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SOCIETY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS

DELIVERED IN THE THEATRE OF THE SOCIETY OF ARTS, NOVEMBER 8, 1876,

AT THE

FIRST GENERAL MEETING OF THE SOCIETY.

BY F. BARHAM ZINCKE,

VICAR OF WHERSTEAD

AND CHAPLAIN IN ORDINARY TO THE QUEEN.

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INAUGURAL ADDRESS

DELIVERED AT THEIR FIRST GENERAL MEETING TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

Can there be a science of education? This is a question with which, we may be sure, the announcement of the existence of our Society will be met. I would answer it by a reference to the history of the word "science." There was a time when people supposed that they had knowledge on every subject, but when what we understand by the word "science" had no place in their minds; and of course they then had no word for a thought or fact which then had no existence. The so-called knowledge of those days in every matter consisted largely of guesses, more or less plausible, and of traditions and practices, sometimes more or less reasonable, sometimes more or less unreasonable. As time went on, in some departments of observation and inquiry these traditions and guesses, the old knowledge, gradually came to be superseded by accurate, verifiable, comprehensive, systematic knowledge; and this, the new and true knowledge of the subject, had to be distinguished from the old knowledge, now seen very largely not to be knowledge at all, and so it was called—the only way of distinguishing it—by a new name; and that new name was Science. This process has for some centuries been spreading, and for every department of observation and inquiry to which it has reached, it has given, or is giving, us a science. And now it has reached so many departments that people have begun to believe that it will reach to every department. That is to say, that in everything science will supersede the old guesses and traditions; or, in other words, that in everything we shall have,

in the place of the old so-called knowledge of guesses and traditions, accurate, verifiable, comprehensive, systematic knowledge —that it will be so in everything, and that, therefore, education will not be an exception. There will then be a science of education. Not only is this possible, but it is inevitable. So much for the preliminary doubt suggested by the title of our Society.

One more introductory remark. It is obvious that what the educator has to work *upon* are the intellectual and moral capacities of man. And it is almost equally obvious that what he has to work *for* is the right furnishing, the strengthening, and the training of those capacities. More difficulty arises when we go a step further, and ask what he has to work *with*, that is, the means that are available for so improving those capacities. When we shall have come to this part of our subject we shall have to show not only what are the means now available, but also the insufficiency of the means still being used by our existing educational system. It will also be necessary in this part of our inquiry to show how the means we now have for doing our work are to be applied, that is to say, by what apparatus or machinery of institutions and teachers. The details of methods and of practice would not be suitable for this our first general meeting.

The settlement of the above-named points will give us a general view of our work; and, if with respect to them our conclusions shall be grounded on sufficiently complete and duly verified data, so far they will be scientific. When that shall have been done will have come the time for working out the details, such as they have been set forth in our programme. Each of these will have, as far as possible, to be settled scientifically; that is, by, in each case, a complete knowledge, as far as it can be attained, of all the elements of the inquiry. All these details, and all that their solution depends on, will not soon be mastered, nor by one mind. For this will be required the long-continued, patient, and earnest work of many minds. And we trust that our Association will bring together such a body of workers.

I.—The Aim of Education.

And now I will enter at once on our great subject. The starting point for its consideration must of course be a distinct conception of the aim of the educator: what he has to work for. I suppose that we at least are all agreed that his aim is moral as well as intellectual; for intelligence, whether in the individual or the community, will often prove worse than useless without morality, and morality is impossible without intelligence. We will say, then, that our object is, theoretically, to make all, women as well as men, what in these days it is required they should be, morally as well as intellectually.

I introduce the limitation of what in these days it is required that men and women should be, in order that we may be reminded at once that we are precluded from considering this part of our subject absolutely. Because, judging from the past, and we have nothing else to judge from, we find that man's moral and intellectual condition has ever been progressive, just as has been knowledge, the means the educator has to work with for securing the condition at any time possible; and no one supposes that the advances in knowledge that have been made in our time have brought into view, any more than the advances of other times ever did, a limit of perfection beyond which further advances will be impossible. Our aim, then, must be considered relatively; it is what is wanted morally and intellectually in these days. Presently we shall have to insist on the same fact with respect to our means; for it is the knowledge we have attained to now, not the knowledge men had attained to at some past epoch, which correlates our educational requirements and possibilities.

These elements of relativity have ever inhered in the aim of the educator. We can now see clearly that what at each past period was sought was never absolute perfection, either intellectual or moral, but what the knowledge, and social conditions of the day, rendered conceivable and possible. For instance, the

most advanced peoples of the old world, from the narrowness of their horizons, from arrogance of race, from the institution of slavery, and from their very imperfect conceptions of morality—the only conceptions then possible—were, as we now see, tied down to corresponding aims and achievements. So also at this moment with the modern world: its ideas and aims are limited by the imperfections both of its social conditions and of its knowledge; the former being very conspicuous in our enormous social inequalities, and the latter not being confined to the deficiencies of our knowledge of external matters, but extending also in a very great degree to misapprehensions, and gaps in our knowledge, of the faculties and operations of the mind itself: which must, we may suppose, issue in somewhat of intellectual incapacity, and in some moral misconceptions. Perhaps we may even say of ourselves, that we are at this moment as far from the ability to divine the moral and intellectual condition of our descendants as the people of Central Africa may now be of comprehending our own actual moral and intellectual condition, because what has at any time been thought on these subjects never has been, and never could have been, anything but a reflection of existing knowledge and of existing conditions of society.

It would, perhaps, make this still more clear if we were to endeavour to summarize all that we can imagine of the moral and intellectual perfection education may be supposed capable of producing. Certainly the imagination could go no further than the suggestion of a man in whom the intellectual faculties had been trained to do respectively their work well on their proper materials, and whose moral nature had been trained to work in conformity with the authentic requirements of morality. But surely nothing could be more unsuccessful than such an attempt to attain to absoluteness and definitiveness, for every term in the above description contains some unknown quantity, or some element of relativity. It talks about the intellectual faculties, but does not define any one of them, and leaves the whole debate

about them still open. It talks about the materials on which they have to work, but these we know are ever increasing in quantity, and improving in quality, as the boundaries of knowledge are enlarged, and its particulars verified. It talks of the authentic requirements of morality; but the conceptions of those who preceded us were, as respects these requirements, always advancing. So are ours. And so, probably, will ever be those of our descendants.

In considering then the aims of education we cannot, even with the aid of theory, and of the imagination, escape from the region of the relative into that of the absolute. As those who went before us did, and as those who will come after us will do, we must work with the means of the day for the purposes of the day. The very terms in which we must state our aim are dependent for their value on contemporary knowledge and on the contemporary conditions of society. This will come out still more clearly as we proceed in our inquiry. It will, however, be worth while to notice here, that that amount of intellectual and moral improvement which, if the contemporary state of knowledge only be considered, is realizable at any time, has hitherto always been rendered impossible of attainment for the majority of every community by the existing conditions of society. In no foregoing epoch of the world's history has any attempt anywhere been made to bring within the reach of the whole of the community as much moral and intellectual improvement as was at the time possible. The institutions, indeed, of caste and of slavery directly aimed at preventing this; and at the present moment only in the United States of America, and perhaps in some two or three European States, could the attempt to impart to all what is now intellectually and morally attainable be conceived as possible.

To glance at our own past history: in the last, and in all foregoing centuries, nothing could have been more revolutionary than such an attempt. It would have inevitably overturned society as then constituted amongst ourselves. It is not long

since we used to hear of the rabble, the vulgar herd, the many-headed monster, the swinish multitude. All expressions, however, of this kind have now become anachronisms. The reason for their use, so long as they were used, was that the existence of society, as then constituted, depended on the lower classes, that is to say, the great majority of the community, being a rabble and a swinish multitude, just as in an earlier stage it had depended on their being slaves. And, therefore, it was that the State did nothing, and could have done nothing, to raise them out of that condition. Now, however, its existence depends on their not being a swinish rabble; and, therefore, it is endeavouring to make education universal and compulsory. This single fact is of itself sufficient to make us understand not only that society has entered on a new phase, but that its ideas and aims vary in accordance with its varying conditions. What in all former times would have been its certain overthrow is now its foremost hope of salvation. At all events we can, and indeed are now obliged to, work for the far wider dissemination of a far higher ideal of education than was ever dreamt of before.

This fact, and its reasons, are obvious enough. What, however, is not so obvious is why, under the existing conditions of knowledge and of society only very half-hearted, faltering, and ill-conceived attempts have for some time back been made to develope thoroughly, or even effectually, the moral and intellectual capacities of the well-to-do, and of the governing classes. That, with respect to them, our educational system has been falling short of what might, and ought to, have been its high aims, could not have resulted from fear of evil consequences to the political constitution of society. Those classes could not have been rendered dangerous by over-education; a strange word invented to give expression to the apprehended consequence—till very lately the danger would have been real enough—of educating at all the great body of the people. These shortcomings would lead us to suppose that even our higher education has hitherto had some particular by-aims, which were not in the

proper sense of the word educational; and such, when, in the course of our inquiry, we come to look into our present system, we shall, I think, find has been the case.

II.—Intellectual Culture.

I must be brief; and so I proceed at once to our second point, the means we have for effecting our object. And here I would begin by insisting on the fact, that our object being what we have just stated it to be, the perfecting of man, as far as this can be done, for society as it now exists, the means available for effecting this purpose are far more extensive than those comprised even in the fully understood and rightly directed efforts of schools and universities. There are other means, which, to say the least of them, are as indispensable, as universally required, and as efficient, as the instruction which may be given in schools and colleges. To take an instance or two. One such means is political liberty; that is, the bestowal on every member of the community, who is not disqualified by crime, ignorance, or pauperism, for the proper exercise of such rights, the same political rights we claim for ourselves. All that we say and believe about the value of the parliamentary franchise, of municipal government, and of local institutions of all kinds, shows that to be possessed of these rights, and to exercise them, is a great educative force; and to be deprived of them is to be deprived of what would have greatly contributed throughout the community to the improvement of its members—of course, not of every individual, which, however, is only what must be said of all the means at our disposal, but possibly of the majority. This, however, if attained would place society in a state of safety. Here, then, we have a potent educational means that belongs to the *political* order.

Another widely and deeply efficient means, quite distinct from the instruction that may be given in schools and colleges, is found in the *economical* order. This may also be said emphatically to belong to the order of nature. It is the most widely felt, the most universal, the most powerful in its action, the most self-

acting of all educative influences, the one which has been acting from the infancy of society up to this moment. It is the pursuit, the attainment, and the management of property. And no kind of property is so attractive, or exerts on the generality of mankind so much educative power, as that in land. The pursuit, the attainment, and the management of property lead straight to, unfailingly engender in all classes industry, self-denial, thrift, self-dependence, foresight, while the prohibition of its pursuit and attainment unfailingly extinguish, or prevent, the formation of these virtues. To see this we have only to compare our own poor-law-taught lackland agricultural labourers with a peasant proprietary.

Speaking of mankind generally, the highest motive for toil and self-denial is the acquisition of a home, or the improvement of one already possessed. This is, on a wide view, the only adequate motive for toiling and saving, which imply incessant self-denial, under circumstances where, as in the case of our agricultural labourers, the margin for self-indulgence is, at the best, very small. But, speaking broadly, this large class amongst ourselves, from John o' Groat's house to the Land's End, can never, under our existing land system, hope to possess any other property than a scanty supply of poor clothes, and a still scantier supply of still poorer furniture. They can never hope to form a home; for in that class there can be no home, if the house does not belong to the family. That is not a home out of which the family, at the bidding of the wants, or plans, or caprices of others, may be ejected at any moment. The whole, therefore, of the education which results from the pursuit and management of property, and from the possessing a home, or the saving in order to possess it, has been denied to this large and important part of the community, and we are all aware of the degraded condition to which it has reduced them. This will be enough to remind us that here, in the economical order, we have another mighty educative force, which may be allowed to act, or the action of which may be suppressed,

I will not dwell at all on the educative power of public opinion. It will be enough to see that it is very different now in 1876 from what it was in 1776, and that it was very different then from what it had been in 1676, or in 1576, and so on backwards. Nor will I dwell on the educative power of religious ideas; it will be enough to see that their effect is different in every country of Christian Europe, and of the world. Nor on the educative power of literature: of that it is enough to see that it is mighty, and that it is increasing year by year, and can never be diminished. What, however, has now been said will suffice to show that there are many means of education, of which some are completely within our control, and the rest more or less so—many besides that particular one to which the word education is popularly confined, that is to say, besides the instruction given in schools and universities. I think it worth while to point out this fact, because it is quite impossible that we should ever rightly understand what we want, or what we ought to be doing, or why we ought to be doing it, unless the whole subject is thus included in our view. We cannot understand the whole of anything, unless we understand the parts; nor can we understand any part, unless we see its bearing upon, and relation to, the other parts, which together constitute the whole. School education must be helpful to, and in harmony with, the education of the times, and with that of the political and economical condition of the people; nor ought they on their side to contradict it.

In this view it is unfortunate that the word education has been restricted in popular usage to what is taught in schools and universities. This is only one of the means of education. I would prefer to call this schooling, which would save us from a false and mischievous assumption, and at the same time be more distinctive of the thing intended. But I am quite aware that no individual can alter the meaning of a single word, or issue an ukase for the substitution of another in its place. Such alterations and substitutions can only be brought about by a general change in men's ideas, which is a work of time, and a result of progress in knowledge.

We are, then, now arrived at what appears to the popular apprehension as the only means that need be inquired into. I acknowledge that it is the one which, having first ascertained its proper place, which is what we have just made some reference to, the members of our Society ought to work out most carefully. But this, which is what we are about to do, ought always to be done with the hope that the other means will be insisted on by others, and with the determination that they shall never be lost sight of by ourselves. We have now come to the means employed for our great object by schools and universities. We are not considering what in these establishments boys and young men may learn from one another. It is not for this that schools and universities exist, and that masters, and tutors, and professors have been appointed. What they learn from each other may be of advantage, but whatever it amounts to it is only an incidental advantage. The reason that calls schools and universities into existence is, evidently, that they may impart knowledge. Their work is to impart knowledge; and the intellectual and moral effects of knowledge, we say this without forgetting its economic and material advantages, are what give to it its highest value. This being the ground we take, we shall have to make out distinctly what in this connexion we mean by knowledge; and how it, and nothing but it, enables the intellectual and moral capacities to do such work, as in these days is for the advantage of the individual and of the community. In the remaining part, then, of this address I propose to consider, as far as the time at our disposal will allow, the means and methods of intellectual and of moral education separately, taking the former first. In thought, and to some degree in practice, they are separable, though not in man's nature. For, as we have said already, the highest issue of intelligence is morality, and morality can have no existence without intelligence. We, however, must here speak of them separately, and we will begin with the education of the intelligence.

