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A
DISSERTATION
UPON
PARTIES;

IN SEVERAL LETTERS TO
CALEB D'ANVERS, Esq;

Dedicated to the RIGHT HONOURABLE
Sir ROBERT WALPOLE.

Multa Me debortantur à vobis, Quirites, n̄ Studium Reipublicæ omnia superet; Opes Factionis, vestra Patientia, Jus nullum, ac maximè, quod Innocentiæ plùs Periculi, quàm Honoris est. Nam illa quidem piget dicere, his Annis XV. quàm Ludibrio fueritis Superbiæ paucorum; quàm fœdè, quàmque inulti perierint vestri Defensores; uti vobis Animus ab Ignaviâ atque Socordiâ corruptus sit; qui ne nunc quidem, obnoxiiis Inimicis, exsurgitis, atque etiam nunc timetis Eos, quibus vos decet Terrori esse. Sed quanquam hæc talia sunt; tamen obviam ire Factionis Potentiæ, Animus subigit. Certè Ego Libertatem, quæ mihi à Parente meo tradita est, experiar; verum id frustrâ, an ob Rem faciam, in vestrâ Manu situm est, Quirites. Neque Ego vos hortor, quod sæpe Majores vestri fecere, uti contrâ Injurias armati eatis. Nihil Vi, nihil Seceffione opus est. Necessè est, suomet ipsi more præcipites eant. Sallust. Bell. Jugurth. in. Memmii Orat.

The FIFTH EDITION, carefully revised and corrected.


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DISPERATION

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To the RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR ROBERT *WALPOLE*,

KNIGHT of the most noble Order of the GARTER, Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of the EXCHEQUER, first Commissioner of the TREASURY, and one of his MAJESTY'S most honourable PRIVY-COUNCIL, &c.

S I R,



AS soon as the Demand of the Publick made it necessary to collect the following Papers together, and to prepare a second Edition of them, I took the Resolution of addressing them to *You*. The *Style* of my Dedication will be very different from That, which is commonly employ'd to Persons in your Station. But if you find nothing agreeable in the *Style*, You may find perhaps something useful, something that will deserve Your serious Reflection, in the *Matter* of it. I shall compare You neither to *Burleigh*, nor *Godolphin*. Let me not prophane the Tombs of the Dead, to raise Altars to the Living. I shall make You no Compliments on the Wisdom of your *Administration*, nor on the Wonders You have perform'd, to the Honour and Advantage of this Kingdom, in

the Course of *fourteen*, or *fifteen Years*, either at home, or abroad. I shall leave these copious Themes to others, and shall confine Myself to Reasons of another Kind, that induced me to *this Dedication*. If these Reasons prove sufficient to convince the Publick of the extreme Propriety of it, I have all that I propose to Myself.—Give me Leave to present to You, in one short View, the general Design of these little Essays.

They are design'd then to expose the Artifice, and to point out the Series of Misfortunes, by which We were divided formerly into *Parties*, whose Contentments brought even the fundamental Principles of *our Constitution* into Question, and whose Excesses brought *Liberty* to the very Brink of Ruin.

They are design'd to give true Ideas of *this Constitution*, and to revive in the Minds of Men the true Spirit of it.

They are design'd to assert and vindicate the Justice and Honour of the *Revolution*; of the *Principles* establish'd, of the *Means* employ'd, and of the *Ends* obtain'd by it.

They are design'd to explode our *former Distinctions*, and to unite Men of all Denominations in the Support of *these Principles*, in the Defence of *these Means*, and in the Pursuit of *these Ends*.

They are design'd to shew how far *these Ends* were answer'd at the *Revolution*, or have been answer'd since; and by Consequence how much, or how little is wanting, to render that glorious Work complete, according to the original Plan, and agreeably
to

Dedication.

V

to the Engagements taken, at that Time, with the Nation.

Let me now appeal to You, *Sir* — Are *These* Designs, which any Man, who is born a *Briton*, in any Circumstances, in any Situation, ought to be ashamed, or afraid to avow? You cannot think it. You will not say it. That never can be the Case, until We cease to think like *Freemen*, as well as to be *free*. Are *These* Designs in Favour of the *Pretender*? I appeal to the whole World; and I scorn, with a just Indignation, to give any other Answer to so shameless, and so senseless an Objection. No; they are Designs in Favour of the *Constitution*; Designs to secure, to fortify, to perpetuate that excellent System of Government. I court no other Cause; I claim no other Merit.

Stet Fortuna Domûs, et Avi numerentur Avorum.

Let the *illustrious and royal House*, that hath been call'd to the Government of these Kingdoms, govern them till Time shall be no more. But let the Spirit, as well as the Letter of the *Constitution*, They are intrusted to preserve, be, as it ought to be, and as We promise ourselves it will be, the sole Rule of their Government, and the sole Support of their Power; and whatever happens in the various Course of human Contingencies, whatever be the Fate of particular Persons, of Houses, or Families, let the *Liberties of Great Britain* be immortal.

They will be so, if *that Constitution*, whose genuine Effects they are, be maintain'd in Purity and Vigour. A perpetual Attention to this great Point is therefore the Interest and Duty of every
Man

Man in *Britain*; and there is scarce any Man, who may not contribute to the Advancement of it, in some Degree. The old may inform the young, and the young may animate the old. Even They, who are most retired from the Scene of Business, may be useful, in this Cause, to Those, who are in it; to Those, who are heated by the Action, distracted by the Cares, or dissipated by the Pleasures of the World. I say, they may be useful; and I add, that they ought to be so to the utmost, that their Situation allows. *Government* is the Business of Those, who are appointed to govern, and of Those, who are appointed to controul Them. But the *British Constitution* is the Business of every *Briton*. It is so more particularly, indeed, of Persons raised, like *You*, to the highest Posts in the Government. *You* lye under particular Obligations of this Kind, besides the general Engagements of Interest and Duty, that are common to All; and a Neglect in *Others* would be a Breach of Trust in *You*. We say that *our Kings can do no Wrong*. The Maxim is wisely establish'd, and ought to be follow'd, no Doubt, as far as the Conduct of *Princes* renders the Observance of it practicable. But from the Establishment of *this Maxim* results the Necessity of *another*, without which the Exercise of the *executive Power* would remain under no Controul. Though *our Kings can do no Wrong*, and though They cannot be call'd to Account by any Form our *Constitution* prescribes, their *Ministers* may. They are answerable for the *Administration of the Government*; each for his *particular Part*, and the *prime*, or *sole Minister*, when there happens to be one, for the *whole*. He is so the more, and the more justly, if He hath affected to render Himself so, by usurping on his

his *Fellows*; by wriggling, intriguing, whispering, and bargaining Himself into this dangerous Post, to which he was not call'd by the *general Suffrage*, nor perhaps by the deliberate Choice of his *Master* himself. It follows then that *Ministers* are answerable for every Thing done to the Prejudice of the *Constitution*, in the same Proportion as the Preservation of the *Constitution* in its Purity and Vigour, or the perverting and weakening it, are of greater Consequence to the Nation than any other Instances of *good*, or *bad* Government.

Believe me, *Sir*, a Reverence for the *Constitution*, and a conscientious Regard to the Preservation of it, are in the political, like *Charity* in the religious System, a Cloke to *hide a Multitude of Sins*; and as the Performance of *all other religious Duties* will not avail in the Sight of God, without *Charity*, so neither will the Discharge of *all other ministerial Duties* avail in the Sight of Men, without a faithful Discharge of *this principal Duty*. Should a *Minister* govern, in various Instances of *domestick* and *foreign Management*, ignorantly, weakly, or even wickedly; and yet pay this Reverence, and bear this Regard to the *Constitution*, He would deserve certainly much better Quarter, and would meet with it too from every Man of Sense and Honour, than a *Minister*, who should conduct the Administration with great Ability and Success, and should at the same Time procure and abet, or even connive at such indirect Violations of the Rules of the *Constitution* as tend to the Destruction of it, or even at such Evasions as tend to render it useless. A *Minister*, who had the ill Qualities of *both These*, and the good Ones of *neither*; who made his *Administration* hateful
in

in some Respects, and despicable in others; who sought that Security by ruining the *Constitution*, which he had forfeited by dishonouring the *Government*; who encouraged the profligate, and seduced the unwary, to concur with Him in this Design, by affecting to explode all *publick Spirit*, and to ridicule every Form of our *Constitution*; *such a Minister* would be look'd upon most justly as the Shame and Scourge of his Country; sooner or later He would fall without Pity; and it is hard to say what Punishment would be proportionable to his Crimes.— To conclude this Head therefore; since the Obligation of Interest and Duty on every Man, especially on every *Minister*, and more especially still on a *prime*, or *sole Minister*, to reverence the *Constitution*, to conform his Conduct to it, and neither to invade, nor suffer it to be invaded by Others, are so undeniable, and so strong; and since the Means, which the *Minister's* Power gives Him to preserve it in Purity and Vigour, or to corrupt and weaken it, are so many; nothing could be more proper than a Dedication to One, in your exalted Station, of *Papers*, that are written to explain this Interest, and to enforce this Duty, and to press them on the Understanding and Conscience of every Man in *Britain*; but of *Him* most, who is most concern'd.

After the general Reasons, that have been given, and suggested, for addressing this Dedication to *You*, give me Leave to descend into some, that are a little more particular, and that regard the *Man*, as well as the *Minister*.

If the *Principles of the Revolution*, and the *Means* employ'd in it, have not been vindicated by
Me,

Me, with as great Force of Reason and Eloquence, as they were by *You*, in a famous Oration You made at *Sackeverel's* Tryal, they have been vindicated however to the best of my Power. The *Cause* is the same, though the *Performances* are not equal; and since the *Cause* is the same, the *Cause* will recommend *my Writings* to your good Opinion, how little soever You may like the *Advocate*. But I have something more to urge in my own Favour. You had a *Sermon* to condemn, and a *Parson to roast*, (for That, I think, was the decent Language of the Time) and, to carry on the Allegory, You *roasted him at so fierce a Fire, that You burnt yourselves*. Your Arguments being confined to the Propositions *this Preacher* had advanced, You may seem rather to have justify'd *Resistance*, or the *Means* employ'd to bring about the *Revolution*, than the *Revolution*; for though the *Principles of the Revolution* were, and must for ever remain true, and though the *Means* were just, and will for ever be so, in Cases of the like Nature; yet *true Principles*, and *just Means*, require to be farther sanctify'd by their *Ends*. The Man, who should affect the greatest Zeal for the *Principles* then establish'd, and the *Means* then used, would deserve, I think, to be rank'd among the *false Brethren*, and would prove himself a treacherous, and a mercenary Friend to the *Revolution*, if He shew'd any Indifference about the *Ends* obtain'd, or endeavour'd in any Manner to defeat Those, that were intended to be obtain'd by it. The People, who run so great a Risque, and bring about so great an Event, in order to restore their *Constitution*, and to secure their *Liberties* against Dangers of every Kind, and especially against Those, which recent Experience hath taught Them to apprehend,

X *Dedication.*

have surely a good Right to the whole Benefit of *such a Revolution*; and They cannot be deprived of any Part of this Benefit, or left expos'd to any Shadow of the same Dangers, by any Rule of Justice, or good Policy.

Such Considerations as These made Me think that, to assert and vindicate fully the *Honour and Justice of the Revolution*, it was necessary that the *Ends of the Revolution* should be insisted upon in *my Arguments*, whether they were so or not in *yours*; and that the Importance of the *Subject*, as well as the Difference of the *Occasions*, (for the whole lay open before Me) would be a sufficient Reason for supplying in the *Copy* what was wanting in the *Original*. I have endeavour'd therefore to shew how much our *Constitution* hath been improved, how far our *Liberties* have been better secured by the *Revolution*, and how little is wanting to compleat that glorious Design, and to render the *British Constitution* the most perfect System of a free Government, that was ever establish'd in the World. If *all the Ends of the Revolution* are already obtain'd, it is not only *impertinent* to argue for obtaining any of them, but *factious Designs* might be imputed, and the Name of *Incendiary* be apply'd with some Colour, perhaps, to any One, who should persist in pressing this Point. On the other Hand, if *any of these Ends* have not been fully obtain'd, the Reproach of *Faction* and the Title of *Incendiary* will belong to every Person, who raises a Contest by his Opposition to these Instances, and who endeavours to make the *Friends of the Constitution* pass for *Enemies to the Government*. Thus it is easy to join Issue; and when Issue is once join'd, it cannot be difficult to decide.

It

Dedication. xi

If a principal End of the Revolution was to secure the Nation for the future against all the Dangers, to which *Liberty*, as well as *Religion*, had been exposed before the *Revolution*; if one of these Dangers arose from the *Corruption*, that had been employ'd to create a *Dependency of the two Houses of Parliament on the Crown*; if this *Corruption* might have succeeded very probably then, had the *Means* been sufficient to support it; if no Provision was made, at the *Revolution*, to secure the *Independency of the two Houses*, and the *Freedom of Elections*, against *Corruption*; if no Provision hath been made against this Danger, since the *Revolution*, proportionable to that Increase of the possible *Means of Corruption*, which hath happen'd since the *Revolution*, by the Increase of the *Revenue of the Crown*, of *Debts*, of *Taxes*, of *Officers*, and *Powers* to raise these *Taxes*; if all This be so, (and the whole Merits of the Cause may be safely rested there) how can it be pretended that *all the Ends of the Revolution* have been already obtain'd? They have not most certainly. When, and in what Manner, they shall be obtain'd, it would be Presumption in any *private Persons* so much as to insinuate. They may represent such Things as They judge to be of use to the Publick, and may support their Representations by all the Reasons, that have determined their Opinions. Thus far their Province extends. All beyond This belongs to their *Superiors*; and, in the Case before us, to the Wisdom of the Nation assembled in *Parliament*. This however I would add; that as a Consistency of Character seems to exact from You a Zeal for obtaining *all the Ends of the Revolution*, suitable to That, which you have express'd for the *Principles* it establish'd, and the *Means* it employ'd,

So the particular Obligations *You* lye under to promote the Honour and Interest of *his present Majesty*, and of his *royal Family*, seem to exact the same; for, after all, the *Revolution* is the Foundation of the *present Settlement*; whatever strengthens the *Foundation*, strengthens the *Superstructure*; and there can be no Need of going about to prove that to obtain *all the Ends of the Revolution* is to strengthen *that Foundation*. The Arguments, that prevail'd formerly with many against the *Principles* and *Means of the Revolution*, are quite exploded; the Prejudices against them are quite worn out. We may therefore persuade, without flattering ourselves, that the Foundation of our *present Settlement*, and of all our future national Happiness, is laid immoveable in these *two Respects*. Shall it not be so, and does it not become *You*, in a particular Manner, to endeavour that it should be so, in *every Respect*? Could *You* forgive yourself, if you neglected the first Opportunity of concurring to remove the least Pretence from the disaffected, nay from the well-affected, to say that the *Ends of particular Men*, of *Parties*, and of *Families*, have been answer'd by the *Revolution*, even beyond their several Expectations; but that the *national Expectations* have not been so fully answer'd, nor the *Ends of the Revolution* intirely obtain'd? No Man knows better than *You* the Truth and Force of what hath been here advanced. No Man therefore is able to make a juster Application of it to the most important Interests of *your Country*, to the true Interest of *your royal Master*, and to *your private Interest* too; if That will add, as I presume it will, some Weight to the Scale; and if That requires, as I presume it does, a Regard to *Futurity*, as well as to the *present Moment*. Upon the whole

Dedication. xiii

whole Matter therefore, I cannot but expect that You should receive favourably an *Address*, made so properly, and in which, if I have press'd You a little warmly, yet I have done it with the Decency, that every *Gentleman* owes to *Another*, at least to *Himself*. You will allow Me, and every Friend of the *Revolution* and of *Liberty*, Leave to hope that the Time is coming, when You will not oppose, or shall not have it in your Power to oppose, the Endeavours of Those, who promote the intire Completion of *all the Ends* proposed by the *first*, and the full Security of the *last*. Whenever This happens; whenever the *Independency of the two Houses of Parliament*, and the *uninfluenced and uninfluenceable Freedom of Elections*, are once effectually secured against the Dangers, that may arise possibly hereafter from the Growth of *Corruption*; then will all our *future Kings* be reduced to the agreeable Necessity of establishing their Thrones, as We are obliged to acknowledge that the Throne is *now* establish'd, not on the narrow and sandy Foundations of *Court-Craft*, and *unconstitutional Expedients*, but on the *Popularity of the Prince*, and the *universal Affection of the Subjects*; Foundations of the *kingly Authority* so evidently supposed by our *Constitution*, that a *King*, who will add Weight to his Scepter, must govern by them, or govern against *this Constitution*, against the very *Rule of his Government*.

I am now come to the last Reason, drawn from the Subject of *these Writings*, that I shall trouble You with, for dedicating them to You. The Attempt to extinguish the Animosities, and even the Names of *those Parties*, that distracted the Nation so long, so fatally at first, and so foolishly at last, in-
titles

titles this Volume to *your kind Reception of it*, at least, as properly as the Attempt to expose the Dangers, that may possibly arise hereafter, from *Corruption*, to the *Independency of Parliament*, and to the *Freedom of Elections*. Whilst a real Difference of *Principles* and *Designs* supported the *Distinction*, We were divided into *national Parties*; and This was Misfortune enough. It was lamented as a great one, at the Time, by every good Man of every Party. But if the *Distinction* should remain, when the *Difference* subsists no longer, the Misfortune would be still greater; because They, who maintain'd the *Distinction*, in this Case, would cease to be a *Party*, and would become a *Faction*. *National Interests* would be no longer concern'd; at least, on *one Side*. They would be sometimes sacrificed, and always made subordinate to *personal Interests*; and That, I think, is the true Characteristick of *Faction*. This Attempt therefore ought to have *your Approbation*. To dedicate it to *You* may be construed to suppose that it will have *your Approbation*; and He, who supposes that it will, makes *You* no indifferent Compliment.

When the *Court* fomented our *national Divisions*, the very worst Designs were carry'd on; for to *divide* can never be an Expedient for good Purposes, any more than to *corrupt*; since the Peace and Prosperity of a Nation will always depend on *uniting*, as far as possible, the Heads, Hearts and Hands of the whole People, and on improving, not debauching their Morals. *Divide et impera*, is a Maxim often quoted. How are We to apply it? There is no Place for it, in *arbitrary Governments*; for in *Them*, the Interest of the *Governors* requires that a *servile Union*, if it may be call'd an *Union*, should
be

be maintain'd by the Weight of *Power*, like That of Slaves in a *Galley*, who are united by their *Chains*, and who tug the Oar together, at the Sound of a *Whistle*. In *free Governments*, it can have Place as little, whilst They, who are at the Head, intend the Maintenance of *Liberty*. To what Case then can it be apply'd? There is but one, and That is the Case of *Those*, who aspire at more Power than a *free Constitution of Government* gives Them. *Such Governors* must divide and incense *Parties* one against another, that They may be always able to bribe the Passions of *one Side*, and so usurp on *both*. But the *Prince*, who pursues this Method, risques the Power He hath for a Power He does not want. He would be the more inexcuseable, under *such a Constitution as ours*; because, if He could not gain Esteem by his *great*, He might gain Affection by his *good Qualities*; and *this Principle* would carry Him, even better perhaps than the *other*, to the Power He would obtain. What can a *Prince* desire more than to be placed at the Head of an *united People*; among whom He may have as many *Friends* as He pleases, and can have no *Enemies*, unless He creates them, by supposing Them to be *such*, and by treating them accordingly? If the Designs of a *Prince*, in fomenting the *Divisions*, are to invade the *Liberties of his People*, his Designs are laid in the utmost Iniquity; and if *These* are not his Designs, they must be laid in the utmost Folly. When a *People* submits quietly to *Government*, and is willing to obey on the *Terms*, on which alone *their Prince* hath a Right to command, how extravagant must his Demands be, and how unaccountable his Conduct, to *divide such a People*? Shall He expect, for Instance, that *all his People* should think like *Him* and *his Council*, about every

every Occurrence, about every Measure He takes, and every Man He employs; and since This is too much to ask of *Freemen*, nay of *Slaves*, if his Expectation be not answer'd, shall He form a *lasting Divison* upon such *transient Motives*? Shall He proscribe every Man, as an *Enemy to his Government*, who dislikes the *Administration* of it? *Proscriptions* are abominable, and inhuman, when they are back'd by a Fulness of *arbitrary Power*. But to hang up the *Tables of Proscription*, without the Power of sending *Centurions* to cut off every Head, that wears a Face disliked at Court, would be Madness in a *Prince*. Such a Conduct cannot suit his *Interest*, however it may his *Passions*, in any Circumstance whatever. There are indeed Circumstances, wherein it may suit the Interest of a *Minister*. Till the Sword of *civil War* be drawn, a *Prince* can scarce become irreconcilable with his *People*, and be reduced, for Want of *national Strength*, to support his Power and Dignity by the Force of *Faction*. But a *Minister* may fall easily, and soon, into this desperate State; and after fomenting, as long as He could, the *Divisions of Parties*, He may have no Refuge but in *Faction*. There may be such a Conduct, as no *national Party* will bear, or at least will justify. But *Faction* hath no Regard to *national Interests*. *Faction* therefore will bear any Thing, share in any Thing, justify any Thing. If the *Minister*, who takes this Method to support Himself, hath any Art, He will endeavour to disguise his *Faction* under the Name and Appearance of a *national Party*. But even this Disguise will soon fall off. The best of Those, who were engaged in the *Party*, will quit the *Faction*, and then the *latter* must stand confess'd to publick View. But it is not only the *criminal Conduct of a Minister*, and the
Fear

Fear of resting his Administration on the *national Judgment*, that may oblige Him to govern by *Division*, and by *Faction*. As the most opposite Notions are often united in the Head, so are the most contrary Sentiments in the Heart of Man. *Incapacity* often begets *Sufficiency*; and yet a *Consciousness of Incapacity* often begets a *Jealousy of Power*, grounded on a Sense of the *superior Merit of other Men*. The *Minister*, who grows less by his *Elevation*, like a *little Statue* placed on a mighty *Pedestal*, will always have *this Jealousy* strong about Him. He must of Course select a *Faction* to Himself; and *this Faction* must be composed, to answer his Purposes, of Men *servilely obsequious*, or *extremely inferior to him by their Talents*. Whenever This happens, the Reign of *Venality*, of *Prostitution*, of *Ignorance*, of *Futility*, and of *Dulness* commences. The *Minister* will dread to see the *Persons* employ'd, whom He *secretly esteems*, for this very Reason, because He *esteems Them*. *Abilities to serve the Commonwealth* will be an Objection sufficient to outweigh the strongest Proofs of *Attachment to the Person of the Prince*, and of *Zeal for his Government*; nay, even the Merit of a *whole Life spent in giving these Proofs*. In short, the very Reasons, that should determine the *Prince* to employ Men, will determine the *Minister* to proscribe Them. *Dislike*, or *Contempt of Him*, will pass with his *Master* for *Disaffection to the Government*; and, under this pompous Name of *Government*, will nothing but the *poultry Interest*, or *Humour*, of the *Minister* be couch'd. The *Minister* will reap, perhaps, (for even That may be doubtful) the immediate Benefit of *dividing*, or maintaining the *Divisions of the Nation*, and of nurling up *Faction*, by continuing longer in Power, his sole Security,

and by deferring, if not escaping, the *evil Day*, the *Day of Account and Retribution*. But the *Prince* will reap, in this Case, the permanent Mischief of establishing *Division and Faction*; and may possibly make the lamentable Exchange of his *own Popularity*, for his *Minister's Impunity*. I need not finish up this Picture of Imagination, since I write to *You*, who know so much better than I pretend to do the *Characters of Men*, and the *Arts of Government*. It is sufficient that I have hinted at the general Causes and Effects of the Endeavours, that are sometimes used, and to which *Great Britain* hath not been a Stranger, to foment *national Divisions*, and to govern by the *Faction of a Minister*, arm'd with the Power of the *Prince*, against the Sense and Spirit of a *Nation*, and the Interest of the *Prince* himself. This may serve, and it is all I shall say, to bespeak Your Approbation of the Papers that follow, on Account of the *Matter* they contain.

But, *Sir*, the Reasons I have given, how pertinent soever they may be, are not the only Reasons I had for addressing Myself, in this Manner, and upon this Occasion, to *You*. There are Reasons of another Kind; Reasons, that come still more home to *Yourself*; Reasons, that appear very important to Me, and that will appear so to *You*, perhaps, when You have reflected duely on them, and have weigh'd impartially the Consequences of them. I shall press these Reasons with all the Plainness and Force, that Decency permits, in so publick and personal an Application; because, though *Truth* may sometimes offend, I am very indifferent to Offences taken with *Truth* on my Side. If You hearken to *Truth*, which Men in your Station seldom

Dedication. XIX

dom hear, You may be the better for it. If You do not, the *Author of this Dedication* cannot be the worse; for I will add, upon this Occasion, that whoever He is, He is one You cannot impose upon, in your *private Capacity*, neither as a Man, nor as a Gentleman; and that You can as little do it, in your *publick Capacity*. You cannot disappoint Him; because the Temper of his Mind gives You no Hold on Him. He hath neither *Avarice* to make Him desire *Riches*, nor *Ambition* to make Him desire *Power*, nor *Vanity* to make Him desire *Honours*. You cannot oppress Him; because He is free from *Guilt*, and from every *probable* (for no Man is free from every *possible*.) *Imputation of Guilt*. The *Laws of his Country* are his Protection; and they are sufficient to protect every *Briton*, who reverences and obeys them, in how *peculiar a Situation* soever He may be found. They, who act against *these Laws*, and They alone, may have Reason to fear, let their *Situation be never so high*, or their *present Power never so great*.

Having said This, I proceed to observe to You, that You are in the right most certainly to retort by *Yourself*, or *Others*, in the best and smartest Manner that *You*, or *They* can, whatever the Writings publish'd in the *Craftsman* may contain, which You judge to be injurious to *Yourself*, or reflecting on *your Administration*. The Publick will judge uprightly upon the whole Matter. The Laughters will be for Those, who have most *Wit*, and the serious Part of Mankind for Those, who have most *Reason* on their Side. Again. As to Affairs of Peace, or War, publick Occurrences, domestick Management, foreign Negotiations, in short, the News of the Day, and the current Business of the

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Time,

Time, *weekly and daily Papers*, or *more elaborate, anniversary Treatises*, are properly employ'd by You to explain, in your own Favour, the Series of your Conduct; to refute *Caleb*; or, which is still more easy, and by some thought as useful, to keep up the Cavil on *one Point*, till a *new one* is started, that draws off the Attention of the World. All This may be call'd *fair War*; and whoever prevails in the Judgment of the Publick, the Publick will reap Information from the Contest, and will have Reason to be pleas'd with *these Appeals*, which present an Image of the Custom, that obtain'd in the antient Commonwealths of *Greece and Rome*, where the greatest Interests of the State were debated, and the greatest Men in those Governments were accused and defended, in *publick Harangues*, and before the *whole People*.

But the Writings of the *Craftsman* have not been confin'd, to these Subjects, that are *personal*, or *temporary*. The Cause of the *British Constitution* hath been pleaded through the whole Course of *these Papers*; every Danger to it hath been pointed out; every Security, or Improvement of it, hath been explain'd and press'd.—Now here, *Sir*, begins my Complaint. I said that the Cause of our *Constitution* hath been *pleaded* in the *Craftsman*; and I am sorry that the Expression is so precisely just, that no other would come up to the Case. The Cause of the *Constitution* hath been *pleaded*; for the *Constitution* hath been *attack'd*; openly, insolently *attack'd*, and is so every Day by Those, against whom the *Craftsman* so often employs his Pen. Who could have expected (for I will give an Instance or two) who could have expected, at this Time, and under the *present Establishment*,

Establishment, to hear the Necessity of maintaining *standing Armies*, in Times of *Peace*, even against the *People of Britain*, who maintain Them, contended for and asserted?—Who could have expected to hear a *Dependency*, a *corrupt Dependency of the Parliament on the Crown*, contended for and asserted to be a necessary Expedient to supply a *Want of Power*, which is falsely supposed, in the *Crown*; as if our Fathers had opposed, and at length destroy'd that Chimæra, call'd *Prerogative*, formerly so dangerous to our *Liberties*, for no other Reason but to furnish Arguments for letting loose upon us *another Monster*, more dangerous to our *Liberties* by far?—Who could have expected that Attempts to revive the Doctrines of *old Whiggism*, and the Principles and Spirit of the *Revolution*, in Opposition to such manifest Contradictions of them all, would give any Umbrage, or cause any Alarm, among Men, who still affect to call Themselves *Whigs*, and pretend Zeal for a *Government*, that is founded on the *Revolution*, and could not have been establish'd without it?—This could not have been expected, I think; and yet so it is. There are *Persons*, who take to Themselves the Title of *ministerial Writers*, that have sometimes the Front to assume That of *Writers for the Government*. *These Persons*, are not content to ring, in daily Panegyrick, Encomiums on the Wisdom and Virtue, the Justice and Clemency, the Success and Triumphs of *your Administration*, and to answer, or to attempt to answer, the almost innumerable Objections, that have been made (it matters not here whether justly, or unjustly) to *your Conduct at home*, and *your Own*, and That of *your Brother abroad*; but They take Fire, They shew an Alarm, and They grow angry, whenever any Thing is written,

written, nay when a Word is dropt, in Favour of the *fundamental Articles of British Liberty*. Sometimes They argue directly, and in plain Terms, against them. Sometimes They perplex and puzzle the Cause; evade what They cannot deny; and, when They cannot impose a Fallacy, endeavour at least to hinder Men from discerning a Truth. Thus, *Sir*, They mingle *your Justification* with the *Condemnation of our Constitution*; and labour, as much as in Them lies, to make *your Preservation* and the *Destruction of this Constitution* a common Cause. If You could possibly doubt the Truth of what is here advanced, I might refer You to the *particular Pamphlets and Papers*, which are known at least by the *Answers*, that have been given to them, till such Time as an Extract of all the Passages, hinted at here, be made publick, as I hope it will; and whenever it is, I dare appeal beforehand to your private Thoughts, whether the *Principles* they contain, and the *Consequences* deducible from them, would not destroy, if they were to take Place, the whole Scheme of the *British Constitution*. It hath been ask'd, why do the *Writers on one Side* eternally harp on *Liberty*, and the *Constitution*? Do They mean to instil *Jealousy* and *Distrust*, and to alienate the *Minds of the People*? In what Instances have the *Laws* been broken, or hath the *Constitution* been invaded by Those, who govern? These Questions deserve an Answer; and I shall answer the *first*, by asking another Question. Why do the *Writers on one Side* eternally labour to explain away *Liberty*, and to distinguish Us out of our *Constitution*? If nothing had been said of *this Kind*, I am persuaded that much less would have been said of the *other*; and I can assure You, with great Truth, that the Publick had not been troubled, particularly, with *this*

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Dissertation upon Parties. As to the *other two Questions*, they may be taken together. There is a plain and real Difference between *Jealousy* and *Distrust*, that may be observed in the present Case. Men may be *jealous*, on Account of their *Liberties*, and I think They ought to be so, even when They have no immediate *Distrust* that the Persons, who govern, design to invade them. An Opportunity of invading them open'd, is Reason sufficient for awakening the *Jealousy*, and if the *Persons*, who have *this Jealousy*, apply to Those, who govern, to help to cure it, by removing the Opportunity, the *latter* may take This, if They please, as a Mark of *Confidence*, not *Distrust*; at least, it will be in their Power, and surely it will be for their Interest, to shew that They deserved *Confidence*, in this Case, not *Distrust*. But it will be always trifling, and foolish, to ask what *Laws* have been broken, what *Invasions* on the *Constitution* have been made; because as nothing of this Sort will be done, when there are no *Designs* dangerous to the *Constitution* carried on; so when there are *such Designs*, whatever is done of this Sort will be private, indirect, and so cover'd, that the greatest moral Certainty may be destitute of Proof. Whenever any of these Things are done publickly, directly, and in a Manner to be easily proved, the Danger will be over, the *Constitution* will be destroy'd, and all Fear for it and Concern about it will be impertinent, because they will come too late. If ever that old, trite Maxim, *Principiis obsta*, was well apply'd, it is so in the Case We speak of here.

The Reasons I have given for mentioning *these Writers* ought to excuse Me for it; at least to *You*; and even to *You* I shall say very little more about
Them.

Them. The Flowers They gather at *Billingsgate*, to adorn and enliven their Productions, shall be pass'd over by Me, without any Reflection. They assume the Privilege of *Watermen* and *Oyster-Women*. Let Them enjoy it in that good Company, and exclusively of all other Persons. They cause no Scandal; They give no Offence; They raise no Sentiment but Contempt in the Breasts of *Those* They *attack*; and it is to be hoped, for the Honour of *Those*, whom They would be thought to *defend*, that They raise, by this low and dirty Practice, no other Sentiment in *Them*. But there is another Part of their Proceeding, which may be attributed by malicious People to *You*, and which deserves for that Reason alone some Place in *this Dedication*, as it might be some Motive to the writing of it. When *such Authors* grow scurrilous, it would be highly unjust to impute their Scurrility to any *Prompter*; because They have in Themselves all that is necessary to constitute a *Scold*; *ill Manners*, *Impudence*, a *foul Mouth*, and a *fouler Heart*. But when They *menace*, They rise a Note higher. They cannot do This in their own Names. Men may be apt to conclude therefore that They do it in the Name, as They affect to do it on the Behalf, of the *Person*, in whose Cause They desire to be thought retain'd. Many Examples of *these Menaces* might be quoted, and most of them would be found directed against *one particular Person*. After employing the whole Impotence of their Rhetorick against Him, and venting for many Years together, almost without Notice on his Part, as much Calumny as their Imaginations could furnish, a *Pamphlet* hath been lately publish'd, the profess'd Design of which is to call for a *vigorous Proceeding in Parliament against THIS MAN*. To introduce
this

this Proposal, it is preceded by a long Series of Facts; some notoriously false; some, which it is impossible should be true; others, which it is impossible *this Writer* should know to be true, if they were so; and others again, not only destitute of Proof, but even of Probability. Such *Accusations* must be brought by some * *Creature*, of so notoriously prostituted a *Conscience*, that *his Evidence* would be rejected in any common Cause, and should not be refuted therefore by Me, if I was concern'd to refute Him. But, *Sir*, if I take Notice of *this Libel*, or refer to others of the same Kind, it is not done out of Regard to *these Authors*, whom I despise, as I am persuaded the *Person* does, against whom all the Virulence of their Malice is directed. My Concern, upon this Occasion, is for *You* alone, and *You* will allow me to represent what that Concern dictates. It is possible that *You* may have very strong Resentments against *this Person*, and He against *You*. It is possible that *You* may have shewn yours, and He may have shewn *his*, according to the different Circumstances *You* have been in, and the different Opportunities *You* have had. But This will not become a *Matter of State*, though *You* are a *Minister of State*. The Publick will espouse your *Passions* no more than *his*; nor concern itself to enquire who gave the first Occasion to *these Resentments*; who hath acted the Part of a *fair*, and who of a *treacherous Enemy*. It is, I doubt, too certain that the *Publick* hath been employ'd sometimes to revenge *private Quarrels*, and to serve the low Turns of *Envy*, or *Jealousy*. But, in all these Cases, the *Publick* hath been imposed upon; *these Motives* have been conceal'd; *others* have been pretended;

* See the Grand Accuser, &c. p. 77.

tended; and the *others* have been of a *publick Nature* alone; because the bare Suspicion of any *private Interest, or Passion*, in a *publick Prosecution* is sufficient, and most justly so, to create invincible Prejudices to it. The *Scribblers* I speak of have laid You therefore under great Disadvantages, notwithstanding your *Elevation*, and your *Power*, whether You design any Thing against the *Person* so obnoxious to You, or not. They should have conceal'd industriously, what They have affected to proclaim; since it is certain that, how great soever your *Popularity* in the Nation may be, They will never bring up Mankind to think that any Person should be prosecuted by *Methods extraordinary*, or even *ordinary*, purely for your Ease, your Pleasure, or your Safety. If They could prove, what They frequently throw out, that every Man is a *Friend to the Pretender*, who is not a *Friend to You*; and that He, who objects to your *Conduct in the Administration*, endeavours to pull down the *present Government*, and set up *another*; then, indeed, They might raise a Spirit against *this particular Person*, for aught I know; but most certainly against *many Others*, of much greater Consequence, who appear every Day, in the Face of the World, not to be your *Friends*, and who make no Scruple of objecting, with the utmost Freedom, to your *Conduct*. But such Assertions as these will only serve to make Men angry, or laugh. They, who have the best Opinion of your *Abilities*, will no more agree that the *present Establishment* is supported, than that it was made, by *You*. They will never be wanting in their Respect to the *Crown* so much, as to confound the Cause of the *King* with the Cause of his *Minister*; or to suppose that the Reins of Government would grow weaker in his Majesty's

Dedication. xxvii

Majesty's Hand, if *You* was out of Power, or out of the World.—In short, *Sir*, You may pass, and I believe You do pass justly, for a *Man of extreme good Parts*, and for a *Minister of much Experience*; but You would not desire, I think, to be represented as the *Atlas*, who supports this State; and *your Brother* will not certainly pass for the *Hercules*, who relieves You, and who sustains, in his Turn, the important Burthen.

I know very well that something is added to supply, if That were possible, this Defect, and to make the Cause more plausible. It is pretended that the Writings imputed to *this particular Person*, and several others publish'd in the *Craftsman*, contain Reflections of a very *extravagant, indecent, and even seditious Nature*; such as They alone, who are capable of supposing them, are capable of making. But then these Reflections are to be proved by the *Constructions*, which the *Accusers* make of the Expressions employ'd by *Those*, whom They accuse; *Constructions* as arbitrary, and as forced, as many of *Those*, by which some of the best Men at *Rome* were brought within the Interpretation of the *Law of Majesty*, by some of the worst. Examples of much the same Sort have been set even in *Britain*, whilst the Practice prevail'd of supposing *Innuendo's*, and *Parallels*, and *oblique Meanings*, and prosecuting and condemning Men on *Suppositions*, and *Interpretations*. But there is no Room to fear that any such Examples should be renew'd, whilst * a BRITISH SPIRIT prevails in a BRITISH PARLIAMENT. Whilst *that Spirit* prevails, no

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* See some Considerations concerning the publick Funds, &c. p. 98.

Parliament will condemn any Man upon Principles, which Parliaments have always condemn'd as unjust and tyrannical. Less than any will They condemn Those, who write in Defence of *this Constitution*, at the Request and on the Instances of Those, who attack it. A *British Spirit* and the *Spirit of the British Constitution* are one and the same; and therefore † *if ever there arises a BRITISH SPIRIT in a BRITISH PARLIAMENT*, of which I presume no Doubt ought to be made at this Time, *Vengeance* will not overtake the *former*; it may be the *latter*.

What hath been said might suffice to shew how foolish and vain it is to throw out Menaces against *Those*, who have nothing to fear, at a Time, when Zeal to preserve the *Constitution* in every Part inviolate seems daily to increase. But since I have enter'd on the Subject, and the Matter seems of some Concernment to *You*, give Me Leave to add one Consideration more, that may serve to shew how foolish and vain such a Proceeding would be, even at any other Time.—Let us suppose that the *very Person* pointed at was, and could be proved to be, the Author of *this Dissertation upon Parties*, for Instance, which I now dedicate to *You*. Let us suppose that the Resolution was taken to follow the generous and equitable Advice of the *Pamphlet-writer*, who thinks He ought to be proceeded against in a *peculiar Manner*. Let us even suppose that We lived in an Age, when Parliaments were brought, in some Degree, under *that very Dependency*, against which so much is said in *this Dissertation*. In short, let us suppose that the most innocent

Man,

† *Ib.*

Dedication. XXIX

Man, who was obnoxious to *Those in Power*, might have reasonable Grounds to fear an exorbitant Exercise of *this Power* against Him. But then let Us make one single Supposition on the *other Side*. Let Us suppose that *this obnoxious Man* was really in earnest; that He wrote from his Heart; and that He felt there the same Warmth for the *British Constitution*, which He express'd in his Writings, and labour'd to infuse into the Breast of every other Man. I would ask You, *Sir*, do You think *such a Man* would be ashamed to avow, in the Face of his Country, the Contents of the *following Sheets*, or be afraid to suffer for them? Could any Eloquence, even *yours*, if You would employ it so unworthily, expect, by the Help of false Surmises, and invidious Comments, (the base Inventions of *little Railers*) to make Him pass for an *Enemy to the present Establishment*, who had proved Himself a *Friend to that Constitution*, in Consequence of which, and for the Sake of which alone, *this Establishment* was made? Would his Endeavours to reconcile *Parties*, and to abolish *odious Distinctions*; would pleading for the Attainment of *all the Ends* proposed by, and promised at the *Revolution*; for securing the *Independency of the two Houses of Parliament*, and the *Freedom of Elections*, as effectually against *Corruption*, as they are already secured against *Prerogative*; would This, I say, make Him pass for the *greatest of Criminals*? No, *Sir*, not in the Breasts even of *Those*, who gave Sentence against Him, if Men capable of giving such a Sentence could be found. Among the rest of Mankind his Innocency would be acknowledged; his Constancy would be applauded; his *Accusers*, and his *grand Accuser* in the first Place, would pass alone for *criminal*. He might fall a Victim to *Power*;
but

XXX *Dedication.*

but *Truth* and *Reason*, and the Cause of *Liberty* would fall with Him; and He, who is buried in their Ruins, is happier than He, who survives them. Thus I am persuaded the *Person* here intended would be found, upon Trial, to think. The Event therefore of *such a Prosecution*, whatever it might be, could not turn to his Disadvantage; and consequently to threaten Him with it would be ridiculous, even at such a Time as We have supposed, much more at the present. Void of all Ambition, except the Ambition of honest Fame, He might stand the Efforts of Violence in *such a Cause*, not only with little Concern, but with much inward Complacency. Weary of the World, determined and preparing to retire totally from it, He would surely suspend his Retreat to face the Persecution; and whatever his Persecutors might imagine, They would erect a Sort of *triumphal Arch* to the Man They hated. He would leave the World with more Honour than they would remain in it. By suffering in Defence of the *Constitution of his Country*, They, who had thought favourably of Him, would think that He crown'd the *Good*, and They, who had entertain'd Prejudices against Him, that He atoned for the *Ill*, which had been imputed to Him. Such different Judgments You know, *Sir*, will attend every Man's Character, who acts on our divided Stage, and He is happy, who can reconcile them so nearly. It never happens that there is a Man, of whom *all speak well*; as it rarely, very rarely, happens that there is a Man, of whom *all speak ill*, except Those, who are hired to *speak well*.

I find it hard to leave off, when I have the Honour of writing to *You, Sir*; but having now explain'd

Dedication. XXXI

plain'd the principal Reasons, that induced Me to address this Dedication to *You*, it is Time that I should force Myself to a Conclusion, and conclude by recommending the *following Sheets* to your serious Perusal. I recommend them to nothing else. I do not apprehend that they will want your Patronage any more than the *Person*, who wrote them. Let them stand, or fall in the publick Opinion, according to their Merit. But if *You* should find any Thing in them, that deserves your Notice, *You* will have an Obligation to *One*, from whom *You* least expected any; to,

S I R,

Your most humble Servant,

THE AUTHOR OF THE DISSERTATION
UPON PARTIES.



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A

DISSERTATION
ON
PARTIES.

LETTER I.

S I R,



TO CORRUPT and to DIVIDE are the trite and wicked Expedients, by which *some Ministers* in all Ages have affected to govern; but especially such as have been least capable of exerting the true Arts of Government. There is however a Difference to be made between *these two Expedients*, to the Advantage of the *latter*, and by Consequence between the Characters of *Those*, who put them in Practice.

Every busy, ambitious Child of Fortune, who hath Himself a *corrupt Heart*, and becomes Master of a *large Purse*, hath all that is necessary to employ the Expedient of CORRUPTION with Success. A *Bribe*, in the Hand of the most *blundering Coxcomb*, that ever disgraced Honour and Wealth and Power, will prevail as much as in the Hand of a

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Man of Sense, and go farther too, if it weigh more. An *intriguing Chamber-Maid* may slip a Bank-Note into a griping Paw, as well as the most subtle Dæmon of Hell. *H*———*e* may govern as triumphantly by *this Expedient* as the *great Knight*, his Brother, and the *great Knight* as *Burleigh* himself.

But every Character cannot attempt the other Expedient of *dividing*, or *keeping up Divisions*, with equal Success. There is, indeed, no Occasion for any extraordinary Genius to *divide*; and true Wisdom despises the infamous Task. But there is need of that left-handed Wisdom, call'd *Cunning*, and of those Habits in Business, call'd *Experience*. He, that is *corrupted*, co-operates with Him, that *corrupts*. He runs into his Arms at the first Beckon; or, in order sometimes to raise the Price, He meets Him but half Way. On the other Hand, to *divide*, or to maintain and renew the *Division of Parties* in a State, a System of *Seduction* and *Fraud* is necessary to be carried on. The *Divided* are so far from being accessory to the Guilt, that They would not be *divided*, if They were not first *deceived*.

From these Differences, which I have observed between the *two Expedients*, and the Characters and Means, proper to put them in Practice with Success, it may be discover'd perhaps why, upon former Occasions, as I shall hereafter shew, the Expedient of *Dividing* prosper'd so much better than That of *Corrupting*; and why, upon some later Occasions, the Expedient of *Corrupting* succeeds so well in those Hands, which are not, and, I trust, will not be so lucky in maintaining, or renewing our *Party-Divisions*.

Much hath been written by You, Mr. *D'Anvers*, by your Correspondents and Others, who have
drawn

drawn their Pens in the Cause of *Truth, Virtue,* and *Liberty*, against the right reverend, as well as undignify'd, the noble, as well as ignoble Assertors of *Corruption*; enough surely to shame Those, who have not lost all Sense of Shame, out of so ignominious a Crime; and to make Those, who have not lost every other Sense, tremble at the Consequences of it. We may flatter ourselves that these honest Endeavours have had some Effect; and have Reason to hope that far greater will follow from those illustrious Examples of Repulses, which have been lately given to the *grand Corruptor*, notwithstanding his frequent and insolent Declarations that He could seduce whomsoever He had a Mind to gain. These Hopes are farther confirm'd to us by repeated Declarations of the Sense of Parliament, and will be turn'd, we doubt not, into Certainty, whenever the Wisdom of the two Houses shall again think it proper to raise new Barriers of Law against *this encroaching Vice*.

In the mean time, I think nothing can better answer the Design of *your Papers*, nor promote the publick Good more effectually in the present Conjunction, than to put our Countrymen frequently on their Guard against the Artifice, which is clumsily, but industriously employ'd to maintain, and, if it be possible, to create *new Divisions* amongst Them. That Day, which our Fathers wish'd to see and did not see, is now breaking upon us. Shall We suffer this Light to be turn'd again into Party-Darkness by the Incantations of *Those*, who would not have pass'd for Conjurers, even in the Days of Superstition and Ignorance? The Nation is not only brought into an Uniformity of Opinion concerning the *present Administration*, by the Length and the righteous Conduct of it; but We are grown

into an Unanimity about *Principles of Government*, which the most sanguine could scarce have expected, without Extravagance. *Certain Associations of Ideas* were made so familiar to us, about half a Century ago, and became in the Course of Time so habitual, that We should have not been able, even a few Years ago, to break them, nor have been easily induced to believe, on the Faith of any Prediction, that *Experience* and the Evidence of *Facts* would, in a few Years more, break them for us, destroy all our Notions of *Party*, and substitute *new ones* in their Room.

The Power and Majesty of the PEOPLE, an ORIGINAL CONTRACT, the Authority and Independence of PARLIAMENTS, Liberty, Resistance, Exclusion, Abdication, Deposition; These were Ideas associated, at that Time, to the Idea of a WHIG, and supposed by every Whig to be incommunicable, and inconsistent with the Idea of a TORY.

Divine, hereditary, indefeasible Right, lineal Succession, Passive-Obedience, Prerogative, Non-Resistance, Slavery, nay, and sometimes Popery too, were associated in many Minds to the Idea of a TORY, and deem'd incommunicable, and inconsistent, in the same Manner, with the Idea of a WHIG.

But now That, which *neither Side* would have believed, on the Faith of a Prediction, is come to pass;

——— *quod Divum promittere nemo
Auderet, volvenda Dies en! attulit ultro.*

These Associations are broken; *these distinct Sets of Ideas* are shuffled out of their Order; *new Combinations* force themselves upon us; and it would actually be as absurd to impute to the *Tories* the Principles, which were laid to their Charge formerly,

as it would be to ascribe to the *Professor* and *his Faction* the Name of *Whigs*, whilst they daily forfeit that Character by their Actions. The Bulk of *both Parties* are really united; united on *Principles of Liberty*, in Opposition to an obscure Remnant of *one Party*, who disown those Principles, and a mercenary Detachment from the *other*, who betray them.

How *this Change for the better* comes to have been wrought in an Age, when most Things have *changed for the worse*; and since it hath been wrought, why the *old Distinctions* are kept up in some Measure, will I think be accounted for in treating this Subject farther. At present, what shall We say to Those, who publickly speak of *this national Union* as impracticable and chimerical; yet privately act against it, with all their Might, as a practicable Thing, and a real Evil to Them? If it be as compleat and as well cemented, as I imagine it is, and as every honest *Briton* wishes it may be; nay, if there be nothing more than a strong Tendency on all Sides towards it, which no Man of the least Observation and Candour will deny; it is surely the Duty of every one, who desires the Prosperity of his Country, to seize the Opportunity, to cultivate and improve it. If Men are to be *known by their Works*, the Works of Those, who oppose *this Union*, denote Them sufficiently. Wicked and unhappy Men! who seek their *private Safety*, in opposing *publick Good*. Weak and silly Men! who vainly imagine that THEY shall pass for the NATION, and the NATION for a *Faction*; that THEY shall be judged in the Right, and the whole BODY OF THE PEOPLE in the Wrong.— On whom would They impose?— How long do They imagine that so unequal a Conquest can last?

There

There is no Complaint, which hath been more constantly in the Mouths, no Grief hath lain more heavily at the Hearts of all good Men, than Those about our *national Divisions*; about the Spirit of *Party*, which inspires Animosity and breeds Rancour; which hath so often destroy'd our inward Peace; weaken'd our national Strength, and sullied our Glory abroad. It is Time therefore that All, who desire to be esteem'd good Men, and to procure the Peace, the Strength and the Glory of their Country by the only Means, by which They can be procured effectually, should join their Efforts to heal our *national Divisions*, and to change the narrow Spirit of *Party* into a diffusive Spirit of *publick Benevolence*.

That we may be more encouraged to do so, it will be of Use perhaps to consider, in some Particulars, what Advances are already made towards that *national Union*, without which no *national Good* can be expected in such Circumstances as ours.

