THE SURVIVAL.

WITH

AN APOLOGY FOR SCEPTICISM.

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CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . 1

THE SURVIVAL. . . . . . . . . 99

APOLOGY FOR SCEPTICISM. . . . . . 425
INTRODUCTION.

I.

but transmigrating from his fifteenth to his

ERRATA.

Page 22, twenty-ninth line—for "Cosmos" read "Space."
Page 33, sixth line—for "deliberate need" read "section that suspended the deliberation."
Page 65, foot note—for "truculent" read "truculence."
Note 122, second line—for "S" read "T."

belief that it was merelygetuned liter-
ary blindness, was rejoiced to find that the ideal of human perfection which it proposed, coincided with the Christian spirit, and that, except as to what is mystical and ritual, the method of sanctification which it begot coincided with that of the Roman Catholic Church, as practised by its religious orders. It differed from mere intellectual certitude of the existence and authority of God as being a potent ally against temptation, as enabling needful self-denial. It enabled its subject (let him be known by the name, Mark Smith) to live in a purgatory of ascetic severity, until
conscience instructed him to be more gentle to nature. It seemed to be supernaturally sanctioned, and especially by the visits of a spirit so like the Paraclete that, if vouchsafed to a Christian, he could not doubt that his heart was for the time a temple. It lasted about fourteen years, and then one night exhaled during sleep. Smith went to sleep a believer, and awoke an infidel—an infidel, if that name can be applied to one in whom the spirit of holiness survives, and who was never more tenacious of sanctity, never so intolerant of its opposite, as he is at this moment.

By the term, spirit of holiness, I mean the sentiment of the sacred. It is to sacredness what seeing is to colour, hearing to sound, aesthetic feeling to beauty, wonder to the marvellous, fear to danger. It is emotion given as intuitive, the object of the intuition being the attribute, sacredness. In its commoner manifestations, it is known as reverence, of which filial piety is the most conspicuous example. In its higher forms, wherein it refers to the supernatural, and above all to the divine, it transcends what is commonly accounted reverence; and, as apprehending sacredness in beings inferior to man (for, in its perfection, it apprehends all conscious being as sacred) it exceeds what is comprehended under the idea of reverence. Reverence is but a species of the sentiment of the sacred. It is embarrassing that language has provided no names for the several species of this genus, nor for the habit of the sentiment, nor for the faculty which the sentiment supposes. Under the name spirit of holiness, I chiefly refer to the habit of the sentiment, and to a sentiment of the sacred that seems to be a manifestation of a divine person. The heart which experiences this beatitude seems to have become a holy of holies, pervaded by what may be described as a vague personality that disposes to, and joins it in, worship. The beatitude is so vague in respect of the personality, as to leave room for a doubt whether it be not mere exaltation of reverence to which imagination, in
fulfilment of the promise of Christ respecting the Comforter, annexes, or essays to annex, the personality.

To make known the strange event, of which I have given an outline, is the object, or rather the primary object, of this work. But how make it known? A narrative of the event unauthenticated by the person in whom it obtained, and by a name and character of known dignity, would not command credit. Good taste excludes such an authentication; and, moreover, Smith is an obscure man; his name would count for nothing with the public. But the event itself has produced certain records which seem to be proofs of the fact from which they have proceeded. They are for the most part the footprints of a moral and religious progress. Bent upon the life of perfect obedience exacted by faith, Smith found his effort to obey thwarted by a principle of intentional action which, deceived by the common error that all intentional action is voluntary, he had thitherto mistaken for will. He found that he had not power to keep his purpose constantly in view, that its absence, when an impulse to some violative action beset him, was the absence of a condition of choice, and that, thus, he was made agent in respect of involuntary intentional action, violative of his will. Sometimes the impulse, especially when one of anger, would transport him into violative action in spite of the utmost resistance of his will. He cast about for means to modify his mind, so that it should always have in view his purpose of obedience and conduct. Practice, he thought, begets habit. By obliging the mind to revert frequently to this purpose, and the heart to God, I shall beget a corresponding intellectual and emotive habit. Accordingly, he made it a rule to revert for about a minute every quarter-hour to the purpose of obedience in an act of worship, to meditate and worship three times a day, to retire monthly into a three-day retreat, and to make minutes of characteristic psychical events, indicative of success, or failure, or sug-
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II.

The annihilation of our annotator's faith during sleep is all the more wonderful, that while under its influence he believed it to be a condition of mind imposed in part by an act of will, and one that, in the normal state of his mind, could not be annihilated but by an act of will. He supposed that the evidence to which he was partly indebted for faith, merely disposed him to believe, but authoritatively, by a moral imperative which he felt it would be irreverent and culpable to disobey, and that the faith was a condition of mind begotten of an answering volition or act of obedience—a fiat or decree that God is and governs. To this volition, analogous to an act of allegiance, he gave the name arbitrium, or arbitrament. The term arbitrium signifies a mental act in which a certitude, or an opinion and a volition are combined, for example, a verdict. When one says of himself after deliberation, I have made up my mind, an act of will is, or seems to be, compounded with an opinion—the act is an arbitrament. The life of the resolute—of men who stem where others drift, who are prone to feel that "the power and corrigible authority of this lies in the will," who have it in them to become masters of themselves—to substitute a life of conduct for one of impulse, proceeds mainly on arbitraments, involving mere opinion. Now, Smith had been drifting between atheism and deism during the greater part of his life, and
so prevented from anchoring a moral life in God. He had vainly endeavoured to intrench himself from sin in stoicism. He had no rock on which to build his moral edifice—only sand. Were his moral longings to be kept thus for ever in abeyance? No: he would no longer be postponed by the impotence of reason. In what relates to the practical when reason affords only opinion, why should not will take a part, and raise the opinion, in an arbitrament, to the equivalent of a certitude? The opportunity of helping reason by such an arbitrament, and thereby securing ground for a moral and religious life, was afforded when the existence of a Divine Creator and Father became probable to his heart. Decree the truth of the thesis, that God is and governs, and, having landed on this truth, burn your ships. Manhood, reason, and duty, concurred in this injunction. Even though truth were not with us, they said, dignity and wisdom are with us. Is it holy, noble, or wise, to follow probability to perdition? If not, what shall be thought of him who will not bestir himself to follow probability to Heaven—who will not budge if certitude be not the guide? The disposition to believe under the influence of which, as Smith supposed, his will pledged itself to God, might vanish, or he might be assailed by atheistic evidence, apparently demonstrative. Could he not moor himself to Heaven by a moral obligation—by putting perfidy between him and infidelity? Could he not keep the fortress for God unaided by sentiment, and even against demonstrative evidence? He believed that he could—that a condition of mind competent to this fidelity would be the result of his arbitrament, and that so long as his mind should be in a normal state, nothing could extinguish this condition but his own volition.

Other things contributed to enhance, in his view, the notion that will is in part the source of a species of faith. In the first place, the notion seemed to agree with the Christian doctrine that men are responsible for faith. How
should they be responsible if faith be independent of will? Secondly, temptations of faith are known to the spiritual of the Roman Catholic Church as affording occasion for an exercise of the highest form of devotion, that which is termed dry devotion. The sentiment of God seems to be extinct, and in its stead is an aversion to, and something like scorn of, things holy: the soul seems to itself, in so far as faith is concerned, to have been the dupe of an illusion: if it put forth no effort it is an infidel; but it puts forth the needful effort, it cleaves manfully to God, and apparently without support. This holding to God by bare will, and especially when duty exacts severe self-denial for God's sake, is regarded by the Church as one of the highest and most salutary forms of devotion. Faith, in this militant phase, seems to be identical with volition. Thirdly, the relation of works to faith, recognised by the Roman Catholic Church, seems to imply that volition is either essential or indispensable to faith. The Church has not declared herself upon the subject, but gives room for the belief that she implicitly holds grace to be one element of faith, and either volition or a condition of mind caused by volition, another. This view is countenanced by the declaration that faith was counted to Abraham for righteousness. If will had not to do with faith, as it has with righteousness, one fails to see why Abraham's faith should be regarded as being, on the scale of merit, the equivalent of righteousness.

III.

The idea of will contributing an element to faith, is abhorrent to the dogmatic mind. It presents an aspect of consistency only to those who are intimately conversant with the radical fallibility of the human mind. To men moved by godliness, have vainly explored the domain in quest of a rock on which to erect religion,
who have come back from the search with a conviction that there is no such thing as a criterion of truth, and that, so far from affording a demonstration of God, Reason threatens to requite scrutiny with atheism, it appears not only consistent but reasonable, and, when possible, even a duty that, as regards the thesis, God exists and man owes him obedience, will should make itself a party to assent. An eminent divine of our time, who seems to have examined the resources of Reason, as regards religion, with rare ability and diligence, has fled for refuge from private judgment to authority. Was not either the volition whereby he thus maintained his hold on Christianity, or a consequent state of mind an element of assent and of faith, the complementary element being the grace that disposed him to cling to Christ? Godliness, common sense, conviction of the impotence of unaided Reason to evolve belief in God, together with manliness, intolerant of postponement by infirmity, conspired to engender in the heart of our annotator a conviction that there is an epoch of mental development at which Reason finds it reasonable that Will shall dictate to her a major premiss on which all judgment respecting conduct shall depend—the axiom that there is a God, and that we owe Him obedience. It seemed to him that he was both logically and morally bound to annex to the beatitude which disposed him to believe and worship the supreme arbitrament, that would make perfidy the alternative of faith. Smith is a born sceptic; in other words the congenital structure of his mind is such that, with fair opportunity of intellectual growth, it must ultimately conform to the conviction that the human mind is radically fallible. To minds of this order, if they hunger and thirst after righteousness, if, in other words, they yearn to break from the shell of original sin, the possibility and dignity of this transcendent function of the will is intelligible.

The term scepticism, as here employed, does not signify
the Pyrrhonic absurdity, universal doubt, but mere cognisance, serving as an habitual mould of judgment, that we are liable to erroneous certitudes, and are incapable of distinguishing true from erroneous certitudes; in other words, that we are liable to error and are destitute of a criterion of truth. The following extracts from a manuscript of our annotator will explain more fully and exactly and justify the sense in which the term is here used, and at the same time contribute to make known the nature of the soil on which had fallen the seed of a faith destined to so strange a development and death.

Definitions of the Terms, Superficial Fallibility, Radical Fallibility, Scepticism, Dogmatism, Pyrrhonism, Dominant Opinion.

"When experience first discovers to us that we are liable to error, we do not suspect how inconsiderable is the sphere of our infallibility. It is not until we have sounded certitude, and ascertained how small a part of it excludes room for error—how many of the most important kinds of certitude, for example certitude of identity are, if true, only accidentally true—that we get at the root of the matter. Let us give the name, superficial fallibility, to that which ordinary experience exposes, and the name, radical fallibility to that which it takes a profound study on the mind to lay bare. Radical fallibility extends indefinitely into the region of what is held to be necessary truth; for privation of a thesis sometimes gives an aspect of necessary truth to what is untrue, and there is therefore room to suspect every certitude of what seems to be necessary truth, except the certitude of one's own existence and of what present consciousness does and does not contain. The following example will prove, not only that we are liable to err in respect of what seems to be necessary truth, but that the
constitution of the mind, and its circumstances, render this kind of error inevitable. Until the mere relativity of direction is discovered, the mind is necessitated to apprehend an absolute up-and-down in space, and until weight is discovered to be attraction, it necessarily passes for a quality of body, not consisting in, nor in any way dependent on, a relation of bodies, but, like solidity, independent on such relation. Now, so long as the mind is, in respect of these attributes, short of the truth, it is deprived of a thesis in the absence of which, the thesis, that an unsupported body is necessarily in falling or downward motion, must pass with it for necessary truth."

"The name scepticism has been circling about two different significations, lighting now on one and then on the other, without finally settling on either, one being universal doubt, and the other conviction of the radical fallibility of the human mind. Popularly the name signifies universal doubt; but certain philosophers applying the name pyrrhonism to universal doubt, have employed the name scepticism, as signifying conviction of the radical fallibility of the human mind; and these, in my use of the word, I shall follow. Scepticism is a kind of cognition. It is efficient cognition of the radical fallibility of the human mind. The cognition is efficient, as being, on every pertinent occasion, a groove of speculation and a mould of theory, not an inoperative belief. Scepticism and pyrrhonism are alike opposed to what has been hitherto named dogmatism. Their likeness in this respect constitutes them a genus; but the genus has not been named. Dogmatism may be defined efficient belief that human infallibility affords sufficient room for philosophy, religion and conduct. Pyrrhonism doubts and scepticism denies the fundamental or determining thesis of dogmatism. Scepticism is agreed with dogmatism, that sanity excludes universal doubt: it regards the profession of pyrrhonism as either a make-believe or a
symptom of insanity. It differs from dogmatism as to the scope of human infallibility which it limits to—1st, certitude of one's own existence; 2nd, certitude of what the subject's present consciousness does and does not contain; 3rd, certitude of whatever else could not be unknown to the subject of the two first certitudes. It agrees with popular common sense, that it is absurd to disparage certitude for not being guaranteed by inconsistency of the opposite, and that it would be mischievous (if indeed it were possible) to deprive the mind of certitudes, not so guaranteed. Considering the prejudice arising from the confusion of scepticism with pyrrhonism and the unsuitableness of the name, dogmatism, to signify the opposite of scepticism, seeing that scepticism is founded on a dogma, I should prefer to substitute the words, fallibilism and infallibilism, but that an unknown writer risks too much in venturing, without extreme occasion, to express himself in terms of his own coining.

"We are sometimes uncertain whether our state of mind in respect of a given object is certitude or opinion. The highest degree of opinion is not immediately distinguishable from certitude, and we act upon it with apparently no less confidence than we act upon certitude. There are lower degrees of opinion, in which the subject knows himself to be merely opining, that afford rest and confidence to the mind, scarcely inferior to what is afforded by certitude. These and the highest degree of opinion, constitute what may be distinguished as dominant opinion."

Of the Perversion of Philosophy by Dogmatism.

"Scepticism in Europe originated with Socrates, and as remote as Socrates is from Pyrrho, so remote is scepticism from pyrrhonism. Socrates promulgated scepticism in the declaration, "I know that I know nothing." This knowledge of ignorance appeared to him to be the difference in
virtue of which, according to the oracle, he surpassed all other philosophers. Literally taken, the declaration is contradictory. It is therefore to be understood as signifying, “I know that only an insignificant part of what seems to be my knowledge, excludes room for error.” On this foundation, so little is scepticism antagonistic to religion, was constructed the theology of Plato.

“When scepticism developed in the mind of Socrates, his certitude must have surrendered a large part of its territory to opinion; and of the subsequent additions to the system of his beliefs, the greater part must have been dominant opinions, not certitudes. Accordingly his disciples, Plato, and the Platonists, must have founded the philosophy, religion, and ethics of the Academy mainly on opinion. The animus of the Academy as regards the restriction of certitude to a narrow confine and the proportionate enlargement of opinion, has been mainly, ever since, the animus of philosophy. The Church contends for nothing more of infallible certitude than what it considers indispensable to Christianity; beyond that, the temper of opinion is, as better agreeing to humility, more congenial to it than the temper of certitude. Inordinate certitude is characteristic of the vulgar and of the weak-minded of every class. It needs a certain strength to keep oneself erect and proceed resolutely on mere opinion; and nature has conferred upon this strength an aspect of dignity that could not be creditably overlooked. The man who, in doubtful and perilous circumstances, studies to evolve a scheme of action that shall exhibit some reason of preference and, having found it, proceeds upon it as resolutely as though he were certain of success, commands our approval irrespective of failure or success. At the opposite pole of our esteem is he whose irresolution holds him gaping on while blind causes are solving the problem for him. In proportion as men are of larger discourse, their beliefs, as a rule, comprise more opinions and fewer certitudes, and how
should it be otherwise, seeing that the movement of scientific research has been mainly from greater error to less?

"Except a mere hope that we are ultimately to attain to certitude in respect of all that interests us, there is no ground for the belief that certitude will ever exempt us from dependence on opinion, as regards the interpretation of nature. Yet dogmatism assumes that opinion is a mere scaffolding with which to construct certitudes—a region of mere hypothesis affording no ground for theory. Theory, according to dogmatism, supposes certitude, and the object of opinion is mere hypothesis: in other words, hypothesis is explanatory idea that is object of opinion, and theory explanatory idea that is object of certitude. The idea of theory grounded in opinion, however strong, is repugnant to dogmatism. Moreover, dogmatism holds that certitude affords ample room for theory, so that philosophy is not condemned to put up for ever with mere opinion in respect of any important truth—that what obstructs the march of knowledge, detaining the mind in ignorance or opinion, is mere accident, not any invincible necessity involved in the nature or circumstances of the mind. It insists that perception and reflection, although liable to superficial error, are radically infallible, and afford to research, in the certitudes that have been ever the terra firma of the common-sense of mankind, a sufficient foundation on which to construct universal science. But, so far as the constitution and circumstances of the mind are exposed to reason, they do not justify the supposition that theory, outside exact science, will ever find a sufficient and commensurate support in certitude. On the contrary, they make it probable that it will always rest mainly on opinion, having about as much support in certitude as the rope-dancer on the rope, and extending into opinion and, beyond opinion, into mere verisimilitude, as the balance pole of the rope-dancer extends beyond his solid support. Allegiance to this probability involves an intellectual humility that serves
as ballast to speculation and keeps it from perilous careening; for example, from throwing philosophy on beam-ends as modern physiology has done, in denying temporal identity to the human individual. According to modern physiology, the human individual is, bodily and mentally, a mere series without a durable element, like a wave or a flame: there is no durable subject of consciousness, no soul: a mere succession of consciousnesses constitutes what is called mind, as a mere succession of molecules or atoms constitutes the body. The doctrine does not seem to be inconsistent; but pyrrhonism is not more repugnant to common sense. It annihilates the ground of responsibility, morality and dignity. Why should conscience restrain? Being is a vortex of delusion and the sentiment of duty, a sham! To popularise the doctrine would be to rot society. The doctrine is the creature of dogmatism.

"All cognition and opinion form upon two latent assumptions—1st, that of a durable subject of consciousness (known as mind or soul), and 2nd, that of durable object. Reason attacks its own point d'appui if it put either assumption in question—it saws the branch on which it is sitting between itself and the trunk. If the assumptions are not valid, it is inconsistent to reason; for there is nothing to reason about. Reasoning supposes the veracity of the mind as regards these fundamental assumptions. To deny the truth of either is to deny the truth of both. Idealism blundered in dogmatically discarding the durable object. A judicious scepticism trusts in the mental constitution and respects its assumptions so long as they are not stigmatised by inconsistency. It is even on its guard against appearance of inconsistency, knowing that the appearance may be specious, so that its conservatism does not easily surrender a primary belief, even to appearance of inconsistency. It is saved by its faith in the mind and by its attachment to common-sense from such extravagances as that of idealism and the negation of human identity.
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CONTENTS.

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THE SURVIVAL. . . . . . . 99

APOLOGY FOR SCEPTICISM. . . . . . . 425
I.

A man, who had been oscillating from his fifteenth to his forty-second year, between atheism and a barren deism, coming at last by what seemed to him, sufficient evidence that Cosmos is the creature of a paternal Creator, derived from it a faith that excited and, to the extent of possible obedience, enabled and obtained a life regularly conformable to what he conceived to be the will of God. The evidence was the manifestation of the dependence of wisdom on authority and obedience. By wisdom I mean knowledge of good and evil, that has for its basis intolerance of evil. It differs from knowledge that is merely intellectual as involving motive. The faith thus elicited neither adopted nor rejected Christianity. It was always reverentially disposed towards Christ, harbored a hope that it would ultimately become Christian, was prone to the belief that it was merely detained from Christ by temporary blindness, was rejoiced to find that the ideal of human perfection which it proposed, coincided with the Christian spirit, and that, except as to what is mystical and ritual, the method of sanctification which it begot coincided with that of the Roman Catholic Church, as practised by its religious orders. It differed from mere intellectual certitude of the existence and authority of God as being a potent ally against temptation, as enabling needful self-denial. It enabled its subject (let him be known by the name, Mark Smith) to live in a purgatory of ascetic severity, until
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The idea of will contributing an element to faith, is abhorrent to the dogmatic mind. It presents an aspect of consistency only to those who are intimately conversant with the radical fallibility of the human mind. To men who, moved by godliness, have vainly explored the domain of Reason in quest of a rock on which to erect religion,
INTRODUCTION.

who have come back from the search with a conviction that there is no such thing as a criterion of truth, and that, so far from affording a demonstration of God, Reason threatens to requite scrutiny with atheism, it appears not only consistent but reasonable, and, when possible, even a duty that, as regards the thesis, God exists and man owes him obedience, will should make itself a party to assent. An eminent divine of our time, who seems to have examined the resources of Reason, as regards religion, with rare ability and diligence, has fled for refuge from private judgment to authority. Was not either the volition whereby he thus maintained his hold on Christianity, or a consequent state of mind an element of assent and of faith, the complementary element being the grace that disposed him to cling to Christ? Godliness, common sense, conviction of the impotence of unaided Reason to evolve belief in God, together with manliness, intolerant of postponement by infirmity, conspired to engender in the heart of our annotator a conviction that there is an epoch of mental development at which Reason finds it reasonable that Will shall dictate to her a major premiss on which all judgment respecting conduct shall depend—the axiom that there is a God, and that we owe Him obedience. It seemed to him that he was both logically and morally bound to annex to the beatitude which disposed him to believe and worship the supreme arbitrament, that would make perfidy the alternative of faith. Smith is a born sceptic; in other words the congenital structure of his mind is such that, with fair opportunity of intellectual growth, it must ultimately conform to the conviction that the human mind is radically fallible. To minds of this order, if they hunger and thirst after righteousness, if, in other words, they yearn to break from the shell of original sin, the possibility and dignity of this transcendent function of the will is intelligible.

The term scepticism, as here employed, does not signify
the Pyrrhonic absurdity, universal doubt, but mere cognisance, serving as an habitual mould of judgment, that we are liable to erroneous certitudes, and are incapable of distinguishing true from erroneous certitudes; in other words, that we are liable to error and are destitute of a criterion of truth. The following extracts from a manuscript of our annotator will explain more fully and exactly and justify the sense in which the term is here used, and at the same time contribute to make known the nature of the soil on which had fallen the seed of a faith destined to so strange a development and death.

*Definitions of the Terms, Superficial Fallibility, Radical Fallibility, Scepticism, Dogmatism, Pyrrhonism, Dominant Opinion.*

"When experience first discovers to us that we are liable to error, we do not suspect how inconsiderable is the sphere of our infallibility. It is not until we have sounded certitude, and ascertained how small a part of it excludes room for error—how many of the most important kinds of certitude, for example certitude of identity are, if true, only accidentally true—that we get at the root of the matter. Let us give the name, *superficial fallibility,* to that which ordinary experience exposes, and the name, *radical fallibility* to that which it takes a profound study on the mind to lay bare. Radical fallibility extends indefinitely into the region of what is held to be necessary truth; for privation of a thesis sometimes gives an aspect of necessary truth to what is untrue, and there is therefore room to suspect every certitude of what seems to be necessary truth, except the certitude of one's own existence and of what present consciousness does and does not contain. The following example will prove, not only that we are liable to err in respect of what seems to be necessary truth, but that the
constitution of the mind, and its circumstances, render this kind of error inevitable. Until the mere relativity of direction is discovered, the mind is necessitated to apprehend an absolute up-and-down in space, and until weight is discovered to be attraction, it necessarily passes for a quality of body, not consisting in, nor in any way dependent on, a relation of bodies, but, like solidity, independent on such relation. Now, so long as the mind is, in respect of these attributes, short of the truth, it is deprived of a thesis in the absence of which, the thesis, that an unsupported body is necessarily in falling or downward motion, must pass with it for necessary truth."

"The name scepticism has been circling about two different significations, lighting now on one and then on the other, without finally settling on either, one being universal doubt, and the other conviction of the radical fallibility of the human mind. Popularly the name signifies universal doubt; but certain philosophers applying the name pyrrhonism to universal doubt, have employed the name scepticism, as signifying conviction of the radical fallibility of the human mind; and these, in my use of the word, I shall follow. Scepticism is a kind of cognition. It is efficient cognition of the radical fallibility of the human mind. The cognition is efficient, as being, on every pertinent occasion, a groove of speculation and a mould of theory, not an inoperative belief. Scepticism and pyrrhonism are alike opposed to what has been hitherto named dogmatism. Their likeness in this respect constitutes them a genus; but the genus has not been named. Dogmatism may be defined efficient belief that human infallibility affords sufficient room for philosophy, religion and conduct. Pyrrhonism doubts and scepticism denies the fundamental or determining thesis of dogmatism. Scepticism is agreed with dogmatism, that sanity excludes universal doubt: it regards the profession of pyrrhonism as either a make-believe or a
symptom of insanity. It differs from dogmatism as to the scope of human infallibility which it limits to—1st, certitude of one's own existence; 2nd, certitude of what the subject's present consciousness does and does not contain; 3rd, certitude of whatever else could not be unknown to the subject of the two first certitudes. It agrees with popular common sense, that it is absurd to disparage certitude for not being guaranteed by inconsistency of the opposite, and that it would be mischievous (if indeed it were possible) to deprive the mind of certitudes, not so guaranteed. Considering the prejudice arising from the confusion of scepticism with pyrrhonism and the unsuitableness of the name, dogmatism, to signify the opposite of scepticism, seeing that scepticism is founded on a dogma, I should prefer to substitute the words, fallibilism and infallibilism, but that an unknown writer risks too much in venturing, without extreme occasion, to express himself in terms of his own coining.

"We are sometimes uncertain whether our state of mind in respect of a given object is certitude or opinion. The highest degree of opinion is not immediately distinguishable from certitude, and we act upon it with apparently no less confidence than we act upon certitude. There are lower degrees of opinion, in which the subject knows himself to be merely opining, that afford rest and confidence to the mind, scarcely inferior to what is afforded by certitude. These and the highest degree of opinion, constitute what may be distinguished as dominant opinion."

Of the Perversion of Philosophy by Dogmatism.

"Scepticism in Europe originated with Socrates, and as remote as Socrates is from Pyrrho, so remote is scepticism from pyrrhonism. Socrates promulgated scepticism in the declaration, "I know that I know nothing." This knowledge of ignorance appeared to him to be the difference in
virtue of which, according to the oracle, he surpassed all other philosophers. Literally taken, the declaration is contradictory. It is therefore to be understood as signifying, "I know that only an insignificant part of what seems to be my knowledge, excludes room for error." On this foundation, so little is scepticism antagonistic to religion, was constructed the theology of Plato.

"When scepticism developed in the mind of Socrates, his certitude must have surrendered a large part of its territory to opinion; and of the subsequent additions to the system of his beliefs, the greater part must have been dominant opinions, not certitudes. Accordingly his disciples, Plato, and the Platonists, must have founded the philosophy, religion, and ethics of the Academy mainly on opinion. The animus of the Academy as regards the restriction of certitude to a narrow confine and the proportionate enlargement of opinion, has been mainly, ever since, the animus of philosophy. The Church contends for nothing more of infallible certitude than what it considers indispensable to Christianity; beyond that, the temper of opinion is, as better agreeing to humility, more congenial to it than the temper of certitude. Inordinate certitude is characteristic of the vulgar and of the weak-minded of every class. It needs a certain strength to keep oneself erect and proceed resolutely on mere opinion; and nature has conferred upon this strength an aspect of dignity that could not be creditably overlooked. The man who, in doubtful and perilous circumstances, studies to evolve a scheme of action that shall exhibit some reason of preference and, having found it, proceeds upon it as resolutely as though he were certain of success, commands our approval irrespective of failure or success. At the opposite pole of our esteem is he whose irresolution holds him gaping on while blind causes are solving the problem for him. In proportion as men are of larger discourse, their beliefs, as a rule, comprise more opinions and fewer certitudes, and how
should it be otherwise, seeing that the movement of scientific research has been mainly from greater error to less?

"Except a mere hope that we are ultimately to attain to certitude in respect of all that interests us, there is no ground for the belief that certitude will ever exempt us from dependence on opinion, as regards the interpretation of nature. Yet dogmatism assumes that opinion is a mere scaffolding with which to construct certitudes—a region of mere hypothesis affording no ground for theory. Theory, according to dogmatism, supposes certitude, and the object of opinion is mere hypothesis: in other words, hypothesis is explanatory idea that is object of opinion, and theory explanatory idea that is object of certitude. The idea of theory grounded in opinion, however strong, is repugnant to dogmatism. Moreover, dogmatism holds that certitude affords ample room for theory, so that philosophy is not condemned to put up for ever with mere opinion in respect of any important truth—that what obstructs the march of knowledge, detaining the mind in ignorance or opinion, is mere accident, not any invincible necessity involved in the nature or circumstances of the mind. It insists that perception and reflection, although liable to superficial error, are radically infallible, and afford to research, in the certitudes that have been ever the *terra firma* of the common-sense of mankind, a sufficient foundation on which to construct universal science. But, so far as the constitution and circumstances of the mind are exposed to reason, they do not justify the supposition that theory, outside exact science, will ever find a sufficient and commensurate support in certitude. On the contrary, they make it probable that it will always rest mainly on opinion, having about as much support in certitude as the rope-dancer on the rope, and extending into opinion and, beyond opinion, into mere verisimilitude, as the balance pole of the rope-dancer extends beyond his solid support. Allegiance to this probability involves an intellectual humility that serves
as ballast to speculation and keeps it from perilous careening; for example, from throwing philosophy on beam-ends as modern physiology has done, in denying temporal identity to the human individual. According to modern physiology, the human individual is, bodily and mentally, a mere series without a durable element, like a wave or a flame: there is no durable subject of consciousness, no soul: a mere succession of consciousnesses constitutes what is called mind, as a mere succession of molecules or atoms constitutes the body. The doctrine does not seem to be inconsistent; but pyrrhonism is not more repugnant to common sense. It annihilates the ground of responsibility, morality and dignity. Why should conscience restrain? Being is a vortex of delusion and the sentiment of duty, a sham! To popularise the doctrine would be to rot society. The doctrine is the creature of dogmatism.

"All cognition and opinion form upon two latent assumptions—1st, that of a durable subject of consciousness (known as mind or soul), and 2nd, that of durable object. Reason attacks its own point d'appui if it put either assumption in question—it saws the branch on which it is sitting between itself and the trunk. If the assumptions are not valid, it is inconsistent to reason; for there is nothing to reason about. Reasoning supposes the veracity of the mind as regards these fundamental assumptions. To deny the truth of either is to deny the truth of both. Idealism blundered in dogmatically discarding the durable object. A judicious scepticism trusts in the mental constitution and respects its assumptions so long as they are not stigmatised by inconsistency. It is even on its guard against appearance of inconsistency, knowing that the appearance may be specious, so that its conservatism does not easily surrender a primary belief, even to appearance of inconsistency. It is saved by its faith in the mind and by its attachment to common-sense from such extravagances as that of idealism and the negation of human identity.
“Again, dogmatism hinders research by causing it to hug the coast of certitude, when it should put to sea under the guidance of verisimilitude. If research should attain to a system of interdependent and consistent hypotheses, explanatory of the ῥᾴδιον and to but one such system, it would be reasonable to receive the system as true; and it might ground itself, like the theory of gravitation, in the belief of mankind—in the certitude of some, and the dominant opinion of others. Now the business of research is to achieve such a system. It seeks at first, not certitude nor even opinion, but, consistency; and it must not reject an hypothesis because it does not, at once, take root in certitude or opinion. It must proceed even upon what it regards as provisional hypothesis. It is in less danger of being compromised to untruth by this boldness, than to dogmatism by its distrust. As it proceeds intentionally on mere hypothesis it is in no danger, through overlooking the fact, of being duped into certitude or dominant opinion. It is master of the situation until it achieves the desired system of hypotheses, when reason requires it to surrender to belief.”

From the above extracts it appears that Smith’s scepticism was an off-shoot from the school of common-sense, and may be fitly named common-sense scepticism. He agrees with Reid, Stewart, Brown and Hamilton that every cognition either is or hinges upon a datum which Reason cannot consistently discredit or even question, except it be stigmatised by inconsistency. His method in philosophy enjoins respect for data, not only for those which are guaranteed by inconsistency of the opposite, such as the axiom, “Things equal to the same are equal to one another,” but also for those that are not so guaranteed, e.g., “the object of my vision or touch is a durable thing”—“It is external to consciousness.” Not only are these axioms unguaranteed by inconsistency of the opposite, but the second is only
partially true. The champions of the common-sense philosophy, in their zeal for the deference due to primary belief, overlooked the fact that there are inconsistent as well as consistent data, e.g., that the immediate object of perception exists otherwise than as object—that there is an absolute up-and-down in space. Smith differs from them as being cognisant of this disgrace of the datum-giving faculty, wherein indeed consists his scepticism. The fallibility of this faculty supposes room for error, even as regards judgments that are otherwise guaranteed by inconsistency of the opposite, and it is only as to judgments which are defended by the extreme absurdity of their opposites that certitude seems to have the right of excluding mere opinion.

The philosophers of the common-sense school are characterised by a spirit as well as a tenet. The tenet is that every cognition either is, or depends upon, a datum, and the spirit is the spirit of trust in the mental constitution. When a member of the school becomes sceptical, trust in the mental constitution succeeds to the latent assumption of the subject's infallibility which obtains in every man in advance of experience of error, and, with slight modification, survives in the dogmatist all discrediting evidence. Despondency, as regards human capacity to achieve truth, would seem to Reason, considering the question a priori, to be the proper outcome of scepticism; but this is excluded by the trustful courage of common sense. Although the data on which all cognitions a posteriori depend are unguaranteed by inconsistency of the opposite, and many of them have proved to be inconsistent, although we have reason to believe that every human mind is plunged in error, and that the movement of speculation in quest of science has been staggering from error to error (it is to be hoped from greater to less), although we can find no faculty in the mind on which the reasons of scepticism do not cast a shadow, at least no faculty capable
INTRODUCTION.

of serving as a fulcrum of effort to raise our beliefs out of inconsistency, absurdity and vagueness, the spirit of common sense insists on the maxim, *nil desperandum*, and that there is a "truthward" tendency in the mind which will finally prevail against error, and is ever helping a progress of judicious originality from greater to less error. It is a make-shift spirit: it does not suffer itself to be prevented by the purism of reason. If, by the adoption of any consistent hypothesis, it can hope to purge the system of human beliefs of inconsistency and absurdity, it will assign to that hypothesis, however wanting in verisimilitude, the place and dignity of a self-evident truth, considering that if, by any means, a theory of the *to παν* (of its nature and history) altogether free from inconsistency and absurdity should obtain, the agreement of that theory with such an infinitude of things could not be fortuitous, and that, therefore, the theory must be true. It dismisses Pyrrhonism because of absurdity, while owning the irrefutableness of the Pyrrhonic argument—"since *appearance* of inconsistency of the opposite does not exclude room for error, the thesis I exist may be erroneous." It is not discouraged by its inability to ascertain precisely, or do more than indicate, the whereabouts of the boundary of human infallibility. It is a conservative spirit. Faith in the mental constitution disposes to faith in what the constitution gives as true, except the thesis be discredited by appearance of inconsistency or absurdity. Therefore, the spirit is tenacious of beliefs, and especially of fundamental beliefs—those that have data for objects—and it is distrustful of all novelties that are candidates for belief, except they be commended by analogy, that is, likeness to what is already believed. This spirit imparted to Smith a rule for the purification of the system of his beliefs from inconsistency and absurdity, viz., *the minimum of change of the system of human beliefs*. Of two mutually inconsistent data that one is to be ejected
of which the removal costs the least change of the system of human beliefs. In the following fragment, Smith explains himself regarding the origin and reason of this method.

"There is a notable difference between reasoning that has, and reasoning that has not, reference to the laws of Reason. The former, on account of its tendency to question and modify the beliefs engendered by the latter as well as those begotten of apprehension, may be distinguished as reactive; the latter as irreactive: and the faculty, Reason, according as it exercises reactive or irreactive reasoning, may be distinguished as reactive or irreactive.

"Let the name primary belief be extended to all beliefs that are not originated by reactive Reason, serving as a common name of all such beliefs, and also as the proper name of the kind. (Every general name is a proper name of a kind.) It has been hitherto limited by those who have used it with strictness as applicable only to data; but the extension of its signification will be found to be highly convenient. It enables us to state with clearness and brevity the origin of philosophy, and to show that philosophy has lost sight of the work to which it was primarily called, and has thereby plunged into confusion.

"When inconsistency or absurdity first appears in a primary belief, and because of the inconsistency or absurdity the subject judges that the believed thesis is untrue, his Reason is, for the first time, reactive. He discerns a law of Reason, viz., that Reason abhors inconsistency or absurdity, and accordingly modifies the system of his beliefs. By such exercises Reason discovered certain of the laws of reasoning, a discovery and science whereon was founded an art: the science and art were named logic. In originating logic it originated a beginning and branch of psychology; for psychology is mainly concerned about the laws of mind which include the laws of reasoning. But the evolution of logic and psychology are only subordinate functions of
reactive Reason, the main function being that which first calls it into action, viz., the elimination of inconsistency and absurdity from the system of our beliefs.

"It appears then that primary belief carries its system of beliefs to reactive reason to have the inconsistency and absurdity removed, as a Californian miner might carry a nugget to a crusher to have the quartz detached. The crusher undertakes to return all of the mass given to him except the quartz, and reactive Reason all of the mass given to it except the inconsistency and absurdity. What if the crusher should cast away large pieces of the nugget because a fancy took him that they contained no gold, or should hand back to the miner, as the most precious residuum of his nugget neither gold nor quartz, but a bubble of gas. So proceeds reactive Reason in respect of primary belief when it casts away data not stigmatised by inconsistency or absurdity, merely to simplify the process of harmonising human beliefs, and gives back to the common sense of mankind, as a substitute for its idea of a man, the idea of a series of subjectless consciousnesses unconnected by temporal identity; or informs common sense that, as regards matter, there is nothing whatever to return, the idea of matter being altogether delusive. Pyrrhonism, idealism, materialism, and the like, are the bubbles of gas which reactive Reason pretends to return to primary belief as the precious residuum of the nugget confided to it, and this because it presumes to meddle with data not stigmatised by inconsistency or absurdity, and to allow invention to substitute hypothesis for the matter given by primary belief. A jealous conservatism should control its operation, and it should hold its success to be in proportion to the recognisability of the result by common sense. It should be less concerned about truth than about the exclusion of inconsistency and absurdity, relying that, if it achieve a theory of the το παν pure of these disgraces, it would therein achieve as much truth as
INTRODUCTION.

the human mind has capacity to receive. This maxim would exempt it from disordering scrutiny of such fundamental ideas as those of time, space, cause, &c., ideas not discredited by an appearance of inconsistency or absurdity, except the mind distort itself in order to look at them, as, though a man should disorder vision by a violent effort to inspect his back."

IV.

The ejectment of our annotator from Christianity happened in this way. He had communed on an Easter Sunday. A former school-fellow railed at him in the evening as being a dupe of faith. Mark undertook to defend his faith. "You will find my argument," said the other, "in Volney. Refute that and you refute me." Mark had no doubt that he could refute all opposers of Christianity, and undertook to read Volney in order to restore the faith of his school-fellow. A faint fear of danger to his own faith appeared in him as he was about to open the volume, and he prayed to be protected from sophistry. He took the volume to bed with him and read till daylight. How he winced at the name of pious impostor applied to Moses! It was the first sacrilege he encountered. He went to sleep a free-thinker and has never since returned to any recognised fold of Christ.

In his twentieth year he lived a solitary life in the country. A pantheistic sentiment of nature obtained in him. It was evolved from the heart without any preliminary suggestion from the intellect. It brought with it a disposition to a sublimely moral life. When business called him to the city he unconsciously left behind him this natural mysticism. Two or three years afterwards it returned upon him in the midst of a lonely and sequestered scene and seemed to reproach with sorrow his long and impious neglect. Later, when experience acquainted him with the spirit of holiness
that exacts the life of the cross, he was able to discern in the contrast that nature-worship abhors self-denial.

Smith was already in his fourth decade before he clearly knew what was signified by the term, moral principle. After he came to know the meaning, it amused him to think how glibly he spoke of "men of principle" and "unprincipled men," without a suspicion of his ignorance and probably without exciting such a suspicion in his hearers. He had a vague idea that principle is another name for goodness or virtue, but no idea that it meant a rule of conduct conformable to virtue and that its subject is one who lives by rule instead of impulse. This fact attests the moral ignorance in which he was plunged during early manhood. Another elucidates the coarseness of his moral fibre at that time. Certain socialists broached to a friend of his the doctrine of free-love, and challenged him to oppose to it a valid objection other than the mere repugnance of prejudice. The friend looked to Smith for the objection and both were baffled. That they could entertain the question showed that they were little better than the brutes who proposed it.

The *res angusta* bore oppressively on the moral nature of Smith up to his thirty-sixth year. Then commenced some motion of the spirit of the noble towards the generation of a moral code. Pride adulterated this spirit at first, and made it abhorrent of obligation. Virtue forsooth is a code which the will enacts for its guidance. Obedience to duty is abject. The individual is sovereign and wills the good, not in an abject spirit of obedience, but because it is his pleasure to do so. Society is not superior to the individual: its members are kings. This theory collapsed one day under the fact, that the sight of a certain person on the other side of the street quickened the pulse and coloured the cheek of the theorist. A man at a distance can alter my circulation, thought Smith, as though we were connected by visible and tangible bonds, like the Siamese twins. Then
broke upon him the truth that individuals are to society what organs are to organisms. The individual begins as an infant in extreme dependence upon society. He owes to it the education of his faculties. If he and it be civilised it is because the individuals of the society have practically owned its sovereignty. To be detached from society, is as a rule, to undergo moral starvation. When the logical ground of his ethical system gave way, the superb spirit departed and yielded the sceptre to humility and the sentiment of duty. He hailed the change with joy and gratitude.

The moral change thus begun, was aided by a social change which transferred him from an irreligious to a religious circle. It was a change from Bohemianism to respectability. It became clear to him that the self-denial which is the condition of respectable conduct and of social health, purity and progress, is not possible to the bulk of men without religion. He attached himself to the party of religion, frequented a Protestant church with his family, and was solicitous to hide from all the world that he was not a Christian. An old acquaintance once asked him, why, being a free-thinker, he frequented church, and the answer made in his heart was, "to eschew you and your like." He was above untruth. A lady appealed to him in conversation, "Of course we must believe there is a God," and, not receiving any affirmative sign, repeated the remark. Smith still maintained silence. "You believe in God, Mr. Smith?" persisted the lady. Still no answer. Embarrassment fell upon the company, and the topic was changed.

About this time Smith's reverence apprehended a sacredness in his children that involved a rare and beautiful authority. It made them seem to him as though they were young princes and he a mere foster-father and tutor. "You cannot make them better than yourself," said this authority, "therefore see to it that you make yourself the best possible."
Infidelity did not alienate Christ from the reverence and love of Smith, except for brief intervals, when his attention would be directed upon some repulsive part of Christian doctrine, such as predestination. His habitual sentiment of Christ was expressed only a few days ago in these words: "My heart is so affected towards Christ that I dare not say He is not God." In his thirty-fifth year, or thereabouts, began a process which still continues, viz., an effort to interpret Christian doctrine according to what is credible to himself.

V.