The point, then, in our inquiry we have now reached obliges us to consider what knowledge is. What is knowledge? Of course the question is not about what you or I know, or still less

about what was known one thousand, or two thousand years ago, but about what mankind now knows, that is to say, about existing knowledge. This way, however, of looking for an answer to our question cannot be attempted here, because it would require an enumeration of all the particular departments of knowledge, accompanied with some estimate of what had been achieved in each. Such a synopsis would fill a goodly volume, and could not on such an occasion as now calls us together be attempted even in the most summary fashion. There is, however, another way in which we may be enabled, if not to answer our question, yet at least to get a not altogether inadequate view of what must be the answer to it, and that is by recalling what is the field of knowledge. Where do we find what we have come to know? The field of knowledge is all the phenomena of nature and of man. Everything in nature and in man that we are capable of observing and noting. That is the field. And there is no other field. And it is now held as demonstrable, or at least as an axiomatic truth, that all these phenomena are manifestations of an all-embracing unity, of a harmoniously working whole, which, therefore, we call the Cosmos. This is the exclusive field of knowledge; and our actual knowledge is all the accurate, verifiable conceptions mankind have attained to about the phenomena of this Cosmos. What the phenomena are, as far as that can be ascertained by observation; what forces are at work in them, as far as that can be ascertained; what are their antecedents, and what their consequences, as far as they can be ascertained; what is the place of each in the general scheme, as far as that can be ascertained. The ascertainment of these particulars with respect to the phenomena of the field of knowledge is knowledge. Nothing else can be knowledge, and we can have knowledge from no other field. The ultimate intellectual achievement of knowledge will be the power of reproducing in the mind, or reconstructing intellectually from verifiable materials, the Cosmos, of course including the phenomena of human activity. How much of this can now be done is the measure of existing

knowledge. The additional materials for this purpose man may collect in the future constitute his prospective knowledge. Such is all the knowledge he now has, and such must be all the knowledge he ever will have. Whether, like Humboldt, we make the remotest observable nebula our point of departure, and from it work through nature up to man; or whether, like Comte, we start from the least complex of phenomena, and, ascending through the scale of ever increasing complexity, at last find that we have reached the limits of the observation and of complexity alike in the phenomena of human society, we shall deal with no particle of knowledge that is not from our field; and the place of every particle in our mental reconstruction of the whole will be evident.

Such, then, is knowledge; and knowledge is the means schools have for effecting their special purpose. What attitude, then, ought they to assume towards the knowledge I have been setting before you, genuine, authentic, comprehensive knowledge? What is now before us is not a question of detail—the time for the consideration of details has not yet come—it is the broad question of the line we are to travel along to reach, of the general means we are to use to secure, our great aim. In endeavouring to find the reply to this question we ought not to allow ourselves to be repelled from an idea merely because it is new. As was said long ago, our most venerable, and most venerated ideas, were each in its turn once new; and so will it be with the ideas, which, though not yet formulated, will be venerated by our remote descendants. Nor let us turn away from a prospect we are invited to contemplate, because it is more extensive than we have been accustomed to. And, too, let us bear in mind, while seeking for the answer to the question before us, that knowledge, like that of which it is the verified intellectual reflection, is one grand harmonious whole. No one who has felt, and somewhat understood, the unity and harmony of all phenomena, will ever be capable of tolerating the idea of thinking of them disconnectedly. To him knowledge will always appear as much one as that of which it is the intellectual reflection.

I return then again to the question before us. Knowledge is the means by which schools and universities do their work; what relation then has this connected, comprehensive, verified knowledge, this true knowledge, and which alone is knowledge, what relation has it to the intellectual work of schools and universities? I reply that from the nature of the case, from the very nature of things, the question is answered by being asked. There is, properly, nothing else to teach. To our apprehension there can be no other knowledge.

It often happens that we can only think and speak by the aid of metaphors. This is always misleading to those, who, not being aware of the nature of the words they are using, are not on their guard against being misled by them. With the caution this recollection should awaken we may speak of the mind of man as a wonderfully capacious many-chambered structure. Of all the constructions of nature the most wonderful, if in no other respect, yet at all events in this, that it is capable of finding space and place within itself for the whole of all the realms of nature. The immeasurableness and infinity of nature do not transcend the capacity of the human mind. There is in it a chamber for everything in nature. It is commensurable with nature. Nature formed the chambers but she does not furnish them. That man must do himself. Ideas are the furniture of these chambers, which may be left unfurnished; or furnished with wrong ideas, or with true ideas. And the three states may be combined in endless degrees and variations. We can to some extent make out how far they have been left unfurnished, or furnished with wrong ideas, and what beginnings and what progress have been made towards their being rightly furnished, respectively in the savage, in our agricultural labourer, and in those amongst us who are most truly cultivated. The fully furnished mind will be that in which every chamber has received the ideas for the reception of which it was formed. And when this has been accomplished the intellectual result will be that there will exist in that mind the orderly and harmonious *ensemble*

of nature, inclusive of that which crowns the whole, is the issue of the whole, the varied and supreme phenomena of human activity. Such as nature is in herself will she be intellectually in ideas in the chambers of that mind. This I think throws some light on the question before us, that is what schools ought to teach. They will make what approaches they can towards the completeness of nature. Of course I am now speaking with an entire abstraction of the facts that schools will vary in the amount of what they teach in accordance with the amount of time available for instruction, and that particular callings will require special instruction, and again that minds vary endlessly in their powers and aptitudes. At present I am only thinking in its simplest expression, and without any special modifications, of the work schools and universities have to do. That work I suppose is to impart knowledge; and ideally complete knowledge, I suppose, is what I have been describing it, the definite, comprehensive, harmonious view of external nature, and of nature manifested in man.

Large ideas do not burst suddenly on the world as lightning would out of a clear sky. Rather, like wide views, they are reached by long and difficult ascents, to which men's steps have been for a long time leading up, but of which some anticipatory glimpses have been at times caught by a few minds possessed of the broad sympathies of deep insight. So has it been with the idea we have been speaking about, and which now at length begins to be seen pretty clearly. It has not come upon us altogether unanticipated. To go a long way back: Solomon assuredly had no conception of an harmonious whole or of science, but throughout the East the fame of his wisdom has survived three thousand years of changes and overthrows, perhaps because in the traditional account of him he was represented as having endeavoured to understand both nature and man; of course taking these words in the sense which throughout all that period would have been attributed to them in that part of the world. At all events he wrote, for so runs the tradition, of

plants, from the hyssop that grows out of the wall to the cedar of Libanus, and he wrote of birds, and of beasts, and of creeping things, and of fishes. And his study of the moral phenomena of human life, as they were exhibited in the rude society of his day, issued in his 3,000 proverbs, and his imaginative faculty in response to his sympathy with human emotion bore the fruit of 1,005 songs. This is the earliest instance the annals of mankind supply of what might with some truth be called a four-square mind, though in this instance it must have been rather its disposition to look than its power of looking far in all directions that arrested attention. Our next instance is "the mighty Stagirite, whose piercing eyes looked all nature through." His mind was thoroughly scientific. It could not but apply to everything analysis and synthesis. Its very constitution did, as it were, oblige it to take to pieces ideas and things and to put them together scientifically. His thought could rest on no other basis. But the unity of knowledge, the direct result of the unity and harmony of the Cosmos itself, the field of knowledge, was not formatively present to his mind. There were too many gaps in the knowledge of his time for that. We cannot, however, doubt that his great influence through so many centuries arose very much out of the wide-ranging character of his mind and work. They were for his day, and for many a day afterwards, all embracing. Bacon, the next great name in this small class, was the first to see distinctly and to announce unhesitatingly the positive natural unity of all knowledge. And, as far as the conditions of his life allowed, he devoted himself to physical and moral investigations with equal interest. At last, in our own time, Humboldt attempted a sketch of the intellectual construction of the Cosmos. The picture, however, (may one venture to say?) is not perfect or well-proportioned, being for the most part more of a history than of a picture, and presenting man rather as an investigator and discoverer than as himself the occupant of the first place in nature. I have brought together these four names because they laid hold of the great idea (the

last two so consciously and firmly that it became the governing idea of their intellectual life) which is now establishing itself generally in the minds of the cultured and thoughtful, that human knowledge, so far as it goes, possesses the unity which belongs to that which it apprehends and mentally reconstructs and reflects.

We aim at being most thoroughly practical. Of course, in everything there can be no practice that is so safe and so fruitful, in a word so practical, as that which is founded on comprehensive and verifiable—that is on scientific—knowledge. And so will it be found in education. Practice of any kind, just in proportion as it rests on any other foundation, must be defective, barren, mischievous, obstructive; that is to say, unpractical. Knowledge, then, being the natural, indeed the only, means for the intellectual perfecting of man, there can be nothing more practical in the highest and best sense of the word than to take care that the knowledge used for this purpose be, as far as possible, the comprehensive, verifiable knowledge we have been speaking of. Nor can I suppose that, because we have to provide for what society requires under its existing conditions, we, therefore, may be content with something less comprehensive and less verifiable.

This comprehensive, then, and verifiable knowledge is what it must become the business of schools and universities to teach. No sooner, however, is this statement presented to us than we are confronted by the fact that the community is composed of classes that are circumstanced very differently. We have wealthy classes who have time enough, without any unavoidable distractions, for any scheme of study that may in itself be best; and we have large professional classes who can devote much time to such studies, but with the necessary deduction of preparing for their professional work; and we have still larger trading classes, who can do less for such studies, because with them the employments of life must be entered on even earlier than by the professional classes, and when once entered on are

found more engrossing; and then we have the working classes, larger than all the preceding put together, and among them the time for instruction is reduced to a manifestly insufficient minimum; and when this short time is ended they are, for the rest of their days, engaged in one uninterrupted struggle for the necessaries of life. Bearing then in mind these facts, we must consider whether, under such conditions, our view of what we have to aim at, and our estimate of the means we must use for attaining to it, are of any workable value. For instance, to take the extremest case, which is that of the greater part of the community, can we, as far as they are concerned, attempt anything of the kind I have indicated, with the view of at all preparing them for the wants of existing society? I think we can. My reason for thinking so is that this is what we now profess to attempt for them, and for all other classes amongst us, by our existing schools; and, if we now think it worth our while to attempt it by our present methods, why should we despair of attaining any good effect—I would say a much better effect—by better, because truer and more natural, methods?

III.—Existing Schools: Their Aims and Methods.

Having now propounded what I believe to be for these days the true and the natural instrument for intellectual culture, I shall next have to show by what apparatus of schools and teachers it may be employed for the purpose of fitting men and women for the work they in these days have to do. One great obstacle, however, stands in our way, that is the theory and practice of our existing schools. I must, therefore, here turn aside for a few minutes to show in what way they are at discord with our object, and with the right use of our instrument.

Very little reflection will show us that the popular idea of education, from our national universities down to the humblest village school, is singularly homogeneous, and, as might have

been expected where there is so much endowment, rigidly traditional. It is, speaking broadly, from top to bottom, some form or other—attempts having been made to adapt it to the circumstances of the different classes amongst us—of the idea, such as it was engendered at the revival of learning, of the Grammar School. That idea was the inevitable product of those times.

As we are all aware, the genuine and authentic name of the schools in which the educated classes amongst us are brought up is Grammar schools. This, their historical and true name, rightly describes their object. They were, and are, all alike Grammar schools. Some of them have endeavoured to get rid of this name by calling themselves Public schools. This is a strange misnomer, for it would imply that they were schools supported by public funds for the general public. This is very far from what they are. They were intended to be, and are, and never have been anything but, Grammar schools. And here it is not unimportant that we should now remember how this fact came about. Recall the dates at which they were founded: Winchester, 1386; Eton, 1440; Shrewsbury, 1551; Rugby, 1561; Harrow, 1571. The dates of these five best known foundations will give us a sufficiently approximate idea of the dates of the hundreds of other similar foundations throughout the country. There will always be anticipations of any great change that is coming over men's minds, or of any great fact that is about to establish itself in the main currents of human affairs; and so some of these schools antedate the actual revival of learning and the actual reformation: the twin causes that, speaking of the schools generally, called them into existence. I mention together these two events, the results of two great simultaneously-felt wants, because they were in fact and in their nature inseparably connected. In truth, they were but two aspects of the same general event. But, be that as it may, learning had to be revived, and religion had to be reformed; and neither could be done without Grammar schools. And, to make the necessity for the Grammar school universal, the old religion itself could not

have argumentatively resisted the reformation without the aid of Grammar schools. They supplied it with its only intellectual weapon, which was indispensable, for it would not have done to have rested everything without disguise on the dictum of authority supported by brute force. This latter means, its great mainstay, of course it did not neglect, but it could not afford to neglect altogether some show of argument, and as that had to be based on the learning of the day, and on reference to the Scriptures and the Fathers of the Church, it also required the Grammar school. The whole work, therefore, of those times, whether we regard it as the revival of learning, or as the reform, or as the defence without reform, of the mediæval Church, rested on Grammar schools. We have plenty of evidence not only in the necessity of the case, and in the actual establishment of these schools, but also in the expressed and recorded statements of opinion of the leaders of thought in those days, that this was the origin of our Grammar schools. Luther said that "true theology was nothing else than the knowledge of Grammar." Melancthon said that "Scripture cannot be understood theologically, unless it has first been understood grammatically." Scaliger said that "the only source of religious divisions is ignorance of Grammar." Bishop Oldham says in the Statutes of the Manchester Grammar School that "Grammar is the ground and foundation of all other arts and sciences; the gate by which all others have been learned and known." And so we might go on to any extent. To revive learning, then contained in two dead languages, and to assail, or to defend, the Church system of the day, which could only be done by an acquaintance with these two same dead languages, were the work of those times. The work, then, of those times necessitated Grammar schools. Without them in this work not a step could be taken, not an idea could be formed, not a word could be spoken. Hence it was that people became enthusiastic about their establishment, and that their establishment became universal. They covered the land as the waters cover the sea. There was no suspicion that the time would ever come either

when the world would want anything else, or when there would be anything else to teach.

Now, it arises out of all this that the system was in the main an ecclesiastical system, established and worked for ecclesiastical purposes—that there might never be wanting an adequate supply of adequately learned men to serve and maintain their respective Churches. The whole system bore this impress from the first, for it was cast in this mould; and it bears it to this hour, for the mould has never been broken. It was an ecclesiastical system, devised for ecclesiastical purposes. This is not seen more distinctly in the common parish schools of Scotland, which made the Scotch a nation of theologians down to the humblest peasant, than it is seen in our English Grammar schools and universities. The hard practical character of the Scotch people has not, even at this day, been able to get rid of the first impress on its schools, and their teaching. And our still-maintained English idea, that none but ministers of religion can properly be teachers of youth, and the difficulty, not yet removed, of getting anything taught in our schools but Grammar, are the logical results of the original fact—I may say of the original sin which still works within the heart of the system.

