

head was broad, especially behind, with a remarkably flat occiput, a part which in the long-headed race was remarkably prominent.

The long-headed race appears to have affinities with the south, and the round-headed with the north; the latter approach in type of skull to that of the people of the stone age, who buried in the barrows of Denmark, and may have been allied to the Laps. But the question is too wide for this discourse.

The Wold people have been spoken of as living before the Roman conquest; but this view has been opposed by some, especially by Mr. Thomas Wright, who place them at a time when the Romans had left Britain. But from Cæsar and other sources we learn that the offensive arms of the Britons at the time of the Roman invasion were made of iron. Yet no trace of this metal has been found in the Wold barrows. And neither in these, nor in those of the same class in other parts of England, has any article showing the least trace of Roman influence been found. All their weapons, implements, &c., are as different as possible from corresponding ones of Roman manufacture, both in shape, material, and workmanship. Is it possible that several centuries of the imperial rule could have had no influence in this respect? For the Wolds were in the vicinity of flourishing Roman towns.

We can, however, come to only an approximate date for these barrows. But taking all the circumstances into consideration, we cannot place them later than a hundred years before Cæsar's landing, and probably the greater part of them belong to a time very much earlier, when bronze, though known, was scarce. More extended researches will enable us to come to a more certain conclusion. In the meantime it is safer not to lay down any specific date, but to say, what we can with confidence do, that they belong to a time which ends a century or two before the occupation of Britain by the Romans.

[W. G.]

WEEKLY EVENING MEETING,

Friday, March 15, 1867.

SIR HENRY HOLLAND, Bart. M.D. D.C.L. F.R.S., President,
in the Chair.

EDWARD BURNET TYLOR, Esq.

On Traces of the Early Mental Condition of Man.

If an antiquary is asked his opinion as to the early condition of mankind, he will probably take up the question with reference to an excellent test of man's civilization, the quality of the tools and weapons

he uses. He will show how, within our own knowledge, the use of metal instruments has succeeded the use of sharpened stones, or shells, or bones; how the stone axes and arrow-heads found buried in the ground prove that in every great district of the world a Stone Age has prevailed at some more or less remote period; and lastly, how recent geological researches have displayed to us the traces of a Stone Age extraordinarily low and rude in character, and belonging to a time as extraordinarily remote in antiquity. The history of man, as thus told by a study of the implements he has used, is the history of an upward development, not indeed a gradual steady progress of each family or tribe, but a general succession of higher processes to lower ones.

Now there also exists evidence, by means of which it is possible still to trace, in the history of man's mental condition, an upward progress, a succession of higher intellectual processes and opinions to lower ones. This movement has accompanied his progress in the material arts during a long but undefined period of his life upon the earth; and of this evidence, and of the lines of argument that may be drawn through it, the object of the present discourse is to give a few illustrative examples.

I. In the first place, the *art of counting* may be examined from this point of view. We ourselves learnt to count when we were children, by the aid of a series of words, *one, two, three, four*, and so on, which we were taught to associate with certain numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, and can thus reckon up to the largest imaginable number, and down to the smallest imaginable fraction. But if we look round among other tribes of men we find a very different state of things. As we go lower in the scale of civilization, it becomes easier and easier to puzzle a man with the counting of 20 objects, or even of 10, and to drive him to the use of nature's counting-machine, his fingers. When we reach the low level of the savages of the Brazilian forests or of Australia, we find people to whom 3 or 4 are large numbers. One tribe, described by Mr. Oldfield, reckoned *one, two*, and then *bool-tha*, "many;" but when their poor word-language fails them they fall back on gesture-reckoning. Mr. Oldfield tells us, for instance, how he got from a native the number of men killed in a certain fight. The man began to think over the names, taking a finger for each, and thus after many unsuccessful trials, he at last brought out the result by holding up his hand 3 times, to show that the number was 15.

Now our words *one, two, three, four, &c.*, have no etymology to us, but among a large proportion of the lower races numerals have a meaning; as among many tribes of North and South America and West Africa are found such expressions as, for 5, "a whole hand," and for 6, "one to the other hand," 10, "both hands," and 11, "one to the foot;" 20, "one Indian," and 21, "one to the hands of the other Indian;" or for 11, "foot 1," for 12, "foot 2;" for 20, "a person is finished;" whilst among the miserable natives of Van Diemen's Land, the reckoning of a single hand, *viz.* 5, is called *puganna*, "a man."

