern German speculation. His great principle, that 'the unconditioned [i.e. the Infinite, God] is incognizable and inconceivable—its notion being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived'—has suggested the principal part of the inquiries pursued in the present work; and his practical conclusion—'We are thus taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence; and are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive

with the horizon of our faith'—is identical with that which is constantly enforced throughout these Lectures" (Pref. to Lect., p. viii).

Salutary lesson indeed for the aerial denizens—that the measures of thought and existence are *not* identical! prodigious re-discovery! nor perhaps the things themselves? The Christian public must be amazed! But *how* did a young thinker, fresh from Germany, find this out? *Thus*—"we are *thus* taught it;" *sc.*, not by reason, but by the "impotence of reason" and its self-abnegation; or, as Sir William himself goes on—"And by a wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all reprehensible reality." The eagle¹ knocked his head against the church-steeple, and in his prostration becomes inspired with a belief in the existence of the church; and if we could suppose the eagle's friend going farther, and believing in the infallibility of the church, in consequence of the hardness of its steeple, we should have about the same relation between this "wonderful revelation" and "inspiration" of Sir William's, or even the "astonishing revelations" of Prof. Ferrier, and "the revelation" and "inspiration" upon which Mr. Mansel falls back, and proceeds to magnify for us by parading the supposed contradictions of "reason."

14. It is not easy to criticize any utterance of the Scottish

¹ "Thought is only of the conditioned; because, as we have said, to think is simply to condition. The absolute is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability, and all that we know is only known to us as 'won from the void and formless Infinite.'

"To think is to condition; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought. For as the greyhound cannot outstrip his shadow, nor—by a more appropriate simile—the eagle outsoar the atmosphere in which he floats and by which alone he is supported; so the mind cannot transcend that sphere of limitation within or through which exclusively the possibility of thought is realized."—*Discus.*, p. 14. It is not easy to see the appropriateness of this simile. What has the *limitation of the atmosphere* to say to the eagle's flight or floating? To think is to condition, and to fly is to exert one's wings. And *as* all beyond the reach of the eagle's wings is a pure negation, and does *not* support it floating, nor enable it to propel itself by motion; *so* all beyond our thinking is "Inconceivable," i. e. merely the negation of conceivability, i. e. a negative idea; i. e. "that to whose object we do *not* attribute existence"—"that which gives *always nil*"—"either *nil purum* or *nil cogitabile*." A most appropriate simile, indeed!

school, in consequence of its essential ambiguity. In fact, the antitheses in which it issues, are but the issue of the latent antithesis which pervades it, from its definition of the *ego* upwards. "My body is no part of myself,"—which half of this sentence are we to believe, subject or predicate? If it be not any part of myself, why is it *my* body rather than any other man's? An occasional exchange, at least, would be no robbery. "I see this paper immediately." Qu., without the medium of the *eye*, supposing we drop all other intermediate links? "Whatever *we* do not perceive immediately, *we* do not perceive at all." Let any one try first to say these *axioms* to himself distinctly, and with a consecutive sense, and then he will have a just notion of what a farrago must result from attempting to build a philosophy on them by men bound all the while to rely on common consciousness and common sense, and to speak the common language of mankind. Mr. Ferrier does well to eschew the latter; and it is really ungracious to find fault with clever and excellent men, who are good-hearted enough, for the benefit of the community, to forget their philosophy even while philosophizing; for if one force their reasoning to any definite result, it is just the opposite of what they wished to say and really believed; the fact being, that they always leave their axioms, and all depending on them, in Prospero's watch-tower, and only forget to doff the "garment." And it is only when they will insist on being consecutive, and will

The connecting link will be found below the surface, however, and in the word "limitation." We have only to confound the limitation of the atmosphere with the limitation of the eagle-wing sphere, or *aëtosphere*, and we shall have a net idea of the process which *first* limits all human consciousness to a definite, highly cultured, reflex consciousness, which the most thoughtful only exercise occasionally, and which the bulk of mankind scarce exercise at all, and *then* mistakes *definite* for *positive*, and boldly affirms *vagueness* equal to *negation*.

He goes on:—"How, indeed, it could ever be doubted that thought is only of the conditioned may well be deemed a matter of the profoundest admiration." Well, indeed! on these definitions. "Thought cannot transcend consciousness: consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought, known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each other." How many men and women, then, have got any human consciousness whatever? And, mark! it is a fundamental error on the Hamiltonian system to make two kinds of consciousness. This philosophy, surely, is not designed for "idiots."

mix their philosophy up, negatively or positively, with other things, that one is bound to protest.

15. But to this misty idol of the theatre, Mr. Mansel adds two considerable ambiguities of his own: one as a philosopher, the other as a preacher. His philosophic ambiguity is, that he half rebels against these axioms, but has not consummated his rebellion; or, rather, has taken an *ad eundem* degree in their wisdom, and would fain tack on their brilliant conclusions to an undercurrent of English thought. He cannot, as yet, tell whether his body be included in his *ego*, or not. "It is a debateable land: in one sense it does belong to the *ego*; in the other, it does not."—Metaph., p. 566¹. It is essential to Mr. Mansel that he make

¹ "The sensitive organism may be considered in two points of view: 1. As belonging to the *Ego*, or conscious subject, which in its actual concrete existence is susceptible of consciousness only in and by its relation to a bodily organism. 2. As belonging to the *non-Ego*, or material organ of consciousness, from which the mind [i. e. assumed to be the *Ego* above described], as an abstract immaterial being, is logically separable, though in actual consciousness the two are always united. The bodily organism is thus the debateable land between self and non-self. In one sense my eye is part of my conscious self; for sight is an act of consciousness, and sight cannot exist except by means of the eye [for the same reason light is part of my conscious self, for sight cannot "exist" without it]. In another sense my eye is not a part of myself, for a man whose eyes are put out continues to be the same person as before [and a man who has lost his memory continues the same person as before. We may as easily omit one mental faculty as one bodily; and the whole mind as the whole body.] Hence the organism, as the vehicle of sensation, exhibits in the same act attributes of mind (*sic*) and attributes of body. In the former point of view the act of sensitive consciousness is regarded as a *sensation*; in the other, as a *perception*."—Being a careful reproduction of Hamilton on Reid; e. g. note D^o, and foot-note to p. 880.

Hence we get the rather complicated definition of "perception." "Perception proper is the consciousness of the existence of our body as a material organism, and, therefore, extended." And hence the body itself is the "only immediate object," that is, in fact, the *only* object of perception!

But how does the *Ego* come to perceive either the body's existence, its materiality, or "therefore" its extension? Sir Wm. says the mind in its totality is present in every part of the body. If so, it ought to be able to perceive it well. But also, surely, it ought to be able to tell us something *more* about it. Why must "I" toil and ponder in vain to find the nature of the processes which are going on in the tip of my index-finger, for instance, when my mind in its totality is there with all its wits about it? I know that it is hard "for the eye to see itself," and for the mind *γνώσει σεαυτὸν*; but there is no such difficulty, surely, in the mind's perceiving "its immediate object," if it be able to "perceive" at all.

And how do we perceive the external world on this system? Why, "properly"

up his mind. Let him interrogate his consciousness again on this prime question; and if it be "impossible to know without knowing that one knows," or "to feel, or think, or judge," without "knowing that one feels, thinks, judges," let him press the matter to a decision. If there be an ambiguity in his *ego*, in what other personal or what other pronoun of his language is there *not* an ambiguity? nay, in what noun, or name, or attribute, or act, or thought, or concept? And if his consciousness cannot pronounce upon this nearest of all finites to himself, and this simplest of all moral problems,—to discriminate whether it be *meum* or *alienum*,—he may well forbear to press his judgment

speaking, we do not perceive it at all, i. e. not the macrocosm; the microcosm is the only "external" thing that "we" perceive; and how we are to know that any macrocosm exists, without perceiving it, is not apparent. But less "properly" we do learn something about it. How? Oh! "not by the senses, but by the power of locomotion"! Common people get their knowledge of the world by their senses *and* by locomotion; but *their* method falls far short of the antithesis. But we go on. By *whose* locomotion do we discover the outer world? by the mind's, or by the body's? If by the body's, why not also by the bodily senses? If the body be able to carry itself on its legs, why not also to see with its eyes, feel with its fingers, and reflect and remember with its brain? If by the mind's, the mind has a power of locomotion. Then why not use it "to some purpose," and observe things distant as well as things at home? When it is *totus teres atque rotundus* on the tip of one's finger-nail, for instance, and has sufficiently "perceived" its physiology, why not go a little farther, and speculate on its own account? Why not, in the *regio sui similis* beyond the watch-tower, compare notes with Democritus and the philosophic hundredth of Prof. Ferrier, and the others—*quorum peregre est animus sine corpore velox*? Indeed, the Hamiltonian mind is a very active entity. It dreams *always*—at least when the body is asleep. Ham. Met., i. 322, sqq. Possibly, also, a little when it is astir.

We, indeed, whose bodies are "part" of ourselves, cannot play fast and loose with them so easily. We must rest on our physical basis, and act from it. But, on the other hand, "we" are truly correlated with the things around, and "perceive" them, quite directly, in the ordinary and vulgar way. Their substance, forces, qualities, affect ours, that is, affect "us": "we" are also conscious of that affection, and our higher powers, i. e. also "we," proceed to theorize accordingly.

Mr. Mansel feels some inkling of the above ambiguities, and presses them once or twice, as Met., p. 567; but, *more Hamiltonico*, it is against Brown! who is unfortunate enough to be a little consecutive, and so gets the School into trouble. Would it not have been simpler to thread the labyrinth at once, and take the bull by the horns, as in some fundamental chapter of Reid, say Intel. Powers, ii. 1, or Ham. Met. ix., where both the idol and its origin are piously paraded? Has not the ambiguous prodigy been honoured long enough? How much of Athens must still be sent there yearly?

to negations and contradictions on more distant and recondite relationships.

His ambiguity as a preacher is quite as signal. For, the impotence of the semi-idealist Reason being established, one cannot then tell what is the "Faith," or "Inspiration," or "Revelation," or "Religion," on which he desires we should fall back. In his *argument*, it is generally Sir William Hamilton's [subjective] "faith" or "revelation." In his application, it is [objective] revelation; nowhere defined, but—as obviously including the Bible, the creeds, the common and popular doctrines, which we are *not* to criticize—it is, in a vague and general sort of way, "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," or "the truth of God," in an indiscriminated totality.

In either senses, however, Mr. Mansel's process is utterly illegitimate, and his conclusion *nil*. In the first sense, as subjective faith stands sponsor for a body of truths which are neither to be procured nor criticized by reason, it is only Kant's "Moral Reason" over again, endowed, however, with such attributes as place it, in point of its advocate's logical acumen, far below Mr. Parker's "Spiritual Faculty," or Mr. Newman's "Soul," and on a par with "the Church" of the C. C. or P. P., or "the Spirit" of the Local Preacher. In the latter sense, as it is a body of truths to be evidenced, digested, expounded, and understood by the common reason, the *à priori* impotence of reason has already disposed of it in its integrity. On Mr. Mansel's principle, the whole idea of such a thing is inconceivable; and arguments for or against are all outside of reason's court. This would not distress the P. P. or the C. C. much; for they have the consistency to allege this uncriticizable "church" upon authority, i. e. pretentiously upon their own; practically, upon the authority of parentage; but, as if to leave no room for consistency, the *one* function which Mr. Mansel does allow to Reason is to question the authority, and to bring into court the "evidence," for what is in its own nature utterly inconceivable to the reason. And as if to define his inconsistency to a point, the one evidence Mr. Mansel allows is miracles, and one miracle for him will be enough; but even this one is to him utterly inconceivable. There could be

no miracle—thing or concept—on his hypothesis. Miracle is relative to some existing ideas of God, of Nature, and of the possibility or probability of His manifesting himself therein, by interference or otherwise. But God himself first removed from the realms of reason, no “sign” could be a sign *of Him*; and there could be no argument or inference whatever. The most extraordinary event would be an extraordinary event, and that is all. Just as birth is birth, and life is life, and death is death, and nothing more; so to Mr. Mansel’s impotent reason the general resurrection would be simply the general resurrection, and nothing more. The very idea of sign, mark, evidence, or argument for Deity, has been already exploded; and it were as impossible to prove Revelation to this Mansellian man as to a monkey or a tree. *Prove Revelation* did I say? Nay, to conceive Revelation, or Religion, or any of its parts, were utterly beyond his potency. Religion, whether revealed or not, is a *relation* between man and God; and “in order to conceive a relation, both its terms must be cognized.” But one of the terms is utterly incognizable and inconceivable; along with that term, then, the whole idea of revelation and of religion lies “as a negative in the abyss of nothing:” *non existens*, under the head of either *nil purum* or *nil cogitabile*, Sir William Hamilton’s specially “legitimate” addition to that mysterious limbo.—“Discuss.,” p. 602.

Thus the *ignis fatuus* of idealism has betrayed Mr. Mansel into the precise position contemplated by the Master’s common place. “So he who takes away reason to make way for revelation puts out the light of both, and does much what the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes the better to perceive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope.” It is a pity that the Church cannot rest content with a vindication of her faith upon this platform; or that the hearty denunciation of all the -isms should compensate so badly for the vacuity at home.

16. But Mr. Mansel is too close a thinker to be answered in this general way. Indeed, he would think it no *answer* to point to a conclusion which his best friends can see at once, and him-

self almost or altogether acknowledges' as the very purpose of his writing. Besides, his present willingness to believe in self-

1 "When, therefore, a critic objects to the present argument, 'that the presence of contradictions is no proof of the truth of a system;' 'that we are not entitled to erect on this ethereal basis a superstructure of theological doctrine, only because it too possesses the same self-contradictions'; that 'the argument places all religions and philosophies on precisely the same level'; he merely charges it with accomplishing the very purpose which it was intended to accomplish. So far as certain difficulties are inherent in the constitution of the human mind itself, they must of necessity occupy the same position with respect to all religions—the false as well as the true."—*Preface to Third Edition*, p. 2. These difficulties being "that the human mind inevitably, and by virtue of its essential constitution, finds itself involved in self-contradictions whenever it ventures on certain courses of speculation"; and Mr. Mansel's reasonable requirement being, that whenever the reason does meet these contradictions, it shall stop.

And the only question that remains is, when and where *does* it meet them?—*how far* can it go without meeting them? And the proper answer is—*no way at all!* No way *in* matters of religion, Mr. Mansel acknowledges. No way *towards* them, he can be forced to acknowledge. For God himself is inconceivable, and, *therefore*, any "relation" between Him and us.

Of course, this inference was immediately drawn and noticed, and Mr. Mansel rejoins:—"It has been objected by reviewers of very opposite schools, that to deny to man a knowledge of the Infinite is to make Revelation itself impossible, and to leave no room for evidences on which reason can be legitimately employed. The objection would be pertinent if I had ever maintained that religion is or can be a direct manifestation of the Infinite nature of God. But I have constantly asserted the very reverse." You have, indeed: it is of this we complain. What difference can the "direct" or indirect make? As soon as it reaches our faculties in its proper meaning, it must stop. And what is the other nature of God beside His Infinite nature? But Mr. Mansel goes on, and I will quote the passage at length, marking a few words in it, to draw the reader's attention to his mode of defending his paradox,—*sc.*, *not on his own* principles, but on *ours*, as indicated at the end of the note, p. xii.; by assuming that there is (not a contradiction, but) a *positive analogy* between the infinite and the finite:—

"In Revelation, as in natural religion, God is *represented* under finite conceptions adapted to finite minds; and the evidences on which the authority of revelation rests are finite and comprehensible also. It is true that in Revelation, no less than in the exercise of our natural faculties, there is indirectly indicated the existence of a *higher* and more absolute *truth*, which, as it cannot be grasped by any effort of human thought, cannot be made the vehicle of any valid philosophical criticism. But the comprehension of this higher truth is no more necessary either to a belief in the contents of a revelation, or to a reasonable examination of its evidences, than a conception of the infinite divisibility of matter is necessary to the child before he has learned to walk.

"But it is a great mistake to suppose, as some of my critics have supposed, that if the Infinite as an object is inconceivable, therefore the language that denotes it is wholly without meaning, and the corresponding state of mind one of complete quiescence. A negative idea by no means implies the negation of all mental activity: it implies an at-

contradiction as inherent in our faculties would turn the point of any "personal argument" drawn from the most flagrant incon-

tempt to think, and a failure in accomplishing the attempt. The language in which such ideas are indicated is not like a word in an *unknown* tongue, which excites no corresponding *affection* in the mind of the hearer; it indicates a *relation*, if only of *difference*, to that of which we are positively conscious, and a consequent effort to pass from the one to the other."

The Infinite, then, is *not* unknown to us! it excites *affections* in our mind! and is *known* [vaguely] in *relation* and *difference*. Nay, *positively*, it is compared in our mind, and known as a *higher truth*; and the finites *represent* it, and are *adapted* thereto, on *some* principle, doubtless, of *similarity* or *Analogy*!

All this line of speech and argument is competent *to us*, and coherent with *our* ideas. Not so to one who holds that the Infinite is *not* either known or "cognizable under relation, degree, or plurality"; that it is *not* the analogue, but the contradictory of the Finite; to whom a "negative idea" is one "to whose object we do *not* attribute existence;" "which gives *always nil*—either *nil purum* or *nil cogitabile*;" and to which, if we [not conceive, but] believe in it [if such procedure be possible, as I do not think it is], we can only attribute such ideas as admit of "only the negative affirmation that they are *not like ours*." Let Mr. Mansel write for a few pages consistently with this, and he will give up his idealism. But he will find it as hard as to write the same pages consistently with the exclusion of the body from his *Ego*; and presently find it needful to doff "the garment," and come down from "the aerial altitudes his proper sphere."

The above passage, then, is a very innocent surrender of his "main position." But he tries to save it, after all; for he goes on: "This is the case even with those more obvious negations of thought which arise from the union of two *incongruous* finite notions. We may attempt to conceive a space enclosed by two straight lines; and it is not until after the effort has been made that we become aware of the impossibility of the conception." Ah! Here is the real negative idea, cloven foot and all—the idea which we may talk about in our foolishness; but which the approach of any positive thought, as soon as it does approach, will show to have been all along incongruous and impossible—such as Mr. Mansel's concept of Eternity, p. x., note, which can be "neither presented nor represented in consciousness," or "the absolute Being who is at the same time absolute Non-Being," which seems his distinctest notion of God (Man's Conception of Eternity, p. 8). And this shows what he tries to persuade himself he means by "represented," in the first line of the above passage; or as he formally expounds it,—"Hence it is that ideas and images which do *not* represent God as *He is*, may, nevertheless, represent Him as it is our duty to regard Him. *They are not in themselves true*: but we must, nevertheless, believe and act as if they were true. A finite mind can form *no conception* of an infinite Being *which shall be speculatively true*; for it must represent the Infinite under finite forms: nevertheless, *a conception which is speculatively UNTRUE may be regulatively TRUE*."—"Man's Conception of Eternity," p. 9.

To take an example from the last Preface:—"The whole argument [about Hegel, see next note] is designed to show that to speak of a *conception of the Absolute* implies a self-contradiction at the outset; and that to reason upon such a conception involves, *ab initio*, a violation of the laws of human thought. That reasoning based on this assumption must end by annihilating itself, is surely no very dangerous concession to the scep-

sistency. Such latent maxims as "The less the reason, the more the faith"—"The less reason *in* the faith, the greater the faith for believing it"—are a shield of passive power, impregnable to common logic. One can only first deny the psychologic necessity for any contradictions; point his attention to the initial ambiguity of his definitions, as naturally engendering his belief in them; and then ask him to apply to his own system the weapons of criticism, which no one wields so well. He cannot but see, I think, that his Faith and Revelation are but a vaguer form of Kant's afterthoughts, and can as little save him from himself as Kant from him. Or one might ask him to quote his critique on an elegant Kantian development, whose appositeness, as ap-

tic. Suppose that an author had written such a sentence as the following:—"A circular parallelogram must have its sides and angles equal, and must also be such that all lines drawn from the centre to the circumference shall be equal to each other—the conclusion is absurd, but the reasoning is unassailable, *supposing that a circular parallelogram can be conceived at all.*"

Very good! We know *now* what "regulative truths" are; and be it noticed, they would not be regulative, *as distinguished* from speculative truths, unless they were of *this* kind: otherwise, there is nothing to prevent their being speculative truths, and ceasing to be "regulative." We know *now how* it is that any finite "represents" the infinite; and how it is that God is "manifested;" what these "higher truths" are which we cannot conceive, but are to believe; and *how*, to say it reverently, man is the image of his Maker, or, specially, how the Lord Christ is "the image of the Invisible God." Let the reader carry these ideas consistently through a few pages of Mr. Mansel, and he will hardly like the effect produced upon his sensibilities. Let him conceive the Church adopting such a rational exposition of its Truth, regulative and speculative, for about ten years, and guess whereabouts her foundation would be in the intelligent mind of this nation. For, be it well remembered, in fine, that the range and amplitude of these regulative Truths [for whatever reason we are still to call them "truths"] is—The Name of God and *all* dependent "relations."

No one supposes I charge Mr. Mansel, or any one who reads and admires his book, with any participation in this sentiment, or even with any considerable realization of the philosophic *ἔροχθ*, which he seems to consider his duty and piety with regard to *religion's starting point*. Any moral force there is in my argument lies obviously in the opposite hypothesis. I am calling on a first-class English thinker, towards whom I more than share the universal sentiment, to abandon the semi-idealism which is a dislocation in the centre of his thought—a root of bitterness in the centre of his religion; and which, so far as it is *operative*, or is *discerned* in his preaching, converts the noble utterance of the Christian and the man into the Dead Sea apples of the "philosopher;" and has given us, instead of solid food, misty and dangerous contradictions, most bewildering to all his readers, and, unless I am much mistaken, to one reader more.

plied to himself he almost acknowledges. Herbart's system, he observes, "postulates ignorance as its starting point, and makes philosophy dependent on an assumption, whose only guarantee is, that we have no means of verifying it." His "reals" are "assumed in order to solve certain supposed contradictions; and the assumption itself introduces other contradictions." "The theory solves none of the difficulties which give rise to it, but only conjectures that, under certain conditions of superhuman knowledge, they might be soluble—a very legitimate position, if it were proposed as resting, not on reason, but on faith; not as explaining difficulties, but as bidding us rest content without explanation; not as the basis of a theory, but as a reason why theories are inadmissible" (Met., 318-9). And this "very legitimate position" is indeed his own system, from end to end; resting throughout on a reason whose self-contradictions are proudly paraded, and on a faith whose only guarantee is that it is superhuman or impossible. Let us run over its outline both in philosophy and in theology.

17. His *Divisio rerum* is into the Infinite and Finite; and the latter is subdivided into the *Ego* and the *non-Ego*. We must glance at each. His main doctrine of the Infinite is, that it is the Inconceivable, and "cannot be positively apprehended in any form of human consciousness." Yet it must be "believed in," he affirms; i. e. by a faith which is no form of *human* consciousness; and it is even "revealed" to us "wonderfully," not, indeed, by reason, but by "the impotence of reason and its self-contradictions," as well as by the ordinary Christian Revelation; which we have, it appears, faculties to prove, interpret, and apply, but not to understand or criticize! All this seems anti-thetic enough; yet it is still more wonderful that, though the Infinite cannot be *apprehended*, it can be *comprehended*, quite positively, by this impotent reason, in concept, term, and syllogism; and can be "demonstrated," moreover, to be the "contradictory," first of itself, in some three or four definitions of it; and next, and in all senses, the contradictory of the Finite. So that as "of contradictories, one *must* be true, and the other false;" and as "the perception of contra-

dictionaries is one," the Infinite *must* be, simultaneously, *both* affirmed and denied; and the Infinite and the Finite *cannot* be both simultaneously acknowledged. In plain words; the distinguished Dean of St. Paul's must, he thinks, in the *same* mental act both affirm and deny the Deity; and he *cannot* at the same time believe the existence *both* of his God and of either his Cathedral or himself,—unless, indeed, by the superhuman faculties.

18. We turn next to the finite in one of those intervals when it is not abolished by the infinite, and we soon find that there is in truth very little to abolish. For he agrees with Sir W. Hamilton that the two fundamental categories of things, Substance and Cause [or Force], are only "negative ideas," and that negative ideas are those "to whose object we do not ascribe existence." There only remains, then, at least if our analysis be just, (Ser. viii., p. 458, *sqq.*) the Category of Direction, Form, or Law; i. e., the direction, form, or law of the formally non-existent. To subdivide this finite is surely to operate on *vacuum*, and needs the chimæra ruminant. And we find, accordingly, that the *non-Ego* is not even a shadow: for a shadow, even if immoveable, would have at least *extension*. Whereas the Dean pointedly and formally agrees with Kant that Space and Time [or Extension and Succession] are not real attributes of things; noticed by us *in* things, or perceived to belong *to* them; but are, on the contrary, creations of our own minds; ideal forms, into which [as we can perceive, mark] our own mental necessities, and these alone, force us to "set," or as it were to frame and hang up the fleeting pictures of [so called] external things, which, however, after all, are *only our own sensations*.

19. The *non-Ego*, therefore, is evanescent except as a subdivision of the *Ego*; and we come, in fine, *to it*. Here the prime question is—Of what does it consist? does it, or does it not include the "person?" And the Dean's answer is, as we have seen, eminently antithetic. In his formal Exposition [Met. 68; see p. xxvi. of this note] the *Ego both does and does not include the person!* But this imposing postulate is too double for use, so in practice he divides it. Commonly his

body *is* a part of himself, just like any other man's; while occasionally the opposite is affirmed with a distinctness which outshines even the *Alcibiades*. E. g. p. 358:—"We cannot help believing that the body and its organs, however necessary during the present life to certain forms of consciousness, however chronologically the occasion of the earliest development of consciousness in general, is yet no part of the conscious subject—is not in any sense of the term *myself*." In p. 68, "the bodily organism is a debateable land;" "in one sense my eye is a part of my conscious self;" "in another sense my eye is not a part of myself." But now "it is *no* part;" "not in *any* sense!" "we cannot help believing"—this *or* those? i. e., by the faith aërial. But we go on—"And this instinctive conviction [*sc.* of p. 358, *not* of p. 68] of the untaught consciousness of mankind [*sic*] is confirmed by all that science tells of the constitution of the body and its organs." So he proceeds to show, with Heraclitus, that the animal body, along with "objects of sense in general," is in a constant flux, while "the conscious subject, the personal self, continues one and unchanged." And he fairly admits that the same is the case with the mental powers. "A similar distinction between the accidental and the essential [he had allowed no essential to body] must be made with regard to the internal consciousness; the matter of that consciousness is continually changing, while the form abides permanent and immutable; emotions, thoughts, volitions succeed one another at every moment; the self—feeling, thinking, willing—is one and the same throughout"—p. 359. What the Ego possesses therefore is (1), no body at all, either form or matter; and (2), of mind, not the "matter of consciousness," but only the "form" of it—not "emotions, thoughts, volitions," themselves, any of them or their sum, but only their *εἶδος* or idea. And it must be still further etherealized; for another fundamental tenet must be borne in mind. "My own consciousness is not merely the test of my real existence, but it actually *constitutes* it. I exist in so far as I am a person; and I am a person in so far as I am conscious. Were it possible, which it is not, to conceive the human soul as a substance of which consciousness is only an

accidental mode—which may exist at one time in a conscious and in another in an unconscious state—such a soul could *in no sense of the term* be called myself, the various modes of its existence could in no sense be called *mine*”—p. 355. Poor *Ego*! I am afraid its mental heritage is a still more debateable land than its bodily. It must be conscious *of the form of its consciousness* behind the matter of it; and *always conscious thereof*, even in sleep or swooning; else its very existence is at an end. The matter of its consciousness, even if continuous, is excluded by its variations; and the form of consciousness is *ipso facto* abolished if there be any defect, or even any remission for a moment, in its consciousness of itself. This *Ego* surely has reached the *regio sui similis*, and needs negative thinking for its apprehension.

20. The connexion also between the *Ego* and non-*Ego* should be noted; it will console the *Ego* for its departed self and faculties to know that they were in truth of extremely little use to it. The senses, for example, have been often blamed for giving inaccurate information of the external world: but this it appears was a mistake. “The senses do *not* deceive us with respect to an external world, because rightly interpreted *they tell us nothing at all about it.*” *Met.*, p. 342. “The proper objects of the bodily senses—colours, sounds, flavours, savours, and tactual sensations*—exist only in my consciousness, and cease to exist when my consciousness ceases. They *may* be caused by

* This phraseology, of making “sensations,” and *not external things*, the “objects” of the senses, is *not* a verbal inaccuracy, but is the deliberate doctrine of all Kantian schools. To them, in fact, nothing else but a sensation is ever the object of the senses; and the other words in the above sentence, “colours, sounds, flavours, savours,” do not mean, as the unwary might suppose, any qualities, real or imaginary, existing in bodies, but merely sensations in ourselves. Whether these be due to *any* external cause or not, the school is utterly unable to divine; and, in fact, the words “external” and “internal” to them have no real meaning. They are only an arbitrary division of “internal.” Arbitrary, that is, so far as the system is concerned; but not arbitrary, so far as the appeal to the public, or as the possibility of publishing, writing, or speaking at all. If they did not adopt this “foolishness,” no one would listen to them for a moment; and they would not listen to themselves.

And this is the first standing paralogism of the school. They allow themselves the use of this ambiguous language—that is, of language built on, and *always implying* the

some permanent reality or realities independent of me ; but of the existence and nature of this reality the senses tell us *nothing*”—ib., p. 345. This seems tolerably explicit, and one has just made up one's mind to do without sensible information of the outer world, when one remembers that there is another “sense” to tell us all about it. None of those outer senses, indeed, of which men are so conceited—not the intellectual vision, or emotive hearing, or discriminative taste or touch, but the highly refined, recondite, metaphysical—What? Why, the muscular system ; the purely animal or almost vegetable physique ! This surely is the Nemesis of idealism. The educated senses confirming, correcting, criticizing, and co-operating with each other, can tell us simply *nothing* : the almost senseless muscles, alone, can teach us all. However,

opposite hypothesis to theirs. And this language conceals, both from their readers and themselves, the emptiness of their elaboration. Read a few pages of Kant, or any Kantian : they may seem rational, and surprisingly acute ; but then read into them, rigidly, the sense of the system advocated—into the word *object*, for example, and its synonyms, as in the above passage, the strict sense of *only subject-object*—and they will turn out at best only balanced verbiage. Indeed, the illusion is so perfect, and the alternative charge so startling, that we insensibly forget that the most resolute of them, such as Kant himself, are idealists at all. Nor are they so, i. e., in the bulk of their actual thought or writing, or anywhere outside their system ; *no one is* ; nature will not be expelled either by fork or fallacy. A few definitions may seem to consist with the conception ; but the expansion and illustration of even these will be far below the watch-tower.

Another prime fallacy of the Kantian system, without which it could never have imposed upon its author, is, that he confounds “space,” that is, pure, indefinite extension, with divided or figured extension ; and so finds in his *a priori* creation the data of mathematical science ; for the tacit suggestion is, that if the *a priori*, i. e., what reason or sensibility “produces after its own design,” can give such real and valuable science as geometry or number, it may also give real and valuable metaphysics, physics, ethics, and theology. But the confusion is a very gross one, and the assumption palpable. Obviously, until the “vague” of space or time is “divided” by the category, direction, limitation, law, and order, it could yield no forms or “successions,” nor any “terms” or concepts whatsoever.

The directions and limitations of Mathematical Science are first seen by us *in things*, and are afterwards refined and theorized in the microcosm. I think the same takes place also in higher sciences, though there the converse process is more supposable. Our first moral formation and information, as well as our physical and intellectual, come to us from without, however needful it be that they find their home within. We arise from “Communion,” and in Communion we exist : however the Communion itself *ascends*, and we become conscious of It, of its Centre, and of its Laws.

welcome information from whatever source ; welcome muscular metaphysics as well as muscular Christianity. But I fear the muscles are sadly misplaced in those ærial altitudes : they have neither *ποῦ στῶ*, *point d'appui*, nor *vires vivæ*. For, first, suppose the muscles do grasp the external world both physically and intellectually, how does this bring it any nearer to the Ego ? They are *no part* of it ; and their acquisitions are divided from it "by the whole diameter of being." And next, how could they signify their information to the Ego ; which has, by the hypothesis, neither eyes to see, ears to hear, nor, *now*, a muscular system to discern the revelation ? Nay, replies the Scoto-Oxonian, "the muscular system is perceived directly : it is the only immediate, that is, the only object of perception." Let then the transcendental Ego, we again intreat, give us some real information about it ; let it, if only for charity's sake, save us the necessity for cutting up dead or living "subjects," in order by the aid of eyes, scalpels, and Dublin Dissectors, to find out some of the facts which concern us most. Until it does, or at least shows that it can do so, we must fear that its *percipient* faculties are of no more real use to it than are avowedly its senses. And this suspicion is signally confirmed in fine, by our noticing that the information conveyed by muscular sense, to the Scoto-Oxonians, is on their system profoundly false. For what the muscles do perceive *in things* is (1) Extension and (2) Force, as seen in either motion or resistance. Two most important, indeed fundamental attributes of things, we acknowledge, everywhere outside the limits of idealism ; but, inside those limits, alas, we have just seen that Extension or Space is not in things at all, but is only a form of mental sensibility ; and that Force, or Cause, whether as motion or resistance, is only a negative idea, to whose object we do not ascribe existence.

To the Scoto-Oxonians, therefore, the Infinite, the non-Ego, the Ego, and the Connexion between them, are all alike ambiguous or unreal ; they can only be affirmed by self-contradictory reason, or believed in by antithetic faith.