But we shall not form a right idea of our Grammar schools, if we content ourselves with the fact that they were primarily, and essentially, and predominantly ecclesiastical schools. Something more has to be said about them. They soon came to have another secondary object. And this secondary object, in obedience to the logic of events, has now come to be their most important object, but is still, as respect both what they teach and what they do not teach, kept in subordination to the original idea that they are ecclesiastical Grammar schools. This secondary object is the education of such of the laity as are obliged to make use of them. This proportion of their pupils, in consequence of our recent unexampled growth in wealth and population, now very far outnumbers those who are being trained for the ecclesiastical life. Indeed in many of these schools the latter element

has been reduced to a comparatively small minority. But such is the force of habit, of tradition, of *vis inertiæ*, of want of thought, when supported by endowment, that the wants of the great majority of those who use these schools have not yet had power to force on a reconstruction of the old system, so as to make it face in another direction. One cause of this immobility, a cause without which it never could have been maintained, is the result of a very curious fact. These ecclesiastical Grammar schools, although established mainly by ecclesiastics and maintained for ecclesiastical purposes, although this was the main reason of their existence, never had anything to teach except the literature of the two great nations of heathen antiquity. These Christian schools have always busied themselves about the teaching of the thoughts and sentiments of pure and undiluted paganism. The instructors in this have been Christian ministers. And this has been the culture of Christian ministers themselves. Historically it could not have been otherwise, because Greek and Latin had to be taught for theological purposes; and, having to be taught, it would have been idiotcy, especially at the time of the revival of learning, to have restricted instruction to the Fathers of the Church, and the Greek Scriptures. The originators of the system, therefore, were obliged to teach the old literature. And it was most fortunate that they were obliged to do so; not only because it enlarged and liberalised the minds of such a clergy as came to understand the old literature, but also because, and that is the point now before us, it rendered the system capable of including the laity. It was because in these schools the clergy were taught Latin and Greek, not by the study of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church and of the Greek Scriptures, but by the study of the literature of the old pagan world, that the schools were in a manner adapted for the education of the laity as well as of the clergy. And it is this that has not only largely saved our national clergy from narrowness and bigotry, a happy result with which, however, we here have nothing to do, but which has also given to these schools, which

is the point before us, their vitality, and enabled them, of course with the mighty aid of endowment, to exist down to the present day little changed. It was because they educated laity as well as clergy. And they educated laity as well as clergy, because, though their objects were predominantly ecclesiastical, their instruments were exclusively pagan.

It will throw some additional light on the meaning and purpose of Grammar schools, if we trace back their history beyond the revival of learning and the middle ages. An analogous necessity had existed for their establishment at a far earlier day. The old Romans, in consequence of their felt and acknowledged inferiority to the Greeks in every department of literature and of intellectual culture, had found themselves obliged to study Greek. Here was the same reason brought to bear on them with respect to Greek as was brought to bear at the revival of learning on our forefathers with respect to Latin and Greek. It was to them the means of culture. They had, therefore, to learn it just as we have to learn French. And so education with them meant, very much as it has meant with us, the acquisition of a strange tongue, and an acquaintance with its literature. This may have been necessary with them. The effect, however, as we can see, was far from being unmixedly good. To copy, to imitate, to have a prescribed model, is antagonistic to, and destructive of, originality. The imitator can very rarely come up to his model, perhaps never, for he feels and acknowledges that the model is his superior. This is depressing and deadening. In the Greeks we see the opposite effects of the opposite practice. They had no occasion for schools of this kind. Their schools were schools of philosophy, of science, of technical excellence, of native literature. Their idea of a school it would be well for us to study. To them the idea that education consisted in learning two foreign languages, and even in becoming acquainted with their literature, would have appeared unintelligibly narrow. How could this make a good citizen? How a perfect man? How could it enable one

to advance knowledge? Or to do anything except what had already been done better?

Ladies and Gentlemen, I think I shall not be very wrong in the supposition that in what I have hitherto been saying, especially in what I have been saying lately, your thoughts have been mainly busied with our universities and Grammar schools. With myself, however, it has not been so. I have had present to my mind, throughout, the education of all classes, and of both sexes. I have been thinking of the education of the peasant as well as of the peer, and of women as well as of men. The human mind is essentially the same in all classes and in both sexes. What are the moral and intellectual wants of one class are essentially the wants of all, and what of one sex essentially of both. On this supposition, therefore, no scheme of education can be true and natural which is not equally applicable to all. This I hold to be the one conclusive test of its being the true and the natural scheme. Now tried by this test our existing system is conspicuously untrue and unnatural. It is manifestly unfitted for women, and for the vast majority of men. Its ecclesiastical aims, and its pagan instrument, cannot in any way be adapted to the wants of the middle classes, or of the lower classes, or of women. We all know that the education of the middle classes is in this country a signal failure. We can hardly say that they have any education at all. If my views be at all right the reason is as plain as the fact. We have nothing to offer them but a very diluted form of our grammar school instruction; a little Latin, reduced to such a minimum that it shall take up very little time, and be of no conceivable use; some arithmetic; a few geographical names; and the pretence of a modern language. The grammar school idea, which is in possession of our minds, is the origin of our thoughts, or of our want of thought, on this subject. But those who offer such an education to the middle classes cannot attempt to work out their idea with firmness and courage, because common sense is all the while telling them that they are offering a lamentable mistake and a mischievous

absurdity. And common sense tells the middle classes themselves, that, notwithstanding all that is said about our so-called public schools and universities, what is offered to them *is* a mistake and an absurdity. And so it comes about that we have not yet got so much as a workable theory of what a middle school ought to be.

So also with the schools we have provided for the working classes. Knowledge is the instrument schools have to use for their contribution towards the intellectual perfecting of man, as far as that can be done, for the wants of society, as it now exists. We are spending yearly millions of pounds, drawn from different sources, on the schools of this class; and passing yearly hundreds of thousands of children through them. But of these hundreds of thousands of children, costing millions of pounds, not one necessarily obtains a particle of knowledge in the sense we have been using the word. Taking the whole kingdom, the present gigantic and costly system requires one certificated teacher, aided by one and a half assistant teachers, to bring one child yearly up to the sixth standard. You are dealing yearly with millions of pounds, expended on teaching, and with millions of children under teaching; and this is the result. An astounding result! but infinitely more astounding, when we come to understand what it really means. This sixth, this highest standard, means a certain proficiency in reading, writing, and cyphering. But, in all seriousness, what are reading, writing, and cyphering? Reading and writing are not knowledge. Let us understand why they are not, that we may be sure of the ground we are taking. They are merely artificial extensions through the eye and hand of the natural faculties of hearing and speaking. Reading, as it were, enables us to hear what people at a distance, or who are even dead, say to us; and writing enables us to address people who are at a distance, and to continue to do this, even when we ourselves are dead. The kind of help that the telescope is to the eye, enabling it to penetrate inconceivably remote space, that reading is to the mind, an extension of what the limited natural

power of hearing could previously alone do for it. And writing is the same to speech. They are marvellous mighty extensions, but still only extensions, of two of the faculties nature has given us. They are not knowledge. There are no other such helps in storing up, in transmitting, and in acquiring knowledge, but they are not knowledge. The elements of knowledge are ideas. And much the same may be said of arithmetic. It is an aid to the mind in certain operations, it is not knowledge. All this is plain enough, and we may see a demonstration of it in the case of one of these highest standard boys, who has become, let us say, a clerk in a railway office. He is all day long employed in reading, writing, and cyphering, that is, in making out the directions of parcels, in making entries of them, and in drawing out bills. But is there one idea, one particle of knowledge, in all this? What he does is merely mechanical. It is no more than the use of an artificial substitute for hearing and speaking, with the addition of a little cyphering. Common sense is beginning to make the public, who have to pay for these schools, suspicious that they are paying too much merely for qualifying children for places that require reading, writing, and cyphering. They are beginning to think that they ought to secure by their outlay some higher intellectual, and some good substantial moral, effects. This suspicion, like so many other things just at present, is in the air. More or less articulate expression is being given to it severally, in accordance with their respective views, by secularists, men of science, theologians, and statesmen. At all events we see that it has reached the Vice-President of the Educational Committee of the Privy Council, that is to say our Minister of Education. And what is the effect it has had upon him? The very proper and legitimate effect of making him determined to do something. What, then, is it that he does? Exactly what we might have anticipated that he would do. He issues an order that these children are to be taught---you can supply the word—Grammar. The field of knowledge is co-extensive with the field of nature, including man. Man cannot be

otherwise than always in contact with it. In every act, and at every moment, of his life he is dependent on its laws, including those of his own being. To know and to obey these laws is power, well-being, wealth, health, intelligence, morality, life. To be ignorant of them, to disobey them, or neglect them, is weakness, ill-being, poverty, disease, intellectual distortion, immorality, death. But there is no question about any of this knowledge being imparted to these millions of supremely ignorant children. Grammar is what they are to be taught. Of the Geography that is mentioned with it I approve as far as it goes. But as to the Grammar, how much of this can be taught to plough-boys? And, if it be possible to teach them a little of it, of what use can that be to them? What then can be the motive of the order? I believe that the only reason is that the Vice-President was himself brought up under the ecclesiastical system we have just been looking at. Really these things are almost enough sometimes to suggest the wish that the world had still heard as little of Grammar as the Royal Psalmist, or the author, or authors, of the Iliad and Odyssey, ever did.

But notwithstanding all this, or, indeed, rather in consequence of the truth of all this, for what has now been done must eventually issue in what we want, I hold that Mr. Forster's Elementary School Act was as wise, as beneficent, and as necessary an Act as the British Parliament ever passed; and that the work it has enabled Sir Charles Reed and his colleagues to do in London, and which is in some sort being done all over the country, is the greatest achievement of our times.

Just the same difficulties beset the public mind on the subject of the education of women. In this moiety of our inquiry—for the education of women is just as much a part of our inquiry as that of men—nothing is more conspicuous than the absence of true principles, and of those master ideas that should guide us to a right conception of our work. Here again, as with respect to middle-class education, for some time the question has been whether women should not be taught Latin. If Latin, why not

Greek? Or for what reason in heaven or earth either? There can be no reason for teaching them Latin, except that we have no other conception of education than that embodied in our Grammar schools. But then they give an ecclesiastical education, and why should we give an ecclesiastical education to women? There is no more reason for our attempting to teach women Latin than there is for attempting to teach plough-boys Grammar. They are both alike suggestions of our ecclesiastical system. Or will any one in his right mind say that the moral effect of an acquaintance with a great part of the old heathen literature is good? It was by its authors never meant for women. And besides, the heathen themselves, who could not be particularly squeamish on these points, thought that the moral effects of much of it was so bad that it ought to be kept from young men. Quinctilian, to take one instance, says this expressly of much of the literature of Greece, of some parts of Horace, and of the elegiac poets. We all know that there cannot be in literature anything more foul and corrupting than much of what he is referring to contains.

I do not say this with any covert wish to get rid of, or in any way to disparage, the study of the old literature. What we learn from it we could not get elsewhere, and with this it is of the highest moment that some of us should be acquainted. It shows what was a very important part of the road along which our branch of the race travelled on its way to the point it has now reached. It shows how the mind of man, such as it is now, was to a very great extent furnished. It tells us what were man's feelings, fortunes, thoughts, and acts while growing to be what he now is. It is a vast enlargement of our experience in many directions. It shows how much that we are deficient in was conspicuously present in the ancients; and how this excellence was reached, and what it rested on. It shows in what respects we are superior to them, and why. This literature is not merely the echo of a dead world. It is no such thing. It is a vast enlargement of our experience of a living world. This, however, is not a reason for pretending to teach it to all of us, but it is a

good reason for teaching it well to those whose work in life requires such knowledge—bearing in mind, however, at the time that it is only a part, and not the whole, of knowledge. The field of knowledge is co-extensive with that of nature, including man, the crown and bloom of nature. The literature, therefore, of a past epoch, however good, and this that we are considering is not unmixedly good, and however interesting, must not be regarded as a substitute for all knowledge, still less as if it really were all knowledge.

IV.—A Proposal for Middle Colleges.

And now we pass on to another stage in our inquiry—What I would suggest as a first step in the attempt to remedy the insufficiencies of our present system. If we should be brought to believe that the science of education imperatively requires the enlargement I was some time back setting before you of the field of instruction, it devolves on us to show by what apparatus of schools and teachers this proposed enlargement may be effected. Upon the right conception of what this enlargement requires I believe depends the future of education.

Once more recall for a moment our present educational practice. As things now are we have no distinctly enounced aims; no distinctly apprehended principles; and consequently no intelligently applied methods. All that we think, and all that we do, throughout our educational system, from the top to the bottom, are more or less suggestions of, or deductions from, the ecclesiastical aims and ideas that have come down to us from the middle ages, and the time of the revival of classical learning. This is not seen clearly by most of us, but what is felt pretty distinctly by most of us is that the system is inconducive to the supply of our present wants, and that it takes little or no account of our present means. Both of our Archbishops in the earlier part of the year said something to this effect; and, as they have said it, I suppose there is no harm in our referring to it, and in

our believing it. My proposal then is, that we of this day take just the same estimate of our existing wants as the founders of our now antiquated system did of the wants of their day; and that we make just the same use of the means of our day as they did of the means of their day. They established a grammatical system to meet the ecclesiastical wants of their time. There were then no other means, either for training ecclesiastics, the great want of those times, or for reviving classical learning, the only other intellectual want of those times. *Mutatis mutandis*, let us do the same. There is nothing else for us to do, unless we choose to maintain, under totally different circumstances, a system established for a particular and very limited purpose we have now quite outgrown. Let us establish what would be the natural system of these days, to supply the wants of the time, which are the wants of all classes, and of both sexes. The new problem is only the old one expanded from one class, or rather from one profession, to the whole of a community of 32,000,000 souls; and, as respects the means, from one old branch, now somewhat dry and withered, to all the strong, and vigorous, and spreading branches, of the tree of knowledge.

The mischievous effects of the old ideas are at this moment manifesting themselves in every grade of schools in this country. In our elementary schools they are seen in the absence of the attempt to impart knowledge, and in the recent order for teaching grammar. In middle schools in almost prohibiting their existence, certainly in prohibiting their having any rational aims, or any rational methods. Much the same have been their effects on girl schools. In our grammar schools they bind us down to making that our almost exclusive object, which can never be attained to any useful extent by one pupil in twenty, and which will make the very idea of study and mental effort through life revolting to the great majority of those subjected to it. And in our universities the same system, though now tottering to its fall, is still to a great extent blocking the way. Consider, then, what would be the effect on all these schools of

substituting for the grammatico-ecclesiastical system the natural system of attempting to teach what we can of what we now know, for the purpose of meeting our present wants. Of course this could only be taught in different degrees in different schools, but the attempt to carry out the principle would at once give to all our schools, to those for the poor and to those for the rich, for boys and for girls, a complete unity. They would all have before them in their respective degrees the same object. Every school would be helpful to every other school; every student would sympathize with every other student. And what is more the whole community would be interested in the schools, which is impossible now, the reverse only being possible now with respect to schools which embody only dead ecclesiastical ideas and corresponding dead practices. Who can now really care whether Eton is teaching Latin and Greek as well as it might? or what our girl schools or middle schools are doing? or whether the certificated teachers of the kingdom turn out their own number yearly of sixth standard children, or twice that number? or whether it is 1,000 or twice that number who yearly attain to the degree of Bachelor of Arts? The absence of personal interest in what ought to concern us all so deeply can only arise from the fact that the studies of all these places of education have but little bearing on the wants, the ideas, the work, and the knowledge of the day. No one can take any real and intelligent interest in them. That is alone a demonstration that there is some great mistake in their aims and practice. It proves that they are antiquated, not very useful, anachronous, obstructive, non-natural. If they were the reverse of all this, plenty of interest would be taken in them. I lay great stress on what I am advocating being the natural system, by which I mean, not that it aims at all exclusively or preponderantly at what is understood by natural science, but that it is the system which would aim in a natural way at meeting the wants, and would use in a natura way the knowledge, of the times.