For displaying to us the picture of the savage counting on his fingers, and being struck with the idea that if he describes in words his gestures of reckoning, these words will become a numeral, perhaps no language approaches the Zulu. Counting on his fingers, he begins always with the little finger of his left hand, and thus reaching 5, he calls it "a whole hand;" for 6, he translates the appropriate gesture, calling it *tatisitupa*, "take the thumb;" while 7, being shown in gesture by the forefinger, and this finger being used to point with, the verb *komba*, "to point," comes to serve as a numeral expression, denoting 7.

Now, though many numerals, especially fives, tens, and twenties were named from the fingers, hands, and feet, this is far from being the only source of numerals. Many centuries ago, the Hindu scholars, besides their regular series, made a new set of words to serve as a sort of *memoria technica* for remembering dates, &c. Thus, for 1 they said "earth" or "moon;" for 2, "eye," or "arm," or "wing;" for 3, "Rama," or "fire," or "quality:"—there being considered to be 3 Ramas, 3 kinds of fire, 3 gunas or qualities; for 4, "age" or "*veda*," because there are 4 ages and 4 vedas. One line of an astronomical formula will show the working of the system:—

vahni tri rtwishu gunendu kritâgnibhûta :

that is to say,

"fire, three, season, arrow, quality, moon, four of dice, fire, element :"

that is : 3 3 6 5 3 1 4 3 5.

When Wilhelm von Humboldt, more than thirty years ago, looked into this artificial system of numeration, it struck him that he had before him a key to the general formation of numerals. When a Malay, he said, calls 5, *lima*, that is, "hand," he is doing the same thing that the Hindu pandits did when they took "wing" as a numeral for 2; and then, he suggested, the numeral words having thus been once made, the sooner their original meaning was got rid of and they were reduced to the appearance of mere unmeaning symbols, the better it would be for their practical use in language. Now a number of actual facts may be brought forward in support of Humboldt's far-sighted suggestion. The Abipones of South America counted to 3, and for 4, said "ostrich-toes," from the division of their ostrich's feet; then for 5, "one-hand;" for 10, "two-hands;" and so on. In Polynesia there is a regular set of decimal numerals, but sometimes, for superstitious reasons, they turn words out of their language for a time, and have to use fresh ones. Thus, in Tahiti, they ejected *rua*, 2, and *rîma*, 5; and in a missionary translation of the Bible we find *piti* and *pae* instead; now *piti*, the new word for 2, means "together," and *pae*, the new word for 5, means "side."

In other South Sea islands, the habit of counting fish or fruit one in each hand has led to *tauna*, "a pair," becoming a numeral equivalent for 2; the habit of tying bread-fruit in knots of 4 has made a new numeral *pono*, "a knot," while other terms for 10 and 100 have had their origin from words meaning "bunch" and "bundle." And so, even in European languages, numeral words break out from time to time,

ready to become proper numbers, should a vacancy be made for them in the now meaningless series *one, two, three, four*. Thus in English we have *pair* or *couple* for 2, and *score*, that is "notch," for 20. The Letts count crabs and little fish by throwing them 3 at a time, and thus the word *mettens*, "a throw," has come to mean 3, and so in many other cases in other languages.

Now when tribes count by saying *hand* for 5, *take the thumb* for 6, *half a man* for 10, and so on, it is evident that the basis of their numeration is finger-counting. But there is also evidence in the systems of numeration of most civilized languages that they, too, are the successors of a rude unspoken system of gesture counting. The rule of the whole world is to count by fives, tens, and twenties; the exceptions are so late or so incidental that we may neglect them and say that the original counting of mankind is the quinary, the decimal, or the vigesimal system, or a combination of these. We need not go abroad for examples. In the Roman numerals, which count to V, and then begin again VI, VII, we have the quinary system. The decimal system is our familiar one. And when we speak of "threescore and ten," "fourscore and thirteen," we are counting by the vigesimal system, each "score" or notch, thus ideally made, standing for 20, for "one man," as a Mexican or Carib would put it. It is a very curious thing that both we and the French, having two good decimal systems of our own, should have run off into vigesimalism. Why should we have ever said "fourscore and thirteen" for the 93, which we have good Saxon tens to express? and why should they say in France, "quatre-vingt-treize," instead of holding to the Latin original of their language, and saying "nonante-trois?" The reason seems to be that counting by scores is a strongly marked Keltic characteristic, found in Welsh, Irish, Gaelic, and Breton, and has been taken up into the alien numeral systems of France and England. At any rate, the rule of the world is to count by fives, tens, and twenties; and the connection of this rule with the practice of counting on the fingers and toes will hardly be disputed. Indeed the remark has often been made that the fact of our having 10 fingers and 10 toes has led us into a system which is actually not the best; while if we had had 6 fingers on each hand, and 6 toes on each foot, we should probably have taken to using, like the carpenter, the more convenient system of duodecimals.

