

- ART. II.—1. *Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development of Civilisation.* By Edward Burnet Tylor. London, 1865.
2. *Primitive Culture.* By the Same. London, 1871.
3. *Primitive Society.* By the Same, in the 'Contemporary Review' for April and June 1873.
4. *Prehistoric Times.* By Sir John Lubbock, Bart. 2nd edition. London, 1869.
5. *The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man.* By the Same. London, 1870.

THAT the proper study of mankind is Man seems to be a proposition the truth of which is being now forced upon us with peculiar intensity. In spite of the expulsion of the 'microcosm' by astronomy from the centre of the material universe, he is at present acquiring yet fresh claims to be considered the one key whereby may be unlocked the mysteries of the 'macrocosm.' With the dispelling of that dream in which the little planet Tellus appeared the great solid nucleus of encircling crystal spheres existing only for its sake, began the vigorous prosecution of the physical sciences—the investigation of nature *external to man.* This investigation having reached a stage rendering possible the exposition of all non-human phenomena as the multifold co-ordinated and harmonised manifestations of one great process—a *theory of evolution*—it remains to test the universal adequacy of that theory by its application to the phenomena presented to us by Man in his highest existing condition and as the wild tenant of the forest—the *Homo sylvaticus.* If all the phenomena which human life presents are capable of being brought under the laws which regulate inferior organisms, it is hardly possible to exaggerate the amount of support which would thereby be given to the universality of that theory. Moreover, it is plain that in such a case all those who deem the theory of evolution sufficient to account for the origin of all other animals, must logically admit it as sufficient to account for his origin also.

At present there are two very distinct views as to the origin of the animal population of this planet.

I. The first of these views—the monistic hypothesis—asserts that one uniform law has presided over the whole, since all such creatures are distinguished from one another by differences which are differences of degree only, and not of kind.

II. The other of these views—the dualistic hypothesis—asserts that man (whatever may have been the case with brute animals) must have originated in some special manner, since the difference between

between him and brutes is a difference of *kind*, and not one merely of degree—he embodying a distinct principle not present in brute animals.

A supporter of the monistic hypothesis must maintain that man at his first appearance was literally in the lowest and most brutal stage of his existence, whence he has gradually ascended to his present condition by a process of progressive development attended with only exceptional and relatively insignificant processes of retrogression and degradation. He will consequently not only maintain that races have existed without articulate speech, or any equivalent symbolic system, without perceptions of 'right' and 'wrong,' and without religious conceptions, but also that the first men were actually so destitute. He may or may not expect to find specimens of this lowest condition of mankind still surviving at the present day, but he will surely anticipate that archaeological, historical, and ethnological research must reveal facts pointing plainly towards such an early condition. He will also anticipate that these sciences will bring to our knowledge tribes in an intellectual stage which is less remote from that presumed early condition than from a choice assemblage of men living now—say, the members of our own 'Royal Society.'

A supporter of the dualistic hypothesis must, on the other hand, maintain that man at the very first moment of his existence was at once essentially man, and separated, at his very origin, from the highest brutes by as impassable a gulf as that which anywhere exists between them to-day. He will consequently not only maintain that no race will anywhere be found without a mode of rational expression, moral perceptions, and religious conceptions (however rudimentary or atrophied), but also that the first men possessed all these. He will be confident that no scientific researches will bring to our knowledge any human races devoid of reason, or (what is its necessary concomitant in a "rational animal") the power of expressing internal *thoughts*, as distinguished from mere *feelings*, by external sensible signs. He will also expect to find in all races of men indications of religious conceptions and of an apprehension of right and wrong, however curiously or perversely these abstract conceptions may be concretely embodied. Finally, he will be confident that no race will be found less remote intellectually from the highest existing men than from a state of brutal irrationality. The actual first origin of man must for ever remain a problem insoluble by unaided reason—a matter incapable of direct investigation, and, revelation apart, only to be investigated by conjecture and analogy. This being so, we must be content to study existing
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all species were produced.

races of men, and thence arrive at the best conclusions we may, with the aid to be derived from history, archæology, and geology.

The questions, then, to which attention should be directed with a view to determining whether the balance of evidence favours the monistic or the dualistic hypothesis, are the following; and to answer these, the savage, *Homo sylvaticus*, must serve as our test. 1. Can any direct evidence be found of races of man, past or present, existing in a brutal or irrational condition? 2. Does available evidence clearly point to the past existence of such a condition? 3. Are races anywhere to be found in a condition which is less remote from mere animal existence than from the highest human development of which we have as yet experience.

Should unmistakable evidence of the sort be forthcoming, then the existence of an essential difference, a difference of kind, between human and brutal nature, could no longer be maintained. It would also follow that if other animals have arisen by a merely natural process of development, reason could oppose no barrier to the belief that the origin of man, in the totality of his nature, was also due to such a merely natural process. If, on the other hand, no such direct evidence is forthcoming, and none even pointing clearly in the indicated direction; if, also, no races can be found in a condition nearer to irrational brutality than to the highest refinement; then it must be admitted that we have no scientific ground for asserting that man is of one nature with the brutes, or that it is an *à priori* probability that his origin was the same as theirs.

More than this, in the absence of such evidence it may fairly be inferred that there is an *à priori* probability against this community of nature and origin. It may be so inferred, because it seems likely that if all men were once irrational animals, some tribe of the kind would have survived in some remote part of the world to this day, especially as, on the theory of evolution, they must have been well fitted to maintain themselves under the conditions existing in their own region.

Man is generally admitted to be, as to antiquity, at the most but a tertiary mammal; but Australia presents us with a fauna in some respects triassic. Some eminent authorities, however, assert that miocene man still exists, and that we behold him in the Esquimaux. It may naturally be a matter of some regret that this cannot be proved, since, if the Esquimaux are indeed miocene men surviving to this day, an investigation of their mental condition would almost suffice to solve the problem decisively one way or the other. It would suffice to solve it since

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we might fairly argue from the progress made between the miocene period and to-day, to that which might be supposed to have taken place between the beginning of the tertiary period and the miocene.

If, however, ethnology and archæology fail to furnish due evidence, and thus show themselves manifestly incompetent to solve the question, then the cause must be transferred to the tribunal of Philosophy for decisive judgment. In that case, if philosophy (including psychology) shows us, as we are convinced it does, that there is a difference of kind between the lowest races of men and the highest species of brutes, pointing to a difference of essential principle, and, therefore, of origin, then ethnology and archæology (in the case of their supposed failure as to the evidence referred to) become important auxiliaries, and will powerfully aid to reinforce such conclusion. They will, by their eloquent silence, supply us with additional grounds for maintaining that the progress of physical science will but more and more clearly bring out the difference existing between all merely animal natures and that of the rational animal man.

The works of the authors whose names head this review are most valuable for our purpose. They are most valuable, in the first place, on account of the industry, patience, ability, and candour with which they have amassed, digested, and laid before their readers all the most important facts which either archæology or ethnology has afforded, tending to throw light upon the lower stages of human existence. Secondly, however, they are of especial value because their authors belong to that school which adopts the monistic view as to man's origin—that is to say, the school of Lamarck, Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer. We may, therefore, confidently rely upon any statements or admissions made by Mr. Tylor and Sir John Lubbock which tell *against* the monistic hypothesis; while we may fairly assume, from the eminent qualities these authors possess, that when they fail to bring forward data *favourable* to that view it is because no such data in reality exist.

We may now proceed to examine their testimony, and we think the following order of subjects may be convenient: 1, Speech; 2, Morals; 3, Religion; 4, Progress; 5, Community of Nature; 6, Results.

I. As to *Speech*, Sir John Lubbock at once admits: * 'Although it has been at various times stated that certain savages are entirely without language, none of these accounts appear to be well authenticated.' The recklessness with which assertions are made about savage tribes is, as we shall shortly see, so great,

* 'Origin of Civilisation,' p. 275.

that

that no account ought to be fully received without a knowledge of the bias of the relater and a careful criticism of his statements. As to 'speech,' such is the amount of ambiguity and confusion which commonly accompanies the use of the word that some preliminary explanations and definitions are absolutely requisite. The essence of language is mental—an intellectual activity called the *verbum mentale*; but actual 'speech' itself is the outward expression of thoughts (rational conceptions) by articulate sounds—the *verbum oris*. Now we may have (1) animal sounds that are neither rational nor articulate; (2) sounds that are articulate but not rational; (3) sounds that are rational but not articulate; (4) sounds that are both rational and articulate; (5) gestures which do not answer to rational conceptions; and (6) gestures which do answer to such conceptions, and are, therefore, external but non-oral manifestations of the *verbum mentale*.

The sounds emitted by brutes, which denote merely emotions and bodily sensations, belong to the first category. Mere articulate sounds, without concomitant intellectual activity, such as those emitted by trained parrots or jackdaws (and which, of course, are not 'speech'), belong to the second category. The third category comprises inarticulate ejaculations which express assent to or dissent from given propositions. The fourth category is that of true speech. Gestures, which are merely the manifestations of emotions and feelings are not the equivalents of speech, and belong to the fifth category. But gestures without sound may be rational external manifestations of internal thoughts, and, therefore, the real equivalents of words. Such are many of the gestures of deaf-mutes incapable of articulating words which constitute a true gesture-language. All such belong to the sixth category. Thus it is plainly conceivable that a brute might manifest its feelings and emotions not only by gestures, but also by articulate sounds, without for all that possessing even the germ of real language. Similarly a paralysed man might have essentially the power of speech (the *verbum mentale*), though accidentally hindered from externally manifesting that inner power by means of the *verbum oris*. Normally the external and internal powers exist inseparably. Once that the intellectual activity exists, it seeks external expression by symbols, verbal, manual or what not—the voice or gesture-language. Some form of symbolic expression is, therefore, the necessary consequence of the possession by an animal of the faculty of reason.* On the other hand, it is impossible

* Mr. Tylor ('Researches into the Early History of Mankind,' p. 68) says that though deaf-mutes prove that man may have thought without speech, yet not

impossible that rational speech can for a moment exist without the co-existence with it of that internal, intellectual activity of which it is the outward expression.