The most promising part of the educational field for the in-

troduction of the natural system would be that which at present is most neglected and in the most hopeless condition, that is to say, the part of it which should be supplying schools for the boys and girls of the middle classes in our large towns. Here there are fewer obstructions in the way of the edifice that ought to be erected than in any other part of the field; and here, though there may not be a distinct perception of our existing wants, there is at all events a pretty distinct perception of the utter inadequacy of existing ideas and practices. This great class understands well enough that our ecclesiastical system is utterly unfit for them. Notwithstanding the misleading effects of social influences, prejudices, and prepossessions, and much ignorance of the whole subject, they see their way to this conclusion. They are, however, quite incapable of organizing schools for themselves. They do not yet see precisely what it is that they want; and if they were to be brought to see it they could not of themselves supply the want. No class can do this alone. Our wealthiest classes have no more done it for themselves in their grammar schools and universities, which are products of endowment, than have our working classes in the elementary schools in which their children are educated. This is a mighty work which requires all the wisdom, and the united efforts, of the whole community. Here then is a field utterly, or all but utterly, neglected in every town. As things are, it is almost in a cleared state, and ready for the structure which has to be raised upon it. And it is at the same time a most hopeful and promising field from the amount and quality of the material to work upon it would supply, that is, the minds of the boys and girls of the vast middle class of the community.

I would propose, then, and this is a part of my answer to the point in our inquiry now before us, that something of the following kind should be done in all our large towns, beginning, let us say, with those of above 40,000 inhabitants. In each a Middle College should be built. This should be done partly at the expense of the town, and partly at the expense of the State. I would

have the cost of the fabrics supplied from these two conjoint sources, because they never could be built otherwise than by the public, and because nothing could be more for the advantage of the public than that they should be built. And I would divide the expense in the way proposed because the community generally, and the locality itself, are equally interested in their existence. Besides, is it just that the upper class should have their endowed grammar schools and universities, and the lower class their rate-built, and in part rate-supported, schools, and that nothing at all should be done for the great middle class, for whom the grammar schools were at all events in part meant, and who themselves in these towns have to pay rates for the schools for the working classes? As to the moiety that would come from the State: we find no difficulty in paying large lump sums for shares in the Suez Canal, for the Alabama claims, for the emancipation of negro slaves, or in raising money for fortifications, or for anything else we need; and here is an object of transcendent importance, which every year would amply repay its cost. We have had surpluses which would in twelve months have effected it. It is a mere nothing for us to do; and no money that could be spent by any people could be spent more productively, or for a higher purpose; or, if words were made to mean what they ought, for a more Christian purpose. And as to the other moiety of the cost, if it is right in principle, which no one doubts, that the ratepayers of a town should be taxed for the erection and maintenance of primary schools, for the education of other people's children, surely it cannot be wrong in principle that they should be taxed, even as a sort of compensation, for the erection of schools in which their own children may receive the education they require; and which schools, looking at the existing state of things in this country, and at the experience of all other nations in this matter, cannot possibly otherwise be brought into existence. For what is wanted is nothing of the grammar school kind, but something very different both in kind and in scale.

The object of these colleges would be to give the instruction

they will need to the sons and daughters of the professional men, farmers, small gentry, tradesmen, and upper artizans of our large towns, and of their immediate neighbourhood. The scheme of instruction will therefore be founded on an unreserved recognition of the educational wants, and of the educational resources, of the present day. The ecclesiastical ideas that inhere in our grammar school system will be abandoned. What they with the educational resources of three centuries ago did for ecclesiastical purposes will with the educational resources now at our command be done for all the purposes schools ought now to meet. We will suppose that children will begin to attend the classes of these colleges at the age of twelve, and will, in the case of a large proportion of the pupils, continue to be under instruction to the age of sixteen or seventeen. The foundations of their instruction, or the general instruction, will be the same for all, for both sexes, and for every destination in life. These will be arithmetic, mathematics, elementary physics, vegetable and animal physiology, physical geography, general and English history, English composition, the science of morals, and some acquaintance with the theory of the beautiful in form, colour, sound, and language. For these subjects will be provided a sufficient number of professors, or tutors. They will bear one of these names, as the institution will be called a college, and will be more than a school, in fact almost a kind of small local middle-class university, what might be called a primary or sub-university.

Having, then, laid this preliminary foundation of general instruction, the same for all, the next step will be to consider, and provide separately for, each of the wants of the times education has to meet. These are naturally and sufficiently indicated by the occupations and professions the sons and daughters of the part of the community we are now dealing with will wish to be trained for. This necessitates that, besides the general instruction, there should be distinct branches of instruction to meet the fact of the many occupations and professions of the day. The fact of this variety of callings exists. It is a governing fact in this

matter. When ecclesiastics had almost alone to be thought about, and their education provided for, they were thought of, and their education was provided for. Let us not then make any attempt to ignore facts as they *now* exist. So long as we do that our work will be thrown away, with the certainty, too, that in the end facts will inevitably master us, and sweep away all our futile resistance. What we have to provide for is a fact, and facts always sooner or later compel their own recognition. We will take first the want our old grammar schools were intended to meet; the want of a properly qualified supply of ministers of religion. This calling is, at the present moment, absolutely more numerous than it ever was before. Of course relatively, and comparatively, it has lost much of its importance, but still absolutely it is more numerous than ever before. This fact, therefore, must be recognised and provided for. We shall then have to consider what is required for their training, as far as it can be supplied by such a college. Of course the foundation will be with them, as with all, a knowledge of such matters as are fundamental, and some general acquaintance with the knowledge of the day; but in their case learning in the old sense of the word, that is an acquaintance with Latin and Greek, can not be dispensed with. This, then, must be provided for them. Nor is this all of a special kind that they will require. Far from it. They must have more than a general acquaintance with the science and history of morality. This, therefore, must with them be particularly attended to. They will, too, require a correct and effective English style, and the power of extemporary address. These requirements will not be overlooked. In the case of most of these clerical students we may hope that their special studies will be completed at the university, but it will be far better that the whole of this part of their work should not be left for the university, which is, indeed, less fitted for much of it than the school. It will be late to begin some of these studies there. And some of these students, we may be sure, will not be able to go to the university at all.

I am here speaking of religion, and of the requirements of its teachers, or ministers, in accordance with popular ideas. On this subject my own ideas go much further. Bacon said that religion was the *summa philosophia.* I am disposed to take a step beyond this, and to say that it is the *sola philosophia.* In a sense there can be no other philosophy. Philosophy and science are distinct affairs. Philosophy is the inference from science. Science proper has nothing to do with inferences. Its domain is limited to the phenomenal. It is conversant with phenomena, and with nothing else. It observes, analyzes, and classifies what can be observed, analyzed, and classified; and there it stops. But the human mind cannot stop there. It never has. From its observations of what is seen it has always drawn some inferences about the unseen. These inferences, going beyond the phenomenal, but strictly inferences from it, are an essential part, the differentiating part, of religion. For religion in its meaning and substance is a theory, a philosophy, of human life, elaborated out of a view in which our inferences about the unseen are brought to bear on what we understand, or suppose we understand, about nature, and about man's nature. Science cannot be metaphysical. Just in proportion as it is so, it ceases to be scientific. Philosophy, or religion, is on one side metaphysical, or inferential; and there is nothing else in the whole range of human thought that is properly, and necessarily, metaphysical, for the science of mind is psycho-physical, and not metaphysical. Religion, however, from its very nature, has always in part been so, and, as far as we can see, must always in part remain so. It is essentially the philosophy, the inference from, the metaphysics of, what is known, or supposed to be known, of the external world, brought to bear on man's thoughts about himself—his affections, aspirations, conduct, life, destiny. When what formerly stood in the place of our existing science was merely rude and imperfect observation, very partial, unanalyzed, unclassified, unverified, inaccurate, unsystematic, the inference was of the same kind. Even its con-

stitutive facts were then, if we may so put it, largely metaphysical. Now that true science has in many matters taken the place of this rude, imperfect, misinterpreted observation, and is doing this, above all in importance, with morality, an essential factor of religion, our inferences, our metaphysics, our philosophy, our religion, have, in proportion as this has been done, become more enlarged, and less conjectural. This will make it necessary that the teacher of religion should have some general acquaintance with science, both with the physical sciences and with the sciences of humanity. Otherwise how can he know the ground he professes to stand on, or be a teacher of truth? But here, as we are now dealing with popular ideas and requirements I only point this out, though we may be sure that our children will insist on its realization.

Closely allied to the ministry of religion, though apparently there are at present some misunderstandings between the two, as is sometimes the case with near relations, is the kindred calling, which in these days has greatly grown in numbers and importance, of the literary man. This embraces professional authorship, or writing, of all kinds: every kind of literature which is made a profession. To this class belong editors of all kinds; and all contributors who are on the staff of any daily, weekly, or monthly publication, and all those who in any other way work with the pen for their own maintenance, and for the instruction and amusement of the community. It is difficult to conjecture even approximately the number of this class; but it is obvious that it is a very large one, and, too, a very important one; and that it is ever, as time goes on, becoming larger; and that the functions it discharges are ever becoming more important. A great deal of the political, moral, and æsthetic teaching of the people, indeed of what it is taught in every department of thought, comes from, or I ought to say through, them. In our present system there is no recognition of this great fact. But in the kind of college I am contemplating such a calling would as a matter of course be recognized, because it exists, and provision would

be made for its training. English composition is the instrument they are to use in their work. This, therefore, in their instruction would have a prominent place. All the time that is now spent in Grammar schools on Latin and Greek composition would with them be devoted to English composition. From an early period of their schooling they would be trained to use the right English word in the right place. But as it is useless to know how to build, if you have bad, or insufficient, or no materials to build with, it will be requisite that a beginning should be made towards enabling them to have the right thing to say, as well as the ability to say it rightly. We have already mentioned the general instruction of the college; that will go some way towards starting them rightly, such as English and general history, physical geography, physical science. To these there will have to be added for their special wants what may be called the sciences of humanity, that is to say political economy, ethics, psychology, and logic. And here I would notice what I suppose is much neglected amongst us, and that is the logic of thought as exhibited in style, by which I would mean not merely the logically right word in the logically right place, but, furthermore, that no thought, or shade of thought, which the logical treatment of a subject requires should be omitted, and no thought, or shade of thought, should be introduced which would interfere with such a treatment of a subject. This, of course, would be the perfection of style; and so perfect is it that I know not where I could find you an instance of it. Our present schools have by their nature been precluded from aiming at anything of this kind, almost from forming a conception of it. In our provision for the training of the literary class at least one learned and one modern language should be included, if for nothing else, yet at all events for the study of differences of style. Their chief use, however, would be as an introduction to the thoughts, feelings, and facts, which are stored up in the literature of those languages, and which, except through an acquaintance with them, would not be accessible. So much for the literary class.

Next after the ministry of religion and the literary calling, or that of the lay teacher, we will take the profession of the law. Here again we have a very numerous body to provide for. The names that stand on the roll of the attorneys, and in the list of barristers, amount to about 20,000. Law is conversant with rights. It is an attempt to define, and to maintain by pains and penalties, such portions of the code of morality as admit of being so maintained, and the violation of which may be demonstrated by sufficient evidence. It is the definition and enforcement of morality, limited by these conditions, and by public expediency. Its professed object has always been to secure the well-ordering, and the well-being, of the community, not of course absolute well-ordering, and absolute well-being, but such as the conditions of any community at the time seem to require. Its scientific aim is supposed to be, to secure the well-ordering of the life, and the well-being of every member of the community, by the application of the principle, now, for the first time in the history of mankind, beginning to be practically admitted, that the freedom of every individual, limited only by the equal freedom of every other individual, must ultimately be its paramount aim. Of course this view is nowhere fully carried out, but now there are some who acknowledge it to be the only tenable view, and society itself now appears to be spontaneously working towards its realisation. But to take things as they are, the protection of the legal rights, the property, the honour of any member of the community at any moment may be, and of many must be, placed in the hands of lawyers. The first requisite then in a lawyer is that he should understand English law. In order to a right understanding of this he must be acquainted with the principles of morality, of which law is a special and limited application. His knowledge of the law will have to be applied to cases that vary infinitely in details. These details will have to be grasped accurately and distinctly, and the law applied to them correctly in words. This will require a thoroughly trained intellect, capable of thinking logically, and of

expressing logically in words the result of thought about the facts of the case, their nature, and relations, so that no word used shall express either more or less than the thought. There must be no omissions, no ambiguities, no overlapping, or insufficient divisions, no redundancies, no irrelevancies. The uncouthness, and general unintelligibility, what is profanely called the jargon, of legal documents, had its origin in the conscious inability of uneducated minds to think, and to express themselves logically. The logic then that is here so indispensable, should be attended to as early as possible in the school instruction of the future lawyer. It is a capital point. Nor can they well begin too soon to make themselves acquainted with English law, and the theory of morals. With them, for its historical use in the study of law, a knowledge of Latin would be more serviceable than that of a modern language. Of course they would share with all the other pupils the general instruction of the college, in which they would have to pay particular attention to English history.

We now come to the medical profession—another very numerous and important body. Their function is to take care of the health of the community. Upon their knowledge the lives of those dearest to us, and our own lives, are often dependent. With them vegetable and animal physiology, chemistry, and particularly organic chemistry, will be special studies. German, or French, will be useful to them, in order that they may be able to acquaint themselves with the medical practice, and to follow the medical researches, of at least one foreign nation.

Some provision will also be made for those who are desirous of preparing themselves for the army or navy, for India, or for the civil service. These are wants which did not exist when our present grammatico-ecclesiastical system grew up, and covered the whole educational area, but, as they are now pressing wants, people are beginning to see that they must be attended to. And it is just as reasonable that they should be attended to now, in

accordance with their own requirements, as it was that the ecclesiastical wants of three centuries ago should have been at that time attended to in accordance with their requirements.

We are now come to the class of technical callings, take for instance those connected with construction, as the architect's, the builder's, and the engineer's. Besides the instruction given in the general subjects, equally desirable for all intelligent and moral beings, who will have to exercise their faculties in relation with nature and with society, there will be provided for them special instruction of a technical kind, as, for instance, on materials, on pure and applied mechanics, hydrostatics, drawing, and whatever else it may be of use for them to begin the study of early.

We will take last the ordinary tradesman. We have here to recognize the double fact that though tradesmen they are still men, and that being men they will moreover be tradesmen. In their case the chief point will not be to endeavour to make much of what is in itself little, that is, what can be taught at school as a direct preparation for trade, but by good general culture to anticipate, and obviate, as far as possible the mind-benumbing effects of retail trade, in order that a life so spent may not extinguish the man. With them, therefore, the general instruction will have a special object. To meet the fact of the ever widening extension of trade, as well as for intellectual reasons, to the general culture, one modern language should here be added, and one or more of the sciences of humanity. With them, too, æsthetic culture would have a special corrective value.