Let us begin with the present Temper of the Members of the *Church of England* towards the *Dissenters*. Those Laws, by which the *latter* were debar'd from serving God after their own way, have not been these many Years a Terror to Them. Those, which were design'd to hinder the Propagation of their Principles, and Those, which shut the Door of all publick Preferment, even to such amongst Them, as *conform'd occasionally*, are repeal'd. Far from desiring to impose any new Hardships upon Them, even *Those*, who have been reputed their Enemies, and who have acted as such on several Occasions, acknowledge their Error. Experience hath removed Prejudice. They see that *Indulgence* hath done what *Severity* never could; and from the Frankness of *These*, if I was a *Dissenter*,

ter, I should sooner entertain Hopes of future Favour, than from the double Dealing of *Those*, who lean on the *Dissenters*, when They are *out of Power*, and who esteem Them a Load upon Them, when They are *in it*. We are now in the true and only Road, which can possibly lead to a perfect Reconciliation among *Protestants*; to the Abolition of all their *Differences*; or to Terms of *Difference* so little essential, as to deserve none of *Distinction*. These happy Ends must be obtain'd by *mutual good Will*. They never can be obtain'd by *Force*. It is true, indeed, that *Force*, which is the Effect of a Majority and superior Power, may support a Rivalship and erect even *Counter-Establishments*. But then, by the same Means, our antient Disputes will be revived; the Church will be thought really in Danger; and religious Feuds, which have been so long and so beneficially kept down, will once more disturb the Peace of the State. It is a certain Truth, that our *religious* and *civil Contests* have mutually, and almost alternately, raised and somented each other. *Churchmen* and *Dissenters* have sometimes differ'd, and sometimes thought, or been made to think, that They differ'd, at least, as much about *civil* as *religious Matters*. There can be therefore no Way so effectual to compose their Differences on the *latter*, as to improve the growing Union between Them on the *former*. *Idem sentire de Republicâ, to think alike about political Affairs*, hath been esteem'd necessary to constitute and maintain *private Friendships*. It is obviously more essential in *publistk Friendships*. Bodies of Men in the same Society can never unite, unless they unite on *this Principle*; and if They once unite on *This Principle*, They will unite on *all others*, or They will readily and chearfully make one another easy about them.—Let me speak plainly. It becomes a Man to do so, who means honestly.—

In

In our political Divisions of *Whig* and *Tory*, the *Dissenters* have adhered to the *former*, and They want no Apology for doing so. They join'd Themselves to Those, with whom They agreed, and stood in Opposition to Those, with whom They differ'd in *Principles of Government*. There could be no Objection brought against Them, on this Account. They certainly did not follow *Power*. They did not act like a *Sect* or a *Faction*, who had, and pursued an Interest distinct from the Interest of the whole. Their *Non-Conformity* hath nothing to do here. They concur'd with *Conformists*; and if they had been *Conformists* themselves, as they were *Dissenters*, they would have acted in the same Manner. But if *this Division of Parties*, on the same Principles, subsists no longer; if there be in Truth neither a *Tory*, nor a *Whig*, as I have said above, but a *Court* and a *Country Party* in Being; if the political Principles, which the *Dissenters* have formerly avow'd, are manifestly pursued on *one Side*; and Those, which they have opposed, or others equivalent to them in their Effects, are pursued on the *other*; can the *Dissenters* hesitate about the Option they are to make? I am persuaded they cannot. I know that several amongst them do not. What might be, and certainly would be said, if they made their Option to stand by the *M——r*, I will not so much as suggest. What must be the Consequence of their standing by the *Nation*, in Opposition to *Him*, (for between *these two Powers* the present Contest lies) it is easy to tell, and impossible to deny. They will prove, in this Case, to the whole World, that the *Spirit of Liberty* animates, and *Conscience* alone determines their Conduct. They, who could never brook a *Regal*, will have the Merit of saving their Country from the Danger of a *Ministerial Tyranny*; and the

their Country will owe them all the Acknowledgments, which are due from good and grateful Citizens of the same Commonwealth.

As to the other great and national Division of *Whig* and *Tory*; He, who recollects what hath pass'd in *Parliament*, and observes what pass'es out of it, can differ very little in his Opinion from what hath been said concerning it. The principle Articles of *your civil Faith*, publish'd some time ago, (or, to speak more properly, the *civil Faith of the old Whigs*) are assented and consented to by the *Country Party*; and I say, upon good Authority, that if *this Creed* was made a Test of *political Orthodoxy*, there would appear at this Time but very few *Hereticks* amongst us. How different the Case is, on the *other Side*, will appear not only from the Actions, but from the Principles of the *Court Party*, as we find them avow'd in their Writings; Principles more dangerous to *Liberty*, though not so directly, nor so openly levell'd against it, than even any of Those, bad as they were, which *some of these Men* value Themselves for having formerly opposed.

In short, the *Revolution* is look'd upon by all Sides as a *new Æra*; but the *Settlement* then made is look'd upon by the whole *Country Party* as a *new Magna Charta*, from whence *new Interests*, *new Principles of Government*, *new Measures of Submission*, and *new Obligations* arise. From thence We must date both *King* and *People*. His Majesty derives his Title from *Acts*, made in Consequence of it. We likewise derive, not our Privileges (for they were always ours) but a more full and explicit Declaration, and a more solemn Establishment of them from the same Period. On this Foundation all the *reasonable, Independent Whigs and Tories* unite. They could unite on This alone; for the *Whigs* have always profess'd the Principles, which

paved the Way for the *Revolution*; and whatever the *Tories* may have profess'd, they acted upon the same Principles, or they acted upon none, which would be too absurd to assert, when they brought about that great Event, in Concert with the rest of the Nation, as I shall some Time or other prove.

To this *Magna Charta*, and *these Principles*, let us adhere inviolably, in Opposition to the *two Extremes* mention'd by Me at the Beginning of this Letter, viz. to *Those*, who *disown* them, and to *Those*, who *betray* them.—Let neither the polemical Skill of *Lesly*, nor the antique Erudition of *Bedford*, persuade us to put on again those old Shackles of *false Law*, *false Reason*, and *false Gospel*, which were forged before the *Revolution*, and broken to Pieces by it.—As little let us suffer the arch Slyncks of *G—on*, the dogmatical Dryness of *H—e*, or the soucing Prostitution of *Sh—k* to slip new Shackles on us, which are inconsistent with the constituent Principles of our Establishment.—Let us maintain and improve the *national Union*, so happily begun, and bless God for disposing the Temper of the Nation almost universally to it.—*Such a Coalition* hath been long wanted in this Kingdom, and never more than at this important Crisis; for on This it will depend whether *They*, who not only oppose the Progress of that *growing Corruption*, which had well nigh overspread the Land, but endeavour to extirpate it by the Roots, shall prevail; or *They*, who nourish and propagate it, who eat Themselves, and tempt othert to eat the baneful Fruit it bears.—On This it will depend whether *They* shall prevail, who constantly insist against the Continuance of a *standing Army in Time of Peace*, agreeably to the Principles of our *Constitution*; or *They*, who plead for it, and endeavour to make it a necessary Part of
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that Constitution, though incompatible with *publick Liberty*.—On This it will depend whether *They* shall prevail, who endeavour to conceal the *Frauds*, which are practis'd, and to screen the *Fraudulent*, at the Risque of ruining *Credit*, and destroying *Trade*, as well as to monopolize in the Hands of a *Few* the whole Wealth of the *Nation*; or *They*, who do their utmost to bring the *former* to Light, and the *latter* to Punishment at a Time, when *glaring Fraud*, or very strong Symptoms of *Fraud*, appear in so many Parts of publick Management, from some of the *greatest Companies* down to the *Turnpike* at *Hyde-Park* Corner.—On This it will depend whether *They* shall prevail, who desire that *Great Britain* should maintain such a Dignity and prudent Reserve in the Broils of *Europe*, as become her Situation, suit her Interest, and alone can enable Her to cast the *Ballance*; or *They*, who are eager, on every Occasion, to prostitute her *Dignity*, to pawn her *Purse*, and to sacrifice her *Commerce*, by intangling Her not only too much with the *other great Powers of Europe*, from whom She may sometimes want reciprocal Engagements, but even with *those diminutive Powers*, from whom it would be ridiculous to expect any.

I am, S I R, Yours, &c.



L E T T E R II.

S I R,

W H I L S T I was writing my last Letter to You, it came into my Thoughts that nothing would illustrate the Subject better, nor enforce more strongly the Exhortation to an *Union of Parties*, in Support of that *Constitution*, on the Terms of

which alone all Right to govern us, and all our Obligation to obey is now founded, than an Enquiry into the Rise and Progress of our *late Parties*; or a short History of *Torism* and *Whiggism* from their Cradle to their Grave; with an introductory Account of their Genealogy and Descent.

Your Papers have been from the first consecrated to the Information of the People of *Britain*; and I think they may boast very justly a Merit singular enough; That of never speaking to the Passions, without appealing to the Reason of Mankind. It is fit they should keep up this Character, in the strictest Manner, whilst they are employ'd on the most important Subject, and publish'd at the most important Crisis. I shall therefore execute my Design with Sincerity and Impartiality. I shall certainly not flatter, and I do not mean to offend. Reasonable Men and Lovers of Truth, in whatever Party they have been engaged, will not be offended at Writings, which claim no Regard but on this Account, that they are founded in Reason and Truth, and speak with Boldness what Reason and Truth conspire to dictate. As for the *Drummers and Trumpeters of Faction*, who are hired to drown the Voice of Both in one perpetual Din of Clamour, and would endeavour to drown, in the same Manner, even the dying Groans of their Country, if She was already brought into that extreme Condition; They shall not provoke Me to break a most contemptuous Silence. The Subject is too solemn. They may prophane it, by writing on it. Far be from me to become guilty of the same Crime, by answering Them.

If the Enquiry I am going to make into the Rise and Progress of our *late Parties* should produce in any Degree the Good, which I intend, it will help to confirm and improve the *national Union*, so happily

pily begun, by taking off some Remains of Shyness, Distrust and Prejudice, which may still hang about Men, who think alike, and who press on from different Quarters to the same common Point of View. It will help to unmask more effectually the wicked Conduct of Those, who labour with all the Skill and, which is much more considerable, with all the Authority They possess, to keep up the *Division of Parties*; that each of These may continue to be, in its Turn, what all of them have been too often and too long, the Instruments and the Victims of private Ambition. It will do something more. A few Reflections on the Rise and Progress of our Distemper, and the Rise and Progress of our Cure, will help us of Course to make a true Judgment on our present State, and will point out to us, better perhaps than any other Method, the specifick Remedies still necessary to preserve our Constitution in Health and Vigour.—Having premised This, I come to the Point.

Queen *Elizabeth* design'd, and the Nation call'd King *James* to the Throne, tho' the whole *Scottish Line* had been excluded by the Will of *Henry* the 8th, made indeed under the Authority of *an Act of Parliament*, and yet little regarded either by the *Parliament*, or the *People*. As soon as He was on the Throne, a flattering *Act of Recognition* pass'd; for though all Princes are flatter'd on their first Accession, yet those Princes are sure to be flatter'd most, who deserve Panegyrick least. In *this Act* the *Parliament* acknowledged, *on the Knees of their Hearts*, (such was the Cant of the Age) the *indubitable Right*, by which they declared that the Crown descended to *Him immediately*, on the Decease of *Q. Elizabeth*. Of *this Act*, and of the Use, which some Men, very weakly I think, endeavour'd to make of it, I shall have Occasion to speak hereafter. I
would

would only observe here that This is the *Æra* of *hereditary Right*, and of all those exalted Notions, concerning the *Power and Prerogative of Kings*, and the *Sacredness of their Persons*. All together They compos'd such a System of Absurdity as had never been heard of in this Country, till *that anointed Pedant* breach'd them. They have been spoken of pretty much at large in your Papers; particularly in some of Those, publish'd under the Name of *Oldcastle*. To them I refer.

To assert that the extravagant Principles of *Ecclesiastical and Civil Government*, which began to be propagat'd in *this Reign*, and were carried still higher in the *next*, gave Occasion to Those of *another Kind*, or of *another Extreme*, which were taught with Success, and gain'd by Degrees great Vogue in the Nation, would be too much. Opinions very different from Those, which received the Sanction of a *legal Establishment in Church and State*, had crept about obscurely, if not silently, even whilst the Government of *Elizabeth* lasted. But This I say; that the Principles, by which King *James* and King *Charles the 1st* govern'd, and the Excesses of *Hierarchical and Monarchical Power*, exercis'd in Consequence of them, gave great Advantage to the *opposite Opinions*, and intirely occasion'd the Miseries, which follow'd. Phrenzy provok'd Phrenzy, and two Species of Madness infected the whole Mass of the People. It hath cost us a Century to lose our Wits, and to recover them again.

If our Grievances under King *Charles the 1st* had been redress'd by a sober, regular, Parliamentary Reformation of the State; or, if the civil War happening, a new Government had been establish'd on Principles of the Constitution, not of Faction, of Liberty, not of Licentiousness, as there was on the Abdication of King *James the 2^d*; We may conclude,

clude, both from Reason and Experience, that the absurd and slavish Doctrines I have mention'd would have been exploded early. They would have been buried in the recent Grave of *Him*, who first devised them; and the Memory of *Him* and of *Them* would have stunk together in the Nostrils of Mankind. But the Contrary fell out. The State was subverted, instead of being reform'd; and all the Fury of Faction and Enthusiasm was employ'd to destroy the Constitution to the very Foundations. A natural Consequence follow'd. If the Principles of King *James's* and King *Charles's* Reigns had been disgraced by better, they would not have risen again; but they were only kept down for a Time by worse; and therefore they rose again at the *Restoration*, and revived with the Monarchy. Thus that epidemical Taint, with which King *James* infected the Minds of Men, continued upon us; and it is scarce hyperbolic to say, that *this Prince* hath been the original Cause of a Series of Misfortunes to this Nation, as deplorable as a lasting Infection of our Air, of our Water, or our Earth, would have been. The Spirit of his Reign was maintain'd in That of his *Son*, (for how could it well be otherwise, when the *same Ministers* were continued in Power?) and the Events of both produced the civil War. The civil War ended in the Death of the King, and the Exile of his Family. The Exile of these Princes reconciled Them to the Religion of *Rome*, and to the Politicks of *foreign Nations*, in such Degrees as their different Characters admitted. *Charles* sipp'd a little of the poisonous Draught, but enough however to infect his whole Conduct. As for *James*,

— Ille impiger hausit
Spumantem Patenam.

He

He drank the Chalice off to the lowest and foulest Dregs.

That *Principles* as absurd as these in their Nature, and as terrible in their Consequences, such as would shock the common Sense of a *Samojede*, or an *Hottentot*, and had just before deluged the Nation in Blood, should come into Vogue again at the *Restoration*, will not appear strange to Those, who carry themselves back as it were to that Point of Time. The Wounds of the *civil War* were bleeding, and the Resentments of the *Cavaliers*, who came into Power at Court and in Parliament, were at their Height. No Wonder then if few Men had, in such a Ferment as This, Penetration enough to discern, or Candour enough to acknowledge, or Courage enough to maintain, that the *Principles* We speak of were truly and primarily the Cause of all their Misfortunes. The Events, which proved them so, were recent; but for that very Reason, because they were recent, it was natural for Men in such a Circumstance as This, to make wrong Judgments about them. It was natural for the *Royal Party* to ascribe all their and their Country's Misfortunes, without any due Distinction to the *Principles*, on which King *Charles* and even King *James* had been opposed; and to grow more zealous for *Those*, on which the Governments of *these two Princes* had been defended, and for which they had suffer'd. Add to This the national Transport, on so great a Revolution; the Excess of Joy, which many felt, and many feign'd; the Adulation employ'd by many to acquire new Merit, and by many to atone for past Demerit; and you will find Reason to be surpris'd, not that the *same Principles of Government*, as had threaten'd our *Liberties* once, and must by necessary Consequence do so again, were establish'd; but

but that our *Liberties* were not immediately, and at once given up. That they were saved, We owe, not to *Parliament*, no not to the *Convention Parliament*, who brought the King Home; but to those great and good Men, *Clarendon* and *Southampton*. Far from taking Advantage of the Heat and Fervour of the Times, to manage Parliaments into *scandalous Jobs*, and *fatal Compliances with the Crown*, to their immortal Honour, (with Gratitude and Reverence to their Memories be it spoken) They broke the *Army*, stinted the *Revenue*, and threw their Master on the *Affections of his People*.—But I return.

Besides these Reasons, drawn from the Passions of Men, others of a more sober Kind may be given, to account for the making a Settlement at the *Restoration* upon Principles too near a-kin to Those, which had prevail'd before the War, and which had in Truth caused it. Certain it is, that although the *Non-Conformists* were stun'd by the Blow they had just received, and though their Violence was restrain'd by the Force of the present Conjuncture; yet they still existed. Symptoms of This appear'd, even whilst the Government was settling, and continued to appear long after it was settled. Now, every Symptom of this Kind renew'd the *Dread* of relapsing into those Miseries, from which the Nation had so lately recover'd itself; and *this Dread* had the natural Effect of all extreme Fears. It hurried Men into every Principle, as well as Measure, which seem'd the most opposite to those of the *Persons fear'd*, and the most likely, though at any other Risque, to defeat their Designs, and to obviate the present Danger, real or imaginary. May We not fairly conjecture, for it is but Conjecture, something more? In such a Temper of Mind, and such a Situation of Circumstances,

D. might

might not even Those, who saw how groundless and dangerous such extravagant Notions about the *Right, Power and Prerogative of Kings* were, imagine however that it was a Part of Prudence to give Way to them, and to countenance them, in the present Conjunction; to suffer the Opinions of the Nation to be bent too far on *one Side*, as they had been bent too far on the *other*; not that they might remain crooked, but that they might become strait?

The same Spirit and much the same Reasons as determined our Settlement, at the *Restoration*, upon such high Principles of *Monarchy*, prevail'd relatively to our *religious Differences*, and the Settlement of the *Church*. I shall speak of it with that Freedom, which a Man may take, who is conscious that He means nothing but the publick Good, hath no Bye-Ends, nor is under the Influence of serving any particular Cause.

I say then very frankly that the *Church* and the *King* having been join'd in all the late Contests both by Those, who attack'd them, and Those, who defended them, *Ecclesiastical Interests, Resentments, and Animosities* came in to the Aid of *Secular*, in making the *new Settlement*. Great Lenity was shewn at the Restoration, in *looking backwards*; unexampled and unimitated Mercy to particular Men, which deserved no doubt much Applause. This Conduct would have gone far towards restoring the Nation to its *primitive Temper and Integrity*, to its *old good Manners*, its *old good Humour*, and its *old good Nature*, (Expressions of my Lord Chancellor *Clarendon*, which I could never read without being moved and soften'd) if great Severity had not been exercised, immediately after, in *looking forwards*, and great Rigour used to large Bodies of Men, which certainly deserve Censure, as neither just, nor politick.——I say, not *just*; because

because there is, after all, a real and wide Difference between *Moral* and *Party Justice*. The *one* is founded in Reason; the *other* takes its Colour from the Passions of Men, and is but another Name for *Injustice*. *Moral Justice* carries Punishment as far as Reparation, and necessary Terror require; no farther. *Party Justice* carries it to the full Extent of our Power, and even to the gorging and sating of our Revenge; from whence it follows that *Injustice* and *Violence*, once begun, must become perpetual in the successive Revolutions of *Parties*, as long as *these Parties* exist.—I say, not *politick*; because it contradicted the other Measures, taken for quieting the Minds of Men. It alarm'd all the *Seets* anew; confirm'd the Implacibility, and whetted the Rancour of *Some*; disappointed and damp'd a Spirit of Reconciliation in *Others*; united Them in a common Hatred to the *Church*; and rouzed in the *Church* a Spirit of Intolerance and Persecution. This Measure was the more imprudent, because the Opportunity seem'd fair to take Advantage of the Resentments of the *Presbyterians* against the *other Sectaries*, and to draw *Them*, without persecuting the *Others*, by the Cords of Love into the Pale of the Church, instead of driving them back by severe Usage into their antient Confederacies. But when Resentments of the *Sort* We now mention were let loose, to aggravate Those of the *other Sort*, there was no Room to be surprized at the Violences, which follow'd; and They, who had acted greater, could not complain of These, great as they were, with any very good Grace.

If we may believe * *One*, who certainly was not partial against *these Seets*, both *Presbyterians*.

* Dr. Burnet, afterwards *Bishop of Salisbury*, in one of his *Tracts*.

and Independents. had carried the Principles of Rigour, in the Point of Conscience, much higher, and acted more implacably upon it, than ever the Church of England hath done, in its angriest Fits. The securing Themselves therefore against Those, who had ruin'd Them and the Constitution once already, was a plausible Reason for the Church Party to give, and I doubt not the true and sole Motive of many for exercising, and persisting in the Exercise of great Severity. General, prudential Arguments might, and there is Reason to believe they did, weigh with particular Men; but they could have little Force, at such a Time, on Numbers. As little could some other Considerations have then whatever they have now. The Promises at *Breda*, for Instance, and the Terms of the *Declaration* sent from thence, could not be urged with Force to a *Parliament*, who had no Mind, and was strictly under no Obligation, to make good such Promises as the *King* had made, beyond his Power of promising, if taken absolutely; or from which, if taken conditionally, He was discharged, on the Refusal of *Parliament* to confirm them. — Thus again, the Merit pleaded by the *Presbyterians*, on Account of the Share They had in the *Restoration*, which was very real and very considerable, could avail however but little. That they went along with the national Torrent, in restoring the Constitution of Church and State, could not be denied. But then it was remember'd too that these Fruits of Repentance came late; not till They had been opprest'd by another *Señ*, who turn'd upon Them, wrested the Power out of their Hands, and made them feel, what They had made others feel, the Tyranny of a *Party*.

Such Reasons and Motives, as I have mention'd, prevail'd; and worse than these would have

have been sufficient, when the Passions of Men ran so high, to lay the *Dissenters*, without any Distinction, under extreme Hardships. They seem'd to be the principal Object of the Fears and Jealousies of *Parliament*. Addresses were continually made, and the Edge of the Law continually whetted against Them, from 1660 to 1669, when the Law for suppressing *Conventicles*, and the last of these penal Statutes pass'd, as I remember. Experience will justify Me for saying that this long and extreme Rigour was unwise, as well as unjust. It appears, indeed, from the Memorials of those Times, that They, who suffer'd, had given abundant Provocation, though not sufficient Excuse, to the Rigour, under which They suffer'd. Some former Hardships, which the *Dissenters* had endured from the *Church*, made Them more violent against it, when They got Possession of an usurp'd Power. Just so the Violence, which They exercised at that Time, stimulated the Severity They felt in their Turn, when the legal Constitution of the *Church* was restored. Notwithstanding all which, I incline, upon very good Reasons, to think that this Severity was not in the first Design of the *Ministers*, nor would have been shewn, if another fatal Influence had not prevail'd. The Influence I mean is That of *Popery*. It prevail'd from the first Moments to the last of the Reign of King *Charles the 2d.* The best *Ministers* were frequently driven off their Byass by it. The worst had a sure Hold on their *Master*, by complying with it. On the Occasion now mention'd, this Influence and the Artifice of the *Popish Faction* work'd very fatally on the Passions of *Parties* and the private Interests of *Individuals*; and the *Ministers*, and the *Church*, and the *Dissenters*, were Bubbles alike of their common Enemy. *Barefaced Popery* could ask no
Favour,

Favour, because *Popery* could expect none. *Protestant Dissenters* were therefore to serve as stalking Horses, that *Papists* might creep behind Them, and have Hopes of being, some Time or other, admitted with Them. The *Church Party* was halloo'd on the *Dissenters*; whilst the *Dissenters* were encouraged to unite and hold out; whilst They were flatter'd with an high Opinion of their own Strength, and the King's Favour; and whilst some *leading Men* amongst Them, who thought it better to be at the Head of a *Seet*, than at the Tail of an *Establishment*, were perhaps encouraged, and confirm'd in that Thought, by the private Applications of the *Court*.

These Arts, these wicked Arts (for such they were) prevail'd; and though the 2000 *Ministers*, who went out of their Churches on one Day, were far from being all of the same Mind, or having one positive, consistent Scheme; though many of Them must have lost their Benefices, even if They had comply'd with the *Act of Uniformity*, because They were *Intruders*, and in actual Possession of Benefices legally belonging to *Others*; yet, by uniting in the Point of *Non-Conformity*, They appear'd as *one Body*, and in some Sense They were so. Several of Them were popular for certain Modes of Devotion, suited to the Humour of the Time; and several were Men eminent for true Learning and unaffected Piety. They increased the Zeal of their Flocks, and created Compassion in others. Here the *Court* began to reap the Fruits of their Management, in the Struggle for a *Tolerance*. I use the Word, though I know it may be simply cavill'd at. The first Step made was an Application to the *King*, who declared Himself ready and willing to *dispense*, in their Favour, with several Things in the *Act of Uniformity*; and thus the *Dissenters* were made, by the Severity of the *Parliament*

liament and the Intrigues of the Court, the Instruments of introducing a *dispensing Power*. Such Attempts were made more than once; but happily fail'd, as often as made, through the vigorous Opposition of *Parliament*; till at last the Scene began to open more, and the *Dissenters* to see that They were made the Tools of promoting, what they never intended, the Advancement of the *Prerogative* above *Law*, and the Toleration of *Popery* against it.

To conclude. By such Means, as I have described, the Constitution of *Parties* after the *Restoration* preserved unhappily too near a Resemblance to the Constitution of *Parties*, before the *War*. The *Prerogative* was not, indeed, carried so high, in some Instances, as *James* and *Charles the 1st* had attempted to carry it. Nay, some Supports of it were brought off, and taken away; and others more dangerous, as We have observed, were prevented by the Virtue of the *Men at that Time in Power*. But still the Government was establish'd on *Principles*, sufficient to invite a King to exercise *arbitrary Power*, and support Him by their Consequences in the Exercise of it afterwards; so that, in this Respect, the Seeds of *future Divisions* were sow'd abundantly. The *Dissenters* had, indeed, lost much of their Credit and all their Power. But still they had Numbers, and Property, and Industry, and Compassion for Them; so that here was another Crop of *Dissentions* planted to nurse up, and to strengthen the other. They did not inflame the Contest, which follow'd, into a civil War, as they had help'd to do formerly; but I think that, without them, and the Disunion and Hatred among *Protestants*, consequent upon them, the Zeal against *Popery* could not have run into a Kind of *factious Fury*, as We shall be obliged to confess it did. I think that Fears of falling once
more

more under *Presbyterian*, or *Republican Power*, could not have been wrought up in the Manner they were, towards the End of this Reign, so as to drown even the Fear of *Popery* itself; so as to form a Party, in Favour of a *Popish Successor*; so as to transport both Clergy and Laity into an Avowal of *Principles*, which must have reduced us to be at this Time *Slaves*, not *Freemen*, *Papists*, not *Protestants*, if the very Men, who had avow'd such *Principles*, had not saved themselves and us, in direct Oppolition to them.——But I am running into the Subject of another Letter, when This is grown too prolix already.

I am, S I R, Yours, &c.



L E T T E R III.

S I R,

THE Sum of what hath been said, concerning the *Settlement of Church and State*, and the *Division of Parties*, at the *Restoration*, amounts to This; that as the Attempts of King *James* and King *Charles* the 1st, against the Spirit of the Constitution, threw the Nation into a civil War, and all the miserable Consequences, both necessary, and contingent, of that Calamity; so the Fury, Enthusiasm and Madness of *those Factions*, which arose during that unnatural Ferment, frighten'd the Nation back, if not into all, yet more generally perhaps than before, into most of the *Notions*, that were establish'd to justify the Excesses of former Reigns. *Hereditary, indefeasible Right*

Right, Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance (those Corner-stones, which are an improper Foundation for any Superstructure but That of Tyranny,) were made, even by *Parliament*, the Foundation of the *Monarchy*; and all those, who declined an exact and strict Conformity to the whole Establishment of the *Church*, even to the most minute Parts of it, were deprived of the Protection, nay exposed to the Prosecution of the *State*. Thus one Part of the *Nation* stood proscribed by the other; the least, indeed, by the greatest; whereas a little before the greatest stood proscribed by the least. *Round head* and *Cavalier* were, in Effect, no more. *Whig* and *Tory* were not yet in Being. The only two apparent Parties were those of *Churchmen* and *Dissenters*; and religious Differences alone, at this Time, maintain'd the Distinction.

Such was the State of *Party*, upon the Meeting of the first *Parliament* call'd by King *Charles* the 2^d, and for some Years afterwards, as nearly as I have been able to observe by what I have read in History, and received from Tradition.— How the *Notions* then in Vogue began to change, and *this Spirit* to decline, some Time after the *Restoration*; how the Zeal of *Churchmen* and *Dissenters* against one another began to soften, and a *Court* and *Country Party* to form themselves; how *Faction* mingled itself again in the Contest, and renew'd the former Resentments and Jealousies; how *Whig* and *Tory* arose, the furious Off-spring of those inauspicious Parents *Roundhead* and *Cavalier*; how the Proceedings of one *Party* might have thrown us back into a *civil War*, *Confusion* and *Anarchy*; how the Success of the other had like to have entail'd *Tyranny* on the State, and *Peppery* in the Church; how the *Revolution* did, and could alone, deliver us from the *Grievances*

We felt, and from the *Dangers* We fear'd; how *this great Event* was brought about by a formal Departure of *each Side* from the Principles objected to Them by the *other*; how *this Renewal of our Constitution*, on the Principles of *Liberty*, by the most solemn, deliberate, national Act, that ever was made, did not only bind at least every one of those, who concur'd in any Degree to bring it about; (and that Description includes almost the whole Nation) but how absurd it is for any Man, who was born since *that Æra*, or who, being born before it, hath been bound by no particular, legal Tye to any *other Settlement*, to be willing to give up the Advantages of the *present Constitution*, any more than He would give up the Privileges of the *great Charter*, which was made and ratified so many Ages ago; all these Points are to be now touch'd in that summary Manner, which I have prescribed to Myself, and which will be sufficient, in so plain a Case, where Men are to be reminded of what they know already, rather than to be inform'd, and to be confirm'd, not to be convinced.

I proceed therefore to observe that the Nation began to be indisposed to the *Court*, soon after the *Restoration*. The Sale of *Dunkirk* help'd to ruin a *great and good Minister*, though it be still doubtful at least, notwithstanding the Clamour rais'd, and the Negotiations with *d'Estrades* so much insisted upon, whether He was strictly answerable for this Measure.——Who knows how soon the Re-establishment of the *same Port and Harbour* may be laid in Form to the Charge of *those two Men*, who are strictly and undeniably answerable for it, and who stagger already under the Weight of so many other just Imputations?

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The *first Dutch War*, which was lightly and rashly undertaken, and which ended ignominiously for the Nation, augmented the publick Indisposition. Nay Misfortunes, such as the *Plague* and the *Burning of London*, as well as *Mismanagement*, had this Effect. But We must place at the Head of all a *Jealousy of Popery*, which was well founded, and therefore gather'd Strength daily. This soon heated the Minds of Men to such a Degree, that it seems almost wonderful the *Plague* was not imputed to the *Papists*, as peremptorily as the *Fire*.

The Death of my Lord *Southampton*, and the Disgrace and Banishment of my Lord *Clarendon*, made Room for new Causes of Jealousy and Dissatisfaction; and the Effects increased in proportion. *These two noble Lords* had stood in the Breach against *Popery* and *foreign Politicks*; and what one of them said of the other, That is *Southampton* of *Clarendon*, may be apply'd with Justice to *Both*. *They were true Protestants, and honest Englishmen. Whilst They were in Place, our Laws, our Religion, and our Liberties were in Safety. When They were removed, England felt the ill Effects of the Change; for when They were removed, all These were in Danger. How glorious a Panegyrick is This, in which the unanimous Voice of Posterity does and must agree! It is preferable surely to all the Titles and Honours and Estates, which those illustrious Patriots left behind them; and so I persuade Myself it is esteem'd by the young Noblemen, who are Heirs to their Virtues, as well as their Fortunes.*

King Charles, and more than Him the *Duke* and the *Popish Faction* were now at Liberty to form new Schemes; or rather to pursue old ones, with less Reserve, against the Religion and Liberty of *England*. As soon as the famous *Cabal*

had the whole Administration of Affairs, these Designs were push'd almost without any Reserve at all.——I am not writing the History of this Reign; nor have I undertaken any thing more than to make a few Observations on the several Turns of Parties in it. I need not therefore descend into particular Proofs of the Designs, which I attribute to the *Court*; nor into a Deduction of the Measures taken to promote them, and the Efforts made to defeat them. That these Designs were real, can be doubted of by no Man; since without quoting many printed Accounts, which are in the Hands of every one, or insisting on other Proofs, which have not seen the Light, (and such there are) the Abbot *Primi's* Relation of the secret Negotiations between the *King* and his *Sister*, the *Duchess of Orleans*, publish'd in 1682, as I think, and immediately suppress'd, as well as the History of the *Jesuit d'Orleans*, written on Memorials furnish'd to Him by *King James the 2d*, put the whole Matter out of Dispute, and even beyond the Reach of Cavil. It is sufficient for my Purpose to observe that the Tide of Party, which had run so strongly for the *Court*, and had been seldom so much as slacken'd hitherto, began now to turn, and to run Year after Year more strongly the *other Way*.

When *this Parliament* fate down, (for it deserves our particular Observation that *both Houses* were full of Zeal for the *present Government*, and of Resentment against the *late Usurpations*) there was but one Party in Parliament; and no other Party could raise its Head in the Nation. This might have been the Case much longer, probably as long as *King Charles* had fate on the Throne, if the *Court* had been a little honest, or a little wiser. No Parliament ever did more to gain
their

their Prince than This. They seem'd, for several Years to have nothing so much at Heart as securing his Government, advancing his Prerogative, and filling his Coffers. The Grants they made Him were such as pass'd for Instances of Profusion in those Days; when 1,200,000^l. a Year for the CIVIL LIST, the FLEET, the GUARDS and GARRISONS, and all the ordinary Expences of the Government, was thought an exorbitant Sum; how little a Figure soever it would make in our Times, when two Thirds of that Sum, at least, are appropriated to the Use of the Civil List singly. But all This was to no Purpose; a foreign Interest prevail'd; a Cabal govern'd; and sometimes the Cabal, and sometimes a Prime-Minister had more Credit with the King, than the whole Body of his People. When the Parliament saw that They could not gain Him over to his own, and to their common Interest; nor prevail on Him, by Connivance, Compliance, and other gentle Methods; They turn'd Themselves to such as were rough, but agreeable to Law and the Custom of Parliament, as well as proportionable to the Greatness of the Exigency. That they lost their Temper, on some particular Occasions, must not be denied. They were Men, and therefore frail; but their Frailties, of this Kind, proceeded from their Love of their Country. They were transported, when They found that their Religion and Liberty were constantly in Danger from the Intrigues of a Popish Faction; and They would have been so transported, no Doubt, if Liberty alone had been attack'd by a Protestant Faction. Then it was, that this High-Church Parliament grew favourable to Protestant Dissenters, and ready to make that just Distinction, so long delay'd, between Them and Popish Recusants, that the whole Protestant In-

terest

terest might unite in the Common Cause. Then it was, that this Prerogative Parliament defied Prerogative, in Defence of their own Privileges, and of the *Liberties of their Country*. Then it was, that this *Passive-Obedience and Non-Resistance Parliament* went the utmost Lengths of *Resistance*, in a *Parliamentary Way*; and the necessary Consequence of the Steps They made, *in this Way*, must have been *Resistance in another*, if the King had not dropt his Ministers, retracted his Pretensions, redress'd *some* and given Expectation of redressing *other Grievances*. In fine, this *Pensioner-Parliament*, as it hath been styled, with *some Corruption* in the House, and an *Army* sometimes at the Door of it, disbanded the *Army in England*, and protested against the *Militia*, settled in *Scotland* by Act of Parliament, and appointed to march for *any Service*, wherein the *King's Honour, Authority and Greatness* were concern'd, in Obedience to the *Orders of the Privy-Council*. That I may not multiply particular Instances, They not only did their utmost to secure their Country against immediate Danger, but projected to secure it against remote Danger, by an Exclusion of the Duke of York from the Crown, after They had endeavour'd strenuously, but in vain, to prevent his entailing *Popery* more easily upon us by his Marriage with a *Popish Princess*; for he had declared himself a *Papist* with as much Affectation, as if He expected to grow popular by it; had already begun to approve his Zeal, and exercise his Talent in Conversions, by That of his *first Wife*; and was notoriously the Agent of *Rome and France*, in order to seduce his *Brother* into stronger Measures than King *Charles* was willing to take. King *Charles*, to use an Expression of the Lord *Halifax* of that Age, would *trot*; but his *Brother* would *gallop*.

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When I reflect on the Particulars here mention'd, and a great many others, which might be mention'd to the Honour of this Parliament, I cannot hear it call'd the *Pensioner-Parliament*, as it were by Way of Eminence, without a Degree of honest Indignation; especially in the *Age*, in which We live, and by some of *Those*, who affect the most to bestow upon it this ignominious Appellation. *Pensions* indeed, to the Amount of *seven or eight thousand Pounds*, as I remember, were discover'd to have been given to some Members of the *House of Commons*. But then let it be remember'd likewise, that this Expedient of *corrupting Parliaments* began under the Administration of that boisterous, over-bearing, dangerous Minister, CLIFFORD. As long as there remain'd any Pretence to say that the *Court* was in the Interest of the *People*, the Expedient of *Bribery* was neither wanted, nor practis'd. When the *Court* was evidently in *another Interest*, the Necessity and the Practice of *Bribing the Representatives of the People* commenced. Should a *Parliament of Britain* act in Compliance with the *Court*, against the Sense and Interest of the *Nation*, Mankind would be ready to pronounce very justly that *such a Parliament* was under the *corrupt Influence of the Court*. But, in the Case now before us, We have a very comfortable Example of a *Court* wicked enough to stand in Need of *Corruption*, and to employ it; and of a *Parliament* virtuous enough to resist the Force of *this Expedient*; which *Philip of Macedon* boasted that He employ'd to invade the *Liberties of other Countries*; and which had been so often employ'd by Men of less Genius as well as Rank, to invade the *Liberties of their own*. All, that *Corruption* could do in *this Parliament*, was to maintain the Appearance of a *Court-Party*, whilst

whilst the Measures of the Court united a Country Party, in Opposition to Them. Neither Places, nor Pensions could hinder Courtiers in this Parliament from voting, on many signal Occasions, against the Court; nor protect either *Those*, who drew the King into ill Measures, nor *Those*, who comply'd with Him in them. Nay, this Pensioner-Parliament, if it must be still call'd so, gave one Proof of *Independency*, besides That of contriving a *Test*, in 1675, to purge their Members on Oath from all Suspicion of corrupt Influence, which ought to wipe off this Stain from the most corrupt. They drove one of their Pay-masters out of Court, and impeach'd the Other, in the Fulness of his Power; even at a Time, when the King was so weak as to make, or so unhappy as to be forced to make, on Account of Pensions privately negotiated from France, the Cause of the Crown and the Cause of the Minister one, and to blend their Interests together.

What I have said to the Honour of the long Parliament is just; because in Fact the Proceedings of that Parliament were agreeable to the Representation I have given of Them. But now, if some severe Censor should appear, and insist that the Dame was *chaste*, only because She was not enough tempted; that more Pensions would have made more Pensioners; that much Money and little Prerogative is more dangerous to Liberty than much Prerogative and little Money; and that the worst and weakest Minister King Charles ever had might have been absolute in this very Parliament, whose Character I defend, if such a Minister had been able to insist, with Places, Pensions and occasional Bribes, not a slender Majority, which the Defection of a Few might at any Time defeat, but such a bulky Majority, as might impose on itself;

itself; if any one, I say, should refine in this Manner, and continue to insist that *such a Minister*, with *such a Purse*, would have stood his Ground, in the *Parliament* I speak of, with how much Contempt and Indignation soever He might have been every where treated by the People; I shall not presume to assert the contrary. It might have been so. Our Safety was owing as much, perhaps, to the *Poverty of the Court*, as to the *Virtue of the Parliament*. We might have lost our *Liberties*. But then I would observe, before I conclude, that if This be true, the Preservation of our *Religion* and *Liberty*, at that Time, was owing to these two Circumstances; *first* that King *Charles* was not parsimonious, but squander'd on his Pleasures what He might have employ'd to *corrupt this Parliament*; *secondly*, that the *Ministers*, in that Reign, fingering no Money but the *Revenue, ordinary and extraordinary*, had no Opportunity to filch in the Pockets of every private Man, and to bribe the Bubbles very often with their own Money; as might be done now, when *Funding* hath been so long in Fashion, and the *greatest Minister* hath the Means of being the *greatest Stockjobber*, did not the eminent Integrity of the *Minister*, and the approved Virtue of the *Age*, secure us from any such Danger.

We have now brought the Deduction of *Parties* very near to the *Æra* of WHIG and TORY; into which the *Court* found Means to divide the Nation, and by this Division to acquire in the Nation a Superiority, which had been attempted ineffectually, even by *Corruption in Parliament*.——But This I reserve for another Letter, and am,

S I R, Yours, &c.



LETTER IV.

S I R,

THERE is a Passage in *Tully* so extremely applicable to the mischievous, but transitory Prevalence of *those Principles of Government*, which King *James* the 1st imported into this Country, that since it occurs to my Memory, I cannot begin this Letter better than by quoting it to You, and making a short Commentary on it, * *Opinionum Commenta delet Dies, Naturæ Judicia confirmat. Groundless Opinions are destroy'd, but rational Judgments, or the Judgments of Nature, are confirm'd by Time.* It is *Balbus*, who makes This Observation very properly, when He is about to prove the Existence of a supreme Being. The same Observation might have been employ'd as properly, on other Occasions, against *Balbus* himself; and the Truth of it might have been exemplified, by comparing the Paradoxes and superstitious Opinions of his *own Sect*, as well as the Tales of an *Hippocentaur*, or a *Chimera*, with the eternal Truths of genuine Theism, and sound Philosophy. In short, the Application of it might have been justly made then, and may be so now in numberless Instances, taken from the most important Subjects, on which the Thoughts of Men are exercised, or in which their Interest, as Men and Members of Society, are concern'd.

* L. 2. de Nat. Deor.

The Authority of a *Set*, and much more of a *State*, is able to inspire, and *Habit* to confirm the most *absurd Opinions*. Passion or Interest, can create *Zeal*. But nothing can give Stability and durable Uniformity to *Error*. Indolence, or Ignorance, may keep it floating, as it were, on the Surface of the Mind, and sometimes hinder *Truth* from penetrating; or Force may maintain it in Profession, when the Mind assents to it no longer. But *such Opinions*, like human Bodies, tend to their Dissolution from their Birth. They will be soon rejected in *Theory*, where Men can think, and in *Practice*, where men can act with Freedom. They maintain themselves no longer, than the same Means of Seduction, which first introduced them, or the same Circumstances, which first imposed them, attend and continue to support them. Men are drag'd into them, and held down in them, by Chains of Circumstances. Break but these Chains, and the Mind returns with a Kind of intellectual Elasticity to its proper Object, *Truth*. This natural Motion is so strong, that Examples might be cited of Men, embracing *Truth in Practice*, before They were convinced of it in *Theory*. There are Cases, where *Reason*, freed from Constraint, or roused by Necessity, acts in some Sort the Part of *Instinct*. We are impel'd by *one*, before We have Time to form an *Opinion*. We are often determined by the *other*, against our *Opinion*; That is, before We can be said properly to have *changed it*. But observe here the Perverseness of that rational Creature, Man. When This happens; when the *Judgment of Nature*, for so we may speak after *Tully*, hath prevail'd against the habitual Prejudice of *Opinion*; instead of acknowledging the *victorious Truth*, which determined Him to act; instead of condemning the *erroneous Opinion*, against which

He acted, He is too often apt to endeavour, piecivishly and pedantically, to reconcile his *Actions* to his *Error*; nay, to persist in renouncing *true* and asserting *false Maxims*, whilst He reaps the Benefit, and maintains the Consequences of the *former*.

You see whither We are brought by these general Reflections. The *absurd Opinions*, (*fieta & vana* our *Roman Orator* would have call'd them) about the *Right, Power, and Prerogative of Kings*, were so little able to take a deep Root, and to stand the Blasts of Opposition, that Few of *Those*, who drew their Swords on the Side of King *Charles the 1st*, were determined to it by them. I assert this Fact on cotemporary Authority; on the Authority even of *Some*, who were Themselves engaged in *that Cause*, from the Beginning to the End of our civil Wars. A more recent Tradition assures us, that when the *same Opinions* revived at the *Restoration*, they did not sink deep even then into the Minds of Men; but floated so superficially there, that the Parliament, (the very Parliament, who had authorized them, and imposed them, as I observed in the last Letter) proceeded a great Way, and was ready to have proceeded farther, in direct Opposition to them. A Tradition still more recent will inform us, and That is to be the Subject of this Letter, that when *these Opinions* revived again, at the latter End of the same Reign, with an Appearance of greater Strength, and of a more national Concurrence than ever, they revived but to be exploded more effectually than ever. King *Charles* made Use of them to check the Ferment raised against his Government; but did not seem to expect that they would subsist long in Force. His *wiser Brother* depended much on them; but his Dependence was vain. They were, at that Time, wearing out apace; and they wore out the faster
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by the extravagant Use, which was made of them. They were in the Mouths of many, but in the Hearts of few; for almost all Those, who had them in their Mouths, acted against them. Thus were *these wicked and ridiculous Principles of Government* twice revived, and twice destroy'd again; in less than thirty Years from the *Restoration*.

*Ter si resurgat Murus abeneus,
 ——— Ter pereat !*

The *second Revival of these Principles*, for enough hath been said of the *first*, happen'd soon after the Dissolution of the *long Parliament*; and there, I think, We must place the Birth of WHITE and TORY, though *these Parties* did not grow up into full Maturity, nor receive their Names, till about two Years afterwards. The Dissolution of *this Parliament* was desired by Men of very different Complexions; by *Some*, with factious Views; by *Others*, on this honest and true Maxim, *that a STANDING PARLIAMENT, or the SAME PARLIAMENT LONG CONTINUED changes the very Nature of the Constitution in the fundamental Article, on which the Preservation of our whole Liberty depends.* But whatever Motives others might have to desire *this Dissolution*, the Motives, which prevail'd on the King, were probably these. *This Parliament* not only grew more reserved in their Grants of *Money*, and stiff and inflexible in *other Matters*, but seem'd to have lost that *personal Regard*, which They had hitherto preserved for Him. They brought their Attacks home to his *Family*; nay, to *Himself*, in the Heats, which the Discovery and Prosecution of the *Popish Plot* occasion'd. That on the *Queen* provoked Him. That on his *Brother* embarrass'd Him. But That, which provoked and embarass'd him

him both, was the Prosecution of the Earl of *Danby* in the Manner, in which it was carried on. I will not descend into the Particulars of an *Affair*, at this Time, so well understood. *This Minister* was turn'd out, and might have been punish'd, in another Manner, and much more severely than I presume any one, who knows the Anecdotes of that Age, thinks that He deserved to be. But the *Intention* of this Attack, according to *Rapin*, was to shew that the King, as well as his Brother, was at the Head of a Conspiracy to destroy the Government, and the Protestant Religion. This is a very bold Assertion, and such a one as I do not pretend to warrant. But thus much is certain; that if the Earl of *Danby's* Impeachment had been tried, He must have justified Himself by shewing, what every one knew to be true, that the secret Negotiations with *France*, and particularly That for *Money*, were the King's Negotiations, not his.

Now, whether the King hoped, by dissolving the Parliament, to stop *this Prosecution*; or to soften That of the *Popish Plot*; or to defeat the Project of excluding the Duke of *York*; his Hopes were all disappointed. The following Parliaments trod in the Steps of This. How, indeed, could They do otherwise in those Days, when the Temper of the People determined the Character of the Parliament; when an *Influence on Elections*, by Prerogative, was long since over, and private, indirect Means of gaining another more illegal Influence were not yet found, or the necessary Supports of such Means were not yet acquired; when any Man, who had desired People, who knew neither his Fortune, his Character, nor even his Person, to chuse Him their Representative in Parliament, (That is, to appoint Him their Trustee) would have been look'd upon and treated as a Madman; in short, when

when a Parliament, acting against the *declared Sense of the Nation*, would have appear'd as surprizing a Phænomenon in the moral World, as a retrograde Motion of the Sun, or any other signal Deviation of Things from their ordinary Course, in the natural World.

There was indeed one Point, which *this Parliament* had taken extremely to Heart, and which was no longer open to the Parliaments, that follow'd; I mean the *Conduēt of the King in foreign Affairs*, during the War between *France*, and *Holland* and her *Allies*, which ended by the Treaty of *Nimighen*. This War was not made in remote Countries. It was made at our Door. The Motives to it, on the Part of the *Aggressor*, were neither Injuries received, nor Rights invaded; but a Spirit of Conquest, and barefaced Usurpation. The Interest *We* had in it was not such as depended on a long Chain of Contingencies, and required much Sublety to find out, but plain and immediate. The Security and, at one Time, the very Existence of the *Dutch Commonwealth* depended on the Event of it. No Wonder then, if the Conduēt of the *King*, who join'd openly with *France* at first, and served Her privately to better Purpose at last, furnish'd ample Matter to the publick Discontent, and help'd to increase the ill Humours of succeeding Parliaments on *two other Points*, which were still open, and continued to draw their whole Attention as long as King *Charles* suffer'd any to sit, during the rest of his Reign.

These two Points were the Prosecution of Persons, involved in the *Popish Plot*, and the Exclusion of the Duke of *York*. The *first* of these had prepared Mankind for the *second*. The Truth is, that it nothing, which affected the *Duke*, had been produced, besides *Coleman's Letters*, these Proofs of
his

his Endeavours to subvert the Religion and Liberty of the People He pretended to govern, join'd to so many others of publick Notoriety, which shew'd the whole Bent of his Soul, and the whole Scheme of his Policy, would have afforded Reason more than sufficient for sacrificing the *Interest*, or even the *Right* (if you will call it so) of *one Man* to the Preservation of *three Kingdoms*. I know how partial We are in the Judgments We make, concerning ourselves, and our own Interests. I know that this Partiality is the immediate Effect of Self-Love, the strongest Spring in the human, nay in the whole animal System; and yet I cannot help being surprized that a Man should expect to be trusted with a *Crown*, because He is born a Prince, in a Country, where he could not be trusted by Law and ought not to be trusted in Reason, with a *Constables Staff*, if He was born a *private Person*. Let me add, that such an Expectation must be deem'd more unreasonable in a Descendant of *Henry* the 4th of *France*, if possible, than in any other Man. The hereditary Title of the House of *Bourbon*, on the Extinction of That of *Valois*, was certainly as clear, and much better establish'd by the Laws and Usages of *France*, than the hereditary Right of any Prince of the House of *Stuart* to the Crown of *England*; and yet *Henry* the 4th, with all the personal Qualifications, which could recommend a Prince to the Esteem and Love of his Subjects, would never have been received into the Throne by the *French Nation*, if He had not been of the *Religion of that Nation*. On what Foundation then could it be expected that a *Protestant* and a *free People* should be less animated by *Religion* and *Liberty* both, than their Neighbours had been by *Religion alone*; for *Liberty* had nothing to do in that Contest? Our Fathers were thus animated

mated, at the Time I am speaking of. The *long Parliament* projected the *Exclusion*; and if the Design had been carried on, in the Spirit of a *Country Party*, it would probably have been carried on with a national Concurrence, and would consequently have succeeded in Effect, though not perhaps at once, nor in the very Form at first proposed.

The violent and sanguinary Prosecution of the *Popish Plot* was intended, no Doubt, to make the Success of the *Exclusion* more secure, by raising the Passions of Men so high, that no Expedient but an *absolute and immediate Exclusion*, in the Terms of the *Bill*, should be thought sufficient. I cannot help saying, on this Occasion, that I wish this laudable and just Design had not been pursued, by wading through the Blood of so many Men; Enemies to our *Religion* and *Liberty*, indeed; but convicted, for the most Part, on Evidence, which could hardly have pass'd, at any other Time. I wish we had done nothing, which might be interpreted to the Disrepute of our *own Religion*, whilst We attempted to proscribe *theirs*. In fine, I wish, for the Honour of my Country, that the Prosecutions, on Account of *this Plot*, and much more on Account of *another*, which was set up as a Kind of Retaliation for *This*, and which caused some of the noblest, as well as some of the meanest Blood in the Nation to be split, could be crazed out of the Records of History. But there is still a farther Reason to wish that greater Temper had been join'd, at this Time, to the same Zeal for *Religion* and *Liberty*. Men were made to believe that the *King*, who had yielded on so many *other Occasions*, would yield on *This*; that *He*, who had given up so many *Ministers*, would give up his *Brother* at last; and that if the *Parliament* would accept nothing less than the *Exclusion*, in their own Way, it would

be extorted from Him. Now in *This* they were fatally deceived; and I must continue to suspect, till I meet with better Reasons than I have yet found to the contrary, that they were so deceived by the Intrigues of *two very opposite Cabals*; by the Duke of *York's*, who were averse to *all Exclusions*, whether *absolute*, or *limited*, but most to the *last*; and by the Duke of *Monmouth's*, who could not find their Account in any but an *absolute Exclusion*; nor in *This* neither, unless the *Bill* pass'd without any Mention of the *Duke's Daughters*, as next in Succession; to which, as Bishop *Burnet* tells us, the Prince of *Orange* was willing to comply, on the Faith of Assurances He had received from hence; a Fact, which the *Bishop* might know, and We may therefore take on his Word, as extraordinary as it seems. I would only observe that King *William*, then Prince of *Orange*, could have no Reason for consenting that his *Wife's Pretensions to the Crown* should not be confirm'd by an *Act*, which excluded her *Father*, except one; and That was the Necessity, real, or apparent, of uniting different private Interests in the publick Measure of excluding the Duke of *York*. Now, if *This* was his Reason, the same Reason proves, what shall be farther confirm'd in the next Letter, that a *Spirit of Faction* ran through the Proceedings of Those, who promoted the *Bill of Exclusion*; and when *Faction* was opposed to *Faction*, there is no Room to wonder, if That of the *Court* prevail'd. The *King*, who had not used to shew Firmness, on *other Occasions*, was firm on *This*; and the Consequence of pushing the *Exclusion*, in this Manner, was giving Him an Opportunity of breaking the *Country Party*; of dividing the Nation into *Whig* and *Tory*; of governing Himself, without *Parliaments*; and of leaving the Throne open to his *Brother*, not only with-
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out Limitations, or Conditions, but with a more absolute Power establish'd, than any Prince of his Family had enjoy'd.