21. One regrets, but cannot wonder, that this antithesis should apply itself to Religion, on the express ground that "no difficulty

emerges in theology, which had not before emerged in philosophy;" and with the express aim, not of widening and enriching, but of cramping and narrowing our common Christianity, and making us more intolerant of each other. But we cannot overlook the Dean of St. Paul's endeavour; we must either agree with him or differ. We ask first, therefore, How, seeing that "the infinite cannot be apprehended in any form of human consciousness," there can be any such thing as human religion at all? To which we receive the same reply in a twofold form—(1) as a matter of reason there cannot, but as a matter of "faith" there may, i. e. of the faith exemplified; and (2) as a matter of speculation, or as a system of speculative truths, there cannot, but as a congeries of regulative truths there may—regulative truths being defined to be those "truths" which "are not in themselves true; but which, though we can perceive them to be untrue, it is our duty to believe and act on *as if* they were true!" The antithesis again; consistent inconsistency, and untrue truth. Regarding Christianity, therefore, as such a quasi-system, and as one which should *not* be criticized, he applies to it a "criticism," in emulation of Kant, and resting on the Kantian distinction between the *phenomenon* and the *noumenon*; in this well-developed form, however, that the phenomenon has almost or altogether become "the false," and that the noumenon has resolved itself into a self-contradictory idea. We must illustrate his treatment.

22. Our theology consists of (1) Christianity, and (2) its Evidence. And the first consists of (*a*) the Story or series of Facts, and (*b*) the Creeds or Doctrinal Synthesis. Let us take the latter first.

"From the fundamental doctrine of religion in general, let us pass on to that of Christianity in particular. 'The Catholic faith is this: that we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity.' How, asks the objector, can the One be the Many, or the Many One? or how is a distinction of Persons compatible with their perfect equality? Is it not a contradiction to say that we are compelled by the Christian Verity, to acknowledge every Person by Himself, to be God and Lord; and yet are forbidden by the Catholic Religion to say, 'There be three Gods or three Lords'?" Lect. vi., p. 174.

In reply to this objection of "Rationalism," he first contends

that it would equally apply to a plurality of *Attributes* as to a plurality of *Persons*; and then, instead of striving to clear up either difficulty, formally renounces the use of reason in such subjects, and almost apologizes for having said anything rational respecting them:

“I should not for an instant dream of adding this metaphysical parallel, as offering the slightest approach to a *proof* of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in Unity. What it really illustrates is not God's nature, but man's ignorance. Without an Absolute knowing, there can be no comprehension of absolute being. The position of human reason, with regard to the ideas of the absolute and the infinite, is such as equally to exclude the dogmatism which would demonstrate Christian doctrine from philosophical premises, and the Rationalism which rejects it on the ground of philosophical difficulties, as well as that monstrous combination of both which distorts it in pretending to systematize it. The Infinite is known to human reason merely as the negation of the Finite; we know what it is not, and that is all. The conviction *that* an Infinite Being exists, seems forced on us by the manifest incompleteness of our finite knowledge; but we have no rational means whatever of determining *what* is the nature of that Being. The mind is thus perfectly blank with regard to any speculative representation of the Divine Essence; and for that very reason philosophy is not entitled, on internal evidence, to accept any, or to reject any. The only question which we are reasonably at liberty to ask in this matter relates to the evidences of the Revelation as a fact. If there is sufficient evidence, on other grounds, to show that the Scripture, in which this doctrine is contained, is a Revelation from God, the doctrine itself must be unconditionally received, not as reasonable, nor as unreasonable, but as Scriptural. If there is not such evidence, the doctrine itself will lack its proper support; but the reason which rejects it is utterly incompetent to substitute any other representation in its place.”—*Ib.*, p. 179.

These sentences grate strangely on Protestant ears, and here, at all events, they overshoot their mark, *for he is commenting on the Creed!*—“excludes alike Dogmatism, and Rationalism, and that monstrous combination of both which only distorts the Christian Doctrine in pretending to systematize it.” The Arians say such things, I know, of the Athanasian Creed;—is this what *he* intends? Nay, he is only aiming at his German cognates in the dark, and drives his thunderbolt into the very centre of the Christian Synthesis. Is not the Athanasian Creed a Dogmatism? and a Rationalism?—a “Speculative Representation of the Divine Essence,” slowly and systematically

elaborated by the Church? Or does he seriously believe it to be a "Revelation," or a Scripture-revelation? and that it came, Koran-like, from the seventh heaven, in the seventh century, written with a pen from Gabriel's wing, which it were impious to scrutinize? Grotesque as this conception is, it is the only one consistent with the bulk of his book; so we must accept it.

23. For Christianity is to him not merely a vast historic whole, whose parts illustrate and sustain each other, but a supernaturally-connected-whole, every part of which is proved true [i. e. regulatively true], by whatever proves any part; and which, on the other hand, would be totally demolished by the demolition of a fragment. And this whole includes with him not only the Scriptures, old and new, but also our whole doctrinal synthesis, at least in its modern form—the Creeds, Articles, Prayer-book, and the Evangelical Doctrines of Justification, Mediation, Atonement, Verbal Inspiration, &c.—for all this he quotes expressly. And all this is to be accepted *as a whole*, on *non-internal* evidence; and is not to be criticized on any account whatever. I quote some passages from the concluding sermon:—

"We may not say, for example, that certain parts of the Christian scheme are unwise or unrighteous, though outweighed by greater acts of righteousness and wisdom: we are bound to believe that we were mistaken from the first in supposing them to be unwise or unrighteous at all. In a matter of which we are so ignorant and so liable to be deceived, the objection which fails to prove everything proves nothing; from him that hath not is taken away even that which he seemeth to have. And on the other hand, an objection which really proves anything proves everything. If the teaching of Christ is in any one thing not the teaching of God, it is in all things the teaching of man."—*Lect.*, p. 247.

"Are you prepared to affirm, as the result of the whole inquiry, that Jesus of Nazareth was an impostor, or an enthusiast, or a mythical figment, and his disciples crafty and designing, or well-meaning but deluded, men? For, be assured, that nothing short of this is the conclusion which you must maintain if you reject one jot or tittle of the whole doctrine of Christ. Either He was what He proclaimed himself to be—the Incarnate Son of God, the Divine Saviour of a fallen world—and if so, we may not divide God's revelation, and dare to put asunder what He has joined together; or the civilized world, for eighteen centuries, has been deluded by a cunningly devised fable."—*Ib.*, p. 249.

“Many who would shrink with horror from the idea of rejecting Christ altogether, will yet speak and act as if they were at liberty to set up for themselves an eclectic Christianity, separating the essential from the superfluous portion of Christ’s teaching; deciding for themselves how much is permanent and necessary for all men, and how much is temporary, and designed only for a particular age and people. Yet, if Christ is indeed God manifest in the flesh, it is surely scarcely less impious to attempt to improve His teaching than to reject it altogether. Nay, in one respect, it is more so, for it is to acknowledge a doctrine as the revelation of God, and at the same time to proclaim that it is inferior to the wisdom of men.”—*Ib.*, p. 250.

“If a single miracle is even admitted as supported by competent evidence the entire history is at once removed from the ordinary calculations of more or less probability. One miracle is sufficient to show that the series of events with which it is connected is one which the Almighty has seen fit to mark by exceptions to the ordinary course of His Providence; and this being once granted, we have no *à priori* grounds to warrant us in asserting that the number of such exceptions ought to be larger or smaller. If any one miracle recorded in the Gospels—the Resurrection of Christ, for example—be ever admitted as true, the remainder cease to have any antecedent improbability at all, and require no greater evidence to prove them than is needed for the most ordinary events of any other history.”—*Ib.*, p. 252.

“Our right to criticize at all depends on this one question: ‘What think ye of Christ? whose Son is He?’ . . . If He be not this [i.e. the Son of God], His moral teaching began with falsehood, and was propagated by delusion. And if He is this, what but contempt and insult can be found in this half allegiance which criticizes while it bows; which sifts and selects while it submits; which approves or rejects, as its reason, or its feelings, or its nervous sensibilities may dictate?”—*Ib.*, p. 253.

“The witness which Christ offers of Himself either proves everything or it proves nothing. No man has a right to say, I will accept Christ as I like and reject Him as I like; I will follow His holy example; I will turn away from His atoning sacrifice; I will listen to His teaching; I will have nothing to do with His mediation.”—*Ib.*, p. 255.

Let us ask the meaning of this lofty declamation. We are not to take from it one jot or tittle, nor add a tittle to it! To *what*? To “the whole doctrine of Christ.” Does this mean (1) Christ’s *personal* teaching? And is then the whole Pentecostal endowment of the Church, “leading it into all truth,” “abiding with it for ever,” and enabling it to develop itself Organically, Scripturally, and Doctrinally, “an *impious* attempt to improve

His teaching?" Or is it (2) "the whole Bible," which it is now a common paralogism to confound with **THE WORD**, or the *only* Word of God? Must then the Creeds be omitted? and the Protestant Confessions? and the Prayer-book and Articles, and our whole dogmatic theology;—are *they* the impiety? Or is it (3) the whole doctrine which "the Spirit of Christ" taught to both predecessors and followers of the Lord—in fact, "the entire history"—the "whole series of events, centering round and hinging on the Sacrifice of Christ?" This last is plainly his meaning,—as it ought to be. Only we must be distinct; for *this* series of events is a very large one indeed. It includes, first, the whole Dispensation of Grace, from the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world to the Lamb slain on Calvary, and thence to His Second Advent, and beyond it; next, it includes the whole Dispensation of Providence: "for," says our Lord, "the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son, that all men might honour the Son even as they honour the Father;" and, lastly, it includes the whole of Nature and Creation, visible and invisible: for, says St. Paul, "by Christ were all things created, both in heaven and earth; all things were created by Him, and for Him; and He is before all things, and in Him do all things consist." It would not be easy to add many jots or tittles to this summation, nor to take therefrom. All this not only is involved in the Christian Scheme, in the estimation of reason; but is expressly, by Scripture, identified with Christ. And if it were not so, reason might add, **CHRIST** would not be **GOD**. But, surely, Dean Mansel, all this is not exempt from criticism? This whole doctrine and entire history includes the Œcumenical Council and the Syllabus, as well as the Bampton Lectures and the Positive Philosophy, to say nothing of the Koran or the Book of Mormon; and if we be debarred from Criticism, we may as well acknowledge at once the Infallibility of the Pope, and the last Roman Development,—"**There is no God: and Mary is His Mother.**"

Seriously, his main criticism of the Matter of Christianity is that of the above extracts. "We have no faculties to judge of the things of God;" *therefore*, any professed revelation, or any pro-

fessed religion, must be either rejected as a whole or accepted as a whole, without modification or curtailment; "whatever proves any part proves all: whatever disproves anything disproves everything." When broadly stated, no proposition could be more irrational, nor any lead in practice to more sublime absurdity. Admit the Resurrection or even the Crucifixion, and we must admit at least the Thundering Legion and the Visions of Auvergne; to dispute any of the latter is to affirm the first "imposture!" It is only the position of its author which brings such reasoning within the pale of Criticism. But as he intends it as a Kritical Canon for silencing Bible Criticism, and it is seriously so used by his admirers, let us test its value by an elementary example.

We have seen that his notion of "the whole" is a very comprehensive one. He quotes as belonging to it doctrines and documents whose composition stretches over 3000 years. But we shall allow him every latitude. I suppose he would include in it at least the New Testament; or at least the Gospels; or at least the first of them. Let us apply it then to Saint Matthew's, and open its first page. "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ; the son of David; the son of Abraham." Is this exact? Oh, yes: sufficiently: "son" means "remote descendant," as often in Scripture and in other ancient documents. Very good: we admit this to be a rational and just criticism, and proceed. We next find nine or [eight] generations,—[Phares]* Esrom, Aram, Aminadab, Naasson, Salmon, Boaz, Obed, and Jesse,—to occupy at least 940 years; and are surprised.

* I mark [Phares] doubtful, for his sons Hesrom and Hamul were born in Canaan before the descent into Egypt. Gen. xlii. 12. The 940 years *at least* are thus made up:—

For the sojourning in Egypt, 480 years. Ex. xii. 41.

For the sojourning in the desert, 40 years. Acts xiii. 18.

In the conquest of Canaan, 20 or 80 years.

From the *conclusion* of it till Samuel the Prophet, 450 years. Acts xiii. 19 & 20.

Attempts are made to shorten some of these dates, but they only tend to multiply the inaccuracies or contradictions. I *diminish* the time as far as possible by making Samuel synchronize with Jesse. Yet it was in Samuel's old age [1. Sam. viii. 5] that the misconduct of his sons obliged the election of Saul, who was one [common] generation older than David.

This amounts to a continual miracle without any apparent purpose or effect. Explanations are offered, none of which is either critical or satisfactory except upon the hypothesis of more than one inaccuracy *somewhere*. However, we go on to v. 8; and there read, "And Ozias begat Joatham." But we find, on turning to the history in either Kings or Chronicles, that Ozias did no such thing; but that three whole royal generations—Ahaz, Amaziah, and Uzziah—are omitted from the genealogy; while yet we are told in v. 17, that "all the generations from David to the carrying "away into Babylon are *fourteen* generations,"—instead of *seventeen*, as the history records. Now *which* is accurate? Whether shall we take away the jots and tittles from the history or add them to the genealogy? or shall we attempt to justify *both* statements; and succeed about as well, as though one wished to justify "twice four are nine," or "some white is black?" There is more than one palpable inaccuracy, which no ingenuity can hide. Now, according to Dean Mansel, "the objection which proves anything proves everything," and we are bound to say the Lord Jesus Christ is an impostor, and so forth—I spare my readers the enumeration—or else we must say that our sense and senses are mistaken! This new Canon for overriding Criticism may be useful to Pope Pius the Ninth; and to him I respectfully commend it.

But possibly some one may say, the genealogies are not "the teaching of Christ." Then we must ask again, *what* is? What "means the whole doctrine," "the entire history," or any other of these imposing synonyms? Did our Lord dictate the Athanasian Creed in the fifth or seventh century, or the doctrines of Atonement and Mediation in the fifteenth, as above referred to? But as if it were expressly to rebuke such rashness, He "who has caused all Holy Scripture to be written for our learning" has caused just such inaccuracy to appear in the report of our Lord's own addresses. For example, in this same Gospel, ch. xxiii., 45, our Lord is made to say, "From the blood of righteous Abel to the blood of Zacharias, *the son of Barachias*, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar." Any plain reader on referring to Chronicles [2 Chr. xxiv. 20, 21], would

surmise that some very early transcriber had made the mistake—natural to him and to his readers, with whom copies of the Bible were not numerous—of confounding Zechariah the Prophet, with whom they were familiar, and who wrote *circ.* B. c. 520, with the other Zacharias, *son of Jehoiada*, slain *circ.* B. c. 840, whom they had forgotten. But not so the Dean of St. Paul's ; if we reject "one jot or tittle," the divine authority of Scripture is at an end, and the whole superstructure of Christianity is demolished ! Our right to criticize at all depends on the question what we think of Christ. Either He was an impostor, or else Zecharias, son of Barachias, is the same as Zacharias, the son of Jehoiada. Will the Œcumenical Council excel this ?

25. We must notice in fine his Kritik upon the Evidences. These, as may be seen by the extracts, he thinks should be mainly or exclusively "external." Indeed, he holds that,

"The crying evil of the present day in religious controversy is the neglect or contempt of the external evidences of Christianity: the first step towards the establishment of a sound religious philosophy must consist in the restoration of these evidences to their true place in the theological system," p. 238.

We *are* then to have "a sound religious philosophy," some time ; though we have no faculties to criticize or correct religion, or "to substitute any other representation in its place," in case any portion of it should prove inaccurate. And to its "first step," he does make, I acknowledge, a signal contribution. The external evidences, he insists, are miracles ; and his notion of miracles is that extremely crude and quasi-philosophical one that they are violations or suspensions of Nature's Laws—"which, as being God's laws, their Author may of course suspend at will." Now, he remembers that God has imposed *other* laws besides natural laws—moral laws, for example—which also might be suspended. And he is candid enough to confront the farther question: Would such suspension constitute a miracle? To which he replies, Of course, "it would be a *moral miracle*:"—and therefore, we presume, available for evidence? To which he still says "Yes," virtually or expressly. "So that it is an intelligible question in this new philosophy,—How much suspension

or violation of a moral law—of the sixth, seventh, or eighth Commandments, for example—will be enough to evidence a revelation?" He hardly shrinks from this *reductio ad absurdum*; in fact it is his *rationale* of the severities of Joshua! These were *Evidences*—not by virtue of the amazing power exhibited, or the just retribution involved, or of the promises fulfilled; but—as being *moral miracles*, i. e. signal violations of the command "Thou shalt do no murder!" *Too much*, he is careful to acknowledge, of either natural or moral miracle might damage Nature and Providence; but a properly regulated amount of them constitutes "the proper" evidence of revelation! This is scarcely travestie. Hear himself. He had just quoted Bishop Butler's apology for Joshua, and he proceeds:—

"There is, indeed, an obvious analogy between those temporary suspensions of the laws of moral obligation and that corresponding suspension of the laws of natural phenomena which constitutes our ordinary conception of a miracle. So much so, indeed, that the former might, without impropriety, be designated as *moral miracles*. In both the Almighty is regarded as suspending, for special purposes, not the eternal laws which constitute His own Absolute Nature, but the created laws, which He imposed at a certain time upon a particular portion of his creatures. Both are isolated and rare in their occurrence, and apparently, from the nature of the case, must be so, in order to unite harmoniously with the normal manifestations of God's government of the world. A perpetual series of physical miracles would destroy that confidence in the regularity of the course of nature which is indispensable to the cultivation of man's intellectual and productive energies; a permanent suspension of practical duties would be similarly prejudicial to the cultivation of his moral character. But the isolated character of both classes of phenomena removes the objection"—*ib.*, p. 245; and restores them to "their true place in the theological system."

And one has only to remark, in fine, that this new "sound religious philosophy" and "theological system" is *not* to be "scientific," "speculative," nor, in spite of this signal contribution, "progressive." For,

"The conclusion which an examination of the conditions of human thought unavoidably forces upon us is this: there can be no such thing as a positive science of speculative theology; for such a science must necessarily be based on an apprehension of the Infinite; and the Infinite, though we are com-

pelled to believe in its existence, cannot be positively apprehended in any mode of the human consciousness. The same impediment which prevents the *formation* of theology as a science, is also manifestly fatal to the theory which asserts its *progressive development*—p. 257. The italics are his.

It will be a “regulative” system, therefore; and we must hope that the Moral Miracles at least will be defined so metaphysically as to be *not* understood of the people.

25. In a subsequent writing—his contribution to a useful volume, the *Aids to Faith*—he seems to forget the moral miracles, and also his former definition of a miracle; at least he acknowledges that “if, by referring miracles to a law, no more is meant than that they, like other events, formed part of God’s purpose from the beginning, and were the result, not of sudden caprice, but of a preordained plan, by which provision was made for them, that they should be wrought at their proper time and place, without disturbing the economy of the universe; such an expression, allowing for the necessary imperfection of all human terms, when applied to divine things, is, perhaps, the most true and reverent conception of those events we are capable of forming,” p. 22. This is a vast advance upon the old negative idea, supposes us able to think rationally and “reverently” on subjects which so nearly concern us, and seems half ashamed of the “impiety, contempt, and insult.” Possibly, therefore, he might admit that *something* more might be said of miracles, without irreverence, than that they probably come under law. Has he any objection to our trying to search out what the law is, and how far it is like or unlike to any other laws we know? Does he agree, for example, with the suggestion of p. 11, as to the effect and use of miracles; with pp. 53, 75, 243, note, 350, as to their place and nature; or with p. 270, as to the natural theory of evidence; or can he teach us better? Such as these, surely, are rational and Christian inquiries, how remote soever from the tone of the antithesis. It looks also as if he had recanted his antipathy to criticism; at least if he at all agree with the sentiments of his fellow-authors, who seem to take especial pains not to be partakers of his interdict. Witness this passage,

for instance, from the next Essay, Bishop Fitzgerald's, which one might hope the Dean will learn by heart:—

“It is the putting of Christianity on other grounds; it is the claim of authority to silence doubt; it is *the discouragement of inquiry, the contempt of reason, the depreciation of the intellect in religious matters*; it is the shrinking from light and correction, the suffering pure truth to be encrusted with prejudices and mistakes for fear of unsettling men's minds; it is the borrowing of the arts and language that are the common signs of imposture by the friends of truth, and leaving its own bold speech and open ways to its enemies; it is *these unworthy methods that deprive the lower classes of the safeguards* which, with such a religion, they ought to have for the security of their faith.”—p. 68.

Or this from the next author, Dr. M'Caul:—

“Let, then, Science pursue her boundless course, and multiply her discoveries in the heavens and in the earth. The believer is persuaded that they will only show more clearly that ‘the words of the Lord are pure words, as silver tried in a furnace of fire, purified seven times.’ Let Criticism also continue her profoundly interesting and important work. *Let her explore, sift, analyze, scrutinize with all her powers, the documents, language, and contents of Scripture, and honestly tell us the results.* Since the day when Laurentius Valla exposed the fiction of the Imperial donation, she has contributed much to the removal of error, and the advancement of literary, patristic, and historic truth; and Divine revelation has also been illustrated by her labours. It might be shown that even the hostile and sceptical have involuntarily helped in the confirmation of the Christian verity, *and that even their labours cannot be neglected without loss.*”—p. 233.

This is as it should be; and we can only trust that the Dean will soon, in this good company, dismiss his unfixed idea, abandon the contradiction between faith and reason, and labour to advance their harmony.

NOTE B.—(SER. I., p. 27. SER. II., p. 50, *et passim*.)

1. I HAVE avoided throughout this volume, the common terms and propositions of the great Justification Controversy, although the substance of it has been, I hope, pretty carefully discussed. I have avoided them (1) because they are profoundly ambiguous; and (2) because the example of the Church Catechism shows that a complete, or even detailed, system of Christian doctrine—Creeds, Commandments, Prayer, and Sacraments—can be expounded without their aid. My first intention was to follow that example still more rigidly than I have done,—to state the things firmly, and omit altogether the ambiguous terminology. But it is only in a brief document that such reticence is possible, or indeed, considering that the terms are Scriptural, desirable. I have therefore indicated occasionally the bearing of my own positions on the questions of the day, and will discuss them more explicitly in this note.

And first, as to the substance of the controversy. Its importance cannot be overrated. It is *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*: on it depend our conceptions of God, of Christ, of Christianity. How shall a man be justified at the last? What will God accept? This is the question of questions, and the answer must direct our life. Does any Church possess a Covenant, or any Creed a Shibboleth, to frank us on easy terms? Will it avail us to be the Seed of Abraham or his Christian Seed; to have been elected into the Jewish or the Christian Church, and Circumcised, or Sacramented? Or to have belonged to an enlightened Church, and possess all mysteries and all knowledge, and faith for removing mountains? Or will nothing really avail us except our personal character such as God discerns it,—our ingrained love and habit of the virtuous and holy, and our hatred of their opposites? And if this last alone be the measure of *our* acceptance, is it the same for all mankind? Is God a respecter of persons, and has He one rule for the

Christian, another for the non-Christian world? Or if not directly, has He indirectly, by attaching some value to Church-obedience, or Faith, or Bible Doctrine, or the Prayers of others, beyond their subjective results, their actual effects upon the character?

Again, if this "real righteousness" be the *measure* of our acceptance, What is the cause or *Ground* of it? Is God free to disregard all other considerations except our character? Specially is He free to disregard our past sins; our transgressions of His Laws, natural or revealed; our manifold violations of the standard of right He has made known to each of us? What legislature or executive could justly or wisely pretermit the past, and regard only the present and the future? Would not this derange or destroy the principles of Rule? Or is the Universal Rule less bound to enforce its dicta than any lower government?

These questions seem to exhaust the Justification Controversy; and to ask them distinctly is also, I think, to answer them as firmly; for surely the answers are explicit or axiomatic, as we understand Christianity. Our true character is alone the measure of acceptance. There will be no favour to Church, or doctrine, or faith, or sacrament. These are indeed vast advantages as engines for the regeneration of character; but, like all God's blessings, they do either good or *harm* according to their use: So far as they sanctify, that is, purify the heart and exalt the principles of conduct, they save; so far as they do not, they only enhance the condemnation. And God *is* free to follow this Universal Rule, (1) because it is Equitable; and EQUITY is everywhere more or less explicitly announced as His Essential Attribute; and (2) because He who has made us, and knows whereof we are made, has also made Eternal Provision for reconciling our frailty with His High Requirements. Emmanuel, God-in-things, takes on Himself the cost of satisfying eternal justice; and this fundamental MERCY is also everywhere more or less explicitly announced as God's Essential Attribute.

Or, in the language of the Church Catechism,—“Secondly, I learn to believe in God-the-Son, who *hath* redeemed me and

all mankind." "Redeemed" us all, as I have expounded in Ser. iii., (1) from death ; (2) from guilt, or curse, or the objective estate of alienation from God ; and (3) has purchased or purchased back the Gifts, or graduated operations of the Holy Ghost, to work our subjective reconciliation.

This last, as expounded in the other sermons, *and this alone*, is the function of Churches, Bibles, Doctrines, Sacraments ; which are all subordinate instruments of "God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God." By this incessant ministration many are called, but few chosen. All, however, "will be dealt with equitably, each according to what he has received." The estate of each will be "determined by his own character" as ultimately formed. Each will be rewarded or punished strictly in proportion as he has imbibed, or has resisted, the measure vouchsafed to him of the Pervading SPIRIT of GOOD. Christ, or Christ's Redemption, has satisfied all other claims.

These surely are our axiomatic or well-established doctrines, and exhaust the *substance* of the controversy.

2. As to its common terms ; I have said they are profoundly ambiguous, and on this ambiguity has the controversy hung. Justification itself and its common synonyms—Righteousness, or God's or Christ's Righteousness, whether imputed, imparted, conveyed, declared, reckoned, or applied ; or Pardon, Acceptance, Forgiveness, Remission of Sins ; or even the special Gospel terms, Atonement, Propitiation, Reconciliation, Grace—all have in this controversy about three meanings ; (1) a purely Objective, or Redemption-sense ;—the Grace wrought out once for all by Christ ; St. Paul's Justification by Christ, or "Justification by His blood," Rom. v. 9, *sqq.* (2) A purely Subjective or Sanctification-sense ;—Grace realized by each individual, and thenceforth working within him ; St. Paul's "justification by faith," Rom. v. 1, *sqq.* ; St. James' "justification by works," or the justification of the Publican, p. 49. (3) A mixture of both, which passes insensibly from one meaning to the other, until both readers and writers have lost any clear conception of the difference. And then the practical blunders follow. The merits of Christ's Sacrifice are ascribed, in whole or in part, to the

sanctification-instruments or "means of Grace," and thence emerge the various faith-and-doctrine-worships, sacrament-worships, bibliolatries, and worse, which bewilder and disgrace the Church.

Thus, to take a prominent example, all three meanings appear for the word justification itself, within a few lines of each other, in the Church of England Articles. In Art. xiii., as quoted, p. 49, and also in Art. xii., it is purely subjective. In the heading and first part of Art. xi., the formal Article "on Justification," it is objective,—“ We are accounted righteous before God, only for the merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ ;” while by ascribing this even there to *faith*; and by using as a synonymous expression in the next clause “ we are justified by faith,” it formally introduces the third meaning, commonly called Forensic Justification, which is, indeed, a formal endeavour to combine the two ;—to this effect, “ we are accounted righteous by God acting judicially, i. e. *in Foro Cœlorum* ; and also by faith acting instrumentally, i. e. *in foro conscientie!*” The profoundest of English thinkers have seldom been sufficiently careful of their terms. Locke’s definitions of knowledge and idea destroy his system, by reducing it to sheer idealism. Butler’s definition of religion omits a future life, which yet he declares essential to it ; while his special doctrine of future life omits Christianity. The above looseness of expression on so cardinal a subject, though due to reverence for Scripture phrases not yet discriminated, has proved an uncertainty in the Church of England, and has weakened her protest. It is, however, only a mild example of the ambiguities prevalent on the subject, and of which forensic justification itself is rather a simplification than otherwise. It seems my duty to pursue these somewhat further. I will confine myself to two authors ; the ablest of their class ; and each a master of precise and careful diction. If they speak uncertainly, what can we hope from others? The questions will be very much of words, that is, to those who are clear-minded about the things ; to others they are questions of misleading words, which seriously misstate the things. Let my young readers, therefore, bear in mind the

broad distinction of the Catechism, and the two Key-words there appropriated. When applied to the justification controversy, they will give us three propositions :—(1). There is JUSTIFICATION, by Christ, *in Foro Cælorum* ; as a part or the whole of Redemption. (2). There is *justification*, by faith, or by faith and works, *in conscientia et vita* ; as a part or the whole of Sanctification. And both these doctrines are true and profoundly important. (3). Forensic and Ecclesiastical ‘justifications,’ as distinguished from the other two, or rather as ‘undistributed’ between them, are only misleading verbiage.

3. DR. NEWMAN’S *Lectures on Justification* advocate the High Sacramental or rather Baptismal view, and try to prove it accordant with the Church of England, as he then understood, or tried to mould its teaching. Subsequent events do not detract from the importance of this interesting book, from which I will quote freely. With very much of it one cordially or reverently agrees. Nowhere are our fundamental truths more richly or impressively set forth.

For instance, our Main Distinction, p. 234 :—

“ Christ’s work of mercy has two chief parts, as specified in the text [Rom. iv. 25] : What He did for all men, what He does for each ; what He did once for all, what He does for one by one, continually ; what He did externally to us, what He does within us ; what He did on earth, what He does in heaven ; what He did in His own person, what He does by His Spirit ; His death, and the water and the blood after it ; His meritorious sufferings, and the various gifts thereby purchased, of pardon, grace, reconciliation, renewal, holiness, spiritual communion ; that is His Atonement, and the application of His Atonement, or His Atonement, and our justification ; He atones by the offering of Himself on the Cross ; and, as certainly, which is the point before us, He justifies by the mission of His Spirit.

“ His atonement is His putting away the wrath of God for our sins. In order to this, He took flesh ; He accomplished it in His own Person, by His Crucifixion and death. Justification is the application of this precious Atonement to this person or that person, and this He accomplishes by His Spirit. For he ceased, I say, to act towards us by His own hand from the day of His ascension. He sent His Spirit to take His place :—‘ I will not leave you orphans,’ He says, ‘ I will come to you.’—‘ I will pray the Father, and He shall give you another Comforter, that He may abide with you for ever.’ Whatever then is done in the Christian Church, is done by

the Spirit; Christ's mission ended when He left the world: He was to come again, but by His Spirit. The Holy Spirit realizes and completes the redemption [*sic*] which Christ has wrought in essence and virtue. If the justification, then, of the sinner be a continued work, a work under the New Covenant, it *must* be the Spirit's work, and not [*sic*] Christ's. The Atonement for sin took place during His mission, and He was the sole Agent; the application of that Atonement takes place during the mission of His Spirit, who, accordingly, is the Sole Agent in it."

To some expressions one might object; I have marked two:—"Redemption" was "Completed" once for all, as he is himself insisting; and what Christ does by His Spirit, He does Himself, *e. g.*, the "abiding" referred to. But this, perhaps, is hypercriticism. With the main statement one totally agrees, and especially with the thesis of this lecture, Lec. ix., which they professedly expand:—*Ib.*

"Whatever is done to us by the Spirit, is done *within* us. Whatever is done in the Church since Christ's ascension, is done by the Spirit; from which it follows that our justification, being a present work, is an *internal* work and a work of the Spirit."

Justification then, as thus defined, is altogether subjective and internal,—is a work of the Spirit, and, therefore, a part of Sanctification, in the sense of the Catechism. It is, also, as he has shown in previous lectures, the "Gift of Christ," procured or purchased by His Atonement, and consequent on His Resurrection. And its real nature is the Indwelling of the Holy Ghost:—p. 160.

"Now, a truth is most explicitly promised us in Scripture, which accurately answers to this description, as being at once the special fruit of Christ's Sacrifice, and, also, an inward gift possessed and residing within us; I mean the *habitation* in us of God the Father, and the word Incarnate through the Holy Ghost. If this be so, we have found what we sought:—this is to be justified, to receive the Divine Presence within us, and be made a Temple of the Holy Ghost."

4. And he vindicates the philosophy of this Indwelling in a noble passage, which my readers will be glad to have entire:—*Ib.*

“God is everywhere as absolutely and entirely as if He were nowhere else, and it seems to be essential to the existence of every creature rational and irrational, good and evil, in heaven and hell, that, in some sense or other, He should be present with them, and be their life. Thus, we are told, concerning mankind, that ‘in Him we live, and move, and have our being.’ And He who lives in all creatures on earth, in order to their mortal life, lives in Christians in a more divine way, in order to their life immortal. And as we do not know how the Creation lives and exists in Him as a Creator, and use words about it beyond our comprehension, so much more (were not comparison out of the question), are we ignorant of this mode or nature of that life of God in the soul, which is the well-spring of the Christian’s sanctity and the seed of everlasting happiness. If this notion of the literal indwelling of God within us, whether in the way of nature or of grace, be decried as a sort of mysticism, I ask in reply, whether it can possibly be but that His presence is in us, if He is everywhere; and, whether the same tone of reasoning, which denies that it is, does not also tend to deny the doctrine of His literal Omnipresence. So much in behalf of the general doctrine of God’s presence in all His works. And, if He is everywhere, and dwells in all, there is no antecedent objection against taking Scripture literally, no difficulty in supposing that the truth is as Scripture says,—that as He dwells in us in one mode in the way of nature, so He is in us in another in the way of grace; that His infinite and incomprehensible essence, which once existed by and in itself alone, and thus at the Creation so far communicated itself to His works, as to sustain what He had brought into existence, and that according to the different degrees of life necessary for their respective perfection, may in the Christian Church manifest itself in act and virtue in the hearts of Christians, as far surpassing what it is in unregenerate man, as its presence in man excels its presence in a brute or a vegetable. And those who without any antecedent still refuse to accept the literal interpretation of Scripture, should be reminded that, since the promise expressly runs that we shall be made one *as* the Father and the Son are One, we are necessarily led either to think highly of the union of the Christian with God, or to disparage that of the Father and the Son; and that such School of religion as maintains that the former is but figurative, will certainly be led at length to deny the real union of our Lord with His Father, and from avoiding mysticism, will verge and fall upon what is called Unitarianism.”