So much it is important the reader should know respecting the mind of our annotator, anterior to the birth of the faith that occasioned the following notes. That event was preceded by a profoundly painful sentiment of the desolation of existence without God. The music of a hautboy ascending from a valley infused one day into his heart an Arcadian sweetness that set his imagination in quest of conditions of existence sufficient for eternal happiness. The conceivable was at its disposal. Exhausting this, he found that, without God, he could conceive nothing better than a beautiful headless trunk. Two or three weeks later, while considering the law that makes obedience the antecedent and *sine qua non* of wisdom, so that until man has obeyed he is ignorant of the *rationale* of morality, and also that wise parents proceed in deference to the law requiring obedience of their children as an indispensable preliminary of an explanation of the reasonableness of moral law—considering these things, it appeared to him that man is dealt with as a child, and it seemed a violation of common sense to suppose that Cosmos does not include a corresponding father. The evidence unlocked a dungeon and set free the prisoner to live, move, and have his being in God.
VI.

For several weeks following his conversion, as usually happens in such cases, the spirit of holiness abode in the heart of our annotator, maintaining what seemed to be a constant worship, and enabling him, by the exclusion of temptation, to transact life without effort or self-denial, in a manner befitting the presence of God. Thus was set before him a pattern of a life which he found himself bound to copy when the beatitude departed. The departure was the opportunity of what is known as dry devotion, that is, the transaction of life as a service of God in spite of indifference and even sometimes aversion to things holy—a state held by the spiritual in higher esteem than that in which the will is sensibly and powerfully abetted by the spirit of holiness. Smith’s effort to give God the homage of a perfect life in the absence of the spirit of holiness, at once engaged him in the struggle with the principle of intentional action, to which I have already adverted, a principle that excludes choice and has nevertheless been hitherto confounded with will. This principle he found to be a species of instinct. As proceeding on intention he distinguished it by the name, intentional instinct. The discovery revolutionised his theory of the nature and function of will and of the sphere of human responsibility. It lays bare the meaning that has been hidden in the word, conduct, and in the mystical obscurity of the terms new and old man. It exposes a new and efficient reason of charity, a capital defect in the spirit and method of criminal law, the need of opposing to temptation severer manners and a more exacting public opinion, and the importance of applying self-denial to the exclusion of temptation instead of counting on it too confidently for resistance. The subject is fully discussed in the following fragment, which readers, averse to study, are recommended to skip.
"Will and Intelligent Instinct."

"It is commonly supposed that all intentional action is volition. I undertake to show that there is a species of intentional action that excludes choice and is therefore opposed to volition, and that, considering the genesis and differentia of the idea of instinct, this species should be classed as a species of instinct. To do this, I must in the first place, make and define several new terms and also define a few known terms.

"Intentional Action" is action according to an anticipatory idea in the mind of the agent and which the agent seems to himself to be optionally bent upon realising.

"Will is faculty of choice. It is a durable attribute of a voluntary being—commensurate with the life of the being, existing when its subject is not choosing as well as when he is. It is active at the instant of choosing, at all other instants inactive.

"A volition is a choice or act of will. It should be carefully distinguished from its immediate effects, especially from the motions of what are called the voluntary organs, e.g., the hands, feet, mouth, eyes, &c., from the acts of the mental faculties immediately consequent to its mandates, and, of these, more especially from the psychical or conscious nisus, whereby, a choice which is to take effect at a time comparatively remote from that of the volition is executed. I choose to forbear from such or such an indulgence on such or such a remote occasion. When the occasion occurs, I, with effort but without choice, forbear: this effort is not a volition.

"We are sometimes occupied by an idea of something apparently feasible by us, but with no more view to corresponding performance than if the idea were a mathematical theorem. The idea may be a frivolous one, as that of making figures of eight with the forefinger in the air, or writing in
water, or it may be one involving expediency, or one which
it would be a duty to realise in act if thought under subjec-
tive conditions of possibility of corresponding performance.
In such cases, if we surprise them, consciousness reports
that corresponding performance is impossible, the subject
having no view to performance. A contrast of this idle
contemplation of things apparently feasible by the subject,
and the practical contemplation of such things, detects that
a tendency to action wanting in the former, underlies the
latter. A man may contemplate, in the idle way, enterprises
feasible by his nation, himself being included in his idea to
the agent. Contrast with this speculation the study of a
national project by a Richelieu or a Napoleon. The con-
trast makes distinct a state of conscious mind not other-
wise distinguishable, an animus that is at once a tendency
and a view to intelligent action. It testifies to those who
distinguish it that, without it, so far as man is concerned,
intelligent action is impossible.

"Let us give the name practical tendency to this gravita-
tion to intentional action, and distinguish the mind under-
going practical tendency from the mind not in that state,
by the name, practical mind. Let us give the common
name practical idea to all ideas of things apparently feasible
by the subjects that are for an instant regarded with a view
to performance by the practical mind, and the name, prac-
tical occasion, to the circumstances that immediately
occasion practical tendency. The bodily state on which
hunger depends is an example of practical occasions, the
tendency involved with the hunger of practical tendency,
and the pertinent idea of eating, of practical ideas.

"The weight with which practical ideas bear upon the
mind, whereby they differ from impractical ideas of things
apparently feasible by the subject, supposes in them a con-
gruity with the mind, such as it is when they obtain, that
is wanting in the impractical ideas. Let this congruity be
named practical congruity, and the weight or importance
which it contributes to generate *practical importance*. Practical congruity may be characterised as *partial* when it is, and *perfect* when it is not, involved with something repugnant to a part of the emotive system.

"Practical tendency is sometimes emotive and sometimes unemotive. Emotive practical tendency is *desire*. We do many things without the intervention of desire. The routine work of life is for the most part transacted without desire. A part of the utility of the principle of *habit* seems to be to save us the wear and tear of emotion. Then there are actions unpreceded and unattended by emotion that are not ascribable to habit. An honest man to whom money has been for the first time confided, complies immediately, and without the pressure of desire, with the demand for restoration. The demand begets in him the idea of opening his strong box to take from it and deliver to the owner the amount held in trust, and he realises the idea in act without emotion and without any mental debate whether he will or no. The act, being the first of the kind performed by him, is not ascribable to habit. It is performed without premeditation and therefore without choice, and, as choice is the function of will, the act is not voluntary. It seems, therefore, to proceed from an instinct of the intellect, either congenital or acquired, and apart from the emotive part of the mind. That, as a rule, we utter truth when we have no interest to lie, and fulfil our promises when we are not tempted to break them, that we do so on the first as on the last occasion without the spur of desire and without the premeditation supposed by choice, seems to be explicable only as proceeding from such an instinct. Epicurus, and all who hold that intelligent action proceeds exclusively from desire, have overlooked this species of action.

"Practical ideas that are apprehended as *means* may be distinguished as *medial*, and those that are not so apprehended, as *immedial*. Practical ideas symbolic of
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"A practical idea is either regular or irregular. A regular practical idea is one that involves the idea of applicability to several successive occasions of action. An irregular practical idea is one that does not involve that idea.

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"Deliberation is sometimes consequent to purpose, but it is for the most part unpurposed. Practical occasions set us upon studying what to do, without allowing us option whether we will or will not deliberate. The deliberation is not preceded by the practical alternative, 'shall I, or shall I not deliberate?' Indeed it is impossible that every act of deliberation should be consequent to choice, for a purposed deliberation presupposes a deliberation antecedent to the purpose, and, if this also be held to be necessarily consequent to choice, it presupposes another deliberation, that another, and, so, every deliberation must be held to presuppose the absurdity of a beginningless series of deliberations. This shows that purposed deliberation presupposes unpurposed deliberation—deliberation that obtains without choice.

"The idea of instinct seems to have originated as follows: Man at first took for granted that useful and regular actions of the lower animals are intentional, and therefore voluntary. When it became apparent, 1st, that the lower animals are incapable of make-shift, incapable of varying means so as to adjust them to even slight changes of cir-
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"A very simple experiment will bring it home to every man that the great bulk of his actions are not consequent to selective deliberation, that they are not preceded by the contemplation of a practical alternative, that, therefore, the determination of the mind in respect of them, is not a choice, nor, consequently, an act of will. This experiment is, that we surprise ourselves every now and then by the question: was my last act preceded by a practical alternative involved with a debate whether I would or would not perform that act? This experiment will speedily convince that what appears to be choice is a thing of comparatively rare occurrence. Sometimes in discussion upon this subject the writer has arrested the opposite argument by the inquiry whether
it was preceded by a selective deliberation wherein the speaker debated whether he would or would not utter that argument, and this never failed to produce a merry conviction of the groundlessness of the thesis against which it was applied.

"When an earnest man is launched upon a regular life purposed in obedience to the Divine will or for the sake of virtue irrespective of Divine authority, and the life-plan which he endeavours to realise is opposed to the congenital and acquired bias of his mind, then, if he be not blinded by the pious prejudice that stretches beyond reality, the sphere of freedom and responsibility, he finds himself in all but continual conflict with principles of intentional action inherent in himself. He sometimes with difficulty stems the current, but is more frequently carried away. Is he a man of irascible temper, and does he intrench himself in a purpose to be patient under some approaching provocation? The temptation is upon him, and, after an interval of struggle, his anger vents itself in contempt of his purpose. It vents itself in intentional action. The strife of will with principles of involuntary intelligent action is described by St. Paul as occurring in himself. In the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans he writes as follows, 'for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would, I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law that when I would do good evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.' Sin is here represented as a principle of involuntary intentional action opposed to and overpowering the will. It represents the mind or spirit of St. Paul, that which he signifies by the word I, as being identical with the will,
and as being the seat of the sentiment that involves delight in the law of God, and it represents the body or carnal organism, the members distinguished from the mind, as being the seat of the principle of evil intentional action that usurps the place of volition. The principle of evil intentional action which St. Paul here denominates sin, and which he so emphatically distinguishes from will, must be accounted by those who agree with the Apostle a species of intentional instinct. If the mind of the Christian ascetic (and all who have endeavoured to conduct themselves according to the commands and example of Jesus, how little soever they may have denied themselves, are Christian ascetics) had not been fettered by the fear of excusing itself through putting to the account of irresponsible instinct what conscience had accounted guilt, its experience of struggle must long ago have banished the confusion that makes will responsible for the actions of intentional instinct.

"The drunkard, the delirious, and people in violent passion, manifest their several states by intentional acts that are not preceded by selective deliberation. Infants and young children perform indeliberate intentional acts; in none of these can the agent be supposed to exercise power of choice. It often happens that an ill-bred man of naturally good taste, finds himself in cultivated society, and, knowing that spontaneity would betray his bad breeding, he speaks and otherwise acts for a time with premeditation. But impunity, real or imagined, relaxing his vigilance, words and other acts escape him that betray the mortifying vulgarity. Such acts are not consequent to selective deliberation. When blind instinct, under the form of irritability, has taught the infant how to derive nutriment from the maternal breast, and he for the first time applies himself, at the suggestion of hunger and with a distinct idea of what is to be done, to the act of sucking, it is not to be supposed that he had previously debated whether he would or would not perform that act.
"It follows that the genus, intentional action, comprehends the species, involuntary intentional action, which, as being pseudo-voluntary, is a species of instinctive action.

"Instinct that generates intentional action may be distinguished as intentional, and that which generates unintentional action as blind. Intentional instinct contains two kinds, of which one may be distinguished as partially intentional, and the other as totally intentional instinct. The former aims at, and regularly realises, ends which the agent has not in view. The instinct hunger is an example. It knowingly aims at eating, but ignorantly at nutrition. Totally intentional instinct aims at an end which the agent has in view. Reflex action, for example, the first sucking of the infant, is an example of the action of blind instinct; also sensory-motor action.

"I have now to show that every deliberate selection or act of selective deliberation is not a choice.

"Let practical ideas that cause intentional instinctive actions be distinguished as instinctive. Now the question arises whether a practical idea is not sometimes instinctive when it is a member of a practical alternative: in other words, whether an instinctive idea does not sometimes bring to a close a selective deliberation? The following facts prove that it does. We often miss with uneasiness, and long for a practical idea capable of making up our minds for us. A practical occasion has set us upon a barren deliberation, not indeed destitute of practical ideas, but destitute of one capable of exempting from the trouble of making up our minds for ourselves. This kind of suspense is sometimes brought instantly to a close by the appearance of a practical idea that fills a certain measure of latent expectation. We have found what our deliberation was looking for. We are clear that if this practical idea had appeared simultaneously with the practical occasion, it would have excluded deliberation. The deliberation terminated by the instinctive idea is not merely expectant,
but is also selective; for, in having the mind made up for us by that idea, we reject one or more practical ideas that constituted with it a practical alternative. Sometimes the occasion suggests several successive practical ideas whereof each successor is of greater congruity than its predecessor, but none of them contenting the deliberate need save the last, say the fourth or fifth. Why in this case does deliberation pass the first, second, third, and perhaps, fourth practical idea? Why does it not pass the fifth? Experience is full of instruction that we might often have done better if we had deliberated longer. Why then do we close upon the fourth or fifth? Clearly because deliberation is in search of a practical idea of a certain degree of congruity, viz., the instinctive degree, and because the practical ideas which it passes are short of that degree. When a practical idea of due weight occurs, it contents the mind and terminates the quest. It follows that there are instinctive and uninstinctive degrees of practical congruity, that unpurposed deliberation involves a latent predetermination to look for and terminate upon a practical idea of an instinctive degree, and that selective deliberation is sometimes so determined. Perfect practical congruity is doubtless instinctive, and is that which unpurposed deliberation blindly seeks. This, by the way, affords an explanation of what is otherwise inexplicable, viz., the genesis of deliberation. How do we come to expect and look for a practical idea of a certain degree of congruity; in other words, how is deliberation possible? Is the expectation a priori? This is a violent presumption and not to be entertained if the fact can be explained as a posteriori. Balked on some interesting occasion of action by privation of the customary instinctive idea, the attention of the child is fascinated to the idea of the occasion, and, after an interval, through the operation of the law of redintegration, the missing link is supplied. Repeated experience of this kind engenders expectation according to the fundamental law of the mind, that
that exacts the life of the cross, he was able to discern in the contrast that nature-worship abhors self-denial.

Smith was already in his fourth decade before he clearly knew what was signified by the term, moral principle. After he came to know the meaning, it amused him to think how glibly he spoke of "men of principle" and "unprincipled men," without a suspicion of his ignorance and probably without exciting such a suspicion in his hearers. He had a vague idea that principle is another name for goodness or virtue, but no idea that it meant a rule of conduct conformable to virtue and that its subject is one who lives by rule instead of impulse. This fact attests the moral ignorance in which he was plunged during early manhood. Another elucidates the coarseness of his moral fibre at that time. Certain socialists broached to a friend of his the doctrine of free-love, and challenged him to oppose to it a valid objection other than the mere repugnance of prejudice. The friend looked to Smith for the objection and both were baffled. That they could entertain the question showed that they were little better than the brutes who proposed it.

The res angusta bore oppressively on the moral nature of Smith up to his thirty-sixth year. Then commenced some motion of the spirit of the noble towards the generation of a moral code. Pride adulterated this spirit at first, and made it abhorrent of obligation. Virtue forsooth is a code which the will enacts for its guidance. Obedience to duty is abject. The individual is sovereign and wills the good, not in an abject spirit of obedience, but because it is his pleasure to do so. Society is not superior to the individual: its members are kings. This theory collapsed one day under the fact, that the sight of a certain person on the other side of the street quickened the pulse and coloured the cheek of the theorist. A man at a distance can alter my circulation, thought Smith, as though we were connected by visible and tangible bonds, like the Siamese twins. Then
broke upon him the truth that individuals are to society what organs are to organisms. The individual begins as an infant in extreme dependence upon society. He owes to it the education of his faculties. If he and it be civilised it is because the individuals of the society have practically owned its sovereignty. To be detached from society, is as a rule, to undergo moral starvation. When the logical ground of his ethical system gave way, the superb spirit departed and yielded the sceptre to humility and the sentiment of duty. He hailed the change with joy and gratitude.

The moral change thus begun, was aided by a social change which transferred him from an irreligious to a religious circle. It was a change from Bohemianism to respectability. It became clear to him that the self-denial which is the condition of respectable conduct and of social health, purity and progress, is not possible to the bulk of men without religion. He attached himself to the party of religion, frequented a Protestant church with his family, and was solicitous to hide from all the world that he was not a Christian. An old acquaintance once asked him, why, being a free-thinker, he frequented church, and the answer made in his heart was, “to eschew you and your like.” He was above untruth. A lady appealed to him in conversation, “Of course we must believe there is a God,” and, not receiving any affirmative sign, repeated the remark. Smith still maintained silence. “You believe in God, Mr. Smith?” persisted the lady. Still no answer. Embarrassment fell upon the company, and the topic was changed.

About this time Smith’s reverence apprehended a sacredness in his children that involved a rare and beautiful authority. It made them seem to him as though they were young princes and he a mere foster-father and tutor. “You cannot make them better than yourself,” said this authority, “therefore see to it that you make yourself the best possible.”
Infidelity did not alienate Christ from the reverence and love of Smith, except for brief intervals, when his attention would be directed upon some repulsive part of Christian doctrine, such as predestination. His habitual sentiment of Christ was expressed only a few days ago in these words: "My heart is so affected towards Christ that I dare not say He is not God." In his thirty-fifth year, or thereabouts, began a process which still continues, viz., an effort to interpret Christian doctrine according to what is credible to himself.

V.

So much it is important the reader should know respecting the mind of our annotator, anterior to the birth of the faith that occasioned the following notes. That event was preceded by a profoundly painful sentiment of the desolation of existence without God. The music of a hautboy ascending from a valley infused one day into his heart an Arcadian sweetness that set his imagination in quest of conditions of existence sufficient for eternal happiness. The conceivable was at its disposal. Exhausting this, he found that, without God, he could conceive nothing better than a beautiful headless trunk. Two or three weeks later, while considering the law that makes obedience the antecedent and *sine qua non* of wisdom, so that until man has obeyed he is ignorant of the *rationale* of morality, and also that wise parents proceed in deference to the law requiring obedience of their children as an indispensable preliminary of an explanation of the reasonableness of moral law—considering these things, it appeared to him that man is dealt with as a child, and it seemed a violation of common sense to suppose that Cosmos does not include a corresponding father. The evidence unlocked a dungeon and set free the prisoner to live, move, and have his being in God.
VI.

For several weeks following his conversion, as usually happens in such cases, the spirit of holiness abode in the heart of our annotator, maintaining what seemed to be a constant worship, and enabling him, by the exclusion of temptation, to transact life without effort or self-denial, in a manner befitting the presence of God. Thus was set before him a pattern of a life which he found himself bound to copy when the beatitude departed. The departure was the opportunity of what is known as dry devotion, that is, the transaction of life as a service of God in spite of indifference and even sometimes aversion to things holy—a state held by the spiritual in higher esteem than that in which the will is sensibly and powerfully abetted by the spirit of holiness. Smith's effort to give God the homage of a perfect life in the absence of the spirit of holiness, at once engaged him in the struggle with the principle of intentional action, to which I have already adverted, a principle that excludes choice and has nevertheless been hitherto confounded with will. This principle he found to be a species of instinct. As proceeding on intention he distinguished it by the name, intentional instinct. The discovery revolutionised his theory of the nature and function of will and of the sphere of human responsibility. It lays bare the meaning that has been hidden in the word, conduct, and in the mystical obscurity of the terms new and old man. It exposes a new and efficient reason of charity, a capital defect in the spirit and method of criminal law, the need of opposing to temptation severer manners and a more exacting public opinion, and the importance of applying self-denial to the exclusion of temptation instead of counting on it too confidently for resistance. The subject is fully discussed in the following fragment, which readers, averse to study, are recommended to skip.
“Will and Intelligent Instinct.”

“It is commonly supposed that all intentional action is volition. I undertake to show that there is a species of intentional action that excludes choice and is therefore opposed to volition, and that, considering the genesis and differentia of the idea of instinct, this species should be classed as a species of instinct. To do this, I must in the first place, make and define several new terms and also define a few known terms.

“Intentional Action is action according to an anticipatory idea in the mind of the agent and which the agent seems to himself to be optionally bent upon realising.

“Will is faculty of choice. It is a durable attribute of a voluntary being—commensurate with the life of the being, existing when its subject is not choosing as well as when he is. It is active at the instant of choosing, at all other instants inactive.

“A volition is a choice or act of will. It should be carefully distinguished from its immediate effects, especially from the motions of what are called the voluntary organs, e.g., the hands, feet, mouth, eyes, &c., from the acts of the mental faculties immediately consequent to its mandates, and, of these, more especially from the psychical or conscious nisus, whereby, a choice which is to take effect at a time comparatively remote from that of the volition is executed. I choose to forbear from such or such an indulgence on such or such a remote occasion. When the occasion occurs, I, with effort but without choice, forbear: this effort is not a volition.

“We are sometimes occupied by an idea of something apparently feasible by us, but with no more view to corresponding performance than if the idea were a mathematical theorem. The idea may be a frivolous one, as that of making figures of eight with the forefinger in the air, or writing in
INTRODUCTION.

water, or it may be one involving expediency, or one which it would be a duty to realise in act if thought under subjective conditions of possibility of corresponding performance. In such cases, if we surprise them, consciousness reports that corresponding performance is impossible, the subject having no view to performance. A contrast of this idle contemplation of things apparently feasible by the subject, and the practical contemplation of such things, detects that a tendency to action wanting in the former, underlies the latter. A man may contemplate, in the idle way, enterprises feasible by his nation, himself being included in his idea to the agent. Contrast with this speculation the study of a national project by a Richelieu or a Napoleon. The contrast makes distinct a state of conscious mind not otherwise distinguishable, an animus that is at once a tendency and a view to intelligent action. It testifies to those who distinguish it that, without it, so far as man is concerned, intelligent action is impossible.

"Let us give the name practical tendency to this gravitation to intentional action, and distinguish the mind undergoing practical tendency from the mind not in that state, by the name, practical mind. Let us give the common name practical idea to all ideas of things apparently feasible by the subjects that are for an instant regarded with a view to performance by the practical mind, and the name, practical occasion, to the circumstances that immediately occasion practical tendency. The bodily state on which hunger depends is an example of practical occasions, the tendency involved with the hunger of practical tendency, and the pertinent idea of eating, of practical ideas.

"The weight with which practical ideas bear upon the mind, whereby they differ from impractical ideas of things apparently feasible by the subject, supposes in them a congruity with the mind, such as it is when they obtain, that is wanting in the impractical ideas. Let this congruity be named practical congruity, and the weight or importance
which it contributes to generate practical importance. Practical congruity may be characterised as partial when it is, and perfect when it is not, involved with something repugnant to a part of the emotive system.

"Practical tendency is sometimes emotive and sometimes unemotive. Emotive practical tendency is desire. We do many things without the intervention of desire. The routine work of life is for the most part transacted without desire. A part of the utility of the principle of habit seems to be to save us the wear and tear of emotion. Then there are actions unpreceded and unattended by emotion that are not ascribable to habit. An honest man to whom money has been for the first time confided, complies immediately, and without the pressure of desire, with the demand for restoration. The demand begets in him the idea of opening his strong box to take from it and deliver to the owner the amount held in trust, and he realises the idea in act without emotion and without any mental debate whether he will or no. The act, being the first of the kind performed by him, is not ascribable to habit. It is performed without premeditation and therefore without choice, and, as choice is the function of will, the act is not voluntary. It seems, therefore, to proceed from an instinct of the intellect, either congenital or acquired, and apart from the emotive part of the mind. That, as a rule, we utter truth when we have no interest to lie, and fulfil our promises when we are not tempted to break them, that we do so on the first as on the last occasion without the spur of desire and without the premeditation supposed by choice, seems to be explicable only as proceeding from such an instinct. Epicurus, and all who hold that intelligent action proceeds exclusively from desire, have overlooked this species of action.

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INTRODUCTION.

it was preceded by a selective deliberation wherein the speaker debated whether he would or would not utter that argument, and this never failed to produce a merry conviction of the groundlessness of the thesis against which it was applied.

"When an earnest man is launched upon a regular life purposed in obedience to the Divine will or for the sake of virtue irrespective of Divine authority, and the life-plan which he endeavours to realise is opposed to the congenital and acquired bias of his mind, then, if he be not blinded by the pious prejudice that stretches beyond reality, the sphere of freedom and responsibility, he finds himself in all but continual conflict with principles of intentional action inherent in himself. He sometimes with difficulty stems the current, but is more frequently carried away. Is he a man of irascible temper, and does he entrench himself in a purpose to be patient under some approaching provocation? The temptation is upon him, and, after an interval of struggle, his anger vents itself in contempt of his purpose. It vents itself in intentional action. The strife of will with principles of involuntary intelligent action is described by St. Paul as occurring in himself. In the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans he writes as follows, 'for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would, I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law that when I would do good evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.' Sin is here represented as a principle of involuntary intentional action opposed to and overpowering the will. It represents the mind or spirit of St. Paul, that which he signifies by the word I, as being identical with the will,
and as being the seat of the sentiment that involves delight in the law of God, and it represents the body or carnal organism, the *members* distinguished from the mind, as being the seat of the principle of evil intentional action that usurps the place of volition. The principle of evil intentional action which St. Paul here denominates sin, and which he so emphatically distinguishes from will, must be accounted by those who agree with the Apostle a species of intentional instinct. If the mind of the Christian ascetic (and all who have endeavoured to conduct themselves according to the commands and example of Jesus, how little soever they may have denied themselves, are Christian ascetics) had not been fettered by the fear of excusing itself through putting to the account of irresponsible instinct what conscience had accounted guilt, its experience of struggle must long ago have banished the confusion that makes will responsible for the actions of intentional instinct.

"The drunkard, the delirious, and people in violent passion, manifest their several states by intentional acts that are not preceded by selective deliberation. Infants and young children perform indeliberate intentional acts; in none of these can the agent be supposed to exercise power of choice. It often happens that an ill-bred man of naturally good taste, finds himself in cultivated society, and, knowing that spontaneity would betray his bad breeding, he speaks and otherwise acts for a time with premeditation. But impunity, real or imagined, relaxing his vigilance, words and other acts escape him that betray the mortifying vulgarity. Such acts are not consequent to selective deliberation. When blind instinct, under the form of irritability, has taught the infant how to derive nutriment from the maternal breast, and he for the first time applies himself, at the suggestion of hunger and with a distinct idea of what is to be done, to the act of sucking, it is not to be supposed that he had previously debated whether he would or would not perform that act."
"It follows that the genus, intentional action, comprehends the species, involuntary intentional action, which, as being pseudo-voluntary, is a species of instinctive action.

"Instinct that generates intentional action may be distinguished as intentional, and that which generates unintentional action as blind. Intentional instinct contains two kinds, of which one may be distinguished as partially intentional, and the other as totally intentional instinct. The former aims at, and regularly realises, ends which the agent has not in view. The instinct hunger is an example. It knowingly aims at eating, but ignorantly at nutrition. Totally intentional instinct aims at an end which the agent has in view. Reflex action, for example, the first sucking of the infant, is an example of the action of blind instinct; also sensory-motor action.

"I have now to show that every deliberate selection or act of selective deliberation is not a choice.

"Let practical ideas that cause intentional instinctive actions be distinguished as instinctive. Now the question arises whether a practical idea is not sometimes instinctive when it is a member of a practical alternative: in other words, whether an instinctive idea does not sometimes bring to a close a selective deliberation? The following facts prove that it does. We often miss with uneasiness, and long for a practical idea capable of making up our minds for us. A practical occasion has set us upon a barren deliberation, not indeed destitute of practical ideas, but destitute of one capable of exempting from the trouble of making up our minds for ourselves. This kind of suspense is sometimes brought instantly to a close by the appearance of a practical idea that fills a certain measure of latent expectation. We have found what our deliberation was looking for. We are clear that if this practical idea had appeared simultaneously with the practical occasion, it would have excluded deliberation. The deliberation terminated by the instinctive idea is not merely expectant,
but is also selective; for, in having the mind made up for us by that idea, we reject one or more practical ideas that constituted with it a practical alternative. Sometimes the occasion suggests several successive practical ideas whereof each successor is of greater congruity than its predecessor, but none of them contenting the deliberate need save the last, say the fourth or fifth. Why in this case does deliberation pass the first, second, third, and perhaps, fourth practical idea? Why does it not pass the fifth? Experience is full of instruction that we might often have done better if we had deliberated longer. Why then do we close upon the fourth or fifth? Clearly because deliberation is in search of a practical idea of a certain degree of congruity, viz., the instinctive degree, and because the practical ideas which it passes are short of that degree. When a practical idea of due weight occurs, it contents the mind and terminates the quest. It follows that there are instinctive and uninstinctive degrees of practical congruity, that unpurposed deliberation involves a latent predetermination to look for and terminate upon a practical idea of an instinctive degree, and that selective deliberation is sometimes so determined. Perfect practical congruity is doubtless instinctive, and is that which unpurposed deliberation blindly seeks. This, by the way, affords an explanation of what is otherwise inexplicable, viz., the genesis of deliberation. How do we come to expect and look for a practical idea of a certain degree of congruity; in other words, how is deliberation possible? Is the expectation a priori? This is a violent presumption and not to be entertained if the fact can be explained as a posteriori. Balked on some interesting occasion of action by privation of the customary instinctive idea, the attention of the child is fascinated to the idea of the occasion, and, after an interval, through the operation of the law of redintegration, the missing link is supplied. Repeated experience of this kind engenders expectation according to the fundamental law of the mind, that
INTRODUCTION.

determines us to anticipate the like of what we have experienced. Thus privation of a practical idea of perfect congruity, originates deliberation, and deliberation is determined to grope for what the mind misses, viz., a perfectly congruous practical idea—an instinctive idea. It is confirmatory of this explanation that the genesis of endeavour to remember is analogously explicable. Some customary link in the train of ideas is missed with a certain degree of uneasiness. Attention is fascinated to the associate idea, and, at last, through the law of redintegration the missing link is supplied. Repeated experience engenders expectation and the nisus from which we try to recover the missing link.

"Allowing the possibility of choice—that reality corresponds to the idea of choice—deliberate selection comprehends the two species, instinctive deliberate selection, and choice.

"Choice is deliberate selection wherein the agent, instead of having his mind made up for him, makes up his mind. When a faint sentiment of duty commands one to refuse a strong passion, and, after a struggle, he complies with the moral imperative, his mind is not made up for him as it is when, deliberating in quest of a satisfactory scheme of pastime, after having allowed several suggestions to pass by, he at last thinks of one which, if it had occurred to him in time, would have excluded the deliberation by its instinctive force. His selection is a choice.

"It is unreasonable to deny the possibility and existence of choice, except the idea of choice be shown to be inconsistent. Those who hold to the datum of human freedom are not called upon to prove that the idea is consistent: the onus probandi is on the shoulders of their opponents. These must show that there is inconsistency in the idea of a man being solicited by opposite desires, the stronger affecting a culpable enjoyment, the weaker obedience to conscience, and the man choosing to obey
INTRODUCTION.

his conscience. They pretend to do so by objecting that preference pre-supposes strongest desire. This we deny, and allege that it begs the question. Human freedom, dignity, and responsibility are not to be surrendered to a fallacy. Another argument of the necessarian is that induction detects a dominion of law and therein of necessity over intentional action, so that men lean spontaneously, confidently, and for the most part with justification by the event, on anticipations begotten of the induction; that intentional action is as predictable as the tide, and predictableness supposes necessity; that, therefore, we have the evidence of the mental constitution against itself as regards the datum of freedom. The induction and the datum are perfectly harmonious. The induction refers to instinctive intentional action which is subject to necessity, the datum to voluntary action, which is free. Intentional instinct transacts the great bulk of the business of life without interference of will. Induction ascertains its laws, and so achieves a knowledge that is an indispensable condition of human intercourse. Society would be impossible if no man could confidently count upon the intentional action of another. The knowledge has expanded into a science of political economy, and is expanding into a science of sociology. The conduct of intentional instinct is the proper function of will, and it generally costs present pain; for example, at the solicitation of prudence a present pain in order to avoid a greater future pain, or, at the solicitation of conscience, the endurance of the pain of forbearing from a culpable pleasure. Aversion to present pain and defect of moral and religious light has hitherto prevented will from exercising its rightful sovereignty, so that its interferences with instinct have been rare and irregular, and, as regards the mass of intentional action, the reverse of conspicuous. Induction might very well ignore its contributions to intentional action. The confusion of intentional instinct with will has betrayed the necessarian
INTRODUCTION.

into an unwarranted inference from a species to a genus, extending the necessity that bears on instinctive intentional action to all intentional action. He errs also in the judgment that regularity and predictableness of intentional action suppose it to be subject to necessity. There is no inconsistency in the idea of a free will transacting a human life according to duty and prudence. But the acts of such a will would be eminently characterised by regularity and predictableness. The idea of God is the idea of a free being whose action regularly conforms to perfect goodness and is, so far, foreseeable by a perfect moral sense. The intentional action of a society of saints exercising free will, would greatly excel, as to regularity and predictableness, that with which experience is conversant.

"Let propensity be the common name of mental attributes that are sources of practical tendency—of all appetites, passions, affections, aversions, habits. In relation to circumstances that excite a propensity, give room for corresponding action, and exclude a practical alternative, (i.e., exclude the opposition of another propensity) the propensity is an instinct. When the opposition of two propensities elicits the interference of will neither is instinctive—each is a source of motive.

"Conduct—that is, the conduct of the propensities—is proper to will—almost, if not quite, its only function. As intentional instincts the propensities are competent to the transaction of, and do actually transact, the greater part of the business of life. When we consider that will is not concerned in deliberation in quest of means, nor in the consequent adoption and application of means, nor in deliberation that is terminated by instinctive action, nor in any indeliberate action, it is obvious that it interferes with the business of life only on such rare occasions—rare in comparison with the vast multitude of our instinctive intentional actions—as when prudence or the moral sense objects to some motion of a propensity. Indeed I know of no other
occasions of volition that are worth attention, and every compliance with prudence, every obedience to the moral sense, is conduct.

"Conduct is either regular or irregular. When it is merely pro hac vice it is irregular, when it has reference to a kind of occasions, regular. If in obedience to conscience, I abstain from wrong-doing on such or such an occasion without having purposed to forbear on all like occasions, my conduct is irregular, otherwise regular. Regular conduct is either perfectly or only partially regular; the former when it is conformable to a system of mutually consistent rules that provides or is intended to provide for every occasion of action; otherwise partially regular. Will may be distinguished as regnant when it has enacted such a system of rules and conducts accordingly, otherwise as irregnant. A purpose to subject oneself to a system of rules whereby will is made master of the practical life, and the propensities are subordinated, may be distinguished as inaugurative. When, for God's sake, or virtue's sake, a man pledges himself to a virtuous life, he forms an inaugurative purpose. Experience does not warrant belief that it is competent to will, to form, and apply an inaugurative purpose except at the instance of godliness or the moral sense. Therefore regnant voluntariness may be held to depend on the religious and moral faculties. The idea of personality supposes a person to be a voluntary being. Accordingly God, angels, and men are accounted persons and the lower animals impersonal. Saint Paul implies the dependence of personality on will in alleging that he did not do what sin, in opposition to his will, did in him—'therefore it is no more I that do it.' We do not commonly apply the personal pronoun to infants as being as yet incapable of choice. Now we may distinguish three states of personality corresponding to three states of will—viz., 1st, the infantile state corresponding to irregnant will; 2nd, the adolescent state corresponding to regnant will before it
INTRODUCTION.

has completely subordinated the propensities; and 3rd, the adult state corresponding to regnant will after it has completely subordinated the propensities. Adult personality is the greatest dignity to which man can attain. It has never been achieved by any human class except the religious of the Roman Catholic Church. At the opposite pole from these are the human brutes who have lost or who never enjoyed power of choice.

"It is conceivable that men might be so endowed with propensities and so circumstanced that intentional instinct might, without intervention of will, transact life as felicitously as adult personality. But our propensities and circumstances are such as to make us for the most part nuisances to society and ourselves. Were it not for the painful restraint which will imposes at the bidding of prudence and conscience, civilisation and even society would be impossible.

"The propensities with or without irregnant will constitute what is known to the spiritual as the old man: the new man is he in whom will has become regnant. The old man is not wholly evil, but a chaos of good and evil.

"Will has for function not only the conduct but also the reformation of the propensities. It is held by Protestants that will is incapable of contributing to the amelioration of the propensities, but this is not the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. Volition co-operative with grace contributes, according to Rome, to sanctification. The works of her spiritual writers are mainly conversant about the rules of what may be termed the art towards sanctification. Considering how plastic nature is in other respects to practice, it would be surprising if long and invariable obedience to Divine law, the practice of worshipful contemplation of Divine perfection, and that of attention to the moral aspects of actions, should exercise no improving influence on the heart. According to analogy, one would expect it to make the good in the old man better, and the bad at least no worse.

"Those who have had experience of the strife that differ-
entiates adolescent personality should know that there are degrees of temptation which exclude choice and responsibility, and that moral ignorance and defect of reflective discrimination exclude from the interference of will a vast province of intentional action. Desire of a certain intensity completely absorbs the mind so as to exclude altogether the idea of an opposed moral imperative, it frequently deprives this idea of practical importance* and sometimes the vehemence of a bad motive rushes to its end over inculpably prostrate will. If the limitation of choice and responsibility by ignorance and the paralysing force of desire were fully known to mankind, and by fully I mean cordially, the knowledge would establish a reign of charity, and beget a universal conviction that our responsibility owes more in the way of avoiding, than of resisting temptation; society would learn that it cannot afford the laxity of modern manners, and he who hungers and thirsts after righteousness that his main concern is to exclude temptation. A new spirit of criminal law would obtain. The law would no longer assume that magistrates and juries are competent to judge as to guilt and innocence, nor would it undertake to punish: it would deal with the offenders not in the spirit of retribution, but in that of the good physician, whom kindness does not disqualify for needful surgery. Abandoning the vain pretension to measure punishment to crime, it would assume the right to keep hold of grave offenders either for life or until competent judges should be assured that they would no longer abuse liberty. It would endeavour to make all prisons self-supporting and as far as possible reformatory. It would apply pain, including that of death, not to punish but to deter. Its austerity would not be lessened by parting with its vindictiveness.”

*Experience of this remarkable state of mind disposes to the belief that will is necessarily indifferent to an idea of a moral imperative destitute of practical importance—that, if the idea be not involved in a sentiment of which the emotive element confers practical importance on the idea, will is no more moved than it is by ideas of feasible things uninvolved with practical tendency.
VII.

Smith's access to faith had been made possible by the advent of a thesis conciliatory of Divine omnipotence with the existence of evil. The free or optional creation of what involves conditions of pain, sin or maleficence of any kind, supposes the Creator to be a fiend. The creation of an infinitude of beings predestined to eternal happiness at the cost of even the risk of eternal misery to a single being, supposes the Creator to be a fiend. The apology of free will is noteworthy only as a measure of the pious infirmity that has given it entertainment. So long as Smith's mind was in captivity to the vulgar idea of omnipotence, according to which there is no absolute impossible, so long it was impossible, in view of the existence of evil, that he should believe in the existence of a Divine Creator, and, at that time, creative power seemed to his reverence to be a sine qua non of divinity. He was rescued from this cause of spiritual paralysis by the idea that omnipotence is power to do the possible, and that eternal happiness, being absolutely impossible except at the cost of a birth-pain consisting of such misery as experience acquaints us with, God created accordingly. This apology for the creation of evil by a Divine Creator is put as follows by Smith:—

"If the dependence of ideas upon experience be absolutely necessary, the proposition, that God could make a perfect man without an antecedent imperfect man—without an intervening era of ignorance, evil and pain, is nonsensical; and, as a nonsensical proposition is one that, under the air of expressing something, expresses and implies nothing, the proposition in question neither expresses nor implies that God is not omnipotent. It is obvious that experience supposes time, that it is not possible for an individual to undergo all possible experience in a moment, that certain kinds of experience are not possible without the
prior operation of other kinds and the prior operation of ideas resulting from the antecedent kinds, and that, therefore, the hypothesis of the absolutely necessary dependence of ideas upon experience supposes imperfect knowledge to be the antecedent of perfect knowledge. It is scarcely less obvious, that the time necessarily measured by imperfect knowledge must be of great length. During this era of ignorance, human affection and volition must inculpably violate moral law and engender misery.

"All nonsensical propositions are not obviously absurd; on the contrary the absurdity of many of them is not discoverable without laborious study. The absurdity of the proposition that God could make an hypothenuse of which the square should be greater than the squares of the other two sides, is not discoverable without crossing the Pons Asinorum and the remainder of the forty-six first propositions of Euclid. Ignorance disguises the absurdity of such propositions.

"There is nothing in human knowledge opposed to the hypothesis, that the dependence of ideas upon experience is necessary; whereas the hypothesis bears upon its face a Divine recommendation to faith as being the only one that reconciles the benevolence with the omnipotence of God. The opposite hypothesis has passed unchallenged into the centre of the most important conclusions that influence human life. Considered by itself, apart from the startling consequences of its ejection from human belief, it is a mere speciosity which a question dissipates. It is not, nor is it implied by, a datum; it is without probability, and so flagrantly opposed to our notion of Divine benevolence that it has been a pregnant cause of atheism amongst civilized men. It is true that it cannot be shown to be contradictory; and it is invested with the authority conferred by ancient and general belief. But the hypothesis of the necessary dependence of ideas upon experience has everything in its favour
except its novelty. The nearer we approach to a complete history and analysis of consciousness, the more intimate the dependence in question seems to be, so that there appears to be but a step from the recognition of the intimacy of this dependence to the recognition of its necessity. This step is the only one that probability leaves to faith; and it is not unlikely that, as the dividing gap was once a gulf, the progress of knowledge will dispense with even this slight demand upon faith by filling up the remainder of the void.

"To be disembarrassed of the thesis is to be free to believe that a perfect mankind, capable of eternal and perfect happiness, was possible upon the condition of the antecedent existence of an imperfect mankind; that the birth-pain of this possible perfect happiness, being, in view of the eternal result, insignificant, God, by an exertion of his omnipotence (which may be defined power to realise the possible) willed its existence, and that the past and present state of man constitute a part of the duration of the necessary human imperfection."

VIII.

There was question one day of the propriety of talking of spiritual concerns in a cotillon. The taste of Smith recoiled from the coarseness and his reverence from the sacrilege, but unfortunately he was attentive only to the sacrilege which decided him that dancing is evil. The argument was this. A situation unsuited to the spirit of holiness and the presence of God, is evil. But dancing, since it is incompatible with godly conversation is such a situation. Therefore it is evil. This specious argument was of great use and damage to Smith. It was of use in so far as it made conformity to reverence the criterion of goodness, and damaging in so far as it sanctioned undue asceticism. When Milton makes holiday in Heaven he
sets the angels dancing, so little did mirth appear to him to be incompatible with holiness; but surely he would not have them alternate the frolic of the dance with solemn acts of worship. The spirit of holiness can take part in mirth as well as in solemnities, but keeps them apart. Those who have acquired liberty "of spirit" know this truth by heart. Accordingly reverence became, in the view of Smith, the cardinal element and test of goodness, the faculty by which we intuitive the sacred and have knowledge of the divine and of good and evil. Without reverence it seemed to him we are religious and moral idiots. The habit of respect, he thought, differentiates the gentleman. Horace rightly characterised the vulgar as profane. Reverence is humble and childlike. It tends to magnify its object and ignores except when it condemns its subject. It is averse to censure of the neighbour disposing to "judge not at all." It is the opposite of pride and of every kind of selfishness, and tends to exclude them. As having cognizance of the sacred it tended to pass with Smith for conscience, and it was only after a long study that he surrendered the pious prejudice which would fain identify them. It seemed to him that reverence is a light with which he could explore the moral world and achieve a science of morality.