As soon as the *Court* had got, by Management, a plausible Pretence of objecting a *Spirit of Faction* to Those in the *Opposition*, the Strength of the *Opposition* was broken, because the *national Union* was dissolved. A *Country Party* must be authorized by the *Voice of the Country*. It must be form'd on Principles of *common Interest*. It cannot be united and maintain'd on the particular Prejudices, any more than it can, or ought to be, directed to the particular Interests of *any Set of Men whatsoever*. A Party, thus constituted, is improperly call'd Party. It is the *Nation*, speaking and acting in the Discourse and Conduct of *particular Men*. It will prevail in all Struggles sooner, or later, as long as our *Constitution* subsists; and nothing is more easy to demonstrate than This; that whenever *such a Party* finds it difficult to prevail, our *Constitution* is in Danger; and when They find it impossible, our *Constitution* must, in Fact, be alter'd. On the other Hand, whenever the Prejudices and Interests of *particular Sets of Men* prevail, the Essence of a *Country Party* is annihilated, and the very Appearance of it will soon be lost. Every Man will resort in this Case to that Standard, under which he hath been marshal'd in *former Divisions*; to which his Inclinations lead Him; or which, though He does not intirely approve, yet disapproves the least.

Such a Dissolution of a *Country-Party* was brought about at the Period, to which We are now come in our Deduction of *Parties*, by the Passions, the publick Pique, and private Interest of *particular Men*, and by the wily Intrigues of the *Court*. The Dissolution of *this Party*, and the new Division of

the Nation into *Whig* and *Tory*, brought us into extreme Danger. This extreme Danger reunited the Nation again, and a *Coalition of Parties* saved the whole. Such an Experience might have shew'd Them, that how opposite soever their *Professions* were, yet They really differ'd more on *negative* than on *positive Principles*; that They saw one another in a *false Light*, for the most Part, and fought with *Phantoms*, conjured up to maintain their *Division*, rather than with *real Beings*. Experience had not this happy Effect soon. The Swell of the Sea continued, long after the Storm was over; and we have seen *these Parties* kick and cuff like drunken Men, when They were both of the same Side,—— Let us hope that this Scene of tragical Folly is over, to the Disappointment of *Those*, who are conscious of *past Iniquity*, or who meditate *future Mischief*. There are no Others, who wish and endeavour to prolong it.

I am, S I R, &c.



L E T T E R V.

S I R,

NOTHING is more useful, nothing more necessary, in the Conduct of publick Affairs, than a *just Discernment of Spirits*. I mean here not only that *natural private Sagacity*, which is conversant about Individuals, and enables some Men to pry, as it were, into the Heads and Hearts of Others,

Others, and to discover with Them those latent Principles; which constitute their true Characters, and are often disguised in outward Action; but I mean principally that *acquired, publick, political Sagacity*, which is of the same Kind, though I think not altogether the same Thing, as the *former*; which flows from Nature too, but requires more to be assisted by Experience, and form'd by Art. This is that superior Talent of *Ministers of State*, which is so rarely found in Those of *other Countries*, and which abounds so happily at present in Those of *Great Britain*. It is by This, that they discover the most secret Dispositions of *other Courts*; and, discovering those Dispositions, prevent their Designs, or never suffer Themselves to be surprized by them. It is by This, that They watch over the publick Tranquility *at home*; foresee what Effect every Event, that happens, and much more every Step They make Themselves, will have on the Sentiments and Passions of Mankind. This Part of human Wisdom is therefore every where of Use; but is of indispensable Necessity in *free Countries*, where a greater Regard is to be constantly had to the various Fluctuations of *Parties*; to the Temper, Humour, Opinion and Prejudices of the People. Without such a Regard as This, those Combinations of peculiar Circumstances, which We commonly call *Conjunctures*, can never be improved to the best Advantage, by acting in Conformity, and in Proportion to them; and without improving *such Conjunctures* to the best Advantage, it is impossible to atchieve any great Undertaking; or even to conduct Affairs successfully, in their ordinary Course.

A Want of this *just Discernment of Spirits*, if I am not extremely mistaken, defeated the Designs of Those, who prosecuted with so much Vigour
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the *Popish Plot*, and the *Exclusion of the Duke of York*. Several of Them were Men of very great Abilities; and yet we shall have no Reason to be surpriz'd that They fail'd in this Point, if We reflect how unfit even the greatest Genius is to *discern the Spirit of others*, when He hath once *overheated his own*. All Men are fallible; but here lies the Difference. *Some Men*, such as I have just mention'd, cross'd by Difficulties, press'd by Exigencies, transported by their own Passions, or by the Passions of Those, who fight under their Banner, may now and then deviate into Error, and into Error of long and fatal Consequence. But there are *some Men*, such as I shall not mention upon this Occasion, (because I reserve Them for another and a better) who never deviate into the Road of good Sense; who, cross'd by no Difficulties, press'd by no Exigencies, meeting scarce Opposition enough to excite their Industry, and guiding a tame well-tutor'd Flock, that follow their *Bell-weather* obstinately, but never tread on his Heels; there are *Men*, I say, whose special Privilege it is to proceed with all these Advantages, deliberately and superciliously, from Blunder to Blunder, from Year to Year, in one perpetual Maze of confused, incoherent, inconsistent, unmeaning Schemes of Business.

But having nothing to do with the *Men of this Character* at present, I return to Those of the *former Class*; to the *Men*, who led the *Whig-Party*, at its first Appearance, in the Time of King *Charles the 2d*. The Foundation, upon which They built all their Hopes of Success, was This; that They should frighten and force the *King* into a Compliance with Them; but They did not enough consider that the Methods They took were equally proper to frighten and force a great Part of the Nation from Them,

Them, by Reason of the particular Circumstances of that Time. They did not enough consider that when they began to put their Designs in Execution, scarce twenty Years had pass'd from the *Restoration*; and that the highest Principles, in Favour of the *Church* and the *Monarchy*, had prevail'd almost universally, during one half of that Time, and very generally, during the other half; that They had the accidental Passions of the People for Them, but the settled Habits of Thinking against Them; that They were going off from a *broad* to a *narrow Bottom*; from the *Nation* to a *Part of the Nation*; and This at a Time, when they wanted a more than ordinary Concurrence of the *whole Body*. They did not enough consider that They were changing the very Nature of their *Party*, and giving an Opportunity to the *Court*, which was then become, in the strict Sense of the Word, a *Faction*, to grow up into a *Party* again, and *such a Party* as would divide, at least, the People with Them, upon *Principles*, plausible in those Days, and sufficient to raise a Spirit, capable to disappoint all their Endeavours.

The same Resentments and Prejudices, the same Jealousies and Fears, which burst out with Violence, upon many Occasions a few Years before, lay still in the Hearts of Men; latent and quiet, indeed, and wearing out by Degrees; but yet easy to be revived, and to be blown up anew. If We compare the Conduct of the *long Parliament*, in 1674 and 1675, with the Attempts, which had been lately made, during the Administration of the *Cabal*; with the Secret of the *second Dutch War*, and many other Designs and Practices of the *Court*, which were then come lately and very authentically to Light; with the State of *Scotland*, which was then subdued under a *real Tyranny*, and with That of
Ireland

Ireland, where, to say no more, the *Act of Settlement* was but ill observed; if We make this Comparison, it will not yet appear that the Proceedings of the *House of Commons* were immoderate, though they were warm; nor factious, though they were vigorous; nor that any Danger could be then reasonably apprehended from them, except to the Enemies of the Constitution in Church and State; and yet even then the old Resentments, Prejudices, Jealousies and Fears began to revive; and an Apprehension of falling back under the Influence of *Presbyterian* and *Republican Principles* began to shew itself in the House of Lords, and in the Nation. It is true that This had no immediate Consequence; because the *Popish Plot* broke out soon afterwards like a mighty Flame, in which these little Fires, that began to burn anew, were lost. This great Event made the *Church* and the *Dissenters* continue to run into one, as They had begun to do before; and the sole Division of *Parties* was That of the *Court* and the *Country*, as long as *this Parliament* lasted. But still it was evident with how delicate an Hand every Thing, that related to our former *Disputes*, required to be touch'd. It was evident that the least Alarm given to the *Church*, or to Those, who valued Themselves on the Principles of *Loyalty* then in Fashion, would be sufficient to open those Wounds, which were just skin'd over, and to raise *two new Parties* out of the Ashes of the *old*.

These Parties were not raised, whilst the *long Parliament* sat; because a general Opinion prevail'd, and well enough founded on their precedent Conduct, that however angry the King might be with the Parliament, or the Parliament with the King, a few popular Steps made on *one Side*, and a little Money granted on the *other*, would soften Matters

Matters between Them, and dispose Them to forget all former Quarrels. As not therefore as the *Parliament* grew, and as much as some People might think that They exceeded their Bounds; yet still it was difficult to persuade even these People that a *Parliament*, like This, would push Things to the last Extremity; destroy the Constitution They had settled and supported with so much Zeal; or draw the Sword against a *Prince*, to whom They had borne so much Affection. But in the *Parliaments*, which follow'd, the Case was not the same, and I will state as shortly as I can, upon Authorities, which no Man likely to contradict Me must refuse, what made the Difference. These Authorities shall be That of *Burnet*, and That of *Rapin*; whom I quote, on this Occasion, for the same Reason as I would quote my Lord *Clarendon* against King *Charles* the 1st, or *Ludlow* for Him.

In the Year 1676, before We have Grounds sufficient to affirm that the Design of (a) *excluding the Duke of York* was form'd, but not before We have Reason to suspect that it might be in the Thoughts of several, Those, who stood foremost in the Opposition to the *Court*, were very industrious to procure a Dissolution of the *long Parliament*; so industrious, that They (b) negotiated the Affair with the *Duke*, who had concur'd in a Vote for an Address to dissolve it; and They undertook (c) *that a new Parliament should be more inclineable to grant the Papists a Toleration, than They would ever find This would prove.* The *Papists* were in Earnest for this Measure; since *Coleman* drew a *Declaration* for justifying it, and since their Design in it was

(a) *Burnet's History of his own Times, Vol. I. p. 393.*

b) *Ibid.*

(c) *Ibid.*

to divide the (a) King and his People. It is fair to conclude that the *Protestants*, who had been in it at the Time I mention, upon *Party Views* were at least as much so, when their Views, rose higher. *This Parliament* had push'd a strict and thorough Examination into the *Popish Plot*, with great Sincerity and Zeal. Nay, the Project of the *Exclusion* had been started, though not prosecuted, in the last Session. May We not take it for granted however that They, who were now resolved to carry the *Exclusion* in a Manner, in which They soon attempted to carry it, and who foresaw by Consequence the Difficulties, that would be opposed to Them, and the strong Measures They should be obliged to pursue, in order to overcome these Difficulties; I say, might not They think *this Parliament* much less proper than any other to engage and persist in such Measures? They thought thus, without Doubt; and so far They judged better than the King, who came into the *Dissolution*, upon very different Motives. But as to the Consequence of engaging a *new Parliament* in such strong Measures, the Event shew'd that the King judged better than They, in the Progress of this Affair.

The *Dissenters*, who had been long persecuted by the *Parliament*, and banter'd and abused by the *Court*, were encouraged by the Conjunction to lift up their Heads. They took Advantage of the Horror and Indignation, which the Discovery of the *Popish Plot*, and the Use made of this Discovery had raised all over the Kingdom. They could not be more zealous in this Cause than the Members of the *establish'd Church* had shewn Themselves to be; but They cried, perhaps, louder for it. In short, whatever their Management was, or however

(a) Burnet's History of his own Times, Vol. I. p. 393.

They were abetted, certain it is that They were very active, and very successful too, in the Elections of the *Parliament*, which follow'd the *long Parliament*, according to *Rapin*, who asserts that many of the Members, chosen in this House of Commons, were *Presbyterians*. He might have said as much, upon just as good Grounds, of the *two Parliaments*, which follow'd This, and I shall speak of Them indiscriminately. The Leaders, who muster'd all their Forces, in order to push the *Bill of Exclusion*, look'd on this Turn in the *Elections* as an Advantage to Them; and it might not have been a Disadvantage, if They and the *Dissenters* had improved it with more Moderation. But They were far from doing so, as *Rapin* Himself seems to own a little unwillingly, when He says, that *Complaisance for the Presbyterians was carried, perhaps, too far in the Bill for the Comprehension of Protestant Dissenters*. Bishop *Burnet* speaks more plainly. He owns that many began to declare openly in Favour of the Non-Conformists; that upon This the Non-Conformists behaved Themselves very indecently; that They fell severely on the Body of the Clergy; and that They made the Bishops and Clergy apprehend that a Rebellion, and with it the pulling the Church to Pieces, was design'd. Several other Passages of the same Strength, and to the same Purpose, might be collected from *this Historian*; and He, who reads them, will not be surprized, I think, to find that such Proceedings as These, both in *Parliament* and out of it, gave an Alarm to the Clergy, and set them to make *Parallels between the late and the present Times*; and to infuse the Fears and the Passions, which agitated Them, into the *Nation*. The *Bishop* accuses Them, indeed, of doing This with much *Indecency*. But They, who are frighten'd out of their Wits, will

be apt to be *indecent*; and *Indecency* begets *Indecency*.

At the same Time, that the Jealousies of a Design to destroy the *Church* prevail'd, others prevail'd likewise of a Design to alter the *Government of the State*; of a Design not only against the *Successor*, but against the *Possessor of the Crown*. Many well-meaning Men, says Bishop Burnet upon one Occasion, began to dislike these Practices, and to apprehend that a Change of Government was design'd.——The King came to think Himself, says the same Author upon another Occasion, levell'd at chiefly, though for Decency's Sake his Brother was only named. Rapin goes farther; for, speaking of the same Time, He uses this remarkable Expression; that Things seem'd to be taking the same Course as in the Year 1640; and there was Reason to think that the opposing Party had no better Intentions towards the King now than the Enemies of King Charles the 1st had towards Him. But whatever some particular Men, who knew Themselves irreconcilable with the King, as well as the Duke, or some others, who had still about them a Tang of religious Enthusiasm and Republican Whimies, might intend; I am far from thinking that the Party, who promoted the Exclusion, meant to destroy, on the contrary it is plain that They meant to preserve, by that very Measure, the Constitution in Church and State. The Reason why I quote these Passages, and refer to others of the same Kind, is not to shew what was really design'd, but what was apprehended; for as the Distinction of Whig and Tory subsisted long after the real Differences were extinguish'd, so were these Parties at first divided, not so much by Overt-acts committed, as by the Apprehensions, which each of them entertain'd of the Intentions of the other. When the
Resolution

Resolution was once taken of rejecting all Limitations, on the Belief artfully and, I think, knavishly propagated, that the *King* would yield, if the *Parliament* persisted; the necessary Consequences of the *King's* adhering inflexibly to his *Brother* were Those, which follow'd; those *Fulmina Parliamentaria*, harsh Votes, angry Proceedings, Addresses, that were in Truth Remonstrances, Projects of Associations, Pretensions to a Power of DISPENSING with the Execution of *Laws*, (that very *Prerogative* They had so justly refused to the *Crown*,) and many others, which I omit. All These would have been Blasts of Wind, *Bruta Fulmina*, no more, if the *King* had yielded; and that they were push'd in this Confidence by the Bulk of the *Party*, who push'd them, cannot be doubted; since it cannot be doubted that the Bulk of the *Party* depended on the *King's* yielding almost, perhaps, even to the last. Some few might be willing, nay desirous, that He should not yield, and hope to bring Things into a State of Confusion; which none but Madmen, or Those, whom their Crimes, or their Fortunes render desperate, can ever wish to see. But it would be hard indeed, if *Parties* were to be characterized, not by their common View, or the general Tenour of their Conduct, but by the private Views imputed to Some amongst Them, or by the particular Sallies, into which Mistake, Surprize, or Passion, hath sometimes betray'd the best-intention'd, and even the best-conducted Bodies of Men. *Whig* and *Tory* were now form'd into *Parties*; but I think They were not now, nor at any other Time, what They believed one another, nor what They have been represented by their Enemies, nay by their Friends. The *Whigs* were not *Roundheads*, tho' the Measures They pursued, being

being stronger than the Temper of the Nation would then bear, gave Occasion to the Suspicions I have mention'd. The *Tories* were not *Cavaliers*, though They took the Alarm so sudden and so warm for the *Church* and the *King*; and tho' They carried the Principles in Favour of the *King*, at least, whilst the Heat of their Contests with the *opposity Party* lasted, higher than They had been ever carried before. The *Whigs* were not *Dissenters*, nor *Republicans*, though They favour'd the former, and though some inconsiderable Remains of the latter, might find Shelter in their Party. The *Tories* had no Disposition to become *Slaves*, or *Popists*, tho' They abetted the Exercise of an exorbitant Power by the *Crown*, and tho' They supported the Pretensions of a *Popish Successor* to it.—— Thus I think about the *Parties*, which arose in the Reign of King *Charles* the 2^d; and as I deliver my Thoughts with Frankness, I hope they will be received with Candour. Some farther and stronger Reasons for receiving them so may, perhaps, appear in a subsequent Letter.

I am, S I R, Yours, &c.



L E T T E R VI.

S I R,

I F King *Charles* the 2^d. could have been prevail'd upon to sacrifice the chimerical divine Right of his *Brother* to the real Interest, and Right too, of his *People*; that happy Event would have made him ample Amends in future Ease and Quiet,
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and the Nation in future Security, for all precedent Disorders, Dangers and Fears of Danger. But instead of This, he was every Day confirm'd in the Resolution of not giving up, directly and in Terms, that Right to his *Brother*, which He thought reflected Strength on his own. The very Measures, taken to force Him to submit, enabled Him to resist. The *opposite Spirit* spent itself in Blood and Violence. The *Spirit of Him* rose visibly in the Nation; and He saw very soon the Time approach, when He might venture to appeal to his *People* against his *Parliament*. This Time was come, when Men were once convinced that a *Country Party* prevail'd no longer, but that *Faction* had taken its Place. Many Appearances, which I have not Room to enumerate, served to propagate this Opinion; particularly the Behaviour and almost avow'd Pretensions of the Duke of *Monmouth*; which were carried on even in Defiance of the solemn Declaration made by the King, *that He had never married the Duke's Mother*.

Some of the worthiest and warmest Men, who were engaged for the *Exclusion*, complain'd Themselves, even from the first, of the private Interests and factious Intrigues, which prevail'd amongst Them. *I must confess* (says a very considerable Man, who laid down his Life for this Cause afterwards, and whose original Letter is still extant) *I must confess, I do not know three Men of a Mind; and that a Spirit of Giddiness reigns amongst us, far beyond any I have ever observed in my Life; and yet He had lived and acted in as factious a Time as this Nation ever saw. He proceeds; Some look who is fittest to succeed.—They are for the most Part divided between the Prince of Orange, and the Duke of Monmouth. The first hath plainly the most plausible Title.—I need not tell you the Reasons against*

gainst Monmouth. *The strongest for Him are, that whoever is opposed to York will have a good Party; and all Scotland, which is every Day like to be in Arms, doth certainly favour Him, and may probably be of as much Importance in the Troubles, that are now likely to fall upon us, as They were in the Beginning of the last. Others are only upon Negatives, &c.*

I could easily multiply Proofs of this Kind; but I think I need not take any Pains to shew that there was such a Faction form'd at this Time; nor to refute *Welwood*, who asserts that the Duke of Monmouth was not ambitious to the Degree of aspiring to the Crown, till after his landing in the West. I will only remark that the Efforts of this Faction amongst Those, who drove on the Bill of Exclusion, furnish'd another Motive to the Division and Animosity of Parties. The *Tories*, who had divided from the *Others*, on Jealousies of Designs to change the Constitution in Church and State, began now to apprehend that the opposite Party might succeed in another View, and set up a King of their own Nomination. A Notion then entertain'd by many, that the worse Title a Man had, the better King He was likely to make, did not persuade Them. They had suffer'd under the Tyranny of a Party; many of Them had been Themselves the Abettors of a Party-Administration; and They fear'd with Reason a Party-King. Thus personal Interests were mingled on both Sides with publick Considerations; and the Duke of York gain'd a great Number of Adherents, not by Affection to Him, but by an Aversion to Monmouth; which increased among the *Tories*, in Proportion as the Duke's Popularity increased among the *Whigs*; not by any favourable Disposition in the *Tories* to Popery and arbitrary Power; but by a Dread, as I have observed already, of returning in the least Degree under the
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Influence of *those Principles*, and the Power of *those Men*, whose Yoke had gall'd the Necks of many that were still alive and active on the Stage of publick Affairs. *Men grew jealous of the Design* (says Bishop Burnet, speaking of *Monmouth's Popularity*) *and fancy'd here was a new civil War to be raised. Upon this, They join'd with the Duke's Party*; meaning the Duke of *York's*.

I say nothing of the Apprehensions entertain'd on *one Side*, and the Expectations entertain'd on the *other from Scotland*; because though there was, even in the Beginning of these Struggles, a Concert between Those, who were oppress'd by the *Court* there, and Those, who opposed it here, which grew afterwards into a closer Correspondence, and became riper for Action; yet the seditious Spirit, that gave Occasion to these Apprehensions and Expectations, was roused and exasperated by the Inhumanity of the Duke of *Lauderdale*; who, though a *Presbyterian* himself, was the Butcher of *that Party*; push'd the warmest of Them into unjustifiable Excesses; revived their silly Zeal for the *Covenant*; and wrought up their Enthusiasm even to *Assassination* and *Rebellion*. Let me only observe that This was plainly the Fault of the *Court*, and could not therefore be imputed to the *Whigs*, whatever Use some of *that Party* might propose to make of such a Disposition. The Violence of the *Conventiclers* was founded high, in order to palliate the Severities exercised in the Government of *that Kingdom*. But the reasonable Men of *all Parties* thought then, as They think now, and always will think, that it is the Duty of *Those*, who govern, to discern the *Spirit of the People*; to consider even their *Passions*; to have a Regard to their *Weaknesses*; and to shew Indulgence to their *Prejudices*; and that *Ministers*,

who punish what They might prevent, are more culpable than *Those*, who offend.

As the *two Parties* were form'd, so was their Division maintain'd by mutual Jealousies and Fears; which are often sufficient to nourish themselves, when they have once taken Root in the Mind; and which were, at this Time, water'd and cultivated with all the factious Industry possible. The most improbable Reports, the most idle Surmises, carried about in Whispers, were sufficient (as I might easily shew in various Instances) to raise a panick Terror in *one Party*, or the *other*. In *both*, there were but too many Persons on the Watch, to improve and to propagate these Terrors, and by a frequent Repetition of such Impressions to raise the Alarm and Hatred of *Parties* to the highest Pitch. He, who went about to allay this extravagant Ferment, was call'd a *Trimmer*; and He, who was in Truth a common Friend, was sure of being treated like a common Enemy. Some, who voted for the *Bill of Exclusion*, were very far from being *heartily* for it; but I have seen good Reasons to believe, and such there are even in our publick Relations, that some of *Those*, who voted *against* it, and declared for *Limitations*, concur'd in the *End*, tho' They differ'd in the *Means*, with *Those*, who promoted the *Bill*. And yet *such Men* were constantly mark'd out as *Favourers of Popery* and *Enemies to their Country*. Thus in the *other Party*, Men, who had no other View but That of securing their *Religion* and *Liberty*, and who meant nothing more than to force the *Court* into such Compliances, as They judged necessary to establish this Security, were stigmatized with the opprobrious Names of *Fanatick* and *Republican*. Thus it happen'd in those Days; and thus it happens in ours; when any Man, who declares against a *certain Person*, against whom the

Voice

Voice of the Nation hath already declared, or complains of *Things*, which are so notorious, that no Man in the Nation can deny them, is sure to be follow'd by the Cry of *Jacobitism*, or *Republicanism*. But there is a great Difference, God be praised, between the *two Cases*. The *present Cry*, being void of *Pretence*, is therefore without *Effect*. It is heard in *few Places*, and believed only in *one*.

——But to return;

When the Nation was divided in this Manner, the Heat of the *Parties* increased as their Contest lasted, according to the usual Course of Things. New Engagements were daily taken; new Provocations and Offences were daily given. Publick Disputes begot private Pique; and private Pique supported publick Disputes with greater Rancour and Obstinacy. The *opposite Principles*, advanced by the *two Parties*, were carried higher and higher, as They grew more inflamed; and the *Measures* They pursued, in order to get the better each of his *Adversary*, without overmuch Regard to any other Consequence, became stronger and stronger, and perhaps equally dangerous. The Meeting of the Parliament at *Oxford* had a Kind of hostile Appearance; and as soon as *Parliaments were laid aside*, which happen'd on the sudden and indecent Dissolution of This, the Appearance grew worse. No Security having been obtain'd, by *Parliamentary Methods*, against the Dangers of a *Popish Succession*, it is probable that They, who look'd on these Dangers as nearest and greatest, began to cast about how They might secure Themselves, and their Country against them, by *Methods of another Kind*; such as extreme Necessity, and nothing but extreme Necessity can authorize. *Such Methods* were happily pursued and attended with glorious Success, a few Years afterwards, when *this Succession* had

taken Place; and, by taking Place, had justify'd all, that had been said against it, or foreboded of it; when the Nation was ripe for *Resistance*, and the Prince of *Orange* ready and able, from a Multitude of fortunate, concurring Circumstances, to support so great an Enterprize. But the Attempts, which were wise at *one Time*, would have been desperate at the *other*; and the Measures, which produced a *Revolution*, in the Reign of King *James*, would have produced, in the Reign of King *Charles*, a *civil War* of uncertain Event at best; I say of uncertain Event at best; because it seems to Me that whoever revolves in his Thoughts the State of *England* and *Scotland*, as well as the Situation of our *Neighbours on the Continent*, at that Time, must be of Opinion that if the Quarrel about the *Exclusion* had broke out into a War, the *best Cause* would have been the *worst supported*. The King, more united than ever with his *Brother*, would have prevail'd. What was projected in 1670, and perhaps more than was then intended, would have been effected; and the *Religion* and *Liberty* of *Great Britain* would have been destroy'd by Consequence. We cannot say, and it would be Presumption to pretend to guess, how far the *Heads of Party* had gone, in *Scotland*, or in *England*, into Measures for employing *Force*. Perhaps, little more had pass'd, in which *They*, who became the *principal Sacrifices*, were any Way concern'd, than rash Discourse about dangerous, but rude, indigested Schemes, started by Men of wild Imaginations, or desperate Fortunes, and rather hearken'd to than assented to; nay, possibly, despised and neglected by Them. But the *Court*, who wanted a *Plot* to confirm and increase their *Party*, and to turn the popular Tide in their Favour, took the first Opportunity of having one; which was soon furnish'd to Them by the imprudent

dent, but honest Zeal of *Some*, and by the Villany as well as Madness of *Others*; and They prosecuted it so severely, with the Help of * *forward Sheriffs, willing Furies, bold Witnesses and mercenary Judges*, that it answer'd all their Ends. The Design of assassinating the *King* and the *Duke* was certainly confined to a few desperate Villians; but † *too many had heard it from Them, who were both so foolish and so wicked, as not to discover Them*; and This reflected great Prejudice, though I doubt not in many Cases very unjustly, against all Those, who had acted upon better Principles, but yet were involved in their Prosecutions.

As *this Event* disarm'd, dispirited and broke one *Party*; so it strengthen'd, animated and united the *other*. The *Tories*, who look'd on the Dangers They apprehended from the *Whigs* to be greater and nearer than Those, which They had apprehended, as well as the *Whigs*, before this new Division of *Parties*, from a *Popish Succession*, were now confirm'd in their Prejudices. Under this Persuasion, They ran headlong into all the Measures, which were taken for *enlarging the KING's Authority*, and *securing the Crown to the Duke of York*. The Principles of *divine hereditary Right*, of *Passive-Obedience*, and *Non-Resistance*, were revived and propagated with greater Zeal than ever. Not only the wild Whimlies of *Enthusiasts*, of *Schoolmen* and *Philosophers*, but the plainest Dictates of *Reason* were solemnly condemn'd, in Favour of them, by *learned and reverend Bodies of Men*; who little thought that in five Years Time, That is in 1688, They should act conformably to some of the very *Propositions*, which at this Time They declared *false, seditious and impious*.

* *Burnet.*† *Id.*

In short, the *Guelphs* and *Gibellines* were not more animated against each other, at any Time, than the *Tories* and *Whigs* at This; and in such a national Temper, considerable Steps were made, as they well might be, towards the Destruction of our Constitution. One of Those, which *Rapin* enumerates, and insists upon very gravely, can scarce be mention'd without smiling. *The King*, says He, in order to make his People feel the Slavery He had newly imposed on Them, affected to review his TROOPS; and these Troops amounted, by the Return of the Garrison of Tangier, to 4000 Men, effective, and well-arm'd. The *Whigs*, indeed, in those Days, were so averse to STANDING ARMIES, that They thought even those Troops, commonly call'd *Guards*, unlawful; and Bishop *Burnet* argues, in his Reflections on my Lord *Russel's* Tryal, that a Design to seize on Them amounted to no more than a Design to seize on a Part of the King's Army. But it is possible that the *Tories*, who had shew'd their Dislike of *standing Armies* sufficiently in the long Parliament, might think it however no unreasonable Thing, when Designs of *Insurrections*, and even of *Assassinations* had come so lately to Light, that a Number of regular Troops, sufficient to defend the Person of the King, but not sufficient to oppress the Liberties of the People, and five Times less than We have since seen kept up, in the Midst of the most secure Tranquility, should be wink'd at, till these Distempers were intirely over.

Another Step, which the same Author mentions, was indeed of the greatest Consequence, and laid the Ax to the Root of all our Liberties at once, by giving the CROWN such an Influence over the Elections of Members to serve in Parliament, as could not fail to destroy that Independency, by which alone the Freedom of our Government hath been, and

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can be supported. I mean the Proceedings by *Quo Warranto*, and the other Methods taken to force, or persuade, the Corporations to surrender their *old Charters*, and accept *new ones*, under such Limitations and Conditions, as the *King* thought fit to innovate. *These Proceedings* were violent, the *Judgments* upon them arbitrary, and the *other Methods* employ'd scandalous. But still it was the *End*, it was the *Consequence*, that alarm'd and terrify'd all those, who had not sold themselves to the *Court*, or who had not lost, in their Zeal for *Party*, all Regard to their *Country*, much more than the *Means*, that were employ'd upon this Occasion. If instead of garbling Corporations by *Prerogative*, the *Court* could have purchased their Elections by *Money*, We may reasonably believe that the *surer* and *more silent Way* would have been taken. But would the Alarm have been less among all the *Friends of Liberty*? Certainly not. They would have seen that the *End* was the same, and have disliked *these Means* the more, for being less liable to Observation and Clamour. A *Prince*, asserting an *illegal* and *dangerous Prerogative*, and applauded for doing so, and seconded in the Attempt by a *numerous Party* in the Nation, carried no Doubt a very terrible Aspect. But still there was Room to hope, the violent Character of the Duke of *York* consider'd, (and that Hope was actually entertain'd by many) that the *Party*, who abetted these Usurpations of the *Prerogative*, might be soon frighten'd back again from a *Court* to a *Country Interest*; in which Case, there was Room to hope likewise, the milder Character and better Understanding of the *King* consider'd, that the *Evil* might be in some Degree redress'd, and the *Consequences* of it prevented. It was reasonable for the *Friends of Liberty* to expect that Men, who
were

were injured, would complain and seek Relief, on the first favourable opportunity. But if they had been *corrupted*, and the Practice of *selling Elections* had been once establish'd, I imagine that the *Friends of Liberty* would have thought the Case more desperate.—— It is certainly an easier Task, and there is somewhat less provoking, as well as less dangerous in it, to struggle even with a *great Prince*, who stands on *Prerogative*, than with a *weak*, but *profligate Minister*, if He hath the Means of *Corruption* in his Power, and if the *Luxury* and *Prostitution* of the Age have enabled Him to bring it into *Fashion*. Nothing surely could provoke Men, who had the *Spirit of Liberty* in their Souls, more than to figure to Themselves *one of these saucy Creatures of Fortune*, whom She raises in the Extravagance of her Caprice, dispatching his Emislaries, ecclesiastical and secular, like so many evil Dæmons, to the North and to the South, to buy the Votes of the People with the Money of the People, and to chuse a *Representative Body*, not of the People, but of the *Enemy of the People*, of *Himself*.

This was not the Case at the Time We are speaking of. It was *Prerogative*, not *Money*, which had like to have destroy'd our *Liberties* then. Government was not then carried on by *Undertakers*, to whom *so much Power* was farm'd out for Returns of *so much Money*, and *so much Money* intrusted for Returns of *so much Power*. But though the Case was not so desperate; yet was it bad enough in all Conscience; and among all the Excesses, into which the *Tories* ran, in Favour of the *Crown*, and in Hopes of fixing Dominion in their *own Party*, their Zeal to support the Methods of *garbling Corporations* was, in my Opinion, That, which threaten'd *publick Liberty* the most. It hath
been

That of *Cromwell's Enthusiasts*, dishonour'd the whole Cause for a Time.—My Intention was not to have left them here; but to have carried these Observations on so far as to justify, notwithstanding these Appearances, what is said at the Conclusion of my *last Letter*, concerning the true Characters of *both Parties*. But either the Abundance of Matter hath deceived Me, or I have wanted Skill and Time to abridge it; so that I must defer this Part of my Task, and crave your Indulgence, as well as That of your Readers, for my Prolixity.

I am, SIR, &c.



LETTER VII.

SIR,

I Advanced, in the *first* of these Essays, something to this Effect; that every *clumsy, busy, bungling Child of Fortune*, on whom She bestows the Means and the Opportunity of *corrupting*, may govern by this infamous Expedient; and, having gratified his Ambition and Avarice, may have a Chance to secure himself from Punishment, by destroying the *Liberties of his Country*. It was advanced likewise, in the *same Paper*, that every Character is not equally fit to govern a People, by *dividing* them; because some Cunning, some Experience, nay, some Skill to form, and some Address to conduct a *System of Fraud*, are necessary in this Case. I persuade Myself that no Man, who read that Paper, was at a Loss to find an Instance to confirm the Truth of the *first of these Propositions*;

tions; and We have now before us another, which may serve to confirm the Truth of the *second*.

Though I do not think the Designs of King Charles the 2^d either deeply laid, or deeply fix'd in his own Mind; yet in general they were founded on *bad Principles*, and directed to *bad Ends*. He desired indeed to be easy, and to make his People so; but then He desired both These on such Conditions, as were inconsistent with good Government, during the whole Course of his Reign, and with the Security of Religion and Liberty, during the latter Part of it. We have seen how the intemperate Conduct of many, and the flagitious Designs of some among the *Whigs*, weaken'd their *own Party*, and gave new Strength and new Provocations to the *other*. But we have not yet consider'd some other Advantages, without which *these Divisions* could neither have been fomented, nor supported as they were. Now these Advantages arose chiefly from the Character and Conduct of the *King* himself. If King Charles had found the Nation plunged in *Corruption*; the People chusing their Representatives for *Money*, without any other Regard; and these Representatives of the People, as well as the Nobility, reduced by Luxury to beg the unhallow'd Alms of a *Court*; or to receive, like miserable Hirelings, the Wages of Iniquity from a *Minister*; if he had found the Nation, I say, in this Condition, (which extravagant Supposition one cannot make without Horror) He might have dishonour'd Her abroad, and impoverish'd and oppress'd Her at home, tho' He had been the weakest Prince on Earth and his *Ministers* the most odious, and contemptible Men that ever presumed to be ambitious. Our Fathers might have fallen into Circumstances, which compose the very Quintessence of political Misery. They might

have sold their Birth-right for Porridge, which was their own. They might have been bubbled by the foolish, bullied by the fearful, and insulted by those, whom They despised. They would have deserved to be *Slaves*, and they might have been treated as such. When a *free People* crouch, like Camels, to be loaded, the next at Hand, no Matter who, mounts Them, and They soon feel the Whip, and the Spur of their *Tyrant*; for a *Tyrant*, whether *Prince*, or *Minister*, resembles the *Devil* in many Respects; particularly in This. He is often both the *Tempter* and *Tormentor*. He makes the Criminal, and he punishes the *Crime*.

But this was not the State of the *English Nation* at the Time we speak of. We were not yet *corrupted*, nor even quite ripe for *Corruption*. *Parties* there were; and the Contests of *these Parties* gave Occasion to the Rise and Growth of *Factions*; some of which ran into the most seditious Practices against the Government, and others into the vilest Submission to it. But still a *Spirit of Liberty* remain'd in many, uncorrupted and unextinguish'd, and such as work'd our national Deliverance in the Days of Distress, that soon follow'd. We were *Freemen* then, in the proper Sense, and full Extent of the Words; because not only the *Laws*, which asserted our common Rights, were maintain'd and improved, but *private Independency*, which can alone support *publick Liberty*, under such a Government as ours, was itself supported by some of that *antient Oeconomy* and *Simplicity of Manners*, that were growing, but not grown, out of Fashion. *Such a People*, as We then were, could neither be *bought*, nor *driven*; and I think King *Charles* could not have *divided* and *led* Them, if He had wanted any of the Qualities He possess'd, or had held another Conduct than He held.

held. Far from being proud, haughty, or brutal, * *He had not a Grain of Pride, or Vanity, in his whole Composition*; but was the most affable, best-bred Man alive. He treated his Subjects like *Noblemen, like Gentlemen, like Freemen*, not like *Vassals* or *Boors*. Whatever Notion He had of his *hereditary Right*, He own'd his Obligation for the Crown He wore to his *People*, as much as He would have been bound to do, in Reason, in Justice, in Honour, and in Prudence, if He had stood at the greatest Distance from it, in the Course of lineal Succession, and had been call'd to it from the low State, in which He was before, by the free Gift and Choice of the Nation. His Professions were plausible, and his whole Behaviour engaging; so that He won upon the Hearts, even whilst He lost the good Opinion of his Subjects, and often ballanced their Judgment of Things, by their personal Inclination. These Qualities and this Part of his Conduct went a great Way to give Him Credit with his People, and an Hold on their Affections. But This was not all. He observed their Temper, and He comply'd with it. He yeilded to Them in Points, from which He had determined, and declared too, that He would never depart. To know when to yeild, in *Government*, is at least as necessary, as to know when to lose in *Trade*; and He, who cannot do the *first*, is so little likely to *govern a Kingdom well*, that it is more than probable He would *govern a Shop ill*. King *Charles* gave up to the Murmurs of his People, not *one* or *two* *uch Ministers* as may be found almost behind every Desk; those awkward Pageants of Courts, those wooden Images, which Princes gild and then wor-

* Sir William Temple.

ship; but several *great and able Men*; nay, *whole Cabals of such*, who had Merit with *Him*, though they had none with the *Nation*. He started often out of the true Interest of his People; but the Voice of his People almost as often reclaim'd *Him*. He made the *first Dutch War*; but He made the *Triple Alliance*, too. He engaged with *France* in the War of 1672; but He made a separate Peace with *Holland*. True it is, indeed, that neither the Representations of his Parliament, nor the Desires of his People, could prevail on *Him* to go farther, and to enter in earnest into the War against *France*. But the Confidence between *Him* and his *Parliament* was so broken at that Time, that They would not trust *Him*, nor He Them. At This I am not surprized, and for that very Reason, I confess, I have always been so at the strong and repeated Instances made to force *Him* into *that War*; since it cannot surely be better Policy to drive a Prince into a War, which He has no Inclination to make, than it would be to be drawn by *Him* into a War, if He had no Ability to conduct it. In *Home-Affairs*, besides his frequent Concessions, whenever the Nation took Umbrage at his Proceedings, He pass'd the *Test* and the *Habeas Corpus Bills*, and many others for the publick Benefit; and I scarce remember any *popular Act*, which stop'd at the Throne in his Time, except That about the *Militia*, which He apprehended to be a dangerous Enchroachment on his Prerogative, and another in Favour of the *Dissenters*, which was contrived, meanly enough, to be stolen off the Table in the *House of Lords*.

What has been touch'd here, and in former Papers, will be sufficient to shew, in some Measure, how King *Charles* was enabled to *divide a Nation* so united and so heated as this Nation was, on the

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Discovery of the *Popish Plot*; to oppose so avowedly and so resolutely the *Exclusion of his Brother*; the Prospect of whose succeeding to the Crown was become still more dreadful, even by that small Part of *Coleman's* Correspondence, which had come to Light; and yet to attach so numerous a Party to *Himself*, nay to his *Brother*; to lay aside Parliaments for several Years, and not only to stand his Ground, but to gain Ground in the Nation, at the same Time. But there is still something more to be added. He had not only prepared for the Storm, but He acquired new Strength in the midst of it; That is, in the Proceedings on the *Popish Plot*, and the *Bill of Exclusion*. He would gladly have kept the *former* out of Parliament; but when it was once there, He put on the Appearances of great Zeal for the Prosecution of it. These Appearances help'd him to screen his *Brother*; as the ill Success of the *Exclusion Bill in the House of Lords*, where it was rejected by *Sixty-Three* against *Thirty*, help'd to screen *Himself* from the Violence of the *House of Commons*. But That, which gave *Him* the principal Advantage, in the present Contests, was another Management. As soon as the first preparatory Steps were made to the *Bill of Exclusion* in 1678, he declared *Himself*, in a Speech to his Parliament, ready to pass any Bills to make his People safe in the Reign of his *Successor*, so they tended not to impeach the Right of Succession, nor the Descent of the Crown in the true Line. He persisted in his Declaration to the last; and if He had done nothing else, I imagine that He would have gain'd no great Popularity. When a free People lye under any Grievance, or apprehend any Danger, and try to obtain their Prince's Consent to deliver Them from *one*, or prevent the *other*; a flat Refusal, on his Part, reduces Them to the melancholy Alternative of
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continuing to submit to *one*, and to stand exposed to the *other*, or of freeing Themselves from *both*, without his Consent; which can hardly be done by Means very consistent with his and their common Interest. King *Charles* was too wise to push the Nation to such an Extremity. He refused what his Parliament press'd on Him, in the *Manner* and on the *Principle* they press'd it; but then his *Refusal* was follow'd by *Expedients*; which varyed the *Manner*, and yet might have been managed so as to produce the *Effect*; and which seem'd to save, rather than actually saved, the *Principle*. Numbers concur'd, at that Time, in avowing the *Principle*; and the *Tests* had made many Persons think *Religion* safe; as the *King's Offers* made Them think it no Fault of his, if it was not made safer. The *Council* had prepared *some Expedients*; and the *Limitations*, and *other Provisions* against a *Popish Successor*, proposed directly from the Throne by the *Chancellor* in 1679, went a great Way towards binding the Hands of *such a Successor*, and lodging the Power, taken from Him, in the Parliament. But the Scheme of *Expedients*, debated in the *Oxford* Parliament, was a real Exclusion from every Thing, but the *Title of a King*. The *first Article* banish'd the Duke of *York*, during his Life, to the Distance of 500 Miles from *England, Scotland* and *Ireland*; and the *Tenth*, to mention no more, excluded him *ipso facto*, if He came into any of these Kingdoms; directed that He should suffer, in this Case, as by the *former Bill*, and that the Sovereignty should vest forthwith in the *Regent*; That is, in the Princess of *Orange*. Surely This was not to vote the *Lion in the Lobby into the House*. It would have been to vote Him out of the *House and Lobby both*, and only suffer Him to be call'd *Lion* still. I am not ignorant of the Refinements, urged by
Sir

Sir *William Jones* and Others against *this Scheme*; but I know that Men run into Errors from both Extremes; from That of seeing too much, as well as That of seeing too little; and that the most subtle Refiners are apt to miss the true Point of political Wisdom, which consists in distinguishing justly between what is absolutely best in Speculation, and what is the best of Things practicable in particular Conjunctions. The *Scheme*, no Doubt, was built on a manifest Absurdity, and was liable to many Inconveniencies, Difficulties and Dangers; but still it was the utmost, that could be hoped for at that Moment; and the single Consideration, one would think, should have been This; whether, united under such an Act of Parliament, They would not have opposed the Succession of the Duke of *York*, with less Inconveniency, less Difficulty and Danger, than disunited, and with the Laws against Them. The Truth is, that as there were Men at this Time, desirous that the *King* should be on desperate Terms with his *Parliament*, because *They* were so Themselves; in like Manner, there were Others, who desired, for a Reason of the same Nature, that the *Parliament* should be on desperate Terms with the *King*. These were *factionous Interests*, and they prevail'd against the *national Interest*; which required that the *King* should be separated at any Rate from his *Brother*, instead of being united to Him by a Fear made common to *both*. But the Dye was thrown; and the Leaders of the *Whig-Party* were resolv'd * to let all lye in Confusion, rather than hearken to any Thing, besides the Exclusion. Obstinacy provok'd Obstinacy. The *King* grew obstinate, and severe too, against his natural Ease and former Clemency of Temper. The

* *Burn. Hist.*

Tory Party grew as obstinate, and as furious on their Side, according to a natural Tendency in the Disposition of all *Parties*; and thus the Nation was deliver'd over, on the Death of King * *Charles*, à la Sottise de son Frere; to the Folly and Madness of his Brother.

It was *this Folly and Madness* however, that cured the *Folly and Madness of Party*. As the common Danger approach'd, the Impressions of Terror, which it made, increased. *Whig* and *Tory* then felt them alike, and were brought by them, as drunken Men sometimes are, to their Senses. The Events of King *James's* Reign, and the Steps, by which the *Revolution* was brought about, are so recent and so well known, that I shall not descend into any particular Mention of them. A few general Remarks on the Behaviour of *this Prince*, and on the Behaviour of *Parties*, in his Reign, and at the *Revolution*, will be sufficient to wind up the History of *Whig* and *Tory*, and to prove what I have so often asserted, that *both Sides* purged Themselves on this great Occasion, of the Imputations laid to their Charge by their *Adversaries*; that the proper and real Distinction of the *two Parties* expired at this *Æra*, and that although their Ghosts have continued to haunt and divide us so many Years afterwards, yet there neither is, nor can be any Division of *Parties* at this Time, reconcileable with common Sense, and common Honesty, among Those, who are come on the Stage of the World, under the *present Constitution*; except Those of *Churchmen* and *Dissenters*; Those of *Court* and *Country*.

The Behaviour and Conduct of King *James* the 2^d would be sufficient, if there was no other In-

* An Expression used by King *Charles* on many Occasions.

stance, and there are Thousands, to shew that as strong Prejudices, however got, are the Parents, so a weak Understanding is the Nurse of *Bigotry*, and Injustice, and Violence and Cruelty its Off-spring. *This Prince* was above *Fifty*, when He came to the Throne. He had great Experience of all Kinds; particularly of the Temper of *this Nation*, and of the Impossibility to attempt introducing *Popery*, without hazarding his Crown. But his *Experience* profited him not. His *Bigotry* drew false Conclusions from it. He flatter'd himself that He should be able to play *Parties* against one another, better than his *Brother* had done; (which, by the Way, was the least of his little Talents;) and to compleat his Designs by an *Authority*, which was but too well establish'd. He pass'd, I think, for a sincere Man. Perhaps, He was so, and He spoke always with great Emphasis of the *Word of a King*; and yet never was the meanest Word so scandalously broken as his. In the Debate in 1678, about the *Test*, when he got a Proviso put in for accepting Himself, it has been advanced in Print, and not denied that I know of, that speaking with * *great Earnestness and with Tears in his Eyes, He solemnly protested that whatever his Religion might be, it should only be a private Thing between God and his own Soul; and that no Effect of it should ever appear in the Government.* At his Accession to the Throne, in *Council* first, and after That in *full Parliament*, in the Face of the Nation, He made the strongest Declaration in Favour of the Constitution in Church and State, and took the most solemn Engagements to defend and support it. But *Bigotry* burst thro' all these Cobwebs; for such they are to Men, transported by a *religious Delirium*, who acquire a Strength

* *Burne's History.*

that Those, who are well, have not, and conscientiously break all the Obligations of Morality. These admirable Dispositions in the *King* were encouraged by the State, in which his *Brother* left and He found the Nation, and by the Complaisance of the Parliament, which he call'd soon after his Accession. They were confirm'd, and He was determin'd to pull off the Mask entirely, by the ill Success of the Duke of *Monmouth* and the Earl of *Argyle*, Bishop *Burnet* speaks of this Parliament very indecently, and I think very untruly. *They were neither Men of Parts, nor Estates*, according to Him. The Truth is, that the Circumstances, under which We were brought, by the factious Proceedings of *both Parties*, in the late Reign, for and against the *Court*, were such as might perplex the best Parts, and puzzle the Heads even of the wisest Men. A *profess'd, zealous Papist*, in full and quiet Possession of the Throne, and, instead of any Provision made, or any Measures taken against Him, the Notion and the Exercise of the Prerogative establish'd at an extravagant Height, were such Circumstances, as laid the Nation almost at the Mercy of the *King*. They therefore, who were the most determin'd not to part with either their *Religion*, or their *Liberty*, and yet had more to lose in the Fray than Dr. *Burnet*, might be willing to look round Them; to wait Opportunities; and not undertake rashly what can seldom be undertaken twice. It is impossible to believe that their Confidence in the *King's Word* was such as They affected. But like drowning Men, who saw nothing else to catch at, They caught at a Straw. The Duke of *Monmouth's* Expedition into *England* and the Earl of *Argyle's* into *Scotland*, were so far from affording the Nation any Opportunity of mending their Condition, that the Declaration of the *former* might draw

draw some of the *Dissenters* to his Standard, as it did; but was calculated to drive the *Tory Party*, most of the *Whigs*, and in short the *Bulk of the People* from Him. The Declaration of the *latter* was founded in the *solemn League and Covenant*; and gave so much Reason to apprehend that a Revival of the *same Principles*, and a Renewal of the *same Tyranny* was intended, that We cannot wonder it had no better an Effect; though We lament the Fate of a *worthy and gallant Man*, whose Crime was refusing a *Test*, that should never have been imposed on *Protestants and Freemen*, and who had been driven into these extreme Resolutions by a Series of *unjust and tyrannical Usage*.

Thus were *these Invasions*, in the very Beginning of his Reign, favourable in some Respects to the Designs of King *James*. They fortified, in the Minds of Men, the Jealousies and Fears, which had a few Years before form'd the *Tory Party*; and disposed Them by Consequence, at least, to keep Measures and not break with the *King*. They gave Him the Pretence, which He seized very readily, of raising and keeping up a *standing Army*. But, in the Event, they forwarded our Deliverance from all the Dangers, to which We were exposed, under his Government, by precipitating his Attempts against our *Religion and Liberty*. The same Day, that the News of the Invasion in *Scotland* was communicated to the *Parliament* here, the *Commons* voted that great Revenue, which they gave Him, and gave Him for Life. After *these Invasions* were over, They voted a Supply, which was intended for the Charge of maintaining the *additional Forces*. They offer'd to pass a Law for indemnifying his *Popish Officers* from the Penalty They had incur'd; and to capacitate *such Others* as He should name in a List to be given to the *House*. In short, They
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suffer'd Themselves to be drawn to the Brink of the Precipice; but there They stop'd. They would neither give Him the whole Supply of 1,200,000 *l.* which He ask'd, nor sanctify, by the Authority of *Parliament*, the Practice of keeping up a *standing Army in Time of Peace*; but rejected the Words moved for that Purpose. They would neither repeal the *Test* and *penal Laws*; nor submit to his *dispensing*, or *suspending*, which was in Effect a *repealing Power*; That is, they would not cast Themselves headlong down the Precipice; and because They would not, He quarrel'd with Them, lost the 700,000 *l.* They had voted, rather than suffer Them to sit any longer; and never met Them more.

Things hasten'd now to a Decision. The *King's* Designs were openly avow'd, and desperately push'd. The Church of *England* opposed them, with the utmost Vigour. The *Dissenters* were cajoled by the *Court*; and They, who had been ready to take Arms against King *Charles*, because He was unwilling to exclude his *Brother*, and who had taken Arms against *this Prince*, since He was on the Throne, became Abettors of his Usurpations. It were easy to prove This, even by Bishop *Burnet's* Account, as much as That is soften'd; and if the Excuses, which have been made for their Silence against *Poperity* in this critical Moment, or for their approving and encouraging the Exercise of a *dispensing Power*, are to be received, one may undertake to excuse, on the same Principles of Reasoning, all those Instances of Misconduct in the *Church Party*, which I have presumed to censure so freely. But the Truth is, these Excuses are frivolous. I could quote some, that are even burlesque. Let us reverence Truth therefore, and condemn the *Dissenters* as frankly, on this Occasion, as We have
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condemn'd the Members of the *Church of England* on others.