That is, I suppose, the Creative Father gradually causes us to grow up into the consciousness of His Pervading Life, and to aspire increasingly to its intelligent Communion. This just and lofty view of the nature of our holiness, whether called justification or not, might surely raise it above external means,

except as materials for its exercise. Yet his theory is, that this "Indwelling" is conveyed by the Sacraments, and especially by Baptism, and especially by infant baptism: "by appointment," "mysteriously," or miraculously; almost or altogether independently of consciousness or intelligence,—faith itself being either changed into faith *in them*, or else reduced to some supernumerary and unassignable place, as a passive or negative condition.

5. His line of argument is to this effect:—The Protestant doctrine of "Justification by faith only" is *erroneous*; the Roman doctrine of "Justification by obedience" is *defective*; whereupon he, first, supplements the latter by adding to it Luther's Forensic Justification; and then, after noticing that this last is itself "a sort of Sacrament" "with an outer and an inner part," he tries to correct and enrich all by combining them in his own doctrine of Sacramental, or rather Baptismal, Justification. And, as the Sacraments themselves are double, and one has always to ask whether the sign or the thing signified be meant, it is clear that we shall have the two parallel ambiguities of forensic and sacramental justifying, which his effort is to make coincident. Let us follow his own order; and it will save us a continual *distinguo* if I mark the different senses of the main word by a particular notation. Objective Justification, therefore, or Justification by Christ, I shall spell with a Capital, subjective justification with a common letter. When both are mixed, so that it is the undistributed middle of an argument or proposition, I shall write it thus, 'justification,' within single inverted commas; doing the same also with Righteousness when used avowedly as 'its' synonym.

6. A fair example, perhaps, is his statement of the case, which, as notated, runs thus, p. 62:—

"The main point in dispute is this: whether or not the Moral Law [I preserve throughout Dr. Newman's capital to Law] can be fulfilled or satisfied by the regenerate. Augustine says, that whereas we are by nature condemned by the Law, the Spirit enables us to perform it unto justification: Luther, that whereas we are condemned by it, Christ has Himself performed it unto our Justification;—Augustine, that our righteousness is active:

Luther, that It is passive ;—Augustine, that it is inherent : Luther, that It is imputed only ;—Augustine, that it consists in a change of heart : Luther, [‘ it ’] in a change of ‘ state. ’ Luther maintains that God’s commandments are impossible to man : Augustine adds, impossible without His grace ;—Luther, that the ‘ Gospel ’ consists of promises only : Augustine, that it is also a Law ;—Luther, that our highest wisdom is not to know the Law : Augustine says, instead, to know and keep it ;—Luther says, that the Law and Christ cannot dwell together in the heart : Augustine says, that the Law is Christ ;—Luther denies, and Augustine maintains, that obedience is a matter of conscience ; Luther says, that a man is made a Christian not by working, but by hearing : Augustine excludes those works only which are done before ‘ Grace ’ given ; Luther, that our best deeds are sins : Augustine, that they are really pleasing to God. Luther says, that faith is taken instead of ‘ righteousness : ’ Augustine, in earnest of righteousness ;—Luther, that faith is all in all, as being a substitute for the Law : Augustine, as being its commencement ;—Luther says, that faith, as such, renews the heart : Augustine says, a loving faith ;—Luther would call faith the tree, and works the fruit ; Augustine, rather, the inward life or grace of God, or love the tree, and renewal the fruit. The School of Luther accuse their opponents of self-righteousness : and they retort on them the charge of self-indulgence ; the one say, that directly aiming at good works fosters pride : the other, that not doing so sanctions licentiousness.”

This elaborate contrast is not in favour of the Great Reformer, and one is glad to be reminded, in a note, that he “ indirectly renounced the extravagant parts of his doctrine at the end of life : that is, the distinctive parts.” But in many of the antitheses, the ambiguity is patent ; I do not ascribe it to Dr. Newman more than to the others. But now he proceeds to supplement *this* doctrine of St. Augustine [for he does not conceal that this is not the whole of St. Augustine’s meaning, and that such propositions had a very different significance to him and his hearers from what they are apt to convey to Protestant ears], by adding to it Luther’s forensic theory ; for doing which, indeed, he apologizes to the Fathers. And he begins it early, indeed in this *Second* Lecture, by grappling with what is in truth a fundamental of the case, p. 42 :—

“ It is usual in the present day, to lay much stress on the *distinction* between deliverance from guilt, and deliverance from sin ; to lay down, as a first principle, that these are two coincident and contemporary, but alto-

gether independent benefits, to call them justification and renewal, and to consider that any confusion between them argues serious and alarming ignorance of Christian truth. Now, in opposition to this, it may surely be maintained, that Scripture itself blends them together as intimately as any system of theology can do; and that such a system is not thereby dark and ignorant unless Scripture is also. In truth, Scripture speaks of but one gift, which it sometimes calls renewal, sometimes justification, according as it views it,—passes to and fro from one to the other so rapidly, so abruptly, as to force upon us, irresistibly, the inference that they *are* really one. In other words, I would say that this distinction, so carefully made at present, is not Scriptural,—

Whereupon he adduces what seem to him Scriptural proofs “that we are forgiven *by being*, or *while we are* renewed, and that the present broad separation of ‘justification’ from sanctification, as if they were two gifts, is technical and unscriptural,” p. 44.

7. But, surely, this is a poor meaning of the words Scriptural and Unscriptural. Would it be Scriptural of a writer on the Second Advent to refuse to distinguish it from the First, because the prophets often or commonly combine them? Or, for a writer on the Trinity to insist on confounding the Persons, because the sacred writers really or apparently do so too? Nay, Dr. Newman would be the first to admit, or to insist, that systematic theology was not, humanly speaking, *possible* until the fulfilment of the Grand Facts on which it rests:—the Crucifixion, Resurrection, Pentecost; nay, much further on, the explicit Calling of the Gentiles, the Destruction of Jerusalem and its Temple-service, and the completion of the Scripture Canon. Vague intimations of Something Such were given universally; but, as to the Facts themselves and their true significance, kings and righteous men could only desire to see them, and did not see them. There was no greater prophet among them all than John the Baptist; yet, obviously in this respect, he that was least in the kingdom of God was greater than he. The Apostles themselves were not least, yet it is certain that, until after the events, not one of them could be got either to believe in *or to understand* even Christ's Death and Resurrection [Luke, xviii. 34; xxiv. 26]. Even our

Lord Himself, in His teaching, was obliged to give men chiefly Premises,—“having a baptism to be baptized with, and being straitened until it was accomplished,”—and found it necessary to leave the significancy both of His Words and Deeds to be gradually developed by His Paraclete. By *Him* was the Church endowed and organized, and its systematic truths evolved. The doctrine of Justification, in particular, owes its first emphatic assertion to St. Paul, and its two leading forms to St. Augustine and Martin Luther, and it has not yet ceased receiving illustration. To discriminate its parts and mark them by appropriate terms, was a real service both to theology and religion; and “Scriptural” arguments against it are scarcely more pertinent than if applied to St. John’s doctrine of the Logos, or St. Paul’s definition of a Jew. Essential religion and profound thought are each largely independent of words, and too often indifferent to them. But theology is scientific, or it is nothing. It aims to understand and to explain; and it must invent *or appropriate* a sufficient number of “terms of art” to register and communicate its knowledge.

And as to the above distinction itself, surely it is of the essence of the question. Between guilt and ‘sin;’ or between sin and sinfulness! What parent and child do not understand it well, and know its use in moral training? and what more suggestive to either of his relations to the skies? Surely, to remove it from theology were, in express terms, to remove “the Main Distinction,” which Dr. Newman has just stated so well, between the Lord Jesus Christ putting away sin by the Sacrifice of Himself, and the same Christ by His Holy Spirit cleansing our impurities.

8. On this ‘basis’ he proceeds in the next Lecture to prove “three positions which arise out of what has been said—first, that ‘justification’ is, properly speaking, a *declaration* of righteousness; secondly, that ‘it’ *precedes* renewal; and, thirdly, that ‘it’ is the *means, instrument, or cause* of renewal;” p. 71. The italics are his. And the ambiguities patent;—*Which* ‘justification’ is a ‘declaration;’—*Where?* Nay, justification is a declaration in the individual conscience, while Justification is a

[supposed] Declaration in heaven—everywhere more or less explicitly announced as well as by Church and Scripture. *This* Justification precedes renewal, for it precedes everything we know: the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world had already justified its whole procedure before it was a world. And the *sense* of this Justification, however attained, precedes in the individual his own renewal; nay, its realization *is* renewal, and is wrought by faith acting on the intimations given. Dr. Newman would hardly dispute these propositions, though he often seems to forget, and is fain to add to them. But this Lutheran addition to St. Augustine's doctrine is only a confusion. He proves his combination (1) Scripturally as before; and (2) by appealing to the Articles. His conclusion, p. 90, *notated*, is this:—" 'justification' is *both* a declaration, and a creation of 'righteousness;' and the proof twofold;—(1) Scripture "abundantly establishes both conclusions;" and (2) "both doctrines are laid down in our Articles, the former in the xi. Article, the latter in the xiii." Or, as he had more fully stated the second, in the beginning, p. 70:—

"In adopting the middle course I have thus prescribed to myself, I am but following out our Articles, which, in one place, speak of justification as synonymous with our being '*accounted* righteous before God;' following Luther; and in another as synonymous with '*the grace of Christ and the inspiration of His Spirit,*' following St. Austin and other Fathers." The italics are his.

"The middle course!" yes, the undistributed middle course, *pace* Luther and the Fathers.

9. Forensic justification being thus added to the ecclesiastical doctrine, in the hope, obviously, of conciliating both those who are, and those who are not satisfied with Luther's effort—he then proceeds to identify the two parts of justification, supposed inseparable, with the two parts of baptism, also supposed inseparable; and thence results the "High Sacramental" view, namely, that at the bidding of the "appointed" priest, the outward part of baptism *conveys*, and the inward part *is* the Divine Indwelling; or, as we may now call it, p. 214, "The fount of Grace which Holy Baptism has stored within us." Our justification now is, that "God [or the priest] has done his

part in *Baptism*, and we must now do ours," *ib.* ; or more fully, *Ib.* :—(The italics are mine).

"Christ's Atoning death, eighteen hundred years since, and our individual baptism in our infancy so changed our state in God's sight once for all, that henceforth salvation depends on ourselves, on our doing our part in the covenant"—"those gracious events put us indeed on a new footing, wiped out what was passed, set us off fair, and are still operative as gaining for us heaven."

"Those gracious events," separated "by 1800 years!" which of them did it "once for all?" and which are we to omit from our argument? our regards? our worship?

Indeed, all these latter are alike bewildered by this surprising complication. Baptismal Justification tries to weld into one conception at least four or five different things :—(1) Some amount of Redemption ; (2) some amount of Sanctification ; and several intermediates ; (3) and (4) "the outward instrument, Baptism," itself consisting of at least two very different parts, and (5) "The inward instrument," Faith. And the endeavour to combine these in an undiscriminated formula not only banishes logical argument and clear conception, but inverts the meaning of common words. For instance, Baptism, the "outward" instrument, as being "the appointed," is the "mysterious," "supernatural," "active," and obviously the only real or effective instrument, i. e. of working "internal" righteousness. And faith occupies a still stranger position, being obviously an intruder. It is "the only internal instrument," i. e. as being receptive ; and though for some reason essential, is only a passive and "negative" condition ; and yet it is a *symbol*. Its nature indeed is changed by the rite : "Lively faith comes after regeneration not before," p. 266 ; or "Faith, then, as gaining its virtue from Baptism, is one thing before that sacred ordinance, another after ;—Baptism changes it from the condition into an instrument of justification," p. 276 ; but it is *always* a symbol, p. 286 :—

"To sum up what has been said :—The question has been in what senses faith *only* justifies, for that it is *necessary* to our justification all parties allow. I answer, it justifies only in two ways, as the only inward *instrument*, and as the only *symbol*. Viewed as an instrument, it unites the soul to Christ through the Sacraments ; viewed as a symbol, it shows forth the doctrine of free

grace. Hence it is the instrument of justification after Baptism; it is a symbol both before and after." The italics are his.

"An *inward* instrument" which is "always a *symbol*," and able to "*show forth* doctrine!" This seems at least a sufficient confusion of terms. Again, the righteousness "received" by this symbolic faith is hardly personal or inward righteousness, p. 217:—

"Whereas if, as I would maintain, the Presence of Christ is our true righteousness *first conveyed into us in Baptism*, then more sacredly and mysteriously in the Eucharist, we have really no inherent righteousness at all. What seems to be *inherent* may be more properly called *adherent*, depending as it does wholly and absolutely on the Divine Indwelling, not ours to keep, but as heat in a sickly person, *sustained by means external to itself*," p. 217.

And the Indwelling itself is an outward Indwelling; not our inmost life *and self*, which, with St. Paul, could repudiate *as not self* the law of sin he found "warring in his members;" Rom. vii., 17, *sqq.*; but rather something connected with those members, and able to prove itself divine, unconsciously to us, by our touch, our shadow, or our bones, p. 190:—

"Further, the effects of this indwelling gift in the Apostles are described as similar to those which our Lord allowed to appear in Himself; I mean it showed itself as a virtue going out of them, so as to obviate all conjecture of its being a mere act of the power of God External to themselves accompanying the word and deed, and not an effect through them, and from them. Thus of St. Paul it is said that 'God wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul, so that *from his body* were brought unto the sick handkerchiefs and aprons, and the evil spirits went out of them.' Again, 'By the hands of the Apostles were many signs and wonders wrought among the people; inasmuch that they brought forth the sick into the streets, and laid them on beds and couches that at least the *shadow* of Peter passing by might overshadow some of them.' The instance of the virtue of Elisha's bones in raising the dead is another remarkable instance of the inward Gift of the Spirit, and anticipates Gospel times."

"Remarkable instance" indeed of the *inward* gifts of the Spirit, anticipating *Gospel* times. Dr. Newman is conscious that this high doctrine of baptismal "virtue" rapidly inclines to

what men call by a very harsh term indeed, and he tries to repel or defend it by a new definition of " Superstition," p. 364 :—

" Superstition is the substitution of human for divine means of approaching God. . . . Thus it was a Superstition in the Jews to reject the Mosaic rites under the Law, and a Superstition to observe them under the Gospel. A Superstition to sacrifice to Baal then, and to keep the Sabbath now. It was a Superstition to worship graven images, no superstition to rise up and worship [*qu.*? what?] when the cloudy pillar descended. . . . Superstition then keeps the soul from Christ [not by substituting something else for Him, but] because it originates in a plain act of self-will; it is not properly superstition unless it does. And hence it is but one form of presumptuousness or profaneness, as the history of the Jews shows us. It is superstitious to ascribe power to the creature when God has not given it, and profane to deny it when He has."

Superstition, then [to accept the euphemism—for common superstition is *not* self-willed, presumptuous, or anxious to deny reverence to *any* thing], consists not in worshipping the creature *instead* of the Creator, but in worshipping the wrong, that is the unappointed creature; or in the language of the Second Command referred to, not in making *any* image or form, graven, conceived, or ceremonial, and in bowing down to worship *it*, but in worshipping any except the right ones. And as the Sacraments are appointed, and therefore right ones, Dr. Newman feels, or seems to feel, no misgiving in substituting, or half substituting these for Christ, both as the Foundation of our Hope and the Object of our Worship. What then are we to expect from others? or from the personal development of these?

Need I pursue farther such semiverbal ambiguities, or specially this confusion on the word "appointed?" Is anything appointed *to be worshipped*? Or would not the highest appointed angel be the first to say, See thou do it not? Or shall I glance at the conclusions which follow too aptly, too inevitably, from such indiscriminated premisses? As the Romanist, by mistaking the appointed emblems of Christ's Body for that Body, has before him at once the OBJECT of his worship, and astounds the Universe by his paraded Fetichism: so may we, as well as Dr. Newman, by confounding with Christ's Great Redeeming Act the symbolic act wherein we pledge our-

selves to die and rise again with Him, imagine that we are redeeming, or half redeeming from eternal death, ourselves or our unconscious little ones; that we are "washing away original sin," "securing grace," and establishing objectively our relationships with God. At the time of writing the *Lectures* Dr. Newman did not accept the Eucharistic worship, but only censured the Roman Church for holding too low views of Baptism. He and others have reasoned more consistently since then. Let faith in the Invisible God be quietly changed into faith in anything else whatever, and it will soon become a credulity which might make the world aghast.

(10). If I notice one or two other points which Dr. Newman works into his system, it is not because they are peculiar to him, but because they meet us too frequently elsewhere

By way of enhancing the virtue of the Sacraments, he insists, though less vehemently than others, on the ideas, popular alike with Romanist and ultra-Protestant theology, of the Fall of Man; the supposed righteousness and holiness preceding that event; the total darkness and severance from God succeeding. One wonders whence the information comes, opposed alike to the letter of Scripture and the geologic record. On this subject he quotes—p. 180, Bishop Bull's "State of Man before the Fall:"—

"Now that these supernatural ornaments and perfections [*sc.* immortality, grace, holiness, righteousness, &c.] were a part, and a chief part, of the image of God, after which the first man is said to be created, is not an idle dream or fancy of the Christian writers, but was a notion received and acknowledged in the Jewish Church many years before our Saviour's appearance in the flesh. This is very manifest from the almost divine author of the 'Book of Wisdom,' which was always entertained in the Christian Church with a reverence next to that which they paid to the divinely inspired writers."

Hardly satisfactory of Bishop Bull. "It was *not*," it seems, "an idle dream or fancy of the Christian writers;" but was derived from the "almost divines" of Judaism, and was quite familiar to the really "inspired writers," *who, however, carefully exclude it*,—as being inconsistent, I presume, (1), with what

they read in Genesis; and (2), with their own insight into the nature and process of God's Creation. Priesthoods love dreams of golden ages *in the past*; prophets see them more truly in the future. Priesthoods worship their remotest ancestor: prophets worship their Far-off Son; and they tell the priests that their remotest organic ancestor was dust—their remotest inorganic, chaos. Now, while priesthoods burrow among traditions, *prophets write the Scriptures*. And as to the Jewish almost divines, it is new to us to esteem them highly, though their tenets certainly transcend our tenets, and their marvels our hagiographies. One is almost tempted to adduce some specimens. But I will quote Dr. Newman on Adam's righteousness itself—p. 181:—

“The Catholic Fathers, as Bishop Bull has collected their testimony, teach that the principle of sanctity in Adam, to which was attached the gift of immortality, was something distinct from and above human nature. That nature, indeed, did look towards such a perfection, but could not in itself reach it. Without this heavenly possession man was not able to keep the Law according to the Covenant of Life; but *with it he could serve God acceptably, and gain the reward set before him.*”

The italics are mine: for one naturally asks—*Why* then did he *not* keep it? It was not so hard! Just such a prohibition as any parent, for training purposes, might impose on an untaught child. And the *rationale* of his *disobedience* is, it seems, (1), that he *could* have kept it, if he wished; and (2), that he *did wish*, by virtue of a supernatural gift of righteousness! What we mean by righteousness, surely, or virtue or uprightness, is not the feeble innocence that falls before the first temptation, nay, is tainted by the tempter's breath; but that which can withstand and overcome temptation;—can be “led out by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil,” and come back unsullied. Is this what Adam had before the fall? Nay, the negative and affirmative must change places in this *rationale* to make it even intelligible; and Bishop Bull and the Catholic Fathers must produce graver reasons, if they would help the almost divines of Judaism to outweigh real inspiration. But Dr. Newman can find Scripture to sustain them: for he

goes on, p. 182: "This interpretation [*sic*] of the Scripture account of man's original nature and fall is confirmed by various passages of St. Paul." He only alleges one—a very familiar passage—1 Cor. xv. 44—to which let us turn. The context is, that God, says St. Paul, gives to every vegetable, every animal, every terrestrial, and every celestial thing, its own body, and its fitting glory; and he applies this to the resurrection of the dead. "It is sown a natural [*G^t. psychical*; it is an Aristotelic term, and he is writing, against Platonism, to cultured Greeks, in the vicinity of the Areopagus, and in allusion possibly to his own contest there; *cf.* v. 33 with Acts, xvii. 32] body: it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body; and so it is written, the first man Adam was made a living soul: the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit *that was not first* which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and *afterwards* that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second man is the Lord from heaven." And this is a *proof* of the high spirituality of man *at first*, and of this glory being subsequently lost! A proof, I suppose, by reading the words thus: "Howbeit *that was first* which is spiritual, and afterwards that which is natural; and very evil-natural, indeed."

And better proof will never be found for it in any real Word of God. It is a dualistic figment. I have alluded (e. g. pp. 42, 425, &c.,) to what I conceive is a juster account of man's first sense of sin; and will treat it more fully in Lect. ii., vol. ii. Here let us only contrast the statements.

(a). Gen. iii. 22:—"And the Lord God said, Behold the man is become as one of us to know good and evil. . . . Therefore he drove out the man,"—upon his human pilgrimage; in quest, as we say, of something better than innocence; of a higher "image of God" than moral quietism, spiritual incapacity, and the lordship of the visible. Man's first Exodus and Great Hegira; or, the second chapter of his Genesis and first of his Regenesiis, his Infant-Baptism, through troubled waters, into Spiritual Life.

(b). Dr. Newman, p. 325:—"Upon Adam's fall the light of God's countenance was withdrawn from the earth, and His

presence from the souls of men; nor was the forfeited blessing restored but by the death of Christ." He means chronologically; so that for these four, or six, or sixty thousand years, there was no access to the Father. Christ was not the Lamb slain from the beginning, and had no relationship to things or men; nor any "witness" in Nature or Providence or Church.

Nay, Fathers and Brethren, look again to history, and you will find that what Genesis records, with *or without* some allegory, is, (1), physical and physiological creation up to a climax and resting-stage; and then, and on this basis, (2), the *beginnings* of psychology. And you will also find that every other Book of God, so far as we have science to decipher it, sustains that Ancient Record.

11. Cognate with this disparagement of God's Natural and Moral Government, and from the same motive, is his still more marked disparagement of the prior religious Dispensation, though it was "appointed" in all its details with a speciality and directness to which Christianity can make no claim. It is the fashion, indeed, to cry it down, and Dr. Newman carries the fashion to extremes, beyond the Protestant—beyond the neo-German Enlightenment. Not only does he continually assume or assert the abolition of the Jewish ordinances as strongly as Strauss, or Baur, or Count Zinzendorf¹ himself,—that "faith

¹ Dr. Newman here finds himself in uncongenial company. But all men now plead the authority of Christ: Ritualists will have it that He abolished the Jewish ritual to institute their better one; Rationalists, to initiate their rationalism, which has an antipathy to all rites and laws whatever. Unfortunately for both hypotheses, they are wrong as to the fact. Christ abolished none of it:—any more than David did, who, while instituting the temple services, made them subordinate to his just necessities; any more than Moses did, who, while giving the Law, instituted also the prophet, beside, and *above*, the priest. But Christ, perceiving that the Law would be abolished, through the blind arrogance of its administrators, took pains to give the germs and principles of a new Liturgy, Discipline, and Ceremonial adapted to His Church. For He, of all men, never lost sight for a moment, of what is in truth the fundamental principle of all *sustained* development, the coexistence of Law and Gospel, and their necessary cooperation, for continued life and growth.

Wesley tells somewhere that Count Zinzendorf once commenced a sermon on the text—"Think not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets," thus—"Yes, but I say you did"! Rather an emphatic statement of the main tenet of modern, rationalism; whereof indeed this useful fanatic was largely the parent; popularly

superseded Circumcision;" the "Gospel abolished the Jewish rites;" "Christ superseded the righteousness, as he abolished the victims of old times," &c. &c.; but, what is more startling,

through various movements emanating from his colony; scholastically, through his follower Wolff, "who first taught philosophy to speak in German," and who was in fact the founder of their schools. At all events, the Count's paradox is now the axiom or postulate of their whole theo-philosophy, critical and constructive, and supplies the canon besides whereby they test the New Testament writings, and fix the age and authorship of each. The sermon itself, I fear, is not preserved. But this can hardly be thought an irreparable loss, so long as we can quote from current literature so many admirable *résumés* or compendiums, with modern illustrations, of what it must have been. Such as this, for example, from about the most moderate and most cultured of living Germans, "the Illustrious Zeller." *Vorträge und Abhandl.* The italics are mine; I make no other change.

"Das nun der Standpunkt des religiösen Lebens, welchen wir Jesus zuzuschreiben geschichtlich berechtigt sind, nicht allein mit der damals herrschenden rabbinisch-pharisäischen Auffassung des Mosaismus, sondern auch mit der ursprüngliche Richtung desselben in einem tiefinnerlichen Gegensatze stand, ist leicht zu sehen. Ein andere Frage ist es, wie klar Jesus selbst sich dieses Gegensatzes bewusst war, und wie bestimmt er sich darüber aussprach. Unsere Evangelien enthalten hierüber, auch abgesehen von dem vierten, verschiedene und theilweise unvereinbare Angaben; das Verhältniss und die Glaubwürdigkeit derselben hat Strauss, S. 209 ff. mit gewohnter Umsicht erörtert, und sein Ergebniss ist, dass Jesus in die Neuheit seines Princips und die Unverträglichkeit desselben mit dem alten jüdischen Wesen eine viel deutlichere Einsicht gehabt habe, als sie seine persönlichen Schüler ohne Ausnahme jemals erlangten. Er beruft sich hiefür auf sein Verhalten zur Sabbathsfeier, zum Fasten, zu dem Ehescheidungsgesetz; auf die Austreibung der Verkäufer aus dem Tempel, welche einen Angriff auf das ganze Opferwesen in sich schliesst, und einen Widerwillen gegen die Aeusserlichkeit dieser Gottesverehrung erkennen lässt; auf den Ausspruch über das Abbrechen des Tempels, von dem er mit Grund vermuthet, dass Jesus denselben wirklich gethan habe, um auf die dereinstige Abschaffung des Tempelkultus hinzuweisen. Halt man aber Matth. v. 18, 19, entgegen, so zeigt er ueberzeugend, dass diese zwei Verse, welche den Gedankenzusammenhang gerade zu stören, ein späteres Einschleusen, sei es in den Text unseres Matthäus, sei es wenigstens in die ursprüngliche Ueberlieferung der Rede Jesu, sein müssen." Strauss und Renan, p. 475. So he goes on, following, approving and improving Strauss, to show how the rest of the Sermon on the Mount contradicts these verses. For, obviously, to extend the law from mere acts to the causes and motives of acts, is not to fulfil, but to destroy the law; and for our righteousness to exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees is, clearly, to renounce righteousness altogether:—"Hiemit tritt Jesus als neuer Gesetzgeber Moses entgegen!" p. 476; just as to sum up the Decalogue in one or two Great Commandments—"Hear, O Israel; the Lord thy God is one God; and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," &c.—is not to quote, but to contradict, that benighted Lawgiver—"und stellte ein Princip auf das bei folgerichtiger Entwicklung selbst in dem Fall, zum Bruche mit dem Mosaismus hätte führen müssen," *ib.* For Christ to cleanse the

he deliberately maintains that the prior dispensation contained no justifying or sanctifying element at all. Let us consider the abolition first.

temple courts was, we see, to "assault" the whole system of Offerings, and express "repugnance" to external worship; just as, I suppose, for the late Dean and Historian of St. Paul's to rejoice over the similar cleansing of *his* temple from gross offensiveness [Hist. of St. Paul's, pp. 88, 84], was to hint a strong desire for its abandonment. *Pari ratiōne*, Our Lord's tears over the city and temple were, as Renan might say, "derisoires au fond;" and His approval of the poor widow's two mites for *the temple treasury*, or its present Dean's approval of a labourer's half-crown "for the Restoration of St. Paul's," would be, in each case, a refined protest against any such procedure. Indeed, Strauss and Zeller believe that the charge of wishing to destroy this temple and [not] to build it in three days, had a serious foundation both as against Christ and Stephen. "Und wir hören ja auch, das schon Stephanus, der von Paulus verfolgt, erklärt habe, Jesus werde bei seiner Wiederkunft den Tempeldienst abstellen, und statt des mosaïschen ein neues Gesetz geben; und wenn die Apostelgeschichte diese Angabe als ein falsches Zeugniß darstellt, so legt doch sie selbst unmittelbar nachher dem Märtyrer ein Rede in dem Mund, die in dem Satze gipfelt, das zwar Salomo Gott ein Haus gebaut habe, dass aber Gott nicht in Gebäuden von Menschenhand wohne. Hat aber schon Stephanus solche Ansichten ausgesprochen, und schon Paulus sie vorgefunden, so ist weit das wahrscheinlichste, das in den eigenen Erklärungen Jesu, und nicht bloß mittelbar in dem Geiste seiner Lehre, der Anlass dazu gegeben war." *ib.* 477.

"Dieses zwar in dem Satze gipfelt!" Here surely is a climax of misinterpretation. Strauss and Zeller evidently conceive that Stephen was *not quoting*, but contradicting Solomon, whose magnificent "Behold, the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house that I have builded!" they suppose the Jews to have forgotten as profoundly as themselves. And it only remains that they should correct their error by applying their principle to Solomon himself; for it is clear that he also must be cut in two; some Jewish Solomon built the Temple, but it was a wiser Solomon, from Hernhutt or Tübingen, who composed the consecration prayer.

The almost divines of either Church may fairly be challenged to produce quotation or argumentation to equal the above. And there is a whole system of it. The Count's paradox is avowedly the test whereby the New Testament Scriptures are appraised and classified. St. Paul, they are confident, was the first to clearly discern the axiom; or, as Zeller puts it, *l. c.*, "Denn so wenig sich bezweifeln lässt das erst Paulus den Glauben an Christus und die Beobachtung des mosaïschen Gesetzes für zwei unvereinbare Dinge erklärt," &c., and therefore the abolition of the latter. By the process above illustrated they read the axiom in this sense into St. Paul's larger Epistles; which, therefore, and which alone, they reckon genuine. They read the same axiom, in an opposite sense, i. e. Judæo-Christianity, exclusive of Pauline, into the Apocalypse; which also they regard as genuine, and as a fierce anti-Pauline manifesto. All the other books are some generations later, and are all more or less unhappy attempts to corrupt the pure or Zinzendorfian Gospel, by compromising with the enemy. And one only wonders why they do not apply their principle to the Old Testament writings; say, to the dimidiation of the Book of Psalms, or of each individual Psalm, or of each

And, surely, it is in the alphabet of Church History that the first Christians had no idea that allegiance to Christ relieved them from one tittle of the law, or did other than elevate, sanctify,

chapter of Isaiah, or each argument of any prophet, or each section of the Jewish Liturgy. It is not possible, for instance, that the 50th or the 51st Psalm could all come from an individual author. Read a few consecutive verses from the latter;—"For thou desirest no sacrifice, else would I give it thee; but thou delightest not in burnt offering. The sacrifices of God are a troubled spirit: a broken and a contrite heart, O Lord, thou wilt not despise." This is sufficiently Pauline. But then the anti-Paul goes on, and terminates the Psalm:—"Do good in thy good pleasure unto Zion: build thou the walls of Jerusalem. Then shalt thou be pleased with the sacrifices of righteousness; then shall they offer young bullocks upon thy altar." The incompatibility is explicit: they are "zwei unvereinbare Dinge." Or take the first chapter of Isaiah. The ultra-Pauline writes—"To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord. I am full of the burnt offerings of rams and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he goats. Bring no more vain oblations. Incense is an abomination unto me. The new moons and sabbaths, and calling of assemblies I cannot away with. It is iniquity, even the solemn meeting. Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil; learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed; judge the fatherless, plead for the widow. Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord: though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow," &c. All this is evangelical enough; yet, within a verse or two, and in the same remonstrance, the pseudo-Isaiah insinuates, "Ah! I will ease me of my adversaries, and avenge me of mine enemies. And I will restore thy judges as at the first, and thy counsellors as at the beginning. Afterwards thou shalt be called the City of Righteousness, the Faithful City." Evidently, Zinzendorf's acute and comprehensive criticism was as needful in those days, as in St. Paul's or ours.

Nay, fearless and far-searching German thinkers, you must look again. With much that is valuable, and much that is *irresistible*, in your rationalism, there mix also some egregious blunders, which deform and mislead the movement. Especially this one, which virtually isolates you from affairs, and obliges even a rational government and an admiring people to set you aside as impracticable theorists. You discern the contrast of Law and Gospel, but you must learn to understand their correlation, if you would subserve abiding progress, instead of mere revolutions and destructions. Sometimes, indeed, they are antagonistic. But even then they are not the less prolific. And generally they sustain and supplement each other's functions, and "keep each other straight." Habitually, it is by the one that the other acts; and they are as essential to each other, constitutionally, as Order is to Liberty, as stability to progress, as a code and executive to advancing legislation; as our habits and principles are to our motives and impressions, as the body to the mind, as bone and muscle to vital force, or as the walls of our blood-vessels to the circulation and elaboration of the blood. Probably, our Lord alone, of all who shared His movement, perfectly sustained this correlation. The Baptist may, like the Essenes, have anticipated the Moravian dualism; some sentences of the Sermon on the Mount seem to imply as much. St. James and the Jerusalem Church may have been too careful ritualists, more so, probably, than the school of Hillel.

complete it. Their Master had been all through "a minister of the Circumcision for the truth of God;" and, how broad soever in spirit and teaching, was *to the last* quite exclusive in His ministrations. "He was not sent but to the lost sheep of the House of Israel," and had "to fall in the ground and die" before He could go farther. The Pentecostal Church followed His example, apparently forgetting or misconceiving His positive instructions. It is eight years after Pentecost that Peter, who had hitherto "never eaten anything common or unclean," has to be taught, by a special vision, to enter the house of a pious Gentile; whom, despite the vision, he still addresses from the

Paul and Peter were evidently the most Catholic of the apostles, though here too there were shades of difference. The tradition which ascribes to Paul *and Peter* the foundation of churches which were first preached to by Paul alone, is probably just, and *pace* the German interpretation, is honourable to them both. Peter consolidated what Paul commenced. Paul planted, Apollos watered; Peter cared and fenced, and built the wine-press and the barn; and God gave the increase.