We have, then, now enumerated several distinct forms of professional employment, each of them having its special requirements, which can only be attended to separately. But as the man comes first, and afterwards the employment, in all the general instruction will claim attention first, but always with the *proviso* that preparation for the future employment be not neglected. Some of the acquisitions that will be necessary for the minister of religion, the literary man, the lawyer, the

physician, the military man, the technical worker, the tradesman, can be made most conveniently at school, and some can not be made effectually elsewhere, or afterwards. Opinion and practice appear to be turning in this direction. We have had for centuries our ecclesiastical schools; every great people now has its military schools; and several other kinds of school for other kinds of special training are springing up amongst us. It is a true principle, and one of universal application, that special requirements should be attended to, but never in such a way as to supersede, or be substituted for, general culture, on which they should be grafted, and out of which they should grow: for the man comes first, and the profession afterwards; and, while the latter must be prepared for, there must be no neglect of the former.

I have already said that the system proposed would be as suitable for girls as for boys. Whether it would be so or not would depend upon whether what has been spoken of as the general instruction of the college would be the fittest and best instruction for girls, to which would be added for them a modern language; music, and other æsthetic culture, not being forgotten. And as many young women look forward to becoming professional teachers, either as domestic governesses, or as mistresses of schools, the art of teaching would be made a special branch for them. And thus might be allowed to die away, and might be got rid of, from its being no longer maintained in the school-room, the untenable and mischievous assumption that women differ so much mentally from men that instruction with them should be confined to a degrading sham, and should not in reality go much beyond accomplishments. And, as a consequence of this, another question of the day would be left to solve itself, for this substantial identity of instruction would remove all educational impediments out of the way of those women who might be disposed to enter on the same pursuits as men. Both would in the main be educated alike, and so the way, as far as education goes, would be equally open to both.

This never can be the case as long as the education of women is not only dissimilar to that of men, but also much less real. Our present non-natural system appears to be the cause of the very unsatisfactory condition of female education amongst us. Under the more natural and organized system I am endeavouring to bring before you the girls might receive the same lessons as the boys, from the same books, and often given by the same professors, only in different class-rooms.

The foregoing analysis of the wants of the variously compounded middle class of our large towns will, I hope, have shown two things; first the narrowness, inadequacy, and unsuitableness to our present wants of our present grammar school system: a conclusion that had by other considerations been previously reached; and, secondly, the possibility of at least imagining something that would seem capable of taking its place. At all events I trust that we in this country are moving in the direction of the conclusion at which people elsewhere are arriving, that the old system, with its one predominant subject, and that grammar, and its masters, each capable of himself teaching all that was required, belong to conditions that are now obsolete; and that what is indispensable under existing conditions is an organization of studies, and a correspondingly organized staff of teachers. This, however, is a work that cannot be left to private enterprise. It is far beyond that in many ways. It is a public concern; and it can only be carried out, that is established, maintained, and supervised, as a public institution. It will require extensive collegiate buildings, and a kind of collegiate body of teachers. It is a widely different affair from the old grammar school.

It is an unfailing characteristic of a right principle not only that it enables us to understand why, and in what respects, other presumed principles are erroneous, but that it is also itself fruitful in good results. It is the bad principle that is barren of good, though, indeed, it is generally also mischievous. The true principle, because it is the true one, that is to say in harmony with

facts, and the nature and course of things, is fruitful in good. Now I can imagine no principle more fruitful in all directions, and the fruit of which would be of more value, than the one I am commending to your consideration for the reconstruction of our middle schools. As an instance; we have heard a great deal about the advantage of our educational system having within it a ladder, by which those whom nature has endowed with abilities, and who have the energy, perseverance, and self-control necessary for turning good abilities to good account, may rise to higher and better positions in life; and may be able to benefit the community by doing for it better and higher work than they otherwise would have the power of doing. This idea is an anticipation of what the true educational system, when it shall have been found, will effect. Our present grammatico-ecclesiastical system hardly at all admits of it. It can never really, and naturally, and effectually have such a ladder. In the tens of millions of the lower classes there are many, and many again, with the capacity for so rising. And it would be very desirable that their active minds, instead of being left entangled in the slough of drudgery, for which they are not fit, and which only makes them discontented and dangerous citizens, should have a clear course open to them in every direction, in which their natural aptitudes may prompt them to advance. At present these courses in every direction are not open to them. Nothing, for which they are fit, is really open to them. What appears to be open to them is the probability, but it is a very small and delusive probability, of their getting to our great national universities. What is the number out of these millions who ever can get to the universities? And if they could, what would be open to them there? Practically no career but the Church, or a fellowship, for both of which, if they could get to the university, which, except through the charity of others, is hopeless, they would, looking at their antecedents, be at present eminently unfit. But, on the other hand, imagine such a system, as I have been suggesting, established; and then see what would follow in this matter. We propose in

our contemplated middle colleges to educate cheaply; the cost need not be more than six pounds a head a year: at the College of Lausanne it is only four pounds; and we propose to educate for every career which society now offers to its members. Here then, it is seen at a glance, would be plenty of ladders, easy to be ascended, and some one or other of which must be suited to the capacity of every promising youth. These ladders would be planted on the ground on which these youths are now standing, and would offer to them the means of rising to what any one might see was within his attainment. As things are at present, when we hear the noble Chairman of some school opening, or school anniversary, exhorting the children of the lower classes to work hard in order that they may have the happiness of attaining to scientific or literary eminence, we are sure that he does not touch a thought or sentiment in their minds, except it be that what he says shows them the hopelessness of their position. We who hear, or read, the exhortation are aware of how hollow it is. But still the idea from which his words take their rise is right. Their position ought not to be so hopeless. His exhortation ought not to be so hollow. And neither of these would be the case, if the right system were established. That they are so, demonstrates that the existing system is a thoroughly antiquated mistake.

I pass to another consideration: only let us get what the times require once established in the great central classes of the community, and there would seem to be no insuperable difficulty in establishing it, for it is no more than an adaptation to the existing conditions of English life of what is already established, and at work, in Switzerland, in Germany, and in Holland, and it will soon be found working in harmony with all that is above, and all that is below it, in our educational system. If it were not profane to give expression to such a thought, we might even expect to see it in this relation with our great and famous universities. For notwithstanding what has lately been said in another place about the want of culture in our middle class, and which, if broad and true culture be meant, may perhaps be said

of more than the middle class, I am disposed to think that if the universities offered what would be really advantageous to the middle class, it would not refuse the offer. Of course this remark points in the direction of an extension of studies. But, should this extension be carried out, it will necessitate the alteration of two arrangements of detail in our present university practice, which, together with the plan of unattached students, of late so successfully established, I advocated at the now distant date of the first University Commission. The first of these two points of detail is that the system of honours should be completely abolished; and at the same time every degree inexorably restricted to a competent knowledge of the subjects for which it is conferred. When all studied the same subjects, and those were of a very limited range, which was natural enough for ecclesiastical purposes, and when all students entered the university at about the same age, which again there was no difficulty in enforcing in a more than semi-ecclesiastical institution, then something might have been said in defence of the honour system: though it never could have been the right and true system. When, however, a great variety of subjects shall have come to be studied, there will be found to be insuperable difficulties in the way of apportioning honours. They may be convenient as a part of the system of prize-fellowships; but both the honours and the prize-fellowships are illegitimate stimulants to study. Knowledge should be pursued, not for the sake of a place in the class list, which may lead to a prize-fellowship, but for its own sake. This only can make its pursuit enduring and fruitful. Even as things are at present, the mischief and the unfairness of the system are manifest. The other existing arrangement of detail, the abolition of which would be very desirable, and which grew out of the honour system, but would be quite unsuited to, and a great impediment in the way of, a more extended system of study, is that of endeavouring to force all students up to the university at the same age, that of about

nineteen, and to keep them at the university for three or four years continuously. Under the honour system it could not have been otherwise. But this arrangement sadly restricts the number of those who, we might suppose, would be desirous of availing themselves of the advantages of a university, and so needlessly and lamentably restricts its utility. Abolish honours, and substitute for them degrees rigidly restricted to a competent knowledge of the subject for which they are conferred, and then the necessity for coming to the university at one particular age, and that not the best or most convenient age in a great many cases, and the necessity for continuous residence, fall to the ground. Let the university determine both what are the proper qualifications for matriculation, or admission, and how many terms it is desirable that a student should keep in residence, and every student will then settle for himself at what age he will come, and when he will keep his terms. Under this freer system many will be able, and desirous, to come, as was once the case, at the age of sixteen, and to whom it would be an enormous advantage to gain these two or three years. Many, too, who are slowly rising in life will come later. Some will be able to keep all their terms continuously. They will get through the university rapidly. Many, however, will, from various reasons, be able to keep perhaps only one or two terms in a year. By giving this elasticity to the system, a vastly increased number will be enabled to avail themselves of the advantages of the university. Of course universities should aim at benefiting the community, through the means they administer, as widely as possible. All restrictions on their utility belong to a bygone order of things, and are thoroughly mistaken, anachronous, and mischievous, both to the public and to themselves.

I think we may have the satisfaction of believing that in our universities things at present are moving in the right direction of a multiplication of studies, but I am not aware that there is yet any indication, in any quarter, that the ultimate aim is yet

seen, that is, an organization of studies on the double basis of the wants, and of the knowledge, of the times—a great work in which universities ought to take the leading part.

And now to go to the other extremity of our educational system —our elementary schools, those in which the vast majority of the community are to be taught. I think it is obvious that the introduction of true principles into the schools for the middle classes will necessitate their adoption in our elementary schools. Should this be so, we shall then see them aiming at imparting what knowledge will be of use to, and what there may be time to impart to, the working man. These limitations will have nothing invidious, for it will be seen that, as far as is possible, the son of the labourer is being taught the same knowledge, with the necessary restrictions of time, and the wise restrictions of utility, as the son of the peer: namely, a knowledge of the world in which we live, of vegetable and animal physiology, and of what may be called the physiology of society, especially of morality and of political economy. We shall not then have the grammar of the language people are already acquainted with, and which they are using, made a primary object in the education of this class, perhaps not of any class. The whole people will then be taught on the same system; and an elementary school will no longer mean a school for the children of the lower orders, but a school for all children under eleven or twelve years of age. We shall all enter on the same field, and each will advance in its cultivation as far as his opportunities permit; and at the same time the special wants of each will be attended to. Possibly, should such a system ever be established, the different classes of society will come to understand each other much better than they do at present. Our instruction, though far more varied than what we have at present, will then possess the unity, as well as the variety, of nature, of course including man. And cannot we imagine that, when our instruction shall thus be founded on nature and on our existing wants, it will be both more attractive and more fruitful than the instruction now given.

To complete our survey a word on our existing Grammar Schools. Some of them, those for instance that are situated in our large towns, will, I think, grow into middle colleges. While, perhaps, those that are at present distinguished by the misnomer of public schools, will, as most of these are situated in small towns, and as they have established an historical connection with the upper ten thousand, be modified, in accordance with the ideas we now have of knowledge, into schools which will prepare the sons of our wealthy classes mainly for political life and for literary pursuits.

Here is one more proof of the truth and naturalness—only different words for the same idea—of the system I am suggesting to you. In these days of inevitable and real democracy perhaps the one thing that will be most needed in any community will be some sufficient amount of homogeneity of thought and feeling for a good understanding between all classes. Without this, equality of political rights will be a cause of mischief and conflict, and in the end will prove only illusory. This indispensable homogeneity of thought and feeling can alone insure the smooth working of democratic institutions, and education can alone give it. Nothing else will enable the different classes of society to feel that they are pulling together in the same boat, and dispose them to work together for the common safety. Universal political equality can be maintained only in combination with universal educational unity. The most fertile source of distrust, misunderstandings, and disunion will be dissimilarity of education combined with equality of political rights. There can be no mutual confidence, right understanding, or union, where the well-to-do classes receive a non-natural, grammatico-ecclesiastical training, and the body of the people are taught only to read, write, and cypher.

Consider for a moment one more suggestion of the truth of the system I am advocating. It is obvious that the maintenance of the position of this country in the world very largely depends on the position it can maintain in the open market of the world.

That depends in these days on the scientific and technical training of the general body of the people of this country. This scientific and technical training the system that I am endeavouring to set before you would give to them.

I have gone a little into particulars on the point of middle-class education, not only because it is the part of our system which is most clear for the erection of a new structure, being that which is least obstructed by endowment; and with respect to which it is most clearly seen that something must be attempted; and in which, if we can do anything to the purpose, we take up a strong position in the centre, if we may so speak, of the enemy's line, and one which must eventually command his two wings—these are educational reasons—but also for a political reason: our upper class is becoming, relatively, too few to keep in their hands an effective command over the course of events, and our labouring classes are becoming too numerous and too powerful, in proportion to their present intelligence, to exercise a wise and beneficial command over the course of events; it is, therefore, to the intellectual and moral power of the middle class that in the immediate future we must mainly look for political stability, and for most kinds of progress; and education can alone endow them with this power.

V.—Moral Culture.

We have now reached the last, though far from the least important or least difficult, point of those to which I suggested that our attention should be directed this evening. We began by propounding as the aim of education the perfecting of men and women, intellectually and morally, as far as that can be done by what may be taught in schools, for the existing condition of society. We then considered the means schools must use for attaining this aim, so far as the intellect is concerned. That, of course, we saw was in one word knowledge. Here we had to ascertain what this knowledge is, which we now have to make

use of. Is it the knowledge the ancients had attained to, or what we have attained to? Is it verifiable, or unverifiable knowledge? Is it knowledge regarded as a whole, or is it some unconnected fragments of knowledge? We next considered by what apparatus of schools and teachers it might, under existing circumstances, be used as the instrument of intellectual culture. This obliged us to notice by the way the inadequacy of the aims and methods of our antiquated grammatico-ecclesiastical system. What now remains for consideration is moral culture. Here the great questions are—and they must be answered sooner or later scientifically—What is morality? In what relation does moral stand to intellectual culture? How can morality be taught in schools? I shall now endeavour to make out what is involved in the discussion of these questions. In this attempt some references will have to be made first to psychology and then to sociology.

All our own efforts to educate assume, and all the educational efforts of all mankind everywhere and always have assumed, that the human mind has capacity for moral education; for this has ever been, more or less professedly, the aim not only of intellectual culture, but also of law and of religion. Indeed it appears that wherever there is mind in any degree there is this capacity. For even in the case of the lower animals moral education is not a phrase without significance; rather, in truth, we may say that it is one that has with them a wide range of meaning. The instincts, the disposition, the character of every species of living creatures, and in these respects no two species are alike, result from the interaction of natural causes, through which has been modified into what it now is every species from the gentlest to the fiercest, from the most timid to the most fearless, from the most confiding to the wariest, from the thriftiest to the most improvident, from the most solitary to the most sociable. In their cases, even if both the end was unseen, and the means were unconsciously used, the process was on that account none the less real. At all events the result, which is the moral idiosyncracy

of the species, is distinct and real enough. Each of the infinity of existing species was educated into what it is; and we cannot but suppose the same of the infinity of extinct species. The whole of this inconceivable amount of, to say the least, *quasi*-moral variation has been the result of innumerable natural processes of education. A similar process, issuing in corresponding results, has ever been at work among mankind. Every nation, every tribe, every family, every individual, presents us with an instance of the capacity of man for moral education. Far the greater part of what has been thus effected among mankind has been effected unintentionally. Much, however, has been effected intentionally. That which has been effected intentionally, in proportion to advances in knowledge and in the conditions of society, has ever been increasing in amount relatively as well as absolutely. It is about what is intentionally effected that we are now inquiring.