The *Revolution* soon follow'd. Many of the most distinguish'd *Tories*, some of those, who carried highest the Doctrines of *Passive Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*, were engaged in it ; and the whole Nation was ripe for it. The *Whigs* were zealous in the same Cause, but their Zeal was not such as, I think, it had been some Years before, a *Zeal without Knowledge* ; I mean, that it was better temper'd, and more prudently conducted. Though the *King* was not the better for his Experience, *Parties* were. Both saw their Errors. The *Tories* stop'd short in the Pursuit of a *bad Principle*. The *Whigs* reform'd the Abuse of a *good one*. Both had sacrificed their *Country* to their *Party*. Both sacrificed, on this Occasion, their *Party* to their *Country*. When the *Tories* and the *Whigs* were thus coalited, the *latter* stood no longer in Need of any adventitious Help. If They did not refuse the Assistance of Those, who had weaken'd their Cause more, by the Jealousies and Fears, to which They gave both Occasion and Pretence, than They had strengthen'd it by their Number ; yet They suffer'd Them to have no Influence in their Councils, no Direction of their Conduct. The Cause of *Liberty* was no longer made the Cause of a *Party*, by being set on such a Bottom, and push'd in such a Manner, as *one Party* alone approved. The *Revolution* was plainly design'd to restore and secure our Government, Ecclesiastical and Civil, on true Foundations ; and whatever might happen to the *King*, there was no Room to suspect any Change of the *Constitution*. There were Some, indeed, concern'd in this great and glorious Undertaking, who had obstinately preserved, or lightly taken up the *Republican* and *other Whimsies*, that reign'd in the
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Days of Usurpation and Confusion. If they could have prevail'd, and it was no Fault of theirs they did not, the *Coalition of Parties* had been broken; and instead of a *Revolution*, we might have had a *civil War*; perhaps. not even that sad Chance for our *Religion* and *Liberty*. But *this Leaven* was so near worn out, that it could neither corrupt, nor seem any longer to corrupt the Mass of the *Whig-Party*. The Party never had been *Presbyterians*, nor *Republicans*, any more than They had been *Quakers*; any more than the *Tory Party* had been *Papists*, when, notwithstanding their Aversion to *Popery*, they were undeniably under the accidental Influence of *Popish Councils*. But even the Appearances were now rectified. The *Revolution* was a Fire, which purged off the Dross of *both Parties*; and the Dross being purged off, They appear'd to be the same Metal, and answer'd the same Standard.

I shall deliver my Thoughts, on some other Occasion, concerning the Disputes, that arose about the *Settlement of the Crown*, after the *Revolution*; and shew, if I do not very much deceive Myself, that no Argument can be drawn from thence against any Thing I have advanced.

I am, S I R, &c.



L E T T E R



LETTER VIII.

S I R,

THE slavish Principles of *Passive-Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*, which had sculk'd perhaps in some old Homily before King *James the 1st*, but were talk'd, written and preach'd into Vogue in that inglorious Reign, and in Those of his three Successors, were renounced at the *Revolution* by the *last of the several Parties*, who declared for them. Not only the *Laity*, but the *Clergy* embraced and co-operated in the Deliverance, which the Prince of *Orange* brought Them. Some of our *Prelates* join'd to invite Him over. Their Bretheren refused to sign an Abhorrence of this Invitation. The University of *Oxford* offer'd Him their Plate, and associated for Him against their *King*. In one Word, the Conduct of the *Tories*, at this Crisis, was such as might have inclined a Man to think They had never held *Resistance* unlawful, but had only differ'd with the *Whigs* about the Degree of Oppression, or of Danger, which it was necessary to wait, in order to sanctify *Resistance*. Now, it may appear at first a little strange that *These Principles*, which had always gone Hand in Hand with Those of the *divine, hereditary, indefeasible Right of Kings*, that were just as well founded in Reason, in Support of which the Example of the primitive *Christians* might be pompously cited, and to countenance which some Texts

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of the Bible might be piously strain'd, should not keep their Hold, and maintain their Influence, as well as the *others*.

This Attachment to *hereditary Right* will appear the more strange, if We consider what Regard was shewn, at this Time, to the Difficulties They, who had pawn'd themselves, as it were for the *Principles*, would be under, when they came to concur in establishing a *Settlement* repugnant to it. That great and solemn Resolution, about the *Abdication of King James*, and the *Vacancy of the Throne*, might have been express'd in Terms much stronger and plainer than it was. I have heard there were Persons, who had a Mind it should be so; and who, more attach'd to the Honour, That is the Humour of *Party*, than to the *national Interest*, in this great Event, would have turn'd this Resolution, as well as the Declaration of the Prince of *Orange*, to a more express Approbation of the *Whig*, and a more express Condemnation of the *Tory* Tenets and Conduct. But a wiser and honest Consideration prevail'd. Instead of erecting the *new Government* on the narrow Foundations of *Party Systems*, the Foundations of it were laid as wide, and made as comprehensible, as They could be. No Man, I believe, at this Time, thinks that the Vote assert'd too little; and surely there was no Colour of Reason on the Side of *Those*, who cavil'd against it, at that Time, for asserting too much.

The Disputes about the Words *abdicate*, or *desert*, and about the *Vacancy of the Throne*, were in Truth fitter for a *School* than a *House of Parliament*, and might have been expected in some Assembly of *Pedants*, where young Students exercised themselves in Disputation, but not in such an august Assembly as That of the *Lords* and *Commons*, met
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in solemn Conference upon the most important Occasion. The Truth is that They, who form'd the Opposition, were reduced to maintain strange Paradoxes; stranger, in my Opinion, than most of Those, which cast so much Ridicule on the *Stoics* of old. Thus, for instance, They were forced to admit that an *oppress'd People* might seek their Remedy in *Resistance*, for They had sought it there themselves, and yet they oppos'd making Use of the *only Remedy*, which could effectually secure them against Returns of the *same Oppression*, when *Resistance* had put it in their Power, as *Oppression* had given them a Right to use this *Remedy*. Surely This must appear a Paradox, and a very absurd one too, if We consider that *Resistance*, in all such Cases, is the *Mean*, and *future Security* the *End*; and that the *former* is impertinent, nay wicked in the highest Degree, if it be not employ'd to obtain the *latter*. Thus again, the *same Men* declar'd themselves willing to secure the Nation against the Return of King *James* to that Throne, which He had *abdicated*; or according to Them, *deserted*; nay, some of them were ready, if We may credit the Anecdotes of that Time, to proceed to such extreme Resolutions, as would have been more effectual, than justifiable in the Eyes of Mankind; and yet they could not prevail on their scrupulous Consciences to declare *the Throne vacant*. They had concur'd in the Vote, that it was *inconsistent with the Laws, Liberties and Religion of England to have a Papist rule over the Kingdom*. King *James* had follow'd the pious Example of *Sigismund*, who, not content to lose the Crown of *Sweden* Himself for his Religion, had carried his *Son* away, that He might be bred a *Papist*, and lose it too; and yet They maintain'd, though They did not expressly name Him, that if the Throne was then,

or should be at any Time vacant of the *Father*, it must be reputed instantaneously full of the *Son*, upon the Foundation of this silly Axiom, that the *King never dies*. According to this Law, and these Politicks, King *James* and his Successors, to the twentieth Generation, might have continued abroad, a Race of Royal Exiles, preserving their *indefeasible Right* to govern, but debar'd from the *Exercise* of it; whilst the Nation continued, during all this Time, from Century to Century, under the Dominion of *Regents*, with *regal Authority*, but without any *regal Right*; an excellent Expedient sure to keep the Monarchy in an *hereditary Succession*! But there remain'd none better, on the Principles of *these Men*, since the Prince of *Orange* had committed the fatal Oversight of neglecting to *conquer* the Nation. His Sword would have cut the gordian Knot of *hereditary Right*, and They could have submitted with safe Consciences to a *Conqueror*. But to *give* the Crown to a *Prince*, though They had put the *whole Administration* into his Hands; which, by the Way, was *High Treason*, unless the Throne was, what they deny'd it to be, actually *vacant*; to *give* the Crown, I say, to a *Prince*, who would not *take* it, when it was in his Power to *take* it, without their *Consent*; to settle a new Government by *Agreement* and *Compact*, when the glorious Opportunity of establishing it by *Force* and *Conquest* had been unhappily lost; These were Propositions, to which they could not consent. King *James* had violated the fundamental Laws, which He had promised over and over and sworn to maintain. He had shewn by his *first Escape*, when nothing was more imposed on Him than to wait the Resolution of a *free Parliament*, that He would renounce his Crown rather than submit to secure effectually the Observation

servation of these Laws. He had made a *second*
Escape, which was voluntary as well as the *first*,
 and made on the same Principle, against the In-
 treaties of his Friends, and the Instigations of the
same Council as had directed his former Conduct,
 and on a Letter from the *Queen*, claiming his Pro-
 mise to do so. Notwithstanding all these Reasons,
 They, who maintain'd the *hereditary Right of our*
Kings, reduced Themselves, and would have reduced
 their Country, to the absurd Necessity of altering
 the *Constitution*, under Pretence of preserving it.
 No *King*, except a *Stuart*, was to reign over Us.
 But we might establish a *Doge*, a *Lord Archon*, a
Regent; and thus these warm Assertors of *Monar-*
chy, refusing to be *Slaves*, contended to be *Repub-*
licans. Many more Paradoxes of equal Extrava-
 gance might be cited, which were advanced di-
 rectly, or which resulted plainly, from the Argu-
 ments employ'd on one Side of the Question in
 those Disputes. But the Instances I have cited may
 suffice for our present Purpose, and may serve to
 shew that although Difficulties hard to solve in
 Speculation, or to remove in Practice, will arise
 in the Pursuit of the most rational Principles; yet
 such Absurdities as these can never arise, except
 from the most irrational, and always must arise
 from such.

If the Persons, who maintain'd this *divine, here-*
ditary, indefeasible Right of our Kings, had thought
 fit to drop these Principles, when They laid aside
 Those of *Passive Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*, and
 no tolerable Reason can be given why They did not,
 their Conduct would have been consistent and uni-
 form on this great Occasion; and this Consistency
 and Uniformity would have been productive of
 great Good, by taking away at once even the Ap-
 pearances of all political Division in the Bulk of the
 Nation

Nation. But whilst They labour'd to reconcile their *present Conduct* to their *antient System*, They were true to *neither*. They had gone much farther than *This* would allow, and then *They* refused to go as far as the *other* required, in order to be safe, and therefore in order to be justify'd. They lost every Kind of Merit; the chimerical Merit of adhering to a Set of *silly Principles*; the real Merit of sacrificing their Prejudices to the compleat Deliverance of their Country from the recent Danger of *Popery* and *arbitrary Power*. Nay, They did worse; for the mischievous Consequences of their Conduct were not hurtful to Them alone, and at that Time alone, but to the Publick, and even down to these Times. They furnish'd Pretence to *Factions*, who kept up a Division under the *old Names*, when the Differences were really extinguish'd by the Conduct of *both Parties*; because the Conduct of *both Parties* was no longer conformable to the Principles imputed to Them. The *Tories* had no longer any Pretence of fearing the Designs of the *Whigs*; since the *Whigs* had sufficiently purged Themselves from all Suspicion of *Republican Views*, by their Zeal to continue *monarchical Government*, and of latitudinarian Schemes in Point of *Religion*, by their ready Concurrence in preserving our *Ecclesiastical Establishment*, and by their insisting on nothing farther, in Favour of the *Dissenters*, than that Indulgence, which the *Church* was most willing to grant. The *Whigs* had as little Pretence of fearing the *Tories*; since the *Tories* had purged Themselves, in the most signal Manner, from all Suspicion of favouring *Popery*, or *arbitrary Power*, by the vigorous Resistance They made to *both*. They had engaged, They had taken the Lead in the *Revolution*, and They were fully determined against the Return of King *James*. The real Essences of
Whig

Whig and *Tory* were thus destroy'd; but the nominal were preserved, and have done since that Time a good Part of the Mischief, which the real did before. The Opposition made to the *Settlement of the Crown* brought This about. An over-curious Enquiry into the Motives of this Opposition would be a Task too invidious for Me to undertake. Something however may be said upon it. We may say in general, without Offence, that *private Ambition* mingled itself early in the great and national Concerns of the *Revolution*; and that it did so more, as the Prospect of a *new Settlement*, and of the Elevation of the Prince of *Orange* approach'd. Expectations were raised; Disappointments were given, or foreseen; and a Variety of Motives of the same Kind began to influence very strongly the Conduct of the principal Actors. *Some* endeavour'd to lay the Foundations of their future Fortune by Demonstrations of a personal Attachment to the *Prince*; which were carried on, I doubt a little too independently of the Regard due to their Country, in some Cases; particularly, if I mistake not, in That of *the Declaration of Rights*, of which We may pronounce, and Experience will justify us, that it was too loose, too imperfect, and nothing less than proportionable to the Importance of the Occasion, and the favourable Circumstances of the Conjunction. *Others* there were, who imagined that the shortest and surest Way for them to take, in Pursuit of the same View, was to make Themselves considerable by *Opposition*, to form a *Party*, and maintain a Struggle for *personal Power*, under the Pretence and Umbrage of *Principle*. This was, without Doubt, the Motive of some particular leading Men, and could not be, at least at first, the Motive of Numbers. But there was *another Motive*, which easily became That of Numbers, because
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it arose out of a Fund common to all Men, the *Perversity of human Nature*, according to an Observation made in one of these Letters. Whilst the Event of the Prince of *Orange's* Expedition was undecided, Men remain'd under the full Influence of their *Fears*, which had determined Them to act against their *Prejudices*. But when the *Revolution* was secure and these *Fears* were calm'd, *these Prejudices* resumed, in some Degree, their former Power, and the more for being revived and encouraged by Men of Reputation and Authority, who argued for some, and might as reasonably have argued for all the Errors, in Contradiction to which most of Them had acted, nay and were ready to act. With such Views, and by such Means, were many brought, at this Time, to entangle Themselves in a Maze of inextricable Absurdities. Had They own'd candidly and fairly that their *Principles*, as well as Those of the *Whigs*, were carried too high in the former Disputes of *Parties*, and that *these Principles* could not be true, since They found Themselves actually in a Situation, wherein it was not possible to act agreeably to them without manifest Absurdity, the Distinction, as well as the Difference, of *Whig* and *Tory* had been at an End. But contrary Measures produced a contrary Effect. They kept up the Appearances, and They could keep up no more, of a *Whig* and a *Tory Party*, and with these Appearances a great Part of the old Animosity. The *two Names* were founded about the Nation; and Men, who saw the same Ensigns flying, were not wise enough to perceive, or not honest enough to own, that the same Cause was no longer concern'd, but listed Themselves on either Side; as their Prejudices at first, and their Inclinations, or other Motives, which arose in the Progress of their Contests, directed Them afterwards; *Whigs* very often under the

the *Tory* Standard, *Tories* very often under the *Whig* Standard.

This general Representation, which I have made of the State of *Parties* at the *Revolution*, is, I am verily persuaded, exactly just; and it might be supported by many particular Proofs, which I chuse rather to suggest, than to mention. But if any Doubt remains, let us analyse the several *Parties* of that Time a little more, reduce Them to their *first* and *real Principles*, and then pronounce whether We find the *Whig*, or the *Tory Party* subsisting among Them.

In the first Place, there was a *Party*, that concurr'd in making the *new Settlement*; a *Party*, that prevail'd in *Parliament*, and was by much the Majority of the Nation out of it. Were the *Whigs* this Majority? Was this *Party* a *Whig Party*? No Man will presume to affirm so notorious an Untruth. The *Whigs* were far from being this Majority, and King *James* must have dyed on the Throne, if the *Tories* had not concurr'd to place the Prince of *Orange* there, in his stead. Was this *Party* a *Tory Party* then? Certainly no. The *Whigs* had been zealous in the same Cause, and had contributed to make it successful by their Temper, as well as their Zeal; by waiting the Time of the *Tories*, or rather the Maturity of the Conjunction, and by moderating their Principles and their Conduct, in Favour of that *Coalition*, without which the *Revolution* could have succeeded no more than the *Exclusion* did. We find then here neither a *Whig*, nor a *Tory Party*; for in *Coalitions* of this Kind, where *two Parties* are melted, as it were, into one, *neither* of them can be said, with Truth and Propriety, to exist.

There was *another Party* directly opposite to *This*; a certain Number of Men, on whom the original

ginal Taint, transmitted down from King James the 1st, remain'd still in the full Strength of its Malignity. These Men adhered to *those Principles*, in the natural Sense and full Extent of them, which the *Tories* had profess'd. But yet, the *Tories* having renounced *these Principles*, or distinguish'd Themselves out of any Obligation to observe them, this inconsiderable Faction could not be deem'd the *Tory Party*, but received the Name of *Jacobite* with more Propriety.

Two other Parties there were at this Time, form'd on one common Principle, but widely different however, by the different Consequences They drew from it. The Principle I mean is That contain'd in the Distinction of a King *de Jure*, and a King *de Facto*. The famous Statute of *Henry the 7th* authorized this Distinction. The Statute was design'd principally, no Doubt, for the Advantage of the *Subjects*, that they might be safe, which-ever Side prevail'd in an Age, when the epidemical Folly of fighting for *different Pretenders* had spilt Oceans of Blood on the Scaffold, as well as in the Field; and yet the Statute was design'd for the Service of *Kings de Facto* too, and particularly of *Henry the 7th*. The Author of *hereditary Right asserted* would have us believe otherwise; and yet surely nothing can be more evident than This, that if King *Henry the Seventh's* Right had been as unquestionable as He supposes, and I presume to deny that it was, yet He would have been declared a King *de Facto* only, if the Intrigues of the *Dutchess of Burgundy*, and the Faction of *York* had succeeded; and consequently this Provision for the Safety of his Adherents, in that possible Contingency, gave Strength to Him, as it would have given Strength to any other Prince, whilst it attach'd his Adherents to him by the apparent Security it provided; for *this Au-*
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thor contends that it did not establish a real Security, and advises us to suspend our Judgment on the Validity of *this Statute*, till We see what the *Opinion of Parliament, or the Judges, may be, whenever a King de Jure shall dispossess a King de Facto*. He refers us *ad Calendas Græcas*.

But there are two Observations to be made to our present Purpose on *this Statute*, which seem to Me natural and plain. *First*, it confounds in Effect the very Distinction it seems to make; since it secures alike, and, by securing alike, authorises alike Those, who adhere to the *King de Jure*, and Those, who adhere to the *King de Facto*, provided They adhere to the King in Possession. *Secondly*, it was contrived to hinder People, according to my Lord Bacon's Sense of it, from busying Themselves in prying into the King's Title, and that Subjects might not trouble Themselves with Enquiries into the Justness of the King's Title, or Quarrel. Now, upon the Foundation of this Distinction, and this Statute, thus understood, They, who demur'd on the Settlement of the Crown, at the Revolution, might plausibly, though I think very unreasonably, resolve neither to vote, nor act Themselves against those Maxims and Principles, which they had entertain'd and profess'd, as Maxims of Law, and Principles of the Constitution, and yet resolve to submit sincerely, and adhere faithfully to a *new Establishment*, when it was once made. But the *other of the two Parties* I mention'd drew from the same Principle of distinguishing between a *King de Facto* and a *King de Jure*, a very different Conclusion. They acknowledged *one King*, and held their Allegiance still due to *another*. They bound Themselves by Oath to preserve a *Settlement*, which They pretended Themselves in Conscience obliged to subvert. This was to justify *Perfidy*, to sanctify *Perjury*,

jury, to remove the sacred Boundaries of *Right* and *Wrong*, and, as far as in them lay, to teach Mankind to call *Good* evil, and *Evil* good.

Such were the *three Divisions*, into which Men broke at the *Revolution*, in opposing the *Settlement* then made; whilst the great Body of the Nation concur'd in it, and *Whig* and *Tory* form'd in Reality but *one Party*. The *first* of these *Divisions* continued, and became a *Faction in the State*; but made no Profelytes, and was worn out by Time. The Principle of the *second* was wrong; but it could not be reputed dangerous, whilst it lasted, and it seems to have been built on so narrow and slippery a Foundation, that it did not continue long in Force. I may be more bold in asserting This, since if We look back to the *Æra* of the *Revolution*, and to the Times, which follow'd, We shall find among Those, who voted for a *Regent*, not a *King*, on the Abdication of King *James*, some illustrious Persons, who served King *William* faithfully, who adhered inviolably to our *new Establishment*, and who have been distinguish'd Friends of the *Succession*, that hath now taken Place. That there have been Persons, who deserved to be rank'd under the *third Head*, is too notorious to be deny'd; but I persuade myself that *this Division* hath consisted always of a flux Body. On one Hand, it is scarce possible to believe that any Number of Men should be so harden'd, as to avow to Themselves, and to one another, the acting and persisting to act on a *Principle* so repugnant to every Notion and Sentiment, that harbour in the Breasts of social Creatures. On the other, We know how the Sallies and Transports of *Party*, on some Occasions, can hurry even reasonable Men to act on the most absurd, and honest Men to act on the most unjustifiable Principles, or both (one and the other

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on no Principle at all, according as the Object, which the prevailing Passion presents to Them, directs. This hath been the Case of many, since the *Revolution*, and there are some of all Sides, I believe, still alive, sure I am that there were some a few Years ago, who know that no Side is absolutely unexceptionable in this Respect.

I am, SIR, &c.



LETTER IX.

SIR,

BUT whatever the State of *Parties* was at the *Revolution*, and for some Time afterwards, the *Settlement* made at that Time having continued, that State of *Parties* hath changed gradually, tho' slowly, and hath received at Length, according to the necessary Course of Things, a total Alteration. This Alteration would have been sooner wrought, if the Attempt I have mention'd, to defend *Principles* no longer defensible, had not furnish'd the Occasion and Pretence to keep up the Appearances of a *Tory*, and a *Whig Party*. Some of Those, who had been call'd *Tories*, furnish'd this Pretence. They, who had been call'd *Whigs*, seized and improved it. The Advantages to *one Side*, the Disadvantages to the *other*, the Mischiefs to the whole, which have ensued, I need not deduce. It shall suffice to observe, that these Appearances were the more easy to be kept up, because several Men, who had stood conspicuous in Opposition to one another before the *Revolution*, continued an Opposition, though

though not the same, afterwards. Fresh Provocations were daily given, and fresh Pretences for Division daily taken. These Contests were present; They recall'd those, that had past in the Time of King *Charles the 2d*; and *both Sides* forgot that Union, which their common Danger and their common Interest had form'd at the *Revolution*. Old Reproaches were renew'd, new ones invented, against the Party call'd *Whigs*, when They were as complaisant to a *Court* as ever the *Tories* had been; against the Party call'd *Tories*, when they were as jealous of *publick Liberty*, and as frugal of *publick Money*, as ever the *Whigs* had been. Danger to the *Church*, on *one Side*, and Danger to the *State*, on the *other*, were apprehended from Men, who meant no Harm to *either*; for though *Dissenters* mingled Themselves on *one Side*, and *Jacobites* on the *other*, and notwithstanding the Leanings of *Parties* in Favour of Those, by whom they were abetted; yet is it a certain Truth, that the Struggle was in the main for *Power*, not *Principle*; and that there was no formal Design laid, on *one Side*, to destroy the *Church*, nor, on the *other*, the *State*. The Cavils, which may be made, and the Facts, which may be cited, some of older, and some of fresher date, against what hath been here said, do not escape Me. Men of Knowledge, and of cool and candid Thought, will answer one, and account for the other, without my Help; and I cannot resolve, for the Sake of the Passionate, nor even of the Ignorant, to descend upon this Subject into a greater Detail.

I pass to That, which is closer to my present Purpose, and of more immediate Use; and I say that as the natural Dispositions of Men are alter'd and form'd into different moral Characters by Education, so the Spirit of a Constitution of Govern-
ment,

ment, which is confirm'd, improved and strengthen'd by the Course of Events, and especially by Those of fruitless Opposition, in a long Tract of Time, will have a proportionable Influence on the Reasoning, the Sentiments, and the Conduct of Those, who are subject to it. A different Spirit and contrary Prejudices may prevail for a Time. But the Spirit and Principles of the Constitution will prevail at last. If one be unnatural, and the other absurd, and That is the Case in many Governments, a vigorous Exercise of Power, signal Rewards, signal Punishments, and a Variety of other secondary Means, which in such Constitutions are never wanting, will however maintain, as long as they are employ'd, both the Spirit and the Principles. But if the Spirit and Principles of a Constitution be agreeable to Nature, and the true Ends of Government, which is the Case of the present Constitution of the *British Government*, they want no such Means to make them prevail. They not only flourish without them, but they would fade and dye away with them. As *Liberty* is nourish'd and supported by such a Spirit and such Principles, so they are propagatèd by Liberty. Truth and Reason are often able to get the better of Authority in particular Minds; but Truth and Reason with Authority on their Side will carry Numbers, bear down Prejudices, and become the very Genius of a People. The Progress they make is always sure, but sometimes not observable by every Eye. Contrary Prejudices may seem to maintain themselves in Vigour, and these Prejudices may be kept up long by Passion and by Artifice. But when Truth and Reason continue to act without Restraint, a little sooner or a little later, and often when this Turn is least expected, the Prejudices vanish at
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once, and Truth and Reason triumph without any Rival.

The Constitution of *England* had been seen in two very different Lights, for almost a Century before the *Revolution*; so that there is no Room to be surpris'd at the great Opposition, that appear'd (when the *Whig* and *Tory Parties* arose a very few Years before that *Ara*,) between *Principles*, which, as opposite as they were, each Side pretended to establish on the Nature of *one and the same Constitution*. How This happen'd, hath been often hinted, and I have not here Room to explain any farther. Let us be satisfy'd that it is no longer the Case. Our *Constitution* is no longer a Mystery; the Power of the *Crown* is now exactly limited; the Chimæra of *Prerogative* removed; and the *Rights of the Subject* are no longer problematical, though some Things necessary to the more effectual Security of them may be still wanting. Under *this Constitution*, the greatest Part of the Men now alive were born. They lie under no Pretence of Obligation to any *other*, and to the Support of this they are bound by all the Ties of Society, and all the Motives of Interest.

Let us prove what We advance; and that We may do so *ad Homines*, let us borrow our Argument from the great Champion of *hereditary Right*. Having mention'd in his Introduction what He endeavours pompously, but vainly, to establish in his Book, in Favour of *hereditary Right*, a *Prescription of nine Centuries*, a *continual Claim of five hundred and fifty Years*, He attempts to convince us by a *novel Law*, and a *modern Constitution*. This modern Constitution is the *Act of Recognition*, in the *1st* of King *James the 1st*. The Declarations there made, in Favour of *hereditary Right*, are no Doubt as strong as Words can frame, and
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the Words are such as would tempt one to think, by the Fustian they compose, that his Majesty himself had pen'd them. From hence it is concluded, that since *the Vows and Acts of Fathers—bind their Posterity—This Act, till the Society hath revoked it lawfully, lays the same Obligation on every Member of the Society, as if He had personally consented to it.*—If *this Act* then was lawfully revoked, or repeal'd, another *novel Law*, contrary to it, might be made equally binding; but neither *this Act*, nor the Act of the 12th of *Charles the 2d*, affirming the Crown to appertain *by just and undoubted Right* to the King, his Heirs and lawful Successors, having been expressly repeal'd, We still lye under the same Obligations, and every Settlement, contrary to them, and by Consequence the Settlement made at the *Revolution*, is unlawful. Now I ask, was not the Will of *Henry the 8th*, which excluded the whole *Scotish Line*, made in Pursuance, and by the Authority of an Act pass'd in the 25th Year of his Reign? Hath not *this Author* justify'd the Validity of *this Will*, much to his own Satisfaction, and, I believe, to That of his Readers? Was this Will lawfully revoked? Was this Statute expressly repeal'd? I ask farther, whether *hereditary Right*, and the Obligations of *Subjects to it*, could be made *immutable and eternal*, as *this Author* asserts that they were by the *Act of Recognition*, without a manifest Contradiction to the Act of *Queen Elizabeth*, which declares the Power of Parliament to *limit and bind* the Succession to the Crown? Was this Act expressly repeal'd? That King *James the 1st* succeeded lawfully against *Law*, our Author is fond to maintain, and the Proposition is not unlike That of some *Popish Casuists*, who assert that his Holiness *Jure potest contra Jus discernere, can decree rightfully against Right*; but if these Questions are fairly answer'd, it will result from

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such Answers, and from the Arguments I have quoted, that this *novel Law*, this *modern Constitution*, is a meer Illusion; that it never bound any *Member of the Society*; and that the Parliament had as much Right to make the *Settlement* in 1688, notwithstanding the *Act of Recognition*, as the Parliament had to make *this Act* in 1603, notwithstanding the *two Acts* I have mention'd, and the *Will of Henry the 8th*, made by Virtue of the *first* of them. This wayward and forlorn *hereditary Right* must therefore fall to the Ground, or be supported by the supposed *Prescription of nine Centuries*, and *Claim of five and a half*, which no intelligent Man, who reads this Book, will be persuaded that the *Author* hath proved a Jot better, than the uninterrupted Succession of *Popes*, from *St. Peter* down to his present Holiness, is proved by the learned Antiquaries of *Italy*. If *this Act of Recognition* be urged, as it sometimes is, to shew the declared Sense of the *three Estates of the Kingdom*, which Declaration was obtain'd, it seems, in an Hurry, since the *Act* was read three Times in one House the same Day; the declared Sense of the *three Estates*, not pronounced in an Hurry, but after the most solemn Debates and Conferences, may be urged with much greater Weight, in Favour of our *present Settlement*. If *this Act of Recognition*, notwithstanding what hath been objected, be urged as a *Law*, which had the Assent of a *King*, in Opposition to the Proceedings of the *Convention*, by which King *William* and Queen *Mary* were raised to the Throne; the Answer is obvious and conclusive. The Circumstances of the *two Cases* are very different; but when they come to be weigh'd in a fair Ballance, Those, which attended the Settlement of the Crown on the *Revolution*, will be found at least as conformable to Reason, to Law, and to Practice, as Those, which attended the Establishment

ment of the *Stuart Family*. Queen *Elizabeth* design'd King *James* the 1st to be her Successor; the Nation concurr'd to make him so; neither She nor They paid any Regard to the *Law*, which stood in his Way. Their Reasons for acting in this Manner are easy to be discover'd in the History of that Time; and on the same Authority We may certainly conclude, that they would have not acted in this Manner, if King *James* had been like his Mother, a *profess'd Papist*. Thus he got into the Throne, and when He was there, He got, like other Kings, *such a Title*, as He chose to stand upon, *agnized*, or *recognized*, by his Parliament. The Settlement at the *Revolution* was made by a *Convention of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal*, and a *full and free Representative of the whole Body of the People*. When King *William* and Queen *Mary* were once settled in the Throne, *this Settlement* was continued and confirm'd by an *Assemblage of all the legislative Powers*. He, who will dispute the Validity of these Proceedings, must shew therefore *first* of all, what hath never yet been shewn, (no, not by the *Author* I have so often quoted) the Invalidity of the Proceedings of those *Parliaments*, which raised *Edward* the 3^d and *Henry* the 4th to the Throne; which were call'd as irregularly, though by Writs in the Names of *Edward* the 2^d and *Richard* the 2^d, as it can be pretended that the *Convention* was. He must shew the Invalidity of the Proceedings even of *that Assembly*, by which *Charles* the 2^d was call'd home, till their Proceedings became valid by a subsequent Confirmation. He must shew farther, how any of the Laws of the Princes of the House of *Lancaster* came to be *constantly received and executed*, a little better than the *Author of hereditary Right asserted* hath done, by assuring us on his Word that it was by the *Sufferance of Edward*.

the 4th and his Successors, and the Approbation of the People. He must account for the Continuance in Force of the Laws of *Richard the 3d*, and of *Henry the 7th*, a little better than the *same Author* does, by the Deficiency of *Henry the 7th's Title*, (which, upon another Occasion, He magnifies; though upon This he affirms it to have been *no better* than That of *Richard the 3d*) and by the great Respect of *Henry the 8th* for his Father. When This hath been once shewn, it will be Time to think of a Reply. In the mean while, We will observe that besides the Passion and Party-Spirit, which possess almost all Those, who write on this Subject, there is a Distinction, which should be constantly made in Cases of this Nature, and which they never make, or never make exactly enough. They compare the Proceedings, without comparing the Situation. *Necessity* and *Self-Preservation* are the great Laws of Nature, and may well dispense with the strict Observation of the common Forms of any particular Constitution. Either the *Convention* must have fallen into the Absurdities I have already mention'd; or have call'd back King *James*, which would have been still a greater Absurdity; or have left their Country in absolute Anarchy; or have done what They did. What They did, was done as near as possible to the Spirit of our *Constitution*, the Forms of our *Laws*, and the Examples of *former Times*. They had the *Merit*; their Posterity hath the *Benefit*; nay He, who would say that They had the *Guilt*, not the *Merit*, must still allow that their Posterity hath the *Benefit*, without sharing the *Guilt*; and, upon the whole Matter, I will venture to assert that He, who scruples, or pretends to scruple, at this Time, the Validity of our *present Constitution*, is no wiser, or else no honest, than He would be, who should scruple, or pretend

pretend to scruple, the Validity of *Magna Charta*. I have often wish'd that some profound Antiquary, of much Leisure, would write an elaborate Treatise to assert *Royal Prerogative* against the *great Charter*, as well as *hereditary Right* against the *Revolution*. I am persuaded that He would succeed alike in *both*. Why, indeed, should a *Charter*, extorted by Force, and therefore vicious in its Principle, stand on a better Foot, or have more Regard paid to it, than a *Settlement* made in Opposition to a *divine*, and therefore *indefeasible Right*? I say, *and therefore indefeasible*; because if it be not proved to be something more than *human*, it will hardly be proved *indefeasible*. But I quit this Subject; upon which, perhaps, You may think I have spent my Time as ill, as I should have done, if I had preach'd against the *Koran* at *Paul's*. It is Time to speak of the Motives of Interest, by which We are bound, as well as by the Ties of Duty, to support the *present Constitution*.

Upon this Head, a few Words will be sufficient; since I presume that no Prejudices can be strong enough to create much Diversity of Opinion, in a Case so very clear, and capable of being stated so shortly. Whether the *Revolution* alter'd our *old Constitution for the better*, or *renew'd* it, and brought it back to the *first Principles*, and nearer to the *primitive Institution*, shall not be disputed here. I think the *latter*, and every Man must think that *one* or the *other* was necessary, who considers, in the first Place, how the Majesty and Authority of the *Prince* began to swell above any Pitch, proportionable to the Rank of *chief Magistrate*, or *supreme Head*, in a *free State*; by how many Arts, the *Prerogative of the Crown* had been stretch'd, and how many *Precedents*, little favourable to *Liberty*, had been set, even before the Accession of the *Scottish*
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Line; and who considers, in the next Place, the direct Tendency, confirm'd by Experience, of *those Principles of Government*, so frequently mention'd, which compos'd an avow'd System of *Tyranny* and establish'd *Slavery* as a political, a moral, and a religious Obligation; which King *James the 1st* was too successful in establishing; but neither *He*, nor his *Descendents* were able to pursue. What these Considerations made necessary, was done at the *Revolution*; at least, so far as to put it into our Power to do the Rest. A Spirit of *Liberty*, transmitted down from our *Saxon Ancestors*, and the unknown Ages of our Government, preserved itself through one almost continual Struggle, against the Usurpations of our *Princes*, and the Vices of our *People*; and They, whom neither the *Plantagenets*, nor the *Tudors* could enslave, were incapable of suffering their Rights and Privileges to be ravish'd from Them by the *Stuarts*. They bore with the *last King of this unhappy Race*, till it was shameful, as it must have been fatal, to bear any longer; and whilst They asserted their *Liberties*, They refused and anticipated, by their Temper and their Patience, all the Objections, which foreign and domestick Abettors of *Tyranny* are apt to make against the Conduct of our Nation towards their *Kings*. Let us justify this Conduct, by persisting in it, and continue to Ourselves the peculiar Honour of maintaining the Freedom of our *Gothick Institution of Government*, when so many other Nations, who enjoy'd the same, have lost theirs.

If a *divine, indefeasible, hereditary Right* to govern a Community be once acknowledged, a *Right independent of the Community*, and which vests in every successive Prince immediately on the Death of his Predecessor, and previously to any Engage-
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ment taken on his Part towards the *People*; if the *People* once acknowledge Themselves bound to such Princes by the Ties of *Passive-Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*, by an *Allegiance unconditional*, and not reciprocal to *Protection*; if a Kind of *oral Law*, or *mysterious Cabala*, which Pharisees of the *black Gown* and the *long Robe* are always at Hand to report and interpret, as a *Prince* desires, be once added, like a supplemental Code, to the *known Laws of the Land*; then, I say, such Princes have the *Power*, if not the *Right*, given Them, of commencing *Tyrants*; and Princes, who have the *Power*, are prone to think that They have the *Right*. Such was the State of *King* and *People* before the *Revolution*. By the *Revolution*, and the *Settlement* since made, this State hath received considerable Alterations. A *King of Britain* is now, strictly and properly, what *Kings* should always be, a Member, but the Supreme Member, or the Head of a political Body. Part of one individual, specifick Whole, in every Respect; distinct from it, or independent of it in none; He can move no longer in another Orbit from his *People*, and, like some superior Planet, attract, repel, influence, and direct their Motions by his own. He and They are Parts of the same System, intimately join'd and co-operating together, acting and acted upon, limiting and limited, controuling and controuled by one another; and when He ceases to stand in this Relation to Them, he ceases to stand in any, The *Settlements*, by Virtue of which He governs, are plainly *original Contracts*. His *Institution* is plainly *conditional*; and He may forfeit his Right to *Allegiance*, as undeniably and effectually, as the Subject may forfeit his Right to *Protection*. There are no longer any hidden Reserves of Authority, to be let out on Occasion, and to overflow the Rights
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and Privileges of the People. The *Laws of the Land* are known, and they are the sole Springs, from whence the *Prince* can derive his Pretensions, and the *People* theirs. It would be to no Purpose to illustrate any farther a Matter, which begins to be so well understood; or to descend into a more particular Enumeration of the Advantages, that result, or may result, from our *present Settlement*. No Man, who does not prefer *Slavery* to *Liberty*, or a more precarious Security to a better, will declare for such a Government, as our national Divisions, and a long Course, seldom interrupted, of improvident Complaisance to the *Crown*, had enabled King *James* the 2^d to establish against such a Government as was intended by the *subsequent Settlement*; and if there be any such Man, I declare that I neither write to Him, nor for Him.

I may assume therefore, without fearing to be accused of begging the Question, that the *Constitution*, under which we now live, is preferable to That, which prevail'd at any Time before the *Revolution*. We are arrived, after many Struggles, after a Deliverance almost miraculous, and such an one as no Nation hath Reason to expect twice, and after having made some honest Improvements on the Advantages of our *new Constitution*, very near to that full Security, under which Men, who are free and solicitous to continue so, may sit down, not without Watchfulness, (for That is never to be suffer'd to relax under such a Government as ours) but without Anxiety. The Sum therefore of all these Discourses, and of all our Exhortations to one another, is, and ought to be, that We should not stop short in so important a Work. It was begun at the *Revolution*; but He, who thinks it was perfected then, or hath been perfected since, will find Himself very much mistaken. The Foundations were laid then. We proceeded
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for some Time after That, like the *Jews* in rebuilding their Temple; We carried on the holy Work with one Hand, and held our Swords in the other to defend it. That Distracted, that Danger is over, and we betray the Cause of *Liberty* without any Colour of Excuse, if We do not compleat the glorious Building, which will last to Ages yet remote, if it be once finish'd, and will moulder away and fall into Ruins, if it remain longer in this imperfect State.

Now, that we may see the better how to proceed in the Cause of *Liberty*, to compleat the Freedom, and to secure the Duration of our *present Constitution*; it will be of Use, I think, to consider what Obstacles lye, or may hereafter lye, in our Way, and of what Nature that Opposition is, or may hereafter be, which we may expect to meet. In order to This, let us once more analyse our political Divisions; Those, which may possibly exist now, or hereafter, as We did Those, which were form'd at the *Revolution*.

One possible Division then is That of Men angry with the *Government*, and yet resolved to maintain the *Constitution*. This may be the Case at any Time; under the present, wise, virtuous, and triumphant Administration, and therefore to be sure at any other.

A second possible Division is That of Men averse to the *Government*, because They are so to the *Constitution*, which I think can never be the Case of many; or averse to the *Constitution*, because They are so to the *Government*, which I think may be the Case of more. *Both* of These tend to the same Point. *One* would subvert the *Government*, that They might change the *Constitution*. The other would sacrifice the *Constitution*, that They might subvert the *Government*.

A *third possible Division*, and I seek no more, is That of Men attach'd to the *Government*; or, to speak more properly, to the Persons of *Those*, who govern; or, to speak more properly still, to the Power, Profit, or Protection They acquire by the Favour of *these Persons*; but Enemies to the *Constitution*.

Now, as to the *first* and *second* of *these possible Divisions*, if there be any such among Us, I do not apprehend that We are at present, or can be hereafter, in much Danger; or that the Cause of *Liberty* can meet with much Opposition from them; though the *second* have certainly Views, more likely to bring *Slavery* upon us, than to promote *Liberty*; and though Prudence requires that We should be on our Guard against *both*. The *first* indeed, might hope to unite even the Bulk of the Nation to Them, in a weak and oppressive Reign. If Grievances should grow intolerable under some Prince as yet unborn; if Redress should become absolutely desperate; if *Liberty* itself should be in imminent Peril; the Nature of our *Constitution* would justify the Resistance, that We ought to believe well enough of Posterity to persuade ourselves would be made in such an Exigency. But without such an Exigency, particular Men would flatter Themselves extremely, if They hoped to make the Nation angry, because They were so. Private Motives can never influence Numbers. When a Nation revolts, the Injury is national. This Case therefore is remote, improbable, nay impossible, under the Lenity, Justice and heroic Spirit of the *present Government*; and if I mention'd such an *imaginary Party*, it was only done that I might omit none, which can be supposed. The Projects of the *second Division*, stated in the same hypothetical Manner, are surely too extravagant, and their Designs too wicked to be dangerous.

dangerous. Disputes may arise hereafter, in some distant Time, about *Ministers*, perhaps about *Kings*; but I persuade myself that *this Constitution* will be, as it ought to be always, distinguish'd from, and prefer'd to *both*, by the *British Nation*. Reasons must arise in Process of Time, from the very Nature of Man, to oppose *Ministers* and *Kings* too; but none can arise, in the Nature of Things, to oppose *such a Constitution* as ours. *Better Ministers*, *better Kings*, may be hereafter often wanted, and sometimes found; but a *better constituted Government* never can. Should there be therefore still any such Men, as We here suppose among Us, They cannot expect, if They are in their Senses, a national Concurrence; and surely a little Reflection will serve to shew Them, that the same Reasons, which make Them weaker now than They were some Years ago, must make Them weaker some Years hence than They are now.

As to the *third Division*, if any such there be, it is in That our greatest and almost our whole Danger centers. The *Others* cannot overthrow, but *These* may undermine our *Liberty*. Capable of being admitted into Power, in all Courts, and more likely than other Men to be so in every Court, except the present, (whose approved Penetration and spotless Innocence give a certain Exclusion to Them,) They may prevent any farther Securities from being procured to *Liberty*, till Those already establish'd are dissolved, or perverted. Since then our principal Danger must in all Times arise from Those, who belong to *this Division*, it is necessary to shew, before We conclude these Discourses, by what Means *such Men* may carry on their pernicious Designs with Effect, and by what Means They may be defeated. These Considerations will lead us to fix that Point, wherein

Men of all Denominations ought to unite, and do unite, and to state the sole Distinction of *Parties*, which can be made with Truth at this Time amongst us.

I am, S I R, &c.



L E T T E R X.

S I R,

IT may be ask'd, perhaps, how Men, who are Friends to a *Government*, can be Enemies at the same Time to the *Constitution*, upon which *that Government* is founded. But the Answer will be easy, if We consider these two Things; *first*, the true Distinction, so often confounded in Writing, and almost always in Conversation, between *Constitution* and *Government*. By *Constitution* We mean, whenever We speak with Propriety and Exactness, that Assèmbly of Laws, Institutions and Customs, derived from certain fix'd Principles of Reason directed to certain fix'd Objects of publick Good, that compose the general System, according to which the Community hath agreed to be govern'd. By *Government* We mean, whenever We speak in the same Manner, that particular Tenor of Conduct, which a chief Magistrate, and inferior Magistrates, under his Direction and Influence, hold in the Administration of publick Affairs. We call This a *good Government*, when the Execution of the Laws, the Observation of the Institutions and Customs, in short, the whole Administration of publick Affairs is wisely pursued, and with a strict Conformity

Conformity to the Principles and Objects of the *Constitution*. We call it a *bad Government*, when it is administer'd on other Principles, and directed to other Objects, either wickedly or weakly, either by obtaining *new Laws*, which want this Conformity, or by perverting *old ones*, which had it; and when This is done *without Law*, or in *open Violation of the Laws*, We term it a *tyrannical Government*. In a Word, and to bring this home to our own Case, *Constitution* is the Rule, by which our Princes ought to govern, at all Times; *Government* is That, by which They actually do govern, at any particular Time. *One* may remain immutable; the *other* may, and as human Nature is constituted, must vary. *One* is the Criterion, by which We are to try the *Other*; for surely We have a Right to do so, since if We are to live in Subjection to the Government of our *Kings*, our *Kings* are to govern in Subjection to the *Constitution*; and the Conformity, or Non-Conformity of their Government to it, prescribes the Measure of our Submission to Them, according to the Principles of the *Revolution*, and of our *present Settlement*; in both of which, though some remote Regard was had to *Blood*, yet the Preservation of the *Constitution* manifestly determined the Community to the Choice then made of the *Persons*, who should govern. Another Thing to be consider'd is This. When Persons are spoken of as *Friends to the Government*, and *Enemies to the Constitution*, the Term *Friendship* is a little prostituted, in Compliance with common Usage. Such Men are really incapable of Friendship; for real Friendship can never exist among Those, who have banish'd Virtue and Truth. They have no Affection to any but Themselves; no Regard to any Interest, except their own. Their sole Attachments are such as I mention'd in the
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last Letter, Attachments to *Power* and *Profit*, and when They have contracted a Load of Infamy and Guilt, in the Pursuit of *These*, an Attachment to *that Protection*, which is sufficient to procure Them Appearances of Consideration, and real Impunity. They may bear the Semblance of Affection to their Prince and of Zeal for his Government; but They, who are false to the Cause of their Country, will not be true to any other; and the very *same Minister*, who exalts his Master's Throne on the Ruins of the *Constitution*, that He may govern without Controul, or retire without Danger, would do the Reverse of This, if any Turn of Affairs enabled Him to compound, in that Manner, the better for Himself.

Under a Prince therefore tolerably honest, or tolerably wise, *such Men as These* will have no great Sway; at least, They will not hold it long. Such a Prince will know, that to unite Himself to *Them*, is to disunite Himself from his *People*, and that He makes a stupid Bargain, if He prefers Trick to Policy, Expedient to System, and a Cabal to the Nation. Reason and Experience will teach Him that a Prince, who does so, must govern weakly, ignominiously and precariously; whilst He, who engages all the Hearts, and employs all the Heads and Hands of his People, governs with Strength, with Splendour, and with Safety, and is sure of rising to a Degree of absolute Power, by maintaining *Liberty*, which the most successful Tyrant could never reach, by imposing *Slavery*. But how few Men (and Princes, by their Leaves, are Men) have been found in Times past, or can be hoped for in Times to come, capable of governing by such Arts as these? Some cannot propose the Ends, nor some employ the Means; for some are wicked, and some are weak. This general Division runs through the
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whole Race of Mankind; of the Multitudes design'd to obey, and of the Few design'd to govern. It was this Depravity of Multitudes, as well as their mutual Wants, which obliged Men first to enter into Societies; to depart from their natural Liberty; and to subject Themselves to Government. It was this Depravity of the Few, (which is often the greater, because born no better than other Men, They are educated worse) which obliged Men first to subject *Government* to *Constitution*, that They might preserve social, when They gave up natural Liberty, and not be oppress'd by arbitrary Will. *Kings* may have preceded *Lawgivers*, for aught I know, or have possibly been the *first Lawgivers*, and *Government by Will* have been establish'd before *Government by Constitution*. *Theseus* might reign at *Athens*, and *Eurytion* at *Sparta*, long before *Solon* gave Laws to *one*, and *Lycurgus* to the *other* of these Cities. *Kings* had govern'd *Rome*, We know, and *Consuls* had succeeded *Kings*, long before the *Decemviri* compiled a Body of Law; and the *Saxons* had their Monarchs before *Edgar*, though the *Saxon Laws* went under his Name. These and a thousand other Instances of the same Kind will never serve to prove, what my Lord *Bacon* would prove by them, † *that Monarchies do not subsist, like other Governments, by a precedent Law, or Compact; that the original Submission to Them was natural, like the Obedience of a Child to his Parents; and that Allegiance to hereditary Monarchs is the Work of the Law of Nature.* But That, which these Examples prove very plainly is, that however Men might submit voluntarily in the primitive Simplicity of early Ages, or be subjected by Conquest, to a Government without a Consti-

† *Argum. in the Case of Postnati.*

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zation, yet they were never long in discovering that * to live by one Man's Will became the Cause of all Mens Misery, and therefore They soon rejected the Yoke, or made it fit easy on their Necks. They instituted *Commonwealths*, or they limited *Monarchies*; and here began that Struggle between the *Spirit of Liberty* and the *Spirit of Dominion*, which always hath subsisted, and, that We may not flatter Ourselves, nor Others, must always subsist, except in those Instances, of which the most antient Histories furnish so few, the Reigns of a *Titus*, or a *Trajan*; for it might look like Flattery to quote the present most auspicious Reign.

To govern a Society of Freemen by a *Constitution*, founded on the eternal Rules of right Reason, and directed to promote the Happiness of the whole, and of every Individual, is the noblest Prerogative, which can belong to Humanity; and if Man may be said, without Prophaneness, to imitate God in any Case, This is the Case. But sure I am, He imitates the Devil, who is so far from promoting the Happiness of Others, that He makes his own Happiness to consist in the Misery of Others; who governs by no Rule but That of his Passions, whatever Appearances He is forced sometimes to put on; who endeavours to corrupt the Innocent, and to inflave the Free; whose Business is to seduce, or betray; whose Pleasure is to damn; and whose Triumph is to torment. Odious and execrable as this Character is, it is the Character of every Prince, who makes use of his Power to subvert, or even to weaken *that Constitution*, which ought to be the Rule of his *Government*. When such a Prince fills a Throne with superior Parts, *Liberty* is in the utmost Peril; nor does the Danger diminish in Pro-

portion, if He happens to want them. Such Men as we are now to speak of, (*Friends to the Government and Enemies to the Constitution*) will be always at Hand to supply his Defects; for as They are the willing Instruments of a wicked Prince, They are the ready Prompters of a weak one. They may sink into the Mass of the People, and disappear in a good and a wise Reign, or work Themselves into Power under false Colours. *Sed Genus immortale manet.* Their Race will continue as long as Ambition and Avarice prevail in the World, and there will be bad Citizens as long as there are bad Men. The Good ought therefore to be always on their Guard against Them, and whatever Disguise They assume, whatever Veils They cast over their Conduct, They will never be able to deceive Those long, who observe constantly the Difference between *Constitution* and *Government*, and who have Virtue enough to preserve the Cause of the *former*, how unprofitable soever it may be at all Times, and how unpopular soever at some.——But I ramble too long in generals. It is high Time I should come to those particular Measures, by which the Men I have described are most likely to carry on their Designs against our *Constitution*; after which I shall say something of the Methods, by which alone their Designs may be prevented, or will be defeated, if a *national Union* oppose itself by such Methods as These, in Time, to them.

Now, that I may do This the better, and make what I have to say the more sensibly felt, give Me Leave to suppose (though I speak of a remote Time, and such an one as We ought to hope will never come) that our national Circumstances will be just the same as they are now, and our *Constitution* as far distant as it now is from that Point of Perfection, to which the *Revolution* ought to have

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brought it, might have brought it, and hath given the Nation a Right to expect that it should be brought. The Completion of that glorious Deliverance is still imperfect, after five and forty Years, notwithstanding the Hopes then given, the Engagements then taken, and the Opportunities, that have since arisen. How This hath happen'd, by what Arts this Justice to the *Constitution* hath been hitherto evaded, sometimes in Favour of one Government, and sometimes in Favour of another, might easily be shewn, and proved too, beyond Contradiction. But I had rather exhort, than reproach; and especially at a Time, when a strong Tendency appears among Men of all Denominations to such a *national Union*, as will effectually obtain the compleat Settlement of our *Constitution*, which hath been so long delay'd, if it be honestly, prudently and vigorously improved.