These are examples of the facts which tend to show that man's early way of counting was upon his fingers; as Massieu, the Abbé Sicard's celebrated deaf and dumb pupil, records in describing his recollections of his yet uneducated childhood: "I knew the numbers before my instruction; my fingers had taught me them. I did not know the ciphers. I counted on my fingers." Among the lower races, the use of word-language has only to a small extent encroached upon gesture-language in counting; among races above these, numeral words are more largely used, but preserve evident traces of a growth out of gesture-counting; while among the higher peoples, though language gives little trace of the original signification of numerals,

there still prevails the system of counting by fives, tens, and twenties, of which we can hardly doubt that the norm is given by the arrangement of the fingers and toes. Thus it appears that in the mental history of mankind we may see back to a condition so much lower than our own, that the numerals, which we look upon as so settled a part of speech that we use them as one of the first tests of the common derivation of languages, were still unspoken, and their purpose was served by the ruder, visible signs which belong to the department of gesture.

II. The next argument to be brought forward belongs to a very different province of thought, and touches on the early opinions of mankind as to the *nature and habits of spiritual beings*. It is well known that the lower races of mankind account for the facts and events of the outer world by ascribing a sort of human life and personality to animals, and even to plants, rocks, streams, winds, the sun and stars, and so on through the phenomena of nature. It is also known that a low stratum of the religion of the world consists in belief in, and adoration of, spiritual beings who inhabit the winds and trees and streams, who preside over the ripening of fruits and the falling of rain, give success in war, or inflict disease or misfortune on the savage hunter. Thus the Mintira, a low tribe on the Malayan peninsula, ascribe every ailment that happens to them to a spirit or *hantu*. One causes smallpox, another brings swelling and inflammation in hands and feet, another causes the blood to flow from wounds; indeed, to enumerate all these *hantus* would be to give a list of all their known ailments. The worship of such spirits, found among the lower races over almost the whole world, is commonly known as "fetichism." It is clear that this childlike theory of the animation of all nature lies at the root of what we call Mythology; if the sun and moon are described as semi-human beings, called by the Greeks, Hēlios and Sēlene, by the Esquimaux, Anninga and Malina, this personification is founded on an original opinion still found in lively existence in the world, that the sun and moon are living Anthropomorphic creatures. It would probably add to the clearness of our conception of the state of mind which thus sees in all nature the action of animated life and the presence of innumerable spiritual beings, if we gave it the name of Animism instead of Fetichism. Now by examining a single phase of this Animism, it seems possible to give some idea how generally man in his lowest known state of culture is a wonderfully ignorant, consistent, and natural spiritualist; and also how the effects of his early spiritualism may be traced through the development of more cultured races in proceedings which have often changed their meaning, and lost their original consistency by the encroachment of more real knowledge.

We all know how deep and sincere is the terror of ghosts among savages. It is often no exaggeration to say that they are in more deadly fear of a man after he is dead than while he is alive. The savage's notion of a ghost corresponds very nearly with that of the English peasant in our own day—it is a thin phantom going from

place to place, like the person it belonged to, when it does appear, but often invisible, though capable of knocking and uttering sounds. The notion of the ghost runs almost inextricably into that of the spirit or soul, of the breath and the blood, and of those unsubstantial somethings which follow the man and are like him, his shadow and his reflection in the water. Now it is consistent with this opinion of ghosts to hold that by killing a man you can release his ghost and send it where you will. This is what the king of Dahome does when he sends men day after day to take messages to his father in the land of shadows. The Getæ, according to Herodotus, sent a man every five years to their god Zamolxis, giving him their messages, and then throwing him up and catching him on their spears. Thus in British India, some eighty years ago, it is on record that two Brahmans, believing that a man had taken forty rupees out of their house, took their own mother and cut her head off, that her ghost might torment and pursue to death the offender and his family—the old woman being herself a consenting party to the transaction. This is not an isolated case, but one belonging to a recognized Hindu practice.