IX.

Faith kindled in Smith the instinct of prayer as well as that of worship, but his theology allowed no room for prayer. It seemed to him, at first, that the idea of a Providential government derogates from Omnipotence, as supposing impotence in the Creator to provide, from the beginning, all needful conditions. He therefore understood the disposition to prayer to be an instrument of sanctification that presents an aspect to adult man different from what it presents to man in the infancy and adolescence of
the race, being to the former an instrument for obtaining the present interference of God, and to the latter a principle of aspiration after union with God, whereby it is competent to ascetic will to lift without supernatural aid, the emotive nature into the purity that sees God. This notion of prayer succumbed, or partially succumbed, after a time to three forces—1st, the visits of the spirit of holiness which were given to reverence as being a present action of God upon the heart; 2nd, certain experiences of our annotator that were given as miraculous interferences of God; 3rd, a certain scorn of what deprived it generated by his yearning for God's present help, and which seemed to be begotten of common sense. When the spirit of holiness occupies the heart the subject feels that not to accept the phenomenon as being somehow a divine presence is culpable profanity. But an occasional divine presence is a divine interference. Then there were events in Smith's experience which he could not without conscious impiety, and without detriment to a sanctifying influence, regard as natural. These causes, together with his longing to escape from law into immediate personal intercourse with God, bore hard upon the notion that divine dignity disowns Providence, and overthrew it when abetted by the hypothesis that the intercourse of Creator and creature is a paramount end of creation. The objections to Providence and prayer that are grounded on the dignity, omnipotence and omniscience of God are paralysed by this hypothesis. As regards our annotator it was an emancipation. But he did not long enjoy his liberty unmolested. Apparent answers to prayer were rare and irregular. The regular apparent futility of prayer excluded expectation of an answer and with it the possibility of regular prayer. What proceeded from regular effort to pray was not prayer, but a make-believe of prayer. It is not in the power of will to exclude this kind of operation of mental law. By the way, the effort to do so exposes conscience in the
anomalous act of imposing pious insincerity on its subject. Smith was grievously disappointed at the apparent failures of Providence to help him in his war on the old man. There was nothing whatever to signify a regular cooperation of Providence in the work of sanctification. Whatever might be supposed to be a divine contribution to the work was tainted by caprice. The capriciousness of the visits of the spirit of holiness was conspicuous. The abortiveness of the efforts of the devout in all ages to trace the course of Providence within the spaces of single lives, discredits the doctrine that obvious personal intercourse between Creator and creature was a part of the plan of creation. Perplexed between these considerations, and his reluctance to surrender what seemed to be a personal intercourse with God, he imagined an experiment by which his doubts might be relieved. It was to pray that God would leave him for a time to nature, withdrawing all supernatural inspiration and support such as Christians signify by the name grace. If during that time there should appear in him a manifest degradation of religious and moral sentiment, he would understand that the previous state of his heart had been wholly or in part the result of an immediate action of God, which would prove that God governs by occasional interference as well as by law, and that His Government gives room for prayer. No such degradation appeared, but Smith was not yet prepared to decide finally against the instinct of prayer. He began the experiment on the 22nd of June. Five days after he experienced a rare affluence of the love of God. On the 9th of the following month he was transported by a longing for personal intercourse with God in prayer that swept him past evidence and argument as things of no account; and on the 30th, twenty-one days later, we find him debating whether prayer will not be ultimately substituted by self-communion in the presence of God. He fluctuated for some time, and then, by an exercise of the newly discovered prerogative of will,
resolved that God's government gives room for prayer not discredited by frequent failure, and the arbitrament served for many years as a sufficient theoretic ground of regular prayer.

X.

The indelout who believe in divine government are prone to imagine that duty is always obvious. According to their experience conscience and grace are ever importunate, never remiss. When one of them emerges into a life of devotion he is astonished to find that perplexity as to what is the duty is one of the most frequent of his embarrassments. Sentiments of duty, consequent to earnest prayer, sometimes oppose men to one another in mortal conflict. Casuistry has exposed a moral gap in the religious mind. It was the product of prayerful and abortive effort to define sin, and especially to distinguish mortal from venial sin. If the moral faculty does not afford a definition of sin that flagrantly stigmatizes every possible deviation from duty it is incompetent to instruct us on all occasions what is our duty. It leaves Pilate's question "what is truth?" unanswered. The Roman Catholic Church declares that a lie is a mortal sin, and her Doctors, including some of the Fathers, are at variance as to what is truth, and, therefore, as to what is a lie. By what method was Smith to discover the unobvious duty?

Man he considered is an embryo in the womb of experience. The embryonism of his moral faculty excludes a moral science. Error, therefore, vitiates almost all our moral ideas. The growth of the faculty is a development from a condition of greater to one of less error. God cannot exempt us from moral defect; but, by His action on the heart, and the concurrence of our obedience, the error is diminished, and a moral progress obtains. What is given as the divine imperative to the heart in prayerful and
meditative quest of duty, is not the command that would be given if the moral faculty were adult, but the nearest approximation to the perfect idea of duty that, under the circumstances, is possible. The adulteration of the command by the inevitable human error neither excludes nor impairs obligation. The command is as binding as though it were the pure expression of the mind of God. If all men, he argued, were bent on seeking and doing the Divine will, the search would not achieve a system of consistent and harmonising commands, the obedience would not exclude discord and violence, but the search and the obedience would accelerate the moral and religious growth of the race. Reverence, it appeared to him, is the tabernacle into which we should enter "to consult the Lord." When the heart is in that sanctuary, adoringly prostrate before God, self-love, the arch enemy of justice and humanity, tends to be at a minimum and the sacredness of the neighbour at a maximum. This disposition of mind tends to depress the sources of error that adulterate divine command. Accordingly it became a rule with our annotator to endeavour to sequester himself in this disposition when he had occasion to seek for duty, and whatever scheme of action should then appear to him to be conformable to a rule, which, if universally practised, would promote in the highest degree the happiness of mankind, that scheme he was to consider himself divinely commanded to realise or to endeavour to realise.

According to his experience, divine intercourse with man is of five kinds—1st, beatific vision; 2nd, the visit of the spirit of holiness; 3rd, command given as supernatural; 4th, what is known as "spiritual sweetness;" 5th, inference respecting duty consequent on enquiry of God. An instance or what seemed to be an instance of beatific vision was not wanting to Smith's experience. Spiritual sweetness is an influence that makes no pretensions to personality; it disposes to worship and to all goodness, and, in contrast
to the normal state of the heart, seems to be supernatural. Command given as supernatural is for the most part prohibitive. Its apparent supernaturalness seems to be the positive aspect of privation of an explanatory natural antecedent. Finding himself distracted one morning during meditation, Smith was for rousing himself from the languor that caused the distraction by an exercise of irascible energy. He was arrested by what seemed to be at once a rebuke and an imperative. It forbade him to employ in the service of God the spirit by which he was actuated. The humility into which he was awed (the awe was of reverence not fear) exposed to him by contrast the fierceness which he mistook for mere volition. This irascible energy in its lower degrees had always passed with him for mere energy of will. Nothing in the way of observation or reasoning had lately occurred to account for the detection, at that time, of the counterfeit, and, if there had, it could not explain away the given supernaturalness of the imperative. Inference respecting duty consequent to inquiry of God is given as being a product of mere nature; but faith demands that it is in part the effect of a latent action of God upon the heart. Spiritual sweetness and the latent action of God upon the heart were classed together by Smith under the familiar name grace. In adopting this name from Christianity he did not imply that what it signifies is gratuitous—in excess of what is due. He held that virtue is absolute and imposes obligation on God as well as on creatures—that the goodness essential to God supposes divine duty.

XI.

Smith's conflict with anger, pride, and vanity occasioned a study of these enemies which brought him to the conviction that they are essentially evil. Malignity is the differentia of anger; for anger is emotion that instigates to inflict pain, and has pleasure in the contemplation or
imagination of the pain of an offender. When excited by abhorrence of baseness, or injustice of any kind, it is gilded by the nobility or righteousness of the abhorrence, and passes, under the name of indignation, for a virtue. The abhorrence is indeed a virtue, but the anger is infernal. “If conscience had power, as it has authority,” there would be no need of vindictiveness to protect justice. Will, in obedience to duty, would do all the needful rigour. What should we think of a judge who should exultingly pronounce the sentence of death; and, if incompatible with judicial dignity, how should anger agree with human perfection. A will that needs the stimulus of anger is as abject as the soldier who needs the stimulus of drink. Humility is essential to reverence, but anger excludes humility. It divests its object of sacredness. It is essentially profane. The decorum of an execution requires that the doomed man be treated with a certain degree of respect and tenderness, because reverence apprehends an inalienable sacredness in man. Anger excludes the sentiment: it ignores and insults the sacredness. It is an insanity that mistakes retribution for justice. It holds vengeance to be a creditor to whom a certain torment of the debtor is due. This hideous doctrine would amaze a heart destitute of irascibility. The insanity has invented hell. Nothing less than infinite torment can content its horrid appetite. Imagine a wife and children absorbed in eternal bliss, in spite of the knowledge that a fond and devoted husband and father is undergoing never-ending torture. Imagine them looking over the battlements of heaven down upon this torture, and exulting in the justice of God. Surely Christ was not the dupe of this madness; and, if He appeared to sanction its infernal doctrine, it was because it was His duty to humour the insanity which He meant to cure.

Pride is imperiousness. It covets power and rejoices in homage, especially that of obedience. It is intolerant of
the subjection of its subject, and is, therefore, essentially impious. Vanity is a mean and hypocritical spirit. It affects honour, which it sets us upon eliciting by the show of virtue. Christ condemns it. "Seek not the honour that cometh of man." When the relation of any human attribute, sentiment, or act to dignity was in question Smith tried it by the test of fitness to Christ. If repugnant to his apprehension of Christ, it was condemned. Tried by this test, vanity is essentially base.

But anger, pride, and vanity are of indispensable utility until experience promotes men into the knowledge and disposition that make devout conduct possible—anger to resist injustice, pride and vanity to harness men to the toil and pain of governing, to determine social rank, which is at first a sine qua non of social progress, and to make worldliness or honour a substitute for virtue in advance of the reign of conscience. This suggested to Smith that they are analagous with the placenta and umbilical cord, which are necessary to the embryonic state of man, but, if not cut off, excludatory of the state that should succeed. Then occurred to him the analogy of the larve and chrysalis, one so appreciated of old and so anciently as to have furnished to the Greek language its name for the soul. Now asceticism seems a priori to be adapted to starve the larve matrix, while the involved godliness seems to be adapted to nourish the chrysalic embryo; and there is pointed significance in the fact that a species of man is differentiated by a propensity to asceticism. That such a propensity exists is proved by the fact that asceticism is older than history, commensurate with civilisation, common to many mutually irreconcilable systems of religion, and that we sometimes find it even in Christian ascetics violating acknowledged duty.* Smith concluded that moral perfection excludes

* Witness the desertion of the saintly Vianney, Curé d'Ar, when on his way to the camp of Toulon, after having acknowledged to his cousin that duty, crossing his longing for holy orders, required him to be a soldier. He deliberately disobeys God in order to become His priest, and delivers himself to a life of appalling ascetic rigour. St. Elizabeth, of Hungary, would disobey her director in order to minister to paupers, and especially those of them that were afflicted with loathsome diseases.
anger, pride, and vanity, that they were inserted into human nature as mere provisional constituents destined to be extirpated when they should be no longer useful, and that the Creator had provided in the instinct of self-denial, involved with godliness, a means for their annihilation. He took for granted that sanctity supposes a disposition to prompt and cheerful acquiescence in every event given as a divine dispensation, however repugnant to the unsanctified heart. This mischievous error was all the more discreditable to his judgment that its opposite was perfectly compatible with his ideas of omnipotence and divine dignity. When death bereaves the wife and the mother, when fathers fail to find food for their hungry children, when those we love best bring shame upon our heads, when incurable disease multiplies anguish by making us spectators of a progress through ever-increasing torment to death, it is competent to one, who holds that omnipotence does not exclude absolute impossibility, to regard the grief as a necessary incident of providential means, which God, had it been possible, would have excluded. If omnipotence could have created and governed so as to exclude the atonement, is it supposable that divine goodness would have made room for the passion and the cross? Insane ascetics who believe that they generate merit by making a shambles of their cells can think so; but who that is penetrated by the spirit of Christian charity and is free to trust his moral sense? To bring his heart into the required state, Smith undertook to abstain from the indulgence of all creature affections. These he considered are the main causes of our repining against divine dispensations, and if we make the love of God the cardinal love, and all other loves dependent upon this, they will hanker after nothing of which God thinks it fit to deprive them. Duty, he thought, requires me to be above all things a soldier of God. I must be husband, father, friend, neighbour, citizen, only in the degree that excludes embarrassment of
the soldier, as though I were an angel commissioned by God to make myself human for a life-time in order to hasten the progress of man towards Heaven. I must strive to regard the objects of man's unsanctified affections as they would appear to such an angel. The ascetic severity required by this undertaking made him a hard husband, a hard father, a hard neighbour, hard even in charity, and so hard to himself that health succumbed and sanity threatened to give way. He was his own physician in this disorder. He prescribed for himself indulgence in every innocent pleasure, and released himself from the celestial straight-jacket which he had put on creature affection.

XII.

ASCETICISM was not the sole cause of the breaking down of his health. Looking for a worthy end of being—an end worthy of divine activity and of the activity of creatures throughout eternity—he failed to find one. The undergoing of pleasant emotion, even though it be a circulation of sympathy between God and His creatures, did not appear to him to be such an end. An eternal progress in knowledge—an eternal study of mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry—did not appear to him to be such an end, and, though, as regards creatures it were, it is an end from which omniscience excludes God. Moreover the acquisition of knowledge is not an end but a means, viz., a means relatively to the end, pleasure—the pleasure of gratified curiosity. The moral sense acknowledges no dignity in intentional action that has for its end mere pleasure. It sees no dignity, for example, in dancing or in sport of any kind. The sport may be innocent, but is destitute of dignity. As regards intelligent action (which is commonly accounted voluntary action) dignity depends on utility; and means that have for end mere pleasure, not in any degree the exclusion of pain, are not accounted useful. If
eternal happiness were maintained by eternal sport, neither the happiness nor the immortal agents would have dignity. Utility is either absolute or contingent. If absolute necessity impose conditions of pain which intelligent action may wholly or partially prevent, the preventive action is absolutely useful. If conditions of pain be voluntarily caused, and the pain prevented by an intelligent agent other than the maker of the conditions, the action of that agent is contingently not absolutely useful. For example, if the Creator had made conditions of starvation which the toil of the creature could prevent, the toil would be contingently not absolutely useful. Absolute dignity inheres in absolute utility, and merely contingent dignity in contingent utility. The causation of conditions of contingent utility is useless, and, therefore, without dignity. If it afford opportunity of pleasure without pain, or of pleasure that more than compensates a pain whereby the pleasure is procured, the causation is innocent, otherwise malignant.

What sinister significance in the mental law that limits dignity to utility and utility to the exclusion of pain, if the law be accepted as a word of God to man! It proclaims that God and the elements of Cosmos exist of necessity, that, as imposing pain, the necessity is infernal, and that God created Cosmos to exclude part of the pain involved in Chaos. Without such a necessity creation would have been absolutely useless, and, therefore, without the sanction of dignity.

The hypothesis of a reign of infernal necessity making room for absolute utility and dignity, did not occur to Smith until his mind had recovered its tone: he had not even that dreary refuge from the thesis, that being is without absolute utility and dignity. It menaced his sanity. He dared not confront it. He kept his eye averted from the horror by recourse to every available distraction, by novel-reading, society, travel, and especially by the indulgence and culture of every innocent creature affection.
Faith, scepticism, and the pursuit of innocent pleasure were the weapons with which Smith fought this terrible enemy. The scepticism was that of the Academy, not Pyrrhonism. It made room for the supposition that the thesis which despoils being of dignity is merely specious, and owes its plausibility to ignorance—to mere privation of hypothesis. He was not ignorant that the absence of one thesis may confer upon another the air of being a necessary truth, and it was competent to him to suppose that the thesis which harassed him owed its force to such a privation—a supposition subsequently justified by the advent of the hypothesis of an infernal absolute necessity antagonised by a divine person—by God.

His faith was not shaken by this trial. It was while the disorder was still in its acute stage that, casting about for a criterion of truth, what seemed to be an inspiration gave him this axiom—Indispensableness to the spirit of holiness is the supreme criterion of truth. The spirit of holiness being the sumnum bonum, wisdom requires of will that it adopt by an arbitrament, as true, any thesis that may seem to be congenial to, and a sine qua non of, the presence of that spirit.

XIII.

The idea of an art toward sanctification is repugnant to most Christians. If the idea supposed sanctification to be a merely natural process, so that will could sanctify without divine co-operation, it would conflict with Christian doctrine; but, if it be the idea of a natural process with which man supplements the action of Grace (being accordingly an art toward, not of, sanctification) it does not seem to be out of harmony with that doctrine. It is to the credit of regular obedience to God that it tends to promote human welfare. The greater its utility, the more it redounds to the honour of him who exacts it. To
demand useless work—useless self-denial—as the condition of divine favour does not seem to the moral sense to agree with divine dignity. Therefore, to suppose that obedience has a natural reactionary influence indispensable for the promotion of the mind towards sanctity, is to suppose what makes for the greater glory of God. Smith owed his faith to this idea—to the evidence of a divine paternity that exacts obedience, not arbitrarily, not for the sake of the homage, not for the gratification of a divine egotism, but because obedience is a sine qua non of wisdom. The natural tendency of good works performed in obedience to God to promote the mind in wisdom, seems to be attested by Christ in the words: “If ye will do the works, ye shall know of the doctrine whether it be true.”

The rules of the art toward sanctification on which our annotator’s practice proceeded, were moulded in part by his theory of the relation of soul and body. The method of common sense scepticism requires that man consists of soul and body. It is proved that the body is not a durable thing, that it is a mere series. If man were merely a body, he would be without the temporal identity which is affirmed in one of the fundamental deliverances of the mind. The datum that gives man’s temporal identity is consistent. It should have preference over all others, as being, in respect to them, cardinal. To surrender it, is to open the gates not only to the greatest possible revolution of the system of human beliefs, but to chaos. In denying it, reason abdicates—puts itself out of court; for it implicitly denies the validity of consistent data, the ground of all reasoning. If any of them may be reasonably ejected all may.

The soul, according to Smith, is the subject of consciousness. He does not undertake to judge what is its relation to life. It may, or may not be, the vital principle. The tenet that it is the principle of life has contributed to bring it into discredit with physiologists. It is dependent for consciousness on the body, and especially on the nerves
and the white and grey matter of the spinal and encephalic systems. Every consciousness except volition, every perception, remembrance, imagination, judgment, ratiocination, emotion, and action of intelligent instinct is the effect of a corporal event—of some change of the bodily substance. The train of ideas is the effect of a train of cerebrations, and what is termed law of association of ideas is also law of the association of cerebrations. Nothing in physical science is more completely proved than the dependence of consciousness on bodily change. Common sense requires us to make an exception as regards volition: for, if what is termed volition were the necessary effect of cerebration, or any bodily event, the fact would exclude choice, apparent purpose or choice being predetermined in the cerebration. Volition or choice is thus far dependent on cerebration, that it is dependent on the presence of opposite motives and ideas, and these are the creatures of cerebration; but these being given, the soul is free to choose; the act of choosing is not an effect of cerebration or of any corporal event. Consciousness includes nothing whatever of its proximate cause, which is an action of corporal changes upon the soul.

Mind comprises both soul and body. This is contrary to primary belief; but consistency does not tolerate adhesion to the datum that limits mental faculties to the soul. The soul per se is not a faculty of vision: the eye, the optic nerve and its ganglion are essential parts of the faculty. The organs on which remembrance depends are essential to the appetites. Recognition or identification depends upon an organ which concussion or disuse may annihilate. What excludes ignorance must be mental. The organ made by study of the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, excludes ignorance of that theorem when the theorem is not objective, for example, when the student is thinking of something else. Therefore, the organ is mental. When coma or dreamless sleep suspends certain bodily functions,
the soul is not a mind. What of mind is essential and proper to the soul is, first, capacity to be made conscious by changes occurring in certain bodily organs, and, secondly, the faculty, will.

The soul may, for aught we know, be an atom capable of constituting with other atoms a molecule or body. Atoms are not matter. They are mere elements of matter. Experience acquaints us with the properties of matter or body, but not with the properties of atoms. To suppose the soul to be an atom is to suppose it to be immaterial. According to Leibnitz and Boscovitch atoms are extended. An atom related to certain other atoms so as to be a centre of an organism, may, for aught we know, be a subject of consciousness caused in it by the action of connected atoms; it may be also a vital principle. The same atom in certain other connections may be incapable of consciousness, and may contribute to cause it. Or certain atoms may be potential subjects of consciousness, and others destitute of the faculty. The principle of parsimony favours the hypothesis that the soul is an atom, but this is no very great recommendation. The hypothesis, however, is worth attention as intimating that speculation respecting the soul is not necessarily very remote from the domain of science.

The effects of concussion of the brain and of other cerebral disorders conclusively prove that experience modifies the brain so as to form in it organs of cognition and skill, which, as being organs formed upon an organ, may be termed epiorgans. The effacement or derangement of these by concussion deprives the patient of the corresponding cognition or skill, sometimes reducing the mind to a tabula rasa, like that of the infant, without in the least impairing its power of acquiring knowledge and skill; sometimes depriving of a considerable part, but not of the whole of his knowledge and skill, and sometimes depriving of some minute and unimportant part of knowledge and ac-
quired faculty, as though Puck were sporting with its powers. Locke, by the way, anticipated modern physiologists as to the existence of the epiorgan. The train of ideas is the effect of a train of epiorganal events. All consciousness that implicates acquired cognition and faculty is the effect of epiorganal change or action. Habit is, as one chooses to consider it, either an epiorgan or an epiorganal function. Epiorgans are strengthened by frequent exercise, and weakened and even extinguished by desuetude.

The power of experience, and practice to construct epiorgans, Smith distinguished as *organific*. Art toward sanctification, he considered, should mainly consist of rules for the exercise of the organific power of practice: it should enable us to modify the "epiorganal" source of the train of ideas, so that the idea of our purpose to transact life as a service of God should be frequently recurrent, and that every exterior occasion of well-doing should remind us of the corresponding duty. Above all he hoped to construct by means of it an epiorgan, having for function a habit of charity. Charity he understood to be the apprehension of the infirmities and vices of men that tend to provoke anger, as symptoms of disease—an apprehension involving such a sentiment as that with which the good physician regards his insane patients. When one discriminates between will and intentional instinct, and, striving to live a perfect life, finds himself continually defeated by that kind of instinct; when, moreover, he recalls the moral ignorance that formerly excluded his will from interference with his evil propensities and the overwhelming power of temptation before religion succoured will, he judges that the bulk of mankind are, as regards moral evil, immersed in necessity—are irresponsible. Now the acts of the insane which would provoke us if we supposed them to be sane, excite pity, not anger, when we know that they arise from insanity. The necessity to which the agent is subject excuses the act, or rather prevents occasion for excuse. If
we could habitually apprehend men as being subject to the necessity that really pulls the strings by which the wretched manikins are moved, anger would be excluded, and we should regard their evil motions either with sorrow or indifference, at any rate, without resentment. Apprehending them and dealing with them as peers, companions, brothers, so long as they are under a good influence, when evil comes upon them it would convert them, in our view, into patients, and ourselves, if commissioned by a corresponding duty, into physicians—physicians equally ready for tender offices or for surgery. To construct in himself an epiorgan, having for function to generate, on every pertinent occasion, an apprehension of the apologetic necessity, and constituting a bulwark against anger, became one of the principal ends of Smith's spiritual industry. He has not been altogether unsuccessful. He has been able to prevent anger from putting its hand upon the helm of his life, but not from convulsing his heart and imagination at times or immuring them in rancour. The stupidity of the heart which obliges it to undergo resentment in the face of a distinct intellectual conviction of the irresponsibility of the offender is itself a marvellous proof of the necessity of which man is for the most part an implement.

XIV.

What a hell upon earth is made by the insanity, anger! An inadvertence offends; the consequent resentment inflicts injury which excites an answering resentment, and an infernal fire is kindled that has the property of generating its own fuel. Or men are natural enemies and, at sight, become as devils to one another. The struggle for subsistence, power and rank, teems with occasions of rage and rancour. How prolific is domestic life of exquisite provocation. Love itself is fuel to anger. Duty is a fire-brand. Religion is a fire-brand. It seems as though wailing and
gnashing of teeth were the very end of human existence. Now if one of the lunatics escape into a lucid interval, what shall he do to save himself, and, if he be humane, to save mankind? He must make war upon anger, intrench himself in abhorrence of the infernal necessity that stultifies, maddens and tortures men, and apply against every provocation the thought that the offender is optionless and irresponsible. He must constitute himself a good physician, and view every temptation to kick the lunatics as a sucking action of the vortex of insanity.

Having brought himself to peace he should endeavour to bring others to peace. Those whom he might heal would in turn become good physicians, and union and organization would multiply the power of healing. The salvation might be ultimately universal. At bottom this method of putting out the fires of hell is identical with that of Christ. What signifies "not seven times, but seventy times seven," and "forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us," but command to eschew anger altogether. If we forgive always, if we forbear to judge that the offender is responsible, if we fear to be angry lest worse come of it, we are waging a truceless war with anger. Christian charity is nothing more nor less than war upon anger.

XV.

The idea of an art toward sanctification was not grafted on the mind of Smith, but evolved by it as the leaf by the tree. When he found that this product of his mind coincided, except as to religious rites and ceremonies, with the rules of the spiritual life propounded under the sanction of the Roman Catholic Church, he was rejoiced and encouraged. His reverence was gladdened that he seemed to be approaching Christ, and his conservatism or common sense
that his untaught mental instincts, under the influence (as he supposed) of grace, were travelling the beaten way of wisdom. He read the "Imitation of Christ" as regularly as the priest reads his breviary, and more frequently. His indocility and originality in respect of spiritual matters were evinced by the fact that the meaning of a great part of the Imitation was dark to him until the things signified were discovered by himself through the improvement of his faculties by obedience, prayer, and worship, when passages that were before apparently trite would flash out confirmation of his discovery. Of the "Lives of the Saints" he made a long and earnest study. He read most of the best known treatises on the spiritual life, Protestant as well as Catholic. He delighted in the sermons of Butler. He read with great interest those of Robertson, which showed him that he himself was not navigating alone, but as one of a fleet. During several retreats he made an epitome of the "Growth in Holiness" by Faber. His study of the Bagavadgita, of the life of Sakia Mouni, of the "Mystique" of Gœrres, and of kindred works, exposed to him that nothing in the code of Christian morals, nor in its rules of spiritual life, are proper to Christianity—that Christ's single original contribution to religion and morals was Christ, a contribution of transcendant value. While piety was keeping itself near to God in this kind of study, philosophy was not inattentive. Pledged to hold to God in spite of atheistic demonstration, and believing in the possibility of doing so, and also because faith and hope promised a final reconciliation of religion and science, Smith gave free rein to Reason. While reading the "Lives of the Saints" he was struck by two facts—first, that the majority of the Saints were derived from a stock in which remarkable piety had appeared, and second, that they evinced, in infancy or childhood, signs of the future sanctity. Confining himself in Butler's "Lives of the
INTRODUCTION.

Saints to biographies that extend over two pages, he marked all the instances that seemed to evince inherited and congenital sanctity, and so ascertained that a very large proportion indicate that sanctity is natural. Now the vocation which differentiates the proper candidate for priesthood in the Roman Catholic Church, differs not essentially, but merely in degree from the sanctity that Rome encourages; and this suggested to Smith that the genuine priest is a member of a natural species which he named natural priest. We give in the following extracts from his notes, the argument that convinced him of the truth of this hypothesis, and that sanctity is, at least in part, natural:—

"The priest, like the poet, is born, not made. The sacerdotal character is congenital, and differentiates a natural human species. Its peculiarity is, that the mere idea of God tends to elicit in it faith in the reality of God and an infinitely magnifying and a self-effacing love of God involving desire to be united to its object. In its higher degrees it involves the ascetic instinct, which discovers to it, that to refuse certain propensities is the condition of what seems to be a vague intercourse with God wherein the soul experiences what is known by the name, spiritual sweetness. This sweetness has hitherto passed for an immediate effect of divine action, whereas it has sometimes served to pamper abuse, as in the case of Madame Guyon, who confesses to have dallied with it to the neglect of her household duties. It would be impious to suppose that God would be convenient to such an abuse. Moreover, undue indulgence in it disorders the imagination, plunging the mind alternately into ecstasy and horror. It sometimes generates emotions of love to God of such violence as to elicit cries for relief from the intensity of the emotion and, in one case, that of Saint Philip Neri, to break a rib by the enlargement of the heart. Asceticism
and mysticism have appeared in all ages, from the dawn of history, and in almost all civilised nations, generating or conforming to their various systems of religion, aiming in all at the same end, namely, union with the Divine, and employing the same means, viz., mortification of all the constituents of human nature that are opposed to holiness; —manifesting themselves everywhere in the same kind of emotions, such as aspiration after the Divine, sensible sweetness, rapture, peace, dryness, prostration, discouragement, despair, together with the sentiment that the pleasing emotions are the immediate action of God upon the spirit, and the painful ones privation of this action. The Christian is not permitted to suppose that the sanction of Divine Grace was given to various and opposite systems of religion and morality; and where asceticism is not the product of grace it must be the product of an instinct. It is well known how, under the name of leading of the spirit, a mystical instinct has violated common sense, and even decency, in Christendom. Signs of the ascetic bias show themselves for the most part in childhood, as will be seen in a study of the "Lives of the Saints;" and, in most cases, the ascetic character seems to be transmitted from parent to child, with enhancement in the child. It is hardly to be supposed that grace is concerned in the production of such signs, before intelligent intercourse between God and the pious soul is possible, or that it regularly follows a natural order, as that of lineage. St. Ignatius deployed his amazing power of endurance in the interest of vanity before he employed it in the work of sanctification. This shows a natural adaptation for the ascetic life. St. Francis Xavier, when labouring for the salvation of idolaters, so says his fellow missionary, Melchior Nunnez, seemed to act, 'not by any acquired power, but as by some natural instinct, for he could neither take pleasure, nor even exist except in such employments. They were his repose; and when he
was leading men to the knowledge and the love of God, however much he exerted himself, he never appeared to be making any effort."

"God seems to signify by these evidences that the sacerdotal character is natural, that it is an instinct peculiar to a species of men, and that it naturally generates the order of ideas and sentiments which constitute the basis of religion and asceticism. If this inference imply that God is a mere spectator of the operations of the sacerdotal faculty—of the generation of religion, and of all religious events—it is a mischievous error; for faith in the constant intervention of God in human affairs is the ground of prayer; to exclude prayer is to stifle the heart in practical atheism; and will bent upon God and perfection should discard every hypothesis that is stigmatised by this tendency. But the understanding does not imply that the sacerdotal faculty is uncontrolled by Providence. That it is a natural faculty capable of generating, under the operation of merely natural causes, religious ideas, emotions, beliefs,* and actions, makes nothing against its being a lever in the Almighty hand. According to Christianity, all nature is controlled by the constant activity of God, so that to belong to nature is to be an instrument of that activity.

"The hypothesis that the sacerdotal faculty is natural, allows it to be fallible, dependent upon experience and determinable as to the idea of the Divine (the name of God?) which it generates, by the degree of moral development of its subject, so that in a ruder phase, when retribution is accounted just, its God is vindictive, and, in a more humane one, charity puts out the fires of hell. It satisfactorily
explains the moral sense and the development of theology, and of religious morality; for example, from the lower idea of the Divine, in the Mosaic theology, to the Christian idea of God, and from the sanctioned polygamy and concubinage of the Mosaic system to the rigorous monogamy of Christianity. If immediate communication of God with man were possible or consistent with divine wisdom, why should God have employed slow and painful means, why not illuminate every heart with perfect faith or beatific vision, and draw it by an overwhelming attraction to Himself and goodness; why must revelation wait the advent of a Moses, and, then, be only partial, why the postponed Messiah and the agony of the cross? All this is unintelligible on the hypothesis that the communication of God with man is impossible save by a language that depends, in part, upon nature and experience, improves with the development of the race and degrades with its retrogression. This language is generated by the sacerdotal faculty: the inspired priest is a word of God. Was it not in this sense, as being priest after the order of Melchisedec, that Christ was the word of God?

"As word of God the priest should be dominant in society, but as an influence, not as a coercive power. Political function stifles the oracle. Civil hierarchy is as antagonistic to the sanctification of society as the suppression of the priest.

* "A perfect moral idea supposes a perfect knowledge of

* The moral sense of England is now beginning to be uneasy under an obstruction against which the chemistry of Christ has been hitherto ineffectual. The obstruction is truculence—truculent high-mindedness. The truculent has turned philosopher and moralist in the nineteenth century; and, propounding the axiom, "the just thing in the long run is the true thing," encourages might to follow its instinct and dismiss its scruples. Sympathy is a condition of the sentiment of right and duty. Privation of sympathy with the lower animals exempts our predatory instinct from embarrassment as regards their rights. Pride, in the strong of our race, tends to exclude sympathy with the weak, and, with it, due apprehension of the rights of the weak. Contempt excludes justice, and fiercely when the wisdom of the strong, intent on the common good, finds itself baffled or retarded by the folly or wickedness of the weak. But for the counteracting influence of blood, the weak would be either exterminated or treated as chattels. They are for the most part tools of the devil, and being mistaken for allies, provoke an enmity and scorn which righteousness seems to sanction. The moral sense, enlightened by Christian compassion, and exempted by meekness from the
what is, in any degree, conducive to the welfare of mankind. It supposes a perfect knowledge of the nature of man and of society. For, to conduct oneself according to perfect morality is to conduct oneself conducively to human welfare, and, if one be ignorant of what constitutes human welfare (the summum bonum) and of what is conducive to it, he cannot conduct himself accordingly: his moral idea is, in proportion to his ignorance, defective. For example, if monogamy be indispensable to human welfare, the moral idea of a polygamic society is, through ignorance, defective. The knowledge on which perfect morality depends forms upon experience, and so slowly that it has never yet attained to perfection in the consciousness of a society. The Mosaic revelation sanctioned polygamy, concubinage, and slavery. The moral idea of modern civilization is still not altogether intolerant of slavery, nor of the vindictiveness of the lex talionis. National life has never yet extended to the degree of experience requisite for the development of the perfect moral ideal. This ideal, therefore, is not involved in the spirit of godliness—does not spring complete from its head; but godliness necessarily adopts whatever embryo of the ideal experience has developed, and then contributes to its growth. The sanctity of David and of Solomon did not find itself out of place in the seraglio.

"The home of human welfare may be in time as well as in eternity—on this as well as on the other side of the grave. A perfect moral idea adapts a man to the earthly, as well as to the post-mortem welfare of mankind—to a kingdom of God on earth as well as in eternity. To con-

stultifying influence of pride and anger, excludes enmity and scorn; enjoining wholesome austerity, it excludes the spirit that says Raca to the brother. Nobleness is incapable of scorn; what seems to be its scorn proceeds from adulterating pride and anger. Its aversion to baseness supposes it to be incapable of enmity and scorn, for these are base. The rescue of nobleness and the spirit of holiness from pride and anger—from truculence or high-mindedness—is a part of Christian salvation. Pioneers of moral development in England who have followed the might-makes-right theory are showing signs of defection, and the close of the century may witness an evolution enfranchising the moral sense of England from the spirit of violence."
duct oneself as a perfect member of earthly society—in such wise that if all men did alike, the fact would involve a heaven on earth—is to prepare oneself in the most perfect way for the social beatitude of eternity. The Scriptural injunction, to regard ourselves as pilgrims and strangers in this world, agrees with this theory of perfection. Those who undertake to live according to the Christian ideal alienate themselves from a society that merely complies with nature. This society, not the earth and all possible earthly society, is the world in respect of which the Christian is enjoined to regard himself as a pilgrim and a stranger. The natural occasions of the business of life are equally occasions of saintly conduct and of sin—of serving God and of serving the devil. We may eat and drink to God, or to sensuality. We may provide for to-morrow in obedience to God or to Mammon—in the spirit of faith, or trusting in only natural causes. Delight in the sublime and beautiful is worship in the saint. To partake with gratitude and temperance of the feast which God has spread for us on the earth, is to honour our Heavenly Father. Ordinate natural affection does not limit the love of God and of the neighbour, but may live, move, and have its being in a supreme love of both. If the proportion of the godly to the godless on the earth, should become that of the godless to the godly in the time of the Apostles, it is the sinner, not the saint, that would be the stranger in this world.

"The instinctive asceticism of the priest tends to beget in him an indiscriminate distrust of nature; and this, combined with his gravitation to God, disposes him to the belief that perfect beatitude is wholly supernatural—that the perfect relation of the saint to God excludes nature—that imperfection is essential to the earthly life, as including nature—that the idea of a heaven on earth, a perfect kingdom of God on earth, is contradictory. On the other hand the natural laity is blind or purblind, not indeed as regards the supernatural, but as regards the Divine. How-
ever prone to superstition, it is cold or dead to God when not warmed and enlightened by the priest. The exalting and purifying influence of a reverence that aspires to fit its subject for the eye of God—hungering and thirsting after righteousness in order to be worthy of Divine love—fails to bear upon the development of a moral ideal that forms exclusively on the experience of a natural laity. Such an ideal must substitute a stoical self-reliance for a childlike dependence upon God, and so, under moral sanction, conserve pride. The power of self-denial necessary to reorganize the instinctive man conformably to a moral ideal, depends upon a degree of faith of which an unassisted laity is incapable. It follows that the priest and the laity—the priest and the congregation—must balance each other in a society to make it the matrix of a perfect moral ideal. The priest must be a guide, not a king—an influence, not a coercive power. He must respect the freedom of the layman as God respects it, who has made man free to disobey Him. He must not regard his own special character as including all that does, and excluding all that does not, belong to perfection, but look for some complement in the mental constitution of the layman. The layman should regard himself as lacking wholly, or in part, the highest of human faculties, the faculty of sanctity—that by which, and by which alone, we come by a consciousness of God that is competent to be a basis of love and obedience. He should cherish the belief that, without the vision of the priest, the ditch is inevitable.

“One of the most powerful of the causes that resist human development, is the adulteration of the priesthood—the assumption of priestly function by those who are without natural vocation to its exercise. The Levitical priesthood involved this adulteration. The limitation of priestly function to lineage in Judea and Egypt ossified society in those countries by substituting a counterfeit for nature’s priesthood. The languor of Protestantism, as
compared with the vigour of Rome, is owing to the fact that the latter does, and the former does not, select its priesthood by the criterion of natural vocation. The High Church movement is the effort of Protestantism to recover and give due ascendancy to the natural priesthood.

"The priest is commissioned to serve God in respect of the eternal welfare of society, and the layman is constituted to be busy, first, about his own temporal welfare, and, secondly, in a subordinate degree, about that of society. The mental constitution and habits of the priest unfit him for sound judgment respecting the temporal interests of mankind, especially civil affairs, and that of the layman for sound judgment respecting sanctification.

"Holiness forms in the priest upon such a theology as the knowledge of the society or the age affords, and constitutes it, for him and for all whom he can influence, the word of God. If the theory differ from what previously passed for the Divine word, he publishes a new religion, and is to His disciples not merely the messenger but the word itself; and truly so; for what is peculiar in the theory proceeds from what is peculiar in the man, so that his doctrine is the exponent of what he is. If it be the truth, then, he also is the truth. Was it not in this sense that Christ declared of Himself I am the truth. He declared of Himself that He was sent, and that He was the truth. Thus, as discovery discredits the theory of the existing
religion, the occasion finds for itself a new priest and prophet, a further development of the Divine word, and, so, society proceeds from theology to theology, from the less to the more developed expression of the Divine mind—from Abraham to Moses—from Moses to Christ.

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"The priest and the layman have opposite duties in respect of the penitent; the rigour of God against sin being the basis of the layman's duty, and the paternal charity of God that of the sacerdotal duty. The priest frequents the sinner without prejudice to society."

In proportion as the vocation of the natural priest calls him to a higher sanctity, he is averse to marriage, and à fortiori to the illicit substitute. Not that he is not subject to concupiscence, but he feels that sexual intercourse excludes or impedes a certain intimacy of communion with God. The concurrence of the will with lust, seems to him an impurity and a degradation—an act that makes the soul less fit for the society of God. The disposition to virgin the heart for God, frequently manifests itself in childhood; for example, in that of Doctor Newman, whose _Apologia_ exhibits a rare sample of the natural priest, and in that of Vianney, the famous Curé d'Ars. To those who have experienced the aversion (and Smith, though married, was one of them) the purity of celibacy seems to befit the priesthood. It appeared to him, that the myth of the marriage of the sons of God with the daughters of men, signified the lapse of the natural priest into marriage whereby the salt lost its savour, and the consequent corruption of society gave occasion for the deluge. Celibacy exempts the priest from that "care for the morrow" which the relation of husband and father imposes.
It detaches him from the sympathy that gives the worldliness of wife and children access to the heart of the husband and father. It exempts him from the fetters of social rank, and so gives him unembarrassed access to all ranks. It sequesters him, considering his vocation, in the utmost degree, compatible with missionary work, from the influence of the devil, the world and the flesh. It enhances his dignity in the view of the natural laity, and with it his authority and usefulness; and it enables the laity to maintain five or six times the missionary force it could otherwise afford itself, or perhaps ten or twelve fold, making account of the distraction of the married missionary between his family on the one hand, and God and mankind on the other.

The institution by the Roman Catholic Church of celibacy of the priesthood appeared to Smith to be a movement in the direction indicated by Christ. It seemed to him that Christ discriminated two orders of men who must be differently affected by His doctrine and commands, viz., the natural priest and the natural laity; and that He mainly applied Himself to the selection, inspiration, instruction, organization, and setting in motion of a priesthood. It was the Christian priest, and not the Christian layman, who was to take no thought for the morrow. If the layman were to take no thought for the morrow, both priest and layman must perish. But since Christ had enjoined upon the Christian laity to maintain the Christian priest ("the labourer is worthy of his hire," and "you shall not muzzle the ox"), it would become the priest to entrench himself against Mammon, against all sordid anxiety or care for the morrow, in trust that God would duly provide for him by means of the laity, those to whom, as missionary, he was sent. The natural priest is the "salt of the earth;" the natural laity, what the salt is to preserve; the natural priest is he who is able, when called, to divest himself of all concerns of creature affection, and
so, I better introduce the paternal priest's role in marriage, as marriage is a source of corruption, and the priest must maintain the purity of the will. The priest is a mediator between the believer and the divine, and it is his duty to ensure that sexual intimacy is conducted with reverence. Newman writes, "Aedicule elevates the priest's role in the sacrament of marriage to a higher level than that of a mere witness. The priest is not merely a witness of the act, but an active participant in the ceremony, guiding the couple through the rites and ensuring their understanding of the significance of the act."