Few recent intellectual phenomena are more astounding than the ignorance of these elementary yet fundamental distinctions and principles, exhibited by conspicuous advocates of the monistic hypothesis. Mr. Darwin, for example, does not exhibit the faintest indication of having grasped them, yet a clear perception of them, and a direct and detailed examination of his facts with regard to them, was a *sine quâ non* for attempting, with a chance of success, the solution of the mystery as to the descent of man. We actually heard Professor Vogt at Norwich (at the British Association Meeting of 1868), in discussing certain cases of aphasia, declare before the whole physiological section, 'Je ne comprends pas la parole dans un homme qui ne parle pas'—a declaration which manifestly showed that he was not qualified to form, still less so to express, any opinion whatever on the subject. Again, Professor Oscar Schmidt, in trying to account for the natural origin of man, quotes,* with approbation, Geiger's words: 'Die Sprache hat die Vernunft geschaffen: vor ihr war der Mensch vernunftlos'—not seeing that he might as well attempt to account for the 'convexities' of a sigmoid line by its 'concavities.' The 'concavities' could as easily exist before the 'convexities' as the existence of the *verbum oris* could antedate that of the *verbum mentale*.† It is almost enough to make one despair of progress when one finds such real 'non-sense' solemnly propounded to a learned audience, and when such amazing ignorance shows itself in men who are looked up to as *teachers*!

It is then *rational* language—the external manifestation, whether by sound or gesture, of general conceptions—which has to be considered. It has to be ascertained whether or not its existence is, as far as the evidence goes, universal amongst mankind; also whether the lowest forms of speech discoverable are so much below the highest forms as to appear transitional steps from irrational cries, and, consequently, whether there is any positive evidence for the origin of speech by any process of

not without 'any physical expression,' rather 'the reverse.' But no sound philosopher ever dreamed of maintaining the absurdity Mr. Tylor here opposes.

* 'Die Anwendung der Descendenzlehre auf den Menschen,' Leipzig, 1873, p. 30.

† It is, we suppose, to an obscure, not-thought-out perception of this inseparability, that we must attribute the singular contradiction given to himself by Mr. Darwin in his 'Descent of Man.' In one place (vol. i. p. 54) he attributes the faculty of speech in man to his having acquired a higher intellectual nature, while in another place (vol. ii. p. 391) he ascribes man's intellectual nature to his having acquired the faculty of speech.

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evolution. It is not emotional expressions or the manifestations of sensible impressions which we have to consider, but the enunciations of distinct judgments as to 'the what,' 'the how,' and 'the why,' whether by sound or by gesture.

In the first place, perhaps, it may be well to consider those speechless human beings now existing—the deaf-mutes. As to these Mr. Tylor tells us:—

'Even in a low state of education, the deaf-mute seems to conceive general ideas, for when he invents a sign for anything he applies it to all other things of the same class, and he can also form abstract ideas in a certain way, or, at least, he knows that there is a quality in which snow and milk agree, and he can go on adding other white things, such as the moon and whitewash, to his list. He can form a proposition, for he can make us understand, and we can make him understand, that "this man is old, that man is young." Nor does he seem incapable of reasoning in something like a syllogism, even when he has no means of communicating but the gesture-language; and certainly as soon as he has learnt to read that "all men are mortal, John is a man, therefore John is a mortal," he will show by every means of illustration in his power, that he fully comprehends the argument.'*

The intellectual activity of their minds is indeed evidenced by the peculiar construction of their sentences. Mr. Tylor tells us (p. 25): 'Their usual construction is not "black horse," but "horse black;" not "bring a black hat," but "hat black bring;" not "I am hungry, give me bread," but "hungry me bread give."'† Thus we see how thoroughly mistaken Professor Huxley was when he asserted ('Man's Place in Nature,' p. 102, note): 'A man born dumb, notwithstanding his great cerebral mass and his inheritance of strong intellectual instincts, would be capable of *few higher intellectual manifestations than an orang or a chimpanzee*, if he were confined to the society of his dumb associates.' Quite contrary to this, there can be no doubt but that a society of dumb men would soon elaborate a gesture-language of great complexity.

Passing now to savage men, Mr. Tylor makes some excellent remarks on, and brings forward a good example of, that reckless and unjust depreciation of native tribes of which travellers are so apt to be guilty, and of which we shall find other examples when we come to the subject of religion. A Mr. Mercer having said of the Veddah tribes of Ceylon that their communications have little resemblance to distinct sounds or systematised language, Mr. Tylor observes (p. 78):—

* 'Researches into the Early History of Mankind,' p. 66.

† This spontaneous tendency may be pleaded in mitigation of De Candolle's strictures on Latin construction as unnatural.

'Mr. Mercer seems to have adopted the common view of foreigners about the Veddahs, but it has happened here, as in many other accounts of savage tribes, that closer acquaintance has shown them to have been wrongly accused. Mr. Bailey, who has had good opportunities of studying them, . . . contradicts their supposed deficiency in language with the remark, "I never knew one of them at a loss for words sufficiently intelligible to convey his meaning, not to his fellows only, but to the Singhalese of the neighbourhood, who are all more or less acquainted with the Veddah patois."'

Again, as to another well-known traveller he remarks (p. 79):—

'It is extremely likely that Madamé Pfeiffer's savages suffered the penalty of being set down as wanting in language, for no worse fault than using a combination of words and signs in order to make what they meant as clear as possible to her comprehension.'

As to the universality of the *verbum mentale* in man he observes (p. 80):—

'As the gesture-language is substantially the same among savage tribes all over the world, and also among children who cannot speak, so the picture-writings of savages are not only similar to one another, but are like what children make untaught even in civilised countries. Like the universal language of gestures, the art of picture-writing tends to prove that the mind of the uncultured man works in much the same way at all times and everywhere. . . . *Man* is essentially, what the derivation of his name among our Aryan race imports, not "the speaker," but he who thinks, he who *means*.'

In other words, he is a *rational animal*. Mr. Tylor reinforces these remarks elsewhere* by saying:—

'It always happens, in the study of the lower races, that the more means we have of understanding their thoughts, the more sense and reason do we find in them.'

A great deal has been sometimes made of the alleged inability of some savages to count more than five, or even three, and this fact is occasionally advanced as pointing to a transition from the psychical powers of brutes to the intelligence of man. We shall return to this hereafter, but some fitting remarks by Mr. Tylor may be here appropriately quoted:—

'Of course, it no more follows among savages than among ourselves, that because a man counts on his fingers his language must be wanting in words to express the number he wishes to reckon. For example, it was noticed that when natives of Kamskatka were set to count, they would reckon all their fingers, and then all their toes, getting up to 20, and then would ask, "What are we to do next?" Yet it was

* 'Primitive Culture,' vol. i. p. 322.

found on examination that numbers up to 100 existed in their language.'

Concerning the origin of existing articulate words, Mr. Tylor distinctly repudiates the 'bow-wow hypothesis' as insufficient. For instance, with respect to the family of words represented by the Sanskrit *vad*, to go, the Latin *vado*, he says (*Ibid.* p. 195): 'To this root there seems no sufficient ground for assigning an imitative origin, the traces of which it has at any rate lost if it ever had them.' Again, as to early words he says (*Ibid.* p. 207): 'It is obvious that the leading principle of their formation is not to adopt words distinguished by the expressive character of their sound, but to *choose* somehow a *fixed word* to answer a *given purpose*.' As to the arbitrary way in which articulate words are used to express sounds and the little real resemblance existing between them, he tells us (*Ibid.* p. 182): 'The Australian imitation of a spear or bullet striking is given as *toop*; to the Zulu when a calabash is beaten it says *boo*.' He concludes (*Ibid.* p. 208):—

'I do not think that the evidence here adduced justifies the setting up of what is called the Interjectional and Imitative theory as a complete solution of the problem of original language. Valid as this theory proves itself within limits, it would be incautious to accept a hypothesis which can, perhaps, satisfactorily account for a twentieth of the crude forms in any language, as a certain and absolute explanation of the nineteen-twentieths whose origin remains doubtful. . . . Too narrow a theory of the application of sound to sense may fail to include the varied devices which the languages of different regions turn to account. It is thus with the distinction in meaning of a word by its musical accent, and the distinction of distance by graduated vowels. These are ingenious and intelligible [intellectual?] contrivances, but they hardly seem directly emotional or imitative in origin.'

Thus it seems not only that neither Sir John Lubbock nor Mr. Tylor is able to bring forward any evidence of a speechless condition of man, but that they are constrained to admit that all available evidence points in the opposite direction, and that it shows speech to be universal amongst existing races. Even those abnormal and unfortunate beings the deaf-mutes are seen to be intellectually endowed with language, so that they infinitely more resemble a man that is gagged than they do an irrational animal. The essential community intellectually existing between them and us is shown by our occasional use of what Mr. Tylor calls* 'picture words,' where 'a substantive is treated as the

* 'Researches into the Early History of Mankind,' p. 63.

root or crude form of a verb,' as, *e.g.*, 'to butter bread, to cudgel a man, to oil machinery, to pepper a dish.'

Turning now to the other question we had to consider, namely, the relation of the lowest forms of speech to the highest, Mr. Tylor may again be cited with advantage. He expresses himself* thus: 'We come back to the fact, so full of suggestion, that the languages of the world represent substantially the same intellectual art, the higher nations indeed gaining more expressive power than the lowest tribes, yet doing this not by introducing new and more effective central principles, but by mere addition and improvement in detail.' Speaking of the native proverbs of Fernando Po, he tells us,† 'There are hundreds at about as high an intellectual level as those of Europe,' and he cites examples. We have said that we mean by language, not emotional expressions, but the enunciations of judgments concerning 'the *what*,' 'the *how*,' and 'the *why*.' Mr. Tylor's verdict as to the result of the application of this test to the expressions of savages is sufficiently distinct. He says:‡

'Man's craving to know the *causes* at work in each event he witnesses, the reasons *why* each state of things he surveys is such as it is and no other, is no product of high civilisation, but a characteristic of his race down to its lowest stage. Among rude savages it is already an intellectual appetite whose satisfaction claims many of the moments not engrossed by war or sport, food or sleep.'

This decisive judgment may yet be reinforced by some admissions made by Mr. Darwin himself:§

'The Fuegians rank amongst the lowest barbarians; but I was continually struck with surprise how closely the three natives on board H.M.S. "Beagle," who had lived some years in England and could talk a little English, resembled us in disposition, and in most of our mental qualities.'