In perfect accordance with this opinion we find in almost every country in the world, at some time or other, the practice of slaying men and women at the graves of the dead. In one of the South Sea Islands a cord is put round the wife's neck at her marriage, and when her husband dies it will be tightened, to release her soul, that it may accompany his to the land of shadows, and continue to catch fish and cook yams for him there. The Dyaks of Borneo have a passion for waylaying their enemies and bringing home their heads; as they told Mr. St. John, "the white men read books, we hunt for heads instead." They do this to secure the services of a slave in the next world. These practices are the consistent working out of a spiritualistic theory, which, if crude and false, is at any rate intelligible. To some extent the same may be said, when not only the dead man's wives and slaves but his dogs and horses are killed, and buried or burnt at his grave. The man's ghost is to ride the horse's ghost in the land of shadows, and the dog's ghost will run on before after ghostly game; or, as in Mexico, the dog was to carry the man across the river which lies between the world of the living and the world of the dead; while in Greenland, a dog's head was placed by the grave of a little child, that the soul of the dog, who ever knows his way home, might guide the helpless infant to the land of spirits.

But when not only men and animals but inanimate objects are buried or burnt for the dead, what does this mean? When the hunting tribes of North America provide the dead man with his favourite horse, and at the same time with his bow and arrows; while the fishing tribes bury the dead man in his canoe, with the paddle and the fish-spear ready to his hand, what difference can we discern between the purpose of the animate and of the inanimate offerings, which alike are to serve the spirit of their owner? When the dead chief's wives and his slaves, his horses, his weapons, his clothes and ornaments, are

indiscriminately buried with him ; when food is put in the grave with the dead man and fresh supplies brought every month ; when the little child is provided with its rattle and playthings, and the dead warrior has the ceremonial pipe put in his hand, that he may hold it out as a symbol of peace when he comes to the other world, while a store of paint is buried with him that he may appear decently among his brother warriors ; in these and hundreds of other instances, the spirit of the dead man is to use the spirits alike of men and animals, and of weapons, clothes, and food. Then we should expect savages to be found recognizing the existence of something of the nature of a spirit or ghost belonging to inanimate objects ; and this in fact they do.* The existence of the Fijian opinion is well authenticated, that lifeless objects have spirits, and that the souls of canoes, houses, plants, broken pots, and weapons, may be seen floating down the river of death into the land of souls : and crossing into North America, we find the same idea, not only that souls are like shadows, and that everything is animate in the universe, but that the souls of hatchets, kettles, and such like things, as well as of men and animals, have to pass across the water which lies between their home in this life and the Great Village where the sun sets in the far West. We must not expect the spirits of spears and kettles to have the same distinctness and vitality in savage philosophy as the spirits of men and horses. Inanimate objects want those signs of life that are given to men and animals by the breath, the blood, the independence of voluntary action ; but at any rate they have shadows, as in the New Zealand tale of Te Kanawa, who offered the fairies his neck ornament and ear-rings ; they took the shadows of them, but the substance they left behind. They have also that property, which in the mind of the savage has so much to do with defining the nature of ghosts—their impalpable phantoms can and do appear far away from where their real substance is, in the dreams and hallucinations, which savages look on as real events. When we meet with notions of apparitions among more civilized people, it seems that they hold a theory inherited from the full Animism of the lower races, but much damaged in its consistency by the interference of a better knowledge of facts. When the ghost of Hamlet's father appeared, he "wore his beaver up." What beaver? To a European believer in ghosts, it would seem foolish to talk of the ghost of a helmet ; but to a North American Indian it is quite reasonable that a helmet should have a ghost as well as the warrior who puts it on his ghostly head. The opinion of the European ghost-seer is no doubt the more scientific, the more affected by knowledge of the facts of nature ; but the broader spiritualism of the savage is more full, more thoroughly consistent, because, as there is much reason to think, it is nearer to its source.

* The speaker mentioned that he had just found in the works of an American writer, Mr. Alger, independent confirmation of the view he had taken of the savage theory of spirits, as including spectres of inanimate as well as of animate objects.