It is certain then that if ever such Men as call Themselves *Friends to the Government*, but are real *Enemies of the Constitution*, prevail, They will make it a capital Point of their wicked Policy to keep up a *standing Army*. False Appearances of Reason for it will never be wanting, as long as there are *Pretenders* to the Crown; though nothing can be more absurd than to employ, in Defence of *Liberty*, an Instrument so often employ'd to destroy it; tho' nothing can be more absurd than to maintain that *any Government* ought to make use of the same Expedient to support itself, as *another Government*, on the Ruins of which *this Government* stands, was subverted for using; tho' nothing can be proved more manifestly by Experience than these two Propositions; that *Britain* is enabled, by her Situation, to support her *Government*, when the Bulk of her People are for it, without employing any Means inconsistent with her *Constitution*; and that the Bulk
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of the People are not only always for the *Government*, when the *Government* supports the *Constitution*, but are even hard and slow to be detach'd from it, when the *Government* attacks, or undermines the *Constitution*, and when They are by Consequence both justified in resisting, and even obliged in Conscience to resist the *Government*.

I have heard it argued lately that *Pretenders* abroad are a Security at home; and that a *Government*, expos'd to their Attacks, will never venture to attack the *Constitution*. I have been told too that these Notions were entertain'd by Some, who drew many political Consequences from them at the *Revolution*. But if any of those Persons are still alive, I persuade Myself that They have alter'd this Opinion, since such a Situation will furnish, at all Times, Pretences of Danger; since Pretences of Danger to a *Government*, whether real or imaginary, will be always urged with Plausibility, and generally with Success, for obtaining *new Powers*, or for straining *old ones*; and since whilst Those, who mean well to the *Government*, are impos'd upon by Those, who mean ill to the *Constitution*, all true Concern for the *latter* is lost in a mistaken Zeal for the *former*, and the most important is ventured to save the least important, when neither one nor the other would have been expos'd, if false Alarms had not been rashly and too implicitly taken, or if true Alarms had not given unnecessary Strength to the *Government*, at the Expence of weakening the *Constitution*.

Notwithstanding what hath been said, I do not imagine that an *Army* would be employ'd by *these Men*, directly and at first, against the Nation, and national Liberty. I am far from thinking that any Men can arise, in future Times, capable of attempting, in this Manner, what some Men in our

Age, who call Themselves *Friends to the Government*, have been so weak and so imprudent as to avow in Print, and publish to the Nation. To destroy *British Liberty* with an *Army of Britons* is not a Measure so sure of Success, as some People may believe. To corrupt the *Parliament* is a slower, but might prove a more effectual Method, and two or three hundred Mercenaries in the *two Houses*, if They could be list'd there, would be more fatal to the *Constitution* than ten Times as many Thousands in Red and in Blue out of them. *Parliaments* are the true Guardians of *Liberty*. For This principally They were instituted; and This is the principal Article of that great and noble Trust, which the collective Body of the People of *Britain* reposes in the Representative. But then no Slavery can be so effectually brought and fix'd upon us; as *Parliamentary Slavery*. By the *Corruption of Parliament*, and the absolute Influence of a *King*, or his *Minister*, on the *two Houses*, We return into that State, to deliver or secure us from which *Parliaments* were instituted, and are really govern'd by the arbitrary Will of *one Man*. Our whole *Constitution* is at once dissolved. Many Securities to *Liberty* are provided; but the Integrity, which depends on the *Freedom* and the *Independency of Parliament*, is the Key-stone, that keeps the whole together. If This be shaken, our *Constitution* totters. If it be quite removed, our *Constitution* falls into Ruin. That noble Fabrick, the Pride of *Britain*, the Envy of her Neighbours, rais'd by the Labour of so many Centuries, repair'd at the Expence of so many Millions, and cemented by such a Profusion of Blood; that noble Fabrick, I say, which was able to resist the united Efforts of so many Races of Gyants, may be demolish'd by a Race of Pygmies. The Integrity of *Parliament* is a Kind of *Palladium*, a tutelary Goddess,

Goddeſs, who protects our State. When She is once removed, We may become the Prey of any Enemies. No *Agamemnon*, no *Achilles* will be wanted to take our City. *Therſites* himſelf will be ſufficient for ſuch a Conqueſt. But I need not dwell any longer on this Subject. There is no Man, who thinks at all, can fail to ſee the ſeveral fatal Conſequences, which will neceſſarily flow from this one Source, whenever it ſhall be open'd. If the Reaſon of the Thing does not ſtrike Him enough, Experience muſt. The ſingle Reign of *Henry* the 8th will ſerve to ſhew that no Tyranny can be more ſevere than That, which is exerciſed by a Concert with *Parliament*; that *arbitrary Will* may be made the ſole Rule of Government, even whiſt the Names and Forms of a *free Conſtitution* are preſerved; that for a *Prince*, or his *Minifter*, to become our *Tyrant*, there is no Need to abolith *Parliaments*; there is no Need that He, who is Maſter of *one Part of the Legiſlature*, ſhould endeavour to abolith the *other two*, when He can uſe, upon every Occaſion, the united Strength of the *whole*; there is no Need He ſhould be a Tyrant in the Groſs, when He can be ſo in Detail, nor in Name, when He can be ſo in Effect; that for *Parliaments* to eſtabliſh *Tyranny*, there is no Need therefore to repeal *Magna Charta*, or any other of the great Supports of our *Liberty*. It is enough, if They put Themſelves corruptly and ſervilely under the Influence of *ſuch a Prince*, or *ſuch a Miniſter*.— On the whole, I conclude that, in the poſſible Caſe here ſuppoſed, the firſt and principal Object will be to deſtroy the *Conſtitution*, under Pretence of preſerving the *Government*, by *corrupting our Parliaments*. I am the better founded in concluding that This may happen in ſome future Age, by what We may obſerve in our own. There is ſurely but too much Reaſon to
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suspect that the *Enemies of our Constitution* may attempt hereafter to govern by *Corruption*, when We hear and see the Friends and Advocates of our *present most incorrupt Minister* harrangue and scribble, in Favour of *Corruption*; when it is pleaded for and recommended, as a necessary Expedient of Government, by some Men of all Ranks and Orders; not only by *profess'd Hirelings*, who write that They may eat; but by Men, who have talk'd and written Themselves already out of their native Obscurity and Penury, by affecting Zeal in the Cause of *Liberty*; not only by such as These, but by Men, whose Birth, Education and Fortune aggravate their Crime and their Folly; by Men, whom Honour at least should restrain from favouring so dishonourable a Cause; and by Men, whose peculiar Obligations to preach up *Morality* should restrain Them, at least, from being the Preachers of an *Immorality*, above all others, abominable in its Nature, and pernicious in its Effects.

These Men are ready, I know, to tell us that the *Influence* They plead for is necessary to strengthen the Hands of Those, who govern; that *Corruption* serves to oil the Wheels of Government, and to render the Administration more smooth and easy; and that it can never be of dangerous Consequence, under the present Father of our Country.—Absurd and wicked Triflers! According to Them our excellent Constitution (as one of your Correspondents hath observed extremely well) is no better than a Fumble of incompatible Powers, which would separate and fall to Pieces of Themselves, unless restrain'd and upheld by such honourable Methods as those of BRIBERY and CORRUPTION. They would prove that the Form of our Government is defective to a Degree of Ridiculousness. But the Ridicule, as well as the Iniquity,

is their own. A good Government can want no Power, under the present Constitution. A bad one may, and it is fit it should. Popularity is the Expedient of one, and will effectually support it. Nothing but Corruption can support the other. If there was a real Deficiency of Power in the Crown, it ought to be supply'd, no Doubt. The old Whimsies of Prerogative should not be revived; but Limitations ought to be taken off, or new Powers to be given. The Friends of Liberty acknowledge that a Ballance of the Powers, divided among the three Parts of the Legislature, is essential to our Constitution, and necessary to support it. The Friends of Liberty therefore would concur, at least to a certain Point, with the Friends of the Ministry; for the former are Friends to Order, and Enemies to Licence. For Decency's Sake therefore let the Debate be put on this Issue. Let it be such a Debate as Freemen may avow, without blushing. To argue from this supposed Deficiency of Power in the Crown, in Favour of a Scheme of Government, repugnant to all Laws divine and human, is such an Instance of abandon'd, villainous Prostitution, as the most corrupt Ages never saw, and as will place the present Age, with infamous Pre-eminence, at the Head of them; unless the Nation do itself Justice, and fix the Brand on Those, who ought alone to bear it.—— Thus much for the Iniquity of the Practice pleaded for. As to the Danger of it, let us agree that a Prince, of such Magnanimity and Justice as our present Monarch, can never be tempted by any fordid Motives to forget the recent Obligation, which He and his Family have to the British Nation, by whom They were made Kings; nor to aim at greater Power and Wealth than are consistent with the Safety of the Constitution They are intrusted to preserve, and obliged to secure.

secure. Allowing This to be our present Case, (and concerning our present Case, there are not two Opinions, I dare say, in the whole Nation) yet still the Symptoms I have mention'd shew that the Poison, with which these pretended *Friends of the Government*, and real *Enemies of the Constitution*, corrupt the Morals of Mankind, hath made some Progress; and if this Progress be not immediately check'd by proper Antidotes, and the Power of poisoning taken from *these Empiricks*, the Disease will grow incurable. The last dismal Effect of it may not, or if You please, cannot happen in this Reign; but it may, nay it must happen in some other, unless we prevent it effectually and soon; and what Season more proper to prevent it in, and to compleat the Security of our *Liberties*, than the Reign of a Prince, for whom the Nation hath done so much, and from whom by Consequence the Nation hath a Right to expect so much? King *William* deliver'd us from Popery and Slavery. There was Wisdom in his Councils, and Fortitude in his Conduct. He steer'd through many real Difficulties at home, and He fought our Battles abroad; and yet those Points of Security, which had been neglected, or not sufficiently provided for, in the Honey-moon of his Accession, were continually press'd upon Him, during the whole Course of his Reign. The Men, who press'd them, were call'd *Jacobites*, *Tories*, *Republicans*, and *Incendiaries* too, not from the Throne indeed, but by the Clamour of Those, who shew'd great Indifference at least for the *Constitution*, whilst They affected great Zeal for the *Government*. They succeeded however in Part, and We enjoy the Benefit of their Success. If They did not succeed in the Whole; if the Settlement necessary to secure our *Liberty*, and therefore intended at the *Revolution*,

tion, be not yet compleat; let us be persuaded, and let us act on that Persuasion, that the Honour of compleating it was reserved to crown the Glories of the present Reign. To finish the great Work, which King *William* began, of establishing the Liberties of *Britain* on firm and durable Foundations, must be imputed an Honour surely; and to Whom can this Honour belong more justly than to a *Prince*, who emulates in so remarkable a Manner all the other heroick Virtues of his *renown'd Predecessor*?

I am, S I R, &c.



L E T T E R X I.

S I R,

I F it was possible for any Man, who hath the least Knowledge of our Constitution, to doubt in good Earnest whether the Preservation of *publick Freedom* depends on the Preservation of *Parliamentary Freedom*, his Doubts might be removed and his Opinion decided, one would imagine, by this single, obvious Remark; that all the Designs of our Princes against *Liberty*, since *Parliaments* began to be establish'd on the Model still subsisting, have been directed constantly to one of these *two Points*; either to obtain *such Parliaments as They could govern*; or else to stand all the Difficulties, and to run all the Hazards of *governing without Parliaments*. The Means principally employ'd, to the *first of these Purposes*, have been undue Influences on the *Elections* of Members of the House of Commons, and on *these Members*, when chosen. When such Influences could be employ'd successfully, they

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have answer'd all the Ends of *arbitrary Will*; and when they could not be so employ'd, *arbitrary Will* hath been forced to submit to the *Constitution*. This hath been the Case, not only since, but before that great Change in the Ballance of *Property*, which began in the Reigns of *Henry* the 7th and *Henry* the 8th, and carried a great Part of the Weight into the Scale of the *Commons*, which had lain before in the Scale of the *Peers* and *Clergy*.

If We look back as far as the Close of the 14th Century, (an *Æra* pretty near to That, when *Parliaments* received their present Form) We shall find both these *Means* employ'd by one of the worst of our Kings, *Richard* the 2^d. That he might obtain his *Will*, which was rash, He directed Mandates to his *Sheriffs* (Officers of the *Crown* and appointed by the *Crown*; for such They were then, and such They still are) to return certain *Persons* nominated by Himself; and thus He acquired an undue Influence over the *Elections*. In the next Place, He obliged the *Persons* thus return'd sometimes by *Threats* and *Terrour*, and sometimes by *Gifts*, to consent to those *Things*, which were prejudicial to the *Realm*; and thus He acquired an undue Influence over the *House of Commons*; so that, upon the whole, the arbitrary *Will*, of a rash, headstrong *Prince*, and the Suggestions of his wicked *Ministers*, guided the Proceedings of *Parliament*, and became the *Law of the Land*. I might pursue Observations of the same Kind through several succeeding Reigns; but to avoid lengthening these Letters, which are grown perhaps too long already, let us descend at once to the Reign of King *Charles* the 2^d; for in That we shall find Examples of all the Means, which a *Court*, that hath common Sense, and a *Prince*, who will not set his *Crown* on the Cast of a *Dye*, can take to undermine the Foundations of *Liberty*,
either

either by governing *Parliaments*, or by governing *without them*.

Now the first Attempt, of this Kind, which King *Charles* made against the *Constitution*, was This. He improved and managed the Spirit of the *first Parliament* He call'd, so as to render the *two Houses* obsequious to his Will, almost in every Case; and having got the *TRIENNIAL BILL* repeal'd, He kept the *same Parliament* in Being for many Years by *Prorogations*; which crept into Custom long before his Time, but were still a modern Invention with Respect to the primitive Institution of *Parliaments*, and wholly repugnant to the ancient Practice. Thus He establish'd a *standing Parliament*; which is, in the Nature of it, as dangerous as a *standing Army*, and may become, in some Conjunctions, much more fatal to *Liberty*. When the Measures of his Administration grew too bad, and the Tendency of them too apparent to be defended and supported, even in *that Parliament*, and even by a *Party-Spirit*, He had Recourse to a second Attempt; That is, to *Corruption*, and *Clifford* first list'd a mercenary Band of *Friends to the Government* against the *Constitution*. — Let us observe, on this Occasion, and as We pass along, that a *national Party* (such a Party as the Court *adopts*, in Contradistinction to such a Party as it *creates*) will always retain some *national Principles*, some Regard to the *Constitution*. They may be transported, or surprized, during the Heat of Contest especially, into Measures of long and fatal Consequences. They may be carried on for a certain Time and to a certain Point, by the Lusts of Vengeance and of Power, in order to wreak one upon their Adversaries, and to secure the other to Themselves. But a *national Party* will never be the Instruments of completing *national Ruin*. They will become the Adversaries of their

Friends, and the Friends of their Adversaries, to prevent it; and the *Minister*, who persists in so villainous a Project, by what Name soever He may affect to distinguish Himself and his Followers, will be found really at the Head of a *Faction*, not of a *Party*. But the Difference between *one* and the *other* is so visible, and the Boundaries, where *Party* ceases and *Faction* commences, are so strongly mark'd, that it is sufficient to point at them.

I return therefore, and observe that when the *Spirit of Party* fail'd King *Charles*, and the *Corruption* He employ'd proved ineffectual, He resolv'd to govern for a Time *without Parliaments*, and to employ that Time, as soon as he had check'd the *Spirit of one Party*, by inflaming That of *another*, in *garbling Corporations*. He had found by Experience that it was impossible to corrupt the Stream in any great Degree, as long as the Fountain continued pure. He apply'd Himself therefore to spread the Taint of the *Court* in them, and to poison those Springs, from whence the Health and Vigour of the *Constitution* flow. This was the third, the last, and by much the most dangerous Expedient, employ'd by the *Friends of the Government*, in the Reign of King *Charles the 2d.*, to undermine our *Liberties*. The Effect of it he did not live to see; but We may easily conjecture what it would have been.

The Use I make of what hath been here said is This. The Design of the *Revolution* being not only to save us from the immediate Attempts on our Religion and Liberty, made by King *James*, but to save us from all other Attempts, which had been made, or might be made, of the same Tendency; to renew and strengthen our Constitution; * to

* See the *Prince of Orange's Declaration*.

establish the Peace, Honour and Happiness of these Nations upon lasting Foundations, — and to procure a Settlement of the Religion, and of the Liberties and Properties of the Subjects, upon so sure a Foundation, that there might be no Danger of the Nation's relapsing into the like Miseries at any Time hereafter; This being, I say, the avow'd Design of the *Revolution*, and the Nation having engaged in it on a Confidence that all This would be effectually perform'd, the Design of the *Revolution* was not accomplish'd, the Benefit of it was not secured to us, the just Expectations of the Nation could not be answer'd, unless the *Freedom of Elections* and the *Frequency, Integrity and Independency of Parliaments* were sufficiently provided for. These are the Essentials of *British Liberty*. Defects in other Parts of the *Constitution* can never be fatal, if These are preserved intire. But Defects in These will soon destroy the *Constitution*, though every other Part of it should be so preserved. However it happen'd, the Truth and Notoriety of the Fact oblige us to say that these important Conditions, without which *Liberty* can never be secure, were almost wholly neglected at the *Revolution*. The *Claim of Right* declares, indeed, that *Elections ought to be free; that Freedom of Speech and Debates ought not to be impeach'd or question'd out of Parliament; and that Parliaments ought to be held frequently.* But such Declarations, however solemnly made, are nothing better than pompous Trifles, if they stand alone; productive of no Good, and thus far productive of Ill, that they serve to amuse Mankind, in Points of the greatest Importance, and wherein it concerns Them the most nearly neither to be deceived, nor so much as amused. These were *Rights*, no Doubt, to which the Nation had an indisputable Claim. But then they ought to have been more than

than claim'd, since they had been so often and so lately invaded. That they were not more than claim'd, that they were not effectually asserted and secured, at this Time, gave very great and immediate Dissatisfaction; and They, who were call'd *Whigs* in those Days, distinguish'd Themselves by the Loudness of their Complaints. Thus, for Instance, They insisted that there could be no * *real Settlement*, nay that it was a *Jest to talk of Settlement*, till the *Manner and Time of calling Parliaments*, and their *sitting*, when call'd, were fully determined; and This, in order to prevent the Practice of keeping ONE and the SAME PARLIAMENT so long on Foot, till the Majority was corrupted by Offices, Gifts and Pensions. They insisted that the Assurances given at the Revolution had led Them to think that † *the antient, legal Course of ANNUALLY CHOSEN PARLIAMENTS would have been immediately restored*; and the particular Circumstances of King *William*, who had received the Crown by Gift of the *People*, and who had renew'd the *original Contract* with the *People*, (which are precisely the Circumstances of the present, Royal Family) were urged as particular Reasons for the Nation to expect his Compliance.

The frequent sitting of Parliament was indeed provided for, indirectly and in Consequence, by the Exigencies of the *War*, which soon follow'd the *Revolution*. This War made *annual Supplies* necessary; and, before it was over, the same Necessity of *annual Sessions of Parliament* came to be establish'd, as it continues to this Hour, by the

* See *Considerations concerning the State of the Nation*, by Mr. Hambden. publish'd in 1692.

† *An Enquiry, or a Discourse*, &c. publish'd in 1693.

great Alteration made with Relation to the *publick Revenue*. The *whole publick Revenue* had been the *King's* formerly. *Parliamentary Aids* were, in those Days, extraordinary and occasional; and Things came to that Pass at last, that *Parliaments* were more frequently, or more rarely convened, just as *Courts* had more frequent, or more rare Occasions for such Supplies. But King *William* began to be, and all our Princes since Him have continued to be, only Proprietors for Life of that Part of the *publick Revenue*, which is appropriated to their *Civil-List*; although They are intrusted still with the Management of the *Whole*; and are even the Stewards of the *publick Creditors* for that Part, which is the private Property of *these Creditors*. This is the present State, sufficiently known, but necessary to be mention'd particularly on this Occasion; and This must continue to be the State; unless some Prince should arise hereafter, who, being advised by a *desperate Minister*, abetted by a *mercenary Faction*, supported by a *standing Army*, and instigated, like *Richard the 2d*, by the * *Rashness of his own Temper*, may lay rapacious Hands on all the *Funds* that have been created, and by applying illegally what he may raise legally, convert the whole to his own Use, and so establish *arbitrary Power*, by depriving at one Stroke many of his Subjects of their *Property*, and all of them of their *Liberty*. Till This happens, (and Heaven forbid that it should be ever attempted!) *Sessions of Parliament* must be *anually* held, or the Government itself be distress'd. But neither is This such a direct and full Security as the Importance of the Thing requires; nor does

* *Per immoderatam voluntatem.*

the Security of our *Liberty* consist only in the *frequent Sessions of Parliaments*; but it consists likewise in *frequent new Parliaments*. Nay, it consists so much more in *This* than in the *Other*, that the *former* may tend, without the *latter*, even more than the *Discontinuance of Parliaments*, to the Loss of *Liberty*. This was foreseen by the Wisdom of our *Constitution*. According to That, although it became in Time (by the Course of Events, and insensible Alterations) no longer necessary to call Parliaments *once*, or even *twice in a Year*, which had been the more antient Practice; yet still our *Kings* continued under an Incapacity of proceeding long in Government, with any tolerable Ease and Safety to Themselves, without the Concurrence and Assistance of *these Assemblies*. According to the *same Constitution*, as *Parliaments* were to be *held*, so they were to be *chosen frequently*; and the Opinion, that the *Holding and Continuance of Parliaments depended absolutely on the Will of the Prince*, may be justly rank'd amongst those Attempts, that were made by some Men to set the *Law*, whilst Others endeavoured to set the *Gospel*, on the Side of *arbitrary Power*. This is the plain Intent and Scheme of our *Constitution*, which provides that the *Representatives of the People* should have frequent Opportunities to communicate together about *national Grievances*; to complain of them, and to obtain the Redress of them, in an orderly, solemn, legal Manner; and that the *People* should have frequent Opportunities of calling their *Representatives* to Account, as it were, for the Discharge of the Trust committed to Them, and of approving, or disapproving their Conduct, by electing, or not electing them anew. Thus our *Constitution* supposes that *Princes* may abuse their Power, and *Parliaments* betray their Trust; and provides

provides, as far as human Wisdom can provide, that neither *one*, nor the *other*, may be able to do so long, without a sufficient Controul. If the *Crown*, indeed, persists in usurping on the *Liberty of the People*, or in any other Kind of *Mal-Administration*; and if the *Prince*, who wears it, proves deaf, as our *Princes* have sometimes been, to the Voice of his *Parliament* and his *People*, there remains no Remedy in the System of the *Constitution*. The *Constitution* is broken by the Obstinacy of the *Prince*, and the * *People must appeal to Heaven in This, as in all other Cases, where They have no Judge on Earth*. Thus if a *Parliament* should persist in abetting *Mal-Administration*, or any Way give up *those Liberties*, which They were intrusted to maintain, no Doubt can be made but that the *People* would be in the same Case; since their *Representatives* have no more Right to betray Them, than their *Kings* have to usurp upon Them; and by Consequence They would acquire the same Right of *appealing to Heaven*, if our *Constitution* had not provided a Remedy against *this Evil*, which could not be provided against the *other*; but our *Constitution* hath provided such a Remedy in the *frequent Succession of new Parliaments*, by which there is not Time sufficient given to form a *Majority of the Representatives of the People* into a MINISTERIAL CABAL; or by which, if This should happen, *such a Cabal* must be soon broken. These Reflections and such others, as they naturally suggest, are sufficient to convince any thinking Man, *1st*, that nothing could make it safe, nor therefore reasonable, to repose in any Set of Men whatsoever so great a

* Locke's *Essay upon Government*, Chap. 14.

Trust as the *collective Body* delegates to the *Representative* in this Kingdom, except the *Shortness of the Term*, for which this Trust is delegated. 2dly, that every *Prolongation of this Term* is therefore, in its Degree, unsafe for the *People*; that it weakens their *Security*, and endangers *Liberty* by the very Powers given for its Preservation. 3dly, that *such Prolongations* expose the Nation, in the possible Case of having a *corrupt Parliament*, to lose the great Advantage, which our *Constitution* hath provided, of curing the Evil, before it grows confirm'd and desperate, by the gentle Method of *choosing a new Representative*, and reduce the Nation by Consequence to have no other Alternative than That of *submitting*, or *resisting*; though *Submission* will be as grievous, and *Resistance* much more difficult, when the *Legislature* betrays its Trust, than when the *King* alone abuses his Power.—These Reflections, I say, are sufficient to prove these Propositions; and these Propositions set before us, in a very strong Light, the Necessity of using our utmost Efforts that the true Design of our Constitution may be pursued as closely as possible by the Re-establishment of *annual*, or at least of *trienial Parliaments*. But the Importance of the Matter, and the particular Seasonableness of the Conjunction, invite Me to offer one Consideration more upon this Head, which I think will not strike the less for being obvious and plain. It is This. Should a *King* obtain, *for many Years at once*, the Supplies and Powers, which used to be granted *annually* to Him; This would be deem'd, I presume, even in the present Age, an unjustifiable Measure and an intolerable Grievance, for this plain Reason; because it would alter our *Constitution* in the fundamental Article, that requires *frequent Assemblies of the whole Legislature*, in order to assist and controul

too, the *executive Power*, which is intrusted with *one Part of it*. Now I ask, is not the Article, which requires *frequent Elections of the Representative*, by the *collective Body of the People*, in order to secure the *latter* against the ill Consequences of the possible Weakness, or Corruption of the *former*, as fundamental an Article, and as essential to the Preservation of our *Liberties*, as the *other*? No Man dares say that it is not; at least no Man, who deserves our Attention. The People of *Britain* have as good a Right, and a Right as necessary to be asserted, to keep their *Representatives* true to the Trust reposed in Them, and to the Preservation of the *Constitution*, by the Controul of *frequent Elections*, as They have to keep their *Kings* true to the Trust reposed in Them, and to the Preservation of the *Constitution*, by the Controul of *frequent Sitzings of Parliament*. How comes it then to pass, that We may observe so great a Difference in the Sentiments of Mankind, about these *two Cases*? Propose the *first*, there is no *servile Friend of Government*, who will not affect all that Horrour at the Proposition, which every *Friend of the Constitution* will really feel. Propose the keeping up *septennial*, nay the making *decennial* *Parliaments*, the same *Friends of Government* will contend strenuously for *one* and by Consequence for *both*; since there can be no Reason alledged for the *first*, which is not stronger for the *last*, and would not be still stronger for a *longer Term*. These Reasons, drawn from two or three common-place Topicks of *pretended Conveniency* and *Expediency*, or of *supposed Tranquility at home*, and *Strength abroad*, I need not mention. They have been mention'd by Others, and sufficiently refuted. But That, which may very justly appear marvellous, is This; that some Men, I think not

many, who are *true Friends of the Constitution*, have been itagger'd in their Opinions, and almost seduced by the false Reasonings of these *Friends of Government*; though nothing can be more easy than to shew, from Reason and Experience, that *Convenience*, *Expediency*, and *domestick Tranquility* may be, and in Fact have been as well, nay better secured, under *triennial*, nay *annual Parliaments*, than under *Parliaments of a longer Continuance*; and as for *Strength abroad*, (That is, national Credit and Influence) it will depend on the Opinion foreign Nations have of our national Dispositions, and the Unanimity of our Sentiments. It must be chiefly determined therefore by their Knowledge of the real Sense of the Nation. Now That can appear no Way so much as in the natural State of our *Constitution*, by *frequent Elections*; and when it does appear so, it must have another Kind of Effect than the bare Resolutions of a *state, ministerial Parliament*; especially if it happens, as it may happen in some future Time, that the Sense of the *Nation* should appear to be different from the Sense of *such a Parliament*; and that the Resolutions of *such a Parliament* should be avowedly dictated by *Men*, odious and hated, contemptible and contemn'd, both at Home and Abroad.

But in the Supposition that some Inconveniences may arise by *frequent Elections*; (which is only allow'd for Argument's Sake;) are such Inconveniences, and the trifling Consequences of them, to be set in the Ballance against the Danger of weakening any one Barrier of our *Liberty*? Every Form of Government hath Advantages and Disadvantages peculiar to it. Thus *absolute Monarchies* seem most form'd for sudden and vigorous Efforts of Power, either in attacking, or in defending; whilst, in *free Constitutions*, the Forms of Government must be necessarily

necessarily more complicated and slow; so that in *These*, the same Secrecy cannot be always kept, nor the same Dispatch always made, nor the same Steadiness of Measures always pursued. Must all these Forms, instituted to preserve the Checks and Controuls of the several Parts of the *Constitution* on one another, and necessary by Consequence to preserve the *Liberty* of the Whole, be abandon'd therefore, and a *free Constitution* be destroy'd, for the Sake of some *little Conveniency*, or *Expediency* the more, in the Administration of publick Affairs? No certainly. We must keep our *free Constitution*, with the small Defects belonging to it, or We must change it for an *arbitrary Government*, free perhaps from these Defects, but liable to more and to worse. Inshort, We must make our Option; and surely this Option is not hard to be made, between the real and permanent Blessings of *Liberty*, diffused through a *whole Nation*, and the fantastick and accidental Advantages, which *They*, who govern not the *Body of the People*, enjoy under *absolute Monarchies*. I will not multiply Instances, though they crowd in upon Me.——*Two Councils* were chosen *annually* at *Rome*, and the *Proconsular Power* in the Government of Provinces was limited to a *Year*. Several Inconveniencies arose, no Doubt, from the strict Observation of this Institution. Some appear very plain in *History*; and We may assure ourselves that many Arguments of *Conveniency*, of *Expediency*, of preserving the *Tranquility* of the City, and of giving *Strength* and *Weight* to the Arms and Councils of the Commonwealth, were urged to prevail on the People to dispense with these Institutions, in Favour of *Pompey* and of *Cæsar*. What was the Consequence? The *Pyrates* were extirpated, the Price of *Corn* was reduced, *Spain* was held in Subjection, *Gaul* was conquer'd, the *Germans* were repulsed,

Rome

Rome triumph'd, her Government flourish'd ; but her Constitution was destroy'd, her Liberty was lost.—The Law of *Habeas Corpus*, that noble Badge of Liberty, which every Subject of Britain wears, and by which He is distinguish'd so eminently, not from the *Slaves* alone, but even from the *Freemen* of other Countries; the Law of *Habeas Corpus*, I say, may be attended perhaps with some little Inconveniencies, in Time of Sedition and Rebellion.—The slow Methods of giving Money, and the strict Appropriations of it, when given, may be attended with some Inconveniency likewise, in Times of Danger and in great Exigencies of the State.—But who will plead for the Repeal of the *Habeas Corpus Act*; or who would not press for the Revival of it, if it stood suspended for an indefinite, or even a long Term?—Who will say that the Practice of giving Money without Account, or passing Votes of Credit, (by which the Purse of the People is taken out of the Hands of *Those*, whom the People trusted, and put into the Hands of *Those*, whom They neither did, nor would have trusted) who will say that such a Deviation from those Rules of Parliament, which ought to be deem'd sacred and preserv'd inviolate, may be establish'd, or should not be oppos'd by all possible Means, if it was establish'd?

If all This be as clear as I imagine it is; if the Objections to frequent Elections of Parliaments do not lye; or, supposing them to lye, if the Danger on one Side out weighs vastly the supposed Inconveniency on the other; nay, if *Laws* and *Institutions*, not more essential to the Preservation of Liberty than this antient and fundamental Rule of our Constitution, be maintain'd; and if all Men are forced to agree, (even They, who wish them perhaps abolish'd) that they ought to be

maintain'd,

maintain'd, for the Sake of preserving *Liberty*; let Me ask again, how comes it to pass that We observe so great a Difference between the Sentiments and Reasonings of Mankind about *frequent Sessions of Parliament*, and *frequent Parliaments*; about the *Case* now before us, and all the *others*, that have been mention'd? The only Manner, in which I can account for such an Inconsistency, is This. The Sight of the *Mind* differs very much from the Sight of the *Body*, and its Operations are frequently the Reverse of the *other*. Objects at a Distance appear to the *former* in their true Magnitude, and diminish as they are brought nearer. The Event, that created much Astonishment, Indignation, or Terror in Prospect, creates less and less, as it approaches, and by the Time it happens, Men have familiarized Themselves with it.—If the *Romans* had been told, in the Days of *Augustus*, that an Emperor would succeed, in whose Reign an *Horse* should be made Consul, They would have been extremely surpris'd. I believe, They were not so much surpris'd, when the Thing happen'd; when the *Horse* was Consul and *Caligula* Emperor.—If it had been foretold to those Patriots at the *Revolution*, who remember'd *long Parliaments*, who still felt the Smart of them, who struggled hard for *annual*, and obtain'd with much Difficulty, at the End of five or six Years, *triennial Parliaments*, that a Time would come, when even the Term of *triennial Parliaments* would be deem'd too short, and a Parliament, chosen for *three Years*, would chuse itself for *four* more, and entail *septennial Parliaments* on the Nation; that This would happen, and the Fruits of their honest Labours be lost, in little more than twenty Years; and that it would be brought about, whilst our Government continued on the Foundations

Foundations They had then so newly laid; if all This had been foretold at the Time I mention, it would have appear'd improbable and monstrous to the Friends of the *Revolution*. Yet it hath happen'd; and, in less than twenty Years, it is grown, or is growing, familiar to us. The uniform Zeal and Complaisance of our *Parliaments* for the *Crown* leave little Room to apprehend any Attempt to govern *without Them*; or to make Them do in *one Session* the Work of *seven*; though This would be extremely *convenient*, no Doubt, a great Ease to *future Ministers*, and a great Saving of Expence and Time to *Country Gentlemen*. But suppose, (for I desire it may be remember'd that We reason hypothetically) suppose a *Parliament* should think fit to give, in the *first Session*, all the *Money*, all the *Credit*, and all the *Powers*, necessary for carrying on the Government, during *seven Years*; and then let those Persons, who will be shock'd at this Supposition, and yet declare Themselves for *septennial Parliaments*, lay their Hands on their Hearts, and consider whether such an Alteration of the Constitution might not grow familiar to Them, and even gain their Approbation. I think, it would do so. I am sure, it might as reasonably as the other. They would find the Ease, in one Case, of *little Attendance*, as much as That of *distant Elections*, in the other. The Arguments of *Conveniency*, *Expediency*, *Publick Tranquility*, and *Strength to the Government*, would be just as well apply'd; and if the *Ministers* should, by Miracle, make no very exorbitant ill Use of such a Situation, I doubt whether He, who should plead for *annual Parliaments then*, would be much better heard by the same Persons, than He, who pleads for *frequent Elections of Parliaments*, is now. But let not the *Lovers of Liberty*, the *Friends of our Constitution*,

reason

reason in this Manner. Let them remember that Danger commences, when the Breach is made, not when the Attack is begun; that He, who neglects to stop the Leak, as soon as it is discover'd, in Hopes to save his Ship by Pumping, when the Water gushes in with Violence, deserves to be drown'd; and, to lay aside Figures of Speech, that our *Constitution* is not, like the Schemes of *some Politicians*, a Jumble of disjointed, incoherent Whimsies, but a noble and wise System, the essential Parts of which are so proportion'd, and so intimately connected, that a Change in one begets a Change in the whole; that the *frequent Elections of Parliament* are as much an essential Part of this System as the *frequent Sitzings of Parliament*; that the Work of the *Revolution* is imperfect therefore, and our future Security precarious, unless our *antient Constitution* be restored, in this essential Part; and that the Restoration of it, in this Part, is one of those Methods, by which alone the pernicious Designs of *such Men*, as We have mention'd in a former Letter, if any such should be ever admitted into Power, (*Enemies to the Constitution*, under the Mask of *Zeal for the Government*) may be defeated.

I am, S I R, &c.



T
L E T T E R

L E T T E R XII.

S I R,

WE have observed already that the *Constitution of the British Government* supposes our *Kings* may abuse their Power, and our *Representatives* betray their Trust; and provides against both these Contingencies, as well as human Wisdom can provide. Here let us observe that the same *Constitution* is very far from supposing the *People* will ever betray Themselves; and yet this Case is possible, no Doubt. We do not read, I think, of more than * *one Nation*, who refused *Liberty*, when it was offer'd to Them; but We read of many, and have almost seen some, who lost it through their own Fault, by the plain and necessary Consequences of their own Conduct, when They were in full Possession of it, and had the Means of securing it effectually in their Power. A wise and brave People will neither be cozen'd, nor bully'd out of their *Liberty*; but a wise and brave People may cease to be such; They may degenerate; They may sink into Sloth and Luxury; They may resign Themselves to a treacherous Conduct; or abet the *Enemies of the Constitution*, under a Notion of

* *The Cappadocians, vid. Strabo. Lib. 12 — Libertatem repudiaverunt, ut quam sibi dicerent intolerabilem.*

supporting the *Friends of the Government*; They may want the Sense to discern their Danger in Time; or the Courage to resist, when it stares Them in the Face. The *Tarquins* were expell'd, and *Rome* resumed her Liberty. *Cæsar* was murder'd, and all his Race extinct; but *Rome* remain'd in Bondage. From whence this Difference? † *Machiavel* shall account for it. In the Days of *Tarquain*, the People of *Rome* were not yet corrupted. In the Days of *Cæsar*, they were most corrupt. A free People may be sometimes betray'd; but no People will betray Themselves, and sacrifice their Liberty, unless They fall into a State of universal Corruption; and when They are once fallen into such a State, They will be sure to lose what They deserve no longer to enjoy. To what Purpose therefore should our *Constitution* have suppos'd a Case, in which no Remedy can avail; a Case, which can never happen, 'till the Spirit, which form'd *this Constitution* first, and hath preserv'd it ever since, shall be totally extinguish'd; and 'till it becomes an ideal Entity, like the *Utopia*, existing in the Imagination, or Memory, no where else? As all Government began, so all Government must end by the *People*; tyrannical Governments by their Virtue and Courage, and even free Governments by their Vice and Baseness. Our *Constitution*, indeed, makes it impossible to destroy *Liberty* by any sudden Blast of popular Fury, or by the Treachery of a Few; for though the Many cannot easily hurt, They may easily save Themselves. But if the Many will concur with the Few; if they will advisedly and deliberately suffer their *Liberty* to be taken away by Those, to

† *Discourses Lib. 1. c. 17.*

whom They delegate Power to preserve it ; This no *Constitution* can prevent. God would not support even his own Theocracy against the concurrent Desire of the Children of *Israel*, but gave Them a *King* in his Anger. How then should our human Constitution of Government support itself against so universal a Change, as We here suppose, in the Temper and Character of our People? It cannot be. We may give Ourselves a Tyrant in our Folly, if We please. But This can never happen till the whole Nation falls into a State of political Reprobation. Then, and not till then, political Damnation will be our Lot.

Let us descend into a greater Detail, in order to develope these Reflections fully, and to push the Consequences of Them home to Ourselves, and to our present State. They deserve our utmost Attention, and are so far from being foreign to the Subject of these Essays upon *Parties*, that they will terminate in the very Point, at which We began, and wind up the whole in one important Lesson.

To proceed then ; I say, that if the People of this Island should suffer their Liberties to be at any Time ravish'd, or stolen from Them, They would incur greater Blame, and deserve by Consequence less Pity, than any enslaved and oppress'd People ever did. By how much *true Liberty* (That is, Liberty stated and ascertain'd by *Law*, in equal Opposition to *popular Licence* and *arbitrary Will*) hath been more boldly asserted, more wisely or more successfully improved, and more firmly establish'd in This, than in other Countries; by so much the more heavy would our just Condemnation prove in the Case, that is here supposed. The Virtue of our Ancestors, to whom all these Advantages are owing, would aggravate the Guilt and the Infamy of their degenerate Posterity. There
have

have been Ages of *Gold* and of *Silver*, of *Brass* and of *Iron*, in our little World, as in the great World, though not in the same Order. In which of these Ages we are at present, let Others determine. This, at least, is certain, that in all these Ages *Britain* hath been the Temple, as it were, of *Liberty*. Whilst her sacred Fires have been extinguish'd in so many Countries, here they have been religiously kept alive. Here She hath her Saints, her Confessors, and a whole Army of Martyrs, and the Gates of Hell have not hitherto prevail'd against Her; so that if a fatal Reverse is to happen; if Servility and Servitude are to over-run the whole World, like *Injustice*, and *Liberty* is to retire from it, like *Astræa*; our Portion of the abandon'd Globe will have, at least, the mournful Honour, whenever it happens, of shewing her last, her parting Steps.

The antient *Britons* are to us the *Aborigines* of our Island. We discover little of Them through the Gloom of Antiquity, and We see nothing beyond Them. This however We know; They were *Freemen*. *Cæsar*, who visited Them in an hostile Manner, but did not conquer Them, perhaps was * beaten by Them; *Cæsar*, I say, bestows very liberally the Title of *Kings* upon their Chieftains, and the Compilers of fabulous Traditions deduce a Series of their Monarchs from *Samothes*, a Cotemporary of *Nimrod*. But *Cæsar* affected to swell the Account of his Expedition with pompous Names; and these Writers, like Those whom † *Strabo* mentions, endeavour'd to recommend Themselves by publishing Romances to an

* *Territa quæsitis ostendit Terga Britannis.*

† *Geog. Lib. 11.*

ignorant Generation, instead of Histories. These supposed Monarchs were the * Heads of little Clans; *Reguli, vel melioris Notæ Nobiles*; and if our Island knew any Authority of the kingly Sort in those Days, it was That of *occasional* and *temporary Monarchs*, elected in great Exigencies, † *communi Consilio, Suffragiis Multitudinis*, like *Cassvel-launus* in *Britain*, or *Vercingetorix* in *Gaul*; for, in some Cases, Examples taken from either of these People will conclude for both. The *Kings*, who ruled in *Britain*, after the *Romans* abandon'd the Island, in the Beginning of the 5th Century, held their Authority from the *People*, and govern'd under the Controul of *national Assemblies*, as We have great Reason to believe, and none to doubt. In short, as far as We can look back, a lawless Power, a Government by Will, never prevail'd in *Britain*.

The *Saxons* had *Kings*, as well as the *Britons*. The Manner, in which They establish'd Themselves, and the long Wars They waged for and against the *Britons*, led to and maintain'd *monarchical Rule* amongst Them. But *these Kings* were in their first Institution, no Doubt, such as *Tacitus* describes the *German Kings* and *Princes* to have been; ** *Chiefs*, who persuaded, rather than commanded; and who were heard in the publick Assemblies of the Nation, according as their *Age*, their *Nobility*, their *military Fame*, or their *Eloquence* gave Them Authority. How many doubtly Monarchs, in later and more polite Ages, would have slept in Cottages, and have

* *Sel. Anal. Anglo Brit. Lib. 2 cap. 3. Camd.*

† *Cæs. de Bell. Gal. Lib. 5. § 7.*

** *De Situ mor. & Pop. Germ. lib. 11.*

work'd in Stalls, instead of inhabiting Palaces, and being cushion'd up in Thrones, if this Rule of Government had continued in Force? — But the *Saxon Kings* grew into Power in Time; and among Them, as among other Nations, Birth, instead of Merit, became, for the Sake of Order and Tranquility, a Title to the Throne. However, tho' these Princes might command, and were no longer under the Necessity of governing by Persuasion, They were still under That of governing to the Satisfaction of the People. By what other Expedient could They govern Men, who were wise enough to preserve and exercise the Right of electing their *civil Magistrates*, and *military Officers*, and the System of whose Government was upheld and carried on by a Gradation of *popular Assemblies*, from the inferior Courts to the high Court of Parliament; for such, or very near such, was the *Witena-Gemote* in Nature and Effect, whenever the Word *Parliament* came into Use?

The first Prince of the *Norman* Race was an absolute *Conqueror*, in the Opinion of some Men; and I can readily agree that He assumed, in some Cases, the Power of a *Tyrant*. But supposing all This to be true in the utmost Extent, that the *Friends of absolute Monarchy* can desire it should be thought so; This, and This alone, will result from it; *unlimited*, or *absolute Monarchy*, could never be establish'd in *Britain*; no, not even by *Conquest*. The Rights of the People were soon re-asserted; the Laws of the *Confessor* were restored; and the third Prince of this Race, *Henry the 1st*, covenanted in a solemn Speech to his People for their Assistance against his Brother *Robert* and the *Normans*, by promising that *sacred Charter*, which was in other Reigns so often and so solemnly confirm'd by en-
gaging

gaging to maintain his Subjects in * *their antient Liberties*, to *follow their Advice*, and to rule Them in Peace with *Prudence* and *Mildness*.

I need not descend into more Particulars to shew the Perpetuity of free Government in *Britain*. Few Men, even in this Age, are so shamefully unacquainted with the History of their Country, as to be ignorant of the principal Events and signal Revolutions, which have happen'd since the *Norman Æra*. One continued Design against *Liberty* hath been carried on by various Methods, almost in every Reign. In many, the Struggles have been violent and bloody. But *Liberty* still hath triumph'd over Force, over Treachery, over Corruption, and even under Oppression. The Altars of *Tyranny* have been demolish'd as soon as raised; nay, even whilst they were raising; and the Priests of that Idol have been hew'd to Pieces; so that I will affirm, without the least Apprehension of being disproved, that our *Constitution* is brought nearer than any *other Constitution* ever was to the most perfect Idea of a *free System of Government*.—One Observation only I will make, before I leave this Head, and it is This. The Titles of those Kings, which were precarious, from Circumstances of Times, and Notions that prevail'd, notwithstanding the general Acquiescence of the Nation to them, afforded so many Opportunities to our Ancestors of better securing, or improving *Liberty*. They were not such Bubbles as to alter, without mending the Government; much less to make Revolutions, and suffer by them. They were not such Bubbles

* *In antiquis vestris Libertatibus. Vestris inclinando Consiliis. Consultius Et mitius, more mansueti Principis.*—— Vid. *Mat. Par.*

as to raise Princes to the Throne; who had no Pretence to sit in it but their Choice, purely to have the Honour of bettering the Condition of those Princes, without bettering their own in proportion: ——— If what I have been saying appears a little too digressive from the main Scope of this Essay, I shall hope for Indulgence from this Consideration, that the natural Effect of such Reflections, as I have made and suggested, must be to raise in our Minds the honest Ambition of emulating the Virtue and Courage of our Forefathers, in the Cause of *Liberty*; and to inspire a reasonable Fear, heighten'd by Shame, of losing what They preserved and deliver'd down to us, through so many Mixtures of different People, of *Britons* with *Saxons*, of both with *Danes*, of all three with *Normans*, through so many Difficulties, so many Dangers, so many Revolutions, in the Course of so many Centuries.

There is another Reason to be given why the People of this Island would be more inexcusable than any other, if They lost their *Liberty*; and the opening and enforcing of this Reason will bring us fully into our Subject.

I supposed just now that our *Liberty* might be ravish'd, or stol'n from us; but I think that Expression must be retracted; since it will appear, upon due Consideration, that our *Liberty* cannot be taken away by the Force, or Fraud alone of Those, who govern; it cannot be taken away, unless the People are Themselves Accomplices; and They, who are Accomplices, cannot be said to suffer by one, or the other. Some Nations have received the Yoke of Servitude with little or no Struggle; but if ever it is imposed upon us, We must not only hold out our Necks to receive it; We must help to put it on. Now, to be passive in such a Case

is shameful; but to be active is supreme and unexampled Infamy. In order to become *Slaves*, We of this Nation must be beforehand, what other People have been render'd by a long Course of Servitude; We must become the most corrupt, most profligate, the most senseless, the most servile Nation of Wretches, that ever disgraced Humanity; for a Force sufficient to ravish *Liberty* from us, such as a great *standing Army* is in Time of Peace, cannot be continued, unless we continue it; nor can the Means, necessary to steal *Liberty* from us, be long enough employ'd with Effect, unless We give a Sanction to their Iniquity, and call Good Evil, and Evil Good.

It may be said that even the *Friends of Liberty* have sometimes different Notions about it, and about the Means of maintaining, or promoting it; and therefore that even the *British* Nation may possibly, some Time or other, approve and concur in Measures destructive of their *Liberty*, without any Intention to give it up, and much more without changing from the Character, which They have hitherto borne amongst the Societies of Mankind, to that infamous Character I have just now supposed. If This were true, it would only furnish more Reasons to be always on our Guard, to be jealous of every extraordinary Demand, and to reject constantly every Proposition, though never so specious, that had a Tendency to weaken the Barriers of *Liberty*, or to raise a Strength superior to theirs. But I confess I do not think We can be led blindfold so far as the Brink of the Precipice. I know that all Words, which are Signs of complex Ideas, furnish Matter of Mistake and Cavil. We dispute about *Justice*, for Instance, and fancy that We have different Opinions about the same Thing; whilst, by some little Difference in the Composition of

of our Ideas, it happens that We have only different Opinions about different Things, and should be of the same Opinion about the same Thing. But This, I presume, cannot happen in the Case before us. All Disputes about *Liberty* in this Country, and at this Time, must be Disputes for and against the self-same, fix'd and invariable Set of Ideas, whatever the Disputants on *one Side of the Question* may pretend, in order to conceal what it is not yet very safe to avow. No Disputes can possibly arise from different Conceptions of any Thing so clearly stated, and so precisely determined, as the fundamental Principles are, on which our whole *Liberty* rests.

If *Liberty* be that delicious and wholesome Fruit, on which the *British* Nation hath fed for so many Ages, and to which we owe our Riches, our Strength, and all the Advantages we boast of; the *British Constitution* is the Tree, that bears this Fruit, and will continue to bear it, as long as We are careful to fence it in, and trench it round, against the Beasts of the Field, and the Insects of the Earth. To speak without a Figure, our *Constitution* is a System of Government suited to the Genius of our Nation, and even to our Situation. The Experience of many hundred Years hath shewn that by preserving *this Constitution* inviolate, or by drawing it back to the Principles, on which it was originally founded, whenever it shall be made to swerve from them, We may secure to Ourselves, and to our latest Posterity, the Possession of that *Liberty*, which We have long enjoy'd. What would We more? What *other Liberty* than This do We seek? And if We seek no other, is not This mark'd out in such Characters as He, that runs, may read? As our *Constitution* therefore ought to be, what it seldom is, the *Rule of Government*; fo-

let us make the Conformity, or Repugnancy of Things to *this Constitution*, the Rule, by which We accept them as favourable, or reject them as dangerous to *Liberty*. They, who talk of *Liberty* in *Britain* on any other Principles than Those of the *British Constitution*, talk impertinently at best, and much Charity is requisite to believe no worse of Them. But they, who distinguish between *practicable* and *impracticable Liberty*, in order to insinuate what they mean, (or They mean nothing) that the *Liberty* establish'd by the true Scheme of our *Constitution* is of the *impracticable Kind*; and They, who endeavour, both in Speculation and Practice, to elude and pervert the Forms, and to ridicule and explode the Spirit of *this Constitution*; these Men are Enemies, open and avow'd Enemies, to it, and by Consequence to *British Liberty*, which cannot be supported on any other Bottom. —

Some Men there are, the Pests of Society I think Them, who pretend a great Regard to *Religion* in general, but who take every Opportunity of declaiming publickly against that *System of Religion*, or at least against that *Church-Establishment*, which is received in *Britain*. Just so the Men, of whom I have been speaking, affect a great Regard to *Liberty* in general, but They dislike so much the System of *Liberty* establish'd in *Britain*, that They are incessant in their Endeavours to puzzle the plainest Thing in the World, and to refine and distinguish away the Life and Strength of our *Constitution*, in Favour of the little, present momentary Turns, which They are retain'd to serve. What now would be the Consequence, if all these Endeavours should succeed? I am persuaded that the great *Philosophers*, *Divines*, *Lawyers*, and *Politicians*, who exert them, have not yet prepared and agreed upon the Plans of

a new

a new Religion, and of new Constitutions in Church and State. We should find Ourselves therefore without any Form of Religion, or civil Government. The first Set of these Missionaries would take off all the Restraints of Religion from the Governed, and the latter Set would remove, or render ineffectual, all the Limitations and Controuls, which Liberty hath prescribed to Those that govern, and disjoint the whole Frame of our Constitution. Entire Dissolution of Manners, Confusion, Anarchy, or perhaps absolute Monarchy, would follow; for it is possible, nay probable, that in such a State as This, and amidst such a Rout of lawless Savages, Men would chuse this Government, absurd as it is, rather than have no Government at all.