Again: ||—

'The American aborigines, negroes, and Europeans, differ as much from each other in mind as any three races that can be named; yet I was incessantly struck, whilst living with the Fuegians on board the "Beagle," with the many little traits of character, showing how similar their minds were to ours; and so it was with a full-blooded negro with whom I happened once to be intimate.'

It would be easy, but superfluous, to add to these testimonies. They are amply sufficient to show that, in the opinion of those

* 'Primitive Culture,' vol. i. p. 216.

† Ibid. vol. i. p. 332. The italics are ours.

§ 'Voyage of the "Beagle,"' vol. i. p. 34.

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† Ibid. vol. i. p. 80.

|| Ibid. p. 232..

most capable of acquiring and most certain to acquire information tending to confirm the monistic hypothesis, not only are there no evidences of men in a nascent state as to the power of speech, but that all available evidence shows that in the essentials of language all existing races of men are mentally one. This, indeed, is manifest and undeniable. No tribe exists which cannot count two, cannot say 'I,' 'woman,' 'death,' 'food,' &c. In other words, there is no tribe which does not express general conceptions and abstract ideas by articulate sounds. But the differences between vocal sounds capable of such expression are but differences of *degree*, while the difference between all such utterances and vocal utterances which but express sensations and emotions is a difference of *kind*. Therefore we are compelled to conclude that the most imperfect languages offer us no indication of a transition from irrational cries, being separated from the latter by an indefinitely wide barrier, while they differ from the highest speech, but by a greater simplicity, which indeed is sometimes more apparent than real, as we shall see more plainly hereafter. This being the case, it necessarily follows that we have no positive evidence whatever for the origin of speech by any process of evolution. As to the *possibility* of its origin by such a process from the cries of brutes, the sciences we are here occupied with, ethnology and archæology, can of course tell us nothing. The reply to that question is given by philosophy and psychology.

II. We now come to the second branch of our inquiry, that concerning *Morals*—concerning the universality or non-universality amongst mankind of a power of apprehending 'right' or 'wrong.' And here again it is necessary to distinguish and define what is meant by this human mental power, because ambiguity and misunderstanding as to this matter are at least as common as in the matter of language. By this power is *not* meant merely a feeling of sympathy, a deference to the desires of others, or some emotional excitement tending to produce materially kind and benevolent actions. Still less is meant the volitional impulse which in all cases directly produces such actions, since this may or may not be 'moral,' according to the circumstances of each case. What is meant is an intellectual activity evinced by the expression of definite judgments passed upon certain modes of action abstractedly considered. The existence of kindly social customs cannot be taken as necessarily proving the existence of such intellectual activity in the absence of some intimation by word or gesture of a moral apprehension. Similarly no amount of gross or atrocious habits in any given tribe can be taken to prove its entire absence. The liking or disliking

liking (and therefore the frequent practice or neglect) of certain actions is one thing; the act of judging that such actions, whether pleasant or unpleasant, are 'right' or 'wrong' is an altogether different thing.

A man may, for instance, judge that he *ought* to renounce a tender friendship without its becoming less delightful to him to continue it. Another may perceive that he has acted *rightly* in foregoing a pecuniary advantage though mentally suffering acute distress from the consequences of his just act. Again, differences of judgment as to the goodness or badness of particular concrete actions have nothing to do with the point we have to consider. Thus the most revolting act that can well be cited, that of the deliberate murder of aged parents, monstrous as the act in itself is, may really be one of filial piety if, as is asserted, the savage perpetrators do it at the wish of such parents themselves, and from a conviction that thereby they not only save them from suffering in this world, but also confer upon them prolonged happiness in the next. Hence we must judge of the moral or non-moral condition of savage tribes by their own declarations when these can be obtained, or by expressive actions as far as possible the equivalent of such declarations. We have already seen the essential community of intellectual nature existing amongst all living races as regards the faculty of speech. From the existence of this community of nature, we may fairly conclude that deliberate articulate judgments of lower races have substantially the same meaning as in our own, whatever may be the concrete actions which occasion the expression of such abstract judgments.

We are all familiar with the constantly employed expressions denoting moral judgments amongst ourselves, and those of us who reflect upon the subject are generally aware that in asserting that anything is 'right,' they mean to make a judgment altogether distinct from one asserting the same thing to be pleasurable or advantageous. Even some men who, like the late John Stuart Mill, assert that the principle regulating our actions should be the production of the greatest amount of pleasure to all sentient beings, must assert that there is either no obligation at all to accept this principle itself, or that such obligation is a 'moral' one. The distinction being then generally and practically recognised as existing amongst ourselves, we have to examine the following points:—Whether, even according to the admission of the authors whose works we are considering, there is any evidence that moral perceptions are wanting in any savage tribes? Whether any races exist in a condition which may be considered as a transitional state

between our own and the amoral condition of beasts? Whether any peoples have their moral perceptions so perverted—so remote from those of the highest races—as to result in the formation of abstract judgments directly contradicting the abstract moral judgments of such highest races? And here again we must be greatly on our guard against the involuntary misrepresentations and the hasty and careless misinterpretations of unskilled observers and inaccurate narrators. Sir John Lubbock himself observes: * ‘We all know how difficult it is to judge an individual, and it must be much more so to judge a nation. In fact, whether any given writer praises or blames a particular race, depends at least as much on the character of the writer as on that of the people.’ Again, we must be careful not to apply to savage tribes standards applicable only to higher races. The essence of morality being the conformity of acts to an ethical ideal, neither the worst any more than the best moral development, whatever be the concrete acts, can coexist with an undeveloped intellectual condition. If any tribes are intellectually in a puerile condition, puerile also must be their moral state. Here we may again quote Sir John Lubbock with approval. He says (p. 340):

‘The lowest moral and the lowest intellectual condition are not only, in my opinion, not inseparable, they are not even compatible. . . . The lower races of men may be, and are, vicious; but allowances must be made for them. On the contrary (*corruptio optimi pessima est*), the higher the mental power, the more splendid the intellectual endowment, the deeper is the moral degradation of him who wastes the one and abuses the other.’

Now one of the clearest ethical judgments is that as to ‘justice’ and ‘injustice,’ and by common consent the native Australians are admitted to be at about the lowest level of existing social development, while as we have seen the Esquimaux are deemed by some to be surviving specimens of the (up to the present time hypothetical) ‘miocene men.’

Concerning the first of these races, the Australians, Sir John Lubbock tells us:—

‘The amount of legal revenge, if I may so call it, is often strictly regulated, even where we should least expect to find such limitations. Thus, in Australia, crimes may be compounded for by the criminal appearing and submitting himself to the ordeal of having spears thrown at him by all such persons as conceive themselves to have been aggrieved, or by permitting spears to be thrust through certain parts of his body; such as through the thigh, or the calf of the leg,

* ‘Origin of Civilisation,’ p. 259.

or under the arm. The part which is to be pierced by a spear is fixed for all common crimes, and a native who has incurred this penalty sometimes quietly holds out his leg for the injured party to thrust his spear through! So strictly is the amount of punishment limited, that if, in inflicting such spear-wounds, a man, either through carelessness or from any other cause, exceeded the recognised limits—if, for instance, he wounded the femoral artery—he would in his turn become liable to punishment.’—*Origin of Civilisation*, p. 318.

The next is a yet stronger example of savage refinement, furnished us by Sir John Lubbock :—

‘Among the Greenlanders, should a seal escape with a hunter’s javelin in it, and be killed by another man afterwards, it belongs to the former. But if the seal is struck with the harpoon and bladder, and the string breaks, the hunter loses his right. If a man finds a seal dead with a harpoon in it, he keeps the seal but returns the harpoon. . . . Any man who finds a piece of drift-wood can appropriate it by placing a stone on it, as a sign that some one has taken possession of it. No other Greenlander will then touch it.’—*Ibid.* p. 305.

But perhaps the recently extinct Tasmanians were at a lower level than the Australians. If so, Mr. Tylor shows us by a legend which he relates,* that they had a strong appreciation of even *male* conjugal fidelity. The inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego are, if possible, more wretched savages than the Australians, yet it is very interesting to note that even with respect to these no less hostile a witness than Mr. Darwin himself informs us,† that when a certain Mr. Bynoe shot some very young ducklings as specimens, a Fuegian declared in the most solemn manner, ‘Oh, Mr. Bynoe, much rain, snow, blow much.’ And as to this declaration, Mr. Darwin tells us that the anticipated bad weather ‘was evidently a retributive punishment for wasting human food,’ *i.e.* for a transgression of the aborted moral code recognised by the Fuegian in question.

That the language of savage tribes is capable of expressing moral conceptions will probably be contested by no one. Similarly no one will probably deny that when a savage emphatically calls ‘bad’ an act of treachery done to himself by one to whom he has been kind, his mind recognises, at least in a rudimentary way, an element of *ingratitude* in such an action. But, in fact, that identity of intellectual nature, fundamentally considered, which we have found to exist in all men as the necessary accompaniment of language, at once establishes a very

* ‘Researches into the Early History of Mankind,’ p. 328.

† ‘Voyage of the “Beagle,”’ vol. i. p. 215.

strong

strong *à priori* probability in favour of a similar universality as to the power of apprehending good and evil. The *onus probandi* lies clearly with those who deny it, and yet not only are Mr. Tylor and Sir John Lubbock unable to bring forward facts capable of establishing the existence of a non-moral race of men, but they bring forward instances and announce conclusions of an opposite character. Mr. Tylor observes:—

‘Glancing down the moral scale amongst mankind at large, we find no tribe standing at or near zero. The asserted existence of savages so low as to have no moral standard is *too groundless to be discussed*. Every human tribe has its general views as to what conduct is right and what wrong, and each generation hands the standard on to the next. Even in the details of those moral standards, wide as their differences are, there is a yet wider agreement throughout the human race. . . . No known tribe, however low and ferocious, has ever admitted that men may kill one another indiscriminately. . . . The Sioux Indians, among themselves, hold manslaughter, unless by way of blood revenge, to be a crime, and the Dayaks also punish murder.’—*Contemporary Review*, April 1873, pp. 702, 714.

In another place,* Mr. Tylor, after showing different early conditions of the tenure of property and the occasional estimation of the tribe as the social unit, &c., adds: ‘Their various grades of culture had each according to its lights its standard of right and wrong, and they are to be judged on the criterion whether they did well or ill according to this standard.’ There being thus no question as to the non-existence of any non-moral race of men, can we find evidence of any transitional stage? But the difference between moral and non-moral existence is a difference of *kind*, and therefore ‘transitions’ are here no more possible than between articulate sound-giving animals which have not reason and articulate sound-giving animals who have it.