In the context of the poem, the priest is depicted as a figure of moral authority, whose presence is necessary to guide the congregation through the complexities of spiritual and temporal life. The priest's role is not only one of guidance but also one of protection, ensuring that the couple's intentions are in line with the will of God. The poem emphasizes the importance of the priest's role in maintaining the sanctity of marriage, and the necessity of his presence in the act of matrimony.
It detaches him from the sympathy that gives the weakness of wife and children access to the heart of the husband and father. It exempts him from the ceaseless toil of social rank, and so gives him unconstrained access to all ranks. It sequesters him, considering its vocation, in the utmost degree, commuting with missionary work, from the influence of the devil, the world, and the flesh. It enhances his dignity in the view of the natural laity, and with it his authority and usefulness; and it enables the laity to maintain five or six times the missionary force it could otherwise afford itself, or perhaps ten or twelve times, making account of the distribution of the married missionary between his family on the one hand, and God and mankind on the other.

The institution by the Roman Catholic Church of celibacy of the priesthood appears to Smith to be a movement in the direction indicated by Christ. It seemed to him that the intercession of wonderers of men who must be determined selected, but not of the same rank, and commands, viz., the highest the natural laity; and that He made men His selected, inspiration, without selection, inspiration, and authority; He designated in motion, the highest the natural laity, and not a million of an institution as much as thought for the world. If the priest, it had had worth, to some (and "you and Me"), instead of the priest to be the salt of all sordid life, that God would be the laity, those to the laity. The natural priest is the laity, what the salt is to the human who is able, when called, of creature affection, and
devote himself wholly to the work of God—who will not delay even to bury a father. The natural layman is he who is to profit by the devotion of the priest, but is neither competent by nature, nor called by grace, to disengage himself from the empire and the duties of creature affection and of concern for the morrow. Enough if, as regards concern for the morrow, his sanctity and obedience exclude cupidity or Mammon, and, as regards creature affection, injustice. Enough if, like the young man who “went away sorrowing,” he keep the commandments; the higher sanctity that enables one to sell all he has, give to the poor, and follow Jesus, is proper to the natural priest. The natural layman, who, in a fit of exaltation, undertakes the work of priesthood, is he who begins to build without counting the cost, and erects a monument of his folly. That men differ as to capacity for receiving and obeying the word of God, and that omnipotence must have respect to the difference, are theses the truth of which is implied in the words of Christ, “He that is able to receive it, let him receive it,” and also in the sorrow He felt for the young man, who was able, from his youth up, to keep the commandments, but could not abandon his wealth to follow Jesus. The natural priest, it appeared to Smith, was designed to succeed Christ as missionary and pastor; and the Roman Catholic Church had, either intentionally or inadvertently, or perhaps with partial insight, enhanced by celibacy the fitness of the order for that transcendent office.

The embryo of an ideal of the priest seems to have been congenital in Smith, and only needed the nutrition of a spiritual life to become perfect. According to that ideal, love of God and the neighbour leave little room in the heart of the priest for other affections. By love of the neighbour, is not meant an affection for an abstract object, but one that takes for object every man upon whom the attention of the priest is directed. He is of boundless
INTRODUCTION.

73

charity, if charity be possible in a heart exempt from anger; he is incapable of craft or violence; zealous to bring men to God, he is incapable of coercion or untruth. The priest exercising civil power, or presuming to help omnipotence by falsehood, is an anomaly. Marriage stifles priesthood.

Occasionally, Smith had the happiness to meet with Roman Catholic priests, who seemed to approximate to this ideal, and, so long as the appearance lasted, he had peculiar pleasure in their society. But his prepossession in favour of the order, did not blind him to the fact that it has always evinced a disposition to maintain godliness by craft and coercion. Now, in the view of the moral sense, whereby we apprehend the attributes, nobleness, and baseness—craft is base. It follows that they who are prone to the use of craft, are wanting in nobleness; and Smith was constrained to allow that privation of nobleness is a characteristic accident of the species, natural priest. I say accident, because fact and reason concur that it is not an essential attribute; happily, there are many noble natural priests; and so far is sanctity from excluding nobleness, that both are essential to perfection. Here was a problem, indeed, for one who yearned to be Christian—to justify the selection by Christ of an order characterized by ignobleness, to be his successor as messenger, and vice-gerent of God! Smith was exempted from the consideration of this problem for thirteen years after his conversion, by a fact which proves that he was powerfully swayed by the authority of Christ. The fact was, that the sense of the noble appeared to him to be the source of a morality, opposed to that of sanctity—an infernal splendour in the moral world, opposed to the light of heaven.

I mean by the name, “sense of the noble,” the emotive attribute or faculty whereby we have intuition of the opposite qualities, nobleness and abjectness. One may be partially noble without having the sense of the noble. A highly benevolent and affectionate man, not much given
to concern for the morrow, is a generous, and so far, a noble man, though he be destitute of the sense of the noble. But without the sense, it is impossible to have an abhorrence of untruth, infidelity, and disloyalty, that would dispose to suffer considerable pain, rather than violate in these respects. One endowed with an average sense of the noble, but otherwise meanly constituted, might purpose to live according to a moral code, having the noble for its basis, and might live accordingly. This voluntary, and, as it might be fitly characterized, artistic nobleness, would differ \textit{toto carlo} from the blind nobleness of the generous man destitute of the sense of the noble. Now of this blind nobleness we shall make no account in the following pages, but use the words "noble" and "nobleness," as though it did not exist. (I by no means approve of the application of the word "sense," to mental faculties, of which the objects do not involve sensations; but language at present affords no better term.) The sense of the noble intuites nobleness in \textit{sacrifice} for truth, fidelity, loyalty, love, justice; for fidelity as regards promise, for loyalty as regards king, country, mankind. It intuities abjectness in falsehood, perfidy, disloyalty, injustice, congenital meekness, egotism, truculence, sordidness, excessive concern for the morrow, fastidiousness, cowardice, defect of fortitude, stupidity, coarseness. It abhors cruelty, but does not necessarily apprehend it as abject. A supernatural being apprehended as cruel would present to it the aspect of a fiend. It generates a sentiment analogous to, and which is commonly confounded with respect—a sentiment of a dignity in others, which determines a corresponding deference. Scorn and indignation are commonly supposed to be expressions of its abhorrence, but they are merely effects of its action on pride and anger, and express nothing essential to the sense of the noble. Its abhorrence in a man destitute of anger would not be expressed by scorn or indignation.

The apparent antagonism of the spirit of the noble to
godliness has not received the attention it deserves. A moral ideal constructed by the sense of the noble, unmodified by a dominant godliness, is a self-apotheosis. The supreme dignity to which it refers is the dignity of self. It excludes humility, which is the basis of the moral ideal, determined by dominant godliness. The dignity of self, according to stoicism, is the reason of self-sacrifice, whereas the dignity or glory of God is the reason in the view of sanctity. Therefore, the sense of the noble tends to substitute a reign of pride for the reign of sanctity. Not that these are alternatives; for, as we have seen, it is possible, in view of the merely natural subordination of the individual to society, to construct a moral ideal on the basis of humility; but they are almost in the relation of alternatives, so strong is the tendency of pride to dominate, stultify, and deprave nobleness detached from sanctity. The tendency of the spirit of the noble to construct a moral ideal independently of sanctity, and, therefore, upon a basis of pride, is evinced by the moral code of chivalry evolved by Christendom in opposition to the code of Christ. According to Christ we should bless those that curse us, and do good to those that hate and despitefully use us; according to the code of honour we should slay them. According to Christ we should leave judgment and re-dressing of wrongs to God and the society; according to the code of honour, judgment and retribution are the prerogatives of the individual. When the sense of the noble is stirred by an appearance of heroism, an emotion, named by Lord Kames the sympathetic emotion of virtue, tends to obtain. It is an elating and self-glorifying emotion, involving an apprehension of self as being also heroic, and emulous of opportunity to exercise a like heroism. It contributes to deprave the sense of the noble, and make it an auxiliary of selfishness. It is helped by another cause. The res angusta tends to blind the sense of the noble as to the moral character of the means which seem to be
available to its subject for provision for the morrow. The means are often base, and thus baseness becomes characteristic of the poor. The rich are free to scrutinize and choose, and for the sake of honour (not generally of virtue) they keep themselves in fair repute with the sense of the noble. Coarseness, parsimony, and dependence are distasteful, refinement, liberality and independence agreeable, to the sense of the noble. The poor are necessarily coarse, parsimonious, and dependent, the rich generally refined, and at least not flagrantly parsimonious or dependent. The attraction and repulsion tend to make nobleness the partizan of worldliness, and thereby of selfishness. We have not yet exhausted the causes that tend to oppose the spirit of the noble to sanctity. According to sanctity, duty is the measure of goodness, and duty, relatively to the creature, is divine command. If anything that tends to pass for goodness should exceed duty, it would be without the province of obedience and the empire of God. But generosity seems to be such a thing, and generosity is an excellent object of the sense of the noble. Now Christ is emphatic against the over-reaching admiration of the sense of the noble and the incident self-complacency which the moral sentiment of Paganism seemed to sanction in the aphorism "Virtue is its own reward." "And when ye have done all these things, say we are unprofitable servants: we have done that it was our duty to do." As moving us to be and apprehend ourselves profitable servants, to do better than God requires, to apply a moral code of which the will of God is not the reason, and so glorify self instead of God by virtue, the sense of the noble tends to oppose itself to sanctity. Again, it is averse to meekness, and approves the self-respect that makes us intolerant of insult. The spirit that is concerned about the dignity of self is an embarrassment that makes us less free to be all things to all men for Christ's sake, and it retrenches the humility involved in the conviction of sin. Lastly, the sense of
the noble excites the high-mindedness of scorn and indignation, and lifts us out of the abjection and charity of remorse and contrition to transform us, as it were, into avenging deities.

Now the sense of the noble involves nothing incongruous with sanctity, but bears on it adversely because of entanglement with other principles of emotive intuition and instinct, e.g., pride, vanity, anger, and because of ignorance. When modified by a dominant sanctity its intuitions, like those of reverence, pass with its subject for indices of the will of God—they determine his ideas of duty, and, in so far, his duties. He has no more reason to regard himself as a profitable servant for complying with the duties which those ideas determine, than for obedience to the ten commandments. As to meekness, since it cannot be supposed that Christ used the term as denoting a congenital defect of self-respect, but as signifying war upon anger—a habit of bearing the wounds of self-respect with brave forbearance—it is the reverse of abject, and, if its reason were understood, it would enjoy exceptional favour with the sense of the noble. A theology requiring that divine omnipotence excludes the absolutely impossible, must indeed find an adversary in the sense of the noble; for this would imply that conditions of pain were needlessly created. A wanton causation of pain is in the view of the sense malignant; it must regard as a fiend an omnipotent Creator, who should wantonly create conditions of pain. The worship of such a being it must apprehend as devil-worship. But nothing essential to theology excludes the union of sanctity and nobleness, and the supremacy of the former.

The apparent antagonism of nobleness to sanctity deceived our annotator for about thirteen years after his conversion. Christ's injunction to regard ourselves as unprofitable servants, and the beatific character which He ascribes to poverty of spirit, strongly contributed to keep
him in bondage to the error. Confounding nobleness with the high-mindedness of pride and anger which its aversions excite, it seemed to him to be the opposite of the poverty of spirit commended by Christ. The effort to exclude the spirit of the noble and live and feel according to meekness, kept him in ever recurrent conflict and mortification. From this abuse of himself he was rescued by the discovery that the sense of the noble may, like conscience, be an oracle of God. Perplexed one day between the opposite claims of meekness and self-respect, he referred the matter, as was his custom on such occasions, to God, and an answer appeared in his heart so pure of concern for self, and so sanctioned by the spirit in which it was involved, that he did not doubt he was divinely counselled. It enjoined him to comply with self-respect, and therein with nobleness.

The sense of the noble being thus given as a divinely sanctioned constituent of the moral faculty, the problem referred to, viz., the selection by Christ of an ignoble successor, was not slow to challenge his attention. His solution was that the natural priest is a pסיס אלייר in the hands of omnipotence, absolute impossibility precluding the religious and moral development of man by any other means.

XVI.

Once it is admitted that omnipotence does not exclude absolute impossibility, that, even as regards the contingent, the Creator is obliged to have recourse to means, the moral sense is no longer in a condition to spurn the question whether it be good to do evil that good may come, or rather whether it be good to do for a good end what, if not indispensable for such an end, would be evil. Ignorance gives room for this holy and noble intolerance; but knowledge humbles our moral haughtiness. The question cannot be reasonably put out of court without a hearing.
The spirit of truth is prone to insist, in the ignorant, that the obligation to respect truth is unlimited. They overlook the accommodation which we owe to the insane whom the truth may exasperate. But this proves that the obligation imposed by benevolence is superior to that imposed by truth, and that it is good to deceive one who is not a free agent for his benefit. If, for example, the human race must dwell for ever in abortion and misery unless it be led by a lie along the way of salvation, it would be the duty of the guide to utter the lie. If benevolence warrant a departure from truth for the sake of an individual why not, à fortiori, when the end is the rescue of mankind? Of course it is dangerous to open the question, considering the tendency of the infernal in man to take an ell when you give it an inch. If the obligation of truth be not put to the vulgar as unlimited, it loses all hold upon them. Pretexts for falsehood would abound, and, making it customary, would make it inoffensive. Besides it gives room for the question: Did Christ endeavour to lead men to salvation by untruth? Was he, perhaps, a benevolent atheist, who proceeded on the conviction that, to conduct man along the way of development or salvation, it is indispensable to humour his godliness? Or was he God Himself, creator, not of matter, but of Cosmos, and, as part of his strife with the uncreated infernal, did he humour human prejudice as a sine qua non of human salvation? It would be worse than indiscreet to propose such questions in a popular form, but it would be unjustifiable to evade or suppress the discussion of them by those whose faith in God and morality they assail. Since we are obliged to allow that the obligation of truth is not unlimited, we admit that it is good to do for a good end what, if not indispensable for such an end, would be evil. It follows that if absolute impossibility exclude the salvation of man, except by means of the natural priest, it befits the divine character to employ the order in spite of its moral defect.
Omnipotence that excludes absolute impossibility may be distinguished as unlimited, and the opposite species as limited.

If omnipotence be limited, it might become divine dignity to apply, as means of human development, not only an ignoble order, but also a false theology. It may be impossible to God to impart a true theology to man, but by degrees and by modifying, through a Moses or a Christ, a received theology of natural origin. Absolute impossibility might exclude the communication of divine truth by an incarnate God, except on the condition of modifying some recorded theology of natural origin, and wide of the truth. The modified theology would involve error, but, if it were a sine qua non of salvation, to teach it would be a duty of the incarnate God. It would not consist with divine dignity to create beings whose development and happiness should depend on the use of deception by the Creator, except the creation were a sine qua non of the exclusion of some greater evil; and the apologists for Christianity who hold to the divinity of Christ, are constrained to take refuge in this excuse. For if they be men of noble sanctity, they must regret a part of the theology which Christ (according to Christendom) has expressly or implicitly sanctioned; and, allowing that he sanctioned the untrue, they must acknowledge that he did not create conditions requiring him to be a party to deception, merely to give existence to human happiness. The Christian theologian holds that God is unlimitedly omnipotent, and that, nevertheless, without a view to a greater evil—1st, He framed the animal kingdom upon the predatory scheme, and otherwise subjected the lower animals to temporal pain, although no progenitor had eaten forbidden fruit—nay, to such conditions of pain, that vivisection can plead for itself the being a means of excluding greater pain than what it involves; 2nd, foreseeing their conversion into devils, and that they would deserve and incur eternal
torment, He created certain angels, who by overwhelming temptation would drag into their ruin the greater part of
the inferior species, man; 3rd, He is every moment calling
out of nothingness into existence human souls, and incarnating them in bodies descended from that of fallen Adam,
foreseeing that they will succumb to the incident infirmity
and temptation, and thereby deserve and incur eternal torment; 4th, He required the Atonement and the temporal misery (Purgatory, according to Rome, included) of the elect; 5th, He inserted such conditions of depravity into the mental constitution of angels and men, as preclude moral recovery after an act of disobedience, except the wretch be helped by grace; 6th, He provided man with organs of grief and compassion prophetic of woe, and of ghastly significance as regards the animus that gave him existence; 7th, He has prepared a beatitude for the elect, which makes them indifferent to the eternal torment of their quandam fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, friends, fellow citizens; 8th, He created the conditions of all these horrors for His own glory. Being of unlimited omnipotence, He might have satisfied the divine egotism by creating only the elect; but He preferred to have the glory seasoned by the torments and curses of the damned. This infernal doctrine gives us a fiend for a God.

The moral sense in an age of ignorance and inhumanity
had mistaken vengeance for justice, and the error moulded
the theology of Moses, which Christ used as a vehicle of
the doctrine of charity. The infernal part of the theology
of Christendom is Mosaic, the divine part was contributed
by Christ. Did He not count upon a strife between these
elements, and prophecy that the "gates of hell" would not prevail? When man should be humanized, and ages of
additional experience interpreted by the Christian spirit,
the divine element would consume the infernal one; charity
would put out the fires of hell. Then sanctity would be
prepared to adore and obey a deity of transcendent, but
not unlimited power, a Creator who had not wantonly created conditions of pain, but had created in order to diminish, and perhaps ultimately annihilate pain.

Uncultivated reverence is not selective. It will receive as a little child whatever authority presents to it, however depraving and false. It is as little selective as the sucking instinct of the infant which goes to work upon a finger as well as a nipple. If you assail a false theology which it has adopted, it apprehends you as impious—as attacking God, not the false theology which divides it from God. Let not this kind of fallacy reproach our arraignment of the theology of Christendom. It is not the Word of God that we arraign, but the word of men who profess that they are sent by God. When a man claims to be sent to us by God, he should show his credentials; as how otherwise should we know that he is not a missionary of the devil. But one of the credentials is the agreement of the message with the moral sense. If the message offend the moral sense, and we exclaim against it, the putative missionary should not charge us with blasphemy. It is he, not God, that is put in question by the objection. If he claim that the message is mortal, but, because of the perversion of our moral faculty, appears the contrary, we answer that in that case we are exempt from all responsibility, for we are, by his own showing, incapable of knowing whether he be or be not God's messenger. Moreover, the question arises whether it be his moral faculty, or ours that is perverted.

The hypothesis that Christ deposited in a false theology the germ of the true one does not suppose that he ever uttered an untrue word. The theology which he is supposed to have sanctioned, was begotten in the minds of his apostles by his words, but how much by mistaking one word for another, and how much by misinterpreting the words? His apostles would understand him as holding whatever part of the national theology he did not expressly repudiate, and thus all that was peculiar in his
teaching would be framed into a doctrine which he suffered to obtain, but never taught. Smith had peculiar occasion to know how easily this may be done. He was in profound sympathy with Christians; as regards moral sentiment and discipline, he was at one with them; the Bohemianism of a society that is uncontrolled by the Christian spirit repelled him; he had hopes to become, one day, in the fullest sense, Christian. To profess that he was not Christian, would be to scandalize and deceive; for society would not be at pains to ascertain his real relation to God and to Christ, but would take him to be adverse to the Christian spirit, as well as to Christian theology. Conscience commanded him to conceal his infidelity, but of course, without violation of truth. To his most intimate friends the secret of his infidelity was known, but he was able to protect it for years from the bulk of his acquaintance. He spoke freely on religious and moral subjects, constructing by his words in the frame of their preconceptions, without uttering an untruth, ideas which partially misrepresented his beliefs.

Although Smith's desire to justify Christianity caused him to stoop to the hypothesis that Christ sanctioned a false theology, he did so with loathing of the law that legitimates exception to the rule of truth. Virtue was lowered in his view when he found that it could include deception, and it is more than probable that the disheartening influence of the discovery bore injuriously on his faith. His practice it could not warp.

XVII.

According to Christ, the Kingdom of God is inaccessible to those who cannot receive it as a little child. The Christian elect receive the Gospel from Christ, and his missionaries as a little child receives what is taught by the parent—unquestioningly. Now, authority is an ascend-
ancy of one person over another whereby the latter believes and obeys unquestioningly what is taught and commanded by the former. The most conspicuous example of authority is that of parent over child. An influence of one mind over another that disposes the latter to receive but not without question, is not authority; filial piety commonly becomes the ground of such an influence when it ceases to be a pedestal of authority. To receive Heaven or the Gospel as a little child, supposes authority in the messenger. Christ taught with authority, not, like the Scribes, by reasoning; and that His missionaries were to be clothed with His authority is implied in His assertion that the Gospel is inaccessible to those who cannot receive it as a little child. It follows that the church designed by Christ should consist of an authoritative priesthood, and a childlike laity, in which respect the Roman Catholic Church is perfectly conformable to the intention of its founder. Reasoning about matters of religion is adverse to the spirit of holiness. It needs exceptional sanctity to do it with impunity. Scarcely can the natural priest meddle with theology, without chilling the love of God. How should it fare with a laity that busies itself with theology—a doctoral laity. "I had rather obey the Trinity," says the author of the "Imitation," "than know how to define it." Then, to be busied about what may be termed the secular interests of the Church, for example, its money affairs, is also adverse to sanctity. That of Judas Iscariot was not helped by carrying the purse. It takes all the piety of the natural priest to live at the point of contact of religion and Mammon. Rome wisely confines to the priesthood the mercantile work of God. Again, an authoritative and educated priesthood tends to counteract the proneness of religious bodies to split into sects. Of course it is not itself exempt from liability to schism, but it is less liable than an ignorant laity that presumes to be its own theologian; and its
authority almost excludes the decomposing process in the laity. While Protestantism has been running to seed—splitting into countless sects—the Roman and Greek Churches have been scarcely disturbed by the sectarian tendency, and not at all by an operation of the tendency originating amongst laymen. Since poverty condemns the bulk of mankind to a state of ignorance, the sectarian tendency preys on it with the greatest possible force when unchecked by an authoritative priesthood. It may be objected that authority would tend to sophisticate the mind of the priest so as to exclude the child-likeness on which sanctity depends; but, according to experience, sophistication by priestly authority is exceptional. The great bulk of the Roman Catholic clergy regard themselves as mere spokesmen of Christ and his church. They receive the Gospel in childhood as little children, and, as a rule, never question it while they study theology, nor ever afterwards. The writer has known many Roman Catholic priests in many parts of the world, but never one who showed the least sign of sophistication by authority. Learning, when it does not include knowledge of the infinitude of human ignorance—the humiliating poverty or human knowledge—tends to inflate; and that priestly theologians have not been exempt from the operation of this tendency is attested by no less a witness than the author of the "Imitation;" but the inflation has been exceptional, not regular. For these reasons it seemed conclusive to Smith that Christ designed to institute a church consisting of a tutelary priesthood, and a laity without right of judgment as regards the essentials or faith. He had ample opportunity of contrasting the spirit of devout Roman Catholics with that of devout Protestants of all sects, and, as regards the attributes of humility and charity and a certain refinement and gentleness incident to these attributes, it appeared to him that the spirit moulded by authority excelled. Abstraction made of what
pious imposture has foisted upon the Roman Catholic spirit, and what has been put upon it by hysterical and otherwise neurotic exaltation, such as the worship of the sacred heart, the legends that represent Christ as exchanging hearts with women, the ecstasy that suspended or counteracted gravitation in St. Theresa, the various instances of the stigmata, the annual liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius, the erotic voluptuousness that yearns, as it is put in the "Imitation," "to bathe in God, and to taste Him with the inner lip," the priestly coddling of the Bambinos, the conversion as regards the Virgin of mere honour into an apotheosis—abstraction made of these disgraces which are partly due to priestcraft, and partly to priest credulity, Smith was in profound sympathy with the Roman Catholic spirit. Pride, it appears to him, always adulterates the sanctity that is not generated and guided by authority. The sanctity may strive with no matter what zeal and sincerity to act as though it were humble, and to achieve humility; it never gets beyond acting, never escapes Pharisaism. Nor has the loss of faith impaired his sympathy with what is pure in the Roman Catholic spirit. A vocation to the life in God which manifests itself in humility and self-unconscious charity is still in his view the greatest enhancement of human nature known to human experience. He is not without hope that conduct availing of science—proceeding on an art toward sanctification—may one day achieve an art of sanctification, and thereby the beatitudes of humility and charity; but he is certain that no such art has yet been attained, and that without the sanctifying influence of authority, sanctity would never have emerged from Pharisaism; certainly the ruin of his faith cannot be imputed to religious radicalism.

Our annotator is, in politics, what may be rudely termed a Conservative Democrat. He believes that the best possible form of the State for advanced races is that which combines universal suffrage with a limitation of high civil office
to a patrician order. A man of these political views cannot be supposed to be prejudiced in favour of authority. It was not through the operation of such a prejudice that he favoured the exclusion of private judgment in matters of faith where the exclusion can be effected without violence. On the contrary, at the time of his conversion, he entertained the opposite opinion, and was gradually driven, disputing every inch of the way, to the conclusion that Christ instituted a tutelary priesthood. We even find him in the following note endeavouring to entrench himself in the position that Christ designed the laity to counter-balance the priesthood as part of the organ of Ecclesiastical authority:

"Christ subjected the conscience of the individual to that of the Church, somewhat as nature subordinates the opinion of the individual to that part of public opinion which is not incorporated in civil law. The modification of private by public judgment, corrects in some degree the erratic tendency of idiosyncracy and the perverting influence of excitement that affect individuals without affecting society. But nature does not subordinate the private judgment of every individual to that of the society. On the contrary, she reverses the rule in respect of certain individuals, subordinating the public judgment to their private judgment. The successive momenta that carry forward civilization obtain first in individuals whose judgment is therefore paramount to that of the society. Confucius, Sachia Mouni, Zoroaster, Solon, Lycurgus, Socrates, the Fathers and Reformers of the Christian Church are examples of this class of individuals. Then, there are individuals whose mind is partly subject, and partly paramount, to that of the society. This class graduates into a lower one which, adopting without modification the opinions of the society, and formed by the highest culture possible at the time and of which that order of mind is susceptible, obtains the greatest ascen-
dancy over the bulk of the society, as being the best representatives of the common sentiments. This is the respectable and conservative class, and it is commonly the most conspicuous and influential part of the organ of public opinion.

"As the divinely caused constitution of things which determines the relation between public and private judgment, while it subjects the great bulk of individuals to public opinion, exempts some in part, and others wholly, from the influence and authority of public judgment; so Christ, while he subjected the great bulk of the faithful to the influence and authority of the Church, exempted some in part and others wholly from its authority, designing both to be in various degrees the originators of the momentum of Christian progress.

"If the class which constitutes the most conspicuous part of the organ of public opinion were perfectly defined, so that our ordinary apprehension of any individual belonging to it should include his prerogative as an individual of that class, society must resolve into castes, and liberty and progress perish. This evil is excluded by the vagueness of the organ of public opinion. And Christ had respect to this utility of vagueness by leaving in vagueness the idea of the Church qua organ of authority. Theologians, ignorant of the reason, and moved by the desire of exact ideas which they erroneously suppose to be in all cases indispensable, have vainly endeavoured to define the organ of ecclesiastical authority, and those of Rome have not been able to stop short of the doctrine of Papal supremacy and infallibility.

"Suppose a man who, in order to disembarrass the spirit of worship, had studied to acquire a consistent theology, and had thereby grown in wisdom and sanctity to desire that men animated by his spirit should continue his research, when he should cease to be, how could he best secure that end? If he had disciples, it would be clear to
him that the peculiar bias of each would tend to deflect them from the direction which the teacher's wisdom would pursue if he were immortal; but if, by any means, he could bind them together, their various idiosyncrasies would neutralize each other, and they would all keep or be kept more nearly in the right direction. This could be best effected by forming them into a society or church, having the spirit of the master for its life, his precept for its rule, and the authority of public opinion for its government—but an authority emanating from a vague organ, in order to consist with liberty and not be of a nature to subordinate or frustrate those whose independence might be indispensable to progress. This, it seems to the writer, is what Christ did in instituting the Church. He instituted a society to which he imparted his spirit and so much of his wisdom as it could at the time receive, designing it to divine, by that spirit, the significance of ages of experience, until at least it should acquire and make known to all men a language whereby to hold immediate and regular intercourse with God. And what a man was this—to conceive such a transcendent plan, to confine it through a life of misery in the solitude of his heart, and make himself a holocaust on Calvary in order to give it effect!"

It was evident to our annotator that Christ regarded and treated those to whom he was sent, not as beings of such moral and religious faculty that the mere statement of divine truth would suffice to cause in them a responsible conviction, but as embryos of such beings needing to be laid hold of and developed by art. He was armed with a power, apparently super-human, whereby he could immediately obtain over certain minds an unlimited ascendancy, so that he could say to a publican—"follow me," and the charmed publican must needs leave all and follow. By the exercise of this power, he selected the twelve apostles, and probably the seventy missionaries and other mere disciples. By miracles he extended his authority over multitudes of
the poor of Judea, and left to future generations an evidence of his divine commission and a support of the authority of the priesthood that was to succeed him and continue his work. He imparted to his apostles and other missionaries power to heal the sick, raise the dead, and cast out devils, and, by their miracles, still farther extended his authority. The authority thus immediately and mediately established, he made the vehicle of the Gospel: it was communicable only to those who could receive it as a little child. That proselytes were to be laid hold of by art is implied by Christ in the words, “I will make you fishers of men.” That they were to be developed by art is implied in the assurance of Christ that obedience would generate religious and moral knowledge. Christ implies that a defect of human faculty excludes the reception of a part of divine truth which he would otherwise have communicated and which he will ultimately communicate when the faculty is able to receive it—“I have more things to tell you, but you cannot hear them now.” He once overloaded the receptive faculty of the disciples so that they left him in such numbers as to elicit the question addressed to his apostles—“Will ye also go away?” St. John, ch. 6, v. 67. The embryoism of the religious and moral faculty is thus authoritatively declared and by experience attested. It is also implied in the declaration of Christ—“No one can come to me except the Father draw him;” and even the drawing does not augment the moral and religious capacity so that it could take in all that Jesus had to tell. Then, the faithful were to be as sheep relatively to Jesus, the Shepherd, and, according to the understanding of the Roman Catholic Church, relatively to the priesthood. It is significant in this connection that the Gospel was first preached to the poor, who may be said to be adult children. In that region it would not be molested by philosophy and science, nor by the habit of question which reasoning engenders. We know how ill it fared when it challenged
the attention of Athenian philosophers on Mar's hill. Once rooted in the poor, it would generate a conformable civilization, philosophy, and science when, in the course of ages, a rich Christian class should proceed from the poor Christian ancestry. The prejudice of faith would mould the culture for which the wealth would make room. If these evidences are conclusive that Christ came, not merely to preach the Gospel, but also to develop in men a faculty for the reception of divine truth, it must be admitted that we cannot imagine an implement more apt for the work than authority.

Understanding 1st, that the words of Christ were employed as means relatively to ends unknown to the hearer—that their significance relatively to the hearer was a vehicle of a physical force adapted to rescue mankind from misery not otherwise terminable; 2nd, that divine omnipotence is limited, and is ever striving with impersonal and maleficent forces; 3rd, that the Gospels are vitiated by mistakes such as vitiate all history; with this understanding it is possible to rescue Christianity from Christian theology, and to harmonize it with morality and the divinity of Christ. For instance, we could hold that the Kingdom of God, which, according to Christ, is inaccessible to all who cannot receive it as a little child, to be the Kingdom of God on earth—the Church—and so exempt his words from signifying that all whose mental structure disables them from accepting the Gospel without question, are doomed to eternal perdition. The unquestioning would constitute the nucleus of Christendom—the central organ of the Christian spirit. This spirit would not be wanting to believers whose faith, like that of Thomas, needed the support of evidence; but, because of their scepticism, it would be more languid and less pure. It might be held that Christ counted on the inevitable sectarianism as a preventive of stagnation, and a means of purification and of enhancement of religious zeal. Nay, it
might be held that he counted on the undoing of Christian theology by philosophy and science, whereby pure Christianity was to emerge from the shell. Luther, Voltaire, Darwin, were also to work for him.

XVIII.

The faith of our annotator was discouraged by various causes before it was extinguished. The principal cause was the failure of his effort to attain to regular intercourse with God. Caprice stigmatized the few events that seemed to evince a supernatural interference in answer to prayer. Regular prayer had become impossible, because of its regular fruitlessness, and events seemed to mock the credulity that looked to see them conform to a providential government of the universe. He was at last enjoined by a vague imperative, that seemed to be a divine one, to desist from looking for the supernatural as though the looking were an intrusion into divine affairs. Another principal cause of discouragement was the failure of his undertaking to prove the unreasonableness of infidelity. The argument by which he hoped to prove this thesis, hinged on the datum that order presupposes an intelligent cause. But we have conclusive proof that the order of all human intellection is caused by the unintelligent process, cerebration or encephalic event. If a watch evince design, it also evinces an undesigning cause of the design. The pattern essential to the design—and there is order in the pattern as well as in the watch—originates as part of the train of ideas which is the effect of blind or undesigning causes, to wit, a train of cerebrations. The train of cerebrations that is the immediate cause of the train of ideas, originates poetry, eloquence, reasoning, wit, music, the patterns of mechanical novelties, the plot of the novelist, coherent dream, coherent waking delusion, and the order involved in all these. Then the train of cerebrations has for remote
cause, the uterine events that formed the fetus of him in whose adult brain the cerebrations obtain. So gives way the ground of natural or rational theology.

XIX.

Understanding sin to be deliberate violation of duty, Smith’s life since 1857 has been sinless: however tossed by passion, his grasp of the helm of life has never for an instant relaxed. The loss of faith has not impaired his power of conduct. Child, nursling, and pupil of faith, this power has become adult, and subsists out of tutelage. Base moods, fierce moods, frivolous moods, cowardly moods have successively so possessed him as to seem to be his very essence, and, nevertheless, the new man, although apparently chilled out of self-consciousness, has steered as steadily as though he were being wafted by breezes of spiritual sweetness. As regards conduct, will has for twenty years achieved success uncontaminated by a single failure. But what has it done as regards wisdom? Is his wisdom still a paralytic hobbling on crutches of “second sober thought?” Yes; but he has achieved a convalescence that promises health, and signifies a vis medicatrix in the treatment he has applied from which a speedier cure, if applied to hearts of better congenital constitution, might fairly be expected. The principle of spiritual growth is exceptionally crippled in Smith by moral and intellectual infirmity, and especially by excess of vanity. Vanity involves an instinct of conformity to the minds of others which acts without distinct intention. What there is of intention in it is so obscure as to be discernible only by the most acute and cultivated faculty of introspection. This parasitic instinct is the offensive element of vanity. It is a squint of the soul, looking at the business in hand with one eye, and at opinion with the other. It is all things to all men, a spirit of abject
conveniency, the opposite of simplicity or simple-mindedness, and in so far of manliness. It is quick or dull, according as the unnamed faculty that gives us intuition of the life and consciousness, including the thoughts, feelings, and volitions of others, is quick or dull. It is the cardinal quality of the courtier—conspicuous in the Celtic and Latin races, and the reverse in the Teuton. It is a volatilizing tendency, that prevents the moral nature from consolidating into massiveness, holding some men suspended in life-long puerility. Perfect moral health is impossible to a soul disordered by excess of vanity. Smith's self-knowledge enables him to prevent this infirmity from adulterating conduct and his sentiment of duty, but not from volatilizing his heart, and so frustrating or retarding the medical virtue of discipline. Of uncharity he is all but healed. The least motion of anger challenges the will to eject it, and the most violent emotions are instantly quelled. Frequently circumstances which would formerly have roused his indignation, awakens instead the spirit of the good physician. He is at peace with men who have maligned him, robbed him, insulted him, and especially with an enemy who strove with him on his hearth, within the precincts of family affection, and, for revenge and emolument, fomented an insurrection that threatened to make him homeless. He would gladly have all of them be his friends and intimates if the relation were made possible by repentance, their souls being thereby rescued from the infernal influence of which they are dupes, victims, and implements. He does not impute to them, indeed he knows them to be without, the moral intelligence on which choice and responsibility depend. Before faith became light and power in him, he had been himself such a dupe, victim, and implement. The experience excludes the possibility of a rational acquiescence in the datum of anger, that these enemies are culprits. Since he has detected Nature foisting upon him counterfeits of
purpose, obliging him to be affected while striving to be
simple, setting him upon a study how to evade obligation,
putting the moral sense in abeyance, and making trans-
gression appear to be an innocent caprice, it is not without
reason that he forbears to impute the guilt which resent-
ment assumes. Moreover, he is in conformity with the
mind of Christ, who enjoins us to "judge not at all," and
to forgive always.

Since in so frail a heart so much has been effected,
experience warrants the hope that man may be rescued
from the spirit of violence, and one of the chief objects of
this work is to stir up an insurrection against the devil,
and arm the insurgents with charity. To do this, is it not
to be a soldier of Christ, the Captain of our salvation: and
if there be anything new in the method, is it not a mere
evolution of Christianity? The first levies of Christ were
from the poor of Judea who were inaccessible to the rationale
of the method of his warfare. He therefore armed them
with an unexplained charity, arbitrarily imposed upon their
obedience, counting that the exercise of charity would
ultimately unfold its reason, when common sense would
become ashamed of anger and retribution.

Yes—to make common sense ashamed of anger, and
thereby to detach the human heart from a moral placenta,
is one of the chief objects of this work. They are pol-
troons who need the Dutch courage of anger to incur the
danger and do the violence exacted by duty; and since
anger is proverbially acknowledged to be a brief insanity,
common sense will not deem it expedient to tolerate it for
the convenience of poltroonery. Cowardice, after all, is the
exception. But even though anger were useful to man in
the way of instigating righteous cowards, it would be silly
to hold to it, seeing that it is as available for the exaspera-
tion of the wicked, as for the inspiration of the righteous,
and, as the wicked out-number the righteous, its bad
must exceed its good efficiency. The conservation of
anger for the sake of righteous indignation is about as reasonable as the employment of dynamite for domestic uses. Righteous indignation is a Greek gift, a disguised adversary. The accidental connection of anger with aversion to moral evil, has imposed itself on the mind as an essential connection. The aversion may be an instinct or constant motive of great efficiency in a man incapable of anger. Christianity taught St. Augustine to distinguish the sinner from the sin—to hate the one and love the other. If his heart conformed to his theory, his aversion to sin excluded anger. In the view of enlightened taste, dignity excludes anger. It demands that power be austere applied against moral evil, but without anger, as the physician applies surgery. Christianity is analogous with medicine, being an art for the cure of souls as medicine is an art for the cure of bodies. Would medical efficiency, as regards the cure of bodies, be enhanced if the doctors were spurred by a passion to kick the patients? Lunatics sometimes provoke their doctors; are we to suppose the provocation to be a benefit both to doctor and patient, as being a stimulant to medical wit and industry. Would justice be better administered if judges were instigated by anger?

Emotions excited by play were turned to good account by our annotator. He named and stigmatized them *paste-board feelings*, as having chiefly experienced them in connection with games of cards. The vicissitudes of the game, though one be merely playing for pastime, excite in turn hope, joy, disappointment, discontent, eagerness, the sense of wrong, anger. One is sometimes indignant at the truculent behaviour of luck, which, when all the advantages are with the adversary, deals us an exceptionally bad hand. The responsiveness of the heart to causes which, when seriously considered, appear to it frivolous, tends to discredit the intuitional function of emotion, and thereby to lessen its power. So long as we
INTRODUCTION.

do not suspect the fallibility of emotive intuition, for example, the angry intuition of culpability, the power of emotion is at its maximum: it wanes as the efficiency of scepticism augments; and the heart, as it becomes better acquainted with its own foolishness, becomes humbler and more plastic to the will. Smith avails of this law to fasten upon anger the stigma of silliness, by reference to which he can at will precipitate the immense and hideous volume of the evil genius. The power of the talisman augments with use, every success making anger more contemptible and less capable of resistance.

Common sense will object that a crusade against anger is an undertaking to wash the blackamoor white. The objection is mainly founded on the subject's consciousness of his own weakness or impotence in respect of anger. According to this consciousness, we are subject to an empire of irascible instinct, which will may perhaps occasionally interrupt but can never supplant. If the consciousness be true, will is either excluded, or for the most part held in abeyance by all the propensities—man is a mere manikin, mainly, or for the most part, worked by necessity. This fastens upon anger the stigma of absurdity; for it as silly to be angry with the sane as with the insane, both being worked by necessity. Now, who shall say that the stigma is not a Nessus shirt, destined to consume irascibility, first in superior minds, and, finally—after quietude has become a mark of superiority and worldliness, in consequence, an ally of peace—in all minds? If the wise be not provided with a peremptory negative, surely it is worth while to attempt a solution by experiment. If the public mind acquire a merely intellectual conviction that irascibility is a principle of stultification, the knowledge will furnish a pretext to its proneness to condemn, and worldliness, convenient to public opinion as the needle to the pole, will pay the homage of hypocrisy (an ally, however despicable, of virtue) to peace. The conveniency, it is to be
hoped, will construct a scaffolding of manners upon which the education of the young may ultimately build a solid structure of nature. The hope is countenanced by the characteristic quietude of the Quaker; which proves the plasticity of nature, as regards anger, to discipline. That it is naturally transmissible from parent to child, and not altogether, if at all, a natural endowment, seems to be proved by the fact that it is not limited to the worthy of the society, but helps the craft of many a fraudulent member.

The scourging of the money-changers is held to be a sanction of anger; as though moral surgery were impossible without anger! Was not the flight of the money-changers and drovers from mere whipcord a calculated miracle, designed to display the power of Christ, not an accidental effect of anger, available now as a bulwark of the devil?

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It would be unseemly to expose the privacy of the heart as it is exposed in this volume, if the writer had not good reason to believe that he is secure against discovery. Every serious man, therefore, is bound to respect his secret, and if the question of his identity be mooted, to uphold, by a significant reticence, the decorum that should protect him.
JUNE 12th. Atheism is a consistent theory. Not so the theism constructed by Reason, without reference to the heart, upon ideas presumed to be necessary—as that the aptitudes of the universe pre-suppose a designing mind competent to create the universe, or, at least, to determine its order. According to reason, therefore, conversant only about such ideas, atheism is the true hypothesis. But it disappoints the heart and annihilates, with the sentiment of God, our sole sufficient motive and indispensable means for attaining the integrity of our nature—for climbing out of the slough of misery in which we stifle. Moreover, we are more comfortable to our higher nature when we act upon even the mere assumption of Divine being and authority. The disappointment of the heart is manifold. Reverence yearns for an infinite object—for infinite holiness, for beneficent omnipotence. Benevolence yearns for an infinite object of gratitude, hope for an omnipotent object of trust.

Nature without God is like a headless trunk that disappoints the sense of beauty by the suggestion of a symmetry which it lacks. Nature without God is dead, and insults the despoiled heart with a mimicry of life. Nature without God is without dignity; for, without God, virtue and vice have no foundation in the absolute, but are merely relative to the nature of a species, and lose their moral, if not their prudential, value when their mere rela-
tivity is detected by the heart. If virtue be not absolute, reverence has no object—being is destitute of sacredness and dignity.

2.

June 12th. Would not the degree of love for which I long impair the equilibrium of my nature and cause instinct to supersede will? Is not this the reason that my prayers procure so little? Is it not because God will have men learn at last that piety consists in a due equilibrium of susceptibility and will, in duly doing as well as duly feeling?

3.

June 12th. I have been rebuked for not having had respect to the division which God has put between men of different degrees of culture. There must be no expansion of the heart, no overflowing of confidence from the higher to the lower.

4.

June 20th. Abhorrence of self-righteousness is apt to engender a sentiment of self-condemnation that is wide of the truth. According to this sentiment, the least recognition that we have done well, or done our duty, is pharisical. I detected such a sentiment this morning. It assumed, contrary to the facts, that I had failed in respect of duty throughout yesterday, whereas the day was devoted to religion according to purpose.