But here again it may be said, that as Liberty is a Word of uncertain Signification, so is Constitution; that Men have taught the most opposite Doctrines, and pretended at least to build them on the Principles of the Constitution; that the Rule therefore of determining our Notions of Liberty, by the Principles of our Constitution, is no Rule, and We are by Consequence just where we were before. But the Answer is ready. It is true that there were formerly Men, who persisted long in the Attempt to talk and write that Chimera, called Prerogative, into Vogue; to contend that it was something real; a Right inherent in the Crown; founded in the Constitution of our Government; and equally necessary to support the just Authority of the Prince, and to protect the Subject. How We had like to have lost our Liberty by the Prevalence of such Doctrines, by the Consequences drawn from them, and the Practices built upon them, hath been touch'd in the Deduction of the State of Parties. But happily this Kind of Progression from a free to a slavish Constitution of Government was stop'd

stop'd at the *Revolution*, and the Notions themselves are so exploded in the Course of six and forty Years, that they are entertain'd at this Hour by no Set of Men, whose Numbers, or Importance, give Them any Pretence to be reckon'd among our *national Parties*.——It is as true, that there are now Men, who pursue the very same Design by different Methods. The *former* attack'd, *These* undermine our *Liberty*. The *former* were the *Beasts of the Field*, hinted at above; *These* are the *Insects of the Earth*; and like other Insects, though sprung from Dirt, and the vilest of the animal Kind, They can nibble and gnaw, and poison; and, if They are suffer'd to multiply and work on, They can lay the most fruitful Country waste. *Corruption* and *Dependency* are their favourite Topicks. They plead for the *first* as a laudable Expedient of Government; and for the *last*, I mean *corrupt, private Dependency*, as an essential Part of our *Constitution*. When They have perplex'd, as much as they are able, our Ideas of *Dependency* and *Independency*, They reason, if I may give their Sophisms so good a Name, as if the *Independency of each Part of the Legislature*, of the *King* particularly, arose from the *Dependency of the other Parts on that Part*. Now, This is both false and absurd.——It is false, because the *constitutional Independency of each Part of the Legislature* arises from hence; that distinct Rights, Powers and Privileges are assign'd to it by the *Constitution*. But then this *Independency of one Part* can be so little said to arise from the *Dependency of another*, that it consists properly and truly in the free, unbiass'd, uninfluenced, and independent Exercise of these Rights, Powers and Privileges, by *each Part*, in as ample an Extent as the *Constitution* allows; or, in other Words,

as far as that Point, where the *Constitution* stops this free Exercise, and submits the Proceedings of *one Part*, not to the private Influence, but to the publick Controul of the *other Parts*. Before this Point, the *Independency of each Part* is meant by the *Constitution* to be *absolute*. From this Point the *constitutional Dependency of each Part on the others* commences. To talk of *natural Independency* belonging to the *kingly Office*, to an *House of Peers*, or an *House of Commons*, (the Institutions of *Art*, not of *Nature*) is impertinent. — It is absurd, because it absolutely destroys the very Thing it is advanced to establish; for if *A's Independency* arises from the *Dependency of B*, and *B's Independency* from the *Dependency of A*, then are *A* and *B* both dependent, and there is no such thing as *constitutional Independency* at all. The *Crown* is the Source of *Honours*, and hath the Disposal of *publick Employments*. This no Man disputes; nor would any Man, I believe, go about to alter. But will it follow that the * *constitutional Independency of the King* would be lost, because the *House of Commons* give the Supplies, if He had not the Power of giving Part of this Money, in *Places and Pensions*, back again to the Members of *that House*? It would be easy for Me to turn this whole profound Reasoning into many, even ridiculous Lights; but the Subject creates other Sentiments than Those of Mirth, though the Logick employ'd about it deserves a ludicrous, not a serious Treatment. — I ask Pardon for having said so much upon so slight an Occasion, and I proceed.

* *Vide London Jour. Sept. 28, 1734.*

Notwithstanding all these Endeavours to puzzle our *Constitution*, formerly in Favour of that *Prerogative*, by the Weight of which it must have been crush'd, and actually at this Time in Favour of *that Corruption* and *corrupt Dependency*, by which it would be soon demolish'd; the main Principles of the *British Constitution* are simple, and obvious, and fix'd, as well as any Truths can be fix'd, in the Minds of Men, by the most determinate Ideas. The State of our *Constitution* then affords an easy and unerring Rule, by which to judge of the State of our *Liberty*. The Improvement, or Decay of *one* denotes the Improvement, or Decay of the *other*; and the Strength, or Weakness of *one*, the Safety, or Danger of the *other*. We cannot lose our *Liberty*, unless We lose our *Constitution*; nor lose our *Constitution*, unless We are Accomplices to the Violations of it; for *this Constitution* is better fitted than any, antient or modern, ever was, not only to preserve *Liberty*, but to provide for its own Duration, and to become immortal, if any Thing human could be so.

I am, S I R, &c.



LETTER



LETTER XIII.

S I R,

MUCH hath been said occasionally, in the Course of these Letters, concerning the Beauty and Excellency of the *British Constitution*. I shall make however no Excuse for returning to the same Subject upon an Occasion, which introduces it so naturally, and indeed so necessarily. Nothing can be more apposite to the profess'd Design of these Writings; nothing of more real, and more present Use. Let me speak plainly. We have been all of us, Those of every Side, and of every Denomination, accustom'd too long to value ourselves foolishly, or knavishly, on our Zeal for *this*, or *that Party*, or for *this*, or *that Government*; and to make a Merit of straining the *Constitution* different Ways, in order to serve the different Purposes of each. It is high Time We should all learn, if That be still possible, to value Ourselves in the first Place on our Zeal for the *Constitution*; to make *all Governments*, and much more *all Parties*, bow to *That*, and to suffer *That* to bow to none. But how shall this *Constitution* be known, unless We make it the Subject of careful Enquiry, and of frequent and sober Reflection? Or unknown, how shall it become, what it ought to be, the Object of our Admiration, our Love and our Zeal? Many of Those, who reap the greatest Advantages

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from

from it, pass it by unregarded, with equal Folly and Ingratitude. Many take a transient, inattentive View of it. Many again consider it in Part only, or behold it in a narrow, pedantick Light. Instead of This, We should view it often. We should pierce through the Form to the Soul of it. We should contemplate the noble Object in all its Parts, and in the Whole, and render it as familiar to our intellectual Sight, as the most common sensible Objects are to our corporeal Sight. *Quam illa arduos Amores excitaret sui, si videretur?* Well may it be allow'd Me to apply to so glorious an Effort of human Wisdom what *Tully* says after *Plato*, in the *Phædrus*, if I mistake not, of Wisdom herself.

All publick Regiment, says Mr. Hooker, hath arisen from deliberate Advice, Consultation and Composition between Men. The Proposition is undoubtedly and universally true. It is as true in the Kingdom of *Morocco*, as it is in the Kingdom of *Britain*; and the undeniable Consequences, which flow from it, are obvious. We are not to wonder however, if Men do not look up to *this Original of Government*, nor trace these Consequences from it, in most Countries. In the Institution of Governments, too great Powers have been usually given, and too great Confidence reposed, either at first, or in Process of Time. These Powers have subsisted, have been confirm'd by more Time, and increased by the very Nature of Power, which is the properest Instrument of its own Propagation. But the *original Composition*, for want of being express'd, or sufficiently imply'd, or frequently recur'd to by the Forms of the Government, hath been forgot, or hath grown so obsolete, that They, whose Interest

* *Cic. de Finib. l. 2.*

required that no such Thing should be believed, have thought Themselves at Liberty boldly to deny it; and not only so, but to suppose *some other Original of Government*. Strange Systems of Policy, and stranger of Religion, have been devised to support and sanctify these Usurpations. Education hath been set on the same Side; and *saucy Authority* hath prevail'd against the clearest Light of Nature, and the plainest Dictates of *common Sense*. No Man, who hath read and look'd abroad into the World, and made a reasonable Use of either, will think This too strange to be true; since there is no demonstrated Truth, (such Truths I mean as are here spoken of) which may not be render'd, at least, very problematical by long, uniform, positive Contradiction; nor any demonstrated Lye, which may not be render'd probable to many, and certain to some, by long, uniform, positive Affirmation; according to a just Observation made by Father Paul somewhere-or other, on Occasion of Constantine's supposed Grant, and other Cheats of the Court of Rome. But We of this Country have been more happy. Our *original Contract* hath been recur'd to often, and as many Cavils as have been made, as many Jestes as have been broke about this Expression, We might safely defy the *Affertors of absolute Monarchy and arbitrary Will*, if there were any worth our Regard, to produce any one Point of Time, since which We know any Thing of our *Constitution*, wherein the whole Scheme of it would not have been one monstrous Absurdity, unless an *original Contract* had been supposed. They must have been blinded therefore by Ignorance, or Passion, or Prejudice, who did not always see that there is such a Thing necessarily, and in the very Nature of our *Constitution*; and that They might as well doubt whether the Foundations of an antient,

solid Building were suited and proportion'd to the Elevation and Form of it, as whether our *Constitution* was establish'd by *Composition* and *Contract*. Sure I am that They must be worse than blind, if any such there are, who do not confes at this Time, and under the *present Settlement*, that our *Constitution* is in the strictest Sense a *Bargain*, a *conditional Contract* between the *Prince* and the *People*, as it always hath been, and still is, between the *representative and collective Bodies* of the *Nation*.

That *this Bargain* may not be broken, on the Part of the *Prince*, with the *People*, (though the *executive Power* be trusted to the *Prince*, to be exercis'd according to such Rules, and by the Ministry of such Officers, as are prescribed by the Laws and Customs of this Kingdom) the *legislative*, or *supreme Power*, is vested by our *Constitution* in *three Estates*, whereof the *King* is one. Whilst the Members of the *other Two* preserve their *private Independency*, and *those Estates* are consequently under no *Dependency* except That, which is in the Scheme of our *Constitution*, this Controul on the *first* will always be sufficient; and a *bad King*, let Him be as bold as He may please to be thought, must stand in Awe of an *honest Parliament*.

That *this Bargain* may not be broken, on the Part of the *representative Body*, with the *collective Body of the Nation*, it is not only a principal, declared Right of the People of Britain, that the *Election of Members to sit in Parliament shall be free*; but it hath been a principal Part of the Care and Attention of Parliaments, for more than three hundred Years to watch over *this Freedom*, and to secure it, by removing *all Influence of the Crown*, and *all other corrupt Influence*, from these Elections. This Care and this Attention have gone still farther. They

They have provided, as far as they have been suffer'd to provide hitherto, by the *constitutional Dependency of one House on the other, and of both on the Crown*, that all such Influence should be removed from the Members, after They are chosen. Even here the Providence of our *Constitution* hath not stop'd. Lest all other Provisions should be ineffectual to keep the Members of the House of Commons out of this *unconstitutional Dependency*, which some Men presume with a silly dogmatical Air of Triumph to suppose necessary to support the *constitutional Independency of the Crown*, the Wisdom of our *Constitution* hath thought fit that the *Representatives of the People* should not have Time to forget that They are *such*; that They are empower'd to act for the *People*, not against *Them*. In a Word, our *Constitution* means that the Members of this Body should be kept, as it were, to their good Behaviour, by the frequent Returns of *new Elections*. It does all that a *Constitution* can do, all that can be done by legal Provisions, to secure the Interests of the *People*, by maintaining the Integrity of their *Trustees*; and lest all This should fail, it gives frequent Opportunities to the *People* to secure their Interests *Themselves*, by mending their Choice of their *Trustees*; so that as a *bad King* must stand in Awe of an *honest Parliament*, a *corrupt House of Commons* must stand in Awe of an *honest People*.

Between these *two Estates*, or Branches of the *legislative Power*, there stands a *third*, the *House of Peers*; which may seem in Theory, perhaps, too much under the Influence of the *Crown*, to be a proper Controul upon it; because the sole Right of creating *Peers* resides in the *Crown*; whereas the *Crown* hath no Right to intermeddle in the electing *Commoners*. This would be the Case, and an intolerable one indeed, if the *Crown* should exercise
this

this Right often, as it hath been exercised some times with universal and most just Disapprobation. It is possible too that This may come to be the Case, in some future Age, by the Method of electing Peers to sit in Parliament. for *one Part of the same Kingdom*, by the frequent Translations of *Bishops*, and by other Means, if the Wisdom and Virtue of the present Age, and the favourable Opportunity of the present auspicious and indulgent Reign do not prevent it. But in all other Respects the Persons, who are once created *Peers*, and their Posterity, according to the Scheme of the *Constitution*, having a Right to sit and debate, and vote in the *House of Peers*, which cannot be taken from Them, except by Forfeiture; all Influence of the Kind I have mention'd seems to be again removed, and their Share in the *Government* depending neither on the *King*, nor the *People*, They constitute a *middle Order*, and are properly Mediators between the *other Two*, in the Eye of our *Constitution*.

It is by this Mixture of *Monarchical*, *Aristocratical* and *Democratical Power*, blended together in one System, and by these *three Estates* ballancing one another, that our *free Constitution of Government* hath been preserved so long inviolate, or hath been brought back, after having suffer'd Violations, to its original Principles, and been renew'd, and improved too, by frequent and salutary Revolutions. It is by This, that *weak* and *wicked Princes* have been opposed, restrain'd, reform'd, punish'd by *Parliaments*; that the real, and perhaps the doubtful, Exorbitancies of *Parliaments* have been reduced by the *Crown*; and that the Heat of *one House* hath been moderated, or the Spirit raised, by the Proceedings of the *other*. *Parliaments* have had a good Effect on the *People*, by keeping
Them

Them quiet, and the *People on Parliaments*, by keeping Them within Bounds, which They were tempted to transgress. A just Confidence in the safe, regular, Parliamentary Methods of redressing Grievances hath often made the freest, and not the most patient People on Earth, bear the greatest Grievances much longer than People, held under stronger Restraints, and more used to Oppression, who had not the same Confidence, nor the same Expectation, have borne even less. The Cries of the *People*, and the Terror of *approaching Elections* have defeated the most dangerous Projects for beggaring and enslaving the Nation; and the *Majority without Doors* hath obliged the *Majority within Doors* to truckle to the *Minority*. In a Word, two Things may be said with Truth of our *Constitution*, which I think neither can, nor ever could be said of any other. It secures Society against the Miseries, which are inseparable from *simple Forms of Government*, and is liable as little as possible to the Inconveniencies, that arise in *mix'd Forms*. It cannot become uneasy to the *Prince*, or *People*; unless the *former* be egregiously weak, or wicked; nor be destroy'd, unless the *latter* be excessively and universally corrupt.— But these general Assertions require to be a little better explain'd.

By *simple Forms of Government* I mean such as lodge the whole supreme Power, absolutely and without Controul, either in a *single Person*, or in the *principal Persons of the Community*, or in the *whole Body of the People*. Such Governments are Governments of *arbitrary Will*, and therefore of all imaginable Absurdities the most absurd. They stand in direct Opposition to the sole Motive of Submission to any Government whatsoever; for if Men quit the State, and renounce the Rights of *Nature*, (one of which is, to be sure, That of being govern'd

govern'd by their *own Will*) They do This, that They may not remain expos'd to the *arbitrary Will of other Men*, the Weakest to That of the Strongest, the Few to That of the Many. Now, in submitting to any *single Form of Government* whatever, They establish what They mean to avoid, and for Fear of being expos'd to *arbitrary Will* sometimes, They chuse to be govern'd by it always. *These Governments* do not only degenerate into *Tyranny*; they are *Tyranny* in their very Institution; and They, who submit to them, are *Slaves*, not *Subjects*, however the supreme Power may be exercis'd; for *Tyranny* and *Slavery* do not so properly consist in the Stripes, that are given and received, as in the Power of giving them at Pleasure, and the Necessity of receiving them, whenever and for whatever they are inflict'd. *Absolute Democracy* may appear to some, in abstracted Speculation, a less Deviation from Nature than *Monarchy*, and more agreeable to Reason; because here it is the *Will of the whole Community*, that governs the *whole Community*, and because Reason does certainly instruct every Man, even from a Consciousness of his own Frailty, the *Impotentia Animi* of the *Latin* Writers, to trust as little Power as possible to any other Man. But still it must be confess'd, that if it be unsafe for a People to trust too much Power to a *Prince*, it is unsafe for Them likewise to keep too much Power to *Themselves*. *Absolute Monarchy* is *Tyranny*; but *absolute Democracy* is *Tyranny* and *Anarchy* both. If *Aristocracy* be placed between these two Extremes, it is placed on a slippery Ridge, and must fall into one or the other, according to the natural Course of human Affairs; if the Few, who govern, are united, into *Tyranny*, perhaps, more severe than any other; if they are disunited, into *Factions* and *Disorders*, as great as Those of the most *tumultuous Democracy*.

From

From such Observations, and many of the same Kind and Tendency, it hath been concluded very reasonably that the best Form of Government must be one compounded of *these Three*, and in which they are *all* so temper'd, that *each* may produce the good Effects, and be restrain'd by the Counter-workings of the *other Two*, from producing the bad Effects, that are natural to it. Thus much is evident. But then how to fix that just Proportion of *each*, how to hit that happy Temperament of them all in one System, is a Difficulty that hath perplex'd the wisest Politicians, and the most famous Legislators. Let me quote one of the greatest Writers of Antiquity. † *Tacitus* acknowledges, in the fourth Book of his Annals, what is here advanced ; but He thinks *such a Constitution of Government* rather a Subject of fine Speculation, than of Practice. He thinks it much more likely that *such a System* should continue to be admired and praised in Idea, than establish'd in Fact ; and if it happens ever to be establish'd, He does not imagine it can be supported long. Not only the real Difficulties, which his Sagacity presented to his Mind, but his Reflections on the Constitution and Fate of the *Roman Commonwealth* might lead *Tacitus* into this Despondency. But what the Refinements of *Roman Policy* could not do, hath been done in this Island, upon Foundations laid by the rough Simplicity of our *northern Ancestors*.

It would be a curious and entertaining Amusement, to reduce the Constitutions of the *Roman Government* and of *Those*, which were form'd on the Ruins

† *Cunctas Nationes & Urbes Populus, aut Primores, aut singuli regunt. Delecta ex his & constituta Reipublicæ Forma, laudari facilius quàm evenire ; vel, si evenit, hanc diuturna esse potest.*

of *that Empire*, particularly of *our own*, to their first Principles; to observe in which they agree, and in which they differ, and the uniform or various Tendencies of each; to mark the latent, as well as apparent Causes of their Rise and Fall; how well or how ill they were contrived for Triumphs abroad, or Peace at home; for vain Grandeur, or real Prosperity; for resisting Corruption, or being ruin'd by it. Such an Analysis and Enquiry would be, I imagine, not only amusing, but useful. At least, it would be more so than any Rhapsody of general Reflections, huddled together with little Order, or Design; for These leave no systematical Impressions on the Mind; nothing but a Confusion of Ideas, often bright and glittering, seldom instructive. But a Work of this Kind would be too voluminous and too aspiring for these little Essays, and the humble Author of them. He will therefore keep to his Point, and content Himself to make some of those Observations alone, which seem proper to illustrate and prove what He hath advanced; that the *British Constitution* is a plain and sufficient Rule of Judgment and Conduct to us in every Thing, that regards our *Liberty*; for preserving of which, as well as for securing its own Duration, it is better fitted than any other.

There was so great a Mixture of monarchical Power in the *Roman Commonwealth*, that † *Livy* dates the Original of *Liberty* from the Expulsion of the *Tarquins*, rather because the *consular Dignity* was made annual, than because the *regal Power* had suffer'd any Diminution in that Change. The

† *Libertatis Originem inde magis, quia annuum Imperium Consulare factum est, quam quod diminutum quicquam sit ex Regiâ Potestate, numeres. Omnia Jura, omnia Insignia primi Consules tenuere. Lib. Cap. 1.*

dictatorial Power, the most absolute that can be imagined, was introduced in eight, or at farthest in eleven Years afterwards, and may therefore be reckon'd coæval with the Commonwealth; and whatever Diminution either This, or the *consular Power* might suffer, the Axes and the Rods were terrible to the last; especially when they were carried before a *Dictator*, for whom the *Tribunes of the People* were not a Match, as They were for the *Consuls*. But though there were *three sorts of Power* exercised, there were but *two Orders, or Estates*, establish'd in this Commonwealth, the *Patricians* and the *Plebeians*; and the supreme Power was divided accordingly between the *Senate* and the *collective, not a representative, Body of the People*. These *two Orders, or Estates*, had frequent Contests, and well They might, since They had very opposite Interests. † *Agrarian Laws*, for Instance, began to be promulgated within three and twenty Years, and continued to the End of the Commonwealth to produce the same Disorders. How inconsistent, indeed, was *that Plan of Government*, which required so much hard Service of the *People*; and which, leaving Them so much *Power* in the Distribution of *Power*, left Them so little *Property* in the Distribution of *Property*? Such an *Inequality of Property*, and of the Means of acquiring it, cannot subsist in an *equal Commonwealth*; and I much apprehend that any near Approaches to a *Monopoly of Property* would not be long endured even in a *Monarchy*.—But I return to my first Observation.

Though the *Romans* made frequent Experience of the cruel Mischiefs, and even extreme Danger

† *Tum primum Lex agraria promulgata est; nunquam deinde usque ad hanc Memoriam sine maximis motibus Rerum agitata.*
Liv. L. 2. C. 41.

to *Liberty*, which attended almost every Variance of the *two Estates*, yet did they never fall upon any safe, or effectual Method of preventing these Disputes, or of reconciling them, without Violence. The old Expedients alone subsisted; and surely they were not only violent, but extra-constitutional. When the *Senate* was inflexible, the *People* had immediate Recourse to *Sedition*. When the *People* was refractory, the *Senate* had Recourse to a *Dictator*. The latter had an Approbation, which could not be given to the former, and was a *legal Institution*; notwithstanding which I make no scruple of saying that it was, at least, as inconsistent with a free *Constitution of Government* as the former. *Sedition* was temporary *Anarchy*. A *Dictator* was a *Tyrant for six Months*, unless He thought fit to abdicate sooner, The *Constitution* was suspended, and endanger'd by both. It might have been destroy'd by the Excesses of *one*. It was destroy'd by the bare Duration of the *other*. If the *Romans* had annually elected out of their Tribes a certain Number of Men to represent the *People*, instead of depending on their *Tribunes*; (a Sort of bullying Magistracy, and often a very corrupt one) and if this *representative Body* had been *one Estate*, and had acted as such, the *Consuls* might very well have supply'd the Place of a *third Estate*, and have been safely trusted, even more independently of the *Senate* than They were, with the *executive Power*. But the Want of a *third Estate* in the *Roman System* of Government, and of a *representative Body*, to act for the *collective Body*, maintain'd one perpetual Ferment, which often increased into a Storm, but never subsided into a Calm. The State of *Rome*, and of the greatest Men in that Commonwealth, would have deserved Pity rather than Envy, even in the best Times, if their

defective


defective Constitution had not made such a State of * Trouble and Tumult the Price They paid for the Maintenance of their *Liberty*. But This was not the whole Price. Whilst *Rome* advanced triumphantly in conquering the *World*, as her Orators, Poets and Historians have express'd Themselves; That is, a few Nations round the *Mediterranean Sea*, and little more; her Citizens turn'd against one another those Weapons, which were put into their Hands against the Enemies of *Rome*. Mutual Proscriptions and bloody Massacres follow'd; *each Party* triumph'd in its Turn; They were more animated and better disciplined by their Contests; both grew stronger; the *Commonwealth* alone grew weaker; and *Pompey* and *Cæsar* finish'd the last tragical Scene, which *Marius* and *Sylla* began. In fine, the *Roman Commonwealth* would have been dissolved much sooner than it was, by the Defects I have mention'd, which many Circumstances concurr'd to aggravate, if such a Spirit of Wisdom, as well as Courage, and such an Enthusiasm for the Grandeur, the Majesty, and the Duration of their Empire had not possess'd this People, as never possess'd any other. When this Spirit decay'd, when this Enthusiasm cool'd, the *Constitution* could not help, nay work'd against itself. That *dictatorial Power*, on which the *Senate* had always depended for preserving it, complicated the Ruin of it, in the Hands of *Cæsar*; and that *tribunitial Power*, to which the *People* had always trusted the Defence of their *Liberty*, confirm'd their *Slavery*, in the Hands of *Augustus*.

I am, S I R, &c.

* *Conciones Magistratum sæne pernoctantium in Restris. — Accusationes potentium Reorum, & assignatæ etiam Domibus Inimicitæ. — Proc. rum Factiones, & assidua Senatûs adversum Plebem Certamina,*

Dial. de Orat. Quintil. Tacito inscrip.

LETTER



LETTER XIV.

S I R,

THE Defects, which I have presumed to censure in the *Roman Constitution of Government*, were avoided in some of Those, that were establish'd on the breaking of that Empire, by the *northern Nations* and the *Goths*; for I suspect that the *Goths* were not properly and strictly a *northern Nation*, any more than the *Huns* and the *Alans*, though They have been often confounded, and I believe by Myself.—Let us cast our Eyes on *Spain* and *France*.

We cannot arrive, as far as my scanty Knowledge informs Me, at any particular and authentick Account of the Scheme of that Government, which the *Western Goths* establish'd, when, driven out of *Gaul* by the *Franks*, They drove the *Vandals* and the *Alans* out of *Spain*; nor distinguish very accurately between such Institutions as were Parts of the *original, Gothick Plan*, and such as were introduced into the several Kingdoms, that form'd Themselves on the Re-Conquest of the Country by the *Spaniards* from the *Arabs* and *Moors*. The Original of the *Cortes* particularly is quite in the Dark, as We are assured by a very * *industrious Enquirer*

* Dr. Geddes in his *miscell. Tracts*.

and judicious Writer. Thus much however We may assert; that the *Gothick Kings* were at first *elective*, and always *limited*, even after they became *hereditary*; and that the *Cortes*, whenever it was establish'd, was an Assembly, that may be more truly compared to a *British Parliament* than the Assembly of the *Estates of France* could ever pretend to be. *Churchmen* had wriggled Themselves into a Share of temporal Power among the *Goths*, as They did in every Country, where they were admitted to preach the Gospel, though without any Authority from the Gospel; so that the *Cortes* consisted of *Prelates*, as well as *Dukes*, *Masters of Orders*, *Earls* and *Ricosbomes*, who composed the whole Body of the Nobility; and of the *Procurators of the Commons*; That is, of the *Citizens* and *Burgeses*, chosen by the *Cities* and *Boroughs* to represent and act for the *the whole Body of the Commons*. To preserve the Independency of this Assembly, *these Procurators* were to be paid by the *Corporations*, for which They served; the *King* was to give no *Office*, or *Salary* to any of Them; nay, a * *Resumption of Rewards*, granted to *Members of the Cortes*, was once at least debated, if not enacted. In short, He was not to name their *President*, nor even to *send Letters unopen'd to any of Them*. No *Money* could be raised on the *Subjects*, without the Consent of *this Assembly*; and it was a standing Maxim, or Order, that *Redress of Grievances* should precede the *Grants of Supplies*. Such a Frame of Government as This seems built for Duration; and in Fact, if it had not been undermined, it could not have been demolish'd. The Manner, in which it was both undermined and demolish'd totally at last, deserves the Attention of every Man

* Dr. Geddes in his *miscell. Tracts*.

in *Britain*. It was undermined by the *Influence of the Court*, too much connived at and too long tolerated, on the *Members of the Cortes*. *Prostitute Wretches* were found in those Days, I doubt not, as well as in ours, to maintain that the *necessary Independency of the Prince* could not be supported, without allowing a *corrupt Dependency of the Cortes on Him*; and They had, in those Days, such Success in *Castile*, as we ought to hope They will never obtain in *Britain*. When *corrupt Majorities* were thus secured, Pretences were not wanting, nor will they ever be so, for making Concessions to the *Crown*, repugnant to the Spirit of the *Constitution*, and even inconsistent with the Forms of it. Such Pretences, however plausible, would not have been admitted by Men zealous to preserve their *Liberty*; because any real Danger, remote as well as immediate, to a *free Constitution* would in their Ballance outweigh all Considerations of real Expediency, and much more all the frivolous Pretences of that Kind. But the * *Members of the Cortes* were no longer such Men, when *Castile* lost her *Liberties* under *Charles the 5th*. The Custom of bribing the *Representatives of the Commons*, by *Gifts* and *Promises*, and so securing a Majority to the *Court*, had long prevail'd, as We have just now said; and after That, it is not to be wonder'd at if *Excises*, given for eight Years only, became perpetual; if *Money* was granted before *Grievances* were redress'd; and if the *Precedent*, set in the Time of *Henry the 2d*, was follow'd in all succeeding Reigns. The *Cortes* gave *this Prince* a Supply, for making War on the *Moors*; but the † Sum being represented by the *Court* to be insufficient for the Service, it was

* *Dr. Geddes in his miscell. Tract.*

† *Ib.*

carried that, in Case of a Deficiency, the *King* might raise, without calling a *Cortes*, the Money necessary to make good that Deficiency. This *Vote of Credit* gave an incurable fatal Wound to *that Constitution*. I call it a *Vote of Credit*, though the Powers it gave seem to be less than those, which are given by *some modern Votes of Credit*; for surely there is a Difference, and not a small one, between a Power to raise Money, directly on the People, for a *Service known*, and already approved, and provided for in Part, by their *Representatives*, and a Power to borrow Money, on the national Credit, for *Services unknown*, and to lay the Nation under an Obligation of paying for That, which it is possible their *Representatives* may disapprove.

This Precedent having been made, in Favour of *one King*, and in one particular Conjuncture, it became a prevailing Argument, in Favour of *every other King*, and in every other Conjuncture; for though it may be, nay must be, in the vast Variety of Characters, and of Conjunctures, prudent and just to grant, in Favour of *some Princes*, and upon some Occasions, what it would be neither prudent, nor just to grant, in Favour of *other Princes*, and upon other Occasions; yet such is the Merit of *every Prince*, who fills a Throne, or rather such is the servile Adulation paid to *Power*, in what Hands soever it be lodged, that general and almost universal Experience shews *this Rule*, which no Man of Sense would break in the Management of his *private Interests*, absolutely reversed in the Management of the most *important, national Interests*. The Inference to be drawn from hence is plainly This; that the Inconveniency, or Danger of refusing to *every Prince*, and in every Conjuncture, such Things as are inconsistent with the *Constitution of a free Government*, must be always

less than the Inconveniency, or Danger of granting them to *any Prince*, and in any Conjunction.

Let me add this farther Observation, which presents itself so naturally after the former. Though it be proper, in all *limited Monarchies*, to watch and guard against all Concessions, or Usurpations, that may destroy the *Ballance of Power*, on which the Preservation of *Liberty* depends; yet is it certain that *Concessions to the Crown* from the *other, constituent Parts of the Legislature* are almost alone to be fear'd. There is no Danger that the *Crown* should make them to the *others*; and on this Head the *People* may very safely trust to Those, who *wear* it, and Those, who *serve* it. The *Nobility* will not make them to the *Commons*, without great Struggles, which give Time for Interpositions; nor the *Commons* to the *Nobility*. But *both* may be easily induced to make them to the *Crown*. The Reasons of this Difference are obvious enough; for, first, a *King* is really nothing more than a *supreme Magistrate*, instituted for the Service of the Community, which requires that the *executive Power* should be vested in a *single Person*. He hath, indeed, a *Crown* on his Head, a *Scepter* in his Hand, and *velvet Robes* on his Back, and He sits elevated in a *Throne*, whilst Others stand on the Ground about Him; and all This to denote that He is a *King*, and to draw the Attention and Reverence of the Vulgar. Just so, another Man wears a *Mitre* on his Head, a *Crozier* in his Hand, and *lawn Sleeves*, and sits in a *purple Elbow-Chair*, to denote that he is a *Bishop*, and to excite the Devotion of the Multitude, who receive his Benediction very thankfully on their Knees. But still the *King*, as well as the *Bishop*, holds an *Office*, and owes a *Service*. *Officium est imperare, non Regnum*. The *King*, when He commands, discharges

discharges a *Trust*, and performs a *Duty*, as well as the *Subject*, when He *obeys*. Notwithstanding which, *Kings* are apt to see Themselves in another Light, and Experience shews us that even *They*, who made Them what They are, are apt to take Them for what They are not. From hence it happen'd in *Spain*, and may happen possibly in other Countries, that the *Kings*, instead of being satisfy'd with, and thankful for the Dignity, Honour, Power and Wealth, which they possess'd in so eminent a Degree above all other Magistrates and Members of the Commonwealth, repined at their being possess'd of no more. What They had, was given Them by the *Constitution*; and what They had not, was reserved by the same Authority to the *Nobility*, and to the *Commons*. But They proceeded, and their Sycophants reason'd, as if the sole Power of the Government; and the whole Wealth of the Nation, belonged of Right to *Them*, and the Limitations of the Monarchy were so many Usurpations on the Monarch.—In the second Place, besides this constant Desire of in-croaching, there is another Reason why *Concessions to the Crown* are more to be guarded against than others, in *limited Monarchies*. The regal Power resides in *one Person*. The other Shares of the supreme Power are assign'd to *Bodies of Men*. From hence it follows that the Interest of the *King*, and the Interest of the *Crown*, cannot well be divided in the Mind of a *Prince*; whereas the Interest of *each Individual* may be distinguish'd from the Interest of the *Nobility*, or of the *Commons*, and still more from That of the *Nation*, in the Minds of Those, who compose an *House of Peers*, or who are *Representatives of the People*. A *King* cannot be tempted to give up the Interest of the *Crown*, because He cannot give up this *publick Interest*, with-

out giving up his *private Interest*; whereas the *Members of such Assemblies* may promote their *private Interest*, by sacrificing to it That of the *Publick*. Several other Reasons might be insisted upon, to establish the Truth of the Observation We have made, and to shew how unfairly They argue, who all along suppose that the *Independency of the Crown* may as easily be lost, and the Ballance of Power be destroy'd on that Side, by *Concessions from the Prince*, and *Usurpations on Him*, as the *Independency of the Lords*, or *Commons*, may be lost, and the Ballance of Power be destroy'd on that Side, by *Concessions to the Prince*, and by his *Usurpations*. Such Reasons, for Instance, might be drawn from the Difference of that *Influence*, which the *Crown* hath on the *other Estates*, and which the *other Estates* have on the *Crown*; as well as from the Difference of the *Pretences*, which may be urged on Behalf of the *Crown*, or of the *Nobility*, or *Commons*, to obtain *such Concessions*; for supposing them all coequal, as Parts of the *Legislature*, yet if it be consider'd that the *executive Power* is solely in the *Crown*; that the Disposition of *publick Money*, as well as *publick Employments*, is a Part of *this Power*; that *this Power* is in continual Exercise, and may immediately affect, more or less, at one Time or at another, every particular Man, *Peer* as well as *Commoner*; whereas the *other Powers* are exercised occasionally, are continued or suspended, in great Measure, at the Will of the *Prince*, and are employ'd chiefly in Matters of general, not particular Concern; in fine, if it be consider'd farther, that the Powers exercised by *Assemblies of Peers and Commoners*, whether *these Assemblies* be regarded as Parts of the *Legislature*, as the *great Councils of the Nation*, or as the *Judges and Prosecutors of enormous Offenders*, are few and simple,

simple, directed to notorious Purposes, conducted by Rules always known, always the same, and always sufficient to these Purposes; whereas the Branches of *executive Power* are numerous and complicated, the Rules various, and the Purposes often unknown, often contingent; so that it may become difficult to judge either of the Utility of the Purposes, or of the Sufficiency of the Powers; if all these Things be consider'd, I say, We shall not be at a Loss to determine on which Side the Danger to *Liberty*, in a *limited Monarchy*, lies; and whether *Concessions to the Crown*, in Prejudice of the *Constitution*, are not more likely to be made, than *Concessions from it*.

Happy had it been for the People of *Castile*; if They had seen this Danger in Time, and had remedied, whilst the Remedies were in their Power, those Defects in their *Constitution*, whatever they were, which gave their *Kings* by Degrees such an Influence over the *Cortes*, as overturn'd at last the whole *Constitution*, and gain'd to the *German Race*, that began to reign in *Charles the 5th*, (for his Father *Philip* is scarce to be reckon'd) such an absolute Power as the *Gothick Kings* had never been able to obtain. Though *Charles the 5th* was a very able Prince, yet the Honour, (for such it will be esteem'd by some Men) or more truly the Infamy, of enslaving *Castile* must not be ascribed to his superior Capacity, nor to That of his *Ministers*. Had He been the meekest Tool, a Thing of Straw, but something less than a Scarecrow, and unable to protect the Property of his Subjects; He might still have taken their Liberties from Them, in that Conjuncture, as He did most effectually. *Corruption* was establish'd; a *Majority of the Cortes* was bribed; the *Nobility* was detach'd from the common Interest by *Titles, Places, Pensions,*

Pensions, and *Grants*; and the *Clergy* in general, for Exceptions there were, took no farther Share in it than their particular Piques, or some indirect and fleeting Considerations, inspired them to take. The Nation saw itself betray'd, and the *Commons* protested loudly against the Proceedings of their *Representatives*. But This was the very Point, for which the Enemies of the *Castilian* Constitution waited; and as soon as a Pretence for employing *Force* was given Them, They muffled Themselves up in that threadbare Cloak of Zeal for the *Government*, and stab'd their *Country* to the Heart. An Ordinance of the *Cortes* had been made, about a hundred Years before, against increasing the *standing Forces of the Kingdom* to more than 400 Soldiers in Garrisons, and 1500 Ginets. This Ordinance had not been very well observed. The long Wars with the *Moors* made *Armies* often necessary, when there was no actual War. The Danger of being invaded by the *Moors*, (for every *Moorish King* was deem'd a Pretender to the Throne) might serve to make Them so represented; and when this Reason fail'd intirely, as it did by the Conquest of *Granada*, the last Possession of these People in *Spain*, Pretences for keeping *Armies* on Foot were still to be found. There were still *Moorish Factions*; the *new Christians* were *Moors* in their Hearts; amongst the *old Christians* there were several, who favour'd Them; the People were not to be trusted with their own Preservation. *Chievres*, the rapacious Minister of *Charles the 5th*, and his *Journeymen* (for so were those *Spaniards* call'd, according to Dr. *Geddes*, who did not care how much their Country was plunder'd by Foreigners, provided They shared the Spoils) *Chievres*, I say, and his *Journeymen*, a real Faction, and perhaps not a great one, were the

fast

fast Friends of the Government. The rest of the Nation were *open*, or *secret Enemies*. According to this excellent Logick, the *former* were to be protected in Blundering, for They were guilty of That too, as well as in Plundering; and the *latter* were to be oppress'd for complaining. The Nation was sacrificed to a *Faction*, and an *excellent Constitution* destroy'd, in Favour of a *profligate Government*. This Destruction however would not have been so easily accomplish'd, nor would *Castilians* alone have enslaved *Castile* to a foreign Race, after asserting their *Liberty* so often, and so boldly, against Princes of their own Country, if two other Circumstances had not concurr'd. *Ferdinand* had conquer'd *Navarre*, and a regular, disciplined Army defended that Conquest against the *French*. This Army, which was at Hand, march'd into *Castile*, defeated the Commons, and extinguish'd *Liberty* in a Country, where it had been long declining. The Nobility was detach'd from the Commons by Grants of Land, amongst other Considerations, as I said above; and the Commons renew'd their Contest on this Head, perhaps unjustly, to be sure very unseasonably. The Commons however were justified for taking Arms, in the Opinion of the Nobility, and even in That of *Adrian*, who govern'd during the Absence of *Charles*, whose Præceptor He had been; for *this honest Man*, (too honest to be long endured on the Papal Throne, where He was afterwards placed,) affirm'd that all the Troubles of *Castile* were caused by the *King*, and by his *covetous and tyrannical Ministers*. The Conduct of the Commons, upon this great Occasion, was in many Instances rash and violent, as well as ill-advised and weak. But They were tumultuous Assemblies driven into Despair; and the *Nobility*, who might have had great Sway amongst Them,

and

and might have help'd to regulate their Fire, and to keep Them sober, help'd on the contrary to make Them mad, either by neglecting Them, or by taking Part against Them, till it was too late; and then complain'd of their being mad, with as ill a Grace as the principal Men of *Rome*, who help'd to *corrupt* that People, complain'd of their *Corruption*, and assign'd it as a Reason for depriving Them of their *Liberty*.

There cannot be a greater Solecism in Politicks than That of a *Nobility*, under *monarchical Government*, who suffer the *Liberty* of the *Commons* to be taken away. In *Aristocracies*, the *Nobility* get whatever the *Commons* lose; but in *Monarchies*, the *Crown* alone is the Gainer, and the certain Consequence of their helping to enslave the *Commons*, must be That of being enslaved Themselves at last. How, indeed, should it be otherwise; since the *Liberty* of the *Commons* cannot be taken away, unless the *Constitution* be first broken; and since neither the *Peers*, nor any one else can hold their Privileges or their Properties, by a better Tenure than That of *arbitrary Will*, when the *Constitution* is once broken? Was it possible to doubt of this Truth, We might find the Proof of it, without going out of the Country where We are; I mean *Spain*. Amongst all the surprizing Phænomena, which have appear'd in the World of late Years, there are none, that have struck Mankind with more Astonishment, than those Instances of Persons raised to the highest Posts of Power, Authority and Command, nay to Empire, who had not, either from their obscure Birth, or their low Talents, or their still lower Habits, the least Occasion even to dream of such Elevation. Amongst other Countries, *Spain* hath had her Share of them; and the *Grandeess*, as They are pompously stiled, the
 Successors

Successors of those Men, who thought to rise on the Ruin of the *Commons of Castile*; They, who have the vain Honour of cocking their Hats in the Presence of their *Prince*, have been seen to stand at awful Distance, or approach with respectful Cringe, in the Presence of a *Parasite* and *Buffoon*.

I know full well that, in such Governments as We speak of here, it is both the Duty and Interest of the *Nobility* to oppose the Excesses of the *Commons*; but I know too that They have another Duty, which they are not to leave undone; another Point of Interest, which They are not to neglect; and therefore I have spoken of this *second Estate* in our Government, as of a *middle Order*, that are properly Mediators between the *other two*, in the Eye of our *Constitution*. Whilst the *Peers* maintain this Character, They will be able to discharge this Duty; but they would cease to be so, if it was possible They should ever become the *Tools of Faction*, or the *Vassals of a Minister*. In Mediations of this Kind, different from Those that are more commonly call'd such, *Mediators* mingle in the Contest, are Parties concern'd, and can by That alone expect to mediate with Effect, whether They be consider'd as *Bodies of Men*, or *Individuals*. When the *Commons* are assisted by the *Peers* in their reasonable Endeavours to promote, or restore *Frugality*, to secure *Liberty*, and to correct all Sorts of *Mal-Administration*; the *Peers* will have, both collectively and separately, a Credit with the *People*, as well as with the *Representatives of the People*; by which They may contribute to check the *latter*, whenever an *House of Commons* shall grow unreasonable, factious, or, seditious. But if the *Peers of the Realm* neglect to oppose the *Commons* in their just Attempts, and forfeit by Consequence the Character of Impartiality,

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tiality, and even the Air of Independency, the *Peers* will then add little Strength to the *Crown*, whenever the evil Day comes, and have as little Power to prevent it from coming. There was a Time, our Fathers saw it, when an *House of Commons* destroy'd, instead of supporting, the *Constitution*, and introduced *Tyranny*, under Pretence of excluding *Slavery*. I think it might be shewn, from the Anecdotes of that Age, that This could not have happen'd, if the *Court* had not been so long and so partially abetted by the greatest Part of the *Nobility* and *Clergy*, both in the *House of Lords* and out of it. An universal and timely Concurrence with the Spirit of the *Commons*, which was pious in the true Sense of the Word at first, would have had, I presume, the full Effect that every honest Man propos'd in a Parliamentary Reformation of the State; and those fatal Opportunities, that were afterwards given to the *Republican*, *Presbyterian* and *Independent Factions*, would have been avoided. But They, who could have trimm'd, (for there is a *wise* and *honest*, as well as a *silly* and *corrupt Trimming*) or have mediated with Success, lost the Power of doing either; Some by abetting the *Crown* so long, for Fear of the *Commons*, and Others by concurring with the *Commons* so far, for Fear of the *Crown*, that the *People* in general had no Confidence in the *former*, and that the *latter* were afraid to trust their Prince after all They had done against Him. If any Man had trusted to the plausible Professions of the *Court* at that Time, and the *Court* had subdued the *opposite Party*, We may judge, without any Breach of Charity, that these Men would have found Themselves deceived. Just so, if any Men, who meant the Reformation, not the Destruction of the State, believed in the *canting Reformers of that Age*, such Men were no Doubt

Doubt egregiously deceived. But I confess Myself of Opinion, and surely upon no improbable Grounds, that there were few, or no such Men. The good Intentions of the *Court* were distrusted even by Those, who took Arms for the *King*; and the ill Intentions of many of the Leaders on the *other Side* were suspected, no Doubt, by many, who took Arms for the *Parliament*. But *two* of the *three Estates* being ripe for the rashest Enterprizes, and the *third* being in no Condition to mediate, the Extremes clash'd without any Power sufficient to interpose; and when the Sword was drawn, the Sword could alone decide. I conclude therefore, from these two Examples, that as there cannot be a greater Error in Politicks than That of a *Nobility*, who assist a *Prince* to take away the Liberties and Privileges of the *Commons*; (which was the Case in *Castile*;) so the surest Way of preventing that terrible Dilemma, wherein Men are obliged to chuse either Submission to *tyrannical Government*, or Concurrence with an *enraged and no longer governable People*, (which hath been the Case in *Castile* and *Britain* both,) is for the *Nobility*, and the principal Men amongst the *Commons*, to engage so early in the Cause of *Liberty*, that the *former* may be always in Condition to mediate with Effect, and the *latter* have always Power to allay the intemperate Heat of their own Body.

I am, S I R, &c.





LETTER XV.

S I R,

BUT to resume the Comparison of *other Constitutions of Government with our own*, I say that if the *Gothick Constitution in Spain*, either by original Defects, or by deviating from, and not being reduced again in Time to its first Principles, was destroy'd through the *Corruption of Parliaments*, and by the Force of an *Army*, one of which betray'd, and the other conquer'd the *Commons of Castile*; the *Commons of France* seem either not to have had, or to have lost, in the dark Beginnings of that Monarchy, all Share in the *supreme, legislative Power*. The great, original Defect of having but *two Estates* to share the *supreme Power* is an Objection common to the *Roman*, and to the *French Constitutions*, with this Difference; of the *three, simple Forms of Government, the Monarchical, the Aristocratical, and the Democratical*, Rome wanted the *first*, and *France* hath always wanted the *last*. Rome had a *Nobility* and a *Commonality*, but no Magistracy fitted by its Institution to answer the Purposes of that supreme Magistrate, who is call'd *King*, even in limited Monarchies. *France* hath always had a *King* and a *Nobility*, and hath felt in their Turns all the Evils of a *Monarchical and Aristocratical Tyranny*. But the *People* have not had, I presume, since the Government of the *Franks* was fully

fully establish'd on this Side of the *Rhine*, and the Form of their Monarchy settled, any Share in the *supreme Power*, either collectively or representatively, how much soever a contrary Notion may have been countenanced by some Writers, and have been generally entertain'd, at least in other Countries.

There is no Nation in the World, says *Mezerai*, more *illustrious*, nor any, whose Original is more *obscure* than That of the *French*. They, who would dispute the *first*, could hardly dispute the *last*; and it is no Business of mine to controvert *either*. As dark as their Original is, We may discover enough to establish what hath been said, and to carry on the Comparison We are making.

The *Franks* were a Nation of *Germany*, seated at one Time between the *Elbe*, *Rhine* and *Neckar*, and at another (That is, in the Reign of *Theodosius* the younger) extending Themselves on the *German* Side of the *Rhine*, from *Cologne* down to *Nimighen*, and still lower. What is known therefore of the Government of the *antient Germans*, either from *Tacitus*, or any other good Authority, may be properly apply'd to their Government, whilst They continued in *Germany*, and even after They settled in *Gaul*, till such Times as We find, by Relations more modern, that a *different Form of Government* prevail'd amongst Them. Now it seems to Me extremely plain that a *different Form of Government* did prevail amongst Them even from the Time of *Clovis*, the Conqueror of *Gaul*. Thus for Instance, that Passage in *Tacitus*, where he says * *that the*

* *Reges ex Nobilitate, Duces ex Virtute sumunt; nec Regibus infinita, nec libera Potestas; & Duces Exemplo potius quam Imperio præjunt.*
De Mor. Germ.

antient Germans took their Kings on Account of Nobility, and their Generals on Account of Valour; that the Power of their Kings was not absolute and unlimited; and that their Generals commanded by the Authority, which their Example rather than their Power gave Them; that Passage, I say, is properly enough apply'd to the Franks before, and perhaps during the Conquest of Gaul; but very improperly afterwards, when † Clovis, both King and General of that People, had founded the Monarchy, which He transmitted to his Posterity. That the Nation of the Franks was divided into several Tribes, or Clans, and that These were govern'd by several little Princes, cannot be doubted. — *Habebat quot Pagos, tot pæne Duces.* That a General was chosen to command the whole with sovereign Authority, but according to certain Rules made by common Consent, whenever any great Enterprize was undertaken, and that Clovis himself, though He succeeded his Father Childeric in commanding over a Part of the Franks, was chosen in this Manner, and for this Purpose, is certain. In his first Expedition, he led an Army of Free-booters, and was obliged by Compact to divide the Spoil by Lots amongst Them. The Story, which so many Authors have told, after Gregory of Tours, of a private Soldier, who refused to leave to his Disposition a Vessel of Gold, that had been taken out of a Church at Rheims, and broke it before his Face, is a Proof that he was nothing more at first than I have represented Him, the Head of a Troop of Adventurers, who chose Him to lead Them, but made their Conditions with Him. The Franks

† *Boulainv. Mem. Hist.*

therefore might be at this Time, in some Sense, * *all free, perfectly equal, and independent*; but will it follow from hence that They continued to be so, in any Sense, after *Clovis* had founded their *Monarchy*; had destroy'd all their *little Kings*; united in one Body, and under his own Domination, all their *little States*; and changed the *Form of their Government*, by appointing *Dukes, Earls, Vicars*, and other Magistrates, to govern under Him, according to the Model of Government in the latter *Roman Empire*? Certainly not. However *this Change* was brought about, and to whatever it was owing, the *Monarchy of the Franks in Gaul* was built on the Ruins of their former Government. This *Boulainvilliers* himself confesses, when He says (though not very accurately, nor consistently, as I imagine, in calling their former Government a Kind of *Aristocracy*) that *the Principle of Union, which founded the Monarchy, on the Ruins of a Kind of Aristocracy, was the mistaken Ambition of particular Men*. In short, Proofs enough may be collected out of *this very Author* to shew that the Government of the *Franks*, even under the *first Race of their Kings*, was not only different from the *German Governments*, but in some Respects founded on quite opposite Principles. One of these Respects, which is immediately to my Purpose, I shall mention.

The *general Assemblies*, that were held at first in the Month of *March*, and afterwards in the Month of *May*, were *national Assemblies*, indeed; but not such as the *antient Germans* held; among whom the

* *Boulainv. Mem. Hist.*

* *principal*

* *principal Men* consulted and decided about the least, and the whole *Body of the People* about the greatest *Affairs*. In these *Assemblies of the French* the People had nothing to do, unless We reckon for Something the Function of † *bowling*, which the *Author* I have just now quoted assigns Them, and which he says that Custom had render'd necessary. In one Word, the People had not any Share in the *supreme Power*, either collectively or representatively, in the *original Plan of the French Government*. Whether They acquired any Share in *this Power* afterwards, let us enquire next. *† *Mezerai* pretends, and indeed the whole *History of France* vouches for Him, †† *that no Nation ever honour'd their Nobility so much as the French; amongst whom the Nobility was not only exempt from all Sorts of Impositions and Charges, but commanded absolutely all inferior Ranks, who were almost in a State of Servitude*. How could it be otherwise, when the *Nobility* and *chief Magistrates*, and the *Clergy*, compos'd alone the *national Councils, or Parliaments*, and even exercis'd *distributive Justice* all over the Kingdom? Their Power increased, as That of the *Kings of the first Race* diminish'd. *Charles Martel*, indeed, who trusted to that *Battle-Axe*, which gave Him his *Name*, and to *foreign*

* *De minoribus Principes, de majoribus omnes.*

Tacit.