It may be replied, however, that Sir John Lubbock and Mr. Tylor at least believe in the natural and gradual development of man from the non-moral to the moral mode of existence, and that therefore the facts cited cannot have the force here attributed to them. To this it must be answered that the faculty of accumulating many facts, or that of arranging and presenting them in a perspicuous and persuasive manner, by no means necessarily carries with it a faculty of understanding what those facts really teach. That such an assertion of intellectual deficiency may not repose upon the mere *ipse dixit* of the present writer, it may be well to quote the judgment of one who is himself a master in those archæological subjects in which Sir John Lubbock is such a

* ‘Contemporary Review, June 1873, p. 72.

proficient, while he is also a most distinguished biologist and a man of universal culture. Professor Rolleston upon this subject remarks* as follows:—

‘It is strange, indeed, that Sir John Lubbock *does not see* how his method of accounting for the genesis of the notions of right and wrong, like that of all other utilitarians, *actually presupposes their existence!* How could the old men “praise” or “condemn” except by reference to some pre-existing standard of right and wrong? How could the parties injured by the violation of a compact “naturally condemn” it except by a tacit or articulate reference to some “naturally implanted,” or, at all events, to some already existing, standard of virtue and vice? Language, which in matters of this kind faithfully reproduces the existence of feelings, and even to some extent the history of our race, will not lend itself to the support of their theories, and gives the Dialectician for once a real victory over the Natural Historian. . . . We must also express our surprise that Sir John Lubbock should not have drawn attention to the difficulty which in early stages of our history must have beset the collection of those “experiences of utility,” of which Mr. Herbert Spencer speaks as the foundation of our so-called moral intuitions; and, secondly, to the exceeding unfitness of the “nervous organisation,” which Mr. Huxley calls “the thoughtless brains,” of a savage, to act as a storehouse for such experiences when obtained. For, firstly, the wicked often remain in a state of great prosperity for periods commensurate with the lifetime of an entire population of civilised, not to speak of the notoriously shorter-lived savage, men; and a lifelong experience would neutralise the results, not merely of tradition, but of hereditary transmission. And, secondly, as Sir John Lubbock himself tells us (p. 70), with reference to the practice of infanticide, the “distinction between the sexes implies an amount of forethought and prudence which the lower races of men do not possess.” We commend this estimate of the faculties and capacities of our ancestors to the careful consideration of those philosophers who suppose them to have been capable of processes of stock-taking, which must, *ex hypothesi*, have enabled them to anticipate the epigram, “Honesty is the best policy.”—*The Academy*, Nov. 15, 1870.

We have thus Professor Rolleston with us when we assert that it is impossible to account for the natural development of a moral power of judgment, without, in fact, presupposing its actual existence—since such judgment cannot exist without an ethical standard, and such standard cannot exist without an ethical judgment.

The third question, then, now alone remains: namely, whether the moral perceptions of any people are so perverted as to directly contradict our own abstract moral judgments. In the

* The italics are not Professor Rolleston's.

words of Mr. Lecky : *—‘ It is not to be expected, it is not to be maintained, that men in all ages should have agreed about the application of their moral principles. All that is contended for is that these principles are themselves the same . . . in fact, that, however these principles might be applied, still humanity was recognised as a virtue, and cruelty as a vice.’ † But if opponents have been unable to bring instances to show the existence of a non-moral race, still less can they prove the existence of one the moral principles of which are *inverted*. Let thieving be here and there encouraged and taught, yet dishonesty is nowhere erected into a principle, but is reprobated in the very maxim ‘honour amongst thieves.’ Frightful cruelty towards prisoners was practised by the North American Indians, but it was towards *prisoners*, and cruelty was never inculcated as an ideal to be always aimed at so that remorse of conscience should be felt by any man who happened to have let slip a possible opportunity of cruelty towards any one. As another writer has well expressed it ‡:—‘ Many men doubtless in various times and places have thought it right to do many an act which we know to be unjust ; still they have never thought it right *because* unjust ; they have never thought it right for the sake of any virtuousness which they have supposed to reside in injustice ; but because of the virtuousness of *beneficence*, or *gratitude*, or the like. Similarly many men think an act wrong, because they think it unjust ; but they never think it wrong because they think it *just*.’

We may then safely conclude that there exists no evidence whatever yet discovered for the existence of races either non-moral or with a really inverted morality, or for the evolution of a ‘moral state’ from a pre-existing brutal and ‘amoral’ condition of mankind. The question as to the *possibility* of such a process of evolution is a philosophical question, and cannot of course be solved by the sciences of the writers reviewed—namely, ethnology and archæology. Nevertheless, we have indirectly and by the way found strong reasons to believe it impossible ; but for an exhaustive treatment of the question there is here no space, and this is not the place. To have ascertained that no positive evidence whatever is yet forthcoming has been sufficient for our present purpose.

III. In proceeding to the third branch of our inquiry, that concerning *Religion*—concerning the universality, or non-

* ‘Morals,’ vol. i. p. 104.

† Mr. Lecky (*op. cit.* p. 105) gives some interesting quotations from Helvetius, ‘De l’Esprit,’ vol. ii. p. 13, to show how practices which are at first glaringly immoral, come, when fully understood, to appear relatively moral, and a positive improvement upon other customs they have displaced.

‡ ‘Dublin Review,’ January 1872, p. 65.

universality,

universality, of religious conceptions—it is once more necessary to commence with definitions and distinctions. It is obvious that it cannot here be meant to assert that men have, almost universally, a positive religious belief, since so vast a number of those we know familiarly have none. It is evident that we cannot be surprised at finding generally diffused in some other nations, irreligious or non-religious phenomena analogous to those we may meet with in our own. Neither can it be meant that a distinct religious system is to be found in every nation or tribe, since it would manifestly be very probable that the descendants of some isolated irreligious parents should have grown up devoid of religion altogether. What is meant by the universality of religious conceptions is the general diffusion amongst all considerable races of men: first, of a power to apprehend the existence of a good supernatural Being possessed of knowledge and will, and rewarding men in another world in accordance with their conduct in this; secondly, of a tendency to believe in the actual existence of superhuman powers and beings, and also in an existence beyond the grave—however shadowy, distorted, or aborted such conceptions may seem to us to be.

We have then to consider our authors' teachings as to the following questions:—First, whether any people are now in a state as unconscious of the preternatural and as unconcerned with regard to a future life, as are the brutes? Secondly, whether any races exist which may be deemed to be in a transitional condition from brutish non-religiosity, or with religious conceptions so essentially divergent from our own as to be different in *kind*, and, therefore, incapable of transition either from or to the highest religious condition? But if in the former inquiries it was necessary for us to be upon our guard against the misapprehensions and misinterpretations of travellers, it is still more necessary for us to be so here. The necessity is so great because both theological and anti-theological prejudices are more likely than are any others to warp the judgment and influence the appreciations of even well-meaning observers. As to the theological prejudice, however, we can effectually guard against that by building upon the facts and inferences offered to us by the authors we are reviewing. Whatever may be their most conspicuous merits, or their shortcomings, theological prejudice will not be a vice we shall have to guard against in them. Admissions made by them, favourable to theology, may be accepted without apprehension upon that score.

As regards the influence of bias in this matter we cite some remarks of Mr. Tylor himself which are well worthy of consideration (the italics are ours):—

‘While

‘ While observers who have had fair opportunities of studying the religions of savages have thus sometimes done scant justice to the facts before their eyes, the hasty denials of others who have judged without even facts can carry no great weight. A sixteenth-century traveller gave an account of the natives of Florida which is typical of such : “ Touching the religion of this people which wee have found, for want of their language wee could not understand neither by signs nor gesture that they had any religion or lawse at all . . . We suppose that they have no religion at all, and that they live at their own libertie.” Better knowledge of these Floridians nevertheless showed that they had a religion, and better knowledge has reversed many another hasty assertion to the same effect ; as when writers used to declare that the natives of Madagascar had no idea of a future state, and no word for soul or spirit, or when Dampier inquired after the religion of the natives of Timor, and was told that they had none ; or when Sir Thomas Roe landed in Saldanha Bay, on his way to the court of the Great Mogul, and remarked of the Hottentots that “ they have left off their custom of stealing, but know no God or religion.” Among the numerous accounts collected by Sir John Lubbock as *evidence* bearing on the absence or low development of religion among low races, some may be selected as lying *open to criticism* from this point of view. Thus, the statement that the Samoan Islanders had no religion cannot stand in the face of the elaborate description by the Rev. G. Turner of the Samoan religion itself ; and the assertion that the Tapinombas of Brazil had no religion, is one not to be received without some more positive proof, for the religious doctrines and practices of the Tapi race have been recorded by Lery, De Laet, and other writers. Even with much time and care and knowledge of language, it is not always easy to elicit from savages the details of their theology. They rather try to hide from the prying and contemptuous foreigner their worship of gods who seem to shrink, like their worshippers, before the white man and his mightier Deity. And thus, even where no positive proof of religious development among any particular tribe has reached us, we should distrust its denial by observers whose acquaintance with the tribe in question has not been intimate as well as kindly. Assertions of this sort are made *very carelessly*. Thus, it is said of the Andaman Islanders that they have not the rudest elements of a religious faith ; Dr. Monat states this explicitly ; yet it appears that the natives did not even display to the foreigners the rude music which they actually possessed, so that they could scarcely have been expected to be communicative as to their theology, if they had any. In our time, the most striking negation of the religion of savage tribes is that published by Sir Samuel Baker, in a paper read in 1866 before the Ethnological Society of London, as follows : “ The most northern tribes of the White Nile are the Dinkas, Shillooks, Nuehr, Kytch, Bohr, Aliab, and Shir. A general description will suffice for the whole, excepting the Kytch. Without any exception, they are without a belief in a supreme being, neither have they any form of worship or idolatry ; nor is the darkness of their minds enlightened by even a

ray

ray of superstition." Had this distinguished explorer spoken only of the *Latukas*, or of other tribes hardly known to ethnographers except through his own intercourse with them, his denial of any religious consciousness to them would have been at least entitled to stand as the best procurable account, until more intimate communication should prove or disprove it. But in speaking thus of comparatively well-known tribes, such as the *Dinkas*, *Shillooks*, and *Nuohr*, Sir S. Baker ignores the existence of published evidence, such as describes the sacrifices of the *Dinkas*, their belief in good and evil spirits (*adjok* and *djok*), their good deity and heaven-dwelling creator, *Dendid*, as likewise *Néar*, the deity of the *Nuehr*, and the *Shillooks'* creator, who is described as visiting, like other spirits, a sacred wood or tree. *Kaufmann*, *Boun*, *Bollet*, *Lejean*, and other observers, had thus placed on record details of the religion of these White Nile tribes, years before Sir Samuel Baker's rash denial that they had any religion at all.—*Primitive Culture*, vol. i. p. 381.