The authoritative perversion of truth involved in this sentiment, or rather the blindness of the sense of truth which it occasions, is manifested in other ways—in the shifts of honest men to defend a contradictory dogma of their faith; shifts so like imposture that they have generally passed for it with those who have not been interested to think better of them.
JUNE 20TH. It is true that the marvellous aptitudes of the universe do not pre-suppose a designing mind. Indeed all formulas of demonstration of the existence of God, which proceed upon necessity, have this radical vice, that, if they be valid, they demonstrate the existence of a being bound up in necessity. They give us, in place of God, a necessary, self-conscious omnipotence: not less a necessary force than gravitation or combustibility. But if, abandoning the pretensions of reason to construct a theology upon necessity, we accept the teachings of nature with the wise docility of faith, God discovers to us, as he discovered to Moses, a part of his infinite nature. I have elsewhere shown that God could not, without faith, be reasonably supposed to be mind. Just now a remarkable aptitude in the human structure appealed to my faith against the conclusions of mere reason: and the child-like acquiescence of faith restores my heart to an intelligent God. An aptitude in nature, surpassing human causation, manifests to faith a divine mind, infinite and uncaused. It does this, indeed, through reason, but not through dogmatic reason—through reason, the handmaid, not the Gamaliel of faith.

JULY 15TH. Sanctity involves nothing in respect of which man and woman are not equally capable; and sanctity involves all that is estimable.

JULY 16TH. Those from whose intercourse familiarity has banished respect, abstain from conversation respecting the highest human concerns from a sentiment of incongruity between the dignity of the topic and their moral inferiority.
Each of them incurs a certain allegiance to their common sentiment of common insignificance, which makes the expression of a higher sentiment, a kind of perfidy; it would certainly expose the speaker, as a pretender, to the jests and laughter of his companions. Inferiority is the professed characteristic and law of this companionship.

8.

**June 16th.** I Corinthians, chapter 13, verses 8 to 13, inclusive. This passage seems to imply that Christianity involves development in the sense that the interpretation of the divine word is imperfect, but ever ripening towards perfection during the probationary era of the Church. This hypothesis is not inconsistent with that of the infallibility of the Church. The Church might be held to be the medium of such Heavenly light as human nature, in any stage of its development, is capable of receiving or evolving.

9.

**June 22nd.** This evening I have undertaken an extraordinary experiment. I have prayed to God to leave me to the resources of my unaided will—to withdraw his grace from me, if, indeed, there be such a thing as grace. I propose to do my utmost, in respect of conduct, according to the will of God, without the co-operation of his grace, in order to ascertain whether, and in what degree, virtue and sanctification depend upon grace; for I have been hitherto, and am still, in doubt whether God has provided, in our constitution, the complete conditions of sanctification, or whether he has reserved to himself one of its essential conditions. This doubt has necessarily corrupted my faith in the efficacy of prayer, and, at times, imposed upon me the sentiment, that the prayer, which I was at the moment uttering, was a devout make-believe. This was especially
the case with regular prayer, which iterated requests that had obtained no reply. Moreover, as I pray only for holiness—for the establishment of holy affections and the elimination of bad ones, and as the good or bad dispositions of my heart might have been, in most cases, referred to states of health and strength, there seemed to be a degree of pious insincerity in attributing the good to the influence of grace granted to prayer. It is, therefore, my duty to make this experiment. If, while making it, my life be not worse than it has been, if I govern myself equally well, if I experience the sentiment of God in an equal degree, if I am not less successful in my effort to isolate and prevent pride, vanity, and anger, I shall conclude that human nature includes in itself all the conditions of human perfection. And this conclusion will contain nothing to the prejudice of man's dependence upon God—for man is his creature, the mere expression of his power. The state of mind in which this experiment is undertaken, is one of depression, much more disposing to dependence than self-reliance. It was preceded by a state of irritation, caused by a sense of the dreary monotony of my life. Remembering my promise to resist discontent, I commanded my heart to resign itself, and its agitation abated. This suggested to me that, according to my experience, much more appeared to result from will than from prayer; and hence the first hint of the experiment.

10.

June 27th. This day is blessed beyond all days of my life. I experience an emotion of love to God which cleanses my heart of all base dispositions, and enables me to consider my enemies, and those who bear themselves in a provoking manner towards me, with love—substantial love. This is no spurious emotion arising from causes of moral or physical exhilaration, for how should such causes purge
my heart of pride, vanity, and anger, and devote it to my Creator. When I awoke my mind reverted immediately to the question of asceticism. I experienced a calm feeling of power to live an ascetic life if duty should require it. I inclined to the opinion that duty prescribes what is commonly understood to be asceticism. Another remarkable effect of the emotion is the relaxation of other affections. I find in myself the possibility of undoing their hold upon my heart, and of being better for the change.

II.

JULY 9TH. This morning I was seized by a longing to pray—a longing to be in immediate relation to God; a relation of dependence and support. The doctrine that law and the sufficiency of human will for all human need exclude occasion for the interference of God in human affairs, revolted me. I prayed for beatific vision. The feeling which succeeded seemed to be a partial response to my prayer; sentiments of worship and of love to my race excluded all other emotions. I felt that I would be gladly annihilated if that might be the condition of the union of man with God. Contrasting these feelings with the animus which, according to experience, seemed to be inseparable from the system of resistance and coercion required for the repression of vice, the stimulation of indolence, the maintenance of respect, and, in fine, the right conduct of life, it occurred to me that perhaps charity, according to the idea of Christ, might successfully supersede rigour in our dealings with men. I asked to be permitted to retain the illuminative sentiment until I could examine this question by its light. Being at the time on my knees, I tried to transfer myself from the uneasy attitude to one more convenient for meditation, with as little disturbance as possible of the physical condition of the emotion which I desired to preserve. I partially succeeded, but the sentiment began
to decompose, the intellectual part of it to wane, while
the emotive part of it held me in a kind of luxurious
drowsiness.
On reverting, in a less exalted mood, to the question of
the superseding of rigour by charity, I remain in the
opinion that charity should be always the animus, but
rigour sometimes the means.
On going out after breakfast, I became aware that the
state of the atmosphere was exquisitely convenient to my
system. The touch of the air was caressing, and a pleasant
enhancement of the feeling of life attended respiration.
The experiment of the 22nd ultimo, which this event
terminates, obtained under opposite physical conditions.
I am undecided respecting the question whether we
should use prayer regularly, or only when the heart im-
portunes the will.

12.

JULY 22ND. Is not the sphere of Providence, as regards
mankind, the sphere of human need that is out of reach of
human will? Allow this, and we distinguish the respective
spheres of grace and will. Should we not pray accordingly,
asking only for the good which human will cannot achieve?

13.

JULY 30TH. It may be that experience will convert prayer
into self-communion in the presence of God. All legiti-
mate prayer is reducible to this—"Help me, my God, to
holiness, if it be according to thy will to do so;" and
the amplification of this into details corresponding to our
various spiritual needs can have no other end than the in-
struction of our own hearts by study of their defects. For, as
regards divine knowledge of our need and divine disposi-
tion to relieve, such amplification is vain repetition.
Decorum requires us to state our requests to human
superiors briefly, and not to employ persuasion; for amplification discredits their knowledge, and persuasion supposes them to be determined by emotion instead of principle. On what pretext should we proceed differently with regard to God? If it be said that the reaction of long and frequent supplication upon our soul is beneficial, I answer that simplicity repugns the double-mindedness which professes one end and contemplates another. And would not the benefit be as easily attainable by the direct means of self-communion before God? Would not the fervent, regular, deliberate, and strong application of attention to God and duty, do as much towards sanctification as fervent prayer?

August 6th. Attend as a general rule to the business of the moment, so that will shall abandon no part of it altogether to automatism, and so as to keep by you the sentiment that your will, thus engaged, is occupied in the service of God.

Exclude mental action foreign to the business in hand; for it holds the will in abeyance, and promotes the ascendancy of automatism. Automatism is susception, not action; and what it does without concurrent, as well as antecedent volition, cannot be held to be obedience.

August 8th. Self-communion before God, regarded as a substitute for prayer, does not satisfy the heart. Godliness affects dependence upon, and communion with God. I desire to be aided by God, not merely for the sake of that to which he may help me, but for the sake of the relation of dependence which the succour manifests. I desire to tell Him of my shortcomings and failures of every kind, as well for the sake of communion with him, as for the
reactionary benefit to my soul. This desire of communion with God and apprehension of dependence on Him, however, are not always at the command of the heart.

16.

August 9th. During prayer, this morning, I felt that it would be improper to ask God to operate in me certain changes of feeling which it seemed to be competent to my will to determine. Sordid anxieties possessed my heart, and all but excluded the sentiment of priesthood. The will, by directing attention upon certain ideas, could vivify the sentiment, and proportionately abate the opposed anxiety. To ask my Creator to effect this change, would, it seemed to me, be asking him to save me a certain trouble. I prayed, however, that he would aid me in respect of memory—in respect of the susceptional condition of pious volition.

17.

October 22nd. To think of God without reverence, is to think falsely, and to be wanting in dignity. A merely aesthetic admiration of God, as the Creator of the beautiful and noble, even when attended with gratitude, is a sentiment that degrades its subject. A false sentiment of God vitiates our practical relation to God and nature.

18.

October 24th. The substance of the following note occurred to me during prayer:

The nature of man excludes cognition (certitude) of God. Evidence of the existence of God appreciable to the mere intellect is not conclusive to an ungodly heart. But our nature includes conditions of faith of which will is one. The idea of God arises from the tendency of the ignorant
mind to personify the powers of nature, and from the apparent necessity of an intelligent First Cause. The idea once formed, takes root in reverence, and becomes independent of the speciosity which contributed to engender it. But not in all minds: many conclude, from the inconclusiveness of the evidence which engenders the notion of God, that the intuition of reverence is unreliable. They acknowledge its utility, but disown or question its veracity. Nature, they say, operates largely by illusion. The practical criterion, however (by their fruits ye shall know them) is on the side of reverence; for sanctification, or true development depends upon trust in God. This, according to reason, determines a preponderance of evidence in favour of the existence of God. It remains for the will to choose between a conclusion indicated by stronger evidence and better fruits and its opposite. The volition which chooses the former, together with the reverent intuition of God, an affection of gratitude to God and the sentiment of the probability of a First Cause, are the elements of faith. Faith, therefore, is, in part, purpose.

Conviction of the existence, providence, justice and benevolence of God is not faith. The obedience of Abraham would have been the creature of mere prudence, and not virtue, if he had acted with conviction. The virtue consisted in the volition by which he chose the better side of a doubt, and made it a sufficient and stable motive.

When the probability of the theistic thesis challenges the will through conscience to found a practical life upon the arbitrament that there is a personal and sovereign Divine, we are not free to shirk a choice: if we do not elect faith, we elect distrust.

November 1st. I have risen from my knees to record what follows, before any part of it can escape me:
I had no thought when I knelt what I should say. It occurred to me to profess to God that when I prayed upon the presumption of his providential government, the frequent ineffectualness of my prayer, and the manifest relation of its apparent occasional success to natural causes, depreciated the presumption in the view of reason, and seemed to be an instruction from him, that the presumption is unfounded—that, on the other hand, when I forbore from prayer, the evils, which pressed in upon me, and chiefly the decay of devotion, the consciousness of being divorced from God, and the revival of my lower nature, warned me that, in abstaining from prayer, I wander from God. Then it occurred to me, that the objection to prayer proceeded from two groundless assumptions; 1st, that if earnest prayer be not generally effectual, it is always vain; 2nd, that what is attributable to natural causes is not attributable to Providence. I then thought of the promotion of my nature and life by faith and apparently by prayer, and the appearance seemed to involve a divine sanction, so that the reasons which determine me to believe in God, require me also to believe in the obligation and efficacy of prayer. And this obligation and efficacy being granted, it follows that God governs providentially. For the efficacy must depend either on created causes or on Providence, and the sentiment of truth objects to the hypothesis, that God requires us to pray to Him on a false presumption, such as the presumption that a recent act of God causes what is really a natural effect of prayer.

20.

November 1st. The operation of reason respecting what pertains to religion tends to corrupt piety by enfeebling religious sentiment. Prayer, on the contrary, tends to convert religious notions and judgments into sentiment, and so to make them practical—to make them wisdom.
1859. November 8th. Did not Christ mean, by declaring himself to be the Son of God, that he was of that kind of human nature which conceives God as Father?

22.

November 12th. I have interrupted prayer to record what follows, which the prayer evolved:—

Pride is exercised by comparison of self with others. The ordinary intercourse of man is fretted with occasions of this kind of comparison, which is excluded by our intercourse with God. We are in intercourse with God when we are exercising priesthood, that is, when we are transacting the common business of life as a service of God. Incessant priesthood, therefore, is necessary to the abeyance and extinction of worldliness.

23.

December 1st. The cultivated owe more in the way of asceticism than the vulgar. Duty varies with the degree of culture. The pursuit of pleasure, which is a vice in the higher man, is legitimate in the lower. It is the duty of the higher to direct the lower in the pursuit of pleasure, so that it shall be as innocent as possible.

24.

December 4th. There is a state of mind in which he, who enjoys it, is conscious of being supremely master of himself. The heart and intellect are calm, prompt, and without any insubordinate bias, so that they are disposed to operate according to purpose. The fragmentary apprehension of objects of emotive intuition to which agitation
and affection usually limit the heart, are displaced by wiser apprehensions, because quiet enables the heart to apprehend as a whole, or more nearly as a whole; and because vicious affection does not intercept the light which ideas reflect towards such faculties as those of conscience and prudence. The whole nature, in a word, is the apt and well-disposed servant of the will, the instinctive impersonal part of the soul being without any opposite bias or obstruction. This state, being the substantive condition of deliberation, and of deliberately purposing, may be termed deliberateness. It is more or less disordered by any emotion opposed to purpose: passion, reverie, madness, dream, weariness, melancholy, animal exhilaration, and the like, exclude it.

Permanent deliberateness is indispensable to sanctification: except, perhaps, when superseded by holy enthusiasm: for every indeliberate action and mental operation exercises and nourishes the lower nature, which should be starved by inactivity.

DECEMBER 15TH. Christianity recognises necessity in the doctrine that devotion depends upon grace. "No man can come unto me except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him" (John vi, 44). And this agrees to the fact, that volition without motive is impossible, and that the first motive, prompting to devout volition, must arise independently of the will.

DECEMBER 15TH. Is not this the due equipoise between prudential self-reliance and dependence upon Providence, that we shall leave to Providence what we cannot rightly undertake in the pursuit of fortune, or undertake without extraordinary risk of failure?
27.

1859. December 16th. Although convinced that —’s failures are not owing to defect of good intention, but to mental defect, I am moved when the conviction is out of mind, to reproach him with the failures, as if they were voluntary omissions or misdeeds. And my reproaches serve to rouse his attention, and to interest him in his duties, so as to enhance his recollection of them. But when I remember my conviction, that he necessarily forgets, I am forbidden, to use this method, as, in that case, involving duplicity. I am then obliged to admit to him that he does not wilfully fail, but of necessity; and I endeavour to interest him in correcting this bad necessity by exhibiting to him its consequence, and teaching him the art of amendment.

Religion has hitherto rebuked and admonished man on the presumption that he errs by choice, not necessity; and the rebuke and admonition have been in most cases honest, useful, and according to the order of nature, and therefore, according to the will of God. But now that experience has disclosed the fallacy of the presumption, religion is bound by truth to alter its language, to avow the necessity that determines vice, to interest man in the effort to release himself from this bad necessity, and to discover and teach him an art of amendment: not such a partial art as can be applied by the few who can afford to retire from the world – to exempt themselves from sordid anxiety, and the corrupting intercourse of selfish man, and, in exclusive commerce with God, develop a sanctity to which they are peculiarly predisposed by congenital endowment—no; but an art available to the body of mankind yoked and held together in the iron harness of toil, unable to believe, on any authority, that God will provide for men if they forbear to provide for themselves, and, therefore, condemned to the service of Mammon.
December 19th. If, as seems probable, the soul be a principle of consciousness and will, dependent, for the faculties that constitute it a human mind, on the animal organism with which it connects, then the paramount business of the soul is to ameliorate its animal system until perfection be attained; and all volition, of which this is not the paramount end, is vanity. But devotion is the sole means of amelioration, and perfection of sanctity is the perfection of human nature; therefore the paramount business in question is sanctification. He, to whom the subordinate ends are the sole ends of action, is like the spendthrift, who, in the intemperate pursuit of pleasure, wastes the means of permanent enjoyment.

December 22nd. It is conceivable, and may, therefore, for aught we know to the contrary, be possible, that we are parts of a godless universe, that our religious creeds, sentiments, and conjectures are the creatures of our cerebral constitution, corresponding to nothing external to humanity, but sometimes of extraordinary utility as incentives serving to develop our nature into an organ of felicity, sometimes of extraordinary maleficence as serving to make it an organ of pain. This hypothesis receives a certain support from the fact, that human development depends largely upon illusion, and that man, in his ruder state, is regulated by an order of motives—such as pride, vanity, and anger—which seem at the time meritorious, and later the reverse, and of which he is at once beneficiary and dupe. In like manner, the religious principle, or that through which the heart yearns for God, may be a principle of useful but illusive intuition, calculated to guide and support us until we attain to a certain point in the line of development, and then destined, like its predecessors, to resign its authority
to a higher principle, and to perish—consumed by our sentiment of its illusiveness. This suggestion from analogy—analogy of no contemptible authority—would acquire probability from an appearance of a ground of doubt that the desire of God is a disguised desire of virtue or perfection. Authoritative rule, or rule apprehended by reverence as commanded by a revered superior, is the antecedent of virtue in the human heart. According as the inherent authority of virtue develops, its shell of extraneous authority decays, and it is cherished and obeyed for itself, not for the human or divine being whose dignity first enabled it to take root in reverence. This suggests a period in which the love of virtue might be completely divorced from the love of God; and such a divorce, concurring with an increase of knowledge calculated to make man the secure master of nature, and so to diminish, with the need of dependence, the sentiment of dependence upon God, seems to point to a time when the utility of that sentiment must cease—when, according to the analogy, the authority of the sentiment might also cease and its object resolve itself into an illusion.

These sinister plausibilities have frequently set me upon considering whether the operation of devotion tends, in my case, to enhance the love of virtue in a greater ratio than the love of God: and I certainly undergo states of the heart, in which it is by no means disposed to return an encouraging answer to the question. But this morning, in prayer, it answered with rapturous and oracular confidence. I put the question thus:—Would you be content with a godless universe on condition of endless human perfection and felicity? "No!" was the reply. "Virtue" or "perfect man without God is dross—my desire is for the infinite God."

December 23rd. No man is so devoid of infirmity as to
be respectable in the eye of God, or in the eye of his moral peer to whom he is thoroughly known, or in his own eye when he compares himself with Christ. Man, therefore, is unworthy of a higher degree of respect than what is involved in charity. But a higher degree of respect for man is necessary to the moral development of the young, and to the due subordination of the ignorant adult. The truth, therefore, cannot be unfolded to these two classes without prejudice to religion and morality, and this is but one of many such truths. Hence humane and practical men, not highly endowed with the sentiment of truth, have been set upon pious fraud.

December 25th. Man cannot ameliorate his nature before he knows it, and he is not congenitally endowed with a science of psychology. On the contrary, this science is so late a fruit of experience, that it has not yet ripened. He is developed, therefore, through a necessary era of ignorance and vice, into an organ of knowledge comprehending the knowledge of self, on which depends the art of self-amelioration. He learns that he is composed of body and soul; that the soul is simply a principle of consciousness and volition, and that its peculiarity, as a principle of human consciousness—the peculiarity in virtue of which it is sensutect, intellect, emotect—it derives from its modification by the body; that the difference of mental character in different individuals, and in the same individual at different times, depends upon difference of bodily constitution or affection, that bodily constitution is subject to alteration by custom, and that it is in the power of the soul, as will, to gradually modify, and within certain limits, determine the constitution of its proper body, that all sentiments are good or evil according as they agree or disagree with the sentiment of God, and that, therefore, the per-
fection of bodily constitution is that whereby the soul has the steadiest and most worshipful affection to God, and such that it makes godliness the basis of all other sentiment.

32.

JANUARY 3RD. The objects made known to us by the external senses are represented in consciousness by sensations. The objects made known to us by the emotive principles of intuition are represented in consciousness by emotion. As a visual sensation having the form of a man or a tree symbolizes that object in our visual consciousness, so an emotion of reverence symbolizes the dignity, authority, or holiness that excites it in emotive consciousness.

But as mere vague sensation precedes the capacity of visual intuition, so a vague emotion precedes emotive intuition; which is proved by the fact, that some of us remember to have rejoiced in beauty, when young, without thought of a cause of our delight. May not the vague emotions of reverence kindled in holy hearts by the idea of God, be the preparatives of an intuition of God, as full and satisfactory in respect of its object, as our visual intuition of a man in respect of the man, commanding as unquestionable a consciousness of the reality of its object? Worshipful emotion would, in that case, symbolize in consciousness the divine substance—the body of God. Such may have been Christ's intuition of his heavenly Father, whereby he conceived of God as being spirit, or of the nature of consciousness, and dwelling within holy hearts: so that to become holy is to see God—to be a temple of God. And this renders more manifest the paramount end of our present phase of being, which is to detach ourselves by asceticism from our lower nature, and emerge into the glory of the vision of God,
January 4th. The notion of Creator is embarrassed by its apparent presupposition that God passed through an eternity of vacuity, destitute of even an idea prior to creation. This embarrassment arises from the prejudice that God is a mind; it vanishes when we cease to presume to comprehend the nature of God and of the realities corresponding to the notions of eternity and infinity—when in fact, we retire into our ignorance, as modestly, as candidly, and as cheerfully as becomes us. The difference between Creator and creature is the difference between God and mind. He is as much superior to mind, as Creator to creature. Nevertheless we are to apprehend Him as mind, this being the only mode of symbolism whereby he can be related to our emotive consciousness so as to be the object of our worship. When I wrote upon this subject two years ago, I was perplexed by the fact that my sentiment of God must content itself with a symbolic object that seemed to be in contradiction with a higher notion intelligible to the

February 16th. It is a mischievous error to dismiss the spirit of worship when we have concluded an act of worship. The spirit should be systematically continued into the succeeding work, and, if possible, into all work. Worship that terminates with the act, becomes at last an empty form. An act of worship should be regarded as a pause in the work of life to replenish the exhausted soul with recollection and inspiration sufficient to carry us to the next seasonable pause.

February 19th. Since I, the will, never violate duty,
I am sinless. I am no more responsible for the defects of my susceptibility, than an able commander for the leakiness of his vessel. My susceptibility comprises both fertile soil and morass; these I am to convert into a garden. My will is a part of the created creative force of nature, and my susceptibility is a part of its passive material.

FEBRUARY 22ND. The bondage of the Jews in Egypt, their escape, wanderings, advances, and back-slidings in the desert, and final attainment of the land of promise, is strangely analogous to the subjection of the will to instinct in the absence of holiness, its efforts at emancipation and supremacy by means of imperfect holiness, and its attainment of supremacy concurrently with the establishment of perfect holiness.

FEBRUARY 23RD. The will is embarrassed to resolve on a course of action that is guaranteed by habit and inclination—for example, if one should endeavour to resolve every morning that he will eat his usual meals. Hence the difficulty of renewing daily a resolution to practise virtues which practice has already so rooted in a second nature that the will is never adversely solicited. What we should daily resolve, in respect of such a course of action, is that, if need be, we shall watch its principle, see that it suffer no decay.

MARCH 15TH. Awe of God is proper to that state of the higher nature in which it endeavours to extricate itself from the lower. The coexistence of these two natures without awe of God, supposes a bad accommoda-
tion of the higher with the lower. Awe of God is the modification of the sentiment of God by the sentiment of our impurity.

It may be objected to this sentiment, that it is the accident of an imperfect view of human nature and of its relation to God; that God, according to his perfect wisdom, created the lower nature because it is a necessary preliminary condition of the existence of the higher; that, so far from being responsible for the existence and operations of his lower nature, man is the martyr of the bad necessity that temporarily links it to the better part of him; and that, as the sentiment of awe involved in compunction supposes the sentiment of responsibility, it should vanish with the error which imposed upon man the sentiment of guilt. But the awe in question is analogous with modesty, and does not depend on the sentiment of guilt. What should we say of the civilised woman, who, being exposed naked, should experience no uneasiness because the violation of decency in her person was not of her will? She is not sensible of guilt, and nevertheless suffers in her modesty; nor could modesty be in her, except upon the condition of suffering under such circumstances. In like manner, reverence of God cannot be without awe in one conscious of impurity, whether conscious or not of guilt.

March 24th. Perfection of human nature excludes all but physical pain and what is involved in sorrow for the pain of others. Being without vanity, it is invulnerable to contempt; being without pride, it is indifferent to the privation of power and authority incident to poverty; being without fear, it is indifferent to danger; and trusting implicitly in God, it is always strong and happy with hope. The suffering of Christ, therefore, if it be held that he was a perfect man, was limited to the sensational pain of
the cross, of the crown of thorns, and of the scourge; and the ideational pain of compassion. His passion of fear in the garden, which contrasts strangely with the eager joy of the martyrs in view of impending torment, is incompatible with the idea of perfection.

**March 25th.** The sacred name of God is the idea that truly symbolizes God. This understanding of the sacred name is corroborated by the representation of divine wisdom as logos, or word. The ancients, like ourselves, were aware that the purest apprehension of God lays hold upon a merely anthropomorphic and vicarious object, in some degree corresponding, but in no respect similar to, God. We are practically near to or remote from God, according as this symbol is near to or remote from perfection, which depends on the degree of development of its subject. He, in whom the name of God is nearest to perfection, enjoys discourse of action with God of the most regular and manifest kind.

**April 3rd.** I dare not disabuse Mr.— of the notion that I believe in hell, being convinced that his morality depends on his belief in hell, and that to endanger the one would be to endanger the other.

**April 12th.** What is known as mental prayer is a yearning contemplation of God by reverence. It is a sentiment of God short of an intuition, and involving a longing to become more than it is—to be perfected into intuition and fruition of God. It is prayer in so far as it is desire. It
is possible only to natures of great congenital endowment in respect of reverence. Natures less gifted, but not wholly destitute of the religious principle, may attain to a degree of it consisting in an habitual sentiment of divine authority.

43.

April 13th. Fear of God, if it do not exclude the sentiment of divine goodness, supports sanctity and strengthens the feeling of obligation to divine law. It excludes familiarity from the love of God. The elimination of fear from religion, therefore, is the elimination of a support as well as an obstacle—a support indispensable to the piety of people who are short of a certain degree of religious culture. It was necessary that fear should have operated in the first epoch of religious development.

44.

May 7th. My experience gives ground for the belief that Providence operates, not immediately, but by means of event, upon the heart; and this supposes that God does not determine the mediatiorial event by the immediate causation of human motive, but in some other way beyond our power to conjecture.

45.

May 10th. The forgetfulness of God consequent on prosperity is not a voluntary, but a necessary change, and one that is operated without consciousness. This is most obvious to those whose will and deliberate sentiment are vainly bent upon preventing the change. It is not a crime therefore before experience discovers the law under which it obtains, and the means of prevention. But prior to the discrimination of the limits of volition, the change is imputed to will, and so appears to be crime; and the evils
that naturally flow from it, as well as those which Providence may apply to recall the erring, are imputed to the retributive action of Providence. This error has the effect of restraining impiety by engaging a part of mankind in a rude effort to that end, during the epoch of experience required for the development of the truth, and of the art of excluding this pernicious operation of prosperity.

46.

May 17th. When my nature sins against God it sins against me.

47.

May 19th. By conducting ourselves alike to all, irrespective of affection and aversion, we exclude the necessity of exposing disapproval when the manifestation of it may be mischievous and unwarranted. We should subdue the expression of fervent love and profound respect, so as not to wound their objects by flagrantly opposite expression when occasion (only too probable) may alter the objective or subjective ground of the sentiment.

48.

May 29th. Those who recognize that humility is essential to virtue, imply that the extirpation of pride and vanity is essential to it; for humility is the absence of pride, vanity and anger.

49.

June 8th. Work begets a desire to continue and repeat it that is independent of the desire of its end; hence work which we begin for God's sake, tends to interest us in itself and detach us from the service of God.
July 2nd. The wise are affected by the manifestation of vice or moral disease, as the good physician is affected by the symptoms of physical disease—both experience aversion to the disease, but pity for the sufferer.

September 26th. Paul retaliates angrily on the high-priest, and afterwards apologises, saying that he did not know him to be the high-priest. He then cunningly roases dissention between the Pharisees and Sadducees; so as to take refuge behind it; proclaiming himself a Pharisee, accused on account of his belief in a resurrection. Is this conduct determined by the Holy Spirit?

October 15th. As my strength wanes towards night, not only the sentiment but even the idea of duty grows indistinct. This is true of all the members of my family who have undertaken the service of God.

October 18th. The uncharity supposed to be essential to disapprobatory judgments respecting the nature, motives, or actions of others, is a mere accident of the judgments: it is proper to the resentful and denunciatory sentiment that attends the judgment. It is good to discern the evil that is in others, but bad to confound them with the evil, and, therefore, to wish them pain or punishment. "Be ye wise as serpents, but harmless as doves."

October 18th. Mat. 13th ch., 1st, 16th. In this
passage Christ implies the intuitive nature of the emotive organs, "and should understand with their heart." He implies the power of practice to modify the organs of intuition, so as to improve, falsify, develop, or annihilate them; "for this people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed." He implies distinction between emotive and intellectual intuition.

October 24th. Last evening I was without the sentiment of the superiority of good (considered in itself and not as a means of happiness) over evil. This miserable state of mind was owing, I take it, to the abeyance of reverence.

January 2nd. The hypothesis that will is unable to do good without grace supposes the will to be without freedom. The will must either refuse, or comply with temptation. To suppose it to be unable to refuse, is to suppose it to be necessitated to comply; whence it follows that either the will is not free or that without grace it is not free.

January 16th. Frequency and fervour of prayer are important, not because greater fervour and importunity prevail more with God, but on account of their reaction on the heart, whereby it is made more susceptible to the influence of grace. They belong to the natural means of sanctification which are immediately or mediately subject to the human will. This explanation was suggested to me by my daughter, while reading Fenelon on Prayer, during the evening of Monday, 14th inst.
January 16th. James, chap. 1, v. 20. "For the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God." Let Christians who uphold righteous indignation digest this deliverance of the divine mind.

January 22nd. The grace with which David was so bountifully endowed did not disabuse him of a sensual, vindictive and perfidious nature; nor are there many, if any, save Christ, to whom grace seems to have brought perfect rectitude of sentiment. It seems to quicken sentiment and motive in conformity with such ideas of right as already exist in the understanding, and to render the heart more apt to assimilate wisdom from experience; but it does not seem to impart a sentiment of right independently of experience and a moral faculty several from the religious one—the moral sense. The wisdom of Fenelon is a great advance upon the gymnastic sanctity of Simeon Stylites; yet it is not probable that Simeon Stylites was less endowed with grace.

January 22nd. It is held by many of my Christian friends that I derive my religion mainly from my Christian environment. This opinion has plausible grounds, but it is not true, as the following fact contributes to show. In the beginning of my religious life I relied mainly upon natural means available to the will—on the power of practice to establish a second nature. My personal experience had not taught me to expect anything from grace, and although I did not presume that we are not dependent upon grace, and both regularly and irregularly prayed for divine aid, my
hope was vague and feeble. In this lame way I seemed to be advancing into a sombre kind of virtue, which, though it harboured no evil, involved no paradise. When humility cried for me to heaven from conscious depths of sin and impotence, and obtained a gleam of grace, the change which this wrought, while it lasted, was so radical and blissful that I altogether abandoned natural means and cast myself wholly on prayer. But the result was a divine No, not a divine Yes; and thus I was reminded that, when opposite measures fail, the right one is apt to lie midway between them. This determined me that prayer must not displace, but must co-operate with works, and, especially, with that effort of will by which we maintain in consciousness the apprehension of ourselves as servants of God, so as to hold in abeyance the godless automatism that incessantly tends to ravish the business of life from the control of will, and so as to act with unremitting distinct reference to a purpose comprising all duty. Those who are disposed by nature, practice, and grace to a devout sentiment of God, expect so much from its sanctifying influence, and the ease with which they realise and repose in it so flatters their indolence, that they are inclined to disregard those harder essentials of sanctification which depend upon toilsome and self-denying efforts of will. Self-examination, interior watchfulness, self-denial, and the culture of the sentiment of self as priest or servant of God, are wholly, or for the most part, neglected by them. I concluded that sanctity is not attainable without these means. This conclusion put me in mind of the words of Christ, "Not every one that saith unto me Lord! Lord! shall enter into the kingdom of Heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father, which is in Heaven." Math., c. vii., v. 21.

Now, Christian society could not have given me this opinion, since up to this morning, I held and acted upon the opposite one; nor did I before understand these words of Christ, as I now understand them. Similarly by the
operation of my own faculty upon the raw material of my own experience, I have come by the greater and most important part of my religious beliefs. This is important as regards the genesis of religion.

61.

January 23rd. John x., 26. "But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you." Through lack of saintly intuition, ye are necessarily excluded from faith in me: ye are the darkness that comprehendeth not the light.

62.

January 26th. On Wednesday, 23rd inst., I again besought God to leave me to the unaided resources of my will in the work of sanctification, with the view of enabling myself to distinguish the consciousness or sentiment excited by grace from the sentiment of natural affection towards God and goodness. Proposing to work as usual in the service of God, and to do all in my power to keep my heart quickened by the sentiment of my Creator, I should be justified in concluding that whatever feeling towards God and goodness I should experience would be of nature, not of grace. During the first day, the experiment seemed to deprive my heart of all heavenly life. I felt languid, discouraged, and all but impotent in respect of God and the higher parts of duty: I missed prayer itself with uneasiness. It would have been a relief and a pleasure to me to have prayed as usual. I found it hard to be obliged to substitute mere worship for prayer—also that I had deprived myself of a sweet habit. On the second day (24th January) my heart was in a better disposition. On the third it seemed to be reinstated in its ordinary sentiment of God, and to support in the ordinary way the
endeavour of will in the Divine service. I modified my petition to God beseeching Him to visit me with manifest grace but not with aid of which the effect in consciousness could not be distinguished from natural sentiment.

This morning (26th January) my heart glowed with such love to God, that, under the circumstances, it would appear to me impious not to refer the love to grace. This morning (27th January) my heart was not without fervour towards God, but during a walk with the children I lost the sentiment, and I am now abandoned to mere will. In this state, pious endeavour seems to be barren, it seems to do no more than conjure into consciousness lifeless ideas, the mere skeletons of dead sentiments of God and duty—but, thanks be to God! this is an error; at such a time, the will is gardening the soil of consciousness, although no present fruit or flower express God's sanction of the labour.

January 28th. The liveliness of the sentiment of God which I experience to-day, proves that the dry endeavour of yesterday was not in vain.

January 29th. I was betrayed yesterday into an important decision without due reference to God. The threatened consequences determined me that I have depended too much upon the routine of ascertained duty; that the automaton in me, availing of this excessive dependence, has held my will and piety too much in abeyance. I resolved, therefore, to stand incessantly before the tabernacle in my heart to learn from the Divine will how I am to meet every occasion of action. This is to be my normal attitude. In the course of the day I noticed that a peculiar sensation in the heart was doing for me the function of a mnemonic, reminding me continually of my resolution, and making compliance easy. This sensation might easily have been mistaken for constant volition or stream of volitions. It was not an emotion. Was it of nature or grace?

January 30th. My heart glowed with fervour towards
God this morning, but although I have gained in recollectedness, I have no reason to be contented with my success in this respect.

January 31. I have this evening terminated my experiment. It seems to have been the vehicle of Divine authority for the conclusion that the ordinary sentiment of love to God is of nature, not grace; but this does not warrant the conclusion that grace does not act unconsciously or without consciousness of the fact on the part of the beneficiary. In all probability, grace operates in many ways unknown to man.

The experiment had the effect of paralyzing prayer, of making the sentiment of dependence upon God languid, and of exasperating the sentiment of self-dependence; it seemed to me to be immodest to importune God for so great a boon as manifest grace, and the experiment excluded petition for other help.

63.

February 1st. The fact that expectation is for the most part inverted remembrance, tends to hold the will in abeyance, and to substitute automatism for volition. When one attempts to renew a devout purpose at regular times, as every morning, his attempt is liable to be swamped in a mere automatic repetition of the form of his purpose; because his expectation of a routine of events conformable to the past, especially in respect of sentiment and motive, absorbs his mind, and excludes the anticipation of occasions of the special application of his purpose. He is prone to drift in automatic indolence disturbed by but few motions of will.

64.

February 2nd. To preserve oneself in recollection it is not enough to have the intention of watching for Divine
1861. instruction before the tabernacle in the heart, it is necessary also to expect and be on guard against surprise.

65.

MAY 10TH. All of gratitude (or rather of what passes for gratitude) occasioned by benefit to self, and in excess of what we should experience if another were the beneficiary, is selfishness. Thankful selfishness is not a proper offering to God from men who are capable of pure gratitude. It imputes partiality to God, praising Him for favours in which it supposes its subject to have been preferred to others. When we are lifted in happiness above others we should not regard the boon as coming from Divine partiality, but as coming from the universal benevolence of God, which finds in the state and circumstances of the beneficiary, an opportunity not presented by the state and circumstances of others.

66.

MAY 27TH. Thos. à Kempis, Page, 426. "Son, my grace is precious, it suffereth not itself to be mingled with external things, nor with earthly consolations." Imitation of Christ, Book iii. chap. liii.

When we experience an agreeable sentiment proper to a principle of emotion which, through congenital or educational defect is feeble, the sentiment easily vanishes if circumstances excite stronger principles of emotion; it is not easy to recover it, and the consciousness of this indisposes the heart to make the attempt. The sentiment of God is, in the bulk of mankind, a sentiment of this kind, and if we are not careful to cherish it during its "angel visits, few and far between," by excluding lively emotion of the lower nature, especially of an agreeable kind, it speedily exhales, and leaves the heart more averse to
sanctity. This natural phenomenon is ascribed to grace, which is therefore represented as jealous and volatile.

67.

May 28th. Devotion to the will of God without belief in his providential intervention in human affairs, is nobler and altogether purer than that which trusts in Providence; for the latter expects temporal reward from God, or at least protection against all temporal ills but what are sanctifying, whereas the former casts itself upon righteousness without hope of temporal aid from God or counting upon righteousness as a better means of temporal success. A religion that regards itself in any degree as a means of temporal advantage, is, to that degree, cowardly or sordid or both; and it cherishes selfishness by exercising fear and prudence. Perfect godliness supposes indifference to the circumstances under which we serve God in this life, excepting those that involve great physical pain: it supposes one to have no preference for conditions of wealth, honour, and ease; to be as ready to serve God in the kitchen as on the throne; and he who enjoys this temper has no need of Divine aid in respect of temporal things. It is dear to human weakness as well as to our love of God to believe that God has not committed us to inexorable law and our own unwisdom, but that we are ever in the hands of his fostering providence, that his providential love determines our sufferings no less than our prosperity; and, for the sake of the better reason of the belief, namely, the love of God, faith would be justified in clinging to it but that experience declares against it, and that it reduces religion to a lower plane. It reduces religion to a lower plane by causing it to adopt an enervating interest in temporal prosperity and adversity instead of leaving it to acquire indifference and fortitude in respect of both. The hypothesis, that God gives no aid in respect of temporal things, derives countenance
from the fact that the purest religious sentiment recoils from asking for temporal advantage or relief, and petitions only for sanctity. This corroboration was suggested to me by my sister.

June 2nd. Notwithstanding that I endeavoured faithfully throughout yesterday in the service of God, I find in myself this morning a frivolous disposition. The contrast between my purpose and disposition makes it strikingly plain to me that I am not that which determines the disposition, but something not only severed from, but opposed to it. I, the will, am in such a relation to my own susceptibility as subsists between the captain of a crazy vessel and his vessel. He is not the vessel, nor are its leakiness and unmanageableness vices in him. When he has done all that his skill suggests, he has perfectly complied with duty and responsibility and if he do not fear drowning, he may be at peace.

June 3rd. Piety tends to destroy contrition, and so to diminish religious fervour. The trespasses of the devout are indeliberate. They violate the purpose of the sinner not less than God and virtue. They are not his acts, but acts of his enemy. He does not feel responsible for them, except perhaps in so far as he may have neglected to take precautions against them, and, even on this head, his self-accusation is seldom or never justified, since the neglect is seldom or never voluntary. He is convinced that he was powerless to prevent those sins in the past, and that he is powerless to prevent them in the future. They are the products and expressions of a bad necessity to which he is subject, and from which it is the duty of his will, by application of the art toward sanctification, to relieve him—but only by slow degrees; for instant emancipation is impossible.
Trespass under such circumstances necessarily fails to excite contrition, and so the spur of contrition ceases to stimulate piety. The desire of God and perfection then is the only momentum that helps the will in the work of sanctification. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the season of first fervours, the honeymoon of the spiritual life, gives way to ascetic drudgery.

**JUNE 11TH.** The Mosaic and Christian systems exhibit ignorance of the necessity that bears upon a great part of human intentional action—a defect characteristic of the earlier phases of experience and observation. Children do not discriminate between motive and volition, much less between motive and the necessary nature which it presupposes. In the earlier stages of civilization, societies are in this respect like children; and long after they have discriminated between volition, motive, and the substantive nature presupposed by both, they fail to see the incongruity between the knowledge they have acquired and erroneous beliefs which had gathered life enough before it obtained to live on for a season after it had deprived them of root. No man is more practically conversant with the necessity than the Christian saint, although, from the writings of the saints and philosophers of the Christian Church, it is obvious that their analysis has only partly separated between desire and will, and so between instinct and will. Nevertheless the Church fails to recognize the contradiction of her theology involved in the recognition of intentional instinct. She fails to see that the rebellious volition of Satan presupposed in him an impious desire, and that this presupposed a necessary nature in the arch-rebel which was created by God—that if Satan had been created minus the substantive principle of the rebellious desire, St. Michael might still be third
in Heaven and Adam first in Paradise. In like manner the disobedient volitions of Adam and Eve, presupposed motives which in turn presupposed necessary natures created by God; and if they had been created minus the substantive natures or qualities which moved their wills to disobedience, they and their posterity might now be in Paradise. It is not uncommon to meet with men who are altogether wanting in the substantive principle of this or that desire, in whom no event, however favourable to the kindling of the desire, can kindle the least spark of it. Some men, for example, divested of the æsthetic sense, but vainly desirous to be esteemed connoisseurs, have tried industriously and with all favour of opportunity, but to no purpose, to acquire susceptibility and discrimination in respect of the beautiful. We must conclude that no action of Satan could of itself have begotten in him the impious pride which moved him to resist Omnipotence; nor could the disobedient volitions of Adam and Eve have of themselves begotten the sinful nature which renders their posterity so abhorrent to God and to itself. God, therefore, is the Creator of the necessary nature in man which is presupposed by the motives of evil volition, as well as of that which is manifested by virtuous sentiment and action.