A slight acquaintance with the spiritualism of the savage has sometimes led to its being considered as the result of a degeneration from the opinions of more cultured races; but more complete knowledge of the facts tends to show that such an opinion inverts the real history of events. The way in which the fullest and most consistent theory of ghosts is at home among savage tribes is well shown by the belief that the spirit arrives in the next world, whole or mutilated, according to the condition of the body at death. For instance, there is an Australian tribe who believe that if a man be left unburied, his soul becomes a wandering ghost. If one of their warriors kills his enemy, he is sometimes embarrassed with the difficulty that by so doing he is setting free a hostile ghost to vex his own people, and therefore he resorts to the device of cutting off the dead man's right thumb, so that the ghost can no longer throw his spear, and may be safely left to wander as an evil spirit, malignant but harmless. The history of the very funeral offerings just spoken of shows in the most interesting way the progress of a ceremony from its source in a crude and savage philosophy to its gradual breaking-down into mere formality and symbolism. To the Aryan of the Vedas it was quite reasonable to burn the priestly sacrificial implements with the dead man's body, for his use in the next world; but the modern Hindu lays one thread of woollen yarn on the funeral cake of his father, saying, "May this apparel, made of woollen yarn, be acceptable to thee!" We may learn from Ovid how the offerings of food to the dead, in ruder times a thorough practical savage proceeding, had in his time dwindled to a mere affectionate, sentimental ceremony. Garlands, he says, and some scattered corn and grains of salt, and bread steeped in wine, and violets laid about: with these the shade may be appeased. "Little the manes ask, the pious thought stands instead of the rich gift, for Styx holds no greedy gods."

"Parva petunt manes—pietas pro divite grata est
Munere. Non avidos Styx habet ima deos."

We may see how the early Christians kept up the heathen custom of burying ornaments with the dead, of putting playthings in a child's grave, doing just what a red Indian squaw will do, but doing it with how changed a purpose. The Chinese keeps up the time-honoured custom of providing the dead with clothes and money; but the money that he will palm off on his dead father is a pasteboard coin stamped like a Spanish dollar and covered with silver-leaf; this he will burn, and his father will have the spirit of it to spend in the next world. The same Chinese will yearly spread a feast for the souls of his dead ancestors; he and his friends will wait a decent while for the ghosts to eat the spirits of the food, and then they will fall to themselves. To see the same thing done nearer home, you have only to travel into Brittany, where on the night of the *Fête des Morts* you will find the fire made up and the hearth swept, and the supper left on the table for the souls of the dead to come and take their part. And when we

see a wreath of everlastings laid upon a tomb, or a nosegay of fresh flowers thrown into an open grave, a full knowledge of the history of funeral offerings seems to justify us in believing what we should hardly have guessed without it, that even here we see a relic of the thoughts of the rudest savages who claim a common humanity with us, a funeral offering vastly changed in signification, but nowhere broken in historic sequence.

Lastly. Another subject may be found to throw light upon an early condition of men's minds. We are all agreed that there is a certain mental process called the *association of ideas*. That we are in the habit of connecting in our minds different things which have, in actual fact, no material connection, we all admit as a matter belonging to this association of thoughts or of ideas. Now we have been taught to keep an eye on the action of the association of thoughts, to recognize it as a fallacious process apt to lead us into all manner of unreasonable opinions. But if we descend to a lower range of civilization, we shall find that the mental association which we tolerate as a sort of amiable weakness, and against which we are at any rate forewarned and fore-armed, is the very philosophy of the savage. There is one particularly excellent way of studying the effects of the association of thought. It began to produce, in a time associated with a very low human condition, a set of opinions and practices known as the occult sciences, witchcraft, divination, astrology, and the like. The germs of these imaginary sciences are to be found still lively among the lower races. Their development into elaborate pseudo-scientific systems belongs to a period now beginning to pass away; and we can still study them in their last stage of existence, that in which their remnants have lingered on into a period of higher mental culture, and have become survivals, or, as we call them, "superstitions." In producing the occult sciences, the association of thought works in ways most distinctly recognizable. When the Polynesian weather-maker practises on his sacred stone, wets it when he wants to produce rain, and puts it to the fire to dry when he wants dry weather; and when in Europe water is poured on a stone, or a little girl led about and pails of water poured on her that rain may in like manner be poured down from the sky, we have practices resting on the most evident and direct association of thoughts.

Thus we may see a Zulu busy chewing a bit of wood, and thereby performing an ideal operation, softening the heart of another Zulu with whom he is going to trade cows, that he may get a better bargain out of him. So it is when we find lingering in England a practice belonging thoroughly to the savage sorcerer, that of making an image representing an enemy or part of him, and melting it, drying it up, or wounding it, that the like may happen to the person with whom it is associated. From time to time there is still found hidden about some country farm such a thing as a heart stuck full of pins, the record of some secret story of attempted magic vengeance.