No one has a profounder respect for the German, or High German race, than I have. I believe it is virtually, and will be for many generations, the dominant Race and Nation of this globe. The more needful is it that its influence, especially its intellectual influence, be well directed, and that its mental and moral culture rest on sound ideas. Now Germanism, that is the German Illumination, however honest in its purpose, and comprehensive and able in details, does not rest on just conceptions, but, as I believe, from Zinzendorf to Zeller, on profoundly false ones. Its Philosophy does not rest on Nature; nor belong to it. Indeed, to a German, "Natural Philosophy" is almost a contradiction in terms; like Natural Religion to a Comtist. It rests on Platonic Dualism; and instead of labouring to understand Nature's Static and Dynamic, her balance and growth and life and unity; flies off always, in pursuit of the fixed idea, into worse than Eleatic Nihilisms. There will be no sound philosophy in Fatherland until it is content to take, not Kant and Hegel, but Humboldt and Liebig for its apostles, and condescends to build on physics and physiology. And its Criticism, Historic and Biblical, is really cognate with its philosophy; it misconceives the nature of the opposing forces which develop human progress, and, as we have seen, would fain omit the most essential of them. But I must reserve the large subject of Rationalism for my second volume. I may have occasion to say a word or two in the next notes. Here it will be pertinent that I conclude with one illustration, from Zeller, where philosophy, religion, and historic criticism all meet in a key-point—the Resurrection of Christ.

In a remarkable passage of the Essay already quoted, p. 479, sqq., Zeller gathers up the elements for forming a judgment. He admits,—(1) that Christ, now towards the end of His course, believed Himself to be the Messiah, in the highest sense of the Jewish prophets, and imparted this conviction to His Apostles;—(2) that it was His moral

highest platform of Jewish exclusiveness. And, for having "gone in to men uncircumcised, and eaten with them," he is called solemnly to account by the other Apostles and brethren. And when the unexpected, and, as it seemed to them, irregular success of the Gospel among the Gentiles, gradually forced the acknowledgment of a Gentile Church; and when the resolute attitude of Paul and Barnabas, and the influence of Peter, had decided "the Council" not to impose the law upon the Gentiles, there was still no whisper of relaxing its obligation upon themselves. On the contrary, while the Gospel of the Uncircumcision was entrusted to St. Paul, and the Gospel of the Circumcision, i. e. *in partibus*, to St. Peter, St.

purity and elevation, and His consciousness of His own complete devotion to the Will and Work of God, which gave Him this conviction;—(3) that He foresaw the probability or certainty of His Crucifixion by His opponents;—(4) that this did not destroy His conviction of the ultimate or even the immediate triumph of His Messiahship and Work;—(5) that in His conviction the mode of this triumph would be His reappearance from the dead;—(6) that He foretold, therefore, to His Apostles, in more or less express terms, both His death and His resurrection. Then we have, in due course, the narratives of His re-appearance, more or less circumstantial and authenticated, more or less confused and difficult to reconcile—and their credibility is the question. Now, on what does this question hinge? No doubt, it involves the metaphysical question of the nature of the soul and the mode of our future life. Does this take place, as Plato reasoned it, by virtue of eternal continuance, and the fixed and changeless essence of our being; or does it take place, as Jews and Christians think, by physical change and the genesis of our spiritual body? Germanism believes the former, and believes it to be so axiomatic, that all evidence for the latter is *a priori* incredible, and outside of reason's court! "Dass ein besonnener, geistig, hoch-begabener Mann erwartet haben soll, nach seinem Tode, auf wunderbare Weise auf die Erde zurückzukehren, finden wir ungläublich; das jeder von uns nach dem Tode, in ein anderen Welt *fortleben* werde, erscheint uns ganz selbstverständlich," p. 487. Perhaps so now; but will Germany think so in another hundred years? I doubt it much. Rather, I believe that a more rational rationalism will outgrow and atrophy the fixed idea, and will find itself, perhaps unexpectedly, congenial with the main tenets of the Church. As Christianity has been taught, half unconsciously, that creation is a Present Dynamique, that the nature of our present life is birth and "transubstantiation;" so does she more consciously affirm that our future life is by new-birth and "transfiguration;" by the step *per-saltum* change into a higher organism. She believes in formation and transformation; in genesis, regeneration, and ascension; the change being sometimes insensible and slow, sometimes sudden and intensified. She does not believe in any mere-continuance, or idealist *fortleben*, as independent of such progressive creation, much less as superseding it. Which of these antagonistic conceptions will be endorsed by "science" in an advancing world?

James and the Jerusalem Church were only the more careful at home; and careful, too, to keep a check on *Peter's* latitudinarian tendencies. St. Paul's own practice was that "he himself walked orderly, and kept the law;" and his *rule* was that each should abide in the condition wherein he was called. If called in Uncircumcision, he should not be circumcised; if called in Circumcision, should not become uncircumcised:—"And so ordain I in all churches" (1 Cor. vii. 17-20).

Now, was all this "superstition," Dr. Newman, on the part of St. Paul, St. Peter, and St. James, and the Pentecostal Church? or on the part of the Lord Himself? or did "Faith supersede Circumcision" in His case any more than it did with regard to Abraham or David, whatever be the meaning of this strange expression? Nay, "the Gospel of the Circumcision" was at first the only Gospel; and it was able to persuade itself that it was not only the original, but the true Gospel, for generations after the fresher graft upon its olive stock had absorbed its fatness. It was the destruction of the Temple Service, with the Temple itself, and the impossibility of restoring it again, which, by abolishing the Law in fact, gradually banished it from doctrine, and obliged the Church to set about constructing law, discipline, and ceremonial for herself; and not before she needed them.

12. And as to the Jewish ordinances not possessing a spiritual element, surely it is in the alphabet of theology that *no* ordinances do. Spirituality exists only in the worshipper, and words and forms and rites are of use to any man only so far as they stimulate and exercise that highest life of his. True, to very many of the Jews "the oracles of God," and their most sacred and suggestive sacraments, "did not profit," not being mixed with faith in those who used them; rather, their true functions being mistaken, they engendered false trust and religious arrogance, to their abiding injury. And the same takes place, alas! on a vastly greater scale, and in more shocking extremes, among the populations of Christendom. But this does not nullify the promises of God, or the principles of true religion, to the true "seed" in either Church; nor should it obscure to any thinker

the true relation of Law and Gospel, their necessary co-existence and co-operation in development, and the essential suberviency of the former to the latter. Law and Sin are the cor-relatives of Grace. Without Grace, they were mere destructives : without them, Grace were simply meaningless. The Gospel, therefore, is no novelty any more than Law and Sin. It has always inspired and sustained, *while it has always ruled and regenerated both*. And this relation was never made more explicit or more emphatic *anywhere* than throughout the Jewish Dispensation. Faith and the Righteousness of Faith, developed doubtless by the rudimentary laws given to Noah and to Adam, were four hundred and thirty years before The Law ; nay, 2000 years before the circumcision of Abraham. "The Law entered" under Moses, and David, and the Maccabees,—as the corresponding laws entered under Augustine, and Ambrose, and the Gregories, and John Knox, and John Wesley,—simply for training purposes. And no one takes more pains to make this clear than Moses. It is not only that he *preaches* "the true circumcision of the heart," and insists that the Love of God, and His kingdom within us, is "the end¹ of the Law," and that to which it ministers ; but he is careful to *institute* the same, and to

¹ There is nothing more prominent in St. Paul than the antithesis between Law and Gospel, but careless readers do not notice that he insists on this as a standing antithesis in every living constitution ; in his own person, in Christ Himself, or any individual Christian ; in Christianity, in Judaism, in Patriarchism, and in the religion of nature. For instance, in the striking passage alluded to, Rom. x., they do not notice that he is quoting from Moses *both* sides of the antithesis ; or that this is part of his formal proof that the faith he preached was virtually the same faith [in Christ] that had been always preached ; by Moses, v. 3 to 10, by Isaiah, v. 10 to 16 ; by natural religion, as collected by the Psalmist from the starry heaven, v. 17 to 19 ; or, in chap. iv., the same as that described by David, v. 5 to 8 ; or that which constituted Abraham the father of many nations, v. 2 to 17 ; or, chapters i. and ii., that written on the heart of heathendom. It is quite absurd, therefore, to attempt reading into such a book the doctrine that the Gospel supersedes the Law, or that faith abolishes circumcision. Nay, Faith was always requisite ; and Law is always requisite ; as requisite as school or schooling ; and the world itself is one continued school. Faith will subordinate all ordinances to itself and to the righteousness which it requires ; but, while subordinating, it will also endorse, illumine, and enrich them, and will operate by their means.

Similarly, in Corinthians, from which I quote his "rule," he insists, almost paradoxically, that the thing signified in the Christian Sacraments is the same as that

give this principle its dominant place and power in the working constitution. He appoints the law in the hand of Aaron, he reserves the legislative function for himself; and institutes, in himself and his successors, the line of prophets who are always to command, renew, regenerate the law, and teach its true significance. One would imagine sometimes, to hear Boston or Tübingen discourse, that it was Pauline Christianity, or Essaism at least, which had discovered *das sittlich-religiöses leben*, and that themselves had re-discovered it. Do they never read a psalm of David, or a proverb or prayer of Solomon, or a page of a prophet, or even Deuteronomy or the Decalogue? Or do they forget that these, bristling with fierce denunciations of legalism and the legal spirit, beyond anything that St. Paul feels called to say, formed at once the current literature and public worship of the nation? True, legalism was always strong among the

which was always signified by Jewish rites, and even by Jewish "providences." All the fathers, e. g. ch. x., had virtually the same baptism [into Christ], and the same communion [with Him] that Paul offered to the world. The old ordinances and old experiences, so far from being incompatible with Christianity—"zwei unvereinbare Dinge"—were really Christian sacraments to those who had faith for discerning the Lord's Body; as ours may only minister damnation to those who discern it not.

To the Galatians, as to the Corinthians, he insists on the *independence* of his own apostleship, and that of the Gospel of the Uncircumcision; but not on any superiority of these to the other apostolate, or to the Gospel of the Circumcision. On the contrary, he affirms the ground principles of both to be identical. Whether in circumcision or out of it, we must be justified by grace alone, and justified by faith alone. Circumcision is nothing, and *uncircumcision is nothing*; what is something is "the new creature," or "faith that worketh by love." And here again, he takes especial pains to explain the function of the law:—It is the natural preparative of liberty; the appointed schoolmaster to train men up to Christ. One would think that modern experience might render this significant, yet it is a careless reading of this illustration that supplies one of the most grotesque blunders of rationalism, and makes it at once revolutionary and absurd. They read it thus: "We are no longer *under* the law," therefore the law is dead; liberty has abolished it! Just as if on the day of a boy's "emancipation" from school, he ought to shoot the schoolmaster and blow up the whole establishment. Nay, foolish boy, do nothing of the kind. *You* are no longer under his ferula; but he is still very useful to your younger brothers, and will be so, perhaps, to your sons and grandsons; besides that the habits, or even the doctrines he has taught may still prove useful to yourself, now that you are entering the Higher School of your Profession, and your Marriage. In fact, schooling, in all its forms, is about the most abiding and most needful of human institutions; and is, perhaps, the justest image of the sphere we occupy. Law must last as long as it does.

Jews, as it is always strong among any people who possess a law worthy of their reverence, or a religion which they feel to do them good. But the prophets, though individually faulty and imperfect, on the whole were equal to their mission. The nation turned its face resolutely towards the future; and legalism was never able to stereotype, or to stagnate and corrupt itself, in Judaism, as it has frequently done in large sections of Christianity.

Doctrinaireships fail to understand the coexistence of Law and Gospel; their co-operation is in its eyes corruption, their development by antagonism, an offence. With it, to follow Moses is to extinguish Aaron; to accept "Moses and the prophets" is to reject the Christ. And on the other hand to acknowledge Aaron; or Gregory, or Pio Nono, is to acknowledge his finality and infallibility; is to help him to construct a golden calf, or a bambino, for the multitude, or to impose a false and offensive dogma on the schools.

The spiritually minded finds Moses and Aaron, and Paul and James, and Augustine and Wesley, all too few for his own assistance and that of others; and learns by experience that they all work together for a common end—each in his own way helping men to discern and love The Fatherhood Unseen.

The legally or carnally minded strives to find a more tangible and less exacting OBJECT. To him the *past* prophets were men of God; the *present* prophet is a disturber of his peace; and his peace is well founded on Scripture and Tradition, and Appointment. *His own* creed and ordinances are *the* true ones; *they* will impart grace and virtue; all other rites and doctrines are valueless and vain, if, indeed, they be not profanity.

The World and Church are quite familiar with all these types of thought. Which of them is it that Dr. Newman labours to instruct in such passages as these?—

"This was the evil tendency of the Jewish rites when Christ came; they interfered between Christ and the soul. They were dark bodies, eclipsing the glorious vision which faith was charged to receive."—Lect. xii., p. 324.

No doubt; as "not being mixed with faith" in the recipients. And so are the Christian rites, to a vastly greater extent, throughout the bulk of Christendom.

"Such being the state of things before Christ came, and the state after

the Law which was before could not be the means of life, because life as yet was not; it was not wrought out; it was not created; it began to be in Christ the Word Incarnate."—p. 325.

It was *not* possible, therefore, for Abraham to "see His day and be glad." In fact, the Lamb was *not* "slain from the foundation of the world;" and so faith "which was before the Law," had no Object or scope in Him.

"God justified Abraham, and He glorified Elijah, but He had not yet promised heaven to the obedient, or acceptance to the believing."—*Ib.*

Had not in fact declared that "the just shall live by faith;" or that all that God requires of us is "to do justice and love mercy, and to walk humbly with our God." God had *not* "shown thee, O man, what is good."

"Judaism had no life, no spirit in its ordinances, to connect earth and heaven."—*Ib.*

No religion has *any* life or spirit in its ordinances, but only in its worshippers.

"What to the Jews then was impossible even to the last, is to us imputed from the first. They might not even end where we begin. They wrought towards justification, and we from it. They wrought without the presence of Christ, and we with it. They came to God with rites, and we with Sacraments."—p. 327.

Abraham, therefore, and David and Isaiah, could not be justified at all.

Or, in an earlier connexion, Lect. viii. :—

"If this be so, we see how wide and essential a difference there is, there must be, between good men before His coming and good men after. Whatever they were, however high in God's favour, however influenced by His secret aids, they could not be partakers of that which as yet did not exist; the Body and Blood of the Incarnate Son."—p. 225.

The Fathers, therefore, did *not* "all eat the same spiritual meat" (1 Cor. xii.) with us, nor "drink the same spiritual drink;" for "the Rock that followed them" was *not* "Christ."

"This is what Christ has done by His coming; but observe *while* He did all this for His Church, He claimed all He did *as* His own. Henceforth whatever is done is His doing, and it is called what it is."—p. 227.

"Hence it is said that of Him the whole family in heaven and earth is named. . . . All is superseded by Him and transmuted into Him. Before He came there were many masters, but henceforth only one. . . . Those former kings, prophets, priests and sacrifices, those masters, teachers, and fathers, not being from Him, were not claimed by Him as His; they were ordained according to the old constitution of nature."—*Ib. sp.* 228.

Which "old constitution of nature," therefore, was *not* Christ's, and had no relation to Him. "All things were" *not* "created by Him," therefore; nor for Him; nor is He before all things; nor in Him do all consist; nor in Him

shall all be reconciled (Col. i.). It is not His Spirit that pervades them all ; nor His Gospel that they declare (Rom. x.). And St. Paul's " whole family of heaven and earth " must now be atrophied into Dr. Newman's narrow line of the true believers, or rather the true baptized.

A lofty Sacrament, alas ! and a very slender Christ. The Elevation of the Host, and the Degradation of the Saviour. An " almost divinity " in the Fetisch, and the Real Presence and Real Character of God and CHRIST forgotten.

It is barely possible, perhaps, to find some sense in which such statements may be defended. In themselves, and in the line of thought and argument which throws them to the surface, they are profoundly false. God forbid we should disparage the enormous stride which Humanity and Religion achieved in Christianity, or the Great Transition which hinges on The Christ. But there could be no greater blunder than to ignore its place in history, or to dis sever it from its own just preparatives, and its multiplied anticipations both within and without the special line of Judaism. It is a poor way of exalting it to disparage, unduly, its progenitors ; as it is a foolish method of exalting God to cut Him off from the bulk of His Creation. God or Christ never left Himself without a witness. The ground principles of Emmanuel's Kingdom were as distinctly said and sung by those He sent before His face as by any who have followed Him. And the Church this moment finds the penitential or triumphant Psalms as congenial to her wants as any liturgy she has herself indited. True, the highest spirit of Judaism was frequently ignored, and its highest truth mistaken or misplaced ; but here again I fear it will be long ere Christendom has earned the right to cast a stone at her. The value of Church Membership, and the significancy of rites, ought indeed to be much better understood by us than it was in Israel, but it is very doubtful if it be so ; and we plainly need the Baptist again to lay his axe to the root of our pretensions, and St. Paul to define for us again " a Christian " and his " baptism."

Indeed, as English readers distrust generalities, it might be worth replying to this highflown antithesis between Baptism and Circumcision, and the startling thesis that " faith super-

seded" the latter, by a concrete paradox. I will, therefore, affirm that neither Faith nor Baptism has even *yet* superseded circumcision; and that they never will: it is essential to our Christianity. That is, not the outer, but "the true circumcision of the heart," such as we still continue to pray for it, initiating each Christian year, on Circumcision-day. In other words, Circumcision was a Sacrament in precisely the same sense that Baptism is, and "the thing signified" in each rite is not only analogous, but identical. So that it is a matter of indifference to St. Paul, when he would describe the essential change which "must" take place with each of us, whether he

¹ Which thing signified is, and always was, essential to salvation to every human soul. "Ye *must* be born again," says our Lord Himself. "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." Or, as the Church Catechism says, more ecclesiastically, "for being by nature born in sin, and the children of wrath, we are *herely* [i. e. by the inward, *not by the outward*, part of baptism] made children of grace." The wording of the Church of England formularies is often spoken of as not sufficiently distinct: and I have admitted this in the case of Justification. With regard to the Sacraments there is less reason to complain. Articles and services alike reiterate that "the offering of Christ once made is the perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for *all* the sins of the *whole* world, *both original and actual*; and that there is *none other* satisfaction for sin but that alone." This exhausts our objective relationship. Then, in respect to the sacraments, she insists explicitly that there is no necessary "grace" in either; but, like any other religious service, only "grace or its opposite." "And in such only as worthily receive the same, *they* [i. e. either of them, for this is the General Article, XXV. about *both* sacraments] have a wholesome effect or operation; but they that receive them unworthily, purchase to themselves damnation, as St. Paul saith." The first serious answer in the Catechism is, indeed, ambiguous; but, then, the whole chapter on the Sacraments was subsequently added, to remove that ambiguity. And any catechist will thoroughly remove it, by asking this farther question—"How, my child, were you made all these?" and teaching this answer, in accordance with the letter and spirit of that chapter—"Outwardly I *was*, by the reception of the outward sign; inwardly I *am*, so far as I have received the thing signified." Then, that chapter further explains the relation between the outward and inward parts. The former is *a* sign and *a* means of receiving the latter; but neither the only sign nor the only means. On the contrary, it is the possession of a certain measure of the signified which justifies, in either case, the administration of the sign. "Why, then, are infants baptized, who cannot have, or at least cannot guarantee, suchp ossession?" Ans.—"*They do* guarantee it." And, on the strength of that "solemn vow, promise, and profession," they are provisionally adopted as Christians, while borne in the womb, or bosom of the family. This is the formal and express ground on which the Church of England rests her observance of infant baptism; and this is what should determine all ambiguous expressions.

words it in the language of the Christian or of the Jewish Ordinance. Sometimes he prefers the one, sometimes the other ; and in one Cardinal passage,—Col. ii.—he emphasizes both.

“For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. And ye are complete in Him which is the head of all principality and power. In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ. Buried with Him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with Him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised Him from the dead. And you being dead in your sins and the uncircumcision of the flesh, hath He quickened together with Him, having forgiven you all trespasses.”—Col. ii. 9, *sqq.*

In fact, the essence of true religion—our dying to our sinful past, and continually rising into new endeavour, or our Ascending Life with God—however difficult to realize in practice—is, in theory, a very simple and pervading thing. The outward form of it also is the commonest of things. One Central Archetypal Act—Christ’s Death and Resurrection—exhibits it in history ; but every corn of wheat will show the same to him who has eyes to see. The Infant Israel “was baptized to Moses in the cloud and in the sea ;” our infant world was baptized to Noah, as even heathendom remembers ; and a still earlier world, it appears, was baptized to Adam. Yet our own birth, or more strikingly our own death and resurrection, will image it most vividly to each ; and every vital act, as I have explained [e. g. p. 457], really repeats its process. Hence any vital act might justly symbolize it ; and that would symbolize it best, which would most consciously identify us with the Archetypal Act, and its pervading Spirit. And hence it is not needful for us, as Moses long ago explained, and St. Paul and others carefully repeat, to go to seek that Archetypal Act “in heaven,” or “beneath the earth,” or “here,” or “there,” or “far off” anywhere ; for the word is near us, in our mouth and in our heart ; “behold, the Kingdom of Heaven is within you.” St. Paul, justly, describes it in the language of that now explicit Act ; and Moses, as justly, describes it in the language of the ceremonial he was appointed to enforce ;—namely, that “The Lord thy God shall circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to Love the Lord thy God with all thine heart,

and with all thy soul ; *that thou mayest live.*" And not even the Explicit Christ has brought a nearer Indwelling, or The Quickening Spirit any Higher Life from the Heart of the Unknown.

We believe, then, in one Baptism, *or* one Circumcision, for the remission of sins. Not that baptism is anything, or non-baptism anything ; but the new creature is all in all. As St. Peter says, "by the antitype of Ark and Flood," that is "by the resurrection of Christ," "baptism doth now save us ;" baptism, that is,—he is careful to explain,—“not the putting away the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience before God.” Or, as St. Paul would say, “For he is not a Christian, which is one outwardly ; neither is that baptism which is outward in the flesh ; But he is a Christian which is one inwardly ; and baptism is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter ; whose praise is not of men, but of God.”

13. *Bishop O'BRIEN'S Sermons on Faith* are a careful statement of “forensic justification,” omitting Luther's happier inconsistencies, and preserving the essential one ; and all I have urged against that part of Dr. Newman's book is equally applicable here. The doctrine is double ; there is Justification [by Christ] *in Foro Cœlorum*, and justification [by faith] *in foro conscientiæ*, and no manipulation can make these one. Each doctrine is true and cardinal when separately stated ; to combine them in one formula is ambiguous ; to force them into one meaning is either to make redemption subjective, or faith to atone for sin. Practically it is half to forget Christ, and half to make some “appointed” faith, that is, a creed or doctrine, like Dr. Newman's sacrament, to take His place. And this last is the Bishop's system. He refuses to see the ambiguity even in the Articles, and loftily thrusts forward his double-single sense, trampling down recalcitrants in the name of the Bible or the Gospel. Unwillingly one subjects to examination a class of theology with whose *positive* side one has the intensest sympathy, and which has been the parent of most of the positive religion that Protestantism has to show. But it has narrowed itself until it is in express antagonism

with the largest necessities of intellect and heart; and it is incumbent on us to scrutinize about its ablest and most careful representative.

The Bishop proves his system by Scripture, sustained by the Articles and by early Protestant divines, in opposition to such as Bull, Burnet, Lawrence, Knox; but he ignores the Catechism, and will not even keep our two key-terms distinct. Thus he begins his treatment of faith by telling us, p. 7:—

“In religion, *faith* surely cannot be spoken of as a thing subordinate or accessory. It holds, as all who know anything of the Bible must know, a prominent and a most important place in that scheme of REDEMPTION which was designed to display the character of God in a new lustre to both men and angels.”

What part does faith bear in Redemption? We thought it was long ago complete. And he begins his account of Justification with this high caution, p. 75:—

“Among Protestants, however, it ought hardly to be necessary to set about a formal confutation of a view which confounds the *justification* of sinners with their *sanctification*. Whenever so flagrant a misrepresentation as this of God’s plan for the redemption and restoration of fallen man obtains currency among those from whom the Holy Scriptures are withheld, we cannot be surprised. But that it should be received by any who have free access to the Bible, is as wonderful as it is painful. I trust that this great error finds no place in the congregation which I now address.”

That is, he trusts they have forgotten their Catechism as sublimely as himself. In *its* language justification *must* form part of either sanctification or redemption. *Which* shall we prefer? Or must we, despite the caution, confound all three?

14. Now the Prayer-Book has no jurisdiction over words. No one is bound to its nomenclature. But no one may neglect its Main Distinction, on which rests our prime conception of Christianity; and if any one dislike its terms, he should use others equally unmistakable. But the Bishop has no other nomenclature, and takes no pains to mark the distinction. Rather, the effect of his system is to obscure it, so that the Divine Universality of Christ’s Work and its objective relationships shrink into some subjective or semi-subjective relation to the elect, and there

emerges the strange doctrine of "particular redemption," which some Christians are not ashamed to teach. I am far from attributing to this distinguished prelate any conscious sympathy with such a tenet, but his book and system seem broadly to imply it, and are generally so understood. Salvation is indeed "offered to All," and "freely," i. e. on very stringent conditions, "most repulsive to the natural understanding;" but there is no account of a redemption positively *conferred* on all, independently of human will or knowledge [see Ser. iii.], or, in Bishop Butler's language, of any "benefits except to those who are made acquainted with them in this present life."

At all events, the tendency to make redemption subjective is obvious in each of the above passages, and becomes more so the more we read. Thus the last passage proceeds:—

"But if unhappily it should be otherwise, and that any among you have been beguiled into the adoption of it, I hope they will find a decisive refutation of it in the divine plan of Redemption to which the progress of our course is soon to lead us. It will be seen not only that *justification* and *sanctification* are distinct, and that the latter follows the former as a matter of fact, but that it must do so by the connexion which the wisdom of God has established between them: that He has made the sinner's *justification* to such an extent the source of his sanctification, that the order by which the former process precedes is not accidental or arbitrary, but necessary and immutable."

From which one would suppose that he makes justification and sanctification parts of redemption. This were intelligible language, if justification meant Justification only, and redemption what is commonly called "salvation." But with the Bishop there is only one justification, that by faith *alone*, and this drags down redemption with it into the regions of the subjective. The "connexion" indicated is truly that of Pentecost proceeding from Resurrection, or more generally, of the Spirit proceeding from the Word; and is true also, in the analogous subjective sense, of gracious dispositions proceeding from the sense of pardon. But are these two justifications one? or does faith work *both*? Strange as it seems, the Bishop's system almost obliges him to answer Yes, and with some explicitness. For, his book is formally on "*The Nature and EFFECTS of Faith.*" The

latter are classified as, (1), Faith's effects *on our state* before God ; and (2), its effects on character. And the first are thus stated, p. 68 :—

“As to the first, then—the effect of faith upon our state before God—the Bible upon it is so clear and copious, that I do not think it too much to say that a plain man who read no other book on the subject would find it hard to conceive how any difficulty about it could have ever arisen. It is there very expressly, and in a great variety of forms, asserted that in the matter of *justification* before God, *faith* is, by His gracious appointment, *counted for righteousness*; that it is by *faith* that we are restored to that state of favour and acceptance with Him, in which the perfect righteousness of His law would have sustained us, had we been able to have attained to that righteousness, and to have preserved it.”

Baptism alters our state before God, with Dr. Newman; faith does, with Bishop O'Brien; *independently, each, of its effects on character!* And as we had to ask of the one, p. lxii, *Which* of “those gracious events” effected it “once for all”? here we have to ask, *Whether* it be Christ's obedience, or our faith, which is counted for righteousness? *Which* of them “restores” and “preserves” the state of favour? If he reply, “Both;” we ask again—Is it both in the same sense? or both in the same court; or are both one? The Bishop seems not to have asked himself such questions, or else to have silenced them as unworthy cavillings. Yet he is, even more than usual, self-complacent at the *distinctness* of his answer, for he goes on :—

“This fundamental doctrine of the Gospel of Christ—the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION by FAITH *only*—the undoubted doctrine of our Church, and of all pure Reformed Churches—I have been anxious to state thus, as simply and unequivocally as I am able to state it; mainly, I hope, because I regard it as of vital importance to true religion; but certainly, in some degree also, I acknowledge, because vague apprehensions of its tendency lead often to a reluctance to state it in distinct terms, and that in this reluctance I should be most sorry to be understood to share.”

Now this is the nearest approach in his book to a statement of the main distinction which underlies his subject, and this is his impression of an “unequivocal” reply.

15. This loose conception of his problem and its terms is the less satisfactory in an author who is building up, with laborious

exactitude, a system *upon words*. For his Method is eminently the "Scripture" one of which we have had a specimen, sect. 7. He holds that the Bible is our *sole* source of information on such topics; that we must therefore eschew all *a priori* notions, especially "natural" ones, and gather our conceptions from it alone. So he first collects the Scripture meaning of faith and justification, *inductively*, by examination of some texts; and having fixed *one* sense for each, he rests thereon (1) his scheme of doctrine, and (2) his exegesis of other passages. The whole method has a mathematical air, and an unpleasant sympathy with Professor Jowett's principle "that each word, or each chief word, in Scripture, should have one and only one meaning, and that if it have more than one meaning it may have any meaning." And the Bishop's application of it, if somewhat peculiar in point of logic, is so like the usual, that it may furnish an apt illustration of its value. He shall state it himself, p. 17:—

"But if there be a doubt about the meaning of a word used in Scripture, the question must be ultimately determined by an appeal to Scripture itself. And though I am confined by the circumstances of this inquiry to a very limited portion of the Bible, I am persuaded that a fair examination of this portion will be abundantly sufficient for my purpose. I avoid all reference to the Old Testament; not because it would be difficult to find there the most decided instances of this use of the term, but because the application of them would require some preliminary discussion unsuited to this place. And from a large proportion of the texts in the New Testament in which the term occurs, I am excluded, obviously, by the course of investigation which I have laid down. But the remainder will, I think, supply abundant materials, when fairly considered, for the satisfactory determination of this question."

These are the conditions for fixing the word Faith. To determine Justification they are precisely reversed:—p. 70.

"And a brief consideration of the use of the word in question in the Sacred Writings will, I hope, leave no reasonable ground for doubting that its meaning has been correctly stated. I must premise, however, that in looking for texts for this purpose we must have recourse to the Old rather than to the New Testament. The texts in the latter, in which the word in question occurs are, for the most part, connected with controverted doctrine; and are in fact the very texts for the interpretation of which we want to have the sense of the word determined. They cannot, therefore, be used for our immediate purpose. But in the Old Testament there are numerous texts against

which no such objection lies; texts wholly unconnected with doctrine, the interpretation of which is, therefore, open to no objection on controversial grounds; and which moreover are so framed as to make the sense in which this word is used in them perfectly clear." He then quotes some texts from the early, and, as he regards them, Undoctrinal Books, and adds, p. 79—"I shall be content, therefore, with those which I have quoted from the earlier portion of the Sacred Volume."

That is, to determine the Scripture meaning of Faith, he leaves out the whole of the Old Testament, and the greater part of the New,—because they are *not* doctrinal; and to determine Justification he leaves out the whole of the New and greater portion of the Old,—because they *are* doctrinal;—the rest being sufficient for his purpose. With or without the reasons, this new Method of Residues may be commended to Mr. Mill, and this illustration of his principle to Professor Jowett. The Bishop frequently reminds us that it needs much "fairness" and "humility" for its use; and we may ourselves surmise that a larger induction would have given a larger Faith and Justification too. However, by this means, he determines that *Faith* means *Trust*; and *to justify*, *to declare judicially the innocence of the person justified*; and these, are his formal definitions.

16. Now, there is a sense in which "Trust" expresses not indeed "faith," nor "the complex of Christianity," but the complex of the sentiments which faith in combination with experience should produce. When we have learned to say, "Though He slay me, yet will I *trust* Him," "Whom *have* I in heaven but Thee, and there is none upon earth that I *desire* besides Thee;" the words *Trust*, *Desire*, and still more, *Have*, express, each of them, not only all that Faith, but all that Faith and works can teach us. Faith and Hope have been matured, and lost themselves in Love; have cast out fear as torment, and calculation of results as mean. There is no longer an "element of time" in it; it is pure religion on Butler's definition, "the affections resting in God as an end;" "resting," as timelessly and disinterestedly as one imagines will be the estate of heaven. And the word "faith" in the passages which the Bishop quotes has much of this sublime and ultimate simplicity. The Syrophenician woman wanted nothing *for herself*; and she "trusted" Christ

against Himself, and despite His words, as profoundly as Abraham trusted God when he said Jehovah Jireh, *both* on the road to sacrifice his son [v. 8] and as he left that scene; or perhaps as profoundly as Isaac trusted both his father on earth and His Father in Heaven to the last. But the forensic faith is extremely different from this, and bears about the same relation to it that a son's "expectations" from his father bear to his affection for, or his dependence on him,—that regards resting in his "will" and Promise do to regards resting in Himself. In the definition it is Trust, or trust in God, or trust in Christ, which is simple, and not far from true; in the system it becomes Trust, not in God, but in God's (1) Promises, (2) as made in the Bible, (3) on strict covenant conditions, of which (4) the Bishop constantly reminds us that the natural man [not the *psychical* man of 1 Cor. xv., nor the *sensual* man of Gal. v., but another natural or very natural man, of whom one often meets examples] will like them the less *the more he knows of them*. Let me quote a passage, p. 47:—

"But I am sure that from this message thus understood fallen man *naturally* [the italics throughout are his] recoils with an aversion just proportional to the degree in which he understands it. And if this be the case—if it be that when this message is best understood it is naturally most distasteful—there is plainly an obstacle to *trust* in the Redeemer which no degree of knowledge, and no strength of conviction, can of themselves overcome, which nothing but the power of God's Spirit can effectually subdue."