Again Mr. Tylor quotes, as surprisingly inconsistent,—

'Mr. Moffat's declaration as to the *Bechuanas*, that "man's immortality was never heard of among that people," he having remarked in the sentence next before, that the word for the shades or manes of the dead is "*liriti*." In South America, again, *Don Felix de Azara* comments on the positive falsity of the ecclesiastics' assertion that the native tribes have a religion. He simply declares that they have none; nevertheless, in the course of his work he mentions such facts as that the *Payaguas* bury arms and clothing with their dead, and have some notions of a future life, and that the *Guanas* believe in a being who rewards good and punishes evil. In fact, this author's reckless denial of religion and law to the lower races of this region justifies D'Orbigny's sharp criticism * that "this is indeed what he says of all the nations he describes, while actually proving the contrary of his thesis by the very facts he alleges in its support."—*Ibid.* vol. i. p. 379.

Once more, as to the easy way in which the real meaning of words may escape the reporters of such expressions, Mr. Tylor judiciously observes:—

'Prudent ethnographers must often doubt accounts of such, for this reason, that the savage who declares that the dead live no more, may merely mean to say that they are dead. When the East African is asked what becomes of his buried ancestors, the "old people," he can reply that "they are ended," yet at the same time he fully admits that their ghosts survive.'—*Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 18.

Mr. Tylor's own belief (expressed, of course, in terms conformable to his own view of evolution) as to the religion of the lower races is thus declared: † 'Genuine savage faiths do, in

* 'L'Homme Américain,' vol. ii. p. 318. † 'Primitive Culture,' vol. ii. p. 288.
fact,

fact, bring to our view what seem to be rudimentary forms of ideas which underlie dualistic theological schemes among higher nations. It is certain that even amongst rude savage hordes native thought has already turned toward the deep problem of good and evil.' He thus admits an essentially and distinctly ethical element into the theology of even 'genuine' savages. But our author has yet more decided views as to the universality of religious conceptions. Concerning the existence of savages without religion, he says* (speaking from his point of view as a supporter of the monistic hypothesis): 'Though the theoretical niche is ready and convenient, the actual statue to fill it is not forthcoming. The case is, in some degree, similar to that of the tribes asserted to exist without language or without the use of fire; nothing in the nature of things [?] seems to forbid the possibility of such existence, but, as a matter of fact, the tribes are not found.'

As we have said, the native Australians have much pretension to the post of lowest of existing races, and we often hear a great deal as to their non-religious condition; nevertheless Mr. Tylor quotes † the Rev. W. Ridley to the effect that 'whenever he has conversed with the Aborigines, he found them to have quite definite traditions concerning supernatural beings, as Baime, whose voice they hear in thunder and who made all things.' Moreover this testimony is reinforced by that of Stanbridge ('T. Eth. Soc.', vol. i. p. 301), who is quoted as asserting that so far from the Australians having no religion, 'they declare that Jupiter, whom they call "foot of day" (Ginabong-Bear), was a chief among the old Spirits, that ancient race who were translated to heaven before man came on earth.' But not only do we thus meet with distinct conceptions of the supernatural where their existence has been denied, but some of the external manifestations of these conceptions are by no means to be despised. Thus in a prayer used by the Khonds of Orissa we find ‡ the following words: 'We are ignorant of what it is good to ask for. You know what is good for us. Give it us!' Mr. Tylor adds: 'Such are types of prayer in the lower levels of culture!'

But the universal tendency of even the most degraded tribes to practices which clearly show their belief in preternatural agencies is too notorious to admit of serious discussion, while the wide-spread, and probably all but universal, practice of some kind of funereal rites speaks plainly of as wide a notion that the dead

* 'Primitive Culture,' vol. i. p. 378.

† Ibid. vol. i. p. 378.

‡ Ibid. vol. ii. p. 335.

in some sense yet live. As to the power possessed by even the lowest races of apprehending strictly religious conceptions, the annals of the Christian Propaganda prove it abundantly. The Australians, however, are generally believed to be the most hopeless subjects of missionary effort, and yet Western Australia* demonstrates the utter groundlessness of this persuasion. We may conclude, then, that no existing race is generally devoid of conceptions regarding the preternatural, or entirely unconcerned about future existence, whether their own or that of their friends or enemies.

It remains, then, to inquire whether any existing races may be fairly considered as in a transitional state from a non-religious condition, like that of beasts? or whether the religious conceptions of any race are so different *in kind* from our own as to render it impossible for them to be the degraded remnants of former religious belief of a higher character? As to the first of these questions, it may be observed that the difference between a nature capable of religious conceptions and one not so capable is a difference of *kind*, and therefore 'transitions' are just as possible or as impossible here, as in the previous matters of morality and speech. This is a question the decision of which, again, rests with philosophy. Nevertheless it may be here observed that obviously no combinations of merely sensible perceptions could give rise to the conception of beings of a preternatural nature and with preternatural powers. It is a question not of a vague fear, but of conceptions of beings with superhuman attributes. As to the second question—that concerning the nature of religious conceptions in the most distinct races—it may be safely affirmed, on our author's own authority, that the differences are often much more superficial and the agreements much more profound than is very often, if not generally, supposed. The extreme want of flexibility of so many minds is the cause of this difficulty of perceiving how often the same essential idea underlies different external modes of representation. The personifications of stars, rivers, clouds, &c., are, when viewed under a certain aspect, to some tribes not only the natural expression of their religious conceptions, but probably even the nearest approach to truth now possible to them apart from revelation. As to their conceptions Mr. Tylor remarks: † 'They rest upon a broad philosophy of nature, early and crude indeed, but thoughtful, consistent, and quite really and seriously meant.' As to the *crudity*

* See 'Mémoires historiques sur l'Australie,' par Mgr. Rudesino Salvado, 1854.

† 'Primitive Culture,' vol. i. p. 258.

of these modes of expressing a belief in the general action of superhuman causation, it may be remarked that after all the error was trifling compared with that of modern Materialists—*i.e.*, the modern crude conception that because the phenomena of nature are not produced by a human personality, they are produced by *none*! Mr. Tylor himself says,* as to the real resemblance between apparently very different religious developments, ‘Baime, the creator, whose voice the rude Australians hear in the rolling thunder, will sit enthroned by the side of *Olympian Zeus himself*.’

We have heard much as to the notion entertained by some barbarians† that a distinction of ranks extends into the next world, and that the future state depends upon the social condition of the departed. But similar notions may exist amongst civilised people, as was evidenced by the often-quoted French lady of the *ancien régime*, who exclaimed, on learning the death of a profligate noble, ‘God will think twice before he damns a man of the Marquis’s quality.’ Indeed it may be said that a belief in the continuance after death of the conditions of this life is at the present time spreading widely amongst thousands who accept the teachings of Spiritualism as a new gospel. But how often may not the highest signification lie hidden and latent under a term which is apparently but sensuous in its meaning? The loftiest terms in use amongst us even now, whether in Science, Religion, or Philosophy, are, when ultimately analysed, but sensuous symbols, such being the necessary materials of our whole language; but this by no means prevents our attaching to such subjects very different *ideas*. Who, when speaking of the spirit of Shakespeare, thinks of the pulmonary exhalation which that term primitively denoted. Mr. Tylor objects‡ to the expression ‘an offering made by fire of a sweet savour before the Lord,’ as being barbarous; but what words could have been used to express spiritual acceptability which would *not* have had a primarily sensuous meaning? Yet granted that many races have no higher conceptions as to the preternatural than belief in demons, dread of witchcraft, and belief in ghosts, is that any reason why such races should not be descended from remote ancestors with a much higher creed? Such, indeed, does appear to be the belief of Sir John Lubbock, who says:§ ‘Religion appeals so strongly to the hopes and fears of men, it takes so deep a hold on most minds, in its higher forms it is so great a

* ‘Primitive Culture,’ vol. i. p. 248.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 78.

‡ *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 350.

§ ‘The Origin of Civilisation,’ p. 331.

consolation

consolation in times of sorrow and sickness, that I can hardly think any nation would ever abandon it altogether.' Again, in reply to the Duke of Argyll, who had objected existing phenomena, Sir John observes: * 'If the Duke means to say that men who are highly civilised, habitually or frequently lose and scornfully disavow religion, I can only say that I should adopt such an opinion with difficulty and regret.' The latter of these passages takes away any weight which might attach to the former, for it is difficult to believe that the passage last quoted can have been seriously meant by its author when we reflect that he must be acquainted with the views of Buchner, Vogt, and Strauss. It is one of the calamities of our time and country that unbelievers, instead of, as in France, honestly avowing their sentiments, disguise them by studious reticence—as Mr. Darwin disguised at first his views as to the bestiality of man, and as the late Mr. Mill silently allowed himself to be represented to the public as a believer in God. When we consider how energetically Atheism manifested itself recently in Paris, its passionate development in Spain with the vigorous atheistic declarations of its late Colonial Minister, when anyone at all acquainted with the Continent must know that it counts its enthusiastic disciples by tens of thousands, it is surely nothing less than solemn trifling † to speak of 'difficulty' in recognising patent facts.

We have, then, but to look about us to see how very easily such a corruption as that supposed might have taken place, even in nations as highly developed as our own. We have but to imagine the emigration of a few such families, and the extinction of religion in their progeny would be inevitable; and in order that a belief in ghosts and in evil spirits might coexist with such religious ignorance, we need but suppose some spiritualists to be amongst the emigrants in question.

But a difficulty is put forward as to the rite of sacrifice. This practice is represented as having originated in the gross notion of actually feeding the gods with flesh, or at least in the spirit of such flesh serving as food to the spiritual beings to whom it was offered, and not in the modern notion of sacrifice. Mr. Tylor

* 'The Origin of Civilisation,' p. 348.