June 18th. Yesterday my reverence ceased to object to the thesis that God is, to a certain degree, subject to necessity. My yearning to love God had been long disappointed by the lack of Divine qualities of which it could take hold. I was not free to think of him, save as free omnipotence, creative and providential according to beneficence, but not from beneficent desire, nor with any sentiment whatever; for desire and sentiment of every kind suppose in the subject necessity to undergo—not even to think of him as a subject of consciousness, notwithstanding that
freedom is inconceivable without consciousness; for consciousness is suspicion, and supposes a necessary nature, a subject that necessarily undergoes. To suppose in God an inclination to the happiness rather than to the misery of others, to loyalty rather than perfidy, to justice rather than injustice, is to suppose him to be necessarily biassed. What then has reverence to take hold of? Consciousness and sentiment are essential to the object of reverence: it cannot take for object even a being supposed to be infinitely superior to conscious and emotive beings. God has not constituted the idea of such a transcendent being so that it can be an object of reverence. Man may devote himself to what he conceives to be its will, but he cannot revere it, nor be grateful to it, nor in any way cleave to it with his heart. Reverence cannot interest itself in such a being: it is so far anthropomorphic that it cannot have for object what is not given as subject of consciousness and sentiment; and this seems to be an authoritative indication from God that we are to believe him to be a conscious and emotive being.

**72.**

**August 9th.** Looking at the trunk of a willow which shoots slantingly from the soil, I felt in it a life energy momentum, and almost motion, that seem to be divined by a sentiment nearer to the truth of things than what is involved in ordinary consciousness. The sentiment is a religious one, a kind of medium through which the heart feels as though it could see God, if only the medium were purer. In my nineteenth year I experienced a fainter degree of this sentiment after having been for a long time alone with nature, with oaks and elms and willows, rising and setting suns and moons and their cone-like paths upon the sea. It seems as though it would explain the connection of the grove with ancient worship.
When it is our duty to teach duty, or to indicate or remonstrate against the violation of it, pride, if it be not wholly wanting to the nature, tends, unknown to its subject, to apprehend self as a God-appointed teacher or guide. Many of those upon whom the sentiment is foisted are in earnest in the service of God, and would be shocked by the discovery of their pharasaism: they would be indisposed to neglect any means for the extirpation of the principle of the sentiment. The natural language of this form of pharasaism is familiar; it is didactic, uncharitable, and severe, and implies that the teacher is incapable of violating the duty which he inculcates, of committing the trespass which he rebukes, or an equal trespass. With the undiscriminating it passes for an expression of dignity and purity; for they confound it with the austere reserve to which the good are prone in presence of vice or on account of distrust of their own spontaneity.

The growth in wisdom of those who are subject to authority gradually relaxes and finally superannuates the authority; but so long as wisdom acknowledges authority, it acknowledges it as absolute, except in so far as a higher may limit a subordinate authority. Authority is incompatible with right, in those who are subject to it, to question its commands; but, from observing the partial independence of those whose wise obedience has rendered the renewal of command with regard to the routine of duty supererogatory, it has been inferred that an authority limited by the private judgment of the ward is possible, and in certain circumstances desirable. To question, is to abolish authority. We may continue to impute superiority to him whose authority we have once questioned, and we may
think it expedient to prefer his judgments in most cases to the judicial tendencies of our own minds; but we do so not from a sentiment of authority, but because we judge it expedient. The English Church ignores an essential of authority in so far as she holds it to be limitable by a reserve in favour of private judgment. What latitude of adaptation the Roman Catholic Church might have allowed herself if, instead of insisting upon her infallibility, she had insisted on its practical equivalent—the absoluteness of her authority.

75.

SEPTEMBER 7TH. "What are we in the order of nature? Simply created out of nothing, and so with no rights, but such as come from God's gratuitous covenant." Growth in Holiness, c. xii., p. 22.

Rights are commensurate with the bounty of infinite or perfect goodness. All the power and enjoyment consistent with the nature of the individual and universal happiness is, in the Divine apprehension, the right of that individual. To withhold it, or any part of it, from him, would be to violate the perfect goodness of the Divine nature and the right of the individual. If creation from nothing excludes rights, God would violate no right in consigning the unoffending Host of Heaven to eternal torment.

76.

SEPTEMBER 8TH. Du Chaillu relates of the Africans, whom he visited, that when fact demonstrated the groundlessness of their superstitious trusts and expectations, instead of moving them to doubt, it set them upon apologetic invention. This exhibits the rudimental operation of a law with whose manifestation, under higher conditions, we are familiar; and it shows that there is a tenacity in
whatever is grounded upon the sense of the supernatural to resist the laws of reason.

OCTOBER 6TH. My lower nature needs to be overawed by authority or menacing power. I lack the awe of reverence in which authority is apprehended, and I am without the lower corrective influence of fear by which menacing power is apprehended. These sentiments grapple and either restrain or subdue the lower nature, rendering the whole nature more pliable to devotion, and they facilitate recollection.

It would seem as if God ought to have modified the human constitution, so that the wholesome hypothesis of future punishment should emerge from it into religion, and hold until the progress of knowledge and civilization had sufficiently relaxed the primitive brutality of the race, and sufficiently developed reverence to enable the sentiment of authority to supersede that of menacing power.

It is not improbable that founders of religion may have so understood the Divine plan, and supposed themselves to be co-operating with God in teaching the future punishment of the wicked, although they knew that to inflict pain, except for prevention of greater pain, is malignant, and, therefore, incongruous with the Divine character. They could easily persuade themselves that to deceive in order to sanctify, is a virtue, not a vice. They might claim that truth is obligatory only between equals, or those who are not far removed from equality, and on inferiors in respect of superiors— that those who are greatly superior in wisdom find in themselves a sentiment which, in the name of God or of goodness, imposes an opposite obligation relatively to the rest of mankind—to those to whom they stand in some such relation as that of prophet, priest, or king. Such a sentiment there is; and, in advance of a certain phase of
psychological knowledge, it necessarily prevails with the majority of those whose superiority constitutes them the natural, as well as ordinary, guides and governors of mankind. However devoted such men may be to God and mankind, if they have only the average degree of pride, they necessarily apprehend the mass of men whom they teach or rule as being short of the moral stature to which truthfulness owes allegiance. According to this feeling, the obligation of truth is merely relative. It is innocent to deceive brutes and lunatics for a good end; why not innocent to deceive the ignorant, who are in a certain sense insane, for their good? Those who feel and reason thus are ignorant that their moral vision is distorted by pride, and so they are the innocent, because ignorant, promulgators of a wholesome error.

To the bulk of mankind it seems incredible that men devoted to God and man, and of surpassing wisdom, should be destitute of the sentiment which apprehends a violation of truth as a violation of God. But to the enlightened and discerning it is only too credible, because experience makes them more familiar with incongruity than with congruity of character; and to no one is it more probable than to those who are endeavouring after perfection. For they, more intimately than others, know how evil abuses judgment up to the last moment of imperfection. But fact excludes serious question of the possibility of pious fraud—of falsehood moved by devotion to God and man. It has been commensurate with religion, and has been in modern times a maxim of one of the most devoted and enlightened of the orders of the Christian priesthood. Charles I. and James II. instance, in their fidelity to religion and falsehood to the nation, that it has made itself a maxim of kingly government. We have proverbial testimony in the terms priestcraft, kingcraft, jesuitry.

The sentiment which engenders pious fraud may have been counted upon as a means of human development by
our Creator, but like every sentiment of which any element proceeds from the lower nature, as a means which ceases to be useful and grows mischievous in proportion as the developing intuition of the higher nature finds it obnoxious. The era of its utility would terminate in an epoch of advanced science and civilization involving purer ideas of virtue, and, consequently, of the Divine character. It must fail to impose upon, or to excuse, itself to such an era; and, if it persisted in living, it must rot out the remainder of its effete life in ignominy.

It may be objected that this hypothesis imputes falsehood to God. It might be as reasonably objected that God is guilty of all sin, as being the Creator of the nature from which proceeds all motive to sin. It is conceivable that man might exist without this nature; in which case it would be impossible for human volition of any kind to corrupt it. If there be not, in this conception, an absurdity that is disguised by ignorance, the Creator needlessly and culpably created a *sine qua non* of sin. The sacrilegiousness of this hypothesis disproves it, and the very idea of God, which implies perfect goodness, supposes a concealed absurdity in the notion—supposes the impossibility of human nature without a temporary connection with a source of evil motive. This God must create if he would create man; *and it would be consonant to his perfect goodness to make it an instrument of its own destruction*. In creating the organs of the sentiment which engenders pious fraud, God would be creating such an instrument. Moreover, the nature of man is such that his development towards science and wisdom is from greater to lesser error—from more to less spurious sentiments of duty and virtue—and it would not be more absurd to accuse God of having deceived us in these respects, than to hold him guilty of the useful deception involved in pious fraud; especially when we consider that it is useful only when it is innocently applied—when applied in an age in which it is
possible to apprehend it as duty—and that it corrupts in a later era into an organ of mischief, more hurtful to those who apply it than to those against whom it is used.

October 14th. Why has God limited Himself to miracles that have failed to establish universal certitude of his existence? Why has he not immediately caused that certitude? Why has he left any portion of mankind in ignorance or doubt? Whatever end he had in view by forbearing to implant certitude of his existence as a primary and ineffaceable belief in the human mind he either could, or could not, realise that end immediately. If he could, he preferred to accomplish it by means involving the putative sin and painful consequences of atheism; which supposes him to have created sin and pain for their own sake. If he could not, either he is not omnipotent, or the idea of the thing is unobviously inconsistent. Duty requires us to adopt the latter hypothesis because the other discredits either the benevolence or the omnipotence of God. But when we admit the unobvious inconsistency, it is more reasonable to suppose the inconsistency to be in the idea of that which occasions perplexity—and so challenges the supposition—than in something else to which the perplexing thing is assumed to be necessary. Therefore, it becomes us to believe the theses, 1st, God could implant in our nature a principle of certitude of his existence as a principle of a primary and ineffaceable belief, 2nd, that he could miraculously excite such a certitude, 3rd, that he could perform a miracle calculated to oblige universal certitude of his existence, to be absurd.

October 26th. The theory and art of sanctification
which Christ planted and Roman Catholic Christianity has developed, stripped of the husk of supernaturalism, is the unripe material of the bread of life.

October 26th. The danger of temporal punishment has, in all ages and countries, prevailed against the powerful tendency of man to violate social order and happiness in spite of the feeling of probability, generally stronger in those who are more disposed to crime, that craft can elude the danger. Whatever force to affect fear and prevail with human will inheres in danger of eternal punishment, is unimpeded by the operation of such a feeling; and, nevertheless, it has proved abortive with regard to the great bulk of those who have been educated to believe it. The dogma seems to be repugnant to the law of habit, so that it cannot incarnate itself in an habitual sentiment capable of influencing the indeliberate life of man. K—confessed to me that he persisted in the practice of a secret crime, during a period in which his confessor more than once warned him that he was thereby incurring eternal torment; and the unhappy man was capable of experiencing horror while I held his imagination, by a lively description, to the contemplation of the hell in which he believed. Had it been possible for him to have acquired an habitual feeling of the danger of hell, equal to only a feeble degree of what he experienced in that deliberate time, it is unreasonable to suppose that he would have persisted in his criminal practice. Habit seems to be as indifferent to the desire of heaven as to the fear of hell; and, indeed, to everything which pertains to religion. Nor can this be ascribed to the sinfulness of human nature, since the hope of reward and the fear of punishment are selfish sentiments that prosper, at least as well, in sinful as in holy hearts; and it is reasonable to suppose that the indifference of emotive
habit to the fear of hell and the desire of heaven proceeds from the same cause as its indifference to other religious sentiments. Reason will not be answered by laying the blame on the will; first, because the exceptions would not be so few, if it depended upon will to form the habit; and second, because those who make great efforts to develop in themselves habits of sanctity, have too much reason to think that the result is not commensurate with the effort. And, considering that those who attempt a spiritual life are, for the most part, drawn to it by extraordinary congenital bias, however late in life this bias may show itself, it is to be inferred that the result must be less in the case of ordinary men, and especially of those who enjoy only the ordinary degree of reflective intuition, and have little leisure to exercise what they possess. The cause must be either in the necessary nature of man, or in our ignorance of the art of training it. Man is still looking for his Messiah, and that Messiah is a perfect art of sanctification; which can be born only of a perfect science of human nature and all that concerns it.

81.

October 28th. When strong emotion occupies attention, ideas that at other times easily make themselves objects of emotive intuition and attention, appeal to the heart in vain. They may be distinct enough in intellectual consciousness, but no sentiment discerns them. Thus, when temptation assails us, the will often essays, to no purpose, to excite counter-feelings, by ideas to which they had at other times responded. Nay, sometimes the effort tends to aggravate the rigour of the grasp with which the heart clutches the temptation or pre-occupying feeling. This warns us that we must be beforehand with occasions of temptation—prepossessing the heart with sentiment calculated to exclude it—which cannot be better done than by keeping God as much as possible before the eye of the heart.
November 9th. One who has incurred ignominy by crime arising from an emotive ignorance or unwisdom that no longer exists, is bound to acknowledge by his humility the divine imperative embodied in the frown of society. If, on the plea that he is the victim of necessity, he confront the ignominy with a deportment that manifestly disowns its power, he is moved by self-esteem to dishonour a provisional law of God because it is not eternal. Humility should acknowledge the divinity of the law until it be superseded by a higher law. When science develops wisdom, and wisdom charity—wise charity that respects wise rigour, not unwise benevolism that, under the form of charity, fecundates crime by excuse and impunity—ignominy will cease to be a law of God; but those who discern the first signs of the dawn must bide God's time, respect what remains of darkness, and not presume to act as if it were already day. The generous who have incurred ignominy, and who could easily submit to the censure of the good, resent the pharisaism and truculence that are involved in the scorn of the bad; but God has provided no opportunity for their humility in respect of the good, whom he has reserved for charity, not for uncharitable judgment and the infliction of purgatorial pain. The bad are the police of heaven—its scavengers against the filth of sin. Let them do their purgatorial work upon thee, wise penitent: thy humility and patience acknowledge not their authority, but that of God.

November 20th. The principle of our nature which projects the future upon the plane of expectation tends to project it in a scheme of action as conformable to inclination as consists with the nature of the expected circumstances; and what we take to be deliberate conduct is for
the most part the indeliberate or automatic performance of this scheme. We drift through the hours upon this kind of expectation and performance; and we mistake the pre-
vision, inclination, apprehension and use of means, for purpose and purposed action. It is this illusion that educates the soul to recognize itself as will, and to emerge into the state of free will when an opportunity of choice is afforded to it by the opposition of a clear sentiment of duty to pre-
ponderant desire. But, like all the preparatives of perfection in human nature, it tends to detain us at the point of development which we attain by means of it. It too often pre-
occupies and fills the mind, excluding the mnemonical operation of things that challenge will to innovate upon routine, and especially their operation upon the moral and religious senses which awakens motives for deliberate op-
position to habit; and sometimes it gives access to an obscure and uneasy consciousness of opposed duty, but prevents the consciousness from becoming distinct enough to rouse the will. It held me in this latter state yesterday, after my return from ——, and the difference between the obscure consciousness, before and after it became sufficiently defined to advertise the soul to become voluntary in the cause of duty, was too slight to be intuited, and only became known to me through inference from its effect. The lack of intuitive discernment of the change perplexed my remembrance of it; so that, on the bare showing of the remembrance, I seem rather to have been transferred than to have deliberately deserted from inclination to duty. But from the moment in which the obscure consciousness ap-
peared to that in which I resolved to act according to duty, my will was not for an instant unfaithful. My necessary nature failed to challenge obedience by a distinct idea of duty: as soon as the embryo of that idea matured, my will complied; and I am clearly conscious that it was impossible for me to have done so before, because I am clearly con-
scious that I was guilty of no disobedience, no hesitation.
Were it not for this reason, I should be obliged to suppose that I had been culpable of an endeavour to stifle the voice of conscience before I obeyed its command; because my remembrance does not detect any greater distinctness in the sentiment of duty when I obeyed it, than it manifested while I was yet in suspense as to what I should do. I believe that the great bulk of men would, under such circumstances, be persuaded that they were guilty; and, in proportion as they depend more upon intuition than reason, they would be the more disposed to this opinion. The fact proves that volition depends upon a certain degree of vividness of idea and sentiment, and that the heart may be possessed by an uneasy sentiment of obligation short of the vividness necessary to volition. In this we have an instance of a limitation of will by susceptibility of which religious and ethical hypotheses have not hitherto made account. It exposes the ignorance in which those hypotheses have arisen. What uncharity they have cherished! How little they have allowed for the absorbing power of habit and passion which exclude every opposing idea from the mind, and so exclude freedom and responsibility.

November 24th. St. Francis, of Assisi, supposed himself to hear a voice from a crucifix in the church of St. Daiman, commanding him to repair the church, which was falling into ruin. To comply with the command, he availed himself of his father's absence to take from his store several pieces of cloth, which he sold at Foligno. He offered the proceeds to the priest of St. Daiman's, which the latter, knowing how he came by the money, refused. Francis threw the money upon one of the windows of the church, where the father subsequently found it. The father brought him before the civil tribunal to oblige him to surrender other monies which he suspected him of having
Francis pleaded independence of civil authority, as having abandoned the world for God; but when brought before the bishop’s court, he surrendered the money without interrogatory, and, with it, even the clothes which he wore, stripping himself naked, all but a hair shirt, which was thus intentionally or inadvertently trumpeted.

St. Bonaventure justifies the sale of the cloth. So does Father Candid Chalipe, one of the biographers of the saint, regarding the Divine command as investing Francis with authority over his father’s property. But the latter acknowledges that the act should not be a precedent. Butler in his account of the matter pleads in extenuation the simplicity of Francis. He omits Francis’ evasion before the civil tribunal.

The conduct of Francis is easily explained. The religious principle in his nature was of morbid susceptibility, and the principles of equity and loyalty were either wholly wanting in him, or had not been duly developed: they did not serve in his heart as interpreters of the Divine will. St. Francis, of Sales, would not, under the same circumstances, have so interpreted the Divine will. St. Francis, of Assisi, resembled all the saints in passionately desiring what he supposed to be dear to God. But he differed from the higher order of saints in that his nature did not truly represent what is dear to God. This difference in saints the Roman Catholic Church has failed to recognize. She has adopted and canonized hallucination, and a revolting variety of moral obliquity, platitude and abomination which morbid sanctity has commended to her, elevating into the rank of virtues the culture of filth and an affection for kissing leprous sores. If, in place of pretending to infallibility—which she does in perfect good faith—she had contented herself with assuming to be merely supreme authority, liable to error, but divinely commissioned and able to conduct man through error, as well as truth, to heaven, she could release herself, in advanced stages of
sentiment, from unwise sanctions that had proceeded from her authority in times of less illumination. As it is, she is obliged to cherish them until they stifle her.

But the fraudulent piety of Francis is chiefly important to us as a proof, not only that godliness does not exclude fraud, but that it is capable of using fraud. If a saint of sanctity and ability enough to make him the founder of one of the principal orders of the Roman Catholic Church, felt it to be consonant to the Divine will to violate property for the promotion of the glory of God, and even to elude civil law with an attorney-like subtlety, it is highly probable he would be equally liable to violate truth for the same end—especially in the cause of a God who had published to the whole heavenly host his sanction of falsehood by preferring the counsel and ministration of the spirit who proposed to be a lying spirit in the mouth of Ahab’s prophets.

85.

November 25th. Recollection in God, and deliberation of every kind are at first laborious, and may easily be protracted so as to exhaust and disorder the system. The will can by practice found in the necessary nature the organic conditions of constant and easy deliberation; but we must not attempt to maintain ourselves in constant deliberation, until we have constructed the needful organ.

86.

November 26th. Lack or feebleness of trust in the goodness of God (for we are more disposed to believe in his power than in his goodness) makes room for a propitiatory fear that passes with itself for love: this causes us to look upon nature so as to see in it only what is complimentary to God. Freed by the fulness of faith from the abject and stultifying “insimplicity” of this fear we
recognise the fact that there is more failure than success in nature, more waste than fruitfulness of force. For one seed that germinates, thousands perish. The ends of nature are, for the most part, secured by an abundance that involves waste, not by a selective aptitude that excludes it. In this respect the operations of nature are no better than what might be expected on the atheistic hypothesis. But it by no means follows that failure is always to bear the same proportion to success: on the contrary, the tendency seems to be that success gains in ratio upon failure. This is manifest in an example, the consideration of which occasioned the foregoing train of thought.

When facts recommend an hypothesis to a man it tends to modify his apprehension and judgment so as to impose its shape upon his consciousness of nature. This bias is of invaluable utility when the hypothesis happens to be true; for it holds the discoverer to an obstinate perseverance, without which the discovery would be impossible. Note, as a proof of this, the history of the hypothesis of "natural selection," in the mind of Darwin, which, whether true or false, must be admitted to be of great importance to science as being, if not the truth itself, at least a tack towards the truth. But when, as most commonly happens, the hypothesis is false, the bias is fraught with mischief and stultification, and often needs for its extinction a purgatory whose fires are not always extinguished in the ashes of the error that kindle them. But development, by discovering an art of research, is constantly diminishing the mischievous and stultifying power of false hypothesis, and promises to exclude it altogether. Have we not reason to hope from the analogy of this case, that the eternal is evolving itself from the temporal—that whatever is consonant to dignity, is eternal, and all beside but temporal—that the hope of faith is the true prophet.

One of the causes of the obstinacy of hypothesis, is that, among other parts of our nature, it takes root in pride, and
pride will have it at any cost to be true. One of the tests to which it became me to subject the theory of my faith, was to try whether it had power to take practical hold of the young mind. Having accordingly applied it to the hearts of my children, my pride engaged itself to the success of the experiment, and has caused me to proceed with it in a coercive and tyrannical mood, rather than in the temper of childlike, reverent inquiry. So far as this mood prevails, it excludes priesthood, peace, right observation and impartial judgment. It moves me to a manufacture of facts that tends to intercept nature and pass for it. I detected it this morning in a feeling of imperious anger with which I apprehended some shortcoming of one of my children. To detect, was to escape from it, and this I did with a sentiment of relief. I find myself freed from a tyrannical responsibility which oppressed me more than it disposed me to oppress my children, and free to relax into the humility of priesthood where it had seemed to be my duty to put myself in the place of God.

DECEMBER 4TH. God may have contributed, by immediate action upon the consciousness of Christ, to confirm Christ in the theology which was developed in him, partly by that of the society which educated him, and partly by the operation of what was peculiar in his mental constitution. God may have done this to propagate the wisdom that, up to that time, was peculiar to Christ, notwithstanding that error must be developed with it; because men would be thereby advanced from greater to less error, and what remained of error must finally find itself opposed to what is true in Christianity, and so necessitate another religious revolution which would advance man still further.
December 9th. In the early part of the spiritual life, before experience has confirmed to the soul that it is a free will, able within certain bounds to resist its strongest desire for God's sake, we are liable, in certain adverse states of inclination, to distrust that we have ability to be faithful—to distrust that we are free. The habit of being the unquestioning, indeliberate instrument of predominant inclination cows in the soul the sense of its new power when the intensity of the inclination or any concurring cause disturbs and weakens the judgment. We need to recover our equanimity in order to feel that inclination is not will, and that, within certain limits, will, and not inclination, is the master of conduct. The more we practise deliberation when opportunity favours, the more we strengthen it against adverse occasions.

The lack of freedom of the soul prior to the attainment of power to prefer duty to predominant satisfaction, is manifested in the feeling of necessity experienced at such times by the spiritual novice. Before he has emerged into freedom the necessity is not felt; inclination and will are not discriminated: but afterwards the consciousness habitually involved with predominant inclination discovers, in contrast to the purpose which it menaces, a force corresponding to what was formerly necessity, and which still tends to pass for it—a force, that seems to scorn the pretension of the soul to independence.

December 15th. Rank is necessary to the sanctification of a society. When the more spiritual associate with those who are less advanced, forgetful of the difference, they are betrayed into an unconscious sympathy with what is defective in the sentiment of their inferiors, and so
gravitate to the state of the latter, instead of attracting the latter towards theirs; whereas, if both were mindful of the difference, and the animus of their intercourse consisted in respect on the part of the inferior, and fraternal charity on that of the superior, the intercourse would tend to benefit both.

90.

December 21st. It is known that we can augment muscular power at the expense of sensibility, and the reverse. It has just occurred to me that there is a psychical correspondent to this physiological law, namely, that we can augment the sovereignty of will at the cost of sensibility. It is impossible for some people to inflict upon themselves, upon their bodies for example, a considerable degree of pain; and it is probable that there is a limit to the degree of pain, short of what extinguishes consciousness, that any one is capable of applying to himself for a considerable time together. But between the degrees applicable by people of the greatest fortitude, and by those who are extremely enervated, there may be a large space for exercise of will, whereby the will may augment its dominion and proportionately diminish either sensibility to pain, or its source of enervation. It occurs to me that the opposite of fortitude (shall we call it enervacy) has the property of exaggerating pain. The more I think of it, the more probable it seems that there is such an exaggerative principle, and that it is one of the most mischievous of the incubi that oppress the will. The way to vanquish it seems to be, to begin to inflict upon ourselves small degrees of pain, and to increase the degree, taking care to be always in the rear of our fortitude.

It is difficult to resist the opinion that this note is providential, for it was only this morning that I declared a longing to my Creator to discover some remedy against my
morbid fear of poverty: its unreasonable apprehensions dry up in me the very source of piety.

The hypothesis throws a new light on mortification. It was vaguely felt by the spiritual, that in proportion as we shrink from pain the soul is more under the dominion of the sensual and lower natures, and that, on the contrary, the higher nature acquires dominion in proportion as we exercise ourselves in fortitude and extend the sovereignty of the will by inflicting pain upon ourselves. The very act of the soul in applying the pain diminishes its consciousness of the pain, and so gives the lie to the exaggerative principle, and redeems us from its enervating falsehood. Under cover of the erroneous idea of penance—as it were in the husk of this idea—the spiritual were really engaged in the development of sanctity: of which voluntariness and fortitude are elements.

DECEMBER 23RD. To-day, for the first time, I have experienced awe of God. I have long aspired after this sentiment, knowing it to be the basis element of the sentiment of God. I had well-nigh abandoned the hope of success, thinking my nature too light and insignificant to be capable of so great a sentiment. To-day, while considering the evidence that I am earnest in religion, and, especially that what I do for sanctity is not done through fear, and while I was in the act of thankfully exclaiming, "I do not fear God," a sentiment arrested me which bore so strange a likeness to fear, that for a moment it seemed as if I were about to utter what was not the truth; but after an instant of this confusion, I saw that the sentiment was the awe of God which I had been so long solicitous to attain. My thanksgiving that my Creator had made this success possible in me, was not short of the occasion, nor was I slow to express the hope that God had also made it possible in me to convert this boon into a practical
power helpful for sanctification in the common business of life. For I take the common business of life to be the grand and final theatre of sanctification, in respect of which the cloister and the church are but preliminary and subsidiary.

December 23rd. In respect of God, the heart is like a broken mirror; it reflects or apprehends him in fragments—now one aspect reflected in one element of the perfect sentiment of God, now another aspect reflected in another element. We now apprehend his goodness without a sentiment of his authority, and now his authority without a sentiment of his goodness. The perfect sentiment of God apprehends, as a single object, the power, the majesty, the authority, the incomprehensibleness, the loveliness of God: the name of the single object is holiness. The perfect sentiment of God excludes self-esteem. We may have a lively feeling of the goodness of God and be at the same time imperious, oracular, or self-complacent; but we cannot have an adequate feeling of the divine authority without perfect humility. It excludes all feeling of human inequality. If we have occasion to admonish, it disposes us to whisper the admonition as from one child to another in presence of a revered father. If there be occasion of command, it disposes us to deliver the command as servants of God, and not as imperious executors of our own power and authority.

February 10th. Man's power to prevent himself from sinning will be greatly augmented when he learns to detect an evil mood immediately or intuitively before it has time or occasion to manifest itself in an evil motive. He will have legislated for the case beforehand, and he will treat it accordingly, dealing with himself as a patient that is to be
retired from such and such proximities and activities, and over whom the will is to keep strict watch until the succession of a better mood shall warrant the ordinary degree of spontaneity. As it is, the mood is for the most part beforehand with consciousness.

94.

February 10th. "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven," St. Math. v. 16.

Christ does not say, "shine before men," but, "let your light shine before men;" that is, do not hide it under a bushel. Do not do your good works to be seen of men, but do not be at pains to hide what is your duty to do. If a devout man should succeed in hiding every act indicative of love to his neighbour, he would make devotion appear hard and unlovely. Let him be sure of the purity of his intention and he need be under no apprehension that censoriousness will succeed in misrepresenting his motive. If it should succeed, he would have the sanctifying opportunity of being indifferent to dishonour.

95.

February 10th. "It is folly to endeavour to make ourselves shine before we are luminous." (Bushnell.) There are many who are constitutionally incapable of becoming luminous—who are altogether wanting in the religious sense, or in whom it coexists with a conflicting and more susceptible nature over which years of devotion fail to give it ascendancy. But this class is not excluded from devout activity. If it cannot domesticate heaven in its life, it can at least exclude evil, it can evolve a life-plan consonant to duty, and compel the conduct to roll within its grooves. It can consecrate to God an un-
remitting fidelity of will, and it can afford to respect the faith that underlies the error of those who threaten that God will requite this devotion with eternal torment. The devout who are endowed with a dominant sentiment of God, respect and love the devout who are not so blessed.

February 16th. St. Theresa's remark, "that an easy position of body is more favourable to mental prayer," is an evidence in favour of the mere naturalness of the phenomenon. For, an interesting spectacle can withdraw the soul from consciousness of a position of body that would be to most people, under ordinary circumstances, insupportably painful, and it is unreasonable to suppose that the immediate action of God upon the soul should be less effective in this respect. It is much more reasonable to suppose that mental prayer, being a phenomenon of organs that are as yet young and feeble, is easily deranged and dissipated like the occasional rally of moribund mental power.

February 21st. People who are incapable of apprehending the Divine Being in a deep or enduring sentiment of reverence, are capable of a lively and prolonged sentiment of Him in the sentiment of reverence which they impute to another; and hence the satisfaction of many devout people in reading the lives of saints and listening to the sermons of those whose natural language excites reverence in a high degree. (By the way, we measure our own reverence by that which we impute, and so are conscious that we experience more or less reverence than this or that person.)
as an art, may have caused Christ to impart Christianity, as an imperative and not as an art. The recognition of reverence as a test of right and wrong and of the true and false, enables a development of religion independently of revelation. I wrote, yesterday, in a memorandum, without comprehending the full significance of what I wrote, that to think of sanctification as an art or system of means without a reverential sentiment of it as being a Divine imperative, is to be in a state that tends to paralyze devotion, and extinguish piety. This appears to me, now, to explain why Christ imparted Christianity as an imperative, and not as an art.

Did I derive this explanation from my Christian environment, or is it as new to Christendom as it is to me? Christianity did not teach me the value of reverence as a test of what is comformable and what unconformable to the divine will; and he who possesses the sacred implement and has this knowledge of its use, is able to discover by himself the way of holiness.

February 24th. My heart was distracted this afternoon by an uneasy gravitation to a carnival of domestic talk which it expected, according to custom, at the close of my retreat this evening. Knowing that I could terminate the distraction and uneasiness by extinguishing the expectation, I resolved to continue my retreat until to-morrow, and immediately my heart was calm.

I have suffered great disquiet through life from this gravitation of the heart to expected pleasure. Indeed it has for the most part cheated me of present pleasure by causing me to overlook the present—to look beyond it to an ever-coming pleasure—and substituting disquiet or positive pain for present enjoyment. Ignorance made me a prey to this evil from which knowledge is emancipating
me. To live in peace and recollection—to live in the now and be master of oneself—to live in the sentiment of God—it is necessary to exclude expectation of pleasure. This explains the unhappiness and corruption involved in the pursuit of pleasure. Pleasure haunts those who shun her, and eludes those who pursue.

February 26th. It might be held that the sole benefit of prayer is the judiciousness incident to the incident reverence and the good that naturally flows from the judiciousness. Either we are drawn to prayer by reverence or enter into it without reverence. The tendency of the act of prayer is, in the first case to augment the reverence, in the second to beget and augment it. A sentiment of reverence stills, or tends to still, so much of the movement of the lower nature as we know to be repugnant to God. Its presence therefore causes us to apprehend and judge more purely and correctly: what we do in this state of apprehension and judgment is done more wisely or is nearer to wise conduct than what we do in the absence of reverence. The relieving operation of our wiser conduct seems to be the practical answer of Providence to our prayer: and so, the natural operation of cause and effect passes for a supernatural event.

March 1st. A dominant sentiment of Divine authority tends to supersede purpose, and to reduce the will to a mere instrument of the commandments of God.

Finding myself gravitating towards business that interests me, not as function of priest but as means to ends that are dear to me irrespective of God, I was about to pledge myself to God that I should endeavour to exclude all thought of such business until a certain hour, and endea-
vour in the meantime to maintain myself in reverential recollection, when I was arrested by a feeling of irreverence in the resolution, and an involved sentiment that, in place of commanding myself with consciousness of power to do this for God, and implying in the pledge of it a power to withhold from God, it behoved me to be passive to the divine command within me as if it were a will that would of itself, if I were not profane enough to interfere, effect in me the motions of mind and body constituting the conduct which it prescribed. It seemed to me as if in this obedience my will became the will of God or of the sentiment of his authority, and ceased to be my will. I felt that a beatitude was nascent in my soul, and feared lest a breath should blow out its feeble life. I felt that if I could hold the sentiment long enough to sketch its lineaments—as I am now doing—I should be able to convert my soul at will into an organ of like sentiment, until it should become the permanent subject of the mood proper to the sentiment.

March 10th, 1877. The event recorded in the foregoing note gave rise to a discussion which occupied sixteen additional pages: these I have effaced. I endeavoured at first in that discourse to maintain the thesis that sanctification substitutes a holy instinct for will, that man becomes a necessary agent in respect of divine command, that self-denying devotion of free will is the necessary preliminary of this instinctive blessedness, and that a comparison of the two states occasioned the dispute about works. I referred to the miraculous change of character wrought in M—as an example, and to her aversion to the interference of will in spiritual things. I referred also to Quietism. Then, recoiling from the idea that perfection excludes freedom (consists in a saintly automatism), I maintain the opposite thesis, and endeavour to reconcile it with the ostensible teaching of the extraordinary event which
occasioned the note. The product of this endeavour strikes me now as being a sample of the compounds of subtlety and platitude which I have classed under the name of pious apology.

March 22nd. At a certain period of life, most men come by a critical or judicial sentiment of what their moral nature has been at time more or less remote from that in which the sentiment obtains. As one makes progress in morality he diminishes the interval between the judged and judging states of mind until at last the moral judgment follows hard upon every lapse from rectitude. The next step in the progress is into a state, which excludes everything obnoxious to moral censure: the judicial man has overtaken the practical man and become one with him.

March 24th. Wise sentiment of what is unseemly or evil is averse to charity, and altogether without anger. In angry apprehension of what is unseemly or sinful self usurps the place of God, and apprehends the unseemliness of the sin as a violation of itself, not of God. All anger is the usurpation of the place of God by self. This is intelligible only to those who have entered upon at least the novitiate of the spiritual life, and who, although they be not yet penetrated by perfect humility, have arrived in view of the fact that perfection excludes anger.

March 29th. To be sometimes deprived of the sentiment of God augments the faith of the devout; because they see the poverty and vileness of human nature destitute of godliness, and they are obliged to judge that, if the
universe be not altogether a hideous inveracity and self-mockery, there is a Creator who proclaims, in the very constitution of man, that union with him is an indispensable condition of human perfection and happiness.

But if the faith of the devout derive strength from occasional privation of the sentiment of God, multitudes fail of devotion and fall into perdition for lack of it; and amongst them many in whom the sentiment has occasionally glowed. To suppose that the sentiment is grace, or the immediate effect of grace, is to suppose that God has withheld a condition of sanctification and is guilty of the sin and misery which he forbears to exclude. To suppose that the sentiment is altogether natural, and that its nature excludes the possibility of its existence except as the natural product of a natural antecedent, is to suppose what is in harmony with the benevolence and omnipotence of God. That there are races of men who have never experienced the sentiment—that it has failed to mature in men in whom it has been partially developed—and that the number of those in whom it has become predominant is insignificant, are facts that consist with Divine benevolence and omnipotence, upon the following hypothesis. When God called the universe into being it contained, amongst the germinal conditions of things that were to be, what was necessary to the inception, after a certain time, of the human race; and the first men contained in their nature the germinal conditions of all human development and history. That their progeny was to include vast multitudes of defective organizations, wanting among other organs the organ of religious sentiment, and that, through congenital defect, ignorance, and voluntary abuse, the race was to develop along an era of sin and misery, was a cost of the eternal good contemplated in the creation which omnipotence could not exclude—the supposition, that omnipotence could exclude it being an unobvious absurdity. It was enough for the divine purpose that the sin and the
misery could not extinguish in the race the organ of the
sentiment by which man was ultimately to exalt himself
into perfection, and that, whatever the history of the race,
it must ultimately develop this sentiment into supreme
authority. Millions would have lived and perished with-
out having once known its illumination; others would
have known it faintly and rarely; it would have perplexed
the holiest by the capriciousness of its appearances and
disappearances; it would have seemed, in certain ages, to
have abandoned the earth, and then it would have blazed
out for a time, here or there in the world, not without a
lurid discolouration of its effulgence by impure theology;
but in the end, it would become the light of the world—
the Kingdom of Heaven in the soul of man.

APRIL 7TH. It is impossible for some minds to divorce
themselves from theological speculation and confine them-
selves to practical religion. If there be a contradiction or
absurdity in their theology, they feel that practice is a
make-believe, and their reverence is necessarily in abeyance.

APRIL 7TH. The theory of the coeternity of matter
with God, and of God being a susceptibility as well
as a power, agrees to the religious sentiment and the
facts of experience better than any other hypothesis.
An unsusceptible being cannot be an object of
reverence, for goodness is essentially conscious and
emotive. The theory agrees better with the existence of
evil, which it imputes to the limitation of divine power by
the nature of matter and by its tendency to disorder. It
excludes the monstrous alternative of an eventless eternity
prior to creation. It recognizes God as Creator—Creator
of order and of durable conscious being, but not of matter. It substitutes a positive for a negative limitation of divine power—for the mere negative limitation involved in the necessarily impossible it substitutes the positive properties of matter. It does not exclude the supposition that God can create and annihilate matter, but it has no use for the supposition. It is an embarrassing excrescence and therefore to be apprehended as being stigmatized by God. The theory supposes it probable that the souls of men are co-eternal with God. It explains that, in creation, God is limited to the use of means; and that he did not make a perfect world and a perfect humanity in an instant; not because he preferred a creation by growth through imperfection, sin and misery: but because the thing is, by its nature, impossible.

107.

April 7th. Philosophy should take its first and final stand on this foundation—without God I am a wretch and an abortion. If I question the existence of God, the result of my labour may be a scientific conviction that I am a wretch and an abortion; in which case I am condemned to a moral paralysis that must deprive me of the happiness involved in virtue. Not to assume therefore the existence of God at the outset, is a practical absurdity. If philosophy would not begin in absurdity it must take its first and final stand upon this assumption. Resolutely loyal to it, in the face of all that may appear contradictory (which should be held to be the mere manifestation of the weakness of our intellect, and the poverty of our experience) we should trust that we shall ultimately fight our way through the nightmare progeny of ignorance, to a certain theology, or into the very presence of God.

108.

April 12th. The prevailing faith respecting prayer is,
that God can sanctify whom he will, and that he for the most part sanctifies only those who pray for sanctity with earnestness. This hypothesis supposes that God has power to annihilate evil and substitute universal holiness, and prefers that evil shall prevail. This monstrous supposition drives those in whom the religious principle is weak upon atheism or indifference. Its maleficent power is neutralized by the theory of unobvious absurdity. Under this theory, which sets us free to suppose, without contradiction, that there are ends which omnipotence cannot realise, the explanation of prayer that first offers itself is that sanctification is a natural process not realizable by omnipotence except as the product of a susceptibility and free will which he has created; and that "deaspiration" (aspiration after God) of which prayer is the husk, is the principal means in the process. When faith adopts this explanation and attempts to act upon it, we find that deaspiration tends to perish when separated from prayer: and that failure summons us, by a sentiment of hopeless impotence, to cry aloud to God for aid; and so signifies to us with authority that the hypothesis of the mere naturalness of sanctification is an error. Thus rebuked we look for another explanation, and find it in the supposition, that sanctification is impossible without divine aid, but that God cannot help unless prayer give him access to the heart.

MAY 3RD. The incompetence of the intellect to explain, by a consistent theology, the theistic postulate of reverence is a reason, not for an arrogant negation of the postulate, but of modest deference to the authority of reverence; which proclaims in the heart what transcends mere intellectual embrace. But, indeed, the intellect is rarely culpable of this inconsequence; for atheism rarely, if ever, obtains in reverential hearts. Where atheism is, there also
is blindness of heart; either from total defect of the principle of reverence, or because the susceptibility of the principle is held in abeyance.

IIO.

May 17th. Mystical theology was practically known to India long before the Christian era. It there proposed, as early as the time of Patanjali, union with God by means of mortification and contemplation, after the manner of such ascetics as St. Francis of Assisi, St. Peter of Alcantara, and St. Theresa; and it achieved the miraculous power that seems to belong to what is termed the prayer of union.

That people of a certain mental constitution can attain to an abnormal state which passes with its subject for union with God, that this state is attainable only by asceticism, that it exempts from susceptibility to causes of pain, and that it imparts extraordinary powers, seem to rest upon evidence commensurate with history. But, although at the first view the facts seem to open a celestial vista to human hope, a closer inspection detects in them a very questionable character. The self-butchery to which the devotee is instigated signifies rather a demoniacal than a Divine inspiration. The infernal ingenuity of St. Rosa of Lima in devising methods of self-torture, and the stigmata of St. Francis of Assisi, which cost him first his sight and then his life—besides the surgery which bolstered the miracle by keeping the victim alive for two years, to exhibit the effects of Divine power and love!—these things do not present to fearless reverence a Divine physiognomy, but the reverse. Then there is nothing congruous with Divine character in the miraculous visions, discourses, revelations, raptures, &c., of such Christian saints as St. Catherine of Sienna, St. Elizabeth of Hungary, and St. Theresa; but, on the contrary, they bear a remarkable likeness to the phenomena of modern mediumship. On
the other hand, it must be allowed that the asceticism of mystical theology coincides in the main with that of genuine religion as to the practice which conduces to sanctification; and that, among the extraordinary powers which it obtains for the ascetic, is the gift of prophecy. But it is only in the main that it coincides, and by this coincidence it imparts the power of causing a deviation from the right line of development of religious minds over which it could not, without the coincidence, obtain the requisite ascendancy. The Christian saints, in whom its most wonderful effects were displayed, do not seem to have improved in morals in proportion as they improved in thaumaturgy. St. Francis of Assisi, rebuking the luxury of the cardinal with whom he was dining in company with other guests, by producing and eating the crust which he had begged by the way, is an example of truculent boastfulness scarcely to be expected in one whose devotion had merited miraculous power. The underhanded measures of St. Theresa by which she eluded the authority of her superiors in procuring the establishment of the monastery of St. Joseph shows that her moral sentiment did not correspond to her devotion; and there is more than one passage in her autobiography which expresses an animus far below the plane of sanctity. For example, referring to her mother, she says—"Her purity was beyond all praise; for although she was very beautiful, no one ever heard she gave any occasion to the least suspicion!"