How, then, shall the educator intelligently set about this great work of developing and of training the moral capacities of those he has to teach? Surely it is the greatest work that can be undertaken, even that thought can conceive, for we know of nothing higher or better than morality; and in these democratic times it must become the sheet-anchor of society. With respect to the intellect we have come to the conclusion that we have no other instrument for its education than knowledge, that is to say verified knowledge, regarded in its entirety; and, as far as it is apprehended, correctly apprehended. I shall now endeavour to show that neither has the instructor of youth for advancing the education of the moral capacities any other instrument. The knowledge with which he educates the intellectual capacities is what he must use for educating the moral capacities also. He has nothing, and never had anything, else for this purpose.

And here I will make a distinction, which, I think, we shall find of much educational value, between what morality is psychologically, that is as a phenomenon of the mind, and what it is sociologically, that is as a phenomenon of society. A knowledge

of the former will show the educator how he may produce morality in the mind without any formal direct teaching. A knowledge of the latter will enable him to teach it systematically. These two aspects of morality I propose to consider separately, taking first the former. And what with respect to it we shall have to investigate for the purposes of our present inquiry I will set before you in the shape of the question, What are in the mind the factors of morality? Or what is there in the mind that prompts to moral conduct?

No one, I think, will question the statement that among the causes which prompt a man to moral conduct must be included certain instincts and emotions he has somehow or other come to possess. These are seen distinctly in the lower animals. And this is the meaning when applied to them, as it is also when applied to ourselves, of the word impulse. It is the impulse of awakened instincts and emotions in the direction of action. Here then is clearly a factor of conduct, but not enough of itself to constitute moral conduct, for we should not apply this title to conduct that was the simple result of instinctive emotions. Indeed, if men were to act unrestrainedly in obedience to these instinctive emotions society would be an impossibility. There must, then, be another factor, a restraining power, which regulates and guides, and even at times suppresses, natural emotion. Of course this restraining, regulative power is the ideas we have come to have in our minds. It is, too, I think, clear, that ideas eventually attain the power of themselves originating emotion, or impulse; and so of leading to action independently of natural, congenital, instinctive emotions, or impulses. The idea-regulated emotions, and the idea-originated conduct, are pre-eminently what we call moral character. Here then are two departments of psychology, which, though in thought separable, are in themselves organically connected; that which has to do with the intellect, and that which has to do with the emotions: the special work of the former being to construct ideas; and the issue of the action of these ideas on the emotions being character, or

morality. I am disposed to believe that the *conscious* bearing of what is in the intellect on the emotions constitutes one of the main psychological distinctions between man and the lower animals. Responsibility and moral progress both depend upon it. A man is responsible to his ideas in a higher sense than he is to his instincts; and moral progress depends on ideas. A man is what his ideas make him.

Here we have space only for a word on habits and instincts, as originating factors of action. It is clear that neither of them can be an absolutely aboriginal source of action. They were themselves in some way or other brought about. Habit is inchoate instinct, and instinct is hereditary habit. To fall back on our only resource, metaphorical expressions: we may say that instincts and habits are channels, which have been worn in the substance of the mind for certain courses of action; and that what cut out these channels was the constant movement of certain ideas in these lines; and that in the case of instincts these channels have been inherited. Or we may say that they are certain apparatus set up, and constructed, in the mind by certain ideas; and that in the case of instincts these apparatus are inherited. But on either of these views, or on any other we are likely to adopt, the habit, or the instinct, is the result of the action in the mind of ideas, that is of knowledge. Whatever may be our way of regarding what has been brought about, that which brought it about could have been only ideas, or knowledge.

We have been endeavouring to get a glimpse of what passes in the mind when abiding moral sentiments, or instincts, and when immediate impulses to moral action, are engendered. What that glimpse has shown us of their dependence on ideas, or knowledge, is confirmed by what we know of the history of religion, of general civilization, and of the contemporary condition of the several existing divisions of mankind. These all tell us clearly enough that knowledge is a prerequisite of morality, and progress in knowledge of progress in morality. They ex-

hibit no conceptions of morality that have not arisen out of knowledge, and no advances in morality that have not been preceded by advances in knowledge. If, for instance, we look at the history of Christianity, which was the greatest advance in morality the world has achieved in the historical period, we shall find that its reception and establishment were not merely realized possibilities of the advances in knowledge the world had then made, but were necessitated by those advances. And so with every previous religious advance from Fetichism up to Christianity: they all, each in its turn, were necessary results of advances in knowledge. Of advance in the general condition of mankind, what we call civilization, the same may be said. Each in its turn was made possible by an advance in knowledge. And the existing differences of civilization amongst mankind are referable to the same cause. They are ultimately differences of knowledge. If we fix our attention on some highly civilized people, and then go through the process of stripping that people, step by step, of the knowledge it now possesses, step by step we shall find it falling away from higher to lower stages of civilization, till at length we shall see it sinking into barbarism. And if we continue the process we shall at last reduce it to Hottentot or Australian savagery. And then if we reverse the process, and gradually rebuild their knowledge, we shall find that we are thereby rebuilding their civilization, till the savage tribe is again brought up to the summit from which it had fallen. Another way of putting the same idea, is by asking how do we expect advances in civilization, or in religion, which is a department of civilization, to be made in the future? Not by keeping our knowledge stationary, but by advancing it.

This seems to have some bearing on the contention, now maintained by many, that man is an automaton. If he acted solely in accordance with his instincts and emotions then there might be something to say in support of this theory, though there would still remain the questions how these instincts and emotions arose, and whether they are not modifiable. I have

just said a few words on the genesis of instincts, and so here I need only further remark that not even the lowest savage acts in perfect obedience to his instincts and emotions. Even he acknowledges certain checks and restraints, to which, and not to his instinctive emotions, many of his actions must be referred. And we see that it is through what he has come to possess in his intellect that he, savage as he is, is raised out of the automatic condition. And this is the case with all mankind up to the most advanced, or rather always in proportion to the furnishing of the intellect each has made. In every individual his conduct varies in accordance with the ideas he possesses, and changes in the same individual in accordance with changes in his ideas. And the fact that all this is in our power does not support the theory that man is an automaton, for it rather goes to show that he is the arbiter and the architect of his own life to such a degree as to make him responsible for his conduct. He is no automaton while he is able to form and set up in his intellect a power, with which he can regulate, and suspend, and even extinguish, what otherwise would have been uncontrolled impulses, and, to go one step further, with which he can even originate other impulses.

Suppose that a man has with some degree of fulness and distinctness attained to the idea of the Cosmos: to some extent he has intellectually constructed it, and carries it in his mind. With him the prepotent, and most formative of all his ideas, the outcome of them all, will be the universality and never-failing potency of law. He looks above, and beholds the unnumbered worlds that people illimitable space. The telescope reveals to him other unnumbered worlds peopling further illimitable extensions of space. Throughout he perceives, or infers, the never-failing potency of law. He turns his thoughts towards this earth on which he finds himself. Here from the closeness of his observation he becomes cognizant of unnumbered facts, physical, chemical, and vital. And here, again, throughout the whole of these also he finds law supreme. Its universality, and its never-

failing potency, are still unquestioned. And if at last he be brought to concentrate his thought on himself, his bodily and mental constitution, his personal life, and the general life around him in which he must bear a part, and on the relations of all this to the external world, everywhere in everything he finds the same fact. The reign of law does not stop short of him. He is no exception to its universality and never-failing potency and inexorableness. Life, well-being, thought, ideas, morality, are all products of law. These are its last and highest expressions. On all sides he may see many stumbling on in the dark, thinking to make themselves and their mistaken guesses and assumptions a law to themselves. But this he sees issues in more or less of wasted time and effort, of degradation, and of suffering. His wish must be to place himself under the tutelage of universal, never-failing law, by knowing it, and conforming himself to it: to violate it being the source of all evil, and to conform to it the source of all good. He cannot say, and will have no disposition to say, this is true of outer nature, but not of man; of physical phenomena, but not of moral. He sees no grounds for such a distinction. Morality is only the bloom, the crown, the last development of the one great all-embracing scheme. There are no impassable-gulf-divided realms in nature. Nature, throughout, is one and undivided; and morality is an ordinance of nature. He who has come to understand, from an universal induction, that he is himself the offspring of law; that he lives, and moves, and has his being through law, will understand also that his well-being depends on his knowledge of, and submission to, the laws, moral as well as physical, with reference to which he must act in some fashion or other.

In times past unverified guesses, self-prompted interpretations, narrow views, when nothing better could be had, did much for mankind. Now we are called upon to try what can be done with verified knowledge, views that embrace all the observed phenomena, and interpretations that take account of them all. We now, at all events, know what is the field of knowledge, and

what are the requisites for knowing the facts of this field. This field is the phenomena of nature and of man. We now see that whatever is to be attained by knowledge, morally as well as intellectually, is to be attained by a knowledge of these phenomena. In the great scheme, which we see supposes, and provides for, the progress of man, this is what exists for the education of the race—that men should learn the language of their mother nature, and attain the power of understanding what she submits to their consideration, and that they should understand themselves. No one denies that morality is capable of improvement. What I here insist on is that what has improved it is knowledge; and that, if the less complete and less accurate knowledge of the past has done much in this way, we have much to hope from the more complete and more accurate knowledge to which we are now attaining.

In religion at all events I think no one will be disposed to deny that every improvement that has ever been secured has been due to this cause; and in no part of religion is this improving effect of knowledge seen more conspicuously than in that which is its highest conception, the idea of God. That, doubtless, has always been an inference from what men at the time knew of nature, and of themselves, or thought they knew. When this knowledge was beginning to form itself the first rudiments of the idea of God began to form themselves. When it grew a little, but still was superficial and full of error, the idea of God was superficial and full of error. As it became step by step more true and more profound, in the same degrees the idea of God became more true and more profound. We now can form no conception of a partial, or exclusive, or unjust, or vindictive, or in any way immoral God, according to our greatly improved, but still we may be sure very far from perfect, ideas of morality. There have, however, been times when men could form no other than what to us would be highly immoral conceptions of God; though indeed these were conceptions which, at the period of their origination, were great advances on those

they superseded. All these differences are based solely and only on differences in knowledge. Some of the elements of the idea of God that still linger amongst ourselves are adaptations of, and inferences from, the ideas of eastern despotism, and of Roman imperialism, the only ideas that men once had of supreme power. Such elements of the idea of God could not have originated, or gained acceptance, in times of self-government, or of political liberty, which in their turn are now giving rise to ideas that are gradually eliminating the old traditional elements I am referring to from our conception of God.

And if advances in knowledge have modified in this way even the idea of God, they must in like manner modify many, perhaps more or less all, of the subordinate details of religion. And the history, at all events, of our own religion confirms this supposition. In the progress of events it had come to be manifest in the East, then the home of practical thought on the subject of the relation of morality to religion, that the idea of a divinely prescribed, immutable law, once the only idea either politically practicable, or metaphysically conceivable, was no longer tenable; it was, therefore, abandoned for the idea of the law written on the heart of the men of that day, that is to say for what had come to be what we call the conscience of those who were then desirous of living moral and religious lives. It had come to be seen, which was not seen before, that God was not the present and minute executor here, in a human fashion, of his moral law; and so that idea was abandoned, and it was affirmed that the end is not now. It had come to be seen, which was not seen before, that the dispensations of God allowed of the heathen being more powerful, more wealthy, and more cultivated than the old monotheistic, theocratic people; this made necessary the thought that he was the God of all. It had come to be seen, which was not seen before, that God does not make his sun to shine and his rain to fall only on the land of the good; that the tares of society are allowed to grow together with the wheat; that it was not for the sins of his parents, and

could not have been for his own sins, that a man was born blind; that the men on whom the tower of Siloam fell, and still less those whom Herod massacred while engaged in offering sacrifice, were not worse than other men in Jerusalem; the idea, therefore, of a special Providence, so far, at least, as these facts contradicted it, was abandoned for something like our conception of general laws. Though, of course, the idea of general laws presupposes the prevision of, and provision for, each particular case that will ever arise. The difference between it and a special Providence being that the latter supposes that events are first seen, and attended to, only at the time of their occurrence—a conception borrowed entirely from the observation of human affairs—while the idea of general laws supposes that they were all foreseen and all provided for in the original plan of the great design. To take one more instance of Christian modification of religious thought arising out of contemporary advances in knowledge, and in the conditions of society: with all the civilized world under one government it was seen, which could not have been seen before, that all mankind are in a sense brethren, and of one family; therefore the idea of national exclusiveness was abandoned. And with it seemed to go the idea, which, however, as might have been expected, again revived in times of ignorance, of persecuting, torturing, and exterminating, in the name of God, those who might happen to be in a stage of religious belief different from our own.

And as the origin of Christianity demonstrated this dependence of religious teaching on contemporary knowledge, so equally has its subsequent history. It has everywhere in all times been rightly understood in proportion to knowledge, and misunderstood in proportion to ignorance. There is not one of its long-in-coming and beneficent truths which ignorance has not obscured or contradicted, and is not at this moment in many minds obscuring or contradicting. Amongst these truths, of course, must be placed that of the progressiveness of religion, which Christianity itself demonstrated by superseding Judaism;

a truth to which Judaism had in its day as distinctly borne witness, not only at its inception, but throughout its course.

And now a word or two about some currently received *dicta* which may appear to be at variance with our position. Many loudly affirm that morality, not knowledge, is the end of education. This I am glad to hear affirmed. But then I affirm, which this *dictum* does not, indeed it is intended to convey, without expressing it, the contrary idea, that morality ever has been, and from the nature of the thing ever must be, regulated by knowledge. Knowledge is always its regulative, sometimes even its originating, factor. I will further remark on this *dictum*, that morality is not at all the aim of our existing grammatico-ecclesiastical system. At the time of its establishment this was not required. What was then wanted, and aimed at, was a supply of learned controversialists, and of learned preachers: the learning, however, being of a very limited kind. Whereas we, because we have to educate not ecclesiastics only, but the whole people for broadly human and political purposes, must aim distinctly at morality. If we cannot secure this, we fail in our object, which is to make the people of this country good, as well as intelligent, citizens. And the morality we wish to teach for these purposes we find is a part, and indeed the highest product, of the order of nature, as manifested in human society: for which reason also our Association cannot choose but show what it is, and how it is to be taught. Letters and learning, which we are told, and with some truth, are the aims of our existing higher education, have no natural, nor indeed any, bearing worth considering, on morality; and our primary education, that is to say reading, writing, and cyphering, have still less.

Again it is loudly affirmed that true, or any serviceable amount of, morality can be the product of religion only. Here and now I need only set by the side of this the counter affirmation that religion has never, throughout its whole history, been purified and elevated, or made what at any period it came to be, by anything excepting advances in knowledge. It is out of

knowledge and conscience, itself largely a product of knowledge, that our religious sentiments and ideas are constructed. Morality, therefore, if it depends on religion, must depend on knowledge. And at this juncture of the history of religion, no one can do so much for its promotion as he who shall give us a verifiable, comprehensive, and systematic, that is a scientific, theory of morality, one of it essential factors.