Not so violent a reprobation of God's Natural and Moral Government as Dr. Newman's, but quite as hard, and as surprising in a professed admirer of Bishop Butler. And it may explain the "reluctance" to which he refers above, without bringing in particular redemption; for surely it suggests the thought, that, if means are to be used at all for the conversion of this natural man, we ought to take pains to make the Forensic Gospel somewhat *less* intelligible.

17. We have seen that, in Dr. Newman's system, faith occupies but a secondary place, and that it tends rapidly to degenerate into what men call Credulity. In the Bishop's system it holds the prime position; but, despite its rather noble definition, is soon

congealed into calculation, stipulation, Covenant ; our side of the "appointed" bargain being a Creed, or doctrinal attainments of considerable eminence. Let us trace it. The first stage of decline is when it comes to mean, p. 17, "Trust in Christ *as the procurer* of Salvation," or "Trust in God *as the giver* of Salvation for Christ's sake ;" where God and Salvation are *both* explicit ; and with this the induction of texts is supposed to cohere, until we reach the final one, Heb. xi. 1, when God slips out, and faith in His Gifts, or rather in His Expected Gifts, becomes the whole of it. The Bishop's translation or paraphrase of this passage, which all regard as cardinal, is emphatically repeated, pp. 25, 35, and runs : "Now faith is the *confident expectation* of things hoped for, and a conviction of *their* existence though *they* be not seen." No longer a very noble definition of faith, and one which is reached, as my younger readers might remark, by a threefold manipulation of the text, and a total defiance of the context. (1). Out of "things not seen" is omitted The Unseen ; (2) the things not seen are resolved into the "things hoped for," despite the *very first*, and some other leading *examples* of the chapter ; and (3) the sustaining power of things hoped for is attenuated into the [frequently mistaken and misleading] expectation of them—the "conviction" of all other invisible things being banished. And then, as neither on St. Paul's system, nor the Bishop's, could so mean a faith produce the effects ascribed to it, he does not hesitate flatly to contradict the Context¹, the Article,² and the Homilies,³ and to affirm that the faith here

¹ The context. "Having therefore boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus. . . Let us draw near with a true heart, in full assurance of faith. . . Cast not away your confidence. . . For ye have need of patience. . . Now the just shall live by faith ; but if any man draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him. But we are not of them who draw back unto perdition, but of them that *believes to the saving of the soul*. Now, faith is the substance of things hoped for ; the evidence of things not seen. For by it the elders obtained a good report. . . Wherefore, seeing we are compassed about with such a cloud of witnesses, let us run with patience. . . Looking unto Jesus, the Author and Finisher of our faith."

² The article, VII. "The Old Testament is not contrary to the New ; for both in the Old and New Testament everlasting life is offered to mankind by Christ, who is the only mediator between God and man, being both God and man. Wherefore they are

spoken of is not justifying or saving faith at all, but is only the principle of faith, or "faith in general," whatever this may mean, and the substance of which, as extracted from that text and context, he summarizes thus: p. 36. The italics are mine.

"In these, as might be expected from his purpose, there is great variety in the objects hoped for; and the grounds of the expectations entertained are as different as the degrees of acquaintance with God's character and designs which the several individuals possessed were different. But the principle unequivocally manifested in all is the same—it is the confident expectation of some benefit at God's hands or by His appointment—it is firm trust in Him for some good that is desired—it is reliance upon the *faithfulness* and the loving-kindness of the Most High."

To this "principle in general" Gospel faith goes on to add conditions:—*Ib.* The italics are his.

"Now, *faith in God through CHRIST*—the exercise of this principle with which we have to do—differs plainly from any case of *faith in God* only in the grounds upon which it rests, and the object about which it is exercised,

not to be heard, which feign that the old Fathers did look only for transitory promises."

³ The Homily, on Faith, ii. "All these fathers, martyrs, and other holy men, whom St. Paul spake of, had their faith surely fixed in God, when all the world was against them. They did not only know God to be the Lord, Maker and Governor of all men in the world; but also they had a special confidence and trust that He was and would be their God, their comforter, aider, helper, maintainer, and defender. This is the Christian faith which these holy men had, and we also ought to have. And although they were not named Christian men, yet was it a Christian faith that they had, for they looked for all the benefits of God the Father, through the merits of his Son Jesus Christ as we now do. This difference is between them and us; for they looked when Christ should come, and we be in the time when He is come. Therefore, saith St. Augustine, the time is altered and changed, but not the faith. For we have both one faith in one Christ. 'The same Holy Ghost also that we have had they,' saith St. Paul. For as the Holy Ghost doth teach us to trust in God, and to call upon Him as our Father, so did He teach them to say, as it is written: 'Thou, Lord, art our Father and Redeemer, and thy name is without beginning, and everlasting.' God gave them then grace to be His children, as He doth us now. But now, by the coming of our Saviour Christ, we have received more abundantly the Spirit of God in our hearts, whereby we may perceive a greater faith, and a surer trust, than many of them had. But in effect they and we be all one; we have the same faith that they had in God, and they the same that we have."

No words, one would think, could more explicitly, or more impartially, condemn the systems of both Dr. Newman and the Bishop of Osoy, than such as these.

not at all—manifestly not at all—in the state of mind which the words are intended to express. The distinction is, that the benefit hoped for from God is *salvation*, and the foundation of the hope, the merits, and the sufferings of Christ. It includes—as every other case of *faith in GOD* (or I may add in any being) does—*desire* of something to be received from Him, and *trust* that we shall receive it. And to this confidence in Him who is to bestow the benefit upon us, it adds confidence in Him who has earned it for us. It is grounded upon the testimony of God's word, and requires of course a belief in that testimony ;” &c.

What is meant by the latter clause we find farther on :—
p. 198.

“From what I have said of *faith in the LORD*, it must be manifest that it involves necessarily a *belief* in all that God has revealed to us of our nature, condition, and prospects. Right apprehensions on all these subjects are essential to render the Scripture notion of a Redeemer intelligible ; and upon firm convictions of the humbling and abasing representations of Scripture concerning them, must *trust* in the Redeemer be grounded.”

Considerable requirements these as a *foundation* for saving faith. The amount of the superstructure is not defined, but it too must be considerable, for he is indignant at Mr. Knox's lax ideas on the subject :—p. 530.

“Insomuch that he does not hesitate to lay down that distinct apprehensions of the expiatory design of our Redeemer's Sacrifice of Himself, and explicit reliance on the satisfaction made thereby for sin, as the ground of reconciliation with God, and of readmission to his favour, are not essential to complete the character of saving faith ; in which he sees, he says, no reason for including the belief of more than the Catholic Verities and their inseparable consequences ; that is to say, the Trinity in Unity, the Incarnation of the Second Person, and the efficacious Grace of the Third, together with the undeniable results of these two latter verities in the salvation of man.”

Which seems to the Bishop almost monstrous. On these high doctrinal conditions, therefore, together with others, which he thinks more formidable, Salvation is “freely” “*offered to ALL.*” The italics are his ; e. g. p. 203. Alas ! I fear this is but a repelling Gospel, and a very particular redemption indeed. How many of all mankind does it include ? How many does it *exclude* ? Obviously, all outside the Jewish and Christian Churches ; and

all inside them too, except their clever and instructed members. Expressly, all who lived before the Scriptures were written, *including those who wrote them*, up to the time when the doctrine itself was distinctly told—that is, up to the date of St. Paul's Epistles—including especially, Enoch, and Abraham, and David, and *all* the examples of the 11th Hebrews, as indeed the Bishop seems to admit. And lastly, and most especially, all those who enjoyed our Lord's own instructions up to the time of His death, including those whose faith He Himself commended—the Bishop's own examples in fact, or rather the instances on which he grounds his definition. Unless, indeed, he will contend that the Syrophenician, and the Centurion, and blind Bartimeus, were more enlightened doctrinally—see sect. 7—than John the Baptist and the Twelve.

The Bishop has narrowed and refined his Faith until he has eliminated from his Elect not only the Church and world, but *the very instances which form his own induction.*

18. The "justification" resting on this "faith" I have already criticized in other hands; and it is no better here. Rather it is worse; for Dr. Newman observes the ambiguities, and tries to steer a middle course; whereas the Bishop will allow no doubtfulness. He lets down his non-vizor, and rides cap-a-pie over questions and objections. Let us take his definition—p. 70 :—"Justification is a judicial act by which the innocence of the person justified is established or declared." "Judicial act." Of whom? "Of God," he says; and yet it is wrought "by faith only;"—it must be by God's "faith" then, as He is the only Actor. "Declared." Where? (1), In the conscience? (2), in the Scriptures? (3), in the Church's Absolution? or (4), in the Courts Above? Now, these are not mere verbal or trifling differences. Serious corruptions of faith and morals rest on each confusion. Yet the Bishop sees no ground or occasion to distinguish. Or take his conclusion—p. 86. "How then can a man be justified with God? This is the mystery of Redemption, to which the Word of God enables us to reply, 'We are justified freely by God's grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.'" In St. Paul's lan-

guage, where "God" stands for the whole of God, "grace" for the whole of Grace, and "redemption" for all Redemption, this is intelligible, and is in truth the GOSPEL. But in the Bishop's system, what does it become? He has just been distinguishing, for pages, between God generally, and God as "acting judicially," *in which capacity alone* He justifies! So that on his system Justification is *never* "freely;"—not on God's part: He required a full equivalent; and not on ours: it is strictly according to covenant, and God will exact the bond. On this system also there is only one justification; and that is by faith only: whereas faith is *not even alluded to* in the passage, nor is anything of ours. Not to say again that, if mentioned, it should, on this system, be God's faith, for He is the only Agent. And not to say in fine what yet one must say, painful though it be, that on this system the whole matter is a "legal fiction" at the best. To declare judicially the innocence of any person who is *not* innocent, is judicially to declare a falsehood. I have myself heard this dying declaration from a criminal, "Good people, I die innocent; I call Heaven to witness in my last moments that I die innocent;" meaning, as it was afterwards explained to me, that he had confessed his guilt to the ecclesiastic who stood behind him, and had received absolution. Is this ecclesiastical or forensic declaration at all parallel to the declaration thus formally insisted on?

Alas! This self-contented legalism is little like the truth or Gospel that Paul was commissioned to "declare." Narrow, fictitious, forensic, formal; professedly unnatural, profoundly unscriptural, essentially or even vauntingly uncharitable, and extremely apt to become irreligious and immoral—it but travesties common Christianity. God's whole family condemned to eternal woe; condemned in the very making; condemned before their birth, and with or without their fault;—in order to evolve a scribe's or lawyer's loophole for a few! This is its conception of Equity, and Mercy, and Grace, and a Gospel-Plan, lustrous "to men and angels." Surely, the professed Atheist would give a juster account of God; and even the ceremonial system, of a priest's incantation and external rule, is humanity and divinity in its comparison. By way of exalting Christianity and Scripture,

it first divorces them from Nature and Providence; and then it cramps the one in an intellectual vice, and would slay the other with strychnine and a tetanus. Happily, these great Words can neither be divorced nor atrophied. God has written His name too unmistakeably on each. The natural man will reject such Gospels always the more resolutely "the better he understands them;" and even those who are browbeaten into accepting, will never half believe them. Christianity has lifted us far beyond such perverse misconceptions of itself.

Nay, Bible readers, and readers of St. Paul, read him far less artificially. If God have concluded us all in unbelief or sin, it is, "that He might have mercy upon all." If law enter, and sin abound, it is that grace may much more abound. This is the process of earth's Moral Genesis. And as to the process of that Eternal Judgment wherein God Himself and all His works are judged and justified, the deeper our insight or our knowledge, the more we shall discern that it is a LOVE that passes knowledge, beyond all that we ask or think. It is our duty, no doubt, to search whatever aspects of it come within our ken, though we only see them darkly, in a mirror. But as yet our best understanding of them is double and undiscriminated. There are in Scripture two justifications at the least. And had the Bishop gone on beyond his selected "first four chapters" into even the fifth, which is the climax of their argument, he would have been obliged, I think, to make them *both* explicit. "Therefore," says the first verse, "being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ;"—peace, and hope, and joy in believing, and all the other moral effects of faith; for this is subjective, or internal, or psychologic justifying, with all its natural results. And, having pictured these, St. Paul goes on as grandly to repeat the *ground* of this "justification by faith;" namely, "Justification by Christ," *without faith*, and before it, and as independent of it as of Christian Baptism or Jewish Circumcision, or any deeds of any law, or any act of human knowledge:—v. 8, to end.

"But God commendeth His love towards us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified by His

blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him. For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more being reconciled we shall be saved by His life. And not only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the Atonement. Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned;—[I omit the parenthesis, which only strengthens and guards the argument.]—Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift *came upon ALL MEN unto justification of life*. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous. Moreover, the law entered that the offence might abound. But where sin abounded, grace did much more abound: That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so grace might reign, through righteousness, unto Eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord."

This is *the* cardinal passage of Scripture on Justification, as Heb. xi. is on Faith. And in the whole of it, including the parenthesis, Faith is never once in the most remote degree alluded to. What place is there for it? This is not Redemption offered, or Redemption realized, but REDEMPTION WROUGHT.

19. There remains only one point more belonging to the Bishop's system—p. 98:—

"Having thus seen the nature of *Faith* and of *Justification*, we are now to show their connexion, by setting forth that which the Church truly styles 'a wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort'—the doctrine of JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH only; to show that in the office of justifying the believer, Faith admits no fellowship—that none of his acts or qualities—none of his gifts or graces—none of his virtues or deservings of whatever kind—whether concomitants of faith, or consequents of it—share with it in this office; but that it is by FAITH, and by it *only*, that we possess that efficacious interest in Christ's sufferings, and that availing title to the fruits of His obedience, which shield us from the curse of the law, and secure to us its blessings and its rewards."

"Efficacious interest in;" "availing title to;" "comfortable doctrine" truly, for those who possess the Shibboleth; and fully an equivalent for "the fount of grace, which," on the other system, "holy Baptism has stored within us." The Bishop's faith also is really a "symbol," that is, a Creed; far more external to the inner mind than Dr. Newman's faith,

and nearly as external as his Sacrament. It is more difficult than merely "being baptized," and calls higher faculties into exercise; especially as it is both a work, and no work; a merit, and no merit; to be trusted to, and not to be trusted to; to be taken for righteousness, and for Christ, and not to be taken for either; and has sundry other such perplexing if convenient characters, very trying to the natural man; but the two "availing titles" to Christ's merits are absolutely the same in kind. The Appointed Ordinance, and the Appointed Doctrine,—Each is a semi-substitute for Christ; each removes Original Sin; procures forgiveness; clears our state with God, and covers all deficiencies. The first is more easy and vicarious—the second more refined and personal: the first is more ecclesiastical and external—the second more intellectual and perhaps more moral. The first aims at exalting Obedience and the Church—the second, at exalting Enlightenment and the Bible. And the two eminent authors I have dared to criticize are about the ablest modern representatives of the two Great Men who shaped them out, and imposed them on Christianity—St. Augustine and Martin Luther.

20. With vast advantage, each of them, I admit, to the progress of mankind. And this, notwithstanding their exaggerations and perversions; rather, considering what human nature is, aided by those exaggerations. Were it not for the mysterious value with which the first invested Rites *and their administrators*, neither the effete Roman nor the rude Barbarian world had submitted to the priestly guidance which worked confusion into shape. Were it not for the mysterious value with which the second invested sacred learning and intellectual landmarks, a more disastrous chaos, probably before now, had overtaken Christendom. Each schoolmaster was suited for his times; and, armed with supernatural sanctions, each trained, and still trains, the masses who require him. But men grow beyond their schoolmasters, and discern their exaggerations and defects; and then it is a grave disaster if their errors be not easily separable from their truth. Reactions, revolutions and destructions follow. The

multitudes probably are still below the standard of each of these legalities, where each prevails; and some perhaps are rather helped than harmed by their irrational pretensions. But many are offended, and many injured by them; and few things are more needful now than their disentanglement. Is it longer credible to Christian thought, that the treasures of heaven are locked, and can only be opened by ceremonial or doctrinal key? Can the Medieval Hell with its triumphant Hierarchies be longer preached as the destiny and deities of the bulk of human kind? Is the palpable duality on which such systems rest any longer "our reasonable service"? Have we no way of exalting Church or Scripture, except by mutilating Grace, and degrading Providence and Nature? And can we, clergy, with all our educational advantages, no longer maintain our lead, except by browbeating the intellect, and denouncing the heart, of man? If so, both intellect and heart will soon denounce ourselves; and God will find some humbler Apostolate to preach a truer Gospel, and build a wider Church. But surely it has not come to this; and is not apt to come. If we have not eyes to discern the signs of the times or the day of our visitation, surely we have hearts to feel the onward march of this great Christian Dispensation, which has borne us hitherto, and will carry us farther into things not seen as yet. Surely we have Faith in It and in the Invisible it hides. Trust we thereto our Doctrine and our Ceremonial, as well as the still dearer interests which His Advent will accept and crown.

Willingly, then, most willingly, let Church and Doctrine be exalted; but each of them in its place. Neither of them *instead* of Christ or God, but each as His Apostle. Faith shuts out both, *and herself along with them*, from any office of our Justifying;—Christ *hath* performed all this;—she includes both, *so far as they are animated by herself*, as chiefest among the engines of our justifying;—all these are the operation of Christ's Spirit. And each of them, in its place is, no doubt, as essential as Faith herself. For it is by means of these that she "worketh by love." Without them her holiest breathings would be but unproductive impulses, as dead and barren as the

dry east wind. With them she cherishes that gentle Presence; kindly sustains its regenerating Fire; diffuses and directs its godly motions; embodies them in act and habit; associates them with all the charities of life; and gradually makes our total devotion to His Family around us our reasonable Duty and our Love to the Majesty Unseen. When *such faith as this* is, by the Father of All, "reckoned to us for righteousness," surely it is for the simplest of reasons—because, in the sight of God, *it is* Righteousness—the highest or the only Righteousness that His creatures can possess—Righteousness inwrought, on the basis of Pardon found, and Grace and Mercy and Adoption realized. True, on our part it is altogether faulty, and stained throughout with sin; but He who has made us incapable of better, and who remembers whereof we are made, *and who has made us so*, has taken on Himself, in Mercy *and in* JUSTICE, the Reconciliation of all abstract and *a priori* difficulties. Is not this THE GOSPEL;—as preached to Adam, to Abraham, to Cornelius, and to us?

*. * It is the less necessary to examine any secondary parts of the Bishop's System, as he seems to admit that it is rather incoherent and unsatisfactory. The "Moral Effects of Faith," for instance, would not follow *from it* "naturally," i. e. logically, on his system, so they are made to follow "supernaturally," i. e. by special operation of the Spirit, and paralogically (p. 46) by substituting real faith for faith in the forensic formula. Still, the transposition is awkward, and as the resulting errors are common and injurious, I shall glance at some of them.

He acknowledges it difficult to reconcile his "faith" with the examples of Heb. ix.; and suggests, in a note, p. 351, that the Apostle there refers not to some regenerating energy *persuading* the lives of the Patriarchs, but only to "particular incidents of their lives," which illustrate, he thinks, the principle of "confident expectation of some good." Obviously, this would omit the Heading of the Examples, "For by it the Elders obtained a good report," v. 2; and the first *four* Examples;—[any one's] insight of the Nature of Creation, v. 3; Abel's insight of the Nature of Sacrifice, v. 4; Enoch's insight of the Character of God, vv. 5, 6; and Noah's insight of the Certainty of Judgment, "whereby he condemned the world, and became an heir of the righteousness which is by faith," v. 7. And this much the Bishop seems to admit, for he heads his note "On the *Examples* of Heb. ix. 8!"—*eight*!—without explaining this irrelevant parenthesis, further than by conceding, in respect of the *first* instance, that it was well to

include an insight of the past, though it did *not* come under the definition. Moreover, he holds that this instance, and *all* the instances, *might* be examples not of faith at all but of some other principle. Were it not that the Apostle has, like the half-taught painters, labelled each "an example of faith," we might, he thinks, refer it with reason to a very different category;—p. 353.

"It may be alleged, it is true, that this belief in the origin of all things, is not necessarily a result of faith in God; for that a man may be convinced 'upon principles of natural reason' that the world is not eternal, and that the course of 'natural reproduction,' by which the existence of all that it contains is now 'continued,' cannot have gone on always, but that both it and they must have had their origin ultimately, in *some act* of the power of its ruler, *essentially different from any that we now witness*, and so forth; and that, therefore, this may be a result of 'rational conviction' in one who disbelieves revelation, or a result of such a belief in the truth of revelation, as I make distinct from faith—from the faith intended to be explained and exemplified by the Apostle. This is, no doubt, true. But it is true of every example given by the Apostle, as well as this one, and makes as much against every account of the meaning of faith as against mine. There is no Act which the Apostle refers to as a result of faith, which might not have been the result of some other principle—I mean of some principle distinct from faith—under every notion of its nature."

Any other expositor would dispute this thesis; and I respectfully submit that the common notion of faith, as I have endeavoured to expound it—the sense of the Invisible, energising, deepening, and directing all our powers—is adequate to the Apostle's treatment; is that of his definition; includes all his examples; and justifies all his inferences. It includes that of the Article and Homily, as quoted above, p. lxxxi; it includes, also, whatever is reasonable in the Bishop's conception; and it excludes, I hope, the narrowness of the latter, and its *virtual duality*, which I have noted in some expressions of the above extract, in order to draw attention to.

On the side of intellect, Faith is simply Insight. It is the prophet or Seer of the constitution; it always persists, like Moses, "in seeing The Invisible." In the Apostle's handling, it is an insight of Nature, or an insight of Providence, and, *therefore*, as he always implies or affirms, an insight of Grace;—quite logically, if these three be "analogous and of a piece," and their ground principles identical, so that the earlier is at once an illustration and a foretaste, a parable and promise, of the latter. Hence, an insight of the past, far from being out of place, is always the most pregnant and characteristic of its operations. The Jews reckoned the understanding of past revelations the highest kind of "inspiration;" as Dr. Lee explains (Lee on Insp., p. 198); and the wisest Grecian prophets claimed no higher prophetic gift than "that of divining the unknown phenomena of the past" (p. 174, note).

Logically, Past, Present, and Future, are all alike from God, but they are not alike intelligible. The Future is hidden in the womb; of the Present we see only an edge or momentary glimpse; it is only the Past that our faculties can measure—that can be reproduced in memory, and compared, and verified, and pondered on—and it therefore, in Nature, Providence, and Grace alike, is what really reveals God's character. Thus, it is not the future, but the past procedure of our own Dispensation on which our insight of *its* nature must depend. The Scripture and the Creeds say little of the Second Advent—a great deal of the first. They present us, with some fulness, the Genesis of Christianity; *there* we may read the nature of Christ and of God, and rest on our dis-

cernment of "the past," our expectations of the future. To Moses and the Prophets, the First Advent was as mysterious and unreadable as the Second is to us. It was, therefore, the back parts of Providence, "as he passed by," that "unveiled" the Deity of their dispensation, and "let them see his Glory;—the Lord, the Lord God, gracious and merciful, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, and transgression, and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty." Those who had neither the First nor the Second Law, had, at least, before them the Book of Nature, in all its freshness and early vigour; and *real* insight was able to read therein, not, indeed, the "continuance," "preservation," or "reproduction" of a vain philosophy; but *bona fide genesis, generation, and production*; in a word, Creation, or the causing-things-to-grow;—and *not* by "some Act essentially different," but by a course of action essentially the same as that which goes on before our eyes.

In fact, whoever has seen the slightest cloud gathering in the clear expanse, especially if he have watched until, perhaps with violent emission of light and sound, it has congealed itself in rain, *has witnessed, however stupidly, the real process of the genesis of worlds.* And whoever has scrutinised the common process of one season or one day, or the nutrition of a single animal, or of an insect, has really before him, if he have eyes to see, (1), the essential *process*, (2), the *order*, and perhaps even (3), the *number*, of the Great Mosaic Days. (See Vol. II., Lect. i.) That Hebrew Insight, as opposed to science falsely so called, should have—in this, or in any other way—discerned all this, and have affirmed it so broadly and so soon, is, indeed, astonishing; but not more astonishing than several other things, or, rather, than the whole series of things, whereof its History is the Revelation, and its Book the Record.

Bishop O'Brien's noble intellect might well sympathize with so just and natural an exercise of the human understanding—might rejoice over its approximations to the Truth; grieve over its frequent shortcomings; and condemn it for so seldom "even of itself judging what is right." But alas for the semignosticism which delights to separate between the Reason and the Faith, and which finds in him and in Dr. Newman, quite as apt disciples as in Dean Mansell and Sir W. Hamilton. It is not only that they speak, like so many others, of "our mere human reason," or of "our mere natural intellect," or "our pure human faculties," or "our unaided, or unassisted powers;" but they single out the reason as specially blind, and dark, and perverse, and separate from God, and, I had almost said, accursed.

Now is there any ground for this? Pray, Reverend Fathers, *what*, in the presence of higher insight, *are* our unassisted powers? or *are* there *any* such, rational or otherwise? Are they the power to breathe? or to be born and die? or to "consist?" or to "live and move and have our being?" Are they the power to sell two sparrows for a farthing; to add one cubit to our stature; or to make one hair white or black? Much less, the power to remember, to reflect, or to anticipate; to repent, or to aspire? Nay, all this language is palpable duality. Scarcely excusable even in the language of the world, which has been formed, much of it, on an express dualistic basis; and utterly insufferable in the logic or the thought of those who have learned the first conception of the Christian Creed. What is there that we have not received? that we do not receive from instant to instant? and which, from the mere fact of its momentary genesis, is not as distinctly God's as though its birth and being were announced by the Archangel Gabriel?

Most persons speak thus from inadvertence, or at best by way of reserving religious

terms for important occasions. But our theologians have a further object. They degrade "our unassisted powers" in order to enhance the "Assistance" which each tenderers in the form of Sacrament or Scripture. The Bishop especially makes himself the patron of a tenet which one would scarcely expect to hear, or at least to hear repeated, out of Laputa or the Empire; but which, in part no doubt from his authority, has actually reached a sort of religious popularity in Ireland—namely, that the Bible is not our Chief, or our most distinct or authoritative, or in any other way our Best—but *our* *SOLE* source of information on the most stupendous and universal topics which can affect humanity.

"For if it [Justification] be a proceeding, in its whole nature and principles [utterly remote from the analogies of Nature, and the Common Conduct of Providence—and therefore] so entirely beyond our experience, and above our conceptions, it would seem a plain dictate of reason that it is our wisdom to receive the *whole* account of the matter from the Word of God, without doubt or reservation. Nothing certainly but the power of His Spirit can effectually subdue that indocility of our proud and darkened reason, which are among the worst parts of our sad inheritance [*sic*]; and bring us in childlike simplicity in all things to submit to the teaching of the Most High. But in the order of means, it would seem of no small efficacy towards securing due attention for a voice which addresses us upon an important subject that we should be convinced that it is upon that subject our *only* source of information. And surely, if anywhere in religion, this conviction ought to be felt here. If we really believe that God forgives our sins—that He views us as innocent—that he accepts us as righteous—because another has suffered punishment in our stead—because another has fulfilled what we were bound to perform, and have not performed [which is surely about the commonest act of brotherly, not to say of fatherly or motherly kindness, we receive]—if we really believe this, surely we must feel that this is a proceeding too wondrous in its nature, too much beyond our reach, and above our capacity—to make it wise or rational in us to assume to prejudge the mode in which it ought to be conducted. Surely we ought to feel that we are henceforth as hitherto—in what remains to be known, as well as in what we have already learned [*sc.* about Faith] on this high and mysterious subject—*wholly* dependent upon the information which God deigns to communicate to us in His Word." (p. 99.) [The italics are his.]

"And certainly if a man be led to consult the Bible," he goes on, "in *this* fair and humble spirit"—he will find, I doubt not, conclusions quite congenial both with its logic and its premises. But if he consult either it or any other Word of God in the "more noble" spirit of the Bereans, he will be astounded, I believe alike at premise and conclusion; and perhaps will ask again the simple question—Was it from "the Bible alone" that the Examples of Heb. xi. derived their information? or our Lord's Examples? or the Bishop's? or any other Example that was ever heard of? But I have been dabbling too long in the bitter waters of controversial criticism; and if this monstrous paradox require further exposure, must leave the task to others. The exact relation of the Bible to the other Spiritual Instruments is stated in pp. 488-9.

NOTE C.—pp. 215, 406, &c.

[Erroneously referred to as Note B; pp. 160, 171, and 174].

I HAD intended in this note a pretty close examination of the Positive Philosophy; but Comte's later efforts have met with so little favour generally, and even his earlier works have been so severely handled by former admirers, that this seems no longer necessary. Especially as his leading tenets have been pretty distinctly criticised both in the text and foot-notes where it came in course to notice them. Probably, it will be sufficient now to refer to those criticisms in detail.

(a.) The formal answer to Positivism is that it omits a *real* and important side of our own nature;—pp. 7; 215, *n.* A procedure specially unwarrantable and unphilosophical in a system which claims to be merely a delineation of the facts;—*ib.*

(b.) As the omitted side of our nature is that which contemplates the Unseen, this system is fairly to be called *atheistic*;—pp. 64; 215, *n.* As is also, or rather, *a fortiori*, the Scoto-Oxonian, or any other system which affirms a *contradictio* between the Reason and the Faith, the Seen and the Unseen, the Finite and the Infinite;—pp. 215, *n.*; 330; Note A, *et passim.*

(c.) Comte's objection to Political Economy is unjust and unphilosophical;—p. 400, *n.*

(d.) As are also his objections to the Protestant Religion and Politics generally;—*ib.*

(e.) His "Threefold Evolution" is an inversion of history;—pp. 171, *n.*; 406, *sgg.*

(f.) And arises from mistaking the heritage of an individual or period for his own spontaneous production;—p. 408.

(g.) The Natural Evolution is that of Comte himself, i. e. that of his individual life;—pp. 171, *n.*; 410.

NOTE D.—pp. 320; 358–9; &c.

1. IT is common to charge the doctrine of the Trinity with multifarious difficulties. With some justice; for it does throw them into prominence, and they who are not thoughtful enough to feel them everywhere have yet sagacity to discern them here; just as the same persons might only discover the mysteries of figure in some treatise on geometry. But our doctrine does not create the difficulties; it is the Church's attempt at their solution. Many such attempts have been made before and since, and the Church has not disdained to profit by them where she could. Without disparaging them, one can express his earnest satisfaction with our own; and may add one's conviction that the others owe whatever value, or even plausibility they possess to the degree in which they coincide in the Church's formulæ.

The difficulties are classed as Metaphysical and Moral. The latter are more especially the preacher's province, and I have endeavoured to deal with them in the preceding sermon [Sermon III.]. I hope it has appeared that we make them for ourselves; and, therefore, that their existence should be a blessing to us, and tend to set us right. If, in worshipping Christ, we worship any other than God, or any less than God, the chasm in our heart and understanding is a voice from the Highest reiterating the command that we shall worship Him alone. And if, in our theology, we narrow or degrade our Christ, so that he is no longer the Expression of the Universal Father, and "the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe," but has become some capricious and arbitrary God; either essentially weak and unprovident, or essentially unmerciful; then surely the struggling of our own better mind and the opposition we excite from good and bad around us, however we may smother the one or denounce the other, are also the voice of Heaven to us, and plead for some Higher Truth than we have yet received. Much more is the rebuke a blessing if our Christ, or the emblems of our Christ,—his Sacraments, or Doctrine, or Church, or Book,—have already become an idol or a fetish to us; and shame us, or ought to shame us, in the presence of Jew,

or Mahometan, or even Pagan worshiper of The Unknown. And if, on the other hand, the moral difficulties vanish, or rather if our doctrine guide us through and help us to overcome them, the metaphysical will not prove serious. In fact, if there be any essential unity in things, whatever solves the one class will virtually have solved the other. This I believe our doctrine does, and therefore I have not shrunk from seeing them as distinctly as I could, nor from indicating their connexion with the creeds. It may be useful to trace them a little farther.

2. In the ancient Trinitarian controversies, it is scarce Christianity itself that speaks. The Church was but a stripling yet; hardly free from nursing bands; just beginning to feel its way into the coming period, and win dominion for itself. Action and conquest were in its heart, rather than abstract thinking; and it was still willing to believe upon authority, and zealously and loyally repeat, the wisdom of its progenitors. It is rather the ancient Jew and Greek, one should add the Egyptian also, who, convinced of the truth of Christianity, combine to formulate its leading principles. It is Jacob, with his hand on Ephraim's head, gathering up his remaining inspiration to divine his grandson's character, and make his lines distinct. Or the Church is like the Christ of twelve years old among the doctors of the temple, hearing them, asking them questions, and answering in turn, and then going down and being subject to His parents, until the time had come for Him to teach Himself. The passage I have commented on, like the other writings of St. Paul, defines "the correlation of things," in the language of Grecian culture, in its reflex contact with the East, whence it had once and again borrowed the materials of its thought. In St. John, the same is said in still more Eastern form, though not without its well-marked Grecian element. To us, who are familiar with the Old Testament, and the commanding line of Hebrew inspiration, the words of our Lord Himself, preserved perhaps most precisely in the first two Gospels, seem the most homely and effective. The Roman dominion mixed the elements of the ancient world; and the Christian faith, working vigorously in their midst, presently *forced* its most mature attention.

After it had well pondered over the giant promise of this last-born Son, the culture of that old creation, now approaching to its grave, exerted itself once more, and in the creeds and liturgies embalmed about its last intelligent and authoritative utterance. These have, without much variation, lasted us till now.