The phenomena of mysticism seem to be explicable only by one or other of two hypotheses. The first is that there are persons imperceptible to human sense, able to modify human consciousness and actuated by motives adverse to the Divine will, who are bent upon arresting human progress, and who do this by two very different sets of means—1st, by fomenting the bad passions of the irreligious—2nd, by causing the religious to deviate from the right line of sanctification in the name of God; and this they do by
inspiring zealots with false theologies which beguile the devout who are not protected by an enlightened reverence. The second hypothesis is that the phenomena of mysticism are altogether subjective, and that the man who undergoes them is, involuntarily and ignorantly to himself, the agent of these bad functions—a supposition that is strongly supported by the analogy of dreams and ordinary somnambulism.

Whichever of these hypotheses be true, or whether the phenomena be explicable by a third hypothesis, it seems to be manifestly the duty of man to shun the practice of mysticism, and to distrust all rules of sanctification that do not seem calculated to make man a perfect member of earthly society. To be a perfect member of earthly society is the criterion of human perfection—the model in conformity with which our Creator wills that our conduct shall reorganize us: not that earthly society is the be all and the end all relatively to man, but that, in acquiring the perfection, we make the best possible preparation for a future state. This rule excludes, not asceticism, but mystical asceticism. To accomplish the Divine will, we must retire, being sick, into the hospital of judicious asceticism, and not arrogate to be capable of sane activity. When we venture into society, we must do so with precaution; and the more we keep in prayerful solitude, the better for most of us. We must endeavour to weed out creature affections, so that we shall look upon every face with the impartial love with which God regards it; not only that we may love equitably, but that there shall be no love that is not a modification of the love of God, and that there shall be nothing enervating in the soul. We must undo the tendency of external occasions to draw us into automatic or indeliberate action, so that will shall reign in the name of God: a change not to be effected without a revolution of our social relations. We must reduce all desires into the temper to wait upon purpose. We must extirpate selfishness, and
love God supremely; and this cannot be accomplished without interruption of ordinary social intercourse, or without extraordinary self-denial and meditation. In indeliberate action we have no regard to the agent, whether he be, or be not, conformable to the Divine will. To make ourselves deliberate we must make God and the agent the principal objects of attention in all action that admits of our doing so. And can we thus reverse the course of habit without arrest and revolution of the routine of social intercourse?

III.

MAY 25TH. The idea of time is indispensable to the duration of human existence and to the sanity of the human mind. But when we attempt to apprehend time separately from other things, it vanishes in bewildering contradiction. For our idea of it supposes it to consist of the past, the present, and the future; whereas the past and future are nonentities, since the one has ceased to be, and the other does not yet exist, and the present is a point in which the past has ended and the future is to begin; so that time must be said to consist of two nonentities and their conterminus! Strictly speaking, the present is not a part of time in the same sense that a second, or the millionth part of a second, is a part of time. Such parts of time as seconds, or millionths of seconds, are capable, by addition, of composing larger parts of time; but the present, being a mere limit of a time, no addition of presents could make up a time, any more than an addition of points could make up a line, surface, or cube. The idea of the present excludes the idea of a divisible time; for if it be divisible, one part must exist before the other, and the idea of the present coincides with only the part that exists; the non-existent part being as yet future pending the existing part. But if the present be a mere limit, it can only be a limit of the past and the future, which are nonentities! But the
limit of a nonentity is a nonentity; so that time consists of three nonentities! It is the nature of the idea of time, then, to be of indispensable practical utility, but to balk every endeavour to subject it to speculative uses. Could it be more emphatically signified to us that the idea is not designed to serve as a foundation for any speculative structure—especially a theology? What absurdity to attempt to build upon it, when it professes itself to be a speculative void. We are obliged to assume, and depend upon its validity for practical ends; and experience declares that the dependence is well founded. But we are warned that it is of no validity for merely speculative uses, and this experience painfully confirms. For, on the one side, the worshipful heart requires that God is Creator; which presupposes a beginningless time antecedent to the existence of all things save God, and this, on the other side, shocks and mocks reverence with an eternity of Divine being without action. In this dilemma the idea of time converts into a trap for devotion—a theological trap, from which there is no issue but into atheism or indifference, except through the humble recognition that the idea of time and all other ideas correspond to external reality only in so far as they are congruous with religion—that they are delusive in so far as they obstruct it. By the correspondence of ideas to "preter-objects,"—things that exist otherwise than as objects—it is not implied that the preter objects are the immediate objects of consciousness, nor that they resemble the immediate objects of consciousness, but that they are such as to put us in practical harmony with those objects. Reverence commands us to take for granted that God is Creator, and to turn our backs upon all adverse corollaries. If we obey and seek God and sanctity in devotion, the practical criterion of truth will justify itself in the resultant moral, spiritual, and social prosperity—the Divine yes. If we fail to obey, expecting an intellectual emancipation from the dilemma,
religion will perish while we wait, and the practical criterion of untruth will discover itself in a corresponding corruption of our nature—the Divine no. Our disobedience refuses all that there is of authority within us for the sake of consistency with an idea that is in itself contradictory—the idea of time—whereas it is open to us to set down the inconsistency to intellectual defect. An idea that cannot give a consistent account of itself to the reason, and is, nevertheless, to a certain extent practically indispensably, should be an instrument, not a law, to the mind. The mind should adapt the idea to its uses, as an ingenious workman applies a broken tool, using a part, so that the useless part shall not be mischievous as well as useless. This is to recognize practically the right relation of the intellect to the heart, which, when illuminated by the sentiment of God, is the higher intuitive faculty; and it is to contribute, as free will to faith, which consists of two elements, probability, contributed by susceptibility, and resolution, contributed by will. It is not improbable that to elicit from man this extraordinary action of the will, as being necessary to his development into perfect voluntariness—to the emancipation of will from its bondage to susceptibility—is the Divine reason for the intellectual defect which has so long bewildered the race, opposing reason to reverence, theology to worship.

I I 2.


The first of these chapters ascribes to the human spirit a large part of the temptations which are commonly ascribed to the devil, but it exhibits no peculiarity in the temptations distinguishing them from those which are
assumed to proceed from the devil. On the other hand, it ascribes to the human spirit motions towards sanctity, even to the degree of mortification, which are such specious counterfeits of genuine devotion and grace that their spuriousness is undiscernible to those who experience them. To suppose such a constitution in man, is to make his apology for all the evils which proceed from it; it is to imply his irresponsibility in respect of them. To insist that this constitution puts him in peril of eternal torment, is to insist that he is the creature and victim of infernal cunning, not the creature and beneficiary of Divine wisdom. The argument that man wrought this corrupt nature out of an originally perfect one, is to the reverent and unprejudiced heart a transparent absurdity. For man could not by any amount, much less by a single act, of disobedience, create in himself a nature; he could only develop what had been created in him, that lay embryonically beneath a volatile tissue of perfection—so volatile that it could be dissipated by the eating of an apple. If any one object that the perfection could not subsist apart from a principle of corruption, and that God must have excluded human existence or permitted the corruptibility, he does not, so long as he supposes the pain of hell to be a consequence of the corruption, relieve the character of the Creator. Only the malice of a fiend could give existence to a race on such conditions.

But with what harmony and verisimilitude do all the facts stated in the chapters we are considering conform to the benevolence and omnipotence of God in connection with the theory, that sanctity in the creature is unattainable save by slow development and suffering! The mixed character of the human spirit is owing to the difference of the three systems of organs through which the soul is emotively conscious, that of the higher, that of the lower, and that of the appetitive natures. According as the consciousness is more of the higher nature, it is purer; and the
Motions arise in the higher nature, which have no respect to God, for example motions of benevolence giving rise to acts of charity irrespective of God. These are good in themselves, and tend to nourish the particular faculties in which they arise; but they have no direct tendency to develop the higher nature as a whole; on the contrary, they tend to foster its subordination to the lower nature by furnishing aliment to pride and vanity and that finer selfishness which seeks an epicurean delight in virtue. It is only when the sentiments of the higher nature are penetrated by the sentiment of God, or modified by volition having respect to his authority, that they are sanctifying. Only the grosser operations of the lower nature are appreciable to the great bulk of those who experience them: these are appreciable, because they manifest themselves in overt acts, which are stigmatised by the common sense of mankind. It is reserved for the ascetic to discern the subtler operations of this nature; and these appear to become more and more subtle as he advances in sanctity, owing to the fact, that as the higher nature becomes purer, more purged of the lower, it acquires a finer repugnant sensibility with regard to the lower. Besides, the lower nature adopts the pursuit of sanctity and tends to baffle it, and this without purpose on the part of the subject, often undetected by him, and often, for a long time together, in advance of detection. From these causes arise the peculiar phenomena of the ascetic life, which Christian ascetics ascribe to the strife of Satan and the human spirit with grace.

Two prominent facts especially are explained by them; 1st, the appearance of supernaturalness in the sentiments ascribed to grace; 2nd, the spuriousness of sentiments and motives that pass with their subject for piety. The flashes of sanctity which rarely illuminate the indelout soul bear little resemblance to the steady radiance of the sentiment of God that is developed by devotion. The strangeness of this sentiment favours the supposition
that it proceeds from something higher than a principle of nature. The normal disposition is selfish: that which is excited by the sentiment of God is the reverse. It disposes us to all that the heart conceives to be agreeable to God. In contrast with the normal, it seems to be distinct from nature; and, as bending us to conformity with the Divine will, to what supernatural influence is it so obviously referable as to that of God? It involves a peculiar felicity, and it is the peculiarity of a distinct species of virtue; for the highest virtue, irrespective of God, is lifeless compared with that which is involved with the sentiment of God. When certain facts are out of view, it seems suitable to the dignity and goodness of God to move man to virtue by holy love. But a more cogent cause than all these tends to impose upon saintly hearts the conviction that their predominant sentiment is an imperfect intuition of God, that somehow God is substantially in their hearts, and that the sentiment is a vague consciousness of the contact. When the occasional presence of the sentiment has excited a hunger for God in the heart, the sentiment becomes the food of that hunger, and so passes for God himself. The very object of the desire seems to be in its embrace, bringing with it a delectation which, according to its connection and degree is known as unction, sensible sweetness, Divine touch, wound of love, &c. The delight of this sentiment has been the object of voluptuous selfishness and impassioned song. It rises in some to rapture and ecstasy. It comes and goes unexpectedly, according to no ascertained rule, as if to show that it is not dependent upon a necessary nature, but freely communicates and freely withdraws its felicity.

The spuriousness of sentiments that delusively pass with their subject for piety is manifestly owing to a predominant but impure operation of the higher nature with reference to God.
The objections to the hypothesis of the supernatutalness of the sentiment of God are the following:—

1st.—To suppose human nature to be susceptible of the sentiment of God from the immediate action of God upon the heart, is to suppose that God gratuitously withholds a sentiment which is not only sanctifying but itself the chief element of sanctity, and that he suffers man to torture himself and pollute the universe by a sinful nature which a Divine volition could speedily dissipate. It may be rejoined that the sanctifying sentiment is withheld for the sake of some greater good of which its absence is a necessary condition. But this merely shifts, it does not get rid of, the absolute necessity that excludes Divine operation; and the excluding necessity is the obnoxious element against which the objection is urged. Since an absolute excluding necessity must be granted, and since there is considerable evidence that it consists in defect of susceptibility of the religious faculty, it is not unreasonable to commit ourselves to this theory.

2nd.—The capriciousness of the sentiment, except in the few who have approached perfection, is more conformable to the instability of nature than to the dignity of Divine conduct. Nor should we attribute to God the disordering intensity to which the sentiment sometimes rises, nor any degree of it calculated to excite the voluptuous desire of which it has been the object, and of which Divine prescience knew it would become the object—a desire that has not refrained from delving into sensuality for metaphorical expression, as when the Author of the "Imitation of Christ" yearns "to taste, with the interior mouth of the heart, how sweet it is to love and to be dissolved and to bathe in love."

3rd.—There is no more familiar fact in the devout life than to pray in vain for the sentiment until prayer is no longer possible, until routine necessarily supersedes volition. Repeated failure destroys the power of voluntary
endeavour, leaving in its stead a mere automatic nisus which passes with people of feeble reflection for volition. Agreeably to this law when people have prayed in vain for a certain time, it is impossible for them to pray voluntarily for what their prayers have failed to obtain. They are reduced to pray automatically with a baffled and discouraged consciousness that they are not in earnest. Religion has invented many apologies for the fact, but none of them reconcilable with our sentiment of Divine dignity and goodness.

Recognize the naturalness of sanctity and sanctification, and all perplexity vanishes without loss of an atom of the substance of religion. According to this theory, the end of sanctification is to develop the principle of the sentiment of God until its substance penetrate the substances of all other principles of emotion in its subject, and become to them a unifying medium, so that there shall be no emotive consciousness apart from a feeling that distinctly or indistinctly has respect to God. The method of sanctification contemplates the application of practice involving exercise and desuetude—exercise of the higher nature, and pre-eminently of the principle of the sentiment of God, and desuetude as regards the lower nature. The practice applies undertwo forms, that of devotion, or barevolition, in obedience to the Divine imperative, involving recusant volition causative of desuetude, and that of deaspiration, of which prayer is the husk, and which I have elsewhere defined to be the crescatory effort of the love of God to convert the whole heart into its substance. I have named, as the end of sanctification, its paramount known end; but it is probable that this is but instrumental to still higher ends, amongst which the hope of the saintly counts the vision of God. Every sense needs experience to develop it, and the process of sanctification may be the process of experience requisite for the development of the sense of God; not indeed in an individual nor in a generation, but through
many generations of ascetic practice. According to this hope, man is the embryo of a nature intuitive of God, and the end of ascetism, or sanctification, is to perfect the embryonic process. It helps forward the process in proportion as it gives frequency, continuity, and practical force to the sentiment of God, which is to the intuition of God what the sensation of a sense that is not yet intuitive is to an intuition of that sense, or what an objectless emotion is to a sentiment. The nature of man is such, that there is an unobvious absurdity in supposing that God could immediately excite this sentiment, although we have evidence that he sometimes acts immediately upon the soul; and indeed it is not improbable that the sentiment is a necessary condition of this immediate action. But that God otherwise assists sanctification in ways beyond human conjecture, is highly probable, although the hypothesis gives no ground for prayer, since it is inconsistent with Divine benevolence to suppose that God would withhold so great a good until poor ignorant man should discover that he has vital need of the good. What should we think of the mother who should withhold medicine from her infant, until the latter should discern its need of the medicine, and reverently supplicate her for it. The infant’s incapability of its own distress represents the blindness of heart of the bulk of mankind in respect of their need of sanctification.

The sentiment of God tends to exalt us out of selfishness, to dispose us to a great love for all his conscious creatures, and, so, to develop the other principles of the higher nature and proportionately enfeeble those of the lower nature; but it does not render us independent of experience for acquiring perfect moral intuition; in proof of which we have striking instances of moral blindness in David, the poet of sanctity, and in other saints.

Devotion is will resolute in faith and obedience whether supported or unsupported by inclination or opinion. It
operates in sensible sweetness when supported by the sentiment of God: and when unsupported by this sentiment drags impious selfishness at its heels with unemotive fidelity, which is the well-known phenomenon of dry devotion. What Faber distinguishes as "the principle of Grace" in contrast to what he terms "the state of Grace," is this dry devotion distinguished from that which is supported by the sentiment of God. Deliberate will is the great agent of sanctification, and one of the subordinate ends of sanctification is obviously the supremacy of deliberate will over the whole nature, but especially over desire and automatism, to which the will has been hitherto subservient. The agency of will in the spiritual life is known to the ascetic under the various forms of devotion, recollection in God, the spirit of captivity, and what Faber terms, "the repose of the soul in its present grace and state."

Amongst the obvious encumbrances of the theory of religion that are annihilated by the theory of the naturalness of sanctity and sanctification, is the distinction of grace into habitual and sanctifying, which supposes one kind of grace more inert than another, and capable of receiving momentum from the latter. It disembarrasses faith of all the inverisimilar distinctions respecting grace exposed by Pascal.

113.

July 18th. To be, and received as a little child, is to be wholly subject to authority. To be subject to authority is to be subject to what our reverence apprehends as authority. To endeavour to adopt into our faith, and to conform to the doctrines and commands of one whom we do not apprehend as authority, is not to be subject to authority. The subordination of all the other mental organs to that of reverence—the organ of the apprehension of authority—is to be as a little child. To receive as a
little child, is to accept without question whatever reverence proposes to faith. Reverence cannot apprehend authority apart from what it esteems to be goodness. But it is liable to mistake evil for goodness, and the reverse. Therefore, however other circumstances may recommend a being as authority to reverence, if the reverence be obliged to impute what it esteems to be evil to the nature of the being, it either cannot apprehend him as authority at all, or only in a degree proportioned to the ratio of good to evil in his nature.

If a being be newly proposed as authority to reverence—as when a religion is newly taught—and if the nature of the being be represented as containing anything which the reverence apprehends as evil, it is impossible for the reverence to apprehend the being as authority. In this case the failure of the religion to root itself in the faith of the person, is not because he is not of a childlike nature: on the contrary, it is his sentiment of authority that rejects the religion; and, in conforming to this sentiment, he is as a little child. In such a case reverence suffers no perplexity; but great is its perplexity when moral development discovers to it that what it held to be consonant to goodness in the nature and history of a being whom it has apprehended as authority, is evil; for the authority tends to consecrate the evil in the eye of reverence, and so to put us in doubt. The possibility of being as a little child relatively to that being, is excluded. We are, in such a case, like the young person whose filial piety has been stunned by evidence of the wickedness of a parent. We are condemned to become judges. We have lost, however, not the nature but the relation of the child. If the judicial enquiry upon which we are forced result in convincing us that what we took to be evil is not so, we again become as little children relatively to the being whose authority we have been forced to question; or we are accessible to that relation with another being whose nature presents nothing obnoxious to reverence.
He who apprehends no human authority is, nevertheless, as a little child, if he be wholly subject to what he apprehends as authority. It is true that the majority of those whose hearts recognize no human authority are altogether without the sentiment of authority, and are as ignorant of God as they are destitute of respect for man; and hence the indiscriminate judgment that all who ignore human authority are godless, and the opposite of the little child. But a man may be as a little child towards God, and so remote from apprehending any man as authority, that all men are objects of his charity.

It is impossible that all men should be as little children relatively to human authority, for those among them who are properly regarded as authorities cannot be as little children relatively to any human authority. They cannot apprehend as authorities those whom it is their function and duty to teach, guide, and govern. They can be little children only relatively to the authority of God. However humble a man may be, he cannot be the peer of the wisest without knowing it; much less can he excel all men in wisdom without knowing his superiority. His humility consists in the fact that he has not a proud or vain sentiment of the equality or superiority. But the knowledge, such as it is, excludes the possibility of his being a little child relatively to any man. However humility may dispose him to suppress himself in his relations with them—to magnify what they say and do, and to make little of what proceeds from himself—he cannot exclude from his consciousness the knowledge of his equality, or superiority, in respect of them—the knowledge that they have nothing new to teach him, and that they cannot contribute anything in aid of his sanctification—which God has now committed exclusively to his own will and the Divine precepts involved in his own wisdom. It may be said that as a physician may be capable of treating others without being capable of treating himself, so a ruler may be capable of
ruling others without being capable of ruling himself, and that it is possible for him in such a case to be as a little child towards some one by whom he elects to be ruled: that it becomes the Pope, for example, to apprehend his chaplain as authority. It is impossible that he, who apprehends himself as vicar of God, should apprehend himself as a little child relatively to a man subject to his authority.

An unlimited precept to be as a little child relatively to human authority would exclude a man from transferring his allegiance from a false to a right authority, and would immure him for ever in an error protected by an individual or corporation that had been once sacred to him. For, in order to transfer his allegiance, he must judge between the person or corporation that he has apprehended as authority, and the person or corporation that demands the transfer. But in this act of judgment he ceases to be as a little child; confiding in the rectitude of his own judgment, he decides, without authority, between the conflicting claimants upon his reverence. There may be cases, indeed, in which one who demands the transfer of our reverence is of such transcendant influence, that he subjects us to his authority, and extinguishes in us the sentiment of the authority which he supersedes without our co-operation; and in such cases we do not cease for a moment to be as little children. So Jesus seems to have acted upon the reverence of his disciples; but it is highly probable that Jesus was a solitary exception to the rule. Experience shows that there is no such power in the gospel. Who, by the mere reading of the gospel, has been unresistingly transferred from a religion deeply grounded in his reverence to Christianity? The mere reading of the gospel might draw into Christianity, without a moment of resistive judgment, a man religiously disposed but without any prior religious conviction, and doubtless has often done so; but this is not a transfer from authority to authority.
September 27th. Anger knows no master. It necessarily ignores obedience—ignores the authority and power of God. It is its own reason and authority. Hence, when experience has unfolded to us the universality of the obedience we owe to God, and grace has quickened the knowledge with reverence and its involved humility so that the heart is all alive with holiness, we shrink from anger—shrink from it by instinctive recoil, even before we have divined the essentialness of its enmity to God, and while we are yet accessible to the opinion that it may not be altogether incongruous with holiness.

Reverence and anger exclude each other. Their opposition—the fact that reverence, when it cannot exclude anger, is itself necessarily driven from the heart—is disguised by the fact that religious zeal in those whom religion has not subdued to humility is prone to anger; and, when it bolts from reverence, humility, and obedience, to transact the business of heaven in the spirit of hell, it deems itself holy on account of the work. When it returns into the spirit of obedience, it is ignorant that it has been absent.

Anger, like all the sentiments of the lower nature, is indispensable to man until experience unfolds God and duty to the eye of reverence; and then it is discovered to be a devil which God has obliged to minister in its infernal way to the convenience of man. When this discovery is made—when it is efficiently manifest that the sentiment of duty is to supersede anger in respect of the useful part of the function of anger—then it behoves us to do all in our power to exorcise this devil, and to demolish the fortress of habit which it has constructed in the heart, through whose secret ways it re-enters after every defeat until we are fundamentally reconstructed by devotion and grace. So useful is anger, and so feeble at first the spirit by which it is to be superseded, that there are but few spiritual people
in positions of authority who have not experienced a season of doubt as to whether forbearance from anger might not imperil the interests of God. They have feared that, if anger did not menace from behind the throne of authority, fear would cease to quicken respect, and keep obedience diligent—that authority itself would grow indolent, and cease to exact industry of obedience. They need experience to give them confidence in Divine authority wielded by priesthood—that he who professes to be the mere vicar of Divine authority can, by fidelity to his office and without anger, prevail more over both respect and fear than he who apprehends himself as authority and makes anger the captain of his power.

115.

September 29th. The faculty of reverence needs grace to give it apprehension of God, because God, not being an object of sense, does not naturally bear on reverence, like its other remote objects. It is easy to reverence, to apprehend the dignity of men in sentiments of respect, because men are tangible and visible, and, independently of the respect, oblige assurance of their reality. It is easy to apprehend the dignity of men whom we have never perceived, because the like have been perceived, and the certitude involved in perception excludes doubt of the existence of the species. It is even easy to apprehend God in a sentiment of adoration so long as, like children, we apprehend him as an omnipotent man, or as consisting of qualities to the like of which perception has assigned real existence; but, when we are constrained to divest him of all intelligible qualities save those of existence and power—to apprehend him as unconditioned, incomprehensible—the object dissolves before the eye of reverence and leaves it gazing on a blank. Do we not need Divine help, the action of grace, to keep us adoringly conscious of our God?
It is true that respectful people are at certain times less susceptible to the influence of human dignity, and that they are even subject to morbid moods which exclude respect; but, except in these rare moods, they are never in presence of human dignity without undergoing some degree of respect. But it is quite otherwise with those who sometimes experience the power of the sentiment of God. The normal state of the great bulk of the latter is destitute of the sentiment of the majesty, holiness, and presence of God. In vain they fix their attention upon intellectual signs of the Divine nature: their hearts gaze without apprehension or emotion. In vain they contemplate the evidences of the goodness and power of God in nature, expecting, from the reality of the things testifying, a sentiment of the reality of the Creator. This inapprehensiveness of the faculty of reverence is the paramount evil of the spiritual life. But sometimes unexpectedly, more frequently in answer to prayer, they are possessed by an adoring sentiment of God which St. Paul describes under the name of faith, as "the evidence of things unseen, the substance of things hoped for." The sentiment involves faith: it carries with it a belief in the reality of its object. We feel that the belief and the adoration are inseparable, and necessarily grow and wane together; whereas the growth, waning, or absence of the love of a perceptible object neither augments nor diminishes the conviction of its reality. The faith seems to depend upon the adoration, so that one might say of it, "I believe because I adore;" whereas, in respect of a perceptible object, it could not be said, "I believe in its existence because I love it." Hence the sentiment is well described by St. Paul as "evidence"—evidence of the existence of its external object. The peace and holiness involved in the sentiment are the substance of the perfection, the heaven that is the object of human hope—heaven being a nature, not a place. Our efforts to excite the sentiment by natural means are fruitless: its appear-
ances are strikingly independent of our will, and scarce ever correspond to that kind of expectation which arises from observation of the natural connection of events. This, together with the consciousness that it does not come from abroad like sentiments excited by natural objects, and that it has relation to the highest of supernatural objects, begets belief that is not a natural fact, but either a Divine presence, or the creature of an immediate action of God upon the soul—such as is denoted by the name, grace. And this consciousness of the nature of the sentiment agrees to what, under the circumstances, we should expect from Divine goodness. If the imperceptibleness of God exclude his being a natural object of reverence, it is reasonable to expect from his goodness and power that he should make himself its object in a supernatural way; since the perfection and happiness of man depends upon his being always adoringly conscious of his God.

The argument makes also for an incarnation.

It is liable, however, to grave objections. 1st.—The majority of the saints of the Christian church, inherited their disposition to sanctity from one or both of their parents, which indicates the dependence of sanctity upon organization. They manifested the disposition at so early an age—in infancy or early childhood—as constrains us to admit that it is congenital. 2nd.—Many of them manifested it in playful forms, as the young of several species show dispositions which determine the serious business of their mature life; and it is not to be supposed that grace is given to excite sport. 3rd.—There is no objection à priori to the supposition, that an emotive sense, like that of reverence, should be capable of adopting an idea of a thing primarily given as merely probable or possible, and of generating faith in the existence of a corresponding reality. In support of this, it might be alleged that it is the nature of certain emotions to involve faith in the reality of their objects. It is proverbial that we too easily believe what
we desire to believe. The wish is father to the thought. Fear tends to raise opinion into certitude. So the desire of an infinite object of reverence might carry with it faith in the existence of a corresponding reality, and an explanation which supposes natural operation is preferable to one which invokes the supernatural. 4th.—The fact that the religious sense is, in its ordinary state, incapable of responding to the action of the intellectual signs of the Divine nature by a sentiment of adoration involving faith, and the fact that the reverse takes place in religious moods arising from extraordinary enhancements of religious sensibility, demand no recourse for their explanation to supernatural power. All the organs of emotion are subject to extraordinary excitements manifested by extraordinary apprehensiveness and desire; so that the religious mood cannot be held to involve anything that separates it from the analogy of other moods, which are all recognized as natural. Moods take a life-long hold upon individuals who are organically predisposed to them, and are situated in a way favorable to their development and conservation; and, in like manner, and according to nature, the religious mood fastens upon individuals or is attained and domesticated by the practice of the art toward sanctification. 5th.—The capriciousness of the religious mood in the devout is inconsistent with the supposition, that it derives from grace; for this is to suppose that God is a present cause of the transgressions into which they necessarily fall from lack of the religious sentiment as withholding from them that sentiment, which, to the utmost of their voluntary power, they are bent upon acquiring; and that he tantalizes them with the consciousness of the virtue that would be possible to them if the sentiment which depends upon his will were at the disposal of their own wills.

The first objection goes only to establish that holiness depends in some degree upon cerebral organization, which the theory of grace acknowledges. The reply to the second
objection is, that the playfulness is a mere natural operation of the organ on which holiness in part depends. It may be allowed to the third objection, that we know no reason, à priori, why an emotive sense should not be able to apprehend, with faith involving love, an object primarily given as merely probable or possible. It assents to the analogy demanded to the fourth objection, but it replies to both objections, that, of the two hypotheses, of which one supposes that holiness depends upon nature solely, and the other that it depends upon nature and grace—the former is abhorrent and the latter consonant to the perfect nature of man; whereas to a mind without reverence the former seems to agree better to simplicity. It has been shown that, according to the practical criterion of truth, the atheistic hypothesis is a practical absurdity. As regards the preference which it gives to the hypothesis of the sufficiency of nature to holiness, it does violence to an authority which all philosophy save Pyrrhonism respects. This authority requires that all our fundamental ideas contain something that must be a part of every phase of knowledge, being the same in the perfect as it is in the most imperfect state of knowledge and in every intermediate state: in a word, that all fundamental ideas contain something true. This fundamental truth is, in judicious minds, the object of a kind of rational respect, through which it influences them to shape their opinions, to take counsel of it with child-like simplicity, and to trust in it, not as an infallible teacher, but as the best they have. Respect for this authority causes us to take for granted the existence of Cosmos when experience convinces us that it is only mediately known. According to this authority, we should respect every element of a fundamental idea or sentiment which experience does not force us to recognize as contradictory or violent. We violate this authority in treating as illusory that element of the sentiment of God which professes that the sentiment is presently
from God; and we do this upon the wretched pretext that it is more simple to suppose that the Creator has not than that he has providential intercourse with the universe—that atheism is more simple than faith. It is more consonant to the dignity of God to suppose him to be in providential intercourse with the universe, than to suppose the contrary; since the contrary supposes an eternally inactive omnipotence. But the theory of grace is a theory of providential action; and the species does not seem to be less credible than the genus. The higher nature in man aspires to the intercourse with God which grace supposes; and holiness, when it visits the heart, proclaims itself the child of grace. The contemplatives of all ages and religions have held the sentiment of God to be either an immediate effect of Divine action or God himself present in the soul. The deist, therefore, is without consistent grounds for the rejection of the theory of grace. As for the atheist, he is a blind man who thinks that vision is a mere embarrassment to reason and research. To the fifth objection it might be answered, that our ignorance of the reasons of God for administering grace with apparent irregularity, is no ground for the belief that it is capriciously administered. But we are not out of view of what appears to be good reasons for withholding the religious sentiment when the subjective conditions of its appearance are not wanting; and we are not without reason to suppose that grace is sometimes excluded by defect of subjective conditions. Experiment has declared against the possibility of spiritual progress, without faith in grace. The experiment was deliberately, reverently, and scrupulously undertaken and conducted, was twice made, and on each occasion was extended over a period of several months—on the second, over more than eighteen months. It was undertaken on the ground, that holiness consists of sentiments of the higher nature and the presumption that these sentiments are susceptible of being educated into predominance.
by attention to things 1st, of a nature to excite them and become their objects, 2nd, by a corresponding practice or conduct, excluding attention to the objects of the lower nature and undue attention to those of the appetitive nature together with the corrupting practice that corresponds to the pre-occupation of the mind by selfishness and sensuality. The presumption was plausible. Why should the will be able to develop, to the highest degree, by natural means, affections and sentiments of the lower and appetitive natures and be impotent, or almost impotent, to affect, by natural means, the higher nature? How was it to be supposed that God had departed from the rule of analogy to empower the will for the accomplishment of any degree of corruption, and deprive it of the power of sanctification? The writer, at least, had not the spiritual sagacity to divine the reason without the aid of experiment. He, therefore, besought God to leave him to himself in the pursuit of sanctity. For a time he seemed to go forward satisfactorily, owing to the momentum derived from the prior operation of grace. At last, there was no more forward motion beyond a certain line; but much that was lateral and backward-and-forward on the worse side of the line. The natural reason of the failure was that, in proportion as his mind became accustomed to the idea that he was to derive no present help from God, God became a nullity to his practical consciousness. The idea of a God not presently needful and co-operative, is inoperative in respect of practical consciousness, however it may awaken powerless aspirations in the speculative part of the heart—in the part that glistens with barren good wishes and pavement intentions, as rotten fish in the dark with phosphoric lustre. The supernatural reason of all such failures is, that God will have man in union with himself, and has constituted him accordingly. Man is so constituted that the Divine energy is necessary to all but certain rudimental and fragmentary operations of the higher nature. Without grace we are
imperfect. In our need of grace consists the possibility of union with God. Grace and its immediate effect, sanctity, or the adoring sentiment of God, constitute the bond that unites us to our Creator. It makes us organs of a strong affection to Divine ends. It enables the human will to be a free agent of God's purposes. This practical union with God is a higher destiny than any that is conceivable. We would be as far below it, as brutes are below men, in any possible perfection out of union with God. To this end, Divine wisdom departed from the rule of analogy in making the function of the higher nature dependent, in part, upon grace. Impossibility of progress without faith in grace witnesses powerfully for the reality of grace.

116.

October 24th. In judging what is our duty, we should have respect to cheerfulness. Our pursuits should be of a nature to give light and air to the heart in the utmost degree compatible with what is necessary to the extirpation of the lower nature.

There are men who are unsusceptible of any pleasure but what is evil. These have need to keep themselves imprisoned in a reserve that excludes all pleasure, and frowns upon it. When under the influence of grace they are moved to act accordingly; but ignorant of, or overlooking the diversity of human dispositions, they have mistaken themselves for types of the race, and taught that all men should do likewise. As regards the great bulk of the devout, cheerfulness is a necessary condition of susceptibility to grace and of vigour of devotion. Besides, sanctity is cheerful, and God is gentle; whence it follows that cheerfulness is expedient to sanctity, and that God wills its application, except by those to whom every degree of pleasure is hurtful. For the grand rule of sanctification is to act as if you were holy; and it is our duty to presume
that the Divine gentleness commends gentleness to self in the pursuit of sanctity.

The natural language of holiness is of two kinds, positive and negative. The natural language which flows from the sentiment of God and love for the neighbour, is an example of the positive kind. It vibrates in the voice, and glows in the face. To counterfeit this is hypocrisy. The natural language which expresses the exclusion of the operations of the lower nature, and which chiefly expresses deliberateness, reserve, and circumspection, is an example of the negative kind. It is our duty to restrict ourselves to this if grace do not manifest itself in the other; for this is the alternative of giving loose to evil. We do not falsely dissemble in imposing a negative character upon deportment and voice when we are angry, if we do it with the view of denying anger. In refusing expression to a bad sympathy and immuring it behind reserve of manner, we do not profess to be better than we are, but simply refrain from evil.

October 25th. Miracle cannot be supposed to be designed by God as evidence to those whom it does not convince, for it does not consist with omnipotence to apply inadequate means. It may be objected that the evidence of miracles is adequate as regards susceptibility, but that it is freely nullified by the will; which amounts to this, that the recusant are believing rebels, and so belong to the class in respect of which the miracles are evidence; not to the class in respect of which they are not evidence: and this annihilates the objection. Reverent men unconvinced by miracles are not wanting; and it cannot be held of these that they voluntarily nullify the evidence of miracles.

October 30th. In man, as he is, introspection and will are
mere rudiments of faculties—sketches of a Divine intention to be realised in a higher state. The former is scarcely used by the bulk of mankind, and the latter never. The transaction of the common business of life as a conscious servant of God requires the highest possible exercise of reflection and will, and of course tends to develop both. It tends to make introspection the mentor of spontaneity through all the business of the day, and to keep the will alive in continued attention and frequent self-denial. Moreover, it reduces automatism from the nature of a master to that of a servant—a servant continually supervised and corrected by its master, the will. The highest faculties of man tend, under the operation, to rule his life; reverence, in the emotive sphere, reflection in the intellectual, and will in the practical—the reign of will being vicariously the reign of God. Religion, therefore, is a means of development, not only as regards the supernatural relations of man, but also as regards his natural faculties. It is obvious that occasions of pain are excluded in proportion as reflection, reverence, and will are developed; and in this we cannot but see that the cardinal end of duty and obedience is not that God should have devout and adoring slaves, but that man shall be perfect, powerful, and happy.

119.

November 1st. A French scoffer replied to one who asked him if he supposed God could forgive him, “Pardi! c’est son metier.” The blasphemy has its apology curiously contained in it.

We seem to be under necessity to suppose that the omniscience and goodness of God exclude him from the exercise of choice or freedom in the government of the universe; that what is best, under the circumstances, or most congenial to holiness, is a law that he will not violate; that he is, therefore, the mere agent, although the free one,
of the law of optimism, and that the law is the equivalent of fate. This idea, notwithstanding the potential freedom which it recognizes in God, reduces him, in human esteem, to the level of a necessary, though intelligent and amiable force, whose function it is to give effect to fate—to work the universe in subordination to fate. This being the case, God is no longer the supreme concern of men, but the law or rule to which God is self-subordinated; and, as a law cannot be an object of reverence, reverence is no longer concerned about the eternal interest of man. * * * *

November 15th. It is the duty of the wealthy to expend a part of their income on æsthetic culture. One part should be consecrated to God for the maintenance and conueniency of the family or person, a second for the expense of the state, a third for the maintenance and propagation of religion, a fourth for addition to capital, a fifth for the relief of poverty, and a sixth for æsthetic culture. A man must maintain himself, and, in all but the poorest communities, should provide himself with those conueniencies which border upon necessaries before he contributes to the expense of the state; for, if men were obliged to do otherwise, either the state would perish with its members, or it would be excluded from development out of the rudest condition. This, therefore, is the first duty with regard to the disposition of income. Next to it, in the order of importance and preference, is the obligation to contribute to the maintenance of the state. Without civil government, society, religion, and development are impossible. It is preferable to the duty to contribute to the maintenance of religion; for civil government is possible without religion, but religion is not possible without civil government; and, as civil society includes in it the possibility of becoming a religious society, it is better that a civil society without
religion exist than that there should not exist even an embryo of a religious society. Of all obligations in respect of the disposition of income the obligation to contribute to the maintenance of religion excels in dignity, perfect godliness being the end of human existence. The obligation to increase capital has for its end the exclusion of poverty, and therefore takes precedence of the relief of poverty; and, à fortiori, of the obligation to contribute to aesthetic culture. Capital includes the wages-fund of the society, and whatever adds to the one adds directly or indirectly to the other. If capital do not increase in the ratio of the increase of population, the wages-fund diminishes, the condition of the labouring class deteriorates, and the number of those who depend on alms is augmented. It is the duty of those who can, therefore, to increase their capital, at least, in the ratio of the increase of population. But, forasmuch as we ought to aim at an amelioration of that condition, and as there are many who fail to apply income for the increase of capital, so that the effect of prodigality is hardly compensated by that of parsimony and avarice, it is the duty of those who have respect to the will of God to augment the wages-fund in a greater degree than would be necessary if all men were intelligent agents of duty. The sixth obligation, that of contributing to aesthetic culture, is the last and least.

Selfishness is so interested in the disposition of income according to the first, fourth, and sixth duties that it excludes the apprehension of them as matters of duty. As the power of the state seems to leave the individual no option with regard to his contribution to taxation, there are but few who apprehend themselves as under obligation to contribute to the maintenance of the state, and still fewer who regard God as the source of the obligation—as if duty could have direct respect to any being save God. The contributions to religion and to poverty, have alone appeared to the bulk of mankind to be matters of duty. A right
apprehension of duty supposes that it ought to be the sole motive of every action.

November 23rd. And when he was demanded of the Pharisees when the kingdom of God should come, he answered them and said, "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation: Neither shall they say, Lo here! or lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you." St. Luke xvii., 20.

"If a man love me, he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." St. John xiv., 23.

"And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men love darkness rather than the light, because their deeds are evil." St. John iii., 19.

From these, and similar passages of Scripture it might be inferred that heaven and hell are states, not places—that heaven is the universe of holy consciousnesses, and hell the universe of godless consciousnesses. Thus would I fain interpret the theology of Christ so as to exclude the doctrine of purposed eternal torment. I would fain discover that Christ's menaces of future punishment signify that, if man does not use all his power to co-operate with grace for salvation, he must remain immersed in moral evil and pain, not only during this life, but during posthumous æons of frightful length. I would fain believe that Christ applied against man erroneous human beliefs in the spirit in which he seems to reproach him for seeing the mote in his brother's eye, and not the beam in his own—as if this were a perverse volition, and not a necessity of nature; or in the spirit in which he reproached the Scribes and Pharisees for whom he offered to his Father on the cross the apology of ignorance—applying them in order to elicit from man devout and saving conduct.
December 14th. According to St. Paul, sin supposes knowledge of Divine law. He declares that between Adam and Moses there was no sin (except the imputed sin of Adam), because the Divine law revealed through Moses was unknown during that interval. Nevertheless, he declares that the Gentiles, though ignorant of the Mosaic law, were guilty because they violated the law of conscience. But the Jews had the law of conscience as well as the Gentiles, so that there must have been sin amongst Jews as well as Gentiles, between Adam and Moses. Unless it be held that the Jews are destitute of the light of conscience, they must have experienced conviction of sin between Adam and Moses, as well as the Gentiles. Therefore, the amazing hypothesis that the Mosaic law was given not to be fulfilled, as being impossible of fulfilment (which implicates the directness, if not the veracity, of God), but to produce conviction of sin, is baseless.

It is not unworthy of attention that the contradiction is dissipated by the hypothesis that the Jews are destitute of the moral sense. Nor does such a supposition necessarily imply that they are less capable of sanctity; for a supreme love of God does not depend upon a moral sense, and he who experiences a supreme love of God, and learns from authority what is dear to God, may attain to perfection as well as the man who, loving God equally, has had the advantage of discerning, by moral intuition, what the other was obliged to acquire from abroad. When both are built up into perfection, the difference of the scaffolding is of no account. By the aid of this hypothesis, then, St. Paul might be understood to mean that the Jews, being without law, were without sin (except the imputed sin of Adam) between Adam and Moses; that the Gentiles were, from the beginning, sinners as having had the law of conscience; and that the Jews became sinners after they received the Mosaic law.
April 30th. "Strive to enter in at the strait gate: for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, and shall not be able." St. Luke xiii., v. 24.

Christ recognises in this that many are impotent to sanctify themselves by obedience; and either that God does not abet all who strive, or that they are unsusceptible of grace.

May 11th. S— and T— are brothers, the former in his 15th, the latter in his 12th year. S— excels his brother in intellect. His sister N— expressed, in his presence, a fear that he had exhibited to his brother a boastful consciousness of superiority. His sentiment of the ignobleness of such conduct caused him to apprehend his sister's opinion as an outrage. But a fact was subsequently recalled to him which showed him, to his astonishment, that his sister's suspicion was correct. A young friend had asked S—, in his presence, how far he was advanced in Algebra, and T— seized the opportunity to publish his own superiority by saying to his brother, "But I am farther than you."

This incident is a proof that the organs of moral apprehension do not, as a general rule, take cognizance of the motives and acts of the subject before they have taken cognizance of like motives in others, and like acts performed by others, or before the subject has been objectively presented to himself by censure or admonition as the actual or possible subject of such motives, or as the possible agent of such acts. A vague consciousness of honourable opinion to be excited by publishing an instance of his superiority, was developed on the occasion in the vanity of T—. This constituted an attraction to the act, with which
he automatically complied—as a hungry dog snatches at a bone—without moral or other cognizance of the actuating motive, or of the nature of the act; whereas his keen sense of the noble would instantly discern the baseness if another were to act in like manner in his presence, and did discern the baseness of that kind of conduct when his sister's suspicion presented him to himself as guilty of it. It is now not improbable that the discovery of his baseness has modified his organization, so that on another like occasion it will tend to shy, instead of precipitating him upon, the ignoble.

125.

May 14th. S— abhors the doctrine that the end sanctifies the means, and, nevertheless, was ignorantly moved to plead for a corresponding practice; she urged that the acknowledgment to the children, that when they err in forgetfulness they err necessarily and irresponsibly, tended to relax their solicitude to improve, and that we should therefore endeavour to undo this idea in their minds, and deal with them as if forgetfulness did not exclude responsibility. When it was shown to her that she proposed to employ untruth in the work of God—to drive out Satan by Satan—she was surprised, and she recoiled.