Another way of putting the foregoing objections is that I am attributing to ideas that which is the proper work of conscience. I gladly recall to you this form of the objection, because it is one that will present itself to many minds. I think, however, it may be satisfactorily answered. Let us endeavour to analyse conscience. What is it? It is, I believe, the effect of one's own knowledge on one's own instincts and emotions. That surely includes all that in ordinary usage is meant by the word, and all the phenomena of the thing. The effect of one's own knowledge on one's own instincts and emotions. A main constitutive element, then, in conscience, and that which should be its regulative element, is knowledge. Not, of course, absolute knowledge, but with the restriction that in each case it is the knowledge the man himself has, or what he supposes to be knowledge; the practical conclusion, therefore, is, not that we are to leave things to conscience, but that we are to supply conscience with genuine, authentic, comprehensive, verifiable knowledge; and that we must not leave it to be misled by partial, or unbalanced knowledge, or by more or less grievous misapprehensions, such as have in all times been mistaken for knowledge. If this be done, conscience will again, as it did in the past, approve for centuries the horrors of the Inquisition, of every form of persecution, of the burning of harmless old women as witches, of slavery, oppression, injustice, and almost of every description of iniquity the world has ever seen. Why, conscience guided by logical deductions from false premises might drive thoroughly honest and well-intentioned men to attempt to bring the whole of the moral, the social, the practical, and the

political life, of the whole of the human race into subjection to the ignorance and ambition of an Italian priest, who might be endeavouring to establish his universal domination by the dungeon, the rack, and the stake. As to the other element of conscience, the impulses that in a man are habitual and instinctive, this must in many cases have originated mainly, and in all cases to some extent, in ideas, that is in knowledge; for habit and instinct must always be brought about, and established, in accordance with present knowledge, or with what is taken for knowledge. But whatever share the incessant pressure of once present knowledge may have had in forming our now existing instincts, and whatever share the knowledge that we, and our descendants, will attain to will have in modifying these instincts, or in creating new ones, at all events the present acting conscience of every one of us is, of course, within a very wide range, dependent for its approvals or disapprovals upon his knowledge, or what he supposes to be knowledge. The factors, then, of conscience are instincts and ideas. They both suggest action. In some actions the ideas, in others the instincts, have the preponderant part; but in all the office of the ideas is to guide and to regulate. They must, too, have had no inconsiderable share in originating and shaping our existing instincts. The great desideratum then with respect to the conscience is that the quality of the knowledge with which it is supplied should be good.

One more objection: we hear it loudly proclaimed, as if it were the solution of every educational difficulty, that the great point is not to impart knowledge, but to discipline the mind. There is much to lead us to suppose that this *dictum* has originated in an unconscious dread of knowledge. If those, however, who most loudly insist on it, and who thus present themselves to us as instances of the advantage of the discipline they are familiar with—otherwise they are not justified in recommending it—were, above other men, themselves conspicuous instances of intellectual power, and of moral excellence, we should then be

more disposed than we are at present to think that there might be something in their much vaunted *dictum*. But, furthermore, to judge it by its general fruits, has the system they advocate, and which has now for many generations been applied to the youth of this country, issued in making those who were disciplined by it more desirous of truth, singly and for its own sake, than we find that other people are? Has it enabled them in a higher degree than others to judge of evidence? To prefer, in their own cases, justice to privilege? and to honour humanity in the feeblest and most degraded? And besides asking about the fruits of the discipline, we may ask about what the discipline itself consists in. Is the study of the eight parts of speech, and their interrelations, so carried on that in all probability far the greater number of those who have been tied down to it for a dozen years—the dozen precious seed years of life—will be unable at its close to give so much as the names of those eight parts of speech, and who, in consequence of the drudgery and absolute fruitlessness of these long years of unnatural study, have conceived a distaste, and even in many cases a hatred, for all kinds of intellectual work, is this study, so carried on, and with such results, a discipline of the mind? If this term is applicable to it, it can only be in a sense which ought to make us endeavour to rid ourselves of it as quickly, and as thoroughly, as possible. No! the natural discipline of the mind is the study of nature, and of man as the highest department of nature. Nature has not ordained that the mind of the race, not even of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom, should be disciplined by learning, or by futile attempts at learning, the names, and the interrelations, of the eight parts of speech. And if these were mastered, that would still be a widely different thing from an intelligent appreciation of the literature, as a manifestation of the life, of the old and of the modern world.

I have spoken of ideas, the mental pictures of knowledge, as some times the counteragents and regulators, and sometimes the orginators, of emotion and impulse; and so I suppose in the opinion of most of us they are. But we must not forget that

there are ideas of all kinds, bad and indifferent as well as good, and false as well as true; and that in ignorant and uncultured minds many of the former kind, for the mind must always be doing something, are constructed at the suggestion of emotion itself, and so are only stimulative of emotion. For instance ideas of revenge, or of any low animal self-indulgence, may stimulate emotion in those directions. But this is not the effect of the ideas I have been speaking about. They are counteragents, or regulative, of the impulses of our lower emotions. To be that is of their very nature. They will always be working in that direction; and often will turn the whole life into a course which will be distinctly moral, that is rightly regulated as respects our lower emotions; or distinctly intellectual, which is carrying it into quite another region than that of the lower emotions. In every action a choice has to be made between conflicting considerations. What, then, we have to do is to strengthen the better side. On one side are impulses, and ideas connected with them, originated by our lower nature. On the other side are ideas, that originated in what is higher within us, or in what is external to us, and which, therefore, are antagonistic to, or regulative of, the former. We must multiply, enlarge, and vivify the latter, as the only means we have for overcoming, or for guiding rightly, the former. A man who has no other than low impulses and ideas, whatever class in society he may belong to, is their helpless victim. Such ideas and impulses will dispose one man to a life of idleness and self-indulgence; another to vulgar profligacy; and a third to unscrupulous money-getting. Because in these men, and in all such cases, their ideas were not sufficiently enlarged, and had not sufficient power, and were not of the kind to overcome their low animal and acquisitive impulses, and to determine them to desire some other mode of life which would have been incompatible with their abandonment to these lower impulses. While on the other hand we see the ideas of others disposing one to a life of laborious philanthropy, another to devotion to the welfare of his family, or of his country, and others to

literary and scientific pursuits. In each of these cases the lower impulses have been so far overpowered as to be kept in subjection, and other very different impulses have become predominant.

It is no answer to this view to allege that many ignorant people are kept in a right course by the single idea of future eternal punishment. I am by no means sure of its being so, because I see that there are multitudes of minds upon which that idea has not that effect. But supposing it to be so, such fears are a low and illegitimate way of influencing minds; and the conduct thence resulting can hardly be regarded as very highly moral. Besides, too, what we have to consider in these days is not how we may influence the minds of a small portion of the most ignorant, but how we may endeavour to make men of, to train up to intelligence and morality, the whole community. And the knowledge necessary for this, looking at mankind generally, the upper and the lower classes, men and women, equally, is the knowledge our attention has been directed to. There is, if we use words correctly, no other knowledge.

What I have as yet said about morality has reference to its psychology only. Its aim was to show that, psychologically, morality is the result of the action of ideas on our instincts and natural emotions, and of a power which ideas seem to have of themselves, independently, originating impulses to action, or at all events of issuing in action. I do not attempt to say anything about a psychological definition of morality, because that would require more precise knowledge on this part of our subject than possibly we possess at present. Still what we have been endeavouring to make out must, as far as it goes, be of some value to the educator. For it will help him in determining what an essential part of his practice in this matter ought to be. It will show him that he has to regulate natural emotion; and with what he has to regulate it; and how also, independently of natural emotions, he may, by idea-originated impulse, shape morality. This, I repeat, is a psychological view of the matter.

The psychological view, however, of morality is not the only one the educator will have to study. He will have formally and systematically to teach morality; and his being able to tell his pupils what morality is pyschologically will not enable him to teach it. In order to be able to do this, he will, furthermore, have to study the phenomena of morality, as they manifest themselves in human societies. He will have to observe, analyse, and classify these phenomena. In this way only will he be able to teach it. Psychology will inform him how morality is to be produced; and this knowledge will be of much use to him in his educational practice; but sociology only can inform what it is that has to be produced. He will have to show what in any particular case society requires; why that is what it requires; what are the motives of any moral action; and what the consequences, both as respects the doer, and him, or those, towards whom the action is directed. Regarded in this way the subject is a very large one, for its data must be collected from the whole range of human history, and of human life as now observable; and also a very important one, for its determinations are supreme for good or evil, as they are correct or erroneous, accepted or rejected, not only over every separate action, but also over the whole plan, of every man's life.

We have, then, now to inquire, as scientific educationists, what morality is when regarded as a sociological phenomenon. It may not be quite useless to begin by asking how this word morality came to stand for the thing we are now investigating. Etymologically it means manners and ways of acting. Eventually it came to be used for the thing we are speaking of because to the general apprehension its original meaning very well fitted it for popularly conveying the idea that had to be conveyed, that of the right manners, and the right ways of acting. A standard has now been set up; and when tried by this standard some manners and ways of acting are condemned, and held to be wrong, and some are approved, and held to be right.

We now, then, have to ascertain what is meant by the right way of acting. What is it that is meant in this connexion by the word right? What is the idea conveyed by it? What does its analysis yield? Let us look for this idea in its derivative, or secondary, but here very important use, I mean in the word "rights." The idea that certain actions are right gives rise to the idea that people can claim that others should so act towards them. These are right actions towards them, or their rights.

I wish it to be distinctly understood that I am here using the word exclusively of moral rights. Legal rights are only that portion of our moral rights which from time to time have been found capable of definition, and of enforcement by law. And, furthermore, in the progress of knowledge, and of the conditions of society, it not unfrequently comes to pass that they are in most direct and flagrant conflict with moral rights, that is to say, are heinous moral wrongs. This was obviously the case with slavery; and possibly those who will come after us will perhaps see that it is so at the present moment amongst ourselves with the law-created and law-maintained right of accumulating the agricultural land of the country in the hands of a few possessors, and, by the device of settling and charging it, of preventing the actual cultivators from having, or from ever entertaining the hope of having, homes of their own; the home being the fountain, and the nurse, too, of wellnigh every virtue, and of almost all happiness. Moral rights are always multiplying, and expanding, and receiving truer definition, in proportion to our advances in knowledge, and to the improvements which from time to time take place in the conditions of society. But legal rights, although professedly based on moral rights, will never, even when the attempt is made honestly to approximate to them as closely as may be possible, equal our moral rights. This is a necessity of their nature, or conditions. They can never equal more than that portion of them which can be defined, and enforced by law, often only what appears to the governing class expedient to define and enforce.

What, then, are these moral rights? What is it that justifies men in claiming them as rights? It will be impossible to answer these questions without looking at the *relations* in which men stand towards each other; because it is out of these relations that the rights in question arise. If the relations had no existence, the rights would have no existence. As we look at these relations, we shall see what rights they give rise to; and seeing how the rights arise, will show us on what grounds they rest, and what it is that makes them rights.

The natural relations, then, of mankind are first those of the family, resolvable into those of husband and wife, and of parents and children; then of individuals to the community, and of the community to individuals, and of individuals towards each other in their endless dealings with each other, and of the several classes of the community towards each other; next come those of communities towards each other; and lastly of communities, and even of individuals towards the race. In every one of these relations the individual, or those towards whom any action is directed, have rights. Let us see this. Nothing need be said here of the rights that grow out of the relations of the several members of a family towards each other, or of the reciprocal rights of the individuals of a community towards each other; but a word as to the reciprocal rights of the community and of individuals: it must not so exercise its rights as to crush, or injure, individuals; and individuals must not claim, as rights, positions that are prejudicial to the public good. As to the reciprocal rights of the different classes of the same community, these, like all other rights, vary in their practical application in accordance with times and circumstances, that is to say in accordance with the conditions of society. Under the present conditions of society we are beginning to see that they consist in this, that no one class shall insist upon, or maintain, any privilege which would be prejudicial to the interest of any other class. The reciprocal rights of communities are defined by international law. As to the rights of the race, formerly they could have had no

place in men's thoughts, but now they are seen to have a large and distinct place. They, as mankind approaches more and more nearly to the condition of a single world-wide community, are rapidly becoming more palpable, more numerous, and more important. For instance, the race may claim from separate communities, and from every individual member of any community who is able to influence its action, that they shall, each, to the best of its, or of his, ability, promote international good-feeling, and oppose unjust and aggressive war; and that they shall expose and denounce cruel and unjust institutions, such as slavery; or revolting barbarities and atrocities such as those that of late have righteously horrified Christendom; and that they shall advocate the removal of all unnecessary restrictions on the friendly intercourse of the different nations of the world; and on the free interchange of their respective productions, so that every man, everywhere, may have access, in proportion to his abilities, industry, and success, to the productions of the whole earth, now becoming in a high, intelligible, and workable sense the patrimony of all. Through the press, too, and the telegraph, a community, or even an individual, may now address the whole world. The world, therefore, now has a claim, or right, that this power also shall be exercised for the general good of the race.

Such, then, are the rights we are inquiring about. The next question is, What is there common to them all which makes them rights? Why do mankind claim them as, and allow them to be, rights? Clearly because what is in each case claimed is for the advantage of him, or of them, who claim it. Were it not for his, or their advantage, it could not be claimed, and the claim would not be allowed. This is what it rests upon, what constitutes it a right. Of course there are limits to these rights; but those limits we need not consider now beyond the remark, that, while all are sufficiently limited by common sense, many may assume heroic forms and proportions. It is enough for our present purpose that we see there can be no doubt as to what

constitutes these rights. It is because the thing claimed is for the good of those who claim it, and whose claim, on that ground, mankind allow.

This, however, is a statement which has regard to only one of the two parties to every action—the party that is to say towards whom the action is directed. We must now look to the other party, he who does the action. Is it at all supposed in the ordinary apprehensions of mankind that the action will be advantageous for the agent in the sense and manner in which it is advantageous for those towards whom it is directed? Is it for his benefit in the same direct sense in which it is for theirs? Are his ordinary interests and pleasures promoted by it? Almost the contrary. It is always understood, and as a matter of fact and experience we know, that on his part it will demand a certain amount of self-constraint, of self-renunciation, of self-sacrifice. It may even require, as in the case of soldiers, and martyrs, that a man should lay down his very life itself. These are extreme cases: but they differ from all acts, that extort our approval on the ground of morality, only in the degree of self-sacrifice they impose. In the Hebrew Prophet, the Christian Apostle, the patriot, the philanthropist, the charitable man, the man who lives a laborious life for some good cause, the good parent, the industrious, the thrifty, the honest, the truthful, the consideration that commands our approval is the same. It is that each of them has imposed restrictions on some one, or other, of his impulses, passions, or ordinary interest for the sake of others; or of something in himself higher and better than these impulses, passions, and interests. This self-constraint, or self-sacrifice, is what in him makes the action, or the life, moral. Without it they would not be moral. It must, therefore, be allowed a place in the determination of what is morality; it must be included in the definition of morality. Of all the benefits Christianity has conferred on mankind I am not disposed to rank any higher than the fact of its having made this element of morality distinct to the general apprehension of Christendom.