† At p. 256 Sir John also says:—'If we consider the various aspects of Christianity as understood by different nations, we can hardly fail to perceive that the dignity, and therefore the truth, of their religious beliefs, is in direct relation to the knowledge of science and of the great physical laws by which our universe is governed.' Were this true, Vogt, Buchner, Darwin, and Strauss would exemplify the *highest* religious belief. But, in truth, what can be more preposterous than to assert or imply that physical science has to do with the *government* of the universe?

says :

says: * 'The mere fact of sacrifice to deities, from the lowest to the highest levels of culture, consisting of the extent of nine-tenths or more of gifts of food for sacred banquets, tells forcibly against the originality of the abnegation theory.' But we ask, Why so? If food in the earliest period was *the* thing to sacrifice which constituted the greatest self-denial easily practised, then, on natural grounds only, we might conclude that such a practice would arise, and that the habit, being once formed, continued and became widely diffused. But elsewhere, indeed, he concedes a great deal, and admits † that 'we do not find it easy to analyse the impression which a gift makes on our own feelings, and to separate the actual value of the object from the sense of gratification in the giver's good-will or respect, and thus we may well scruple to define closely how uncultured men work out this very same distinction in their dealings with their deities.' This is excellent, and how distinctly a real and unmistakably expressed ethical conception really accompanies such practices in some tribes he himself shows us in another passage. In a Zulu prayer given by him, ‡ we find: 'If you ask food of me which *you have given me*, is it not *proper* that *I should give it to you?*' As he truly says: § 'The Phœnicians sacrificed the dearest children to propitiate the angry gods,' &c. But, in fact, early sacrifice contained, at the least, implicitly, potentially, vaguely, and in germ, all that which later became actually developed and distinctly expressed. It is not possible for Mr. Tylor, or for anyone else, to prove that it did *not* do so, and that it inevitably *must have done* so we may securely judge from the *outcome* which has since resulted.

We may fairly, then, conclude that there is no evidence of the existence of any race devoid of religious conceptions altogether, or possessing such conceptions so fundamentally different from those existing to-day, that it is impossible to regard them as instances of degradation. The *possibility* of such states is a question for philosophy, but their *actual* non-existence may be taken as established from the failure of all efforts to prove them, and from the admissions herein quoted. Before leaving the subject, we may cite an amusing parody of certain recent attempts to explain almost all early history and legend by myths of dawn and sunrise. Mr. Tylor says, || with respect to the 'Song of Sixpence:' — 'Obviously, the four-and-twenty blackbirds are the four-and-

* 'Primitive Culture,' vol. ii. p. 360.

† Ibid. vol. ii. p. 357.

§ Ibid. vol. ii. p. 361.

‡ Ibid. vol. ii. p. 333.

|| Ibid. vol. i. p. 287.

twenty hours, and the pie that holds them is the underlying earth covered with the overarching sky: how true a touch of nature it is, that when the pie is opened, that is, when day breaks, the birds begin to sing. The king is the sun, and his counting out his money is pouring out the sunshine, the golden shower of Danae. The queen is the moon, and her transparent honey the moonlight. The maid is the rosy-fingered dawn, who rises before the sun, her master, and hangs out the clouds, his clothes, across the sky. The particular blackbird who so tragically ends the tale by snipping off her nose, is the hour of sunrise.' Mr. Tylor similarly explains the life and death of Julius Cæsar.

IV. We may now proceed to our fourth inquiry, that concerning 'Progress,' or the question whether, on the whole, progress has prevailed among savage races, or whether they have not in the main degenerated? As to this matter, both our authors are strongly of opinion that no extensive or predominant retrogression has taken place. Nevertheless, certain facts stated by them, and certain opinions expressed, seem to indicate at least the possibility of a more extensive process of degeneration than they are inclined to allow. Social progress is an exceedingly complex phenomenon, the result of many factors; and even existing instances of partial retrogression, as in Spain, are palpable enough, while no one will probably contest the inferiority, in many respects, of the Greece of our day to that which listened to the voice of Aristotle or Plato.

Mr. Tylor contrasts very favourably with the late Mr. Buckle in his appreciation of this complexity, and in his perception of the importance of moral as well as of intellectual improvement, and of the absurdity of those who make sure that every revolutionary change must be an improvement. He says:—

'Even granting that intellectual, moral, and political life may, on a broad view, be seen to progress together, it is obvious that they are far from advancing with equal steps. It may be taken as a man's rule of duty in the world, that he shall strive to know as well as he can find out, and do as well as he knows how. But the parting asunder of these two great principles, that separation of intelligence from virtue which accounts for so much of the wrongdoing of mankind, is continually seen to happen in the great movements of civilisation. As one conspicuous instance of what all history stands to prove, if we study the early ages of Christianity, we may see men with minds pervaded by the new religion of duty, holiness, and love, yet at the same time actually falling away in intellectual life, thus at once vigorously grasping one-half of civilisation, and contemptuously casting off the other.'—*Primitive Culture*, vol. i. p. 25.

This aspect of the question has an important bearing upon our
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mode of regarding the earliest families of man. It is plain that a high moral standard might have existed with a most rudimentary state of art and the scantiest appliances of material civilisation. After speaking of Mr. Alfred Wallace and of Lieut. Bruijn Kops, Mr. Tylor says: 'Ethnographers who seek in modern savages types of the remotely ancient human race at large, are bound by such examples to consider the rude life of primæval man under favourable conditions to have been, in its measure, a good and happy life.'

It is difficult for us, surrounded by the abundant aids afforded by international communication, to realise the different effects which would probably result from an absence of such assistance and stimulus. This is perceived by Mr. Tylor, who remarks: * 'In striking a balance between the effects of forward and backward movements in civilisation, it must be borne in mind how powerfully the diffusion of culture acts in preserving the results of progress from the attacks of degeneration.' Therefore, at an early period, when there was little diffusion and no intercommunication between groups which had become isolated, degeneration might very easily have taken place, and these isolated groups may have become the parents of tribes now widely spread. Indeed, our author adds,—

'Degeneration probably operates even more actively in the lower than in the higher culture. Barbarous nations and savage hordes, with their less knowledge and scantier appliances, would seem peculiarly exposed to degrading influences.'

After giving an instance from West Africa, he continues:—

'In South-East Africa, also, a comparatively high barbaric culture, which we especially associate with the old descriptions of the kingdom of Monomotapa, seems to have fallen away, and the remarkable ruins of buildings of hewn stone fitted without mortar indicate a former civilisation above that of the native population.'

But actual degradation is a fact which is directly attested, and which the ruins of Central America demonstrate. Our author quotes Father Charlevoix to the effect that the Iroquois, having had their villages burnt,

'have not taken the trouble to restore them to their old condition. . . . The degradation of the Cheyenne Indians is matter of history, and "Lord Milton and Dr. Cheadle came upon an outlying fragment of the Shushway race, without horses or dogs, sheltering themselves under rude temporary slants of bark or matting, falling year by year into lower misery."'—*Primitive Culture*, vol. i. pp. 41, 42.

* 'Primitive Culture,' vol. i. p. 39.

Thus we may be *certain* that some savages have been degraded from a higher level, and this establishes an *à priori* probability that all have been so. Such degradation would not, however, be inconsistent with the existence of a considerable amount of progress in some places side by side with a wider degradation. The New Zealanders show evidence of a possible degradation through changed conditions, as they doubtless at one time inhabited a more favoured clime. They show* this by their use of the well-known Polynesian word 'niu' (cocoa-nut) for different kinds of divination, thus keeping 'up a trace of the time when their ancestors in the tropical islands had them and divined by them.'

How soon the use even of stone implements may be forgotten is proved by Erman in Kamskatka,† who got there a fluted prism of obsidian; 'but though one would have thought that the comparatively recent use of stone instruments in the country would have been still fresh in the memory of the people, the natives who dug it up had no idea what it was.' Again: 'The Fuegians ‡ have for centuries used a higher method' of making fire than have the Patagonians. This looks very much like the *survival* of a higher culture as to this practice in the midst of a widespread degeneracy. Such an explanation is strengthened by the following remark § about the Fuegians: 'This art of striking fire instead of laboriously producing it with the drill, is not, indeed, the only thing in which the culture of this race stands above that of their northern neighbours,' their canoes also being of superior quality. Mr. Tylor thinks that the South Australians may have learnt their art of making polished instruments of green jade from 'some Malay or Polynesian source,' instead of its having survived the wreck of a higher culture, as the fire-making art of the Fuegians has probably so done. But this is a mere possibility, and experience shows us how often such arts are *not* learnt even when we know for certain that the opportunity of learning them has been offered. Thus our author himself remarks,|| that the North Americans never learnt the art of metal work, &c. from the Europeans of the tenth century. That the belief in a persistence of social conditions after death, before referred to, may be a degradation, is shown by the spread of modern 'spiritualism,' which has widely propagated that belief amongst people whose ancestral creed taught a very different doctrine.

A curious proof of degradation of one or another kind is exemplified by the ceremonial purifications practised by the

* 'Primitive Culture,' vol. i. p. 73.

† 'Researches into the Early History of Mankind,' p. 207.

‡ Ibid. pp. 245-6.

§ Ibid. p. 259.

|| Ibid. p. 205.

Kafirs. Respecting these Mr. Tylor remarks : * 'It is to be noticed that these ceremonial practices have come to mean something distinct from mere cleanliness. Kafirs who will purify themselves from ceremonial uncleanness by washing, are not in the habit of washing themselves or their vessels for ordinary purposes, and the dogs and the cockroaches divide between them the duty of cleaning out the milk-baskets.' Therefore here one of two things must be conceded. We have either a case of degradation and degeneration from earlier cleanliness, or else there must have been an original spiritual meaning in certain primitive washings pointing to a higher religious condition than that at present existing amongst those who practise the ceremonies in question. Again, the legend of the World Tortoise † may be but a degradation, and have meant, as Mr. Tylor suggests, to express the hemispherical Heavens overarching the flat expanded plain of Earth.