3. But now the Christian world is itself enlightened and a thought. It no longer repeats from dictation merely, but insists on judging and speaking for itself. It has tilled its fields, built its cities, enforced its laws, written its multitude of books, endowed its schools and synagogues, and cultivated its public mind, until it is now capable of reflection and abstract reasoning, and finds itself again in the controversies that have slept,—controversies the same in substance and in tendency, for all their novelty of form, and entered on, not now externally at the bidding of the Church, to agree or differ, but spontaneously generated from its own fields of thought. For thought itself ascends, and while seeking to generalize and centralize itself, approaches or finds the central Unity. True, its first utterances are various, largely perhaps erroneous and discordant; but fundamental concords and directing lines, though hidden, presently begin to tell, and shape it into harmony. Nature is pervading; the love of truth is strong; the polarities of the earth are well nigh fixed; its directions are appointed; and human history, though it enriches and expands its cycles, is yet always extremely like itself. The wise proverbs of the ancients, “and their dark sayings,” dark to the bright intelligence of childhood, become illumined into meaning by our more troubled experience, and presently astonish us by enunciating our own profoundest and most original reflection. Whenever men capable of thought begin, though but in the humblest gallery of nature, they presently inquire into the nature of the things they see, and their relations to other things, up to the Highest Thing, and have become theologians insensibly and unawares. When they look back upon their statement, they are surprised to see that they had been reformulating, in the language of their own department, some fragment of the creed, or perhaps some easy blunder that the creed has avoided or condemned. We had been busy loitering in some crypt or cranny,

and making strange discoveries, and are only half pleased, perhaps, on opening some door, or turning round a column, to find that we are still within the precincts of the Church, or hard by its central nave.

4. The teaching of the Creeds might be more significant to us if we varied their expression somewhat; and I venture the following as a summary or exposition of them, especially the Athanasian:—

Their fundamental doctrine is that we believe in UNITY:— in the Unity of Deity, and in the Unity of Things, and that these are but two sides of the same Unity. We believe in the Unity of God, including His Self-Manifestation; or, we believe in the Unity of Things, including Him “in whom they have their being.” In more detail:—

a. We believe in God the ETERNAL FATHER, the Ultimate and Immanent Cause, Director, Judge, of everything that is.

b. We believe in the SON or Word of God, in the Self-Expression or Self-Manifestation of Deity. We believe in it as *being*, and as being itself divine;—divine, (1), in its Totality, and (2), in its Archetypal parts—those which perfectly embody and exhibit the principles of the whole. We believe in it not as being the whole, even in its totality, or the ultimate, of God, but as the balanced Utterance, Self-Expansion, Self-Announcement of the Father, and truly *partaking* of His essence; and including in its substantive existence the whole reality of things; all our eyes can see, our hands handle, our thought and heart conceive.

c. We believe in the HOLY GHOST; the Living Energy of God, His Creative, Exertive Force and SPIRIT; felt in all kinds of Motion, Emotion, moral and spiritual Motive; the *vital* power that worketh Nature, and Providence, and Grace, and is truly operative, generative, regenerative in every thing that is. We believe in this again as *being*, and being divine; not the whole or the ultimate of God, but proceeding; proceeding on the whole from the Father, but in its partial aspects or operations proceeding from the Son; acting from, and by, and

through the Manifestation, which thus essentially "mediates" between each thing and the Ultimate.

d. Each of these Three—so far as we can conceive of each as separately existing—is Infinite, Eternal, Incomprehensible, and God; but we do *not* conceive them to separately and independently exist; they *coexist*; coexist in a certain order and relation; both the Manifestation and the Force "proceeding ever" from the Unchangeable. In their Triunity they are "God, God-Manifest, God-Exertive;" and they coexist from eternity; they are co-eternal together; such as God is, God always was and will be: eternity is the "now" of His existence.

e. And this is "our conception" of the Inconceivable; the best idea we can form, in brief and in the aggregate, of the nature of God and things.

f. "Furthermore," we believe that God has given to us a special image of this nature of God and things, suited to and arising from the requirements of our planet, and head and lord of its vitalities—a perfect image, instance, and exemplar of God and nature;—Emmanuel, God-in-our-own-nature, Deity-in-the-Human Archetype.

g. That whereas our own Macrocosm, vaguely, and our own microcosm, more distinctly, image to us, and were designed to image, this nature of God and things—imperfectly, however, and perversely, from their own imperfections and perversities—the Human Archetype, the Lord Jesus Christ, images it perfectly, throughout His History, and so is *the* Son, Word, or Expression of God to us.

h. The origin of this special Manifestation is God-the-Spirit and Humanity. As God caused the creative forces operative in our planet to produce Humanity, lord of its productions, and first climax of its attainment—so He caused the forces operative on Humanity to produce the Son of man, climax of *its* past attainment, transition-point of its history, and basis of its further aspiration, which in due time He will head and crown.

i. What relations this Divine human being bears to other beings, or even to ourselves, we very inadequately apprehend. That He is the one Mediator between God and us, and the

origin to us of the gifts of the Spirit, we are expressly told. He passed through our birth, and life, and death, and was raised again from the dead, expressing or embodying to us the Divine presence and sympathy in all human things; in all our ties and duties, and joys and sorrows, in the depth of our sin, and the certainty of our resurrection. We are told that He did all this *for us*; endured in our stead, exhausted the penalty that was against us, the antagonist that was before us, satisfied God's justice and indignation, procured for us the future life he illustrated, and caused all God's attributes towards us to consummate in love. How this vicariousness is, or why, we cannot tell:—we find it according to the analogy of nature; we can procure no shelter, except at the expense of that which shelters us; we can obtain no life, except at the expense of other life that feeds us; we cannot live on into a future moment, except by the expenditure of our present living self; nay, both Nature and Providence seem to rest on it essentially for their very existence, as their central fact of Birth or Maternity exhibits. But why things should be so, and why human nature should feel it so, and express its sense of it in every form—as by urging sacrifice and self-sacrifice to all extremes—or why God, God-manifest, should work the futurity and elevation of His creatures by the giving of Himself, we pretend not to understand or to explain. The Church re-states it, on authority, as it has been handed down to her;—to this effect, “God-in-things *sustains*, while conducting, Creation's process, and bears in Himself the reconciliation of all its real and apparent difficulties: His highest Character, as yet revealed, being Conscious Sympathy, Deliberate Self-Sacrifice or LOVE.

k. Meantime the Church preaches this objective reconciliation of God's attributes to each other and to us, as engine of our subjective reconciliation—our assimilation to God in the likeness of His true image. This “sanctification” is essential to our “salvation,” and will prove in history its immediate “cause” and “measure.”

Do these terms sound too modern for an exposition of the Creed? If so, let us remember, first, that our own controver-

sies and those of the ancient world virtually coincide: as men become capable of abstract thought, they rise into a sphere of large relations, which vary as little as does the structure of an Island-Universe; and, next, that it was these very controversies surrounding the infant Church which obliged the gradual expansion of her baptismal formula; that is, in fact, the formation of the Creeds. I do not say that she always intended to pronounce directly upon the questions agitated. Rather, perhaps, the contrary; she took refuge, it may be, from perplexities she could not master, and in which she refused to lose herself, in the authoritative statement of the one aspect and line of things whereof she did feel sure. But things and "aspects" are not isolated. If she described things truly in one respect, and that the highest, she must have given, however unconsciously, one true line for speculation's guidance, and has virtually decided the other questions which lie around her truth. Just as the formal solution of any problem involves in itself the principles of its science, and only needs a just "discussion" to evolve them.

5. Without entering too far upon our field of controversy, it seems needful to throw into greater prominence *two* key-points of the Creed, which are broadly indicated by its structure as well as by its words;—(1.) That the doctrine of the Trinity is independent of the Incarnation, and may be, and is, in fact, expounded without its aid; the latter doctrine being introduced by "Furthermore." (2.) That the Incarnation involves the Trinity, and *exemplifies* that doctrine in the concrete: it thus guarantees the *reality* of the terms, and prevents either God or things from being explained away into ideal mists.

And the substance of the *first* point may be thus stated:—We do believe in Co-eternals, but not in *independent*, separate or separable Co-eternals, nor in any Duality or Plurality whatever. Our Co-eternals are Co-essential, and are One. "We distinguish the Persons—we do *not* divide the Substance." Our faith is Trinity-in-Unity; and is the Church solution of the standing philosophic question, Diversity-in-Unity.

In other words, we do not believe in three separate or separable Beings; but we do believe that Being is essentially tripar-

tite; that all "existence" up to the Highest, both in fact and in conception, presents itself in a threefold nature and relationship, which, for want of a better term, we name "personality;" and which we endeavour to describe as follows:—

I. Being Ultimate, Unchangeable, Directive, and Supreme; sometimes less properly called, Being Impersonal or Ontologic; more justly, the Absolute or the Unconditioned, which imposes its own conditions universally, and is subject to no conditions *but Itself*. In more common language, that Real Being which underlies, originates, and rules all manifestation and all force.

II. Being Manifest, Mediating, Instrumental, Sensible; Being expressed in Form, or rather in multiplied and correlated forms, which by their own exhaustless yet connected variety and multiplicity "express" the Unvaried and Inexhaustible.

III. Being Motive, Operative, Organizing, Vitalizing; the active energy which works all manifestation and variation: "commands," forms, transforms matter, generates and regenerates all form; but which, on the other hand, truly animates form, is possessed by and "proceeds" from it; acts from and by it, and on its basis. In fact, Form is to Force what Momentum is to Motion; but Vital Force, being creative and creative, always transcends and commands any given Form, is *Κύριος* as well as *Ζωοποιός*.

6. And, I insist, this is a just, nay, so far as we know, the only just analysis; and I believe that the perplexities both of the ancient and of the modern Areopagus are mainly due to its inadequate apprehension. Having developed its statement to some length in Sermons III. and VIII., I need not here pursue it farther; and only note how absurd it is to charge it with contradictions, or with creating instead of resolving difficulties. In the Macrocosm it will run thus—(1.) Ultimate, Unchanging, Directing Will; (2.) Infinite and infinitely-diversified Embodiment; and (3.) equally infinite and equally diversified Exertive Force. In the Microcosm it runs thus—(1.) Our ultimate unchanging self; (2.) our personal embodiment, whether in our present material, or our future spiritual body; and (3.) our living powers. Is there any contradiction here? or

is there any other analysis which,—by confounding these, or dividing their substantial unity, or denying any of them,—would not involve itself immediately in contradiction and absurdity? It were indeed absurd, I admit, if we were supposed to say that two or three Ultimate Wills made one Ultimate Will; two or three Infinite Embodiments one Infinite Embodiment; two or three Infinite Systems of Force one System; or that any such Co-Infinites could be; and this would be equivalent to saying that three Fathers made one Father, three Sons one Son, three Holy Ghosts one Holy Ghost; or that three Gods could be. But to say that one Father, and one Son, and one Holy Ghost, are co-essential and co-eternal together, is as obvious a truth, or truism, when the words are understood, as that, in our “image,” one unchanging self, one organized body, and one series of living powers, are co-essential and con-natural; are each and each equally “human;” and make by their undivided union, “not three men, but one man.” And so on through all the *doctrinal* clauses, which are, I believe, singularly careful and exact. As to the *damnatory* clauses, I have already expressed my conviction, that, as now popularly* understood, they are false and injurious, and should be removed from the Athanasian Creed, as the parallel clauses were removed from the Nicene. In the only sense that, as I conceive, they are strictly true, they are paraphrased in sentence *k*.

7. Our *second* key-point is the connexion between the Trinity and the Incarnation—namely, that the latter is an

* In the original or Scriptural sense of the words ‘faith,’ ‘perish,’ ‘salvation,’ and ‘damnation,’ these clauses are, indeed, defensible; and there is this advantage in their continuance, that they almost force the clergyman to protest habitually against their present popular meaning; just as a similar clause in the Apostles’ Creed obliges us to criticize the ecclesiastical ‘Hell.’ But ‘doubtful discussions’ are just those to which we ought not to invite our neophytes. And these, standing on the threshold of our profession, are a grave offence, not to say a blasphemy. Various other religions, as well as those of Mahomet, Dominick, and Calvin, ostentatiously reserve salvation for their “true believers;” but such pretension, absurd and wicked everywhere, is, in Christianity, absolutely without excuse. Was not the very first “Revelation” after Pentecost expressly to teach that “God is no respecter of persons, but in every nation,” *and in every creed*, “he that feareth God, and worketh righteousness is ACCEPTED with Him?” Has He not found a Ransom? Acts, x. 34, 37.

Instance, a *concrete* Example of the former; involving, therefore, and implying the doctrine which it did, in fact, reveal; while, on the other hand, the doctrine is prior to, and independent of the example; just as any rule or principle is independent, not, indeed, of all its cases, but of any one particular application.

The Trinity is an Eternal and Essential Verity; as true before the Incarnation as after it, and equally true had the Incarnation never taken place at all;—as *true*, but not as *manifest*; not as explicit or as apprehensible by us; not known, or guaranteed, or brought steadily within our intellectual or practical regards. It might have been gathered from other intimations—in some measure it was so; but the concrete example invited or obliged its examination, and so became the historic origin and Revealer of the doctrine. Out of the baptismal formula came forth the Apostles' Creed, and out of it in turn the Nicene and Athanasian, which yet are but the exposition of Eternal Fact. Emmanuel makes the Eternal God-in-things explicit and intelligible. God-in-our-own-nature expounds to us both God's real nature and our own.

In other words, the Incarnation is neither the whole nor the only manifestation of God, though it be to us the Archetypal, Central and Exponential one. The Son of Man is not "co-extensive" with God-the-Word, or even with Humanity; though He be the climax in which Humanity has reached full communion with the Father; and though He be the Archetype of God's Self-expression to other worlds than ours. He is identified or made "one altogether" with God, "not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh," nor by the reduction of God-the-Word to this one point, however typical, but by raising Humanity to this central and conscious elevation. Hence, the Communion, or Oneness with the Father, which Christ claims, He labours expressly to diffuse.—"That they may be one," He prays, John, xvii. 11, "*as we are*;" or, more fully, v. 21, 'That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, art in Me and I in Thee, that they also may be one in Us; that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me. And the glory which Thou gavest Me I have given them, that they may be one, ever

as we are one: I in them, and Thou in Me, that they may be made perfect in one." In fact, The Christ is a sustained instance of Sonship Realized, and the Medium or Mediator for extending and organizing such realization. All things are of God, and all, half-consciously, reach up to Him again:—He is the Word which utters intelligibly the meaning of the rest; the Son, in whose inheritance and household they all have share; the Unique, in whom the Universal sees and shows the ONE. And hence He is, within our range at least, the Sun and Centre of God-the-Word, or God-the-Light, and all other manifestation becomes correlated with Him. He is the Head; we are the members: He is the Vine; we are the branches: He is the Cornerstone; we are the temple;—or, in more emphatic if more startling language, first, the Church is His Body, "the fulness of Him that filleth all in all;" and next, and in a wider circle, "in Him all things consist." And hence, in fine, our union with Him is typified and "represented" by our true communion with things *below* ourselves, expressly with the food we eat. "For we," says the apostle, "being many, are one bread and one body: for we are all partakers of that one bread." In His Communion, we have alike our true communion both with God and things; and may perceive and almost feel the Fundamental Unity.

8. We do not pretend to understand all this, nor indeed any of it, beyond a very narrow and superficial range; any more than we pretend, beyond the same narrow and superficial range, to understand the mysteries of number, of chemical combination, or of diffused light. But within our range, and so far as our faculties can firmly go, the above outlines are as clear and firm to us as any other truths we know. And had they not seemed so to the old Greek mind, it had never built them, in a highly reflective and disputatious age, into the balanced and authoritative creeds. Indeed, it is only as one wanders through the philosophic schools, and tries in each, (1) to honour and learn its truth, and (2) refuses to allow truth itself to be explained away,

or reality banished into nihilism; that one gradually feels the value or the necessity of the concrete centre, which tests their varied utterance, correlates their efforts, and enables us positively and consistently to build. The extremes of speculation are always a surd Materialism on one side, a vague Idealism on the other. Each side starts from a true affirmative; but each, resting on a latent dualism, develops, on being questioned, only contradictions and negations. What is true in *each* is affirmed in the Christian OBJECTIVITY, and round the Object of our Worship the metaphysical nature of things becomes revealed as truly as the historical and moral. Materialism, without abandoning its base, looks upward, and is able to ascend, if only while it asks itself in what organism shall we next be born? Idealism is able to define and realize itself; rejects its dualism as self-destructive, and gathers up its chaotic pantheism into Theism and Theocracy. "All things are of God," says the pantheist; "True," we reply, "and therefore, *a fortiori*, the Order, and Law, and Principles of things; their Spirit and Purpose, and the pervading Imperative to climb. Let these be followed up, and we shall be all inquiring together for the One true Path of Life." Soon Humanity, the Human Ideal, and the Human Archetype, will be found revealed in the Object of our search, and "the Desire of our eyes" shall meet as from the wilderness. To the thoughtless and low, it is true, the doctrine lends itself to fetishism—a fetishism, however, which always tends to raise itself, to make its fetish a true sacrament, and worship *only* the unseen—while it obliges always the abstract thinker to connect himself with Fact; to "theorize" our true humanity and the actual world we know.

9. The very endeavour to express our doctrine in the language of "philosophy," ancient or modern, will at once exhibit the weakness of the schools, and the necessity of the Incarnation, or of *some such* Deity-in-the-concrete-example, if plain reality is to be upheld. Our nearest attempt is "God-ultimate, God-phœnomenal, God-dynamical." But we are obliged to use a Latin term for the first Person, in order to avoid the utterly false connotation which either the ancient term "ontological,"

or the modern "noumenal," would fix upon the other two. Either would imply, to philosophic ears, that only the first possesses real existence, or is a "*ding-an-sich*," both the others being mere-phenomenal, or phantasm. And to this one point perhaps might be reduced the essential difference between the philosophy which is not "vain" and all the variations of idealism. The latter divide off the Being from the Becoming, the *ὄν* from the *γιγνόμενον*, and so virtually deny the reality of *both*. With them, as with us, "things" are the manifestation of Being; are God's *φαινόμενα* or "Word." With them also, as with us, they are derived from GOD; are His *γιγνόμενα* or, ultimately, "Son." But with them the *φαινόμενον* is *ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ὄν*, with us it is *ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὄντως ὄν*. Their phenomena are not really "Facts." "Always becoming, never being," *they never truly ARE. And therefore nothing is*; for, as themselves acknowledge, the Being which has no real manifestation is but the same as Non-Being. With us, on the contrary, the Becoming is the Being; not the whole of it, only the *present* portion of its Fulness—yet permeated by, and truly "partaking," the "substance" it "displays." Else, as we ask, it displays—what? *quod nihil habet nihil ostendere potest*. Our phenomena, therefore, *are* facts; and every fact with us is a portion of the Eternal Fact. Whether it be also a typical or an Archetypal Fact depends on how much of the real Spirit and Character of the whole it can embody and express. With us the commonest of things are profoundly "real;" Archetypal things are seen to be divine, and to be the steps whereby our Aspiration climbs.

To say the same, reverently, in more concrete yet more lofty terms—"Show us the Father," asks the *Greek* section of the Apostolate, "and it sufficeth us." "Have I been so long time with you," replies our Lord, "and yet hast thou not known me Philip? He that hath seen me *hath seen* the Father"—in the only way, that is, that ever the invisible can be seen—in the only way that any Force, or Life, or Spirit, any Direction, or Law, or Character, ever can be seen—namely, in a just Embodiment. And these, or the highest of these cognizable by human nature, Philip had seen, and continued to see, living, working, dying and

living again, re-embodied in a vastly more elastic and powerful organism, in the ascending centre of Humanity. Of this God-in-real-things, God-in-a-perfect-Humanity, God-in-a-suffering-yet-ever-ascending Humanity, He became a prime Apostle.

10. Thus we reach again, from every side, our initial questioning, and must resolve the central question of our worship into the general question of our being. And it is obvious that I have been all along but commenting on a text which is, in fact, the Motto of the Christian Church, and embodies her distinctive effort. "Ye believe in God, believe also in me." As long as God is merely some abstract or "idea" to us He may be anything or may be nothing; thought is bewildered, and faith and worship dissipated in vacuity. But Revelation "divides for us this vague," and gathers our powers into progress and productiveness round its definite OBJECT. We believe in God: we believe also in Christ;" Christ, not as some separate or separable deity, but as the true Expression of the Father. We believe in God the Invisible, Unutterable, and Unknown: we believe also in God the Image, the Manifest and Visible; the articulate Word that makes the Unknown Known. We believe in the essential Father, Immediate, Original, Ultimate: we believe also in the essential Son, the Ever-Derived, Ever-Generated, Ever-Mediating, who shares with creatures and to creatures the Essence of the I AM. We believe in God the Being: we believe also in God the Becoming, the Ever-Becoming, and that the Becoming is the Being, partakes of the divinest Fulness, and "gives" the same to us. We believe in God the abstract Omnipresent; Unchangeable behind all change, and succession, and show, and history: we believe also in God the concrete Omnipresent; in God the Present; God *in* all change, and successive-ness, and fact, and history; in whom we and all things consist, and have our transitory or our abiding, yet our most "real" Being.

11. What relation our centre of the celestial light bears to other centres and dependent systems, is beyond our conception. But that Christ placed humanity and human history in some conscious correlation with them all, and caused it to express to

them, if but in parable, the true features of Emmanuel—nay, that He bore it and its cross up through them all to the very throne of God, and in it reconciled them all, or is reconciling them, seems the express affirmation of my text* and context, and not of them alone. But how shall we pretend to comment on statements such as they, farther than to say with reverence, that they are consistent with themselves and with what we might surmise or hope; that the proof of the lower statement seems to imply the higher; and that its explicit announcement is a gracious condescension to the utmost wanderings or yearnings of our thought? The Scriptures set our own Christ, however, distinctly before us. He who has seen Him hath seen the Father. He who has reached Him has reached the Father; he who is conformed to Him is conformed to the express image of the Father. Let us consider well the image; it will not shake a feature of its delineation to be told that each line is the edge of a surface, or each point the apex of a cone, which stretches out thence, and with the same essential characters, to wherever God and things are found.

And for practical purposes, I must again insist on one feature of the delineation, as there is a tendency among us to disparage or obscure it. Our Emmanuel is God-in-history,—not capriciously “interfering” with it, not “suspending” or “violating” it; but sustaining it throughout, carrying it towards and through its crises, and hinging its regenerations upon Himself. Down to the depths of humanity He came, but not unexpected or unprepared for, and not without having made the expectation of Himself truly to prepare His way, and to lift men into some approximate likeness of the humanity He bore. Came and went, but not without marking His type and æra on the world; not without passing humanity through His tomb, and regenerating it in the transition; not without generating a new humanity, whose energetic principle is the spirit of the resur-

* The greater part of this note was written for the Pulpit, as part of Ser. III.; but as it was delivered on Trinity Sunday, which is one of the chief Festivals in Trinity College, it was necessary to shorten the Sermon, in order to leave time for the Communion Service.

rection, and to which He bears the same relation now that Adam's offspring bore to His first feeble carnal expectation. This is Christ's place in history, and thus stands He correlated to the vitalities of earth. Mankind as a whole worked up towards His Advent, and in that was satisfied; as the first Natural Creation worked up to Adam, and in Him worshipped the "Image" it could then appreciate. And now His Church works up to Him again, and with a growing intelligence expects another Advent, a higher Pentecost, and holier Sabbath day, which shall transcend, yet verify, its utmost range of thought.

12. And the theory of morals finds in Christ as signal a transition. Nature's principles, her directions and instincts, emerge into consciousness in man; becoming, in the individual, Will and Conscience, in the community, Law. This sense of Law, the early societies elaborated into systems, whose object was the development of the individual, and training him to some knowledge of his sphere. Among such, the institutions of Israel, derived mainly from Egypt, enriched by Moses with higher knowledge and a distinct prophetic or progressive element, gradually took the lead, and had already begun to impress the nations when it culminated in Christ, and in Him passed away. What He taught and rendered necessary is the Spirit of Law, not as superseding the letter, but as "commanding" it, however perfect; enabling men to rise above it, and make it not lord but minister. Henceforth, Law and Ceremonial, whatever men require, are to be instituted and enforced; but they must be recognised as steps in progress, and men must be called on to pass them by into an individual consciousness of the rule of Heaven. Christ summons us into a kingdom of invisible truth; its subjects are His freemen. Their liberty does not destroy the Law, but fulfil it; for it carries on its principles into a higher sphere; converts it from *positive* into *moral*; lets us see their reasons, and then *binds us by the reasons* out far beyond what the letter seems to say; so that the Mosaic Decalogue will more than comprise whole systems of legislation, and one or two great commands will more than comprise the Decalogue. This is the

largest step in morals that the world has seen. I do not say it was not largely anticipated both inside the Jewish institutions and without. I insist it was. It is not ours to isolate the Son of Man from any human history. But I insist also that in that central system which was able to command the others, to gather their excellences around itself, and carry their momentum into the future world, Christ not only taught it formally, but rendered it compulsory. In fact, the Hebrew system, its prophet, priest, and king, not merely culminate, but terminate in Christ ; find their climax in His person, and in Him are slain. The temple on Zion shortly follows the temple of His body, and with it the whole possibility of its law and ordinance. The co-ordinate civilizations of the ancient world soon follow, with the ancient world itself, into a new chaos of the nations. Thence emerge in time the Church and the Church's progeny, all steeped in this Great Lesson, whereof they have, unconsciously indeed, recorded their sense, by passing on their "period" to a new Sabbath-day. True, both men and institutions, whether clerical or not, are slow to learn what spirit they are of; but the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free pervades our instincts, and breathes in our profession. Quick as anything grows up to near its standard, it finds, all too easily perhaps, both utterance and authority for freedom. The practical danger is that men will insist in having it, or worse, in spreading* it, too soon. For Grace has its Order, as well as Nature and Providence, and visits, with extremest penalties, inversion and *prematurity*.

13. And this brings us, in fine, to the common doctrine of the Cross, and that which makes its preaching eminently God's Gospel in the world. For what about this dark side of Nature and of Grace? That God should institute and sustain them both ; that He should write His great lines in nature's substance, evolve them in her growth, make her discern, and utter, and obey them in her consciousness, and shrink and tremble at the consciousness of any disobedience, is easily conceived : this all sounds to us of God. But why should there be *any* disobe-

* See Note F.

dience in His handiwork and world? Are not *all* from Him? That He should sympathize, especially, with Law and Order, and with true Humanity and with Humanity's progression; that he should prepare and converge the dispensations to a Central Christ, who should regenerate their character, and initiate a higher kingdom of regenerated man; and that he should sustain and purify this Chosen Person through some ineffable communion with Himself, and empower Him to speak and act as never man did before or since,—all this is conceivable, or may be proved. But what of the violation of all this law and order? What of Humanity's *untruth*, and perverseness, and degradation? What of its resistance to progression, its disregard and despite to the Spirit of purity and good; its persecution of all His prophets; its rejection, betrayal, denial, its deliberate crucifixion of the Christ?

Nay, this *is* the Gospel that we preach, and this is the reconciliation we are commissioned to declare. For the Cross of Christ *is* the Throne of Christ; and the title on it is His true title, in Hebrew, and Greek, and Latin; and the crown of thorns is His true coronation; and the purple robe and ignorant hypocrisy, that, mocking, bowed the knee, is still the purple robe and ignorant hypocrisy with which a now large circuit of the world does homage to His true Royalty; and the death of Christ is the life of Christ and the life of all things in Him. Strange is the inversion of terms with which we must describe the act that changes the destinies of earth, and the position of every creature—that disappointed all present calculation of friends or foes, visible and invisible, and embraced them all in unexpected judgment. The agents and spectators, they knew not what they did; their acts and words passed into some deep and strange significance they could not understand. From the high priest who “prophesied,” by virtue of his office, that one man should die for the people; or the loving woman who came beforehand to anoint his body to the burial; or the Judas who sold him “quickly,” as he was desired; or the Peter who denied with an oath, I do not *know* the man; or the Pilate who thought he did know Him, and “wrote what he had written;” or the

lookers-on who said, " He saved others, himself he cannot save ;" or the malefactor who challenged him to " save thyself and us ;" or the other who thought himself " in the *same* condemnation," and prayed to be remembered in His kingdom ; or the multitudes, Jew and Gentile, who cried—is it an imprecation or a prayer ?—" His blood be on us and on our children ;"—all men, like earth itself, they did it " reeling in amaze." Darkness was on them at mid-day. And as we recall and contemplate the scene, the very Cross is transfigured before our eyes, and our words and thoughts come back to us " changed in sign," as having passed the infinite.

On that Cross all untruth, ill-meant and well-meant, converged, and exhausted itself or was transformed—The Truth that hung there made it true. On that Cross all violence, and error, and perplexity, and selfishness, and hypocrisy, and faithlessness, converged and were exhaust : Unexhausted Goodness accepted all, and bowed His head, and turned them into good. On that Cross all " political necessities," all tyrants' pleas, and all moral and religious necessities, converged and were exhaust—The Son of Man accepted all as the dispensation of His Father and meekly drank the cup : behold, it was Earth's Amreeta-cup—Creation's sacrament of life. In a word, Sin and Curse were concentrated there, and there transformed to good ; for there " God made Him to be SIN for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him." In fact, upon the cross of Christ—no ; not the cross alone, this is but the wrong half of our Gospel ; but the cross, and that which follows it—the cross as illumined by Easter and by Pentecost ; on that Cross which is now earth's symbol of truth and glory, and which our very fetishism makes its idol—on that Cross all evil that this world knows and others, perhaps, that earth knows not,—all evil, physical, social, spiritual, up to the very forsaking, so far as could be seen or felt—the forsaking of a righteous man in his extremity by God Himself—on that Cross all evil converged and culminated, and was then and there exhausted—nay, then and there found its passover, and did pass over into good ; for, behold upon that Cross all evil had found " God."

Found God there explicitly, and found him for ever in what

that crucial instance makes explicit, and was intended to reveal—that all things *are* of God, however they appear, and all find in Him their Out-embrace, and Reconciling Mystery. There captivity was led captive; death and hell destroyed themselves; earth's central degradation and despair became the life-spot of her history; and the concentration of human, perhaps of other weakness, ingratitude, and guilt, found and made the sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of all. How, and WHY? Simply because there they all found God—"God in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses *unto them*," but taking them on *Himself*,—God, remembering whereof we are made, and Who has made us so, and coming down to our deep need, and taking on Himself all necessities, and sufferings, and sins, and condensing their very darkness until it bursts forth in light ineffable, and shows Him in it all—God-in-creation, creating it anew, bearing the children to the birth, and swallowing up the travail and agony in the joy of its new life—God-in-higher nature, making Himself its veil and passover, and centre of its self-sacrifice; nay, making Himself its grave and charnel-house, and enabling it to spring, as all must spring (so has He willed it) "on footsteps of its dead self" into its higher self. God-in-our-own-nature descending below us, and purging away our guilt, and lifting us with true sympathy, with patient resistless love, into the true communion of the Father. Or, may we say it once more, God in moral and religious discipline,—call it natural or supernatural as you will—endorsing, enforcing, and *bearing* it along with us; God taking on Himself the responsibility and consequences of that mysterious elastic atmosphere of mixed restraint and freedom with which He has encircled each, and demonstrating, in its central and apparently most inexplicable instance, that it is all, triumphantly, both Good and God. This is our "image of the invisible God, and first-born of every creature," in Whom all creatures are reconciled to God, and in Whom, we say it reverently, God's attributes are reconciled together—in Whom, therefore, and towards Whom we worship God, and cast ourselves upon the pervading Sympathy, the expressed Purpose, and the essential Unity of things.

. To plain people, who have never been perplexed either by the books or the difficulties above alluded to, the substance of what is insisted on may be expressed thus:—The moral significance of the Cross is to assure us that, even in its extremest case, every “cross” comes from God; and that if we will view it right, and do our duty by it, *i. e.* “bear” it as we ought, from obedience to God and from regard to others,—it will prove the special means of our moral elevation, of revealing God *to* us and *in* us, and of our assimilating communion with Him. There is a “crook in each one’s lot,” nay, in every portion of it, and this crook is the special finger of God for our spiritual growth. Though it were some thorn in the flesh, some minister of Satan to buffet us, yet is it the very thing the Apostle needs to prevent his premature exaltation, and permanent abasement. God “crosses” us everywhere; and if we will see Him in it, and act accordingly, the very cross will be the engine of our regeneration, and the door into that “narrow path that leadeth unto life.” He gives us, in the natural creation, a direct spontaneous prosperity; but we must be born again, and the mode of it is trouble. He stops, and thwarts, and throws us back upon ourselves in order that He may make us reflex creatures, and feed us with a higher “word” than merely “bread alone”. This is every man’s common experience, and pictured in many a psalm besides those printed in the Bible. What metaphysics aims at is to resolve this into some more general law or relation; in other words, to discern its coherence with the Unity of things. Its answer amounts to this, that trouble comes from God, in the same sense that anything else does; He is the author of it, beginning, middle, and end, as He is of everything. In other words, He now truly *sympathises* with all the natural feelings His behests elicit, and has found and will find for that fact its appropriate EXPRESSION. “Then God feels pain?” Yes, God the Son, no doubt, God-in-creation; God the Father, also, so far as we can attribute “feelings” or any mental succession to the Ultimate, which we can perceive is a mistake. Our nearest statement perhaps would be, that the bliss of sympathy

transcends its pain, and in the integration obliterates it. In *Creation*, that is in the process of it, God gives us the feelings which trouble *generates*, and these *are*, in fact, our new-creation. Trouble *generates* them, I say not alone, but in its connexion with the other beneficence of Him who is *seen* therein. Who sees God in trouble only is a devil-worshipper; who sees Him in prosperity only is a brute. To see God in *everything* is to walk by faith, and then *all* things are "*for good*," and *therefore* Good.

NOTE E.—p. 193, &c.

IN the above and other passages I have referred to "Note E," which I intended should have contained some strictures on our present Bible controversy. But I would gladly avoid this if I could. We are all sick of controversy: at least we ought to be; and the object of these volumes is positive not critical; to develop some of the mines of untouched or half touched Truth which the Bible contains, rather than to thresh longer at the conventional circle of doubtful opinions which pass muster as Bible Dogma. It will be obvious also to my readers that I do not believe some of those opinions; that I think some of them very unnecessary exaggerations, and some, very injurious falsehoods; on the whole, that I regard them as a set of traditions which hamper and obstruct the Bible in its work, and tend to "make the word of God of none effect."

As such I may notice—(1) Bishop O'Brien's idea that "the Bible is our sole source of religious, or high religious light;"—p. ci, Note B.