In the ancient and still existing art of astrology, we see the same early delusive association of ideas producing results so perfectly intel-

ligible to us, that it is really difficult for educated people to have patience to study its details. An astrologer will tell us how the planet Jupiter is connected with persons of a bold, hearty, jovial temperament; and how the planet Venus has to do with love and marriage; while to us the whole basis of this theory lies in the accident of the names of certain gods having been given to certain stars, which are therefore supposed to have the attributes of these gods. The wonder is not that much of the magician's sham science is inexplicable to us, but that the origin of so many of its details is still evident.

[An extract from Zadkiel's almanac was here read, with the object of showing the principle on which the astrologer's deductions are still made, the movements of the heavenly bodies being simply taken to symbolize human action, virtue and good fortune being connected with the aspects of the Sun and Jupiter (sunny and jovial influences), &c., the working of the early childlike principle of the association of ideas being thus traceable through the occult sciences from their rise among savages to their decay among educated men.]

By the study of facts like those of which a scanty selection has here been brought forward, it seems possible to look back to an early condition of our race much more nearly corresponding with that of existing savages than with that of the civilized nations even of very ancient times. We seem to have before us the traces of a state of language so low that words for counting had not yet arisen in it, but mere gesture-language served their purpose. It is not meant to imply that we have evidence of a state of pure gesture-language anterior to any spoken language: we do not seem to have such evidence, and even among the lower animals we find, in a rudimentary form, expression by action and by voice going on together. In the working of the minds of these early tribes, we trace a childlike condition of thought in which there is a wonderful absence of definition between past and future, between fact and imagination, between last night's dream and to-day's waking. Out of this state of mind we find arising all over the world a consistent, intense, and all-pervading spiritualism to form a basis upon which higher intellectual stages have been reared. In this low and early mental state there reigns supreme the faculty of association of thoughts. Out of this, when unchecked by experience, arise those delusions of sorcery which pervade and embitter the whole life of the savage, and carry a stream of folly far on into the culture of the higher races. But through age after age there has gone on a slow process of natural selection, ever tending to thrust aside what is worthless, and to favour what is strong and sound. Wilhelm von Humboldt, already once quoted, may serve us again by laying down in few words one of the great generalizations of our intellectual history. "Man," he says, "ever seeks the connection, even of external phenomena, first in the realm of thought; . . . his first endeavour is to rule nature from the idea outward."

Now if the result of inquiries like the present were to bring out

mere abstract truth, barren of all practical importance—this would perhaps be the last place where it would be needful to apologize for the want. But it is to be noticed that they do happen to have this practical importance. There are certain studies which have entered upon a thoroughly scientific stage, and ask no aid from ethnographic research; they care nothing for the crude theories of earlier times, but go directly to their own observed facts by which they must stand or fall. But there are other studies, of not less importance to us than Astronomy or Chemistry, which are in a very different state. In such especially as relate to man, the operations of his mind, his relations to the rest of the universe, the past and future condition of his race, his ethical and political rights and duties—in all these complex and difficult problems we find established side by side sources of opinion of very different value. Some opinions come to us authorized by the best of evidence, and when put to the test of reason and experience the trial proves their soundness. Others again, though founded on some crude theory of less educated times, have been so altered in their scope and meaning by the lessons of experience, as to be on the whole the best known representatives of facts, and by this not unsatisfactory title they hold their ground. Others, lastly, may arise out of opinions belonging to a low stage of culture, and maintain their place, not because they are proved to be true or useful, but simply because they have been inherited from long past generations. Now it is one duty of ethnographic research to follow up these lines of thought, to mark out, among existing opinions, which are old notions kept up in a modified condition to answer a more modern purpose; in what cases a growing knowledge goes about with the remains of the old philosophy which once clothed it, now hanging in strips and tatters about its back; in what case opinions belonging to a low and early mental state survive into the midst of a higher culture, pretending to be knowledge, and being really superstition. Thus the study of the lower races has a work to do in facilitating the intellectual progress of the higher, by clearing the ground, and leaving the way open for the induction of general laws and their correction by the systematic observation of facts, to the results of which method alone we may fitly give the name of Science.

[E. B. T.]