Sir John Lubbock presents to us data which, in fact, also speak of degradation in a more northern part of Africa, namely, amongst the Christians of Abyssinia. He quotes ‡ Bruce as saying that there is 'no such thing as marriage in Abyssinia, unless that which is contracted by mutual consent, without other form, subsisting only till dissolved by dissent of one or other, and to be renewed or repeated as often as it is agreeable to both parties, who, when they please, live together again as man and wife, after having been divorced, had children by others, or whether they have been married, or had children with others or not. I remember to have once been at Koscam in presence of the Itege (the Queen), when, in the circle, there was a woman of great quality, and seven men who had all been her husbands, none of whom was the happy spouse at that time.' § Sir John significantly couples with this quotation another to the effect that, for all this, 'there is no country in the world where there are so many churches.' || Now when Christianity was first accepted by these Christians their practice must have been very different, and, therefore, we have here an unquestionable case of Christian degeneracy parallel to, and carried further than, the analogous degeneracy of Portugal and its transatlantic offspring Brazil. It is curious, also, that in these cases, more or less religious *isolation* has been the prelude to degeneracy.

There is, then, much reason to think that degeneracy may have been both great in degree and wide-spread in its effects,

* 'Primitive Culture,' vol. ii. p. 303.

† 'Researches into the Early History of Mankind,' p. 333.

‡ 'The Origin of Civilisation,' p. 57.

§ Bruce's 'Travels,' vol. iv. p. 487.

|| Ibid. vol. v. p. 1.

so as to account by degradation for the existing state of all the various tribes of savages which discovery has made known to us. But the maintenance of this position is by no means necessary to justify the religious belief of even the most orthodox Christians. Orthodoxy does not by any means necessarily conflict with such views as those put forward by Messrs. Tylor and Lubbock. All traces now, or to be hereafter, discovered of ancient man, may indicate *ascent* and progress, and all existing savages may be *ascending* from still lower levels, and yet the first man may, notwithstanding, have been all that theology asserts that he was. Nay more, his progeny may none the less have preserved for a considerable period a high degree of direct, simple, moral elevation in an age of stone, and yet have been the ancestors of races who fell below the level of any savages now existing on the earth. In theology Adam stands in a category of his own. According to it he was actually all that it became him as man to be, having the full and perfect use of reason in the first moment of his existence. But it is impossible to argue from Adam even to his immediate descendants, as the difference between their states is a difference not of degree but of kind. According to the strictest theology, part even of Adam's knowledge was acquired, not infused, and, therefore, took time and depended upon the occurrence of opportunities. His descendants were naturally in a state of mere ignorance, to be removed only by education either by way of what is technically called *disciplina* or else by *inventio*. Now as regards their degenerate descendants, the *Homines sylvatici*, these were, by the hypothesis, in a position which deprived them of the first of these influences, and circumstances might well have rendered their power of *inventio* inoperative and practically futile. Thus some might have remained stationary, or have continued to retrograde till discovered by civilised man, while others more favourably circumstanced might have again spontaneously advanced by their own *inventio* and been found by discoverers in a positively ascending and improving condition. Nothing, therefore, which ethnology or archaeology can demonstrate can conflict with Christian doctrine, since the question as to the mental condition of Adam is one utterly beyond the reach of any physical science, while any facts which science can prove concerning *Homo sylvaticus* will be welcomed by theologians as tending to throw light upon the condition of his descendants, as to which question there is complete freedom of opinion.

It is physical science, not theology, which inclines us to assign a greater scope to degeneration than that assigned to it by the authors we are reviewing. As has been said, instances
of

of degeneration are before our eyes to-day in Europe. Even the periodical literature of our own country is continually giving vent to opinions which have but to spread predominantly to render our degradation certain.

One of the greatest achievements of the last two thousand years has been the successful promulgation of the doctrine that *purity of intention*, and not success, is that which is really deserving of esteem. Yet the essentially cruel heartlessness of Paganism is having its intellectual justification prepared for it in the midst of our beneficent, humanitarian activities. To show this the more clearly we may quote the words of one who, in so many ways, contrasts favourably with other members of that school of thought which he has not as yet explicitly repudiated. The exigencies of his present philosophical position have betrayed even Mr. Herbert Spencer into speaking* of the 'Worthy' and the 'Unworthy' as synonymous with the 'well-' and the 'ill-to-do,' and he does not guard himself from being understood to call the poor and the unsuccessful, as such, by the opprobrious epithet 'good-for-nothings.' † Another triumph of the same Christian period has been the establishment of at least a pure theory of the sexual relations and the protection of the weaker sex against the selfishness of male concupiscence. Now, however, marriage is the constant subject of attack, and unrestrained licentiousness *theoretically* justified. Mr. George Darwin proposes ‡ that divorce should be made consequent on insanity, and coolly remarks that, should the patient recover, he would suffer in no other respect than does *anyone* that is forced by ill-health to *retire from any career he has begun* [!]; 'although, of course, the necessary isolation of the parent from the children *would be a peculiarly bitter blow.*' Elsewhere § he speaks in an approving strain of the most oppressive laws, and of the encouragement of vice in order to check population. There is no hideous sexual criminality of Pagan days that might not be defended on the principles advocated by the school to which this writer belongs. This repulsive phenomenon affords a fresh demonstration of what France of the Regency and Pagan Rome long ago demonstrated; namely, how easily the most profound moral corruption can co-exist with the most varied appliances of a complex civilisation. The peasants of the Tyrol, on the other hand, serve equally well to demonstrate how pure and lofty a morality and how really refined a mental civilisation may co-exist with very great simplicity in the adjuncts and

* 'Contemporary Review,' August 1873, p. 343.

† Ibid. p. 339.

‡ Ibid. p. 418, 'On Beneficial Restrictions to Liberty of Marriage.'

§ Ibid. pp. 424-5.

instruments of social life. We have but to develop this idea somewhat further to see a family of the Stone age, clothed in a few skins, ignorant of the sciences, and innocent of all but the rudest art, yet possessed of a moral integrity but very exceptionally present amidst the population of the greatest cities of modern days. Mr. Tylor tells* us that the wild Veddahs of Ceylon, though extremely barbarous as to their dwellings, clothing, and use of the fire-drill, 'are most truthful and honest,' and 'their monogamy and conjugal fidelity contrast strongly with the opposite habits of the more civilised Singhalese.' Sir John Lubbock has collected the following particulars as to the social state of the Esquimaux, a people so peculiarly interesting to us in this inquiry because by some deemed to be the last survivors of an ancient miocene race:—

' Captain Parry gives us the following pictures of an Esquimaux hut. "In the few opportunities we had of putting their hospitality to the test we had every reason to be pleased with them. Both as to food and accommodation, the best they had were always at our service; and their attention, both in kind and degree, was everything that hospitality and even good breeding could dictate. The kindly offices of drying and mending our clothes, cooking our provisions, and thawing snow for our drink, were performed by the women with an obliging cheerfulness which we shall not easily forget, and which demanded its due share of our admiration and esteem. While thus their guest I have passed an evening not only with comfort, but with extreme gratification; for with the women working and singing, their husbands quietly mending their lines, the children playing before the door and the pot boiling over the blaze of a cheerful lamp, one might well forget for the time that an Esquimaux hut was the scene of this domestic comfort and tranquillity; and I can safely affirm, with Cartwright, that, while thus lodged beneath their roof, I know no people whom I would more confidently trust, as respects either my person or my property, than the Esquimaux." Dr. Rae,† who had ample means of judging, tells us that the Eastern Esquimaux are sober, steady, and faithful, . . . provident of their own property and careful of that of others when under their charge. . . . Socially they are lively, cheerful, and chatty people, fond of associating with each other and with strangers, with whom they soon become on friendly terms, if kindly treated. . . . In their domestic relations they are exemplary. The man is an obedient son, a good husband, and a kind father. . . . The children when young are docile. . . . The girls have their dolls, in making dresses and shoes for which they amuse and employ themselves. The boys have miniature bows, arrows, and spears. . . . When grown up they are dutiful to their parents. . . . Orphan children are readily adopted and well cared for until they are able to provide

* 'Primitive Culture,' vol. i. p. 45.

† 'Trans. Eth. Soc. 1866,' p. 138.

for themselves. He concludes by saying: "The more I saw of the Esquimaux the higher was the opinion I formed of them."—*The Origin of Civilisation*, p. 343.

V. The quotations just given bring us directly to the explicit consideration of our fifth inquiry, the answer to which has been already so much anticipated—that, namely, respecting the existence of a community of nature amongst all the most diverse races of mankind. Here again we must carefully bear in mind the inaccuracy and the tendency to exaggeration so common with travellers, as well as their liability to be intentionally deceived. Thus Mr. Oldfield showed to some New Hollanders a drawing of one of their own people, which they asserted to be intended to represent not a man but a ship or a kangaroo, or other very different object. As to this story Sir John Lubbock shrewdly remarks* : 'It is not, however, quite clear to me that they were not poking fun at Mr. Oldfield.' A similar explanation is probably available in some other cases also. The absence of certain arts or customs in a given area at a given early period, by no means necessarily implies that they had not previously existed. The necessity of this caution is shown by the following remark † of Sir John Lubbock concerning the pictorial art : 'It is somewhat remarkable that while even in the Stone period we find very fair drawings of animals, yet in the latest part of the Stone age, and throughout that of Bronze, they are almost entirely wanting, and the ornamentation is confined to various combinations of straight and curved lines and geometrical patterns.' In the two preceding pages the same author relates to us different curious modes of salutation ; but all such curious customs prove the essential similarity and rationality of man, and form no approximation to a brutal condition, in which 'salutation' is unknown. Sir John Lubbock gives ‡ the following as an instance of remarkable superstition : 'The natives near Sydney made it an invariable rule never to whistle when beneath a particular cliff, because on one occasion a rock fell from it and crushed some natives who were whistling underneath it.' It is not clear, however, that this was not rather a case of prudence, which many Europeans would be inclined to imitate. Sir John Lubbock also quotes with approval from Mr. Sproat the opinion that the difference between the savage and the cultivated mind is merely between the more or less aroused condition of the one and the same mind. The quotation is made § in reference to the Ahts of North-Western America : 'The native mind, to an educated man, seems generally

* 'Prehistoric Times,' p. 428.

† Ibid. p. 188.

‡ 'The Origin of Civilisation,' p. 25.

§ Ibid. p. 5.

to be asleep; and, if you suddenly ask a novel question, you have to repeat it while the mind of the savage is awakening, and to speak with emphasis until he has quite got your meaning.'