Here, then, we have another most important, and altogether indispensable, constituent element in moral actions. The two together seem to cover the whole of the field of inquiry. For we are inquiring into the nature of an action, and have now ascertained how it will affect both the agent and those towards whom his action is directed. A moral action, then, in the apprehension of mankind, which is a reflection of the nature of the thing, is one which will be for the good of another, or of others; and the doing of which will impose self-constraint, or self-sacrifice, on the doer. These are evidently in every case the grounds, and the only grounds, men have for praising such actions. If they were not for the good of others, if they did not impose self-renunciation, there would be no ground for praising them. Neither society, nor individuals, praise those who do them service merely for their own advantage, or at no cost at all to themselves. I look for the never-failing constituent elements of the idea of morality in the universally received conceptions of mankind, because there is no other quarter in which we can find them, or even look for them. We are not investigating anything but what is a conception of mankind about a phenomenon of human society.

I have no time for subordinate considerations: but it may have been observed that I have not forgotten what may be called personal morality, that is to say the morality which is seen in a man's conduct, when, from a proper consideration and estimate of all that his nature requires of him, he puts such constraint upon himself as to suppress the claims of what is immediate and lower in favour of the claims of what is more distant and higher: who, for instance, prefers health to self-indulgence, or who lives an intellectual in preference to an animal life. It is obvious that this kind of personal morality is strictly analogous to that which has its root in considerations for the interests of others.

One remark more on this part of the subject. Morality, like every other course of action, must have an adequate motive; and experience shows that it is not without it. Its natural motives,

and those whose ideas render them capable of feeling them seldom find their power insufficient, are the approval of others, and of a man's own conscience; the contemplation of the good that will be done; and the reflection that something will be contributed to the improvement of society, of which the actor is himself a member, and that if all could be brought to act in a like manner the well-being of society would be fully secured. This last motive is not so feeble a one as might appear at the first glance, for the moral man is endeavouring by his own conduct to get established as a law of society, that on the condition of his acting morally towards others all the world should act morally towards himself. Or we may put this with an elimination of the idea of personal advantage: men cannot help desiring perfection in all things, and most of all in that in which mankind are most concerned, that is in society itself; and morality is a conscious effort to advance and establish the perfection of society.

Of course, if our theory is at all adequate it will help us in understanding the possible inadequacies of other theories. We will, therefore, now just set by the side of it some of the most generally received. Theologians, and the majority of Christian people, would tell us that right morality is what God has made right morality. This may be regarded as the popular account of the phenomenon. But, taking for granted its truth, still it will not assist us much in the work before us. For the question instantly arises what has God made true morality? And on investigation we find that in every age theologians, and the great mass of Christian people, very much like other people in all ages all over the world, have had very different ideas as to what this is. Doubtless what moralists of this kind would at this day, guarding themselves as carefully as they could by a recollection of the divergences and errors of their predecessors, lay down very confidently as perfect immutable morality, will be repudiated by the theologians and Christian people of the future. Not even is the contemporary morality of one Christian Church the morality of another. There is, in fact, no theological

road to the discovery of what we are in search of. To believe that there is, is only a survival of the old traditional attempt to solve the great question by the only method once, and for a long time, possible. The use of such a method belongs to those times when in any place men's acquaintance with the race was very limited; and when from the necessities of their position their observations were so imperfect, and their judgment so warped, that they could form no conception of the universality of morality, and were obliged to believe that God had originated none but their own, and that whatever elsewhere claimed to be morality was hateful to him. Had they been as widely acquainted as we are with all mankind, and as able as we are to analyse the morality of all, they would have arrived, as we are doing, at a perception of the substantial identity of the bases of the morality of all, both as to its purpose as it affects others, and as to its requirement of self-constraint as it affects the doer. They would, then, have placed the will of God in this matter in these two essential constants, and not as they very much did in the variable accidents, which resulted from the contemporary degree of knowledge, and the contemporary conditions of society. Now that we are beginning to grasp the constants, and to find that we can safely by them test our own actions, and the actions of others, we can say with the understanding that morality is as much in the divinely-appointed social order as gravitation is in the divinely-appointed physical order. In this sense there will be but few to doubt but that it is the will of God. This, however, is a conclusion which is reached by observation and analysis. Besides it is now obvious, which formerly was not seen, that religion is an outgrowth of morality. The very reverse used to be taken for granted.

Another theory is that of Aristotle. He tells us that the virtues, which together constitute morality, are each of them a middle term. This was a very ingenious remark; but it is not one that at all enables us to understand the nature of morality. It is something like the attempt of Linnæus to classify plants by

counting their stamens and styles; though, indeed, it is not nearly of so much scientific value, for the number of the stamens and styles is a fixed fact in the nature of the things he was dealing with; the limits, however, of the middle term are variable, and must in every age, and among every people, be laid down by contemporary common sense and good feeling. In Aristotle's time they had to be settled by Aristotle's countrymen; and when thus settled they allowed much we now consider erroneous, and omitted much, both in the political and personal order, we now require. Of course right morality will have to guard against too much and too little; against excesses and deficiency; but they are not of its essence. They do not originate or shape its constants, which are what they are, because the nature of man and of human society is what it is; that is to say, because the good of society, alike in all its relations, can be promoted only by the efforts, often very costly, always more or less costly, of its individual members.

Our acquaintance with the moral conceptions of the Greeks, for which we are so largely indebted to Aristotle's great systematic work on ethics, is most valuable; for without it we should not have the full knowledge we now possess of the conclusions reached on this subject by the most thoughtful and most cultivated people of the old world. And this full knowledge adds much to the importance of the particular it supplies for our induction, from the morality of all ages and peoples, for ascertaining what absolute morality is.

A word about the most famous of modern theories, that of utility. This, as generally understood, attempts to explain the whole of the matter by one of our constants, the way in which morality affects others than the agent. This doctrine has been formulated into the criterium of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Here however we seem to have a principle of legislation rather than of morality. What the act is as respects the agent, evidently a primary consideration in all questions of morality, is entirely passed over. We have, however, seen that

in the nature of the thing itself, and in the apprehensions of mankind about it, this is, to say the least, an equipollent constitutive element of morality, which we have found is not a simple undecomposable, but a complex, matter, capable of yielding up its elements to analysis.

Again the doctrine of utility, as presented to us in its popular formula of the greatest good to the greatest number, appears to apportion to the majority all the good, and to the minority anything that may happen; indeed it seems to imply that their part of the transaction will be only inconvenience, loss, and suffering. This, however, is a thoroughly untenable, we may say, an absurd, suggestion. This would be tyranny, and not morality. It is a non-moral, or rather an immoral conception. No one could be expected to act, or would act, in such a way as on the whole, everything considered, permanently to injure himself; or so to abandon his own interests as that others should in every respect have the whole advantage of his conduct: for his conduct is after all voluntary, and a matter of choice. The true account of the matter will show not only that others will be benefited, but will also include the consideration of the natural human motives which influence the agent, and of the ways in, and of the extent to, which he will be compensated for his acts of self-renunciation.

Another suggestion of this formula which is misleading is that it seems to regard the majority, or the minority, of the community rather than the individual, as the moral unit. Of course any supposition of this kind is quite the reverse of the true view. In those cases in which the majority, or the minority, of a community may in a certain sense be regarded as a moral agent, it is still the nature of the conduct of the individuals that compose it, which gives to the action its moral character. The individual is always the moral agent. In every moral action it is the individual who has to determine how he will act. That he has to determine this for himself is what makes it in him a moral action. If we do not see this distinctly our moral inquiries become hazy, and are up in the air; whereas, as practice is

involved, that is to say as conduct and life are the result, we ought to be sure that every step we take is on firm and distinctly understood ground. If morality is to be taught scientifically in schools, and with a view to practice, the utmost distinctness will be indispensable; and that I felt obliged me to submit to your consideration something about both its psychological genesis, and its sociological definition: in order that, as respects the former, we might get a glimpse of how morality is produced in the mind; and, as respects the latter, of what it is in itself, and in men's apprehensions, when regarded as a phenomenon of society; this necessitated a reference to the relations of mankind towards each other, out of which every form and shape of it has its rise, with the single exception of what I called personal, which, however, is strictly analogous to altruistic, morality.

In these days when it is not one class, but the whole nation that we have to educate, morality becomes an indispensable aim of education. This, therefore, is a subject the educator must study and master. He will have to explain what it is both abstractedly in our conceptions, and concretely in each particular act; what makes it what it is; what are its motives; what are its consequences; and how all its variations, both historical and contemporary, are to be accounted for; these are sociological questions. And it will also be necessary for him, at least for the guidance of his educational practice, furthermore to know something about its psychological genesis: for he will have not only to teach his pupils what morality is, and what it will require of them, but also by his general scheme of instruction to produce it in their minds, without formally saying at the moment anything about it. If he cannot in these ways present the subject to his own mind, and to the minds of his pupils, we shall I think deem him deficient in the highest qualification of an educator for these times.

It is futile to say that everybody already knows in what morality consists. This is not true even for the requirements of practising it, still less is it true for the requirements of teaching

it. It would be very much nearer the fact to say that a great many people have nothing that can properly be called an idea on the subject; and that even educated people have up to a very long range very different ideas about it. This in part arises from the popular method of treating the subject having had so little, or no, recourse to observation and analysis, which of course can alone enable us to arrive at a knowledge of its substance, and consequently so to present its truths as that they may be readily and intelligently apprehended by ordinary persons. If any one should think that this method is unnecessary because religion has, as he would maintain, sufficiently defined it, I would reply that this is impossible, because religion, as is now distinctly understood, grows in part out of morality, and is, under the guidance of the ideas man may have of the Unseen, an application of it. It can neither originate morality, nor determine what it is. Morality is originated by the conditions of society and of human nature, and determined by the common sense of mankind when directed to the consideration of what the conditions of society require. When it has been so originated and so determined, religion makes use of it for its purposes. Or if others are of opinion that in this matter of morality, observation, analysis, and scientific definition are not necessary, because, as they would maintain, law has already adequately dealt with it; again I reply that this too is impossible, for law also grows out of morality, and is an application of it; on the whole an advancing application, but often, indeed, so imperfect an application of it as to be in direct antagonism with it. Morality has an existence that is independent either of religion, or of municipal law. It is what the nature of man, and the nature of society, make it. It has its place in the order of man's nature, and in the order of society, as much, and in the same sense, as any physical phenomena have their place in the physical order. No guesses, or metaphysical assumptions, or interested, or narrow interpretations of it, are of any real value. What it is in the mind, and what it ought to be for the purposes of society, can

only be ascertained by wide observation, history, experience, analysis, induction. When we shall have thus ascertained what it is psychologically, and what are its sociological requirements, we shall have placed it on an immovable foundation, and invested it with unquestionable authority. We shall then be able to teach it with precision and firmness, intelligibly and thoroughly.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I have not shrunk from dwelling at some length on moral culture, because I hope that it will be the high privilege of our Society to endeavour to show in this matter what ought to be done, and how it ought to be done. If the science of education has the all-embracing significance we would attribute to it, this must be an essential part of it. When I contemplate the intellectual, the moral, and the material condition of the overwhelming majority of the vast aggregation of human beings in the midst of which we are still allowed quietly to consider this subject, and recollect that in Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Leeds, Glasgow, and in other towns only less populous than these, we have very insufficiently balanced hosts of operatives and artizans, equalling in numbers the population of capitals that have been famous in their day; and when to these propertyless, and but scantily-instructed, millions I add our agricultural labourers, among whom my life has been spent, and of whose moral and intellectual and material condition I have not been led to form an assuring estimate, I am brought to the conclusion irresistibly that morality, even if we take no other than political grounds, must in the future be made a leading aim of education in all classes; and that it must be lighted by intelligence. In these days of universal political equality, when force, as an instrument of government, is impracticable, voluntary submission alone being possible, if of the two one can be said to be more needed than the other, it is morality, and not intelligence. Intelligence alone, still less very partially cultivated and scantily-furnished intelligence, will not serve our turn. With the

means now within the reach of all for combining, with our enormous disparities of condition, with the mighty powers of mischief science has put into the hands of the discontented, the ill-disposed, and the ignorant, in one word of the neglected, any system of education which is incapable of teaching, which does not aim at teaching, and, too, succeed in teaching, morality, is worse than a sham; for by stimulating and arming intelligence, while it does nothing for morality, it aggravates, and calls into activity, and gives strength to, the evils that are festering in the bosom of modern societies. In the course of human affairs the facts which drive us to this conclusion are assuming such distinctness and force as will oblige every community to cultivate morality. The evil that is to be met is appalling, but not irremediable. There is one remedy, and but one, that can be applied to it. The nature of society, as well as the nature of man, proclaim its appropriateness, its exclusiveness, and its sufficiency. This remedy is morality. To have it taught is the supremest interest, and the highest duty of the community, as to practise it is of the individual. For the community to neglect to have it taught is to make provision for its own convulsion and overthrow. And for our Society to neglect the endeavour to show what in this matter ought to be done, and how it ought to be done, would be to renounce our title, which implies the truthfulness to nature, and the comprehensiveness of science. Our hopes of vigorous vitality and of much usefulness would thus be brought to nothing. If we neglect this work, others, we may be sure, will arise to take it up. The day will come when what is needed in this matter will be generally understood—let us hope that we in this country may not have this understanding forced upon us by some dire catastrophe—and when the attempt to supply it will be generally made in schools. In the meantime let our Society contribute what it can to this consummation by at once inscribing on its banner—"Intelligence and Morality. In everything, and for all, as far as possible, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

The main facts and principles I have endeavoured to establish, and of which I have made use, in the foregoing Address, are the following:

That in every department of thought and work, therefore in education, comprehensive, systematic, verifiable knowledge, that is to say science, must eventually supersede the old so-called knowledge of guesses and traditions.

That the aim of education is the intellectual and moral perfecting of man, so far as this can be done, for the existing conditions of society.

That our present educational system is ecclesiastical, and non-natural.

That originally it was ecclesiastically necessary, and now is only ecclesiastically convenient.

That the true system will be natural, that is to say that it will use in a natural way the resources of the day for the purposes of the day; and that it will, in proportion to their opportunities, be suitable for all.

That the instrument of education is knowledge.

That complete knowledge will be the intellectual reflection of the *ensemble* of nature, including the varied phenomena of human activity.

That in education the special must grow out of, and rest on, the general.

That our teaching, and our arrangements for teaching, must be so organized as to provide for this view of our work, that is to say that we now require, in the place of the old single subject system which has become anachronous and obstructive, an organization of studies, and an organized staff of teachers, which can be supplied only by public institutions

That in educating the whole people morality can not be omitted from our aim

That knowledge is the instrument for educating the moral as well as the intellectual faculties.

That morality has its own place and being in the constitution

of nature, as the *modus vivendi bene* of the family, of the community, of the race, and, in respect of the rival claims of his compound nature, of the individual.

That the constants of morality are ever complicated with contemporary variables.

That morality has both a psychological and a sociological definition, being a phenomenon both of the mind and of society.

That its psychological definition will show what morality is in the mind, and how it is produced.

That its sociological definition will show how it affects both those towards whom it is directed, and the agent, and also its motives.

That the educator will need both these definitions.

That law and religion are applications of morality ; that both depend upon it.

That law being a limited, and often a false, application of morality makes necessary religion, which affirms its universality, and aims at its ideal perfection : the other factor of religion being what man from time to time infers from the phenomenal about the unseen.

That the generally received theories of morality, though of course containing much truth, are insufficient for educational purposes.

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