(2) Dean Mansel's dictum that the Bible "must not be criticised;"—p. xlii, and that "if we reject one jot or tittle of it we are bound to consider all Christianity an imposture;"—pp. xlii, *sqq.*, Note A.

(3) These are closely related to our common Bibliolatry, which sets up the infallibility of the Bible as a counter idol to the infallibility of Church or Pope (pp. 326, *sqq.*; 438)—and a more

senseless idol;—for (1) whatever *a priori* reasons would lead us to expect such assistance, would lead us to expect, not a dead Utterance which had spoken once for all, but a living Guide, who could direct us constantly. And (2) to disprove the infallibility of Pope or Church requires some considerable amount of learning and of study; whereas to disprove the like infallibility of the Sacred Scriptures only requires ten minutes of any one's attention to its leading chapters. The true doctrine of infallibility, as I conceive, is stated in pp. 416, *sqq.*

(4) To these may be added the dangerous practice of building important conclusions on verbal criticism; of which we have had examples in pp. lix, lxxxvi, Note B.

(5) Together with Professor Jowett's canon, "that each word in the Bible should have one and only one true meaning; and that if it have more than one meaning it may have any meaning;"—p. 388. A canon which would be quite absurd in respect to any large book; and is especially out of place when applied to a mass of writings which throw themselves, from the first, on the simplest analogies of nature, for the inculcation of the highest truths they contemplate.

It is but another form of some of the above to say that I do not believe in the literal or "verbal inspiration" of the Bible, or in its minute accuracy in any respect whatever. Indeed, I know of no large, serious book which is so markedly careless in this respect; or rather which is so obviously careful to dot itself over with minute and trifling inaccuracies in respect to all the matters on which it treats. It is clearly the design of Him who gave the Book that we should not worship the outward and visible form of it, or attach any great value to its letter. It is common with some Christian Rabbis to attribute the small errors to translation, and when this explanation fails, to transmission—throwing the blame on copyists, and assuming that there once *was* a version of the Bible, or of some parts of it, which agreed with their ideal. Even were their assumption just, it would not help the Bibliolaters. What avails it that there once *was* a perfect Bible, according to their idea of perfection, if it were immediately and irrevocably lost; and the world left practically with

such a Bible as we have? But, indeed, we have positive reason for knowing that the assumption is groundless, and that the authors of our Sacred Books, and Higher than they, He who gave them their commission and inspiration, attached no value to this minute accuracy; or rather took pains to ensure that His book should be without it.

I do not notice that our Lord never wrote a line of the Scriptures Himself, which surely He would have done had He wished that even so much, say, as some key portions of the New Testament should be perfect—seeing that He was the only human being who was ever gifted with perfectness on the earth—but left the writing of his life and utterances to secondary or unknown disciples. An example which even so literary a person as St. Paul seems to have followed; seldom writing his epistles himself, beyond a few verses of salutation, but employing a generally unknown Secretary. Nor, shall I insist that among the Offices enumerated as "given" by the Spirit to the early Church, that of "the Writer" as such, is not only not mentioned with honour, but is not even mentioned at all. But I will draw attention to this fact which is also quite level to the English reader.

In our Lord's days there existed two common versions of "the Scriptures"—the Hebrew, in use among the more careful Jews; the Septuagint, among both Jews and Hellenists; and these two versions differed very seriously. The Septuagint, indeed, besides other large defects, had been gravely corrupted in its origin. The translators belonged to the Alexandrine School of Neoplatonists, and they modified the meaning seriously so as to favour their most false philosophy. The Hebrew of that time had probably met with corruptions in Babylon or elsewhere, but it was much more accurate than it afterwards became; as we know it was largely and deliberately corrupted by the Jews themselves, for controversial purposes, in the second century of our era. At present the difference between the two versions is much greater than it was, but even in our Lord's day it must have been very considerable—vastly beyond what any one could think of ascribing to honest copyists or decently competent translators. Now, *which* of these two different Versions do our Lord

and His Apostles quote, when they have occasion to refer to Scripture? Why—indifferently either! Sometimes the one, sometimes the other, with no apparent preference! Is it possible they could have done this if superficial accuracy had any great value in their eyes; or if they attached importance to the outer envelope of the weighty truths they laboured to impress? Nay, whatever be the value of the Book-Revelation, God has put it in an earthen vessel, and a vessel full of small yet patent blemishes besides—just in order, I suppose, that His Church might not worship that earthen vessel; a thing which, after all, it appears, it is extremely difficult to prevent our doing.

It is perhaps in unconscious imitation of this example that the Church of England authorises the use, in her public services, of *four* different English versions; and if she apply sometimes the word "infallible" to any text,—which she never does in the Prayer-book, but only in the Homilies,—she is careful to apply both it and its equivalents, not only to the canonical but also to the uncanonical Books, which she "does not apply to establish any doctrine;" thereby showing what a vague and unemphatic sense she attaches to that vague but important word. [See pp. 416, *sqq.*] Another English version is now being made, on authority, for the sake of some greater accuracy in reading the Greek; and still another version is badly wanted indeed, for the every day service of the Church—it is a wonder and a shame that it has not been made generations since—one which by refining the coarse expressions which society in Europe tolerated 300 years ago, but tolerates now no longer, would practically restore the Book to society, and enable a public or a private school, or any modest family, to use it freely and without offence. It should have been the first care of one of the great Bible Societies to provide us with such a version. It could be very easily done; and a large, and most valuable and rapidly increasing section of society is virtually deprived of the Scriptures until it is completed. The Bibliolaters, of course, would render no assistance to such a work; perhaps would even resent the tampering with their idol; but those who prefer Spirit and meaning to form and letter, and the best interests of the living to the worship of the dead, should have done it long ago.

As to the unwrought or half-wrought mines of Truth existing in the Bible, I believe there are many such, and very needful for our times. I have touched on some of them in this volume, and hope to work them farther in my next. I am an earnest believer in human progress; I am confident that it has proceeded, is proceeding, and will proceed to an almost indefinite extent. But I have no such faith in our present enlightenments, German, English or American. I fear that in many respects we have not struck upon the proper lines. Rather, in some serious matters we have positively missed our way, and must try back, and re-measure our heights and distances, in order to find our whereabouts. It may be, hasty Brethren, that an Ancient Guide-Book may yield us substantial help, beyond our expectation. Perhaps the next note will furnish us an instance? But in order that our Guide may be effective, it must be relieved of the Saul's armour of traditional fixedness and immobility with which the *distrust* of the religious world has carefully invested it. It must be a free Bible, freely used, and unfettered by the stereotyped interpretations and conceptions of a frequently mistaken past.

For instance; to take its initial chapter;—It must be free to give its own definition of *creation*—namely, *causing-to-grow* [out of prior elements or elaborations],—if we are to allow it to throw light on the chief controversy which now agitates the scientific world—instead of the semi-gnostic meaning, *making-out-of-nothing*—a meaning which is contradicted in detail by every special instance of creation which Genesis describes. [See pp. 119, *sqq.* Note.]

Again: if it is to illustrate the study of History, or the growth of Literature, we must drop the idea of the Bible being a dogmatic Revelation of unchangeable truth, made once for all, and preserved as a fixed Deposit in certain sections of the Church. If there ever were any such prime Deposit, it certainly is not our present Bible, which grew up very slowly, and piece by piece; and was not formed into a Bible, nor its separate portions “canonized,” until a very late period of Church history. Nor does it contain any allusion to such ideal treasure.

Again : when we read " the Lord said," or that " God did" so and so, we are not to imagine that He said or did them " miraculously ;" farther than that all God's action is profoundly miraculous, and will always appear so to us the more (1) we study it, and (2) study it *as His*. And when we meet such expressions as " the Word of God," or the " law," " ordinance," " statute," or " commandments of the Lord," we are not to take these as meaning anything separate, or peculiar, or anomalous to nature—much less are we to understand them generally, or indeed ever in the Old Testament, of the Scripture, or God's *written* Word. For these generally had not been written yet ; and the parts which were written were in the hands of extremely few. The Word of God, as His searching Whispers come home to each, and the Law and Ordinances of Nature and Providence, sometimes of the Temple Service, are generally those referred to. The *Nineteenth Psalm*, for example, is an Exaltation of the Gospel as preached by Nature, with man's best nature responsive to her voice ; yet how often do we hear vv. 7-10, &c., interpreted not of Nature, but of the Scriptures ; and these, by way of doing them honor, placed in contrast to that Essential Gospel.

Much the same is to be said of Inspiration and its synonyms. The traditional inspiration was confined to few indeed—to Prophets, Apostles, and Evangelists ; and at very special times ; those times, it seems to be with many, in which they *wrote* their contributions to the Scriptures. But only a very small proportion even of these ever wrote *any* of it ; whereas Scripture represents not only them, but common Christians, as constantly filled with the Spirit of God, and living by His life. It must, indeed, have been a very special influence which enabled those mostly unknown men to indite such grave yet burning sentences as have proved fountains of holy life to their posterity for ever ; but the special operations of the Holy Ghost are not His only operations, and we must frame our thoughts and words accordingly.

The word Revelation has been used in much the same sense as Inspiration. It is now made a merit to distinguish them,

yet the distinction has been but coarsely drawn. Properly, Inspiration is the action of the Holy Spirit in producing anything. The thing produced, especially if it be a typical or an archetypal thing, will be a Revelation. Hence, *The Revelation of God is the Totality of His Creation*,—as viewed, say, in the Nineteenth Psalm. Next after that is the Human Archetype, the Son or Word made flesh—incarnated by the Holy Ghost. Whatever expounds or describes these, with power and truthfulness, may also justly be called Revelation; and therefore eminently beyond comparison the Sacred Scriptures, though they do not give that appellation to themselves.

But it is important to remember that no Inspiration was ever “without measure,” except One; and so, no Revelation, except the Product of that One, was ever perfect, or “Infallible,” as men now use that term. All the rest God has been pleased to mix with imperfection, and throws it on our own discretion to judge and use them as best we can.

NOTE F.—pp. 222-298, &c.

To one pondering on the material progress of mankind some large facts grow into prominence, each quite intelligible by itself, but not at all so intelligible in their collocation.

1. A very large proportion of the most advanced and energetic races of mankind are very hard pressed for the means of sustenance. The number of persons actually receiving public charity in the city of London approaches half a million yearly. And London is not the poorest, but the wealthiest city in the world. The peasantry in parts of England, in most of Ireland, and in large portions of Europe, are habitually on the very verge of subsistence—have only the very poorest food, clothing, housing, which are consistent with health; while the grades of society just above these are constantly pinched for comforts which they can well appreciate, or even feel themselves to require. All this in ordinary times. Any calamity, such as

the failure of a food crop, or two or three unfavourable seasons, brings on these classes vast distress and misery, a great deal of disease and death.

2. The next fact is that there lie within easy reach of these masses of people vast regions of fertile land, virtually unoccupied, and capable of supplying all their wants many times, perhaps 100 or 1000 times over. The basin of the Mississippi, or of any of its leading branches, if properly managed, even as men now know how to manage it, would far more than supply all these multitudes. Besides that there are large tracts of unreclaimed or half-reclaimed land in most parts of Europe itself.

It is true that a considerable emigration has been, and is, proceeding from the over-crowded to the unoccupied regions, but nothing like so much as one would think natural or wise under the circumstances; nor is it nearly so advantageously directed or organized as it ought to be.

3. With the exception of small tracts in India, China, and Egypt, the tropical regions of the globe, and those large and choice portions of it which, though not within the tropics, possess a tropical climate, are virtually unutilized by civilized man. And this though the greater portion of them is rich beyond imagination; and though its natural products—sugar, cotton, rice, maize, oil, tea, coffee, and condiments—are the staple comforts of civilized life. Were the tropical zone, or even one-fiftieth part of the tropical zone, utilized, as it is easy to suppose it utilized, the results would feed and clothe in comfort the whole of the present human family.

4. A large impediment here presents itself. The climate is not suitable for Indo-European races: at least it is not suitable for them to work in. Anglo-Saxons, Celts, or Slaves can live there in health, so long as they are not required to labour in the open air; but when they are, the heat and light are found too powerful for the constitution, and the health generally succumbs.

But are there no other races which can work there, and develop those magnificent resources? Oh, yes! many, and

near at hand. But these races do not choose to work; they prefer to idle. And so the resources of the tropics lie undeveloped.

5. And is their idleness good for them? Do they cultivate their leisure in any other way so as to compensate themselves or others for the loss of all this wealth? Nay, it is only too notorious that words can scarce describe the state or states of brutal wretchedness and misery to which it has reduced, or in which it hopelessly detains them. In large regions, teeming with an only too luxuriant vegetation (to which, however, they are acclimatized, and from which they get no harm) the only human inhabitants are naked savages, devoid of decency or virtue, and only distinguished from each other by the excesses of cruelty, brutality, and misery which are habitual among them. In our days Africa has been explored much more fully than before, and we almost stand amazed at the two great facts which it exhibits—its exuberant fertility over vast well-watered areas, and the barbarous wretchedness of its inhabitants. There are grades in their wretchedness and brutality; but many of the tribes, especially those towards the west, are so near the helpless poverty of the brute creation, that it appears to be quite usual for whole tribes of natives to be annihilated by a single famine, and their country to lie absolutely waste and uninhabited for a series of years.

6. And do these races admit of improvement? Have they the physical stamina for work, and the freshness, pliability, and capacity of growth, which would bear the change of habits, and a total alteration of life? Yes. This is one of the large facts which experience has best established. Many races, it appears, have not; but the negro races *have* a singular capacity for growth and culture. When placed in fitting circumstances, and treated judiciously, the negro shows invariably the ability to develop as the white man does; nay, even the capacity to overtake the white man, or even the best races of the white man; proves himself able to take an equal place with the Anglo-Saxon or the Celt, in carrying on the progress of the world. There are individual negroes entitled to be placed among the upper thousands

of our race. There are thousands of negroes entitled to take rank among the respectable grades of intelligent and well-conducted citizens. And there are hundreds of thousands of negroes who are not inferior to the inferior grades of the white populations of Europe.

7. And what are the "fitting circumstances;" what is the judicious treatment which is capable of producing such results? This is about the most interesting and important question in social ethics. We have met with it repeatedly in the preceding volume, and shall meet it in the next; and I have always answered it plainly, and without disguise. There is only one way of raising barbarians to civilization, as there is only one way of bringing up children to a free and independent manhood. They must be ruled and trained *by others* until they are able to rule and train themselves. They must be directed, and if requisite obliged, to develop their faculties, by exercising them upon appropriate objects, and to form their principles by conforming their conduct to wise direction. To the individual this means School or its equivalents. To masses or families of men it means apprenticeship, slavery, or graduated serfdom—Joseph's land of Goshen, and Pharaoh's house of bondage. This is the mode in which the exemplar nation of Israel was trained, and trained successfully—the mode in which Pelasgians, and Hellenes, and Tyrrhenes, and Latins, in their several tribes, were trained, also with large success—the mode in which Anglo-Saxons, and Celts, and Serbs, and Slaves have been trained, still more successfully—and the mode, in fine, in which several large sections of the negro race were being trained, when the hot and hasty ideas of those who would run too fast deranged and broke the process.

8. Slavery and serfdom!—Are not these the very synonyms of degradation and oppression? To make a man a slave, is it not a frightful tyranny and wrong? And to keep a man a slave, does it not stunt and starve his virtues one by one, and kill at last even the aspiration after manhood? And is not this "cursed institution" the protector and parent of every kind of injustice and immorality?

Such things indeed are often said, and said with a large amount of truth. But they are often said, also, when they are profoundly false. So we must endeavour to discriminate; and the analogy of the School suggests two leading conditions of any just apprenticeship. (1) There are good schools and bad schools. It might vastly injure a boy to be under Mr. Squeers, of Dotheboys Hall. It might vastly improve the same boy to be under Dr. Arnold, of Rugby. (2) Though it would be neither a degradation nor oppression to send a boy to the latter *while he is a boy*, it might be both, to keep him there too long; and it certainly would be both, to take a man of thirty, or forty, or fifty, and submit him to the routine and discipline of a school, even under Dr. Arnold. School is essentially a transition state, and its object is, as quickly as possible to supersede itself by preparing men for College and beyond it. And so should it be with every form of that social institute through which the nonage of nations passes. (1), It should be as good as possible; thoroughly kind and careful always, and as indulgent as the great and serious objects aimed at will allow. And (2), it must be always treated as a transition state; and inspired with the ambition to supersede itself, by fitting men to dispense with its cumbrous regulations, and each to take his place in God's world as an intelligent and self-directing freeman.

9. I fear that they on whom it rested to administer the Institution in modern times have not sufficiently remembered these two rules, and especially the last of them; and the consequence has been a reaction, which has injured many classes, and seriously thrown back the progress of the world.

a. It has much diminished the world's material wealth—especially the food and clothing fund of the struggling millions of civilized life. The Island of St. Domingo, for example, while under the Institution, used to export as much sugar as all the British West Indian Islands put together. Since the system was broken up, it has not, I believe, exported a pound. And all its other industries tell nearly as sad a tale. The Island of Jamaica under the system used to export as much as all the smaller islands put together: now it does not export as much as the little island of

Barbadoes, * 24 miles long by 12 broad. And so, with scarce an exception, in every place where this wretched abolition experiment has been tried—and it has been tried so extensively as almost to dry up, as it were, that warm gulf-stream of comfort and abundance which used to flow from the regions bordering on “the gulf” over the whole north temperate zone.

b. It has stopped the reclamation process which was gradually converting those exuberantly fertile regions from tangled jungle and malaria swamp into healthful fields of labour, capable of producing two or three valuable crops a year. Nay, it has rendered their cultivation so profitless, or impossible, that in many places—and notably beneath the central station of the British flag—the once cultivated fields are falling back into jungle and bush again.

c. What is most serious of all, it has stopped the civilizing process by which families and tribes of negroes were being added to the cultured populations of the globe—and specially were being prepared to develop and distribute its tropical abundance, and build up in time nations and empires there congenial with its requirements—and, instead, has thrown the negroes out upon the world at large, untaught and masterless, in different

* The “Bims,” or “Badians,” have certainly every right to be proud of their little Island, or rather of themselves, as I believe they are. Without the best of land, and without the very best either of methods or machineries, they export more sugar than Jamaica, and support in comfort their astonishing population of 150,000 souls, or more than 500 to the square mile. Here is an example for the Malthusians. Besides, by not giving to their emancipated negroes one perch of ground to squat, or allowing them to obtain anything on trust, or gift, or without fairly earning it, they have trained their black population to industry, and decency, and prosperity. Here, then, is one bright exception to the ill effects of Emancipation. Surely, too, it is the exception which proves the rule—by showing whence the ill effects arise. It is surprising to see an eminent political economist quote Barbadoes as an instance in which the emancipated slaves had thriven by becoming free proprietors! It was by directly the reverse process. His mistake, perhaps, arose from the ambiguous use of the word Creole. Many proprietors are Creoles; but this means simply persons of native birth, and foreign parentage, and is equally applicable to the white gentry as to the working blacks. In Demerara, on the other hand, the newly-made freemen clubbed together and bought townships in common. But they have not had the steady industry to carry out the wise advice or impulse under which they acted. And so the negro villages are going back to barbarism.

stages of unfitness for contending with its temptations, for avoiding its follies and vices, or escaping the sweeping judgments which attend on failure. A few, no doubt, will be able to make good their footing in it, and live and work like other freemen; but it is only too clear that the great bulk of them will succumb, as vast numbers have already succumbed, to the difficulties of the struggle, and perish miserably from the earth.

10. Men try to hide from themselves the wretched consequences which follow from this Abolition Mania; and there is no end to the fallacies and falsities which are trumpeted on the subject under the abused names of philanthropy, benevolence, Christianity, and even social and moral science or philosophy.

Having dealt pretty distinctly with what I conceive the essentials of the question in several passages of this volume, [see pp. 158, 224, 297, &c.], it is not necessary to spend much time in tracing these mistakes, but it is only respectful to many who have insisted on them that I should notice one or two.

a. For instance, we are still gravely asked, is it not "self-evident that God created all men equal," or that men "are naturally equal," or "equal in the sight of God;"—and, therefore, to place any man in such a position of inferiority, is it not abnormal and a sin? Nay, even if men were naturally equal, it is impossible to conduct any social business whatsoever without immediately instituting grade, and order, and subordination, and insisting on them stringently. How, for instance, could an army be handled, or a ship be sailed, or a bank, or factory, or store conducted, without strictly carrying out discipline and command, and rank, and graduated inequality? How, above all, could school be conducted? It is on this very point that St. Paul pointedly presses the analogy. "Now we know," he says (Gal., iv. 1, 2), "that the son, while he is a child, is no whit better than a slave, but is *under* governors and pedagogues, [particular kinds of slaves], though he be the heir of all." He is learning how to command himself and others by first understanding to obey; and such obedience was the mainspring even of Christ's perfection, as it must be of ours, and of the negro's.

But, indeed, the whole idea of God creating men equal is a childish inversion of the fact. What two men did ever God create equal in any respect whatever, either of bodily or mental endowments, or of external circumstances? or what two things are created equal? or what two halves of anything could we find or make which would be strictly equal? Nay, the Cosmos or Constitution of things is a graduated inequality, from the Son of God, or from God Himself, downwards. And the nearer we approach to equality, the lower we must go down Nature's scale, till we have arrived at Chaos. *There*, indeed, things are equal, or assumed equal, so long as the chaos lasts. Assumed equality is the just or natural *initial state*; but as soon as Nature's Dynamique begins to work, and her latent principles to tell, she differentiates herself, and classes, and unfolds, and multiplies her differences, until she approaches the Cosmos that is in her heart. Nature does this, and Social Nature does the same. And it is only when some departments have been working wrong, and it is necessary to go back and *begin again*, that the "just initial state" of a presumed equality finds its plausibility and its use. And after all this only means free and open competition—"It is necessary to obliterate our past: we all now start alike: let him lead, and hold the lead, who can."

b. But is not slavery contrary to the Bible, and specially forbidden by the spirit and letter of the Christian Scriptures? We hear this gravely asked by persons who have really read the Scriptures—nay, sometimes, by some who write about them! If the New Translation had appeared of which we hear so much, and if the Translators are faithful enough to substitute the word "slave" for "servant," and "slave-master" for "master," wherever these words occur, the questions will probably change their form. Every independent reader knows that the Bible from end to end *assumes* Slavery as a just or necessary condition of society, and no more thinks of breaking or disparaging it than it does Marriage, or Law, or Worship, or any other Social Institute. But as the Scriptures do not confine themselves to generalities, but enter into the details of that relationship, we had best reserve this question for the last.

c. But is not man born for freedom? is not his liberty one of those inalienable rights which no one can forfeit, or even of his own will deprive himself of? This again is talking in the clouds. May not a criminal alienate his liberty? or a soldier, or sailor? or a hired servant during the periods of his engagement? or any one who undertakes an office, *so far* as the "obligations" of that office reach? or, in fact, impliedly, any one who lives with fellow-men, or in society at all? And so poor Hecuba in her bonds and misery is strictly right:—Agamemnon is as truly a bondservant as herself: even the freedom of a monarch is illusory. Man indeed is born, I believe, to lofty destinies;—to self-rule, and rule over angels, and self-knowledge, and self-sacrifice, and all things that are noble and divine;—that is, he is born *to* them, not *in* them;—born that he may aspire to, and labour for, and bravely win them; not born in their otiose enjoyment. He is born singularly helpless and dependent; *frens animal ceteris imperaturum*; and this is the main reason why he must be sent to school, and obliged to learn the right application of his faculties. That this is eminently the case with respect to liberty, socially and civilly, even enthusiasts on that subject have the candour to acknowledge. I gladly quote such a passage as the following from Mr. Mill; and only regret that he does not bear it, and its principle, more constantly in mind:—

After explaining that the object of his Essay is to assert one very simple principle—namely, "that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection," he goes on to state a large exception:—

"It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming

them ; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually attaining that end. *Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.* Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion either in the direct form, or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others."—MILL *on Liberty*, p. 22.

d. But is not free labour more effective than slave labour, and therefore cheaper in open market ? Generally so, where you can get it for anything approaching the same expense. Yet the following remarks are well worth considering, which I am glad to quote from a recent American publication, Professor Davis's Essay in Stebbin's "*100 Years of American Progress*"—a book which carries with it high testimonials, I rejoice to see, from the Secretaries of the Chambers of Commerce in New York and Boston, as well as from three Chancellors of Universities, and eighteen Principals of United States' Colleges:—

"Some political economists have supposed that free labour is cheaper than slave labour ; but though there are pursuits where the watchfulness, foresight, intelligence, and energy of the free man will make his labour so much more productive than that of a slave as to pay the superior cost of his support, it is certain that the want of these qualities in the slave is but a slight drawback to the value of his labour in the production of cotton. The work is so regular, and simple, and easy, that the freeman performs it no better than the slave, and as the direction, and management, and skill are in the master, the work is well directed, and wisely managed. The slave works enough, though he does not work as hard as some free men. In fact it is very doubtful if a free white man, impelled by necessity, or the desire of accumulation, would be more efficient in the cotton field than the slave. Certain it is that in the South, where the hot sun breeds disease, and the malarious air brings fevers, the white freeman could not produce as much as the slave—much less could he labour as cheaply. His expenditure being more, his wife and children not working at all, or but little, his waste of time and money in vicious practices and holidays, would require larger wages, and for these he has nothing more to give than the slave."—STEBBINS' *American Progress*, 121.

The same remarks are applicable to the gathering of tea, coffee, hops, tobacco, &c., the feeding of silkworms, or the dressing of vines or canes, and many other easy, yet extensive, industries connected with agriculture. But the question practically is not between free and slave labour, but between *slave labour*, with all the virtues which follow upon industry, and *free idleness*, with all the vices which it begets. If the negroes could be induced to work in freedom as hard or half as hard as they work in slavery—that is perhaps about one-third as hard as the working classes of England and Scotland work, there would be an end of the question. No one would wish to burthen himself with slaves if he could hire for a moderate price—say for anything like what he would pay at home—labour upon the spot. It is because the negroes will not, and that whites cannot, work in these regions, that we are obliged to make them.

e. And what right have we to make them? The same right that we have to “subdue the earth” at all, or to interfere in any way with the otiose course of Nature. Because our mission is positive and aggressive, and we are set here to *fellow-create* with God whatever best our own powers and the powers of Nature will enable us. For this reason, in civilized life, we work ourselves, and virtually oblige one another to work, and do our best to render the idler's life unhappy and disgraceful. And for this reason, so long as there are people to be fed and clothed, and nursed and educated, we think it right to make the negro work, for his own good and ours. He is in fact the strayed and exposed child of the family of nations; and it is our duty to take him up, and tend and train him, and fit him to take a place with the rest in the workshop of Humanity.

11. But I cannot believe that it was on any abstract or general grounds that such a practical nation as England or the United States has abolished slavery within its bounds. The institution was abused, and provoked reaction and an outcry: and this has been maintained by sensation platforms and pulpits, trading on the surprising ignorance of the English middle classes respecting all things foreign. It is incredible to me that, if the public once *realized* the facts I have enumerated, they could

long hesitate as to the duty of England and America towards the wretched barbarians whom God has made our subjects or our neighbours. Let me illustrate the actual state of Africans at home from our most trustworthy eyewitnesses, and let this be compared with the known estate of English or American slaves. I shall first quote a few extracts from Dr. Livingstone :—

“They [the Bakalahari; north of Cape Colony] are a timid race, and in bodily development often resemble the aborigines of Australia. They have thin legs and arms and large protruding abdomens, caused by the course, indigestible food they eat. Their children's eyes lack lustre. I never saw them at play. A few Bechuanas may go into a village of Bakalahari and domineer over the whole with impunity. But when these same adventurers meet the Bushmen they are fain to change their manners to fawning sycophancy. They know that if the request for tobacco is refused, these free sons of the Desert may settle the point by a poisoned arrow.”—LIVINGSTONE'S *Africa*, p. 37, Small Edition.

Pleasant Neighbours! Yet even these have been much improved by their contact with the colonists, and look down on their prior degradation, p. 139. Among them Dr. Livingstone was specially attracted by the Makololo, and their good kings Sebituane and Sechele, father and son. The latter he accompanied on his installation tour, up and down the Zambesi or Leeambye, and they were all on their good behaviour, in order to please the Doctor. I select some characteristic incidents :—

“On the first day of our voyage, an old doctor [native, a witch-doctor] had his canoe filled by one of those large waves which the east wind raises on the Lecambye, and he went forthwith to the bottom. The Barotse who were with him saved themselves by swimming, and were afraid of being punished with death in the evening for not rescuing the doctor. Had he been a man of more influence, *they would certainly have been executed.*”—p. 146.

“Before reaching the Loete, we came to a number of people from the Lobale region who were hunting hippopotami. They fled precipitately, leaving their canoes and all their utensils and clothing, as soon as they saw the Makololo. My own Makalaka, who were accustomed to plunder wherever they went, rushed after them like furies, regardless of my shouting. As this proceeding would have destroyed my character at Lobale, I forced them to lay down all the plunder on a sandbank, and leave it for its owners.”—*Ib.*, p. 163.

This illustrates how wars commence; and when, for any reason, an African potentate summons his tribes to war, all

who remain behind are put to death—frequently with torture. Livingstone thus sums up his impressions of the tour :—

“During a nine weeks' tour I had been in closer contact with heathens than I had ever been before; and though all were as kind and attentive to me as possible, yet to endure the dancing, roaring, and singing, the jesting, grumbling, quarreling, and murderings of these children of nature, was *the severest penance I had yet undergone* in the course of my missionary duties.”
—p. 155.

12. The most civilized people SPEKE found in the interior of Africa were the Wagonda, living on the west side of the Luta-Nzige or Lake Victoria. He considers them to have a considerable mixture of Abyssinian blood; and it was a great relief to him to get among them and their nearest neighbours after his trials among the more savage tribes of the south. He spent a long time at the Court of Mtesa, king of this country, and its manners are fully described. Probably there is no part of the world in which more etiquette is maintained. It is the duty of the nobles to be almost always present at Court; and while at Court to be almost always saluting the king, after either the lesser or the greater forms of salutation, both which are extremely onerous and elaborate, and the slightest mistake or omission in any detail is punishable by death—the death being very often inflicted, but often compounded by the offer of most of the offender's property and daughters to the King. Hence he has an enormous harem, and it would grow beyond all bounds were it not the royal habit to order one, two, three, *or four* of his wives to execution daily, on some pretext of violated etiquette. The royal progeny also is numerous, for the same reason, and might cause embarrassment in the succession only for another Uganda institution. On the new king's coronation day, his royal brothers, who had hitherto been half guests, half prisoners in the palace, are deliberately *burned*—with the exception of one or two who are kept in reserve, to provide against an accidental failure in the succession. And his relations to neighbouring countries are pretty similar. On his coronation day the new king makes an oration to this effect—

“Cattle, women, and children are short in Uganda; an army must be formed of one or two thousand strong to plunder Unyoro [to the north].

The Wasoga [eastwards] have been insulting his subjects, and must be reduced to subjection. For this emergency another army must be formed of equal strength, to act by land in conjunction with the fleet. The Waharga [westward] have paid no tribute to his greatness lately, and must be taxed. For all these matters the Commander-in-Chief tells off the divisional officers, who are approved by the king, and the matter is ended in Court. The divisional officers then find subordinate officers, who find men, and the army proceeds with its march. Should any fail with their mission, reinforcements are sent, and the runaways, called women, are *drilled with a red hot iron* until they are men no longer, and die for their cowardice."—SPEKE'S *Journal*, p. 257.

Sufficient pretext for military expeditions. And every expedition, whether in war or peace, or indeed every marching body of natives who are strong enough to do so, like Livingstone's Makololo, p. cxli, pillage and destroy, wherever they come, friends and foes alike, without distinction and without compunction. Let us proceed with the customs of Uganda :—

"As to the minor business transacted at Court, culprits are brought in bound by officers, and reported. At once the sentence is given, perhaps awarding the most torturous lingering death—probably without trial or investigation, and, for all the King knows, at the instigation of some one influenced by wicked spite. If the accused endeavour to plead his defence, his voice is at once drowned, and the miserable victim dragged off in the roughest manner possible by those officers who love their King, and delight in promptly carrying out his orders. Young virgins, the daughters of Wakungu, stark naked and smeared with grease, but holding for decency's sake a small square of mbugee at the upper corners in both hands before them, are presented by their fathers in propitiation for some offence, or to fill the harem. Seizing officers receive orders to hunt down Wakungu who have committed some indiscretions, and confiscate their lands, wives, and property. An officer observed to salute informally is ordered for execution, when everybody near him rises in an instant, the drums beat, drowning his cries, and the victim of carelessness is dragged off, bound by cords, by a dozen men at once. Another man, perhaps, exposes an inch of naked leg while squatting, or has his mbugee tied contrary to regulation, and is condemned to the same fate."—*Ib.*, p. 257.

"Strict as the discipline of the outer Court is, that of the interior is not less severe. Should a wife commit any trifling indiscretion, either by word or deed, she is condemned to execution on the spot, bound by the pages and dragged out. Notwithstanding the stringent laws for the preservation of decorum by all male attendants, stark-naked, full-grown women are the valets."—*Ib.*, p. 259.

"I have now been for some time within the Court precincts, and have consequently had an opportunity of witnessing Court customs. Among these, nearly every day since I have changed my residence, incredible as it may appear to be, I have seen one, two, or three of the wretched palace women led away to execution, tied by the hand, and dragged along by one of the body-guard crying out, as she went to premature death, Hai Minangi, (O my Lord), Kbakka (my King), Hai N'yawo (my mother), at the top of her voice, in the utmost despair and lamentation; and yet there was not a soul who dared lift hand to save any of them, though many might be heard privately commenting on their beauty."—*Ib.*, 359. He *once saved one* himself, p. 369.

"During this one day, we heard the voices of no less than four women, dragged from the palace to the slaughter-house."—*Ib.*, 434.