The low arithmetical power possessed by many tribes has been much spoken of; but, in fact, what is really remarkable is, that this power, however low, really exists in all. If any tribe could be found without the conception 'number' at all, and therefore unable to count two, that would indeed show the existence of an essential diversity; but no one has attempted to assert that such a tribe has been discovered. Those who have examined the remains of our own ancestors of the Bronze period—their elaborate ornaments, their ceremonial weapons—can hardly have avoided arriving at the conclusion that the difference between them and the Englishmen of to-day can have been but trifling in the extreme. An absurdly exaggerated idea of the special importance of our own social condition and of the value of the merely material appliances of civilisation can alone induce an opposite conclusion. It is an analogous superficiality which also tends to break down the barrier between man and brute by what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls 'inverted anthropomorphism;' and with respect to which some good remarks* are made by Mr. Tylor, who tells us:—

'Uncivilised man deliberately assigns to apes an amount of human quality which to modern naturalists is simply ridiculous. Everyone has heard the story of the negroes declaring that apes can speak, but judiciously hold their tongues lest they should be made to work; but it is not generally known that this is found as serious matter of belief in several distant regions—West Africa, Madagascar, South America, &c.—where monkeys or apes are found. . . . On the other hand, popular opinion has under-estimated the man as much as it has over-estimated the monkey. We know how sailors and emigrants can look on savages as senseless, ape-like brutes, and how some writers on anthropology have contrived to make out of the moderate intellectual difference between an Englishman and a negro something equivalent to the immense interval between a negro and a gorilla. Thus we can have no difficulty in understanding how savages may seem more apes to the eyes of men who hunt them like wild beasts in the forests, who can only hear in their language a sort of irrational gurgling and barking; and who fail totally to appreciate the real culture which better acquaintance always shows among the rudest tribes of man.'

Again, he adds †:—

'The sense of an absolute psychical distinction between man and beast, so prevalent in the civilised world, is hardly to be found among the lower races.'

* 'Primitive Culture,' pp. 342-3.

† Op. cit. vol. i. p. 423.

Thus.

Thus the view, so popular to-day, as to the community of nature between man and brutes, is really a reversion towards savage thought. As to man, considered without reference to lower animals, Mr. Tylor declares himself very decidedly in favour of the substantial community of nature existing in the most divergent human races. He pronounces * as follows: 'The state of things amongst the lower tribes which presents itself to the student, is a *substantial similarity* in knowledge, arts and customs, running through the whole world. Not that the whole culture of all tribes is alike—far from it; but if any art or custom belonging to a low tribe is selected at random, it is twenty to one that something substantially like it may be found in at least one place thousands of miles off, though it very frequently happens that there are large portions of the earth's surface lying between, where it has not been observed. Indeed there are few things in cookery, clothing, arms, vessels, boots, ornaments, found in one place, that cannot be matched more or less nearly somewhere else.' Respecting the alleged ignorance of fire in some races, he observes: † 'It is likely that the American explorers may have misinterpreted the surprise of the natives at seeing cigars smoked, and fire produced from flint and steel, as well as the eating of raw fish and the absence of signs of cooking in the dwellings.' Wilkes, in the 'Narrative of the United States' Exploring Expedition' (1838-42), has given 'ignorance of fire' as an interpretation of such observed phenomena, and yet, as Mr. Tylor remarks, 'curiously enough, within the very work particulars are given which show that *fire* was in reality a *familiar thing in the island!*' It is probable that the same error has occurred in other instances.

Our author even thinks ‡ that the Fijians have themselves *invented* an eating fork, and he reminds us § how our practices of stopping teeth with gold and dressing fish *en papillote* have been anticipated by the ancient Egyptians on the one hand, and by the Australians (by means of bark) on the other.

But it would be difficult to cite stronger testimony than that given by Mr. Tylor to the community of nature in different races under the most diverse physical conditions, judging from unity of products, gesture, language, customs, &c., although 'we might reasonably expect that men of like minds, when placed under widely different circumstances of country, climate, vegetable and animal life, and so forth, should develop very various phenomena of civilisation.' ||

* 'Researches into the Early History of Mankind,' p. 169. † Op. cit. p. 231.

‡ Op. cit. p. 175.

§ Op. cit. p. 173.

|| Op. cit. p. 362.

Although

Although Mr. Tylor ventures * 'to judge in a rough way of an early condition of man, which from our [his] point of view is to be regarded as a primitive condition, whatever yet earlier state may in reality have lain behind it,' he fully admits that, as far as research carries us, the same human characteristics come again and again before us on every hand. He concludes with the following emphatic tribute to the essential unity of man in all ages, all climes, and all conditions:†—

'The historian and the ethnographer must be called upon to show the hereditary standing of each opinion and practice, and their inquiry must go back as far as antiquity or savagery can show a vestige, for there seems no human thought so primitive as to have lost its bearing on our own thought, nor so ancient as to have broken its connection with our own life.'

With these declarations we may well rest contented, and conclude—from the absence of opposing evidence, as well as from such admissions on the part of a witness whose bias is in an opposite direction—that one common fundamental human nature is present in all the tribes and races of men (however contrasted in external appearance) which are scattered over the whole surface of the habitable globe.

VI. We are now in a position to draw our conclusions from the foregoing data, and state the results which the teachings of Mr. Tylor and Sir John Lubbock seem to force upon us. The works referred to and quoted have been, as we said, selected for review because their authors are not only most justly esteemed for their information and capability, not only because they are representative men in ethnology and archæology, but also because their bias is *favourable* to the monistic view of evolution, and their evidences, and admissions made by them which tell against that view, can be more safely relied on. We have considered facts brought forward by one or other of them, and judgments expressed on those facts with regard to speech, morality, religion, progress, and community of nature in the most diverse tribes of mankind, with a view to discovering (1) whether any evidence can be adduced of man's existence in a brutal or irrational condition; (2) whether the evidence points in the direction of such a condition in the past; and (3) whether any men now exist less remote from beasts than from the highest individuals of mankind? We have found, as regards *Language*, not only an essential agreement amongst all men, but that even the merely dumb prove by their gestures that they are possessed of the really important part of the faculty (the *verbum mentale*), though acci-

* 'Primitive Culture,' vol. i. p. 19.

† Op. cit. vol. i. p. 409.
dentally

dentally deprived of the power of giving it verbal expression (the *verbum oris*). As to *Morals*, we have found that not only are all races possessed of moral perception, but even that their fundamental moral principles are not in contradiction with our own.

Concerning *Religion*, we have seen that religious conceptions appear to exist universally amongst all races of mankind, though often curiously aborted or distorted, and often tending to extreme degradation after periods during which a higher level had been maintained. Respecting *Community of Nature*, we have been able to quote from Mr. Tylor assertions of the most unequivocal character. Finally, as to *Progress*, we have found cause to believe that '*Retrogression*' may have been much greater and more extensive than our authors are disposed to admit; but that however that may be, and even if their views on this subject are correct, as to existing races, such views, if established, would not constitute one iota of proof that the Christian doctrines as to man, his origin and nature, are erroneous.

From the absence of any positive proof as to a brutal condition of mankind, and from the absence of even any transitional stage, a presumption, at the least, arises that no such transition ever took place. This absence, also (there being at the same time so much positive evidence of essential community of nature amongst all men), clearly throws the *onus probandi* on those who assert the fact of such transition in the past. At the least they must betake themselves to philosophy, which is alone able to decide as to the abstract possibility or impossibility of such a process, and show by it that the asserted transition is not only possible but also probable; and both demonstrations, we are confident, are beyond their power.

It seems, then, that in the sciences we are considering, namely, ethnology and archæology, the most recent researches of the most trustworthy investigators show that the expectations of the supporters of the dualistic hypothesis are fulfilled, while those of the favourers of the monistic view are disappointed.

The final result therefore is that ethnology and archæology, though incapable of deciding as to the possibility of applying the monistic view of evolution to man, yet, as far as they go, *oppose* that application. Thus the study of man past and present, by the last-mentioned sciences, when used as a test of the adequacy of the THEORY OF EVOLUTION, tends to show (though the ultimate decision, of course, rests with philosophy) that it is inadequate, and that another factor must be introduced of which it declines to take any account—the action, namely, of a DIVINE MIND as the direct and immediate originator and cause of the existence of its created image, the mind of man.

Such

Such being the result of the inquiry we have undertaken, the assertors of man's dignity are clearly under no slight obligations to Sir John Lubbock and Mr. Tylor for their patient, candid, and laborious toil. But if such is the case with regard to these writers, how much greater must be the obligation due to that author who has so profoundly influenced them, and whose suggestive writings have produced so great an effect on nineteenth-century Biology.

A deep debt of gratitude will indeed be one day due to Mr. Darwin—one difficult to over-estimate. This sentiment, however, will be mainly due to him for the indirect result of his labours. It will be due to him for his having, in fact, become the occasion of the *reductio ad absurdum* of that system which he set out to maintain—namely, the origin of man by natural selection, and the sufficiency of mechanical causes to account for the harmony, variety, beauty, and sweetness of that teeming world of life, of which man is the actual and, we believe, ordained observer, historian, and master.

But the study of savage life has taught us much.

Our poor obscurely thinking, roughly speaking, childishly acting, impulsive cousin of the wilds, the *Homo sylvaticus*, is not a useless tenant of his woods and plains, his rocks and rivers. His humble testimony is of the highest value in supporting the claims of his most civilised brothers to a higher than a merely brutal origin.

The religion of Abraham and Chrysostom, the intellect of Aristotle and Newton, the art of Raphael, of Shakespeare, of Mozart, have their claims to be no mere bestial developments, supported by that testimony. Through it these faculties are plainly seen to be different *in kind* from complex entanglements of merely animal instincts, and sensible impressions. The claims of man as we know him at his noblest, to be of a fundamentally different nature from the beasts which perish, become reinforced and reinvigorated in our eyes, when we find the very same moral, intellectual, and artistic nature (though disguised, obscured, and often profoundly misunderstood) present even in the rude, uncultured soul of the lowest of our race, the poor savage—*Homo sylvaticus*.

ART. III.—*The Book of Carloverock*. 2 vols., large quarto. Edinburgh, 1873 (not published).

COLLECTIONS of family papers have of late years much increased in both size and numbers. Even where no one of the name has risen to historical importance there are chests full