† *Ills* (That is the French) *laisserent passer aux hauts Magistrats, les Ducs, les Comtes, & les Vicaires, le Droit de la Nation entiere; de sorte que le Commune n'eut plus d'autres Fonctions dans les Assemblees reelles, que d'y paroitre pous les Acclamations, que l'Usage rendoit necessaires.*

Boulayn. Mem. Hist.

*† L. 2.

†† *Jamais Nation n'honora tant la Noblesse que celle la; car non seulement elle estoit exempte de toute sorte d'Impots, & Corvées, mais commandoit à baguette à ses Inferieurs, sur lesquels elle avoit presque Droit de servitude.*

Troops, laid aside the *national Assemblies*, neglected the *Nobility*, and misused even the *Clergy*, who damn'd Him for it. But *Pepin* found it necessary to regain *Both*, and attach Them to his Interest, in order to mount the Throne. By attaching Them, He attach'd the *whole Nation* to him. *Childeric* was deposed, and He chosen King in a general Assembly held at *Soissons*, which *Mezerai* calls most improperly (since the Expression communicates a false Idea to his Reader) *the States, les Etats*. These *Assemblies*, in his Time, in That of his Son *Charles the Great*, and so on, consisted of the *Nobility* and *Clergy* alone; and once more it is beyond all Dispute certain, that the *People* had no more Share in these *national Councils*, under the *second*, than under the *first Race of the Kings of France*.

When the *third Race of these Kings* began in *Hugues Capet*, the *Lords* were so powerful in their *Estates*, and so independent in their *Governments*, that He was forced to come to a Kind of Composition with Them. They became *Sovereigns*, each in his Territory, but held of the *Crown*, and acknowledged the *King* for the supreme Lord. There was scarce a *Town*, which had not a *little Sovereign*; scarce a *Castle* without some *little Tyrant*. The *Parliaments*, in these Ages, took several Turns; *Ils prirent divers plis*, as * *Pasquier* expresses Himself; but still they consisted of *Princes, great Lords, Bishops* and *Abbots*, who decided in them their Disputes with *one another*, and with the *King*, and maintain'd by these Means a Sort of national Confederacy, or foederal Union of *many States*, politically united under *one Head*. Such *Assemblies as these*, under the *second and third Race*, were the original

* *Recherches de la France.*

Institutions, from whence the * *Parliaments of France* have proceeded, as many Alterations as they have received, and as much as they are now changed; so that We may safely affirm the *Parliaments of France* never gave the *People* any Share in the Government of that Kingdom, and whoever entertains a Notion that the *Assemblies of the States* did, or that † *these Assemblies* are of great Antiquity, or that they are the Foundation of the Liberty of the People of that Country, will find Himself, on due Examination, grossly deceived.

These *Assemblies* of the *three Estates*, the *Nobility*, *Clergy*, and *Commons*, were invented first by †† *Philip le Bel*. They were entirely unknown before the Year 1301. The *People* had no Right to any *such Assemblies*; and when they were instituted, they were plainly design'd for nothing less than the *Good of the People*. Long after the Establishment of the *Capetian Race*, when *Taxes* grew heavy, and were laid on and levied very arbitrarily, *† *Seditious* and *Rebellions* of an oppress'd *People*, who had no other Recourse, follow'd. To prevent These, not only *Writs*, or *Orders*, were sent to the *Nobility* and *Clergy*, in the several *Sheriffwicks* and *Bailiwicks*, but to the *Commons*, to assemble and take into Consideration how to redress *Grievances*, and support the publick *Expences*; and after such Consideration had amongst Themselves, to depute some Persons of *each Order*, or *Estate*,

* *Primitive Origine & Institution des Parlemens. Ib.*

† *Ib.*

†† *L'Assemblée des Etats. — fut une Idée toute nouvelle de Philippe le Bel. & jusqu' alors entièrement inusitée.*

Boulainv. Let. sur les anciens Parl. de France.

*† *Pafqu. Rech.*

to confer together in the Place appointed for holding such general Assemblies. *The Commons were added to these Assemblies, * says Pasquier, against the antient Order or Practice of France, for no other Reason than This, that the principal Burthen, or Charge, was to fall upon them.* This was the true Reason. *Redress of Grievances* had no Part in the Schemes of that *rapacious and profuse Prince*, who was the Author of this Institution; and He, that considers the Manner, in which *these Assemblies* were convened, the Powers They were suffer'd to exercise, the Subordination, in which the *Commons* particularly were kept, and the habitual, unavoidable Influence, under which They lay, will be easily convinced that *such Assemblies* were fitted to do the Jobs, and sanctify the Iniquity of the *Court*, and nothing more. If, at any Time, they make any good Ordinances for the Reformation of the State, † *these Ordinances are*, says honest *Pasquier*, *like fine Pieces of Tapestry, hung up to make a Shew to Posterity.* They have no other Effect. But the *Imposition granted to the King hath its full Effect.* I conclude therefore, and upon sufficient Grounds, that even since the Establishment of these *Assemblies of the Estates*, in the Beginning of the 14th Century, the *People of France* have had no real Share in the *supreme Power of the Government*, either collectively or representatively.

I might illustrate and prove what is here advanced by the Example of every *Assembly of the States of France*, of which We have any good Accounts,

* *Le Roturier fut expres ajouté, contre l'ancien Ordre de la France, à cette Assemblée, &c.*

† — *Ces sont belles Tapisseries, qui servent seulement de Parade à une Posterité. Cependant l'Impost que l'on accorde au Roy est fort bien mis à Effet.*

from the *first* in 1301 to the *last* that was held, as I remember, in 1614. But such a Deduction would carry us too far. I shall content Myself therefore with making two Observations.

First, that *these Farces* (for such *these Assemblies* were, and such they were design'd to be) owe their Institution not only to one of the *worst Kings*, but to one of the *worst Ministers*, that *France* ever saw; *Enguerand de Marigny*, who was call'd the *Coadjutor* and the *Governor of the Kingdom*; the most insolent, the most avaricious, and the most prodigal Man of his Age. The great Ability of *this Minister*, on which his whole Merit with a *greedy Master* was raised, consisted in making his Administration a System of *Violence* and *Fraud*, in order to plunder and enslave the *People*. When he durst not employ *one*, He turn'd Himself to the *other*; and how grossly and impudently He managed even *Fraud*, it may not be improper to take Notice, in one Instance; because We shall see the better, by this Instance, what the Nature and Effect of *these Assemblies* were, of which We speak, and what Use the *Court* made of them from their first Institution. *Enguerand de Marigny* then, meeting with great Opposition to * *some Taxes* He had devised, proposed the calling an *Assembly of the States*, and hoped probably that He might gain the *Commons* to favour the Intention He had of extending *these Taxes* to the *Nobility* and *Clergy*. A great Scaffold was erected. The *King*, the *Lords* and the *Clergy* took their Places on it. The *Commons* attended at the Foot of it. The *Minister* made a most vehement *Declamation*, to stir the Pas-

* *Boulainv. Let. sur les anciens Parl. de France.*

sions of the Audience, and made no Scruple of insinuating in it, what neither He nor his *Master* intended to perform, a Promise of reimburtng, after the Expedition propos'd, what the *People* should give to the *King*. The *King* rose from his Throne, and advanced to the Extremity of the Scaffold, that He might second by his Looks the Harangue of his *Treasurer*, and see who Those were, that refused, or consented to the Aid he demanded. The *Deputies of Paris* promised to give a sufficient Supply, or to follow the *King* in their Persons to the War. The *other Deputies* concur'd in this general Engagement, and the *Assembly* broke up, without any farther *Deliberation*, or any *Ordinance of the Estates*. But an *Ordinance of the King* soon follow'd; a † *general Excise* was impos'd by his Authority, as if it had been the Grant of the *Estates* to Him; and his *Minister* had a Number of *Harpies* ready, whom He let loose to desolate the Kingdom, by levyng this *infamous Tax*, for the Consideration of some little Advance made to the *King*. If you ask what were the Consequences of *these Proceedings*, it will be sufficient to mention two. The Tax of a 5th on the *Revenues of the Subject*, which is the Proportion of our *Land Tax of four Shillings in the Pound*, was continued, though the *general Excise* had been impos'd; and * *Enguerand de Marigny* was hang'd in the succeeding Reign for This, amongst other Crimes, though not by an *Assembly of the Estates*; for the *Estates* had neither

† ———— Six Deniers par Livre de toutes les Merchandises, Viſtuailles, Boissons, & Denrées, ———— Vendues dans le Royaume.

Boulainv. *Let. sur les anciens Parl. de France.*


* Mezerai, Daniel, &c. *Sous Louis Hut. 7.*

the Opportunity, nor the Power of resenting the greatest Insult that could be offer'd them, and the greatest Injury that could be done to the Nation.

The *next Observation* I have to make is very short; but I think very pertinent, and very important.— This Example shews us clearly how true it is, that no *Instruments of Tyranny* can be found so sure and effectual as an *Assembly of the Estates of a Realm*, when such an *Assembly* is so constituted as to want the *Power*, (which was from the first the Cause of the *three Estates in France*) and the same must happen, when they are so managed as to want the *Will* (which became at last the Case of the *Cortes in Spain*) to secure the Liberty and defend the Property of the *People*, against such Kings as *Philip le Bel*, and such *Coadjutors* as *Marigny*. This Prince and his *Minister* had strain'd *Prerogative* to the utmost, and had govern'd by it very tyrannically. Whilst *this Expedient* would do, they try'd no *other*; but when They apprehended it might fail Them, They added a *Deputation of the Commons* to the *Assembly of the Estates*; that, iceming to create a *new Controul on the Crown*, They might in Reality give greater Scope and freer Exercise to *arbitrary Will*. The *Friends of Liberty* therefore, who live under *limited Monarchies*, cannot be too careful to preserve their *Constitution* in Vigour, nor too fearful lest their *Representatives* should be so influenced as to neglect their *Privileges*, misapply their *Powers*, and depart from their *Integrity*; since these *Friends of Liberty* see that the *greatest Masters of Tyranny* have judg'd the *Form*, without the *Spirit*, of a *free Government* more favourable to their *Schemes of Oppression*, than all the Authority, that *absolute Monarchy* can give; and

and that They made an Innovation in the *Form of their Government* on this very Motive, and for this very Purpose.

I am, S I R, &c.



LETTER XVI.

S I R,

I Have dwelt long, perhaps too long, on the last Head. I was induced to it, not only because the Account, I have given according to the Truth of History, is contrary to the national Prejudices of many People on this Subject, as I hinted before ; but principally because the great Point of Strength and Security, on which the *Freedom of our Constitution* rests, will appear in a fuller Light, by being thus contrasted with the *Constitution of the French Government*. Both *their Ancestors* and *ours* came out of *Germany*, and had probably much the same Manners, the same Customs, and the same Forms of Government. But as They proceeded differently in the Conquests They made, so did They in the Establishments that follow'd. The Conquest of *Britain* was a Work of Time, and the *Saxon Monarchy* was long in forming. The Conquest of *Gaul* was carried on with greater Rapidity, and the *French Monarchy* was sooner form'd. From hence some Reasons might be drawn to account, amongst others, for that great Difference between
the

the *Constitutions of the two Monarchies*, which these two *German Nations* founded, at no great Distance of Time, in *Britain* and in *Gaul*. But I shall not indulge myself in guessing at the Reasons, or Accidents, that determined the *Franks* to the Division They made of their People, and to the Form of Government They establish'd. Whatever Reasons, or Accidents, determined Them, This is certain; that the Distinction of *Lord* and *Vassal* became the general Distinction of the whole Nation; that the * *Commons* amongst Them were little better than *Slaves*, whatever They had been in *Germany*; and that They were so inured to Servitude under their *Kings*, *Prelates* and *Lords*, that They look'd on Themselves at last, not *justly*, but *unjustly*, as Men, who had no Right, no not even a Right by Nature, to any Share in the Government of that Community, wherof They made so vastly the principal Part.

In *Britain* another Constitution was form'd, and another Spirit prevail'd. The *Saxons* had a † *Nobility* too, arising from personal Valour, or Wisdom, continued by Blood, and sometimes confer'd by the Prince, however legally at first it matters not to enquire, on such as held great Offices about his Person. All these were the *Adelings*, or *Nobles*, an Handful in Comparison of the *Frilingi*, or *Freeborn*, who made the Body of the *Saxon People*. The Freedom of this People was erected on two Columns, that have proved more durable than Brass.

* *Le Peuple, d'un autre Coté, se fait Justice, reconnoissant combien la Condition naturelle le Doit éloigner de Concours au Gouvernement, & dans le sentiment ne se fait entendre que par Requete.*

Boulainv. *Let sur les an. Parl.*

† *Nat. Bacon Hist. & Pol. Dif.*

They were Parties to the making, and to the executing all the general Laws of the Kingdom. They shared the *legislative Power*; were join'd to the *Lords* in the Administration of Justice; and no *Magistrate*, or *Officer*, could exercise Jurisdiction, nor Authority over Them, no not Ecclesiastical, without their Consent and Election. The *Comites ex Plebe*, who were chosen for this last Function, the Administration of Justice, made one Rank amongst the *Saxon Commonalty*. The *Custodes Pagani*, such as had an Helmet, a Coat of Mail, and a gilt Sword, for their ordinary Arms, whether They fought on Foot, or on Horseback, made another Rank; and the plain *Pagani*, or *Ceorles*, made the lowest. But even These were totally distinct from, and far superior to the *Lazzi*, or *Slaves*, nay to the *free Lazzi*, such as had been *Slaves*, and were become free. The *Ceorles* were *Freemen* to all Intents and Purposes, and in all the Essentials of *Liberty*, as much as the *Saxons* of any superior Rank, and were capable of rising to any superior Rank by Merit, or by Favour.

These are the Sources, from which all the Distinctions of Rank and Degree, that exist at this Day amongst us, have flow'd. These are the general Principles of all our *Liberties*. That this *Saxon Constitution* hath vary'd in many Particulars, and at several Periods of Time, I am far from denying. That it did so, for Instance, on the Entry of the *Normans*, though certainly not near so much as many have been willing to believe, and to make others believe, is allow'd. Nay, let it be allow'd for Argument's Sake, and not otherwise, that during the first Confusion, and the subsequent Disorders, which necessarily accompany and follow so great, and so violent a Revolution, the Scheme of the *Saxon Constitution* was broken, and the *Liberties*

of the People invaded, as well as the Crown usurp'd. Let us even agree that *Laws* were made, without the Consent of the *People*; that *Officers* and *Magistrates*, civil, military and ecclesiastical, were imposed without their Election; in one Word, that these *Norman Kings* and the *Lords* had mounted each other too high to be *Lords* over *Freemen*, and that the Government was intirely *Monarchical* and *Aristocratical*, without any Exercise of *Democratical Power*. Let all This be granted, and the utmost that can be made of it will amount to This; that Confusion and Violence at the Entry, and for some Time after, under the Government of a *foreign Race*, introduced many illegal Practices, and some foreign Principles of Policy, contrary to the Spirit, and Letter too, of the *antient Constitution*; and that *these Kings* and the *Lords* abused their Power over the *Freemen*, by *Extortion* and *Oppression*, as *Lords* over *Tenants*. But it will remain true that neither *Kings* nor *Lords*, nor both together, * could prevail over *Them*, or gain their Consent to give their Right, or the Law, up to the *King's Beck*. But still the Law remain'd *Arbiter* both of *King* and *People*, and the *Parliament* supreme *Expounder* and *Judge* both of it and *Them*. Tho' the *Branches* were lopp'd, and the *Tree* lost its Beauty for a Time, yet the *Root* remain'd untouch'd, was set in a good Soil, and had taken strong Hold in it; so that *Care*, and *Culture*, and *Time* were indeed required, and our *Ancestors* were forced to water it, if I may use such an *Expression*, with their *Blood*. but with this *Care*, and *Culture*, and *Time*, and *Blood*, it shot up again with greater

* *Nat. Hist. Summary Conclus. of the first Part of Hist. and Pol. Disc.*

Strength than ever, that We might sit quiet and happy under the Shade of it; for if the same Form was not exactly restored in every Part, a Tree of the same Kind, and as beautiful, and as luxuriant as the former, grew up from the same Root.

To bring our Discourse to that Point, which is here immediately concern'd; *Parliaments* were never interrupted, nor the Right of *any Estate* taken away, however the Exercise of it might be disturb'd. Nay, they soon took the *Forms* they still preserve, were constituted *almost* as they now are, and were *intirely* built on the same general Principles, as well as directed to the same Purposes.

When I say that *they were constituted almost as they now are*, I do not mean to enter into any of those minute Questions, about which a Man may employ much Time and Study, and have as little true and useful Knowledge of our *Constitution* as the most ignorant Man alive. But I propose to make a short Reflection or two on the *Property* and *Power* of the *three Estates* that compose our *Parliament*, as they stood formerly, and as they now stand; because although our *Parliaments* were composed of *King, Lords* and *Commons* in those Days, as well as these, yet the Difference of the Weight, which each of *these Estates* hath cast into the Scale of Government, at different Periods, does in Effect make some Difference in the Constitution of *Parliaments*; and by considering this Difference, our Thoughts will be led the better to judge of the true Poise of our *Constitution*, on maintaining which our All depends; since the nearer We keep to it, the safer our *Liberty* is, and since every Variation from it is dangerous to our *Liberty*, in a Degree proportionable to such Variation. *Property* then, and *Power* by Consequence, have changed Hands, or rather have shifted much in the same

Hands, since the *Norman Æra*. *Kings, Lords* and the *Church* were in those Days, and long afterwards, the great Proprietors, and by the Nature of Tenures, as well as by the Bulk of their Estates, They held the *Commons* in no small Subjection, and seem to have govern'd without much Regard to Them, or to their Concurrence, in many Cases. But the Regard, that was not paid Them at first, the *Kings, the Lords* and the *Church* found it necessary to pay Them in a short Time; and that Authority, that Weight in the Ballance of Power, which *Property* did not give Them, They soon acquired, or rather resumed by their *Numbers*, and by the *Circumstances*, that follow'd. By the *Circumstances*, that follow'd, I mean the great Disorders in the State, and the civil Wars, which the Ambition of *Princes*, of the *Nobility*, and of the *Church* too, created. In all these Conflicts, some of the *Commons* * *holding for the King, who promised Liberty from the Lords, and Others siding with the Lords, who promised Them Liberty from the King*, They came off better in the End than their *Principals*, and an Example rarely to be parallel'd was set; for *general Liberty* was nursed by these Means, under the Wings of *particular Ambition*. In later Days, when the Nation, harrass'd and spent by the long Wars of *York* and *Lancaster*, seem'd glad to settle under any stable Government; and in this Temper gave many Advantages to the Cunning of *Henry* the 7th, which the Violence of his *Son* improved. It is certain that the *Commons* suffer'd extremely from the Avarice of *one*, the Profligation of the *other*, and the high-strain'd Prerogative of *both*. But then their Sufferings were tem-

* *Nat. Bacon Hist. and Pol. Disc. Conclus. of the 2d Part.*

porary, and may be said to have ended with these Reigns ; whereas the Sufferings of the *Nobility* and the *Church* were permanent and irreticvable. *The King and his Council*, says the Author I quoted last, under Colour of *Liveries and Retainers*, brought the whole Kingdom to be of their *Livery*. It was so. But still the *Commons* lost nothing, and gain'd much. They were more under Subjection to the *Crown*; but They were less under Subjection to the *Lords* and the *Church*. Not only the Dependencies on *These* were broken, but the *Lords* and the *Church* were made more dependent on the *Crown* than the *Commons* had been on *Them*. The *Lords* were obliged to attend the *Court* at their own Expence, and might alienate their Estates to defray this Expence. A great Part of the Lands of the *Church* were confiscated and parcell'd out to Those, who could buy, at very cheap Rates ; and the Increase of *Trade*, which begun about this Time to be very considerable, put the *Commons* into a Condition of being the Buyers. Thus were the old Foundations of *Property* and *Power* sapp'd on one Side, and new Foundations laid on the other. Some of the Weight of the *Church* continued in the Scale of the *Lords*, and some of it hath gone since into That of the *Commons*. The *Parliamentary Controul* of the *Crown* did not become less, but it became more equally and more usefully placed. *Democracy* was so well poised with *Aristocracy*, after this great Change, that if They divided, They could not invade one another ; and if They united, They could not be invaded by the *Monarchy*. Far different was the Case in other Countries, where the *Crown* got the better of the *Lords*, and baffled, at least in some Degree, the monstrous Attempts of *Ecclesiastical Usurpation*. In *France*, for Instance, when the Incroachments of the *Papal Power* were check'd, the

Church

Church compounded with the *Crown*, and an Alliance succeeded of the *Monarchy* with the *Hierarchy*. But if the *Church* was able to compound, the *Nobility* was forced to submit in that Kingdom; so that the Authority and Wealth of the *Church* being fix'd on the Side of the *Crown*, the whole Strength and Influence of the *Nobility* being taken from Them, and incorporated with the Power of the *Crown*, and the *Commons* having nothing to do in that Government, but to pay *Taxes*, and carry *Arms*, the Kings of *France* are become *absolute Monarchs*; and whatever *Liberty*, or *Appearance of Liberty*, there was in *that Constitution*, it is totally destroy'd.

When I say, *that Parliaments were intirely built on the same general Principles, as well as directed to the same Purposes, as they still are*, I shall be justify'd by the whole Tenour of our *History*, and of our *Law*. Let us consider This in a Case the plainest imaginable, tho' it suffers so much Debate through the Effrontery of *some Men*. Let us consider it relatively to that great Principle, *that Parliaments ought to be independent of the Crown*, in all Respects, except such as are settled by the Law and Custom of *Parliament*, and concerning which there is no Dispute. Now, this *general Principle* hath not only been always the same, but it hath been always so declared, in the most authentick and solemn Manner; and *Parliaments* have not been more intent on any national Concern whatever, than on maintaining *this Principle*, and securing the Effects of it. May *Parliaments* have been constantly thus intent, and especially in the best Times, during more than *three Centuries* at least; for I would not go back too far, nor grope unnecessarily in the dark. What else did those Laws mean, that were made in the Time of the *Lancaster Kings*, to regulate the *Elections*,

tions, and to prevent the Influence, which *Richard* the 2^d had illegally and arbitrarily employ'd, and which there was Room to fear that *other Princes* might employ? What else do all those Resolutions, all those Declarations, all those Remonstrances, all those Acts of Parliament mean, that have been made so often, and enforced so strongly, from Time to Time, and from those Days to these, against the Influence of the *Crown*, either on the *Elections*, or on the *Members of Parliament*? I should be ashamed to ask any more Questions of this Kind, or to descend into any Detail, in order to prove what every *Clerk of a Justice of Peace*, nay almost every *Day-Labourer* knows. But there is another Question, which I must ask. If This be so, what do *those Men* mean, who are employ'd, or rather what does *He* mean, who employs Them to plead in all Places, and on all Occasions, even the most solemn, in Favour of *this very Influence*, nay of the very worst Sort of it; of *that Influence*, which is created immediately by *Corruption*; for to That their Arguments reach by undeniable Consequences? *Reason* is against Him and Them; since it is a plain Absurdity to suppose a *Controul on the Crown*, (and They have not yet ventured to suppose the contrary, that I know of) and to establish at the same Time a Power, and even a Right, in the *Crown*, to render *this Controul* useless. *Experience* is against Them; since the Examples of other Countries, and at some Times (former Times I mean) of our own, have proved that a Prince may govern according to his *arbitrary Will*, or That of his more *arbitrary Minister*, as absolutely and much more securely with, than without the Concurrence of a *Parliament*. *Autherity*, even the uniform Authority of our whole Legislature, is against Them. The *Voice of our Law*
gives

gives Them the Lye. How then shall We account for this Proceeding; this open and desperate Attack upon our *Constitution*, and therefore upon our *Liberty*? Have these *great Men* made any nice Discovery, that escaped the blunt Sagacity of our Ancestors formerly, and is above the narrow Conceptions of all other Men, except Themselves, at this Time? Is it less fit than the Wisdom of this Nation hath judged it to be, for so many Ages, that Kings should govern under the *constitutional Controll* of *two other Estates*? Or is it less fit that They should govern so, for the Time to come, than it was for the Time past? We shall hear, for aught I know, even in this Age, that *Kings are God's Vicegerents*; that They are, next to *Him* and his Son *Christ Jesus*, *supreme Moderators and Governors*. We shall hear again, perhaps, of their *hereditary*, their *divine*, their *indefeasible Right*, and the rest of that silly Cant, which was invented to make the Usurpations of *Prerogative* go down the better. But will even This alter the Case? Will This make it unworthy of them to submit to the full Controll of such a *Constitution* as God himself approved, in the Institution of the *Jewish Senate*. *Moses* was undoubtedly *God's Vicegerent*. He was, if ever Man was so, next and immediately under God, a *supreme Moderator and Governor*. He was * inspired, and assisted in a supernatural Manner; and yet He took the Advice of his Father-in-law *Jethro*, the Priest of *Midian*. He associated to Himself in the Government of the Common-Wealth, or He bad the People take, as he says in † another Place, or chuse *wise Men and understanding, and known among the Tribes*, that They might be

* *Exod.* 18.† *D. ut,* 1.

associated to Him. He found Himself unequal to the Task of governing alone, and He expostulated with God upon it. * *I am not able to bear all this People alone. Have I conceived all this People? Have I begotten Them? If thou deal thus with Me, kill Me, I pray Thee, out of Hand.* Whether They, who deduce from hence the Institution of *Sanhedrins*, are in the Right, or They, who assign them a more modern Date, against the Opinion of the *Jewish Doctors* Themselves, whose Authority our *Doctors* receive implicitly enough in some Cases, and reject as arbitrarily in others, it matters not to enquire. Let us leave the Dispute to the Partisans of *Joseph Scaliger* and *Petavius*, of *Father Simon* and *Le Clerc*. Thus much is certain. A great *Sanhedrin* subsisted at *Jerusalem* even at the Coming of the *Messiah*, as well as *inferior Sanhedrins* in several Parts of *Palestine*; which Form of Government bore some Resemblance to our old *Saxon Constitution*; and He, who takes the Trouble of looking into Mr. † *Selden*, will find that the great *Sanhedrin* had as much Authority, and exercised as much Power, as ever *Parliaments* did, or *Wittenagemotes* could claim. That God approved a Kind of *Parliamentary Establishment*, and a Division of the supreme Power between his Vicegerent *Moses* and the *seventy Elders*, to whom He gave some of the Spirit, that was on *Moses*, the Quotations I refer to from holy Writ do sufficiently prove. After This, it cannot be said, I think, to derogate from the Majesty of any Prince, let us entertain as high Notions of this Majesty as We please, that

* *Numb. 11.*
Ebræorum.

† *Seld. de Synod. & Prof. Ivid. vet.*

He is relieved from the Burthen of governing *alone*; that He is obliged to share the supreme Power with the *Nobility* and *Commonality* of the Realm; and that He is hinder'd from destroying, either directly or indirectly, that Independency of *those other Estates*, which can alone preserve this Division of the supreme Power, really, as well as apparently. But perhaps, these *great* and *honest Men* have discover'd a Necessity of putting the *Members*, or a *Majority of the Members of Parliament*, under the Influence of the *Crown*, in order to preserve *this very Constitution*. Let us see therefore what Dangers *this Expedient* is fitted to prevent.—Are We afraid that an *House of Commons*, unless restrain'd by *Places* and *Pensions*, should give up the Constitution to the *Lords*, and establish an *Aristocracy*? This Fear would be ridiculous surely; and He, who should argue against such a Supposition, would make Himself so.—Are We afraid that an *House of Commons*, unless restrain'd in this Manner, should usurp more Power than belongs to Them, and establish a Kind of *Democratical Tyranny*? But They would have in Opposition to Them a Power sufficient to defeat their Designs; the united Power of the *Crown* and of the *House of Lords*. Formerly, indeed, They succeeded in an Attempt of this Kind; and the *King* and the *Lords* may, at any Time, throw too much Power into their Scale, and set the Sense and Spirit of the People on their Side, as was done at that Time. But This neither hath been, nor can be done, unless both *King* and *Lords* conduct Themselves so ill, that the Mischiefs to be apprehended from their Prevalency appear as great, or greater than Those, which are to be apprehended from the Prevalency of the *Commons*. Let it be remem-
ber'd

ber'd too that as the *King* and *Lords* may give too much Power and Popularity to the *Commons*, so the *Lords* and *Commons* may give too much Power to the *Crown*. The Difference will lye only here; that the *King* and *Lords* will never do the first designedly; whereas there is a Possibility that the *Lords* and *Commons* may be induced, in some Age less virtuous than the present, by *Places*, *Pensions*, and other *Gratifications*, bestow'd on a Majority of *those Assemblies*, to do the last designedly. What now remains to be urged in Favour of *this Expedient*? From What Danger are We to be protected by it? Shall We be told that *Parliaments* will not pursue the national Interest, unless their Members are bought into it by the *Crown*? Some think like This hath been advanced, I have heard, and nothing more impudent, nor more silly could be advanced. A *Court*, that is truly in the Interest of the Nation, will have, nay must have a Concurrence of *Parliament*, as it would be easy, if it was needful, to shew. Time and Trouble, indeed, may be sometimes required to lead *independent Men*, who judge for Themselves, and comply because They are convinced; whereas neither one nor the other are wanting to determine such as hold to a Court by a *corrupt Dependency* on it; for They are soon disciplined and ready to perform the whole Exercise of *Parliamentary Mercenaries* at the Beat of a Drum. Some Inconveniencies may likewise arise (for That, which I have just mention'd, does not deserve the Name) from the *Independency of Parliaments*. *Ministers*, for Instance, may be call'd to Account by the Passion, by the Prejudice, if You will, of *such Assemblies*, oftner perhaps than They deserve to be; or their Errors may be censured, or their Faults be punish'd, in a greater Degree, and with more Rigour, not only than *true political Ju-*

Justice requires, which should always be temper'd with *Mercy*, but even than *strict Justice* exacts. But as one of These is a Fault, if it be a Fault, on the best Side, and as the other will certainly happen very seldom, it does not seem reasonable that a Door should be open'd to *Corruption* and *Dependency*, in order to prevent them. Nay farther, this Vigilance, and this Severity of *Parliaments*, which We here suppose, will not fail to have some very good Effects, that are more than sufficient to balance the supposed ill Effects. Among the rest, they may render the *Rash*, who are in Power, more cautious, and the *Bold* more modest. They may render *Fools* less fond of Power, and awe even *Knaves* into Honesty. It were better surely that *able* and *good Men*, should now and then suffer, (nay the *good Man*, who suffer'd, would be Himself of this Opinion) than that the Adulation and Servility of *Parliaments*, which are the necessary Consequences of *Corruption* and *Dependency*, should ever contribute to make the *Court* become, in any future Age, a Sanctuary for *Pickpockets*, and an Hospital for *Changelings*,

I am, S I R, &c.



L E T T E R



LETTER XVII.

S I R,

THE great Alteration we have spoken of, in *Property* and *Power*, brought our *Constitution*, by slow Degrees, and through many Struggles and Dangers, so near the most perfect Idea of a *free System of Government*, that nothing would be now wanting to compleat it, if effectual Means were found of securing the Independency of Parliament against *Corruption*, as well as it is secured against *Prerogative*. Our *Kings* have lost little of the gaudy Plumage of the Crown. Some of their superfluous Power, indeed, hath been bought and more hath been wrested from Them. Notwithstanding which, it is a very demonstrable Truth, that the *Crown* must sit lighter, and more secure, on the Head of a *wise Prince*, (and no constitution provides for, though every Constitution should provide against, a *weak Prince*) since the great Change of *Property* and *Power*, in Favour of the *Commons*, than ever it did before. Our *Kings* are no longer exposed, as some of the greatest of Them have been, to the Insults of *turbulent, ambitious Lords*, or *haughty Prelates*. It is no longer in the Power of a *few factious Noblemen* to draw Armies into the Field, and oblige their Prince to fight for his Crown, to fight to gain it, and to fight to keep it; as *Edward* the 4th did, I think, in nine
pitch'd

pitch'd Battles. To make the Prince uneasy, or insecure, as We are now constituted; the *whole Body of the People* must be uneasy under his Government. A *popular King of Great Britain* will be always not only easy and secure, but in Effect absolute. He will be, what the *British Constitution* alone can make any *Prince*, the *absolute Monarch of a free People*; and this *Popularity* is so easily acquired, a *King* gains the publick Confidence and Affection at so cheap a Rate, that He must be poor indeed in all the *kingly Virtues*, who does not purchase them, and establish *true Popularity* upon them.

If the Condition of our *Kings* is mended in many Respects, and made worse in none, That of the *Nation* is mended in every Respect, by the great Improvements of our *Constitution*; which are due principally to the *Change* I have mention'd, as the Advances We have made in *Trade*, and in *national Wealth and Power*, are due principally to these Improvements. It is by *These*, that the Subjects of *Great Britain* enjoy hitherto such a Freedom of their *Persons*, and such a Security of their *Property*, as no other People can boast. Hence that great Encouragement of *Industry*; hence that broad and solid Foundation of *Credit*, which must always continue, unless the Weight of *Taxes*, and the Oppression of *Tax-Gatherers* make it worth no Man's while to be industrious any longer, and unless *national Credit* be reduced, by Length of Time, and private Management, to rest no longer on its *natural and original Foundation*, but on the feeble Props of *yearly Expedients*, and *daily Tricks*; by which a *System*, that ought to be the *plainest and fairest* imaginable, will become of Course a *dark, intricate, and wicked Mystery* of STOCKJOBING.

But

But the great Advantage We are to insist upon here, which hath arisen to the *whole Nation* from the Alteration in the State of *Property* and *Power*, is This ; that We have been brought by it to the true Poise of a *mix'd Government*, constituted like ours on the *three simple Forms*. The *Democratical Power* is no longer kept under the same *Dependencies* ; and if an *House of Commons* should now fail to assert that *independent Share in the supreme, legislative Power*, which the Constitution assigns to *this Assembly*, it could not proceed, as it might and sometimes did formerly, from the Nature of *Tenures*, and many other unavoidable Restraints ; it could proceed alone from the *Corruption of particular Men*, who threw Themselves into a *voluntary Dependency*. The *Democratical Power of our Constitution* is not sufficient to overtop the *Monarchical and Aristocratical* ; but it is sufficient to counterwork and ballance any *other Power* by its own Strength, and without the fatal Necessity of favouring the Ambition of the *Crown* against the *Lords*, or That of the *Lords* against the *Crown*. Nay more, as our Government is now constituted, the *three Estates* have not only the common Interest, which They always had ; but They have, consider'd as *Estates*, no separate, contradictory Interest. Our *Constitution* gives so much Grandeur, so much Authority and Power to the *Crown*, and our *Parliaments* give so immense a Revenue, that no Prince hath any real Interest to desire more, who looks on Himself as the *supreme Magistrate of a free People* ; for if We suppose inordinate Ambition, or Avarice, to make Part of his Character, these Passions are insatiable ; but then for this very Reason, because they are so, there ought to be no Account held of them ; and though a *Prince* may measure his

Demands, a *People*, who are in their Senses, will never measure their *Concessions* by them.

The Property of the *Commons* is not only become far superior to That of the *Lords* upon the whole, but in the Detail there are few, very few, Instances to be produced of greater Shares of private Property amongst the *latter*, than amongst the *former*; and as the Property of the *Commons* is greater, so it is equally *free*. There are no Badges of Servitude on *one Side*; no Pretence of any Superiority, except Those of *Title* and *Rank*, on the *other*. The *Peers* are, in some Points, (I speak it with all the Respect due to Them) *Commoners with Coronets on their Coats of Arms*; and affecting to act as such, it is plain They desire very wisely to be taken for such, on many Occasions. The Interests of *these two Estates* then, with Regard to *Property*, are the same; and their *particular Rights* and *Privileges* are now so well ascertain'd, and so distinguish'd, that as the Proximity of their Interests of *one Sort* should always unite Them, so the Distance of Those of *another Sort* cannot easily make Them clash. In short, *these two Orders*, according to the *present Constitution*, (and how different is it from That of *Rome*, or, in the last Respect, even from That of *Spain*, not to mention That of *France*?) have no Temptation, and scarce the Means, of invading *each other*; so that They may the better, and the more effectually, employ their Vigilance, and unite their Efforts, whenever it shall be necessary, against the Encroachments of the *Crown*, from whose Shackles They have both emancipated Themselves, whether the Attempts to impose these Shackles again are carried on by *Prerogative*, or by the more formidable Enemy of Liberty, *Corruption*.

It

It hath been observed already, that although the *Crown* hath the sole Power of creating *Peers*, yet the Independency of the *Peerage* on the *Crown* is secured by This; that their *Rights and Privileges* cannot be taken from Them, at the Will of the *Crown*. Could the *Crown* un-make, as well as make *Peers*, it would be a Jest to talk of *three Estates*, since there would be virtually, and in Effect, but *two*; and therefore our *Constitution* hath provided against it. But the *Commons of Great-Britain* can make, and, at proper Seasons, and in a proper Manner, un-make their *Representatives*; by which Means, many Inconveniences and Mischiefs are avoided, and many wise and just Ends obtain'd. The *Peers of the Realm* can, the *Commons* cannot, assemble in their *collective Body*, without exceeding those Numbers, amongst whom the Quiet, Order, Decency and Solemnity of a *Senate* may be preserved. The *Peers* therefore sit in Parliament in their *collective*, the *Commons* in their *representative Body*. The *Peers* have an inherent, the *Commons* a delegated Right. The *Peers* are therefore accountable for their Conduct, as all other Men are, to *God*, to their *own Consciences*, to the Tribunal of *publick Fame*, and to no other. But the *Commons* are accountable to *another Tribunal*, as well as to *These*; to That of their *Constituents*, before which They must frequently appear, according to the true Intent of our *Constitution*, to have a Censure, or Approbation, pass'd on their Conduct, by the Refusal, or Grant of *new Powers* to the particular Members. Thus the *collective Body of the People of Great Britain* delegate, but do not give up, trust, but do not alienate their *Right* and their *Power*, and cannot be undone, by having *Beggary*, or *Slavery*, brought upon them, unless They co-operate to their own Undoing, and in one Word betray Themselves.

We cannot therefore subscribe to those two Sayings of my Lord Bacon, which are quoted to this Effect; *that England can never be undone, unless by Parliaments; and that there is nothing, which a Parliament cannot do.*—Great Britain, according to our present Constitution, cannot be undone by Parliaments; for *there is Something, which a Parliament cannot do.* A Parliament cannot annul the Constitution; and whilst That is preserved, though our Condition may be bad, it cannot be irretrievably so. The Legislative is a *supreme*, and may be call'd, in one Sense, an *absolute*, but in none an *arbitrary* Power. * *It is limited to the publick Good of the Society. It is a Power, that hath no other End but Preservation, and therefore can never have a Right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the Subjects; for the Obligations of the Law of Nature cease not Society, &c.*—If you therefore put so extravagant a Case, as to suppose the *two Houses of Parliament* concurring to make at once a formal Cession of their *own Rights and Privileges*, and of Those of the *whole Nation* to the *Crown*, and ask who hath the *Right*, and the *Means*, to resist the *supreme legislative Power*; I answer, the *whole Nation* hath the *Right*; and a *People*, who deserve to enjoy *Liberty*, will find the *Means*. An Attempt of this Kind would break the Bargain between the *King* and the *Nation*, between the *representative and collective Body of the People*, and would dissolve the *Constitution*. From hence it follows that the *Nation*, which hath a Right to preserve *this Constitu-*

* Locke's *Essay on civil Government*, C. 11. of the Extent of the Legislative Power.


tion, hath a Right to resist an *Attempt*, that leaves no other Means of preserving it but those of *Resistance*. From hence it follows, that if the *Constitution* was actually dissolved, as it would be by such an Attempt of the *three Estates*, the People would return to their original, their natural Right, the Right of restoring the *same Constitution*, or of making a *new one*. No Power on Earth could claim any Right of imposing a *Constitution* upon Them; and less than any *that King, those Lords, and those Commons*, who, having been intrusted to preserve, had destroy'd the *former*.—— But to suppose a Case more within the Bounds of Possibility, though one would be tempted to think it as little within Those of Probability; let us suppose our *Parliaments*, in some future Generation, to grow so *corrupt*, and the *Crown* so *rich*, that a *pecuniary Influence* constantly prevailing over the *Majority*, They should assemble for little else than to establish *Grievances*, instead of redressing them; to approve the *Measures of the Court*, without Information; to engage their Country in *Alliances*, in *Treaties*, in *Wars*, without Examination; and to give *Money* without *Account*, and almost without *Stint*. The Case would be deplorable. Our *Constitution* itself would become our *Grievance*, whilst *this Corruption* prevail'd; and if it prevail'd long, our *Constitution* could not last long; because this slow Progress would lead to the Destruction of it as surely as the more concise Method of giving it up at once. But, in this Case, the *Constitution* would help itself, and effectually too, unless the *whole Mass of the People* was tainted, and the *Electors* were become no honester than the *Elected*. Much Time would be required to beggar and enslave the Nation, in this Manner. It could scarce be the Work of *one Parliament*,

liament, though *Parliaments* should continue to be *septennial*. It could not be the Work of a *triennial Parliament* most certainly; and the People of *Great Britain* would have none to blame but Themselves; because, as the *Constitution* is a sure Rule of Action to *Those*, whom they chuse to act for Them, so it is likewise a sure Rule of Judgment to Them, in the Choice of their *Trustees*, and particularly of such as have *represented them already*. In short, nothing can destroy the *Constitution of Britain*, but the *People of Britain*; and whenever the *People of Britain* become so degenerate and base, as to be induced by *Corruption* (for They are no longer in Danger of being awed by *Prerogative*) to chuse Persons to represent Them in Parliament, whom They have found by Experience to be under an *Influence*, arising from *private Interest*, *Dependents on a Court*, and the *Creatures of a Minister*; or *Others*, who are unknown to the *People*, that elect Them, and bring no Recommendation but That, which They carry in their *Purses*; then may the *Enemies of our Constitution* boast that They have got the better of it, and that it is no longer able to preserve itself, nor to defend *Liberty*. Then will that trite, proverbial Speech be verif'd in our Case, *that the Corruptions of the best Things are the worst*; for then will that very Change in the State of Property and Power, which improved our *Constitution* so much, contribute to the Destruction of it; and We may even wish for those little Tyrants, the *great Lords* and the *great Prelates* again, to oppose the Encroachments of the *Crown*. How preferable will Subjection to *those powerful Landlords*, (whom the Commonality were accustomed to serve; and by whom, if They suffer'd on one Hand, they had considerable Advantages on the other) how preferable indeed, will this Subjection appear

appear to Them, when They shall see the whole Nation oppress'd by a few *Upstarts in Power*; often by the *meanest*, always by the *worst of their Fellow-Subjects*; by Men, who owe their Elevation and Riches neither to *Merit* nor *Birth*, but to the Favour of *weak Princes*, and to the *Spoils of their Country*, beggar'd by their Rapine. Then will the Fate of *Rome* be renew'd, in some Sort, in *Britain*. The Grandeur of *Rome* was the Work of many Centuries, the Effect of much Wisdom, and the Price of much Blood. She maintain'd her Grandeur, whilst She preserv'd her *Virtue*; but when *Luxury* grew up to favour *Corruption*, and *Corruption* to nourish *Luxury*; then *Rome* grew venal; the Election of her *Magistrates*, the Sentences of her *Judges*, the Decrees of her *Senate*, all was sold; for her *Liberty* was sold when *These* were sold; and her *Riches*, her *Power*, her *Glory*, could not long survive her *Liberty*. She, who had been the Envy, as well as the Mistress of Nations, fell to be an Object of their Scorn, or their Pity. They had seen and felt that She govern'd other People by *Will*, and her own by *Law*. They beheld Her govern'd Herself by *Will*; by the *arbitrary Will* of the worst of her own Citizens, of the worst of both Sexes, of the worst of Humankind; by *Caligula*, by *Claudius*, by *Nero*, by *Messalina*, by *Agrippina*, by *Poppæa*, by *Narcissus*, by *Calistus*, by *Pallas*; by *Princes*, that were stupid, or mad; by *Women*, that were abandon'd to Ambition and to Lust; by *Ministers*, that were emancipated Slaves, Parasites and Pandars, insolent and rapacious. In this miserable State, the Few, that retain'd some Sparks of the old *Roman Spirit*, had double Cause to mourn in private; for it was not safe even to *mourn* in publick. They mourn'd the Loss of the *Liberty* and Grandeur of *Rome*; and They
mourn'd

mourn'd that both should be sacrificed to *Wretches*, whose Crimes would have been *punish'd*, and whose *Talents* would scarce have recommended Them to the *meanest Offices*, in the virtuous and prosperous Ages of the Commonwealth. Into such a State, (the Difference of Times, and of other Circumstances consider'd) at least, into a State as miserable as This, will the People of *Britain* both fall, and deserve to fall, if They suffer, under any Pretence, or by any Hands, *that Constitution* to be destroy'd, which cannot be destroy'd, unless They suffer it; unless They co-operate with the *Enemies of it*, by renewing an exploded Distinction of *Parties*; by electing *Those* to represent Them, who are hired to betray Them; or by submitting tamely, when the *Mask* is taken off, or falls off, and the Attempt to bring *Beggary* and *Slavery* is avow'd, or can be no longer conceal'd. If ever This happens, the *Friends of Liberty*, should any such remain, will have one Option still left; and They will rather chuse, no Doubt, to dye the *last of British Freemen*, than bear to live the *first of British Slaves*.

I am, S I R, &c.



L E T T E R



LETTER XVIII.

S I R,

IF We had propos'd nothing more to Ourselves in writing *this Dissertation on Parties* than the Entertainment, such as it is, of your Readers, and our own Amusement; We should not have dwelt, perhaps, so much on the Nature of the *British Constitution*, nor have recurr'd so often to assert the *necessary Independency of Parliaments on the Crown*. But We had another Motive, which We are neither affraid, nor ashamed to avow. This *necessary Independency of Parliaments*, in which the Essence of our *Constitution*, and by Consequence of our *Liberty*, consists, seems to be in great, not to say, in imminent Danger of being lost. They, who are alarm'd at every Thing, that is said in Favour of our *Constitution*, and of *British Liberty*, and who are prejudiced against every Man, who writes or speaks in Defence of them, may take, or affect to take, and try to give, Offence at this Expression. But We desire to be understood, as We have explain'd our Meaning upon some former Occasion. We understand our *Constitution to be in Danger*, not only when it is *attack'd*, but as soon as a *Breach* is made, by which it may be *attack'd*; and We understand *this Danger* to be greater, or less, in Proportion to the *Breach*, that is made, and without any Regard to the Probability, or Improbability

probability of an *Attack*. This Explanation of our Meaning is the better founded, because the Nation hath an undoubted Right to preserve the *Constitution* not only inviolate, but secure from Violations. Should *Corruption* prevail among the *Members*, which We trust will never happen, as notoriously as it does in the *Elections of Parliament*, We all know how much the Magnanimity of our *present King* would scorn to take so mean an Advantage over the Nation; how much, on the contrary, his heroical Spirit would prompt Him to maintain the *Liberty* even of a *degenerate People*, who might deserve no longer the Enjoyment of so invaluable a Blessing; who could never deserve to have it taken from *Them* by a *Prince of that Family*, which was raised by *Them* to the Throne, for no other Reason but to preserve it. All This We know; and the Nation may have, no Doubt, the same Confidence in every *future King*, of the same illustrious and royal House. But This will not alter the Case; nor make That, which I call *Danger*, cease to be such. Should *Angels* and *Arch-Angels* come down from Heaven to govern us, the same *Danger* would exist until the *Springs*, from whence it arises, were cut off; not because some *Angels* and *Arch-Angels* have fallen, and from being the *Guardians* have become the *Tempters* and *Tormentors* of *Mankind*, and Others therefore may fall; but because as *private Liberty* cannot be deem'd secure under a Government, wherein *Law*, the proper and sole Security of it, is dependent on *Will*; so *publick Liberty* must be in *Danger*, whenever a *free Constitution*, the proper and sole Security of it, is dependent on *Will*; and a *free Constitution* like ours is dependent on *Will*, whenever the *Will of one Estate* can direct the Conduct of *all Three*.

Having

Having thus explain'd what I mean by *Danger*, and taken away all Colour for Cavil, it remains that I prove *this Danger* to be real, and not the Phantom of a crazy Imagination, or a prejudiced Mind. This shall be done therefore as shortly as I am able, and by an undeniable Deduction of Facts.

He, who undertakes to govern a free People by *Corruption*, and to lead Them by a *false Interest*, against their *true Interest*, cannot boast the Honour of the Invention. The Expedient is as old as the World, and He can pretend to no other Honour than That of being an humble Imitator of the *Devil*. To *corrupt our Parliaments* hath been often attempted, as well as to *divide our People*, in Favour of *Prerogative*, and in order to let the arbitrary Will of our *Princes* loose from the Restraints of *Law*. We observed This, in speaking of the Reign of *Charles the 2d*; but the Efforts then made were ineffectual. The frugal Habits of the *former Age* were not entirely lost in *That*; which, I presume, may be reckon'd as one Cause of the noble Stands, that were then made by our *Parliaments*, in Opposition to the *Court*. But not to ascribe more Honour than is due, perhaps, to our Fathers, the *Revenue of the Crown* was at that Time so small, (I speak comparatively; for, in every other Respect, it was very ample) and the Profusion of that *Prince* on his Pleasures was so great, that no Minister of King *Charles the 2d* could find Sums sufficient to buy a *Parliament*. He stood therefore on his *Prerogative*, strain'd it as far as He durst, and made all the Use of it he could. The *Revenue of the Crown* was greatly increased in the Reign of King *James the 2d*, and was given most unwisely for *Life*. I say *most unwisely*; for as a *Prince*, who hath an Heart and Head to govern well, cannot stand in need of *such a Grant*;

to a *Prince*, who hath neither, does not deserve it; and therefore whatever the Generosity of our Countrymen to their *Princes* may carry Them to do at all Times, They might leave This undone at any Time, without any Reflection on their Prudence, or even their Generosity. The Reign of King *James* was short; and, during this short Reign, He rested on that Prerogative, which he knew was a cheaper Expedient than Corruption, and which He vainly flatter'd Himself was enough confirm'd to support the Measures He took, for subverting the Religion, the Laws, and the Liberty of *Britain*. Thus were Men brought, by the Conduct of *these two Princes*, to fix their Eyes on *Prerogative*, as the sole Instrument of Tyranny, and to forget that *Corruption* had been employ'd, though unsuccessfully, by King *Charles*, and might have been employ'd with greater Force, and perhaps more Success, by King *James*. The Cry of the Nation was for a *free Parliament*, and no Man seem'd to doubt, in that Ferment, but that a *Parliament must be free*, when the *Influence*, which the *Crown* had usurp'd, in the precedent Reigns, over the *Elections* was removed, as it was by the *Revolution*. But this general Inadvertency, as well as the particular Neglect of Those, who took the Lead in national Affairs at that Time, is the more surprizing, because *Corruption* having been so lately employ'd, amongst other Means, to render *Parliaments dependent on the Crown*, the Danger of *Corruption* was by Consequence one of those Dangers, against which the Nation had a Right to be secured, as well as a Promise of being so, according to the Terms of the *Prince of Orange's Declaration*. Those Persons especially, who had exclaim'd so loudly against *Place-men* and *Pensioners* in the Reign of King *Charles*, and who complain'd at this Instant so bitterly
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of the *undue Influence*, that had been employ'd, in small Boroughs chiefly, to promote the *Elections of the Parliament*, which fate in the Reign of King *James*, ought to have been attentive, one would think, to take the glorious Opportunity, that was furnish'd Them by a *new Settlement of the Crown*, and of the *Constitution*, to secure the *Independency of Parliaments* effectually for the future. *Machiavel* observes, and makes it the Title of one of his Discourses, *that a free Government, in order to maintain itself free, hath Need every Day of some new Provisions*, in Favour of *Liberty*. The Truth of this Observation, and the Reasons that support it, are obvious. But as every Day may not furnish Opportunities of making some of these *new and necessary Provisions*, no Day, that does furnish the Opportunity, ought to be neglected. The *Romans* had been so liberal in bestowing the Right of Citizens on *Strangers*, that the Power of their *Elections* began to fall into such Hands as the *Constitution* had not intended to trust with them. *Quintus Fabius* saw the growing Evil; and, being *Censor*, He took the Opportunity; confined all these *new Electors* into four Tribes; put it out of their Power to turn the *Elections*, as They had done, whilst their Numbers were divided among all the Tribes; freed his Country from this Danger; restored the *Constitution*, according to the true Intent and Meaning of it; and obtain'd, by universal Suffrage, the Title of *Maximus*. If a Spirit like This had prevail'd among us, at the Time We speak of, something like This would have been done; and surely something like it ought to have been done; for the *Revolution* was, in many Instances, and it ought to have been so in all, one of those *Renewals of our Constitution*, that We have often mention'd. If it had been such, with

Respect to the *Elections of Members to serve in Parliament*, these Elections might have been drawn back to the *antient Principle*, on which they had been establish'd; and the Rule of *Property*, which was follow'd antiently, and was perverted by innumerable Changes, that Length of Time produced, might have been restored; by which the *Communities*, to whom the *Right of electing* was trusted, as well as the Qualifications of the *Electors* and the *Elected*, might have been settled in Proportion to the present State of Things. Such a Remedy might have wrought a radical Cure of the *Evil*, that threatens our *Constitution*; whereas it is much to be apprehended, even from Experience, that all others are merely *Palliative*; and yet the *Palliative* must be employ'd, no Doubt, till the *Specifick* can be procured.