"There are no such things as marriages in Uganda; there are no ceremonies attached to it. If any Wakungu possessed of a pretty daughter committed an offence, he might give her to the king as a peace-offering: if any neighbouring king had a pretty daughter, and the king of Uganda wanted her, she might be demanded as a fitting tribute. The Wakungu in Uganda are supplied with women by the king, according to their merits, from seizures in battle abroad, or seizures from refractory officers at home."—*Ib.* p. 361.

"I asked him [Congow, a statesman in Uganda], what use he had for so many women. To which he replied, 'None whatever; the king gives them to us to keep up our rank—sometimes as many as one hundred together—and we either turn them into wives, or make servants of them, as we please.'—*Ib.*, p. 365.

"And, finally, a large body of officers came in with an old man, with his two ears shorn off for having been too handsome in his youth, and a young woman, who, after four days' search, had been discovered in his house. They were brought for judgment before the king.

"Nothing was listened to except the plaintiff's statement, who said he had lost the woman four days, and, after considerable search, had found her concealed by the old man, who was indeed old enough to be her grandfather. From all appearances, one would have said that the wretched girl had run away from the plaintiff's house in consequence of ill treatment, and had harboured herself on this decrepit old man without asking his leave; but their voices in defence were never heard, for the king instantly sentenced both to death, to prevent the recurrence of such impropriety again; and to make the example more severe, decreed that their lives should not be taken at once, but being fed, to preserve life as long as possible, they were to be dismembered bit by bit, as rations for the vultures, every day, until life was extinct. The dismayed criminals, struggling to be heard, in utter despair were dragged away boisterously, in the most barbarous manner, to the drowning music of the miléli and drums."—*Ib.*, p. 375.

Mtesa's Court, however, had one great advantage over Kamrasi's (of Unyoro), the next potentate on Speke's line of march :—

“Nothing could be more filthy than the state of the palace, and all the lanes leading up to it ; it was well, perhaps, that we were never expected to go there, for without stilts and respirators, it would have been impracticable, such is the dirty nature of the people.”—*Ib.*, p. 526.

And of nine out of every ten tribes in Africa. I could multiply such quotations, almost without limit, to the disgust and horror of my readers, but I will conclude with one relating to a custom which he describes in his Introduction as common to the races in that section of the Continent :—

“Kyengo informed me that the king, considering the surprising events which had lately occurred at his Court [the visit of a white man, &c.], being very anxious to pry into the future, had resolved to take a very strong measure for accomplishing that end. This was the sacrifice of a child by cooking, as described in the Introduction—a ceremony which it fell to Kyengo [Speke's particular friend and companion in travel] to carry out.”—*Ib.*

“They have also many other and more horrible devices. For instance, in times of tribulation, the magician, if he ascertains a war is projected, by inspecting the blood and bones of a fowl, which he has flayed for that purpose, *flays a young child*, and having laid it lengthwise on a path, directs all the warriors, on proceeding to battle, to step over his sacrifice, and insure themselves the victory. Another of those extra barbarous devices takes place when a chief wishes to make war on his neighbour, by his calling in a magician to discover a propitious time for commencing. The doctor places a large earthen vessel, half full of water, over a fire, and over its mouth a grating of sticks, whereon he lays a small child and a fowl side by side, and covers them over with a second large earthen vessel, just like the first, only inverted, to keep the steam in, when he sets fire below, cooks for a certain period, and then looks to see whether his victims are still living or dead—when, should they be dead, the war must be deferred, but, otherwise, commenced at once.”—SPEKE'S *Introduction*, p. xxi.

No wonder that Captain Speke finds himself at last breaking out into such an expression as this :—

“The granitic hills, like those of Ungamauei, are extremely pretty, and clad with trees, contrasted strangely with the grassy downs of indefinite extent around, which give the place, when compared with the people, the appearance of a paradise within the infernal regions.”—*Ib.*, p. 575.

13. But these are travellers' tales ; they come from beyond

the Moon, or at least the Mountains of the Moon, and need not much affect us. Take then the parts of Africa with which we are most in contact; which are within view of the British Ensign, and almost or altogether beneath our sway—with whom we have war occasionally, and trade constantly, and report our commercial advices monthly in *The Times*. Let any one look over the monthly West African news in its proper column in *The Times*, and he will not need to go to Speke, or Baker, or Du Chaillu, for horrifying illustrations of the estate of Negro freedom. For instance, while these Sermons were being preached the following morsels appeared:—

"Another barbarous affair had taken place at Dahomey. The *West African Herald* publishes statements from eye-witnesses of the barbaric 'custom' just perpetrated at Dahomey. In this fearful narrative we learn that the recent 'grand custom' of Badahung, King of Dahomey, was one of the most revolting which had ever taken place. Several persons agree in stating that the number of persons slain on the occasion was estimated at 2,000, but another correspondent gives the number at 7,000. He says he was present by compulsion, and that the blood swept past him like a flood into a large reservoir. Another gentleman, referring to these inhuman butcheries, says:—'I assure you it made me quite sick, and at the same time I felt stunned. The poor wretches met death with perfect indifference.' The *Herald*, which gave Government notice through its columns many months since of the intention of the King of Dahomey to hold an unusual 'grand custom,' in remembrance of the death of the late King, concludes the recital of these butcheries by stating that 'Consul Foote has come out with full powers to "treat" with the King of Dahomey as to the abolition of these human sacrifices.'—*Times*, February 14, 1861.

Consul Foote's full powers "to treat" were not, however, very successfully exercised, for we read next month:—

"BONNY.—Another of those horrible cannibal feasts so degrading to Africa has again occurred in this river, during the stay of the mail, and under the very eyes of the white men. The victims in this instance were some unoffending negroes, captured from a neighbouring tribe. Their heads were cut off and publicly exhibited in the front of the Fee-jee house (*i. e.*, place of worship) in the centre of the town. Trade improving. The river very sickly."—*Times*, March 14, 1861.

The next is from the official report of Commander T. L. Perry, of Her Majesty's ship *Griffin*, addressed to the Governor

of Lagos, *August 6, 1862.* The eye-witness quoted is a Dutch gentleman, Mr. Euschart, for whose trustworthiness Captain Perry vouches in the fullest manner:—

"*July 5.*—He was brought to the market-place, where he was told many people had been killed the night before. He first saw the body of Mr. William Doherty (a Sierra Leone man), late a missionary and Church Catechist at Ishagga. The body was crucified against a large tree, one nail through the forehead, one through the heart, and one through each hand and foot; the left arm was bent, and a large cotton umbrella in its grasp. He was then taken to the market, where the King was seated on a raised platform, from which he was talking to the people much 'war palaver,' and promising them an attack upon Abbeokuta in November. Cowries, cloth, and rum were then distributed. In front of the market-place rows of human heads, fresh and gory, were ranged, and the whole place was saturated with blood, the heads evidently belonging to some of the Ishagga prisoners who had been killed during the night, after having been tortured in the most frightful manner. . . . Three Ishagga chiefs were then brought before the King, and told they were to go and tell his father that 'Customs should be better than ever.' Each chief was then given a bottle of rum and a head of cowries, and then decapitated. Twenty-four men were then brought out, bound in baskets, with their heads just showing out, and placed on the platform in front of the King; they were then thrown down to the people, who were dancing, singing, and yelling below; as each man was thrown down, he was seized and beheaded, the heads being piled in one heap and the bodies in another; every man who caught a victim and cut off the head received one head of cowries (about 2s.). After all were killed, Mr. Euschart was conducted home."

"*July 22.*—Taken to see the 'Grand Customs' at the Palace of the late King, at the gate of which two platforms had been erected; on each platform sixteen men and four horses were placed; inside the house was placed another platform, on which were placed sixteen women, four horses, and one alligator. The men and women were all Sierra Leone people captured at Ishagga, and were dressed in European clothes, each group of sixteen men seated or rather bound in chairs placed round a table on which glasses of rum were placed for each. The King then ascended the platform, where he adored the Dahomian fetish, and seemed to make obeisance to the prisoners, whose right hands were then loosed to enable them to take up the glass to drink the King's health. After the King's health had been drunk, the effects of the late King were paraded and worshipped by the people as they passed; a grand review of the troops then commenced, and as each marched past the King harangued them, and promised the sack of Abbeokuta in November. Nearly the whole of the troops wore firearms; a few select corps had rifles, but the greater part were armed with flint-lock muskets. The artillery consisted of about twenty-four guns (twelve-pounders). The number of troops

altogether could scarcely be less than 50,000, including 10,000 Amazons, all apparently well disciplined troops. After the review was over the prisoners were beheaded, their heads being hacked off with blunt knives; at the same time the horses and alligator were despatched, particular care being taken that their blood should mingle with that of the human prisoners."—*Times*, September, 1862.

The Consul's powers evidently had not been full enough, except to irritate King Badahung, and make him more fierce and superstitious at home, and more dreaded by his neighbours. The following is from next month's news :—

"An attack from the King of Dahomey was expected to take place in November. He had again been sacrificing a number of slaves, and was making preparations for another butchery. It was expected that some of Her Majesty's vessels would interfere [no doubt as effectively as before]."—*Times*, November 12, 1862.

And matters have been going on in much the same way from that time to this. I do not take *The Times* in the country, and only see it occasionally; but sporadic hints like the following are significant enough :—

"These quarrels, though of old standing, have recently been greatly aggravated by the Creeka men having made a raid upon New Calabar, and captured a large number of prisoners, upwards of 100 of whom were killed and eaten at a cannibal feast; and the New Calabar men have signified their determination to retaliate in a similar manner."—*Times*, October 11, 1866.

"At New Calabar trade was dull, owing to hostilities having been resumed between the Ecricke and New Calabar tribes. An attack was made by the latter on the 19th of February, and seven prisoners were taken, killed, and eaten."—*Times*, April 5, 1867.

"War still going on between the native tribes at Old Calabar; women and children slaughtered indiscriminately."—*Belfast News-Letter*, November 1, 1867.

"A further account, under date of the 11th ult., from Coomassie, states that the remains of the hordes of Ashantees which had been invading the Eastern districts of the English Protectorate were returning, bringing with them thousands of captives, principally women, girls, and boys, from the neighbourhood of the Volta. When the remnant of the troops which comprised the first army of invasion of the Eastern Province entered Coomassie, there was public lamentation on account of the numbers that had fallen in the war, and, according to the fearful custom of the country, there were terrible human sacrifices; 'in fact, hardly any description,' according to an eye-

witness, 'could exaggerate the reality. At least half the Ashantees who went to battle are reported to have died, and two hundred human jawbones were carried in procession through the streets.'—*Belfast News-Letter*, September 1, 1871.

Behold the blessings of barbaric Liberty!

14. I cannot forbear adding one quotation more to illustrate the status of the people who are out of reach of the King of Dahomey, and who have not yet found either him or any other native Akbar, to begin drilling them into *some* kind of ambition in the name of his father's ghost. The '*United States*' brig Dolphin had captured a slaver, the Echo, with some 400 slaves on board; and the bulk of these were transferred to the noble frigate Niagara, to be conveyed to the station of the American Colonization Society. The surgeon of the Niagara gives the following account of his charge:—

"This cargo came from the regions of the Congo River, about 5° south latitude; it is said from Kabenda. There are a few Kabendas among them; many Congos, or Muscongos; a few from the interior districts of Loango and Londa; and some whom they call among themselves Negroes. Four or five of them speak a *patois* of the Portuguese, which I can understand sufficiently to know all of their wants and feelings, and learn the little which they know of themselves and one another.

"They are extremely filthy, and much prefer nudity to dress. We have adopted the plan of having a large hose turned on them twice per week, with strong men at the engine. They appear well enough satisfied with the bath, but cannot, even by the lash, *which we are compelled to employ freely*, be made to observe any other sanitary or decent habit. It requires a good large crew of men to keep the spar deck, where they are located, clean. When clothing was put on them in Charleston, of which the negro slaves in the city contributed several dray loads, they immediately tore it off and rolled in the sand and basked in the sun.

"I know but few cases in which they manifest *any sympathy for one another*, except to help scratch each other's backs. They give no attention or sympathy whatsoever to the sick and dying. When one is dead the body may lie for hours among them in immediate contact, yet unnoticed. But as soon as the soul has fled they steal the blanket of the deceased, and most unceremoniously proceed to appropriate his bread spoon and bag. During the process of burial, they never manifest the slightest concern. A more stolid, brutalized, pitiable set of beings I never beheld."—*Times*, November, 1862.

Now *which*, Abolitionist Friends, were in the more noble

and more Christian position, the Charleston slaves, who brought down dray-loads of clothes, or those children of freedom, who, "much preferring nudity to dress," tore off the clothes and rolled themselves in the sand?

One of the most common, and, considering how well the facts *ought* to be known, one of the most shameless fallacies of the Abolitionists, is to attribute the low state and idle habits of the emancipated black to the fact that he *had been* a slave. Slavery had degraded him! his faults were effects of the cursed institution! Were the faults of these people, for instance, the effects of slavery? or were the faults of the Unyoro, or the Waganda, or Du Chaillu's Fans, or Livingstone's Makololo—were these due to slavery? Nay, if Liberty were the one or the chief thing needful for elevating a nation, the Fans, and the Bushmen and Kabendas ought to be at the Head of the World; for none have had so much of it. In fact, they have had so much as to neutralize all their other magnificent advantages, and make them about the most inhuman of human beings.

15. Let me add now a quotation or two to show from what an intolerable fate the brig Dolphin had delivered the Echo's cargo:—

"A gentleman in Kentucky does not sell his slaves. To do so is considered to be low and mean, and is opposed to the aristocratic traditions of the country. A man who does so willingly puts himself beyond the pale of good fellowship with his neighbours. A sale of slaves is regarded as a sign almost of bankruptcy. If a man cannot pay his debts his creditors can step in and sell his slaves; but he does not himself make the sale. When a man owns more slaves than he needs, he hires them out by the year; and when he requires more than he owns, he takes them on hire by the year. Care is taken in such hirings not to remove a married man from his home. The price paid at the time of my visit for a negro's labour was about 100 dollars, or £20 for the year; but the price was then extremely low in consequence of the war disturbances. The usual price had been about 50 or 60 per cent. above this. The man who takes the negro on hire feeds him, clothes him, provides him with a bed, and supplies him with medical attendance. I went into some of their cottages on the estate which I visited, and was not in the least surprised to find them preferable in size, furniture, and all material comforts to the dwellings of most of our own agricultural labourers. Any comparison between the material comfort of a Kentucky slave and an English ditcher and delver

would be preposterous. The Kentucky slave never wants for clothing fitted to the weather. He eats meat twice a day, and has three good meals; he knows no limit but his own appetite; his work is light, he has many varieties of amusement; he has instant medical assistance at all periods of necessity for himself, his wife, and his children; of course he pays no rent, fears no baker, and knows no hunger. I would not have it supposed that I consider slavery, with all these comforts, to be equal to freedom without them. Nor do I consider that the negro can be made equal to the white man. But in discussing the condition of the negro, it is necessary that we should understand what are the advantages of which abolition would deprive him, and in what condition he has been placed by the daily receipt of such advantages. If a negro slave wants new shoes he asks for them, and receives them with the undoubting simplicity of a child. Such a state of things has its picturesquely patriarchal side; but what would be the state of such a man if he were emancipated to-morrow?"—TROLLOPE'S *America*, I, 116.

This is from a thoughtful English gentleman—about the last literary eye-witness of slavery as it was, at least in Kentucky. I shall only quote another testimony, Professor Davis's Essay, which, as I mentioned before, p. cxxxix, bears such high recommendations from *North American* authorities :—

"The slaves marry and are given in marriage as regularly and religiously as the white peasants of any country; and though the marriage has not the legal sanction [which it ought to have had], it has the religious and moral. They are kept together with their families far more than the white people. On many plantations there are one or two hundred negroes, all descended from three or four families; while the children of the first master have been scattered from Maine to Texas. They have regularly improved since first introduced from Africa, and are now improving from year to year, in intelligence, in moral culture, in intellectual development, in appearance, in habits, in comfort, and they are as cheerful and faithful, as devoted to the interests of their master, as attached to him and his family, as if they were free hired servants receiving regular wages. There is no mendicity, no need for poorhouses, asylums, hospitals; for the master's house is the asylum of the slaves; his wife and his daughters their nurses, and his own doctor their physician. Such a set of labourers, able and willing to work, contented and happy, with every want supplied, and yet costing the masters the least possible sum needed for their health and their strength, furnish the cheapest and most efficient labour possible."—STEEBINS' *American Progress*, p. 121.

Now, may I not beg of any thoughtful person to "look on this picture and on that," and then to ask himself was not Kentucky, or Jamaica, or Demerara, or even Cuba or Brazil, a real

Goshen to the wretched inhabitants of Africa, blessed as they are with every material benefit, cursed with the ignorant, indolent incapacity to turn them to advantage, and, for the want of honest industries, only spending their time in injuring one another? Surely, whoever hesitates to answer, Yes, is beyond the reach of argument.

16. But did not the Southern States forbid the education of slaves; were not many severe and tyrannical laws in force against them; and were they not often treated with individual cruelty where no law or custom could protect them? Suppose so—still was the utmost degree of this that has been asserted *anything comparable* to their state in Africa? Take, for instance, Mrs. Stowe's pictures. Do they not represent Dixie's Land on the whole as a real Paradise for the Negro, compared with the Purgatory of his native home? As to the severities themselves, God forbid I should extenuate them, so far as they were not necessary—which very often no doubt they were, e. g., those on board of the Niagara. But there is this general remark to be made about them—in nine cases out of ten *the Abolitionists made them necessary!* Revert to the analogy of the school or family; and suppose that the clerical visitors of a school or schools took it into their heads to inform the lads “that they were free-born Britons, or Americans! that no master had a right to punish or coerce them! that the attempt to do so was a sin and a crime, and constituted the master a Godless, unprincipled scoundrel!” &c., &c.,—what would the effect be on the school or family? Would it not immediately render the most kind and self-sacrificing of parents or masters suspicious and severe, and oblige them to a strictness of discipline, especially of preventive discipline, quite abhorrent to their nature? To any thoughtful person this will abundantly explain the coercive *legislation* of the South, and a great deal of the individual severity. For, it must be borne in mind, such coercion and severity were directly contrary to their money interests, and every clause, and line, and instance of it cost them a serious decrease of wealth. The slave was the master's capital, and it was his direct interest that he should be strong, and healthy, and happy, and handy, and

intelligent, and learned, at least in all matters that are needed for agriculture and manufactures, and initial commerce. A stupid, sickly creature from on board the *Echo*, or from *Du Chaillu's Fans* or *Livingstone's Bakalahari*, would be scarcely worth his keep; whereas the confidential man, who was able to keep his master's books, to rule his household, or his farm, or to buy and sell in market, was worth to his master a large percentage of his income; and he could always hire out his spare hands, at yearly salaries depending on their intelligence and skill.

17. What, then, was the actual effect of Southern or of Jamaican slavery upon the Negro? It varied locally, of course, like any other schooling; but its effect, on the whole, was unmistakable. It was smoothly and very quickly raising up the black to the level, or near the level, of the white man. It was yearly passing hundreds over into actual freedom, and adding a considerable element to the population of both southern and northern states; where they generally occupied the position of hotel keepers and hotel servants, coachmen, cooks, butlers, and small shop-keepers. And how nearly the mass of slaves had reached this level at the time of their emancipation is evident from this, that President Lincoln was able to find among them from one to 200,000 of excellent soldiers, able to stand in line with the other regiments of his army; and his successors hope to find perhaps ten times that number of decently conducted citizens, able to vote as intelligently and as freely as their neighbours.

18. And what will be the effect of emancipation on them? This also will vary locally, even with those who have reached equal grades of the necessary preparation. Those who were really fit for freedom will battle their way through life in the same way that we must do ourselves. But most of them were not fit; and with these the future will mainly depend:—(1) on whether they can be kept from the towns; the temptations of which are very apt to ruin them immediately, both men and women:—and (2) on whether the land be so plentiful that they can find room to squat. If land be so scarce in proportion to po-

pulation that they can find neither food nor lodging, except on the condition of labouring for it, as in Barbadoes, they will labour, and God will bless their industry. If they can find anywhere room to squat, as in Jamaica, or even if they be so far advanced as to buy townships for themselves, as in Demerara, they will squat, and take it easy, and gradually go back to idleness—the innocent-looking parent of all our deadly vices. And then, as soon as the white man requires the ground, he will first exterminate the negro, as he does the alligator, or Blackfoot, or Dacotah, and occupy his place. If it be too hot or too malarious for this, like the basin of the Orinoco, it must be abandoned to utter barbarism; the natives there now, I believe, are cannibals.

19. "But modern slavery has been administered not as an apprenticeship or school, but as a permanent estate, dependent upon colour—as if God had caused black men to be born essential slaves, whites as essential freemen." I fear that this representation is partly true, and so far as it is so, one can feel but little pity for the ruin that has overtaken slaveholders. I denounce all such ideas as vehemently as the abolitionists themselves. It is only as a transition and preparatory state—preparatory to freedom, and hastening to make men free by developing the qualities which will make freedom inevitable—that it has its place in ethics or in history; and it is only in this aspect that I say a word in its defence. But in this aspect it is not only defensible but necessary, and the opposite hypothesis as irrational as it is unhistoric and destructive. The white races are suitable for temperate or coldish climates; the black for the sunburnt and sultry. The white races have passed through their schooling of enforced duty—the exigencies of climate having helped to make it necessary. The black races have not passed through it yet, Nature's tropical abundance having spontaneously supplied their wants. Hence the difference in their present qualities and their respective status. One black race, indeed, the Egyptian, did pass through that school, at the same time as Israel, or before it, and the permanent results are still apparent. Higher results had been reached in their case also,

as well as in Israel's, had they, like Israel, found a Moses and Samuel, or, like mediæval Europe, found an Augustin, and Hildebrand, and Francis, to pass them through the next school of religious discipline. Until they do pass through these both, two great lamentable and permanent facts will still continue permanent—1, The tropical riches will go to waste, while millions of cultivated men are pinched or perishing for want of them; and, 2, The tropical races, instead of being developed into rich-blooded and noble-minded nations, will continue as they are, filthy, bloody, and unfeeling—a disgrace alike to humanity and nature.

20. "And how," some one may ask, "should the details of this schooling or apprenticeship be conducted?" Well, it may be clerical prejudice—an idol of the theatre—but the Mosaic Institutes seem to me to mark out the outlines so wisely as scarce to admit improvement. Let us glance at them.

a. And, first, I fear that an exodus is needful—from Canaan to Goshen, or *vice versâ*—that a total change of scene and of associations is requisite for working, at least quickly, a large change in habits and ideas. Will Sir Samuel Baker, for example, find it easy to work any large *and abiding* change among any of the tribes by Lake Victoria; surrounded as they are by other nations who will gladly receive his fugitives, and tempt, and annoy, and injure? whereas if he could remove them bodily, 1,000 miles northward down the Nile, or even to the Orange River, his pupils might make large progress. Who could make anything of Du Chaillu's Fans among the Fans, or of the cargo of the Echo at Kabenda? Whereas, the process in Kentucky or Maryland might be profitable to both whites and blacks. We find an exodus almost requisite for any rapid amelioration—even of an Irish peasantry.

b. Whoever should kidnap, or steal a freeman into slavery, "should surely be put to death." Even Bishop Colenso and Dr. Livingstone will admit that there are few more grievous crimes; whereas no punishment or stigma followed the *buying* of a slave in Israel, provided he were honestly come by. The Ishmaelites

did no crime in buying Joseph from his brethren—the crime would have been to refuse to buy. Nor did the Jews do wrong in buying the Crusaders' captives, provided they were not too exacting in the matter of ransom. If Sir Samuel Baker succeed, famine will many a time drive the neighbouring races to offer him their children and themselves for sale. If he mean permanent improvement, he will generally buy them, like Joseph, and will use his discretion subsequently in relaxing terms. An Israelite might sell his slaves, or he might sell himself and children into bondage.

c. This bondage, however, was only a seven-year apprenticeship. He might resell himself, it is true, at the end of the seven years; still the great fact remained, he was once more a freeman, and it required his own deliberate act to make him bond again. The constant action of this law would soon leave no permanent slaves who could maintain themselves in freedom. Besides, once in every fifty years they were *all* freemen together, and had a year's experience of universal freedom before they could relock their chains.

d. The master was obliged to look after the spiritual welfare of his slaves, and that with no niggardly or unequal hand. In fact he was obliged at once to circumcise his slave; to make him thereby a full Israelite, his own equal in status, and a member of his family. So that among the Jews, still more than among other ancient nations, the estate of slavery, as compared with that of a hired servant, was one of respect or honour. The stranger, or the hired servant, should not eat the passover, "but every man's servant, born in his house, or bought with his money, when thou hast circumcised him, shall draw near and eat thereof," under the same "law" as his master. And this feeling of their relative position continues even to New Testament times—"the hireling fleeth because he is an hireling, and careth not for the sheep"—the hireling, "whose *own* the sheep are not!" Had he become a slave, and a member of the "family," he would have felt the family property to be his own. How totally different is this from the statements one sometimes

hears* of the Bible teaching on this important subject. But I am writing an Essay, not a note, and it is time to cease. God give us of the Spirit of Christ, and direct us aright in our duty to God and our duty to our neighbours.

* *E. g.*, one of those elaborate treatises which seem to aim at bewildering the question of the Inspiration of the Scriptures gives this as its first example of the "unceasing presence and controlling influence of its Divine Author:" "Consider," he says, "for example, the superhuman wisdom with which the language (*sic*) of Scripture touches (*sic*) upon the institutions of the old Gentile world (*sic*) in their relation to Christianity. Need I mention here the oft-quoted instances of how the New Testament writers abstain from all *direct* (the italics are his) reprobation of the great social crime of slavery?"—On Insp., p. 247. "Of the Old Gentile World!" as if the Mosaic or the New Testament world would not touch it with one of their fingers. "The Great Social Crime of Slavery!"—the God of our Lord's parable, then (Mat. 18), "who commanded his servant (i. e. his slave) to be sold, and his wife and children, and all that he had," must have been, in this writer's view, a very criminal God indeed. But, in truth, so common is the assumption in this case, and so highly coloured the spectacles, that it is only a wonder that this writer saw so much. "The Zooloo who converted a Bishop"—having, like Mr. Weller, "only eyes, and not double-million gas magnifiers"—had a much directer means of reading the Scriptures, and a far clearer insight of their meaning.

Even Mr. Trollope is so much under the popular, or quasi-popular, influence, that though he sees clearly the evils of hasty abolition, and many of the advantages of "the institution itself," he shrinks from the idea of it as if it were a crime; *e. g.* :—

"What would a farmer say in England if his ploughman declined to work, and protested that he preferred going to his master's granary and feeding himself and his children on his master's corn? 'Measter, naw, I beas a-tired thick day, and dunna mind to do no wark.' Then the poorhouse, my friend, the poorhouse! And hardly that; starvation first, and nakedness and all manner of misery. In point of fact, our friend the ploughman must go and work, even though his over-laboured bones be tired, as no doubt they often are. He knows it and does it, and in *his* way is not discontented. And is not this God's ordinance?"

"His ordinance in England and elsewhere. But not so, apparently, in Jamaica. There we had a devil's ordinance (*sic*) in those days of slavery; and having rid ourselves of that, we have still a devil's ordinance of another sort. It is not, perhaps, very easy for men to change devil's work into heavenly work at once. The ordinance that at present we have existing there is that *far niente* one of lying in the sun and eating yams—of eating, not your own yams, you lazy, do-nothing, thieving daskie; but my yams—mine, who am being ruined, root and branch, stock and barrel, house and homestead, wife and bairne, because you won't come and work for me when I offer you due wages, you thieving, do-nothing, lazy nigger.' So, angrily, does the Jamaica planter, according to Mr. Trollope, describe the *fact*."—*West Indies and Spanish Main*, p. 88.

NOTE G.

I HAVE somewhere referred to "Note G,"—on the Results of Modern Missions. But I must defer this subject to the Second

And if slavery were a devil's ordinance, Mr. Trollope,—despite Moses, and Paul, and Christ, and all the wisdom of the ancient and mediæval worlds,—what sort of an ordinance preceded it to the negro in Africa? or what sort now dominates there? But no one writes more candidly on the subject than Mr. Trollope. I quote the following passages with pleasure, and pray some of my readers to ponder on them:—

"But in the meantime, what are we to do with our friend, lying as he now is at his ease under the cotton tree, and declining to work after ten o'clock in the morning? 'No, tankee, massa, me tired now; me no want more money.' Or perhaps it is, 'No; workee no more; money no nuff; workee no pay.' These are the answers which the suppliant planter receives, when at ten o'clock he begs his negro neighbours to go a second time into the cane fields and earn a second shilling, or implores them to work for him more than four days in the week, or solicits them at Christmas-time to put up with a short ten days' holiday"—*ib.*, p. 64—while the 'plantation' is being ruined for want of work, and the Island is in this state—"Her roads are almost impassable, her bridges are broken down, her coffee plantations have gone back to bush, her sugar estates have been sold for the value of the sugar boilers. Kingston, as a town, is the most deplorable that a man ever visited, unless it be that Spanish Town is worse."—*Ib.*, p. 119.

Or these from a later work:—

"Charming pictures are drawn for you of the negro in a state of Utopian bliss, owning his own hoe, and eating his own hog; in a paradise where everything is bought and sold, except his wife, his little ones, and himself. But the enfranchised negro has always thrown away his hoe, has eaten any man's hog but his own, and has too often sold his daughter for a dollar, when any such market has been opened to him."—*America*, vol. ii., p. 86.

"The Abolitionist is struck with horror when he thinks that a man and a brother should be a slave; but when the man and the brother has been made free, he is regarded with loathing and contempt. All this I cannot see with equanimity. There is falsehood in it from the beginning to the end. The slave as a rule is well treated, gets all he wants, and almost all he desires. The free negro as a rule is ill treated, and does not get that consideration which alone might put him in the worldly position for which his advocate declares him to be fit. It is false throughout—this preaching. The negro is not the white man's equal by nature. But to the free negro in the Northern States, this inequality is increased by the white man's hardness to him."—*Ib.*, p. 87.

"I have observed but little difference made between the negro and the half-caste, and no difference in the actual treatment. I have never met in American society any man or woman in whose veins there can have been presumed to be any taint of African blood. In Jamaica they are daily to be found in society."—*Ib.*, 89.

Volume ; only repeating here that Missions have been found no substitute for the Schooling described in the last note, though admirably fitted for breathing into it a proper spirit, and for initiating the *Second School*, pp. 160, 301, &c.

Upon another point I can hardly agree with Mr. Trollope. He thinks the negro *cannot be made* equal to the white man. I admit that he could not be made to be of the same type as the white man. But the negro may be of a different type, yet not inferior. He may never have, for instance, the gravity, earnestness, and fixity of purpose, of the present Anglo-American ; but he may have more of elasticity, cheerfulness, patience, contentment with his sphere ; and these latter qualities may be as useful as the former. Indeed, the Anglo-American seems to wear himself out from over-earnestness, and the negro qualities may be a useful supplement to his. Neither race is at all deficient in enthusiasm, determination, self-sacrifice, or the other elements of a great and generous character.

END OF VOL. I.

POSTSCRIPT.

AT the request of some friends I add a postscript upon Slavery. It is objected (1) that I use that offensive *term* without necessity; for the procedure which I advocate—schooling or apprenticeship for savages, as direct preparation for freedom (*e.g.* p. cliv.), and which, it is acknowledged, would be a vast benefit to the world, if it could be carried out—is very different from anything that *we* call slavery: and (2) that I do not sufficiently describe the details of such apprenticeship.

As to the first; I have no affection for the word; and if my readers will allow “apprenticeship” or any other word to describe the thing, I shall be extremely glad. But it is obvious that those who cannot rule themselves, so far at least as to be harmless—that those who know no better than to devote their adult faculties to idleness and vice, and their magnificent plains and valleys to jungle and swamp and malaria and the *tzetze*—ought to be ruled by others, and gradually trained to the industries, the virtues, the ambitions, which sustain and civilize mankind. This condition of being ruled and trained *by others*, is the essence of Slavery, as it is of Schooling; and the evil connotation is not essential to either. It has arisen, amongst us, partly from abuses of the institution, and partly from the incessant exaggeration and paralogisms of the abolitionists. But there is no reason why we should not have Christian “Apprenticeship” as well as Christian Schooling, Christian Law, Christian Ceremonial, or a Christian Sabbath. Eliezer of Damascus, and the 319 warriors of Abraham’s household, occupied a position of respect and comfort, not merely as compared with the naked savages of Africa or Asia, but with the present free labourers of Europe; why should not the position be at least as good in an English or American Plantation?

As to the second point—I have given an outline of the Mosaic regulations, which seem to me wise, just, and eminently courageous on the side of freedom. And I have tried to make these practical to my reader, by asking him to apply them to Sir Samuel Baker's experiment. But legislation on such a subject could not be everywhere alike; it must vary with the circumstances. *The great thing is that it should interfere at all*—that instead of standing apart, like a Pharisee, denouncing and destroying the institution, and shutting its eyes on consequences, it should assume its just responsibility, and institute and maintain careful methods of training its infant populations. Men are not equal; and all men are not fit for freedom; the law should recognise the fact, and deal with them accordingly.

For instance, I have noticed (p. clv.) that an exodus is a usual and perhaps needful feature of the training. The law ought to recognise and regulate this, instead of denouncing the trade as piracy, and thereby heaping—this is universally acknowledged—unnumbered horrors both on those who perish on the voyage and those who survive it. This would be more troublesome, perhaps, and less gratifying to the national self-esteem; but it would be far more charitable and profitable to all, and ultimately to ourselves. The statesman who shall succeed in amending the national policy in this respect will have earned the gratitude of the world.

In Jamaica and Virginia, and such places, whence slavery has been abolished, legislation should probably take the form of strict laws against vagrancy and idleness, carefully enforced and aided by the competition of a moderate immigration. But in general it would be requisite that the law should endorse and enforce contracts for the surrender of the person, or the person and *young* family, for a term of years, say seven, as in Israel. Of course, it should protect the "apprentice" from outrage, and his *peculium* from dissipation; while allowing, under certain circumstances, the contract to be repeated; but it would be well that, as in Israel, disgrace should always attach to the willingness to continue in bondage (p. 300, note).