But nothing of this Kind was done at the *Revolution*. Pleased that the *open Attacks on our Constitution* were defeated and prevented, Men entertain'd no Thought of the *secret Attacks*, that might be carried on against the *Independency of Parliaments*; as if our Dangers could be but of *one Kind*, and could arise but from *one Family*. Soon after the *Revolution*, indeed, Men of all Sides, and of all Denominations, (for it was not a *Party-Cause*, though it was endeavour'd to be made such) began to perceive not only that nothing effectual had been done to hinder the *undue Influence of the Crown in Elections*, and an *Over-Ballance of the Creatures of the Court in Parliament*, but that the Means of exercising *such an Influence*, at the Will of the *Crown*, were unawares and insensibly increased, and every Day increasing. In a Word, they began to see that the Foundations were laid of giving as great Power to the *Crown* indirectly, as the *Prerogative*, which they had formerly dreaded so much, could give

give directly, and of establiſhing *universal Corruption*. The *first* hath happen'd, and We pray that the *last* never may.

The *Net Revenue of the Crown*, at the Abdication of King *James*, amounted to somewhat more than *two Millions*, without any Tax on *Land*, or *Malt*, and without a Multitude of *grievous Impositions* and *Excises*, that have been since heap'd on the Nation. It is plain, and it was so then, that *this Revenue* might have been so increased, as to answer annually the great annual Expences, in which We engaged soon afterwards. In this Case, the People would not have had a greater, nay nor so great a Burthen to bear, as They had in the Course of the *two Wars*, that follow'd; and, at the End of *these Wars*, They would have found Themselves with little or no Load upon Them, instead of crouching under a Debt of *fifty Millions*. That *this Method* was not taken, furnishes Matter of very melancholy Reflection to the present, and will do so to future Generations. But these Reflections are no Part of my Subject. How it came to pass that a Method so practicable, and so eligible, was not taken, (whether This was owing to *private Interest*, to *Party-Cunning* of different and opposite Kinds, or to an unhappy Refinement in Politicks that contracting *national Debts*, under a *new Establishment*, was an effectual Expedient to attach Men to *this Establishment*) I shall not presume to say. All *three* might have their Share, perhaps, in determining for *another Measure*. At least, it is a Point, on which the Men of that Time have spoken with much Prejudice, and little Candour. But however That might be, certain it is that We began to borrow at high Interest, to anticipate and mortgage, immediately after the *Revolution*; and having once begun, there was no Remedy; We were
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forced to proceed in the same Manner thro' the Course of *two mighty Wars*. Formerly, the whole Expence of the State was borne by the *Crown*; and when this Expence grew, upon extraordinary Occasions, too great for the *Revenue of the Crown* to bear, the People aided the *Crown*, if They approved the Occasions of the Expence. These Grants were properly *Aids*, no more; for the *Revenue of the Crown* was engaged in the first Place, and therefore it might seem reasonable that the *Crown* should have the Levying and Management of the *whole*; of *these Aids*, as well as of the *standing Revenue*. But it happen'd in this Case, as it does in many; the *Reason of the Thing* ceased, and the *Thing* continued. A *separate, private Revenue*, or a *Civil-List*, as We commonly call it, was assign'd to the *Crown*. From that Time, the former Order hath been reversed. Our *Kings*, instead of contributing most, have contributed nothing to the publick Charge; and the People of *Britain*, instead of giving occasionally *Aids* to the *Crown*, have taken upon Themselves the whole Load of *ordinary and extraordinary Expences*, for which they annually provide. Notwithstanding this vast Alteration in the State of the *Revenue*, and the Interest of the *King* and the *People*, in the Management of it, the same Forms of granting *Aids to the Crown*, and of levying *Taxes*, and of managing the *publick Treasure*, have been continued; so that the *People* stand obliged (for the *Crown*, that is trusted with the whole, is bound for nothing) to make good all *Deficiencies*, though They have no Share in the Management of the *Revenue*. Our *Kings*, since the Establishment of the *Civil-List*, have not only a *private and separate Estate*, but receive a Kind of *Rent-Charge* out of the *publick Estate*, to maintain their *Honour* and *Dignity*, nothing else; and whether the *publick*
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Estate thrive, or not, this *Rent-Charge* must be made good to Them; at least, as it hath been settled on our present, most gracious Monarch, if the Funds appropriated produce the double of that immense Revenue of 800,000*l.* a Year, which hath been so liberally given Him for Life, the whole is his, without Account; but if they fail in any Degree to produce it, the entire, national Fund is engaged to make up the Difference. But although our Kings have thus no longer any immediate Interest in the publick Estate, They are trusted with the intire Management of it. They are not only *Stewards for the Publick*, but They condescend to be such for all those private Persons, who are the Creditors of the Publick, and have the additional Trouble of managing about three Millions a Year, on this Head.

Now this new Settlement, which appears absurd in Speculation, how wise soever it may have been thought contrived for Practice, hath had this evident and inevitable Consequence. As we have annually increased our Funds, and our Taxes, We have annually increased the Power of the Crown; and these Funds and Taxes being establish'd and laid for Perpetuity, or for Terms equivalent to Perpetuity, in the Sense here intended, this Increase of Power must not only continue, but still increase, as long as this System of Oeconomy subsists. How this Increase of Power arises from the Increase of Funds and Taxes, and the Influence of the Crown grows, in Proportion to the Burthen on the People, heavier, hath been explain'd so much in the Debates on a late, detestable Occasion, that much less needs to be said on the Subject here. If we consider, in the Increase of Taxes, nothing more than the Increase of Officers first, by which a vast Number of new Dependents on the Crown are created in every Part of the Kingdom; (*Dependents* as numerous, and certainly

tainly more prevalent than all the *Tenants and Wards of the Crown* were antiently ;) and secondly the Powers given to the *Treasury*, and *other inferior Officers*, on Account of *these Taxes*, which are at least as great and as grievous, in this *free Government of ours*, as any that are exercised in the most *arbitrary Government*, on the same Occasions ; if We consider This alone, We shall find Reason sufficient to conclude that although the *Power of Prerogative* was more open, and more noisy in its Operations ; yet the *Power thus acquired* is more real and may prove more dangerous for this very Reason, because it is more cover'd, and more silent. That Men began to see, very soon after the *Revolution*, the Danger arising from hence to our *Constitution*, as I said above, is most certain. No less than *seven Acts* were made, in King *William's* Reign, to prevent *undue Influences on Elections* ; and one of the Acts, as I remember, for I have it not before Me, is grounded on this Fact, * *that the Officers of the Excise had frequently, by Threats, and Promises, prevail'd on Electors, and absolutely debarr'd Them of the Freedom of voting*. What hath been done, or attempted to be done, since that Time, in the same View, and what hath been done, or attempted to be done, both in the Reign of King *William* and since, to prevent an *undue Influence on the Elected*, as well as on the *Electors*, I need not recapitulate. They are Matters of fresh Date, and enough known. Upon the whole, this Change in the State and Property of the *publick Revenue* hath made a Change in our *Constitution*, not yet perhaps attended to sufficiently, but such an one however as deserves our utmost Attention ; since it gives a *Power*, unknown

* *Tertio Jul. & Mar.*

in former Times, to *one of the three Estates* ; and since *publick Liberty* is not guarded against the Dangers, that may arise from *this Power*, as it was, and as it is now more than ever, against the Dangers, that used to arise from the *Powers* formerly possess'd, or claim'd by the *Crown*. Formerly, *Prerogative* was kept in Sight, and Provisions were made against the Effects and Encroachments of it, as often as Occasion required, and Opportunity offer'd. They, who call'd Themselves *Friends to the Government*, in those Days, opposed these Provisions. They, who were *Friends to the Constitution*, promoted them. That the same Thing should happen again, in a similar Case, We must expect. But as the *Friends of the Constitution*, in Times past, were not deterr'd, tempted, nor wearied, whilst They defended it against Dangers of *one Kind*, and by their honest Perseverance deliver'd it down, not only safe, but more improved, to Posterity ; let us flatter Ourselves with this agreeable Hope, that the *Friends of the Constitution*, at this Time, and in all Times to come, will be neither deterr'd, tempted, nor wearied in the same generous Cause, in watching and guarding it against Dangers of *another Kind* ; and that They will deliver it down, in like Manner, to future Generations. Sure I am there are Reasons, and Those of no small Moment, why They should be more watchful, more upon their Guard, more bold, and more incessant in their Endeavours, if possible, even than the *Affertors of British Liberty* were formerly ; and the Enumeration of some of these Reasons is an Article not to be omitted on this Occasion.

I am, S I R, &c.



L E T T E R X I X .

S I R,

AS the Means then of influencing by *Prerogative*, and of governing by *Force*, were consider'd to be increased formerly, upon every Increase of Power to the Crown, so are the Means of influencing by *Money*, and of governing by *Corruption*, to be consider'd as increased now, upon that Increase of Power, which hath accrued to the Crown by the *new Constitution of the Revenue*, since the *Revolution*. Nay farther. Not only the Means of corrupting are increased, on the Part of the *Crown*, but the Facility of employing these Means with Success is increased, on the Part of the *People*, on the Part of the *Electors*, and of the *Elected*. Nay, farther still. These Means, and this Facility are not only increased, but the Power of the *Crown* to corrupt, as I have hinted already, and the Proneness of the *People* to be corrupted, must continue to increase on the same Principles, unless a Stop be put to the growing Wealth and Power of *one*, and the growing Depravity of the *other*. We are, to be sure, in no Danger from any Advantage *his Majesty* will take of this Situation; but if Advantage be not taken, in Favour of our *Constitution*, of the present most happy Reign, of the mild and beneficent Temper of our *heroical Monarch*, of the generous Principle, instill'd by Nature, and improved

improved by Philosophy, of his *Royal Consort*; it may be supposed, (for We speak hypothetically all along as the Reader will please to remember, even where the Precaution is not used) it may be supposed, I say, that *pretended Friends to the Government*, and *real Enemies to this Constitution*, no Matter whether They are such by *Principle*, or become such by their *Crimes*, will get into superior Power, in some future Time, and under some weak or wicked Prince; and whenever This happens, the Subversion of our *Constitution*, and of our *Liberty* by Consequence, will be the most easy Enterprize imaginable; because nothing can be more easy than the Creation of an *anti-constitutional Dependency of the two Houses of Parliament on the Crown* will be in that Case; and because *such a Dependency of the two Houses* is as real a Subversion of our Constitution as an *absolute Abolishment of Parliaments* would be.

The first of those Means of *Corruption*, that have grown up, or been increased, since the *Revolution*, which I shall mention, is the Establishment of the *Civil-List*; not so much on Account of the Manner, in which it was originally given, as on Account of That, in which it hath been since given, and of the vast Augmentations, that have been made to it; Augmentations, that may be doubled, or trebled, in Times to come, upon the same Motives, under the same and other Pretences; in short, just as speciously as they have been made. The Revenue of King *James the 2d*, as it stood at his Abdication, hath been mention'd; and it would not be hard to shew, by indisputable Computations, that They, who apprehended He might be able to govern without *Parliaments*, or to buy *Parliaments*, if he wanted their Assistance, had good Reason for such Apprehensions, notwithstanding the

Expence He was at, over and above all the *ordinary Charges of the Government*, in maintaining against Law a great standing Army of *sixteen, or eighteen thousand Men*.—But to go back to the Reign of King *Charles the 2d*, whose Revenue was much less. The Patriots of that Age, even when this Revenue was computed at no more than *1,200,000 l.* a Year, took great Alarm at the *pecuniary Influence* it might create, and look'd upon it, and ipoke of it, as a *Fund for Corruption*. Now, if this Revenue could afford a *Fund for Corruption*, when, besides maintaining the Honour and Dignity of the *Crown*, it was to defray all the other Expences of the *State*, and among the rest Those of a *small Army*, and a *great Fleet*; what would the *same Patriots* think of a Revenue of *800,000 l.* or a *Million* a Year, applicable to the particular Expences of the *Crown alone*, and not one Farthing of which sacred Treasure was ever diverted to any *national Use*? They would have the same just Confidence, no Doubt, as We have, in his *present Majesty*; but They would say, as We do, that so *immense a private, or separate Revenue*, may become hereafter an *inexhaustible Fund of Corruption*; and therefore that the *Independency of Parliaments* is, and must be in real Danger, till some Remedies, as effectual against the *pecuniary Influence*, as have been found against the *Prerogative* of the *Crown*, are provided. They would shew that a small Sum, in Aid of *Places and Pensions*, of *Fears and Expectations*, might serve for the ordinary Charge of *annual Corruption*; and that a small Saving reserved *every Year* might produce, at the End of *seven*, a Fund sufficient for the extraordinary Charge of *septennial and national Corruption*.

But

But again. If We suppose the *Civil-List* to become an insufficient Fund for these Purposes, by the Profusion of some future King; (and nothing less than the most extravagant Profusion can make it so;) or if We suppose that some future King may join to so many ill Qualities, as leave Him no Means of governing but by *Corruption*, a fordid Avarice, that renders Him unable to open his Coffers even for this Use; yet will a very little iniquitous Cunning suffice to create *Funds for Corruption*, that may come in Aid of the *Civil-List*. It is natural for Men to be less frugal, when Others are to pay for their Want of Frugality. Our *Kings* therefore may become more apt to take, and our *Ministers* to advise such Engagements, as plunge the Nation at every Turn into vast Expence; since the Load, which fell, in Part at least, on the *Crown* formerly, falls intire on the *People* now. But besides this general Reason to promote a Want of Frugality, there may arise particular Reasons of more positive, and more pernicious Effect. A *weak Administration*, for Instance, may pretend *publick Necessity*, when *private Inability* alone hath form'd the Conjuncture; and frequent and extravagant Supplies may be ask'd and obtain'd; to do, or to undo, by the Weight of *Money*, what might have been attain'd, or prevented, by a *little Foresight*, and by a *prudent Conduct*. A *wicked Administration* may propose to impoverish the People; to render Them as submissive and as abject as the Subjects, the Boors, or the Slaves, in some foreign Countries, and to *beggar* Them out of their *Sturdiness*. But there is another View, that may be common to a *weak* and a *wicked Administration* both. In such an Age as We suppose, *publick Money* will be easily granted, and *publick Accounts* rarely, or incuriously inspected. The *Ministers* therefore, tho'
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never so weak, may be impudent enough to ask, and able enough to get, *frequent Supplies*, on *national Pretences*, for *private Purposes*. The Consequences of This are manifold; for in general, the more *Money* passes thro' their Hands, the more Opportunities They have of *Gain*; and, in particular, They may share, if They please, in every *bad Bargain* They make for the Publick; and the worse their Bargain, the better their Share will be. Thus an *immense Subsidy* given to some *little Prince*, who deals in *Soldiers*, or an *immense Arrear* stated in Favour of these *little Merchants of human Flesh*, may be so order'd as to steal enough from the Publick to replenish the *royal Coffers*, to glut the *Ministers*, to feed some of their *hungry Creatures*, and to bribe a *Parliament* besides. Several of these *occasional Jobs* may be, and no Doubt will be contrived, in such an Age, and by such Means as We here suppose, and may be justly reckon'd as so many *auxiliary Funds*, belonging to the *great aggregate Fund of Corruption*. Let us however break off from discoursing of These, which may be more easily and more frequently contrived under the *present*, but might have been contrived under the *former Constitution of the Revenue*; and let us turn our Discourse to speak of that *great Source of Corruption*, which was open'd soon after the *Revolution*; which was unknown before it; and which hath spread, since it was open'd, like the Box of *Pandora*, innumerable Evils over this unhappy Country.

The Increase and Continuance of *Taxes* acquire to the *Crown*, by multiplying *Officers of the Revenue*, and by arming Them with formidable Powers against the rest of their *Fellow-Subjects*, a Degree of *Power*, the Weight of which the inferior Ranks of our People have long felt, and They
most,

most, who are most useful to the Commonwealth, and which even the superior Ranks may feel one Time or other; for I presume it would not be difficult to shew how a full Exercise of the Powers, that are in being, with or even without some little Additions to them, for the *Improvement of the Revenue*, (that stale Pretence for *Oppression*) might oblige the greatest Lord in the Land to bow as low to a *Commissioner of the Customs*, or *Excise*, or to some *subalteru Harpy*, as any Nobleman, or Gentleman in *France* can be obliged to bow to the *Intendant of his Province*. But the Establishment of *publick Funds*, on the Credit of *these Taxes*, hath been productive of more and greater Mischiefs than the *Taxes* themselves, not only by increasing the Means of *Corruption*, and the *Power of the Crown* but by the Effect it hath had on the *Spirit of the Nation*, in our *Manners*, and our *Morals*. It is impossible to look back, without Grief, on the necessary and unavoidable Consequences of *this Establishment*; or, without Indignation, on that *Mystery of Iniquity*, to which this *Establishment* gave Occasion, which hath been raised upon it, and carried on, for almost half a Century, by Means of it. It is impossible to look forward, without Horror, on the Consequences, that may still follow. The *ordinary Expences of our Government* are defray'd, in great Measure, by *Anticipations* and *Mortgages*. In Times of Peace, in Days of Prosperity, as we boast them to be, We contract *new Debts*, and We create *new Funds*. What must We do in War, and in national Distress? What will happen, when We have *mortgaged*, and *funded* all We have to *mortgage*, and to *fund*; when we have mortgaged to new Creditors that *sinking Fund*, which was mortgaged to other Creditors not yet paid off; when We have mortgaged
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all the *Product of our Land*, and even our *Land itself*? Who can answer that when We come to such Extremities, or have them more nearly in Prospect, *ten Millions of People* will bear any longer to be *Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water*, to maintain the two hundredth Part of that Number at Ease and in Plenty? Who can answer that the *whole Body of the People* will suffer Themselves to be treated, in Favour of an Handful of Men, (for *They*, who monopolize the whole Power, and may in Time monopolize the whole Property of the *Funds*, are indeed but an Handful) who can answer that the *whole Body of the People* will suffer Themselves to be treated, in Favour of such an handful, as the poor *Indians* are, in Favour of the *Spaniards*; to be parcell'd out in Lots, as it were; and to be assign'd, like these *Indians* to the *Spanish Planters*, to toil and starve for the *Proprietors of the several Funds*? Who can answer that a *Scheme*, which oppresses the *Farmer*, ruins the *Manufacturer*, breaks the *Merchant*, discourages Industry, and reduces Fraud into System; which beggars so often the *fair Adventurer* and *innocent Proprietor*; which drains continually a Portion of our national Wealth away to *Foreigners*, and draws most perniciously the rest of that immense Property, that was diffused among Thousands, into the Pockets of a *Few*; who can answer that *such a Scheme* will be always endured? —

But I have run, before I was aware, from my Subject, which requires no more than that I should take Notice of the Establishment of the *Publick Funds*, as it furnishes *new Means of Corruption*, on the Part of the *Crown*, and new Facilities to these Means, on the Part of the *People*.

Now This, I suppose, hath Need of no Proof, and of little Explanation; for, *first*, the whole
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Art of *Stockjobbing*, the whole *Mystery of Iniquity*, mention'd above, arises from *this Establishment*, and is employ'd about the *Funds*; and, *secondly*, the main Springs, that turn or may turn, the artificial Wheel of *Credit*, and make the *Paper Estates*, that are fasten'd to it, rise or fall, lurk behind the Veil of the *Treasury*. From hence it follows, that if *this Office* should be ever unrighteously administer'd; if there should ever be, at the Head of it, one of those *veteran Sharpers*, who hath learn'd by Experience how to improve the Folly, and aggravate the Misfortunes, of his Fellow-Subjects, of the Innocent, of the Poor, of the Widow, and of the Orphan, to his own, or any other private Advantage; it follows, I say, that He must have it in his Power, and there can be no Doubt of his Will, to employ *two Methods of Corruption*, without any Incumbrance to the *Civil List*. Such a *ministerial Jobber* may employ the Opportunities of gaining on the *Funds*, that He can frequently create, by a thousand various Artifices, (notwithstanding the excellent Provisions, that have been lately made against the *infamous Practice of Stockjobbing*, by the Wisdom of the Legislature, and which We promise Ourselves will be still improved) and He may apply the *Gains*, that are thus made, to *Corruption*, in Aid of the *Civil List*. He may corrupt Men with their *own Spoils* and bribe even *Those*, whom He reduced by his clandestine Practices to *that Penury*, which could alone make Them capable of being *bribed*; or, when He hath to do with Men of *another Character*, (for no Rank alone will be sufficient to raise Them, in such an Age, above the most direct and prostitute Corruption) He may bribe Them by a *Whisper*, initiate Them into his *Mys-*

stry to gain Them, and then secure Them by a Participation of the *same Fraud*, and the *same Profit*.

Though this Reasoning be hypothetical, yet the Suppositions are not strain'd, nor unnatural; for as the meanest Grubs on Earth have raised Themselves by *Stockjobbing* to the Rank and Port of Noblemen and Gentlemen; so may Noblemen and Gentlemen debase Themselves to their Meanness, and acquire the same Spirit, by following the same Trade. That *Luxury*, which began to spread after the Restoration of King *Charles the 2d*, hath increased ever since; hath descended from the highest to the lowest Ranks of our People, and is become national. Now nothing can be more certain than This, that *national Luxury* and *national Poverty* may, in Time, establish *national Prostitution*. Besides This, it is to be consider'd that the *immense Wealth of particular Men* is a Circumstance, which always attends *national Poverty*, and is in a great Measure the Cause of it. We may apply already to our Country thus much at least of That; which *Sallust* makes *Cato* say of the State of *Rome*; and I wish We could apply no more,—*Habemus Luxuriam, atque Avaritiam; publicè Egestatem, privatim Opulentiam; Luxury and Avarice, publick Want and private Wealth abound*. Now, as *publick Want*, or *general Poverty*, (for in that Sense I take it here) will lay Numbers of Men open to the Attacks of *Corruption*; so *private Wealth* will have the same Effect, especially where *Luxury* prevails, on some of Those, who do not feel the *publick Want*; for there is *imaginary*, as well as *real Poverty*. He, who thought Himself rich before, may begin to think Himself poor, when He compares his Wealth, and the Expence he is able to
make

make, with Those Men, whom He hath been used to esteem, and perhaps justly, far inferior to Himself in all Respects. He, who would have been ashamed to participate in *Fraud*, or to yield to *Corruption*, may begin to think the Fault venial, when he sees Men, who were far below Him, rise above Him by *Fraud* and by *Corruption*; when He sees Them maintain Themselves by *these Means* in an Elevation, which They could not have acquired by the *contrary Virtues*, if They had had them. Thus may *Contraries* unite in their Effect, and *Poverty* and *Wealth* combine to facilitate the Means and the Progress of *Corruption*. Thus may the *great Thieves of the Nation* do more, and less reparable Mischief by the *Practices* They introduce, and the *Examples* They set, than by the *actual Robberies* They commit. *Plusque Exemplo quàm Peccato nocent*, to use an Expression of *Tully*, in one of his Books of *Laws*.

Much more might be said, concerning the *Increase of Power*, which the *Crown* hath acquired, and must continue to acquire, according to the *present Constitution and Management of the Revenue*. Much more might be said to shew that the *Power of Money*, as the World is now constituted, is *real Power*, and that *all Power*, without This, is *imaginary*; that the Prince, who gets *Prerogative* alone, gets a *Phantom*; but that He, who gets *Money*, even without *Prerogative*, gets something *real*, and will be as much stronger than his *Neighbours*, and his *People* too, as He hath a greater Command of *Money*. In fine, a great deal more might be said to shew how much *Corruption* is a more deadly Weapon than the *highest Prerogative*, in the Hands of Men, who are *En-*

mies to such a Constitution of Government as ours is.——But I hasten to a Conclusion.

If then a *Spirit of Rapine and Venality, of Fraud and Corruption*, continue to diffuse Themselves, not only *Luxury and Avarice*, but every Kind of *Immorality* will follow; and the whole may be improved by such Ways as have been sketch'd out, and by others, whenever the Nation falls under a *bad Government*, till the *Prince* on the Throne shall not be able to say, speaking of his whole People, even That, which *Phillip the 2d* said, speaking of the Corruption of his own Court; *They all take Money, except MY SELF and SAPENA.* Britain will then be in that very Condition, in which, and in which alone, her *Constitution*, and her *Liberty* by Consequence, may be destroy'd; because the *People* may, in a State of *universal Corruption*, and will in no other, either suffer Others to betray them, or betray Themselves. How near a Progress We have made towards *this State*, I determine not. This I say; it is Time for every Man, who is desirous to preserve the *British Constitution*, and to preserve it secure, to contribute all He can to prevent the ill Effects of that *new Influence and Power*, which hath gain'd Strength in every Reign since the *Revolution*; of those *Means of Corruption*, that may be employ'd, one Time or other, on the Part of the *Crown*, and of that *Proneness to Corruption*, on the Part of the *People*, that hath been long growing, and still grows. It may otherwise happen that *these Causes* remaining in Force, their *Effects* will become too strong to be check'd, and will ensure the Ruin of the best Constitution upon Earth, whenever the *Men in Power* shall think their Grandeur, or their Safety, concern'd in the Ruin of it. We are not expos'd, at present,
most

most certainly to any such Contingency; but the bare Possibility of being so is a Reason sufficient to awaken, and alarm every honest Man. Hath not every such Man, indeed, Reason to be alarm'd, when He hears the Cause of *Corruption* publicly pleaded, and when Men are suffer'd, nay paid by Somebody or other, to plead this unrighteous Cause, as if it was That of our most righteous Government. Had We lived when the *Star-Chamber* tyrannized, and many other extravagant Powers were exercis'd, under the Authority of the *Crown*, We should have found Fault as much as We dared, no Doubt, and yet have waited patiently, perhaps, for some favourable Opportunity of redressing the Grievances. But when We heard these *Acts of Power* justify'd as *legal* and *constitutional*, and the *Prerogative*, by virtue of which They were done, claim'd as a *Right in the Crown*, We should have taken the Alarm, I presume, as hot as our Predecessors did. Thus, in the Case now before us, *Corruption* may have been practis'd in some Degree, perhaps, at all Times. But then it hath been always kept under by the Shame and Danger, that attended both the *Corrupter* and the *Corrupted*. It hath been always complain'd of, never defended, and Endeavours have been used, from Time to Time, with general Applause, to prevent it. But according to the *Principles*, now avow'd, these Endeavours were unjust; they ought to be repented of; and the Acts made in Consequences of them ought to be repeal'd; for the *constitutional Independency of the Crown* cannot be supported, unless the *Crown* have the Right and the Means of taking their Independency from the *other Parts of the Legislature*, by keeping the Members of those Assemblies under a *pecuniary Influence*. Let no Man think

think that the Absurdity and Profligacy of *these Doctrines* secure us against the Effect of them. They may soon grow into Vogue, and be reputed as sacred Truths as any of those Falshoods, that are establish'd by the Systems of *Policy* and *Religion*, in many other Countries. What can be too absurd, or too profligate, for an absurd and profligate, or for a superstitious People?

But if We should apprehend the Effects of *these Doctrines* as little, as We esteem the *Doctors*, who preach them, yet still the Alarm is given by Them, and it would be Stupidity, or somewhat much worse than Stupidity, not to take it. We despise the *Drummers and Trumpeters of an Enemy's Army*; (for I resume the Allusion, that I apply'd in the first of these Discourses;) but when We hear the Noise of their *Drums* and *Trumpets*, we take the Alarm, and conclude the Enemy is near. The *Friends of our Constitution* therefore are in the Right to join Issue upon this Point with the *Enemies of it*, and to fix upon this principal and real Distinction, and Difference, the present Division of *Parties*; since *Parties* We must have; and since *Those*, which subsisted formerly, are quite extinguish'd, notwithstanding all the wicked Endeavours of *some Men*, who can have no Merit but *Party-Merit*, nor Safety but in *Faction*, to revive them. If there was Merit, and surely there was great Merit, in opposing the Assertors of *Prerogative* formerly, when it rose so high as to endanger our *Liberty*; there is great Merit in opposing the Assertors of *Corruption* now, and in exposing the Means, by which *this Expedient* may be improved to the Ruin of our *Constitution*, and therefore of our *Liberty*. Nay, the Merit is greater in some Respects, if *Corruption* be in itself, in its own Nature, and in the present

present Circumstances of the Nation, and Dispositions of the People, more dangerous than *Prerogative* ever was; and if the Means of establishing a Government of arbitrary Will, by *Corruption*, be more likely to prove effectual, than Those of doing it by *Prerogative* ever were. That it should ever become harder to save our Country from the Effects of *Corruption*, than it was to defeat the Efforts of *Prerogative*, God forbid. — On the whole Matter, a *Dissertation upon Parties* could not wind itself up more properly, We think, than by shewing that the *British Constitution of Government* deserves, above all others, the constant Attention, and Care to maintain it, of the *People*, who are so happy as to live under it; that it may be weaken'd for want of Attention, which is a Degree of Danger; but that it cannot be destroy'd, unless the *Peers* and the *Commons* (That is, the *whole Body of the People*) unite to destroy it, which is a Degree of Madness, and such a monstrous Iniquity, as nothing but *confirm'd* and *universal Corruption* can produce; that since the Time, when all our Dangers from *Prerogative* ceased, *new Dangers to this Constitution*, more silent and less observed, are arisen; and, finally, that as nothing can be more ridiculous than to preserve the nominal Division of *Whig* and *Tory Parties*, which subsisted before the *Revolution*, when the Difference of *Principles*, that could alone make the Distinction real, exists no longer; so nothing can be more reasonable than to admit the nominal Division of *Constitutionists* and *Anti-constitutionists*, or of a *Court* and a *Country Party*, at this Time, when an avow'd Difference of *Principles* makes this Distinction real. That this Distinction is real cannot be denied, as long as there are Men amongst us, who argue for,
and

and who promote even a *corrupt Dependency of the Members of the two Houses of Parliament on the Crown*; and Others, who maintain that *such a Dependency of the Members takes away the constitutional Independency of the two Houses*, and that, *this Independency lost, our Constitution is a dead Letter*, and We shall be only in a worse Condition by preserving the *Forms of it*.

To reduce therefore our present Parties to *this single Division*, our present Disputes to *this single Contest*, and to fix our principal Attention on *this Object of Danger*, too long and too much neglected, hath been and is the sole Design of these Discourses. The Design may have been insufficiently executed; but it is honest; but it is of the last Importance; and whatever the *Enemies of our Constitution*, who call Themselves the *Friends of the Government*, may say, to amuse and impose on the weak, ignorant, and trifling Part of Mankind, the Importance of it will be felt every Day, and every Hour, more and more, till it be felt by every Man in *Britain*. Let us hope, and endeavour by all possible Means, that it may not be felt too late; and to encourage the *Constitutionists*, or *Country Party*, in this Attempt, let us consider from whom an Opposition to it is to be expected. — Shall it be expected then from *Those*, who have pass'd under the Denomination of *TORIES*? Certainly not. They feel as much as any Men in *Britain* the Preference, that ought to be given to that System of Government, which was establish'd by the *Revolution*, and in which They took so great a Share, and shew Themselves as ready to render that *great Work*, which was left and still continues imperfect, compleat. — Shall this Opposition be expected from the *DISSENTERS*? It cannot be. Shall *They*, who pretend to *greater Purity*

Purity than Others, become the Advocates of *Corruption*? Shall *They* contribute their Endeavours to to undermine the *best Constitution of Government* They can hope to enjoy, unless They hope to rise on the Ruins of it, and to form *another* on *their own Model*? As *religious Sects*, They deserve Indulgence, and They have it; but They are too wise not to see that, as a *Faction in the State*, They would deserve none.——In Fine, shall this Opposition be expected from *Those*, who have been call'd WHIGS? That too is impossible. Their Predecessors asserted the *Independency of Parliaments*, and struggled hard against *Corruption*, in former Reigns. When the rest of Mankind embrace the *same Principles*, and pursue the *same Ends*, shall They renounce *one*, and run counter to the *other*? Shall *They* own Themselves against ONE Method of *destroying our Constitution*, but for ANOTHER? Against making KINGS *independent on PARLIAMENTS* by PREROGATIVE, but for making PARLIAMENTS *dependent on KINGS* by CORRUPTION? Shall *They* give the *Enemies of the Revolution* a plausible Pretence to say that nothing more was meant by *Them* at least than a *Change of Government*, in which They hoped to find their *particular and Party Account*? This would be to cast *black and odious Colours on the Revolution*, indeed; more *black*, and more *odious* than any, that it was in the Power of a * *vain, forward, turbulent Preacher* to cast, by his frothy Declamations. But the *Whigs* are so far from opposing the Endeavours to preserve our *Constitution*, that They co-operate to promote the Success of them; and that however *personal Prejudices, personal Partialities, and old Habits*, that are daily wearing off, may be still entertain'd

* *Dr. Sacheverel*

by some amongst Them, all the *independent Men*, who pass under that Name, unite in the common Cause of *Liberty* and their *Country*.——It remains therefore that no NATIONAL PARTY can be form'd in Opposition to *Those*, who endeavour to secure the *Independency of Parliaments* against the *new Influence of the Crown*, and against *Corruption*; nor any Strength be exerted, except That of a *Faction*, compos'd of the *Refuse of all Parties*, glean'd up by *One*, who hath none for Him.——I would willingly carry This farther; and, in doing so, I shall not advance a Paradox, unless it be supposed, which I think would be a greater Paradox, that a Man may have Abilities to destroy the *Constitution*, and yet not Sense enough to see his *remote*, as well as *immediate*, his *family*, as well as *personal Interest*. I say then that if a Design of raising the *Power of the Crown* above any Pitch of *Prerogative*, and of reducing *Parliaments* to an *absolute Dependency*, as well as a *Faction* to support this Design, be form'd; the very Man, who forms *such a Design*, and *such a Faction*, must be infatuated, if He can wish very sincerely his own Success. His *first Design*, We are sure, will be That of raising a *great Family*, and heaping upon it *Riches* and *Honours*. Shall his *second Design* be That of rendering *these Riches* and *Honours* precarious and insecure, and of entailing Servitude on his *own Race*; for it will be impossible to exempt Them from the common Calamity? Nothing but *Despair*, (That is, *Fear* void of *Hope*,) arising from a *Consciousness of Guilt*, can drive any Man into such a Design. But, in this Case, there will be *Fear* oppos'd to *Fear*, and *one of these Fears* may be allay'd by *Hope*. The *Fear of being call'd to a severe Account* may be mitigated by the *Hope of escaping*. Where is the *insolent, rapacious, odious Minister*, that may not entertain
some

some Hope, as well as Fear, when He sets before his Eyes the Examples of Those, who have gone before Him? *Pallas* was the Favourite of *Agrippina*. He govern'd like the *Master of the Empire*, and supported her Pride and Ambition by his Counsels and Services, as He had been raised to Power, and was maintain'd in it, by her Credit, whilst her Credit lasted. * *Nero* dismiss'd Him; and, seeing Him go from Court with a Croud at his Heels, said pleasantly enough, as if it had been spoken of a *Dictator*, that He went to *abdicate*. But *Pallas* carried off the Spoils of the Empire with Him; all Scores were quitted between Him and the Publick; and, according to the Bargain He had made, He was call'd to no Account. Many such Examples might be cited to comfort with Hope the *most guilty Minister*, who is wise, if not honest enough, to stop in the Career of Iniquity, before the Measure of it be intirely fill'd, pres'd down, and running over. But if one of those *Bubbles of Fortune*, who thinks He always shall escape, because He always hath escaped, not content to wound a *free Constitution of Government*, should resolve to make it expire under his Administration; the Condition of *such an one*, however He may flatter Himself, or be flatter'd by Others, must be ten Times more wretched and forlorn than the worst of *Those*, to which his Cruelty

* *Nero infensus iis, quibus superbia muliebris innitebatur, demovet Pallantem Curâ Rerum, quis à Claudio impositus, velut Arbitrum Regni agebat; ferebaturque, digrediente Eo, magnâ Prosequentium Multitudine, non absurdè dixisse, ire Pallantem ut ejuraret. Sanè pepigerat Pallas, ne cujus Facti in præteritum interrogaretur, paresque Rationes cum Republicâ haberet. Tacit. An. L. 13.*

hath reduced Multitudes — For what? —
 If He succeeds in his sacrilegious Designs, (they are of as deep a Dye, at least) He may hope for Impunity, perhaps, to his grey Hairs, and be suffer'd to languish through the Infirmities of old Age, with an inward Remorse more pungent than any of Them; but He is sure to entail Servitude on his *whole Race*, and indelible Infamy on his Memory. If He fails, He misses of that Impunity, to which He sacrificed his Country; He draws triple Vengeance on his *own Head*; and exposes his *innocent Family* to a thousand Misfortunes, of which it will not be the least (whether He succeeds, or fails) that They descended from *Him*. — But whatever *Ministers* may govern, whatever *Factions* may arise, let the *Friends of Liberty* lay aside the groundless Distinctions, which are employ'd to amuse and betray Them; let Them continue to coalite; let Them hold fast their Integrity, and support with Spirit and Perseverance the Cause of their *Country*, and They will confirm the good, reclaim the bad, vanquish the incorrigible, and make the *British Constitution* triumph, even over CORRUPTION.

I have now gone through the Task I impos'd on Myself, and shall only add these few Words. There was an Engagement taken, in the Beginning of these Discourses, not to flatter. I have kept this Engagement, and have spoken with great Freedom; but I hope with the Justice and Moderation, and Decency, that I intended, of *Persons* and of *Things*. This Freedom intitles Me to expect that no *Parallels*, no *Innuendo's* should be supposed, to carry my Sense farther than I have express'd it. The reasonable Part of Mankind will not disappoint so reasonable an Expectation. But there are a *Set of Creatures*, who have *no Mercy on Paper*,

to

to use an Expression of * *Juvenal*, and who are ready to *answer*, even when They are absolute Strangers to the *Subject*. Unable to follow a Thread of *Fact* and *Argument*, They play with *Words*, and turn and wrest *particular Passages*. They have done mine that Honour, as I am told, and have once or twice seen. They may do the same again, whenever They please, secure from any *Reply*, unless They have Sense enough, or their *Patron* for Them, to take for a *Reply* the Story I am going to tell You, and which You may find related a little differently in one of the *Spectators*. The Story is This.

A certain pragmatistical Fellow, in a certain Village, took it into his Head to write the Names of the *Squire*, of *all his Family*, of the *principal Parish Officers*, and of some of the *notable Members of the Vestry*, in the Margin of the *whole Duty of Man*, over-against every Sin, which He found mention'd in that most excellent Treatise. The Clamour was great, and all the Neighbourhood was in an Up-roar. At last, the *Minister* was call'd in, upon this great Emergency; a pious and prudent Divine, and the same, for aught I know, who was a Member of the *Spectator's Club*. He heard Them with Patience; with so much, that He brought Them to talk one after the other. When He had heard Them, he pronounced that They were all in the wrong; that the *Book* was written against *Sins of all Kinds*, whoever should be guilty of them; but that the *Innocent* would give Occasion to unjust Suspicions by all this Clamour, and that

——— *Stulta est Clementia* ——
 ——— *perituræ parcere Chartæ.*

the *Guilty* would convict Themselves. They took his Advice. The *whole Duty of Man* hath been read ever since, with much Edification, by all the Parishioners. The *Innocent* have been most certainly confirm'd by *Virtue*, and We hope the *Guilty* have been reform'd from *Vice*.

I am, S I R, &c.

F I N I S.



I N D E X.

I N D E X.

A.

- A**bdication (of King *James the 2d.*) what the Revenue amounted to at that Time, p. 221.
 Administration (the *present*) how far the *righteous Conduct* of it hath prevail'd upon the Nation, 3.
 Armies (*standing*) a Remark upon them, in the Reign of *Charles the 2d.* 62.—The Danger of them, 114.

B.

- Bacon (Lord) his Sense of the Statute of *Henry 7th.* concerning a *King de Jure*, and a *King de Facto*, 91.—Of *Allegiance to hereditary Monarchs*, 111.—Two of his Sayings, 210.
 Bigotry; what is its *Nurse*, and its Off-spring, 75.
 Bribe; as prevailing in a *Blunderer*, as in a *Man of Sense*, 1.
 Britain; the Temple of *Liberty*, 141.
 Britons (*antient*) the *Aborigines* of our Island, 141.

C.

- Cappadocians; the only Nation that refused Liberty, when it was offer'd them, 138.
 Castile; the Troubles there caused by the King, and his *covetous Ministers*, 175.
 Charles (the *1st.*, King of *England*) the national Misfortunes of his Reign, 14.—What Revenue he had, and the Influence of it, 228.
 Charles (the *2d.*, King of *England*) how *Popery* prevail'd in his Reign, 21.—The People soon grew dissatisfied under his Government; and the Reasons of it, 26.—How generous the Parliament was to him at first, 27.—His Character and Conduct, 67, 69, 70.—How he managed Parliaments, 123.

Chicvres

- Chievres* (the Minister of *Charles* the 5th. of *Spain*) a fast Friend to that Government, 174.
- Civil-List*; when establish'd, 126.— How it is the Means of Corruption, 227.— To what it is apply'd, 228.
- Glarendon* (Earl of) his honest Conduct at the Restoration, 17.— A farther *Eulogium* on him, 27.
- Clifford* (Lord) the first Corrupter of Parliaments, in the Reign of *Charles* the 2^d, 31.—123.
- Clovis* (King of *Gaul*) how chosen King, 182.
- Coalition* (of Parties) the Blessings of it, 10.— A Cause of the Revolution, 89.
- Commons* (*House* of) must stand in Awe of an honest People, 157.— Their Property superior to That of the *Lords*, 208.— To whom they are accountable for their Conduct, 209.
- Constitution* (*British*) ascertain'd by the Revolution, 96.— How improved by it, 101.— But not perfected, 104.— A Distinction between *Constitution* and *Government*, 108.— When it may be said to fall into Ruin, 116.— Under what Pretence it may be destroy'd, 117.— The *Tree of Liberty*, 147.— Suited to the Genius of the Nation, *ib.*— The Principles of it, as obvious as any Truths, 152.— Not to be lost unless we are *Accomplices*, *ib.*— The Nature of it farther explained, 153.— A conditional Contract between the *Prince* and the *People*, 156.— The Defects of the *Roman Constitution* consider'd, 162.— The Defects of the *French Constitution* consider'd, 180.— And compared to our own, *ib.*— The Preference of our *Constitution* to That of *France* explain'd, 191.— When it is in Danger, 215.
- Corruption*; what is necessary to employ it with Success, 1.— How easily practiced, 2.— By whom begun upon Parliaments, 31.— The most effectual Method to destroy *Liberty*, 116. Who write in Favour of it, 118. How employ'd by King *Charles* the 2^d. 123—217.— The Danger of it, 218.— How increased by the *Civil List*, 227. What contributes to the Progress of it, 234.— The Proneness of the People to it, 236.— The Merit of opposing it, 238.
- Cortes* (*Spanish*) compared to a *British Parliament*, 167.— A *Vote of Credit* fatal to that *Constitution*, 169.
- Credit* (*Vote* of) how granted by the *Spanish Cortes*, 169.
- Crown*; the Source of Honour, 151.— Hath no Right to intermeddle in electing *Commoners*, 157.— Formerly used to bear the Expence of the State, 222.— What Power it hath to corrupt, 226.— And opprefs, 230, 232.
- Cunning*; necessary to divide a People, 2.
- D.
- Devil*; who resembles him, 68.— By whom imitated, 217.
- Dissenters*

Dissenters (Protestant) their present happy Condition, 6. —
 What is their Interest and Duty, at this Time, 8. — Their
 Conduct at the *Restoration*, 17. — Made the Tools of the
Papists, 21, 78.
Dividing; what is necessary to succeed in it, 2.
Divisions (political) analysed, 105.

E.

Elections (of Members of Parliament) how influenced in the
 Reign of King *Charles the 2d.* — The *Right of the People*
 to frequent *Elections* consider'd, 121, — 156.
England (Church of) her present Moderation towards *Dissenters*,
 6. — Her Conduct at the *Restoration*, 19.
Error; the Instability of it, 35. —
Exclusion (Bill of) by what defeated, 41, — 71.
Experience; necessary to divide a People, 2.

F.

France; the Defects in the Constitution of *that Kingdom* con-
 sider'd, 180. — How that Nation ever honour'd her Nobil-
 ity, 184. — Their Liberty destroy'd, 198.
Fraud; necessary to carry on a *Division of Parties*, 2.
Funds (publick) what Mischiefs they occasion, 231.

G.

Government; a Distinction between *That and Constitution*, 108.
 — What is call'd a *bad* or a *tyrannical Government*, 109. —
 The Difference between *free and arbitrary Governments*,
 133. —

H.

Henry (the 1st, King of England) how he covenanted to maintain
 his Subjects in their *antient Rights*, 143.
Henry (the 7th, King of England) some Remarks on the Statute
 in his Reign, concerning a *King de Jure*, and a *King de Facto*,
 90.

I.

James (the 1st, King of England) the chief Author of all our
Party Divisions, 14. — Some Remarks on the Statute in his
 Reign, concerning *hereditary Right*, 97.
James (the 2d, King of England) his Character and Conduct,
 74, 75. — Some Remarks on his *Abdication*, 82.

K.

Kings (of Britain) what they are, 103. — Held their Authority,
 in the Beginning of the 5th Century, from the *People*, 142. —
Bad ones must stand in Awe of an *honest Parliament*, 157. —
 Nothing more than *supreme Magistrates*, 170. — A *Popular*

one will always be *absolute*, 206.— Are *Stewards for the Publick*, 223.

L.

Lauderdale (Duke of) some Account of his Conduct in *Scotland*, 57.

Liberty; when it is in the utmost Peril, 112.— The *Essentials* of it, 125.— Refused by *one Nation*, when it was offer'd them, 138.— Designs against it carried on in almost every Reign, 144.

— Not to be taken away, unless the *People* become profligate and corrupt, 146.— Who are *Enemies* to it, 148.—

Not to be lost, unless the *Constitution* is lost, 152.— Why the *Roman Liberty* is dated from the Expulsion of *Tarquin*, 139. 162.

Lords; are only *Commoners*, with *Coronets* upon their Arms, 208.

Luxury, the Effects of it 234.

M.

Machiavel; one of his Observations upon Government, 219.

Ministers; their Method of *corrupting* and *dividing* the People, 2.

An *Eulogium* on our *present Ministers*, 45.— A short Character of a *weak* and *profligate Minister*, 64.— An Instance of a *bad Minister* in *France* being hang'd for imposing a *general*

Excise, 189.

Monarchy (*absolute*) could never be establish'd in *Britain*, 143.

Monmouth (Duke of) aspires to the Crown, 56.—

N.

Non-Resistance; renounced on both Sides at the *Revolution*, 81.—

O.

Obedience (*passive*) renounced on both Sides at the *Revolution*, 81.—

P.

Parliaments of *England*) an Apology for the *Pensioner-Parliament*, 29, 37.— For what Reasons it was dissolved, 49.—

How the *Elections* of *Members of Parliament* were influenced, in the Reign of *Charles the 2d*, 62.— The *Corruption* of *Parliament* the most effectual Method to destroy *Liberty*, 116.—

The *Right* of the *People* to frequent *Elections* of *Parliament* asserted, 121.— How managed by King *Charles the 2d*, 123.

The Care, which *Parliaments* have taken to secure the *Freedom* of *Elections*, 156.— *Corrupt ones* stand in Awe of an honest

People, 157.— Reflections on the *Property* and *Power* of the *three Estates*, that compose our *Parliaments*, 195.—

Parliaments (of *France*) never gave the *People* any Share in the Government of that Kingdom, 186, 187.

Parties;

Parties; (Whig and Tory) on what Principles united, 5. — In what a *Country Party* properly consists, 43. — How it was dissolved in the Reign of King *Charles the 2d.* 55. — Revived at the *Revolution*, 79. — Divided again into the nominal Parties of *Whig and Tory*, 87. — The several Parties of those Times analysed, 89. — How they have changed and are totally alter'd, 93. — The Parties of the present Times, 105. — A *Country Party* not dangerous to the *Constitution*, 123.

Peers (House of) constitute a *middle Order* of *Parliament*, 158. — Are properly *Mediators* between the *other Two*, 177. — Will have great *Credit* with the *People*, when they assist the *Commons* to restore *Frugality*, and correct *Male Administration*, *ib.*

People; their Right to the *free Election* of their *Representatives*, 136.—156.

Plot (Popish) some Account of the Prosecutions upon it, 39.

Plot (Protestant) some Remarks upon it, 60. —

Prerogative; the Power of it, 224. — The Merit of opposing it, when our *Liberty* is in *Danger* from it, 238.

Pretenders; how far they are a Security to the *Constitution*, 115.

Princes; when They have the *Power* of commencing *Tyrants*, 103.

Q.

Quo Warranto; some Account of the Proceedings upon it, in the Reign of *Charles the 2d.* 63.

R.

Recognition (the Act of) some Remarks upon it, 96.

Restoration (of King *Charles the 2d.*) the Prejudices of the *People* at that Time, 16. — They soon grow dissatisfied with the *Court*; and the Causes of it, 26.

Revenue (publick) the great Alteration made in it since the *Revolution*, 127. — What it amounted to in the Reign of *James the 2d.* 221.

Revolution; a new Magna Charta, 9. — The Design of it, 79.

— Some Account of the Settlement made upon it, 81, 85, 98. — The End of it not yet compleated, 104, 114. —

The Design of it, 124. — What Spirit ought to have been shewn at that Time, 219. — A *Renewal* of our *Constitution*, *ib.*

Romans; some Account of their *Elections*, 219.

Richard (the 2d, King of *England*) how he influenced the *Elections* and *Proceedings* of *Parliaments*, 122.

Right (hereditary) asserted after the *Revolution*, 81. The Absurdity of it, 90. — Farther explain'd, 96.

S

Seduction; necessary to maintain *Divisions* of *Parties*, 2.

Southampton

Southampton (Earl of) his honest Conduct at the *Restoration*, 17.—
A farther *Eulogium* on him, 27.

T.

Tories; what Ideas were associated to the Idea of *that Party*, 4.—
The Idea of a *Tory* inconsistent with That of a *Whig*, *ib.*—The
Principles of the *Tories* changed, *ib.*—A short History of *Torism*
12.—The Birth of it, 37.—Misrepresented by their
Enemies, 53.—Their Jealousies of the *Whigs*, on Account
of the Duke of *Monmouth*, 56.—The worst Part of their
Conduct, 64.—When *that Party* really expired, 74.—
—Join'd in the *Revolution*, 79.—Had no longer any Pretence of
fearing the Designs of the *Whigs*, 86.—Give the *Whigs* an
Advantage over them, 93.
Tyrant; how he resembles the *Devil*, 68.—When Princes
have the Power of becoming *Tyrants*, 103.

U.

Union (*national*) said to be impracticable, 5.—Opposed by *some*
Persons, *ib.*—What Advances have been made towards it, 6.

W.

Walpole (Sir R.) A Dedication to him, iii.—The Reason of de-
dicating this *Dissertation upon Parties* to him, viii.
Whigs, what Ideas were associated to the Idea of *that Party*, 4.—
The Idea of a *Whig* inconsistent with That of a *Tory*, *ib.*—A
short History of *Whiggism*, 12.—The Birth of it, 37.—The
wrong Conduct of the *Whig Party* in the Reign of *Charles the*
2d. 46.—Misrepresented by their Enemies, 53.—The worst
Part of their Conduct, 65.—When *that Party* really expired,
74.—Reform'd their Conduct at the *Revolution*, 79—86.—
Old Reproaches renew'd against them, 93.
Wittena-Gemote; like our *Parliament* at this Time, 143.

Y.

York (Duke of) how the *Exclusion* of him was projected, and in
what Manner carried on, 41.—What secured the Crown to
him, 61, 71.