126.

October 7th. It is possible that human development, and especially development into perfect sanctity, may depend upon erroneous beliefs respecting God and the relation between God and man—that the mental constitution may be such that it cannot attain to theological truth and practical harmony with God, except through a series of erroneous hypotheses, of which each successive one includes more truth, or is more apt than its predecessor. It
may be that when a portion of mankind is prepared to pass from one of these theses to another, the bulk of those so prepared are incapable of acquiring power to make the transition without human aid; that of those who are capable only one is able in advance of the others, and that the constitution of this one's mind affords opportunity for a peculiar action of Divine power, whereby the change may be consummated in himself, and be peculiarly adapted to bring it about in others. In such a case it would be conformable to Divine goodness to apply all the resources of grace in aid of the person who could thus expedite the development and sanctification of the race, inspiring and strengthening him with the assurance that he is divinely commissioned and, if need be, endowing him with miraculous power. This hypothesis is more than consistent—it is probable. It is probable by reason of analogy; for in other respects we ripen into knowledge through delusion. For example, we attain to faith in an external universe through the operations of a delusion which represents modes of consciousness as things external to and independent of consciousness. It is probable as accounting for what is repugnant and agreeable to moral sentiment in the systems of Christ and Moses. It is probable, as coinciding with the avowed modification of the Mosaic by the Christian system; as in the substitution of charity for the spirit of retaliation.

October 10th. The power of practice to make habit is in proportion to the congenital tendency of the agent's organization to develop into the kind of organ on which the habit depends, and this is generally indicated by the degree of satisfaction which the practice occasions. It would be invariably indicated by this sign and measure, but that exercises which would be agreeable, if it were not
for a stronger attraction, lose their relish, when they are apprehended as withholding us from pleasanter pursuits: as happens with talented youths whom study, that would be otherwise agreeable, detains from the play-ground. It is probable that the embryonic capacity of certain organs is too small to admit of their development into organs of habit, while others are so responsive to exercise that they become organs of habit before repetition deserves the name of practice.

The slowness of the organs of the moral and religious sentiments to develop into organs of habitual consciousness is the bane of the devout. Indeed nature seems to confess that, in respect of sanctity, she is powerless to beget habit: leaving us to infer that grace alone can confer sanctity.

128.

October 12th. "And the other is like unto it—Love thy neighbour as thyself."

Like commandments must be commandments to the same effect. The forms of the commandments may differ as presenting different aspects of the thing commanded; but they cannot be like in any other sense than as commanding the same thing. All commandments are like in so far as they are commandments: therefore, Christ must have meant a differentiating likeness over and above the general one.

129.

October 16th. On the morning of the 14th the writer, while in prayer, was seized by a feeling of abjection amounting to physical pain.

It represented him to himself as being sunk in a baseness from which the purity of God ought to exclude grace. Not that this thought possessed him at the time, but that
it seems to describe in the best way the opposition of the nature which he apprehended in himself to the holiness of God.

If the writer believed in the freedom and the responsibility of the sinner, the feeling would doubtless have been compunction—conviction of sin; but it did not alter his sentiment of the necessity of sin, and was, therefore, a mere feeling of his baseness as a sinner.

If he had reasoned, he might easily have modified the feeling by the belief that the greater the necessary baseness the more urgent its claim upon Divine charity. But he did not reason; he was too intent upon maintaining the purgatory in his heart to allay its salutary fire by any means whatever.

He had prayed for an austere humility that would expel all levity from his heart, all buoyant complacency of egotism, worldliness, and creature affection, and hold him to the work of sanctification in the spirit in which men work when they know that their lives depend upon their labour. He supposed that such a humility would be analogous to fear; and here, in fact, was what he prayed for. The feeling was not fear, but it was analogous to fear.

His faith in Divine goodness excluded fear of punishment. The most striking incident of the feeling was that it represented all his prior devotion as specious, and all the emotive states which had passed with him for effects of grace as mere counterfeits of piety. He did not dispute this deliverance. Remembering that long continued kneeling would be hurtful to him, he thought of rising in order to continue his prayer and meditation, as is usual with him, seated; but he was apprized that the feeling would desert him if he left the posture of abjection in deference to mere health. When at length he arose and seated himself, the feeling gradually evaporated, leaving behind it a grave, but painless, mood. The egotism of the
writer was tempted more than usual throughout the day, and seemed to him more than usually susceptible.

This morning, while my soul seemed to be penetrated with reverence, I looked to see if its purposes were merely specious, and its apparent reverence and humility spurious. I could discover no speciosity or impurity of any kind.

October 21st. Study Christianity as an operation upon involuntary beings that are embryos of voluntary natures, and which need for their maturation, not a revelation of truth, of which they are unsusceptible, but a modification of false ideas, which these embryos had already generated. Suppose that, without an apparent acquiescence of the Messiah in those ideas, man, by necessity of his nature, must be excluded for ever from truth, wisdom, freedom and happiness, and consider whether, under these circumstances, it would not be consonant to Divine dignity and goodness to command such an acquiescence. Is it untruth in the physician to acquiesce in the false assumption of the lunatic, if the acquiescence be necessary to soothe and heal, or to impart a curative courage to the patient whom fear is hurrying to the grave by imparting to him a groundless idea that his malady is not a grave one? My sentiment of truth, which seems to be the Divine imperative within me, returns a peremptory "yes," to this question. It moves me to suppose that no affirmation, contrary to the knowledge or belief of the person affirming, is sanctioned by God. But is not this prejudice? It may be so, and there may come a time when my reverence may receive an opposite dictum from God. Meantime my duty is to comply, in faith and conduct, with that which reverence now commands me in the Name of God—to respect, and not to violate the authority of the oracle, by hesitating to
accept the response. Obedience, not importunate speculation, is what is required of me now.

October 23rd. I have immediately detected in myself the operations of instinct as will, its difference from will and the dependence of volition on sentiment of duty. I perceived it in a selfishness which I could not dislodge nor prevent from shaping my intention and action in the absence of an idea of duty. I felt that I was in danger of relapsing into its power, whereas, I, the will, would fain exclude it. I felt that it was likely to deprive me of self-mastery, although I would on no account deliberately comply with it.

October 25th. The affections cannot take hold of the abstract, for example the good of mankind; nor can any sentiment in man, save the love of the neighbour or mankind involved in the love of God. Hence the aversion to philosophical systems which propose universal objects as practical attractions to the heart. Common sense condemns them as vain speculations; but common sense recognizes a certain degree of power in religion to moderate the injustice of human loves arising from their partiality—from the fact that they are restricted to particulars and cannot take universals for objects. It does not recognize however that this corrective principle is, in its repressive form, but the embryo of a universal love, namely, the love of mankind involved in the love of God. In the sentiment of duty God commands us to have respect to the happiness of mankind under the appearance of having respect to that of our neighbour; and when grace, co-operating with obedience, expands the sentiment of duty into the love of God, it converts reluctant justice into a
substantial love of mankind, which sees mankind in every man we behold.

November 9th. Christ was the first to propose faith or trust in God, as a basis of judgment and action. He did so in a way to graft it on the mind of poverty, knowing that it would grow with the growth of experience and knowledge into definable form.

January 16th. Christ's mission was directly to the poor, and especially to those of them whose reverence could at once apprehend his authority. His apostles consisted of men to whom his words "follow me" were resistless; and his miracles were for those who could have faith in his power. Those to whom he was sent were not accessible to the rationale of religion; but they could take hold of Christ by faith; their reverence could cleave to his authority, and so they might be transported to heaven. If he had been sent to men of cultivated reason, such as the Brahmins of India, the priests of Egypt, or the philosophers of Greece, he would have exhibited to them the rationale of religion as it was in his own mind, and of those who might be able to follow his argument perhaps a few would have entered upon a corresponding life of devotion. To them Jesus would have merely indicated "the way, the truth, and the life." His argument would have been all to them—his authority nothing. He would have shown them the way as Euclid shows the way of mathematical science. But, to the mind of poverty, inaccessible to the argument of Jesus, his authority (and, in that, his person) was everything. His reason and righteousness could be to this order of mind in place of reason and righteousness of its own, until
obedience and imitation should develop the rationale of religion upon the basis of a Christian spirit. Therefore to the child-like mind of poverty, disposed to receive him, he was more than a guide—he was "the way, the truth, and the life."

But why did he not address both orders of minds? Why did he not build the rationale of religion upon the foundation laid by Plato? I do not know; but doubtless for reasons worthy of the wisdom that begot Christendom. Our pity for the sufferings of Jesus, and our sentiment of his meekness, lowliness, and self-sacrificing tenderness, are apt to exclude from us the aspect of intellectual power and subtlety which he presents to us when he tells Peter that "he will make him a fisher of men," and advises his disciples "to be wise as serpents," or mourns that the children of light lack the sagacity or "learned spirit of human dealings" manifested by the unjust steward. The laws of the necessary nature in man seem to have been known to Jesus as they have been known to no other human being; and we may safely take for granted that whatever measure he did not employ would, if employed, have marred his work.

It does not follow, however, that others are to suppress, in imitation of Jesus, what appears to them to be the rationale of religion; for we are not to conclude that, because it was not seasonable to do this when Christianity was founded, it is never to be done. On the contrary, it is presumable that religion is ultimately to satisfy reason—that the doing of the will of the Father will one day make the truth of the doctrine obvious to reason.

January 26th. The marriage of the sons of God with the daughters of men was probably the marriage of men of ascetic instinct. They stifle their Divine capacity in conjugal enervation. The highest spirituality knows that it
cannot subsist out of ascetic chastity. It knows this, not by inference, but immediately. Therefore it is probable that the Creator designed to signify that those in whom the capacity of sanctity discovers itself should abstain from marriage and dedicate themselves to the development of a saintly spontaneity and a sovereign will, by transacting the duties of the station of life in which they are born with a paramount view to the service of God. They are the sons of God, because it belongs to them to divine, in the higher phase of their development, the paternity of God. The continuation of the species is the function of those who are impotent to lift themselves out of the instinctive state. They constitute the great bulk of mankind. When the sons of God extinguished their spirituality in marriage, humanity was for the time deprived of its priesthood, and "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." The celibacy of the Roman Catholic priesthood seems to be an obscure recognition of the Divine intention respecting the sons of God. It is also significant that Christ did not marry, and his implied approval of those that make themselves eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven is pregnant.

JANUARY 31ST. Reverence cannot content itself with any idea of God which man is capable of forming, nor with any human idea of the antecedents of creation, or, if matter be uncreated, of the antecedent of the order of things to which humanity belongs, nor with any human idea of the eternal future of the human soul. It is agreeable to faith and reason to infer from this that humanity is only a transitory state of the soul. Reverence is all that is trustworthy in human nature as foundation of belief; and since reverence requires faith in God, and is dissatis-
fied with the best idea we can form of him, it is reasonable to conclude that God signifies to us, in the indispensability and inadequacy of our idea of him, that it suffices to put us in practical harmony with him, but that it is no more a basis of knowledge of God, than a blind man's idea of the firmament is a representative of the visual apprehension of that object; and moreover, that reverence is to expect a superhuman state of the soul, which will content it with an adequate symbol or name of God, as well as of its own nature, relation, origin, and destiny. The mystic tendency in man seems to have been designed to compensate the defect. It seems to depend upon an emotive principle, the peculiarity of which is, that its sentiments suppose themselves to have respect to objects that transcend human comprehension: hence the craving for the supernatural which the evil in man perverts towards the demoniac under the forms of necromancy, magic, sorcery, and which reverence directs towards the Divine—whence, indeed, are derived the aspirations (not groanings) that cannot be uttered, spoken of by St. Paul—hence the mystical yearning for union with God which has made asceticism commensurate with human history—hence the contemplation, the sweetness, and raptures of the spiritual life, wherein a minimum of intellection contemplates the emotion as related to something infinitely transcending in dignity what corresponds to the sublimest objects of the mere intellect. This is not peculiar to religious emotion. The intellection involved with musical emotion frequently contemplates the emotion as related to some object that transcends intellectual comprehension.

A part of the glad tidings was addressed to the mystical principle; such as "the Kingdom of Heaven is within you," "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," "In God we live, move, and have our being," "My father and I are one," "And that day ye shall know that I am in my father, and ye in me, and I in you," "Believest
thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? the words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself: but the Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works,"

"And I will pray the Father, and He will give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever."

February 15th. The doctrine that enlightened faith abrogates human authority, tends to deprive the ignorant of the support of the enlightened, to cause every man to regard his own conscience as the only Divinely accredited interpreter of the Divine will, and so to destroy the corrective tendency of public moral sentiment in respect of private judgment. On the other hand, belief in human authority, such as the Roman Catholic belief in the authority and infallibility of the Pope, tends to arrest human development, to suppress the religious reformer, to tie mankind to the crude dogmas that are grafted upon reverence in the infancy of societies, and, by representing one part of humanity to the other as worthy of authority, to exclude that perfect knowledge of the embryonic condition of the race which is indispensable to its sanctification.

A true religion should be adapted to these opposite needs. It should present the more enlightened part of humanity to the ignorant as authority, without exciting in the former a corrupt sentiment of self as worthy to be authority; and it should provide, that as men ascended from the lower to the higher class, they should recognize that God is the sole authority, and that humanity cannot be more than the mere instrument of authority. Christianity is such a religion. It presents Christ to those to whose idolatrous nature a mediator is necessary as the way, the truth and the life, and to the spiritual, whose godliness aspires directly to God, as the pioneer, the teacher, and the model. To the idolatrous class Christ could be the way,
1864

but could not show it. Authority, being itself, in the view of him who imputes it, the reason of what it commands, is the way. To show the way to Heaven is to show the sanctifying fitness of certain means that are available independently of the person showing. But to sanctify by authority—by commanding the performance of the means without showing their fitness—is to be, not to show the way. The idolatrous nature needs the way of authority until the soul which it obstructs is enlarged into the faculty of sceptical faith. Therefore, it was according to truth and duty that Christ should present himself to the idolatrous class as supreme authority—as the way, the truth, and the life. He accordingly declared himself to the ignorant poor, to whom he preached the Gospel, and on whose childlike dependence he grafted Christianity, to be the way, the truth, and the life; but it is not to be inferred that he therein professed himself to be more than pioneer, teacher, and model, in respect of other men. He says indeed that no man can come unto the Father, but by him; but one equally reaches the Father by Christ, whether it be by the mere guidance, or by the authority of Christ. Having thus constituted himself authority to those who have need of authority, and guide to those who are capable of immediate aspiration after God, and having founded the most general and simple rules of Christian conduct and the criteria of the Christian spirit in the reverence of his disciples, he had respect to the law whereby common sense is corrective of the error of private sentiment and the sentiment of the more enlightened corrects that of the rude and ignorant; and, in conformity with it, constituted the Church. He purposely left the Church undefined. To this obvious though indefinite corporation, he imparted power to bind and loose sin, whereby he ordained it the moral tribunal of Christendom, and subordinated the consciences of individuals to its correction. The Church so empowered must of necessity include the whole, or a part of the
Christian priesthood, that is, of a body prepared and set apart for the ministration of the word. This is the obvious part of the substance of the judicial Church. It would also, in all probability, include the devout of the laity. The ascendancy which they must obtain would command a corresponding ascendancy for their moral apprehensions and judgments in the councils of the Church. But beyond these two classes, it is impossible to infer what the judicial Church includes, and what are its boundaries. And this vagueness agrees to that of the organ of corrective common sense, or public opinion—a vagueness that is indispensable to the right operation of the organ; for definiteness of the subject would tend to exclude change and development. It would petrify society into castes, as in India, Egypt and Peru, and destroy the liberty that is indispensable to progress. The indefiniteness is the space in which freedom prepares change, and finally, in spite of many arrests and retrogressions, moral progress. Freedom and incentive to exercise ratiocination, and especially the consciousness of being liable to the bad consequences of erroneous moral judgment, are necessary to the development of the individual into what may be termed the adult state of humanity. So long as the ipse dixit of another man, or of an order of men, is his sole moral reason, so long is his moral sense retarded in mere adolescence and tutelage. And such an obstruction of the development of society has always obtained where the moral judgments of a class, completely defined by perceptible signs, are binding upon the consciences of all other parts of the society. To this evil is added another; selfishness tends to adulterate the moral sentiment of the privileged class with the spirit of caste, and to convert the priest into a master. The corrective and progressive operation of public opinion depends on the indefiniteness of our apprehension of its organ. It enables the moral sentiment, in which the worthiest and most enlightened of the society are agreed, to modify, for the most
part with superior force and uncorrupted by the selfishness of a privileged order, the public opinion of the society; and Christ seems to have respected the law of nature which avails of this vagueness in the institution of his Church. He knew well what embarrassments, divisions, and discords would arise from the vagueness; but he knew also that hell would not prevail in them against the spirit which he imparted to the Church. Rome would insist on papal infallibility, Calvinism on private judgment; England would endeavour to maintain herself upon a mixed system of authority and independence; but the Christian spirit would carry all across the gulf of time that must intervene between the passion and the Kingdom of God.

The Church is the whole body of the faithful, and the public opinion of the Church is the binding and loosing judgment that is ratified in Heaven. Through what kinds of judicial organs this opinion should be systematically expressed, Christ left to that law of human nature which variously fashions, in all societies, adequate practical organs for public or dominant opinion in the shape of judicial bodies.

The publication of the doctrine, that enlightened faith disowns human authority, is not calculated to supplant human authority where it is indispensable; nor does it necessarily supplant it in any breast without an adequate substitute. The authority of discreet parents over their children during the period of adolescence is in no danger from such a doctrine; because the sentiment of the authority is, for the most part, insoluble by any idea or belief which the inculcation of the doctrine could excite in the mind of childhood. As regards adults who need the support and guidance of abler and wiser men, and who might be betrayed by the doctrine, if there were no saving substitute, into a mischievous independence, it can be shown to them that it is their duty to look to their intellectual and moral superiors for counsel, both in respect of things
temporal and things eternal—that God has not made them sufficient to themselves, but dependent upon other men to the degree in which the superiority of other men is obvious to them; and that there is defect of humility in looking exclusively into their own breasts for the manifestation of the Divine will. In doing so, they ignore the system of rank upon which it pleased God to construct humanity, and according to which inferiors should consult superiors: not as infallible and authoritative oracles, but as being less liable to error. To avail of the superior judgment of others, it is not necessarily to apprehend them as authorities. Common prudence helps itself daily in this way without so apprehending those who help it.

March 22nd. In opposition to the idea that celibacy is indispensable to the highest sanctity, it may be objected that paternity tends in many to sanctity and priesthood. It sets before the reverence of the father a possible goodness and dignity into the likeness of which the child may be developed, and an opposite possibility from which he recoils into a serious and priestly sentiment of responsibility. This tendency to what may be termed patriarchal priesthood has recovered many from the descensus averni.

April 16th. Does God design to raise us in a third revelation to the apprehension of ourselves as his friends? The supposition has an aspect of blasphemy, but this may be the dragon at the gate of the Hesperides. If it be attacked and vanquished, may not the victor enter into blessedness? If it be reverence, and not any godless sentiment that moves us to investigate the suggestion, we incur no risk of a false conclusion.

When Christ represented himself as son of God,
wherein he implied the paternity of God in respect of mankind, he appeared to the reverence of the Jews to blaspheme. The Mosaic revelation had not authorized any higher apprehension of man than that in which he is represented as creature and servant of God; therefore, to assume to be son of God appeared to the Jews to be blasphemous arrogance. But Christ felt himself to be Son of God and that mankind is the lost child of God, and his intuition developed out of the Mosaic revelation, making a second and a brighter day. May not reverence have to suffer the shock of a third revelation, appearing as a third, and more effulgent day?

The race, like the individual, has its infancy, adolescence, and maturity. Its adolescence includes three periods; 1st, the period prior to the attainment of reverence; 2nd, that in which reverence obtains, but is of little or no efficiency; 3rd, that in which reverence becomes a normal basis of apprehension, judgment and motive. In the first period it is impossible for man to apprehend himself as anything more than creature and servant of God, held to obedience by fear of punishment. In the second he is accessible to an occasional sentiment of the holiness of God, but he is not yet prepared to apprehend Divine paternity. The revelation of Moses was adjusted to these two periods. In the third, the heart is accessible to the glad tidings, that God is the Father Almighty; and Christ and his revelation were adjusted to this period. Adolescence, unsusceptible in its first period to authority, needs for its government and guidance, power armed with pain and menaces of pain. In the second period, authority suffices, and is indispensable. But, according to analogy, authority is but a transitory instrument adapted to raise an inferior towards the level of its subject. The authority of the human father educates the child to be his peer in faculty, and so to outgrow its utility. Analogy therefore suggests that this may also be true of Divine authority, and that when it has
sanctified or perfected man he will no longer apprehend or need to apprehend goodness as being the will of God, but will be bent upon goodness for its own sake, as God is bent upon it. Divinity apprehended by human holiness as without authority would appear rather as friend than father.

Majesty is the expression of imperiousness, and imperiousness, at least in man, revolts reverence when reverence has attained to a certain phase of development. When painters present us a majestic Christ, what holy heart recognizes in the image the beloved Jesus—the divinity of the meek and lowly Jesus—the divinity of the Lamb? To the spirit of paganism, the august is venerable, but, in the view of the purest Christian spirit, it belongs to Cæsar, not to God. This spirit cannot identify majesty with divinity, although, in a lower state of the Christian spirit, the apprehension of Divinity is inseparable from that of majesty. A progress in holiness, therefore, seen in its later phases, seems to be a transition from the filial to the amical sentiment of God; for a sentiment of divinity which excludes majesty and authority is rather an amical than a filial apprehension of God.

Why should Christians revolt from the idea of an amical relation of God and man since they hold Christ to be at once their brother and their God?

Once the writer was for an instant conscious, in a rapture of reverence of an infinite, child-like smile, irradiating the universe, and this to his lightning-like intuition was the smile of God. Was the fact a natural illusion of imagination, or an inspiration of the devil, or was it indeed a beatific vision? The writer's belief is committed to none of these hypotheses; but the fact has prepared him to feel that holiness and omnipotence are compatible with childlikeness, and that reverence loses nothing worth preserving in parting with the paternal majesty of its supreme object.
April 22nd. St. Paul recognises the existence of bad moral approbation in Romans 1, 32 v. "Who, knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure (approve) in them that do them."

August 23rd. It is commonly supposed that conscience informs us upon every occasion what is our duty, without waiting to be questioned. This error arises from the fact, that conscience is clamorous when men are about to violate some of the most obvious and fundamental rules of virtue by the commission of crime; but, except when roused by so great violence, conscience is altogether voiceless and incapable if we do not worshipfully and humbly enquire of God. And her responses are defective in proportion as the inquirer lacks piety and humility. To obtain counsel from conscience, we must inquire, not of conscience, but of God; we must enter into the tabernacle of reverence, stript of all desires, affections and selfishness, conscious of the infinite holiness of God, and of our own nothingness. In this state we are organs of moral judgment of as much rectitude as consists with the power of our reason and the extent of our knowledge. Nothing is wanting, so far as the heart is concerned, to the formation of a wise moral judgment, although the judgment will be necessarily as remote from perfect wisdom as we are defective in power of reason, or remote from what constitutes perfect human knowledge. Errors, however, which do not arise from defect of godliness and humility, are, in all probability, of such a nature that Providence can compensate them without the instrumentality of pain and moral evil.

When a man deliberately inquires of God either with reverence and humility or voluntarily demeaning him-
self as if he were reverent and humble, he opens his heart to grace, which otherwise could not find access to it, and then grace may quicken nature, so as either to obtain from her, in the way of rectitude of moral judgment, the utmost of which she is at any time capable, or construct upon such a nucleus as she is able to present a perfect or nearly perfect moral judgment. That grace, or God immediately operative upon the human heart, contributes to every good sentiment and volition, is indispensable matter of faith; for, otherwise, God is to man as though he were not; but what grace does—what is the scope of its operation—is not known to man. If faith were obliged to forego the theory of grace, there would remain to it the lame and unsatisfactory hypothesis that according to the God-given constitution of man when we devoutly apply to our Maker for orders what to do, our nature, in virtue of the reverence and humility, or the voluntary conformity to both involved in the application, generates an answer in the form of a sentiment of duty similar to what God would immediately impart if an immediate operation of Divine power upon the heart were possible. But such a disappointing substitute would be likely to paralyze religion. Nothing short of immediate intercourse with God can satisfy the craving of the saint in man; and if man knew himself to be so immured from God in nature that his yearning must put up with a mere counterfeit of the Divine Word, sanctity would be likely to famish. The consciousness that the appeal to God was only a form under which he was aiming at a mere reaction of nature upon herself, would speedily resolve the procedure before his heart into a make-believe, and so render it abortive. This is the reason why the theory of grace is indispensable.

A man cannot revere one of his own faculties, therefore he cannot apply with reverence to his own conscience. If he cannot apply reverentially and humbly, his conscience is in abeyance. It is only upon the condition of applying
to the supreme object of reverence that he can duly *quicken* the moral sense. This is the reason why a man must enquire directly of God, and not of his conscience, what it is his duty to do.

**August 29th.** The limits within which devout volition is possible, are narrower in some people than in others—narrower in those who are new than in those who are old in self-denial, in those who are physically weak, than in the robust. A given intensity of emotion will exclude possibility of volition in one capable of volition within moderate degrees of emotion. Weariness sometimes suspends voluntary power—more frequently in the novice than in those who are old in the spiritual life. These exclusions occur when the subject is capable of deliberation and of deliberate instinctive action, such as commonly passes for volition: and, therefore, it appears not only to others but to the subject himself, that his instinctive compliance with temptation is voluntary.

Devout volition depends upon a sentiment of the *importance* of holiness; certain states of emotion incapacitate the heart to be the organ of such a sentiment and the intellect of such an idea. Nature in these states delivers us wholly to instinct, depriving us of the possibility of resisting temptation. A heart inflamed with anger, for example, is incapable of a sentiment of duty; nor, unless the mind be old in the struggle with evil, is it likely to undergo, in such a case, a thought of duty. If it experience such a thought it is only to be whirled past it by the momentum of passion.

The power of a devout resolution to put to flight the importunity of adverse desires, is known to the spiritual. But there are states of the mind in which we try in vain to make such a resolution. Our effort is as if we were writing
upon water. The mind will not receive the record essential to a resolution. We feel while we are making the effort, that it is an abortion; and desires adverse to devotion blow as they list across the impotent soul.

143.

September 14th. I am fresh from what appears to be the detection of an illusion in which a suspicion had well-nigh passed for an action—for a volition. I was distracted in prayer by the thought that it would be expedient for Mr. — to leave earlier than usual in order to see a house-agent relatively to the repair of the roof of my house. I seemed to resolve that he should do so; but immediately after the formation of the apparent resolution, I became conscious that I had not resolved, but that a lively sentiment of the expediency of what was proposed assumed the form of a resolution. I am distinctly conscious that the resolution was not a choice—that there was no comparison between the reasons in favour of Mr.—leaving at the earlier hour, and those in favour of his leaving at the later one. I had no thought about his not leaving at the earlier hour. The thought of his leaving at the earlier hour preceded the sentiment of the expediency of his doing so, but the sentiment of the expediency did not precede the apparent resolution but was simultaneous and identical with it. It is clear to me that I was suscipient, and not agent, in respect of the apparent resolution.

The detection is owing to the fact that the apparent resolution was intruded upon me in violation of my purpose, to direct my attention to God and duty.

If I should now ratify what was resolved for and in me I should be in doubt whether the ratification was not a necessary compliance.

If remembrance and reflection be in this instance correct, I have intuitively detected an act of instinct of the
kind that passes for volition; so that the question of the operation of instinct in human nature is no longer dependent for its solution upon inference.

SEPTEMBER 14TH. Reverence objects in me this morning, and has been for a considerable time objecting, to mere worship, or that which is not involved in prayer. From the point of view which my heart now occupies, mere worship appears to it to be suitable only to a state of habitual opposition to God, as being an occasional protest against that state made in the lucid moments of the mind. It is a submission made in a passionate state of the sentiment of God, and which professes itself under the form of a glorification of the infinite dignity and adorableness of God and of the nothingness of self. But when the heart and will are normally bent on God, and there is no opposition that can be the occasion of a reactionary desire to magnify him, mere worship seems to be mere flattery. Prayer and the transaction of all the business of life for God involve worship. They imply a sentiment of total dependence on God, and a purpose of unqualified obedience to him, and to turn regularly—which is necessarily to turn without impulse of intensified emotion—from this practical doxology to a merely verbal one, seems to me to be inconsistent with sanctity and a right sentiment of Divine dignity. We should yield to impulses of adoration, and bless God for them as gifts of grace—as evidences that God has visited the heart, and that the heart is hailing its Divine guest. If this adoration should break into song, finding itself uneasy within the bounds of ordinary speech, so much the better. But impulsive and regular adoration are things that rarely coincide.

Nevertheless, I shall continue regular adoration or worship until it shall please God to signify to me more
plainly his will in respect of it. If, for a considerable time to come, my heart should, in its most reverent moods, continue to object to it, and if nothing to the contrary be signified to me by God through other sources, then I shall conclude that God will have me abandon it.

145.

September 14th. Was not the withering of the fig-tree designed to signify to those who could divine its meaning, that Christ regarded sin as the fruit of necessity for which the sinner is as irresponsible as the fig-tree for its barrenness? It would have been premature to have avowed the irresponsibility of the sinner, as that would paralyze the usefulness of the consciousness of responsibility while it was still indispensable; but by dealing with the fig-tree as if it were responsible, may not Christ have signified to those who could divine his meaning, that to him the sinner was as irresponsible as the fig-tree?

146.

September 22nd. The extirpation of bad moral sentiment is one of the ends of sanctification. A bad moral sentiment in me apprehended meekness as unmanly and abject, and for a long time corrupted my theology. Bad moral sentiment is the light that is darkness referred to by Christ.

147.

October 9th. One of my children fell from a life of conscientious industry, into a lax and perfunctory way of doing, evincing a relaxation of conscientiousness. A proof of the change excited my anger to such a degree as to exclude the thought that anger violates godliness, and that it is my duty and purpose to resist it. Why was I angry? If I had observed such a change in any one not of
my own family it would not have angered me. And how comes it that the desire of the sanctification of another should be of a nature to ignite anger? Is it not to some selfish part of me which has become interested in the sanctification of my child that the excitement of the anger is due?

If my zeal for the sanctification of my children were priestly—that is, for God's sake, and not for the sake of the children—their failures would cause me sorrow, not anger. But it is paternal, not priestly zeal—selfish, not disinterested—having respect to what I apprehend as belonging to me; and this zeal is of a nature to stimulate anger. I am necessitated by the paternal instinct to desire what I think to be the good of my children. I have been elevated by God to the knowledge that the welfare of man depends upon sanctity, and selfish paternity desires this welfare for my children.

November 16th. Custom tends to stifle the spirit of prayer in respect of regular prayer, and to render the latter automatic. When one endeavours to frustrate this tendency by endeavouring to be more fervent and demonstrative, custom tends to stifle the fervor and adopt the demonstrativeness into automatic formula. We should endeavour to elude this tendency by varying our manner of praying; offering it sometimes in a subdued, and sometimes in a demonstrative way, and above all things, by seeking to make it voluntary or recollected.

December 17th. Commentators are greatly divided respecting the meaning of the name, "Poor in spirit," especially as, according to St. Luke, it seems to be the poor literally understood to whom Jesus refers. But the
various meanings assigned to the term appear, upon close inspection, to be merely different faces of the same diamond. The poor constituted the only human material with which the nucleus of the Church of Jesus could be constructed. Their spirit is held in a child-like consciousness of inferiority and dependence; for they impute an indefinite superiority of knowledge and power to the rich, which prevents self-esteem, from hardening them into the conviction that they are sufficient to themselves. They are also free from the high minded self-respect which tends to oppose selfishness to God as reason of morality in the hearts of the rich. They are, therefore, more accessible to conviction of sin and to the sentiment of their dependence on God. Humility is less encumbered in them, and when they are enlightened by revelation and grace it is more easily disengaged. Jesus congratulates the poor who constituted his audience on account of this facility of spirit which fitted them to be the first recipients of the Kingdom of God. According to this interpretation the text may be read in two ways; 1st, Blessed in spirit are the poor; or, 2nd, Blessed are the poor in spirit. The first reading has the advantage of more nearly reconciling St. Matthew and St. Luke; but the second has this advantage, that it extends the class blessed so as to include those of the rich who resemble the poor in the beatific peculiarity of spirit. Humility is the virtue to which Christ refers as the ground of the blessedness; not that he supposes the subjects of the beatitude to be already humble, for that would be to suppose them to be perfect, but that they are peculiarly disposed to humility, and, through revelation and grace, secure of its attainment.

This explanation is confirmed by the second beatitude, according to which "they that mourn" are blessed. Now mourning belongs to no class, and if it be more in one class than in another the rich are more subject to it; for wealth develops a finer sensibility, and ills, which wealth
cannot exclude, are more severely felt. But mourning, like poverty, disposes the heart to humility—"Whom God loveth he chastizeth"—and it is in order to humble that God chastizes. Therefore, they that mourn are blessed—blessed on account of the facility, of which, nevertheless, they often fail to avail. It cannot be supposed that mere mourning is an invariable cause of sanctity, or that all who mourn attain to Heaven in virtue of the mourning. Therefore it must be on account of the disposition to sanctity which mourning tends to engender and foster, that Christ proclaims the mourner blessed, and by analogy he must be understood to mean that the poor, or those who resemble the poor in spirit, are blessed; not because poverty secures sanctity or Heaven, but because it disposes to sanctity.

But Christ does more in these beatitudes than inculcate humility. He vindicates the benevolence of God to the needy and bereaved. Their misery is not a sign that they are overlooked or abandoned by God, but that, on the contrary, he is preparing them by peculiar means for Heaven.

In the third beatitude, as indeed in all the beatitudes, Christ has still reference to humility, which is the basis of all Christian virtue. Meekness is humility considered as to exclusion of anger, or the spirit of retaliation. It is a species of humility, or poverty of spirit.

No commentator seems to have given an adequate reason why rewards apparently different are assigned to these merely different aspects of Christian virtue. For all rewards are insignificant in comparison with that of immortal sanctity and of the eternal intercourse with God which it involves; nor can we understand that the poor in spirit, who are to enjoy the Kingdom of Heaven are not to see God, that the pure who are to see God are not to possess the Kingdom of Heaven, and that neither of these are to be called the children of God. The truth seems to be that as Christ in the beatitudes presents different aspects of
sanctity and of the heart in its progress to sanctity, so he presents the rewards of sanctity under different aspects as being enjoyment of Heaven to the poor in spirit, comfort to the mourner, food and drink to those who hunger and thirst after righteousness, mercy to the merciful, beatific vision to the pure, filial enjoyment of the Heavenly Father to the peace-makers. But we are at a loss to know in what sense it is inheritance of the earth.

150.

November 23rd. Purity without fortitude excludes charity. Its fastidiousness with regard to vice makes it impotent to help the sinner—impotent to be a good physician. It must be robust in order to apply itself helpfully like Jesus to the publicans and sinners. Saintly instinct led a few to cultivate robustness by applying sense to the disgusting.

151.

November 26th. Change either had or had not a beginning. If it was beginningless it excludes a first cause. If it began to be it was preceded by an eternity of inaction. The idea of an eternal first cause supposes the first cause to have been eternally inactive before it caused change. What this violent alternative signifies is that we are not to busy our little minds with "pre-eternity."

152.

December 16th. One of the criteria of due trust in God is distrust of means that offend the moral sense but seem to be indispensable for the attainment of good ends. Faith often finds itself in circumstances wherein, according to the unregenerate mind, the cause of God is in some respect lost, and souls are doomed to perish in ignorance, unless we
stoop to some management that offends sincerity. But faith judges that what violates sincerity is always inexpedient as regards the cause of God. The bulk of those, however, who believe themselves to have faith, and whose lives are in the main devout, are short of this degree of trust, and are swayed into compliances that are incompatible with the simplicity of holiness. Instinct obliges them to act in conformity with natural reason as though they knew the Divine ends and would have them anyhow realised—as though God were impotent in respect of such ends, and the pious cunning and conveniency of men could compensate the impotence of God. An embryo of faith enveloped in such a distrust of God is the intellectual basis of an instinct that more or less actuates the bulk of the religious.

The art generated by it is what is known by the name priestcraft. It moved Gregory to disseminate Christianity by accommodation with pagan habits and rites. It caused the Church to ally itself with the State and substitute coercion for authority. It shows itself in the tendency to cleave to dogmas in which reason discerns contradiction or other evidence of unsoundness for the sole reason that they seem to be indispensable for the exclusion of moral evil. Whether operative as instinct or mere motive, the distrust rarely exhibits itself to its subject as distrust. He is without a suspicion that he distrusts God and he is conscious of a desire to promote the glory of God. No feeling of culpability warns him to think a second time, but on the contrary a feeling of duty urges him upon the crooked way.

153.

DECEMBER 21ST. My conviction or cognition that the bulk of mankind is instinctive, manifests itself for the most part as a mere judgment, and but rarely as an apprehension. When it appears as apprehension it disposes me towards
the man in whom I apprehend the instinct, as a tender father or a kind physician is disposed towards child or patient. The man can provoke no feelings in me but those which consist with charity. But the mere judgment that such or such a man is instinctive has no such disposing efficacy. It serves indeed as a reason of conduct in respect of him—conduct conformable to charity, but without its spirit. Now the tendency of the judgment, if it frequently obtain, is to develop an organ of corresponding apprehension, and if this change were wrought in me charity would become in me not only a reason of volition but a basis of instinct, so that in my unrecollected or merely instinctive intercourse with men my action must be conformable to charity and proceed from the spirit of charity.

Language does not yet afford material for a scientific expression of the relation of the judgment and apprehension in question to the practical part of man, or that in him, whether instinct or will, which applies knowledge of means, and ends in action. It has no adequate name for the system of human organs that are the seats or sources, so to speak, of human instinct. This cannot be called the instinctive nature, for it is only instinctive when will is in abeyance. It is reduced to a mere organ of motive when will reigns. The habit or desire that, if no extrinsic obstacle prevent, must become action in the absence of will, is reduced to the condition of a mere motive that has to obtain a permission of the will in order to go out into action. Let us remedy the defect by assigning the name, spont, to the system of organs on which depend motive and instinctive action that applies a knowledge of means. The spont includes all organs of habits that apply or depend upon knowledge of means, all emotive and intellectual organs, in so far as they are organs of motive or of instinctive action, that applies a knowledge of means, and all organs of motion, in so far as they are organs of such instinctive action. Let the word spontal signify pertaining
to the spont and of spontal efficacy, and let the word *spontive* signify mainly, or altogether, actuated by the spont.

When will excludes instinct, the executive function of the spont does not cease, only the action of which it is the proximate cause is consequent to volition. Volitions are not the immediate causes of the bodily motions and mental processes which they command or sanction. When one wills to raise his hand, the volition is not the force that immediately raises the hand. If it were, the paralytic would not attempt to raise his hand. So when one wills to remember, the force that immediately operates in the nisus of memory is not the volition, but a force proper to memory. When one wills to play the piano it is habit, and not volition, that immediately does the work. In ceasing to be instinctive the spont does not cease to work, but it works as servant of the will, and not independently.

Let the word *inspontal* signify not pertaining to the spont, and without spontal efficacy, and let the word *spontify* mean to make spontal.

We are now prepared to express with scientific precision the relation of the cognition that the bulk of mankind is instinctive to the practical part of man. When the cognition is a mere judgment, it is inspontal, but not without practical influence since it may be a reason of volition, for example, a voluntary conformity to charity, even when the spont is exasperated by provocation. But when the cognition is an apprehension it is spontal, and contributes to determine either motive or instinct. It is in the power of many to "spontify" the cognition by frequently meditating the matter of the judgment, and making it a frequent occasion of action.

Sanctification is the spontification of religious cognitions and opinions. It is the reorganization of the spont upon the basis of a supreme love of God.

Wisdom is "spontal" knowledge involved in sanctity. An "inspontal" form of the knowledge exists in minds that
are indifferent to God and to virtue. Such a form may be regarded as an embryo of wisdom. We promote the embryo into wisdom by the spontifying efficacy of practice aided by grace. Let the word spontity signify the attribute of being spontal, and the word inspontity privation of spontity.

A devout will is liable to frequent failure from the inspontity of the cognitions on which it depends. Thus a man who would fain be invariably charitable, fails through the inspontity of his cognition that the bulk of mankind is for the most part incapable of volition.

154.

December 25th. It is said that justice required either the atonement or eternal torment. This supposes a law extrinsic to the Divine will which that will could not oppose without injustice. It supposes that the moral law is independent on the Divine as on the human will, and that if God willed to save man immediately (without means of the atonement) the fact that the volition was of God would not exempt it from the quality of injustice. In other words, it is not in the power of Omnipotence to save man immediately without injustice. If this must be admitted, how much more congenial to reverence to adopt the alternative that the nature of man is such that Omnipotence could not save him without the atonement. Each member of the alternative includes the repugnant supposition that there is something thinkable that is impossible to Omnipotence; but this is the only objectionable attribute of one of them while the other has scarcely a rag of pretextive decency to cover it.

155.

December 27th. I discern my worldliness, and long to be purged of it, but I am without power to heal myself.
1864. It obliges me to apprehend men as more or less important according to their worldly power and rank, or at least it keeps me busy weeding the heart of such apprehensions. It corrupts my apprehension of self—that obscure consciousness of self which underlies almost all consciousness—with a sore self-respect. No effort towards humility, no offensive representation that I can make of the parasitism of this mode of self-apprehension, suffices to exempt me from its vulnerableness, nor from the symptoms of its pain. But I have the consolation to know that worldliness is not essential to me, and to trust that the power of my Creator will ultimately enfranchise my spirit from the disease.

156.

1865. January 1st. When one has purposed to resist a temptation at the cost of a revolution of life he is liable to distrust his power to carry out his resolution; and when he suffers the first assault of the temptation it seems to him almost idle to attempt resistance. In this we see the instinctive force of temptation. If the temptation make the soul appear to itself so helpless when armed with such a resolution, what is there to prevent it from becoming action when there is no resolution nor any motive whatever to oppose it?

157.

January 2nd. Although it is acknowledged that sanctification is a co-operative work in which will co-operates with grace, yet reverence superstitiously disposes us to deny that this or that particular thing is done by will. When any part of the common work is proposed as being exclusively done by will, superstition will have it that this part also is done by grace, so that there is no room left for any function whatever of will. To suppose a human volition to be caused by anything distinct from the will, is contrary
to the idea of will and volition. Therefore, the function of grace in sanctification is limited to the causation of pious motive, and of instinctive power to do what the motive solicits, including a consciousness of this power. This is the limit of what Omnipotence can do in the work of sanctification. No farther aid can be given by grace to the human will. The will must do of itself, or forbear from doing, the remainder of the work. Grace can make the possibility of sanctifying volition, but it can do nothing more in the way of co-operative sanctification.

Can Omnipotence sanctify immediately, or by means more apt than that which involves the co-operation of human volition? Our Creator signifies to us the contrary. For, he has established in our moral constitution the sentiment that it is wanton to postpone to mediate doing a good end that can be done immediately, or to substitute, in the causation of a good end, means less apt for means more apt. We have no Divine sanction in our moral nature for supposing that God preferred to detain man in moral evil and incident pain for so many ages, rather than sanctify him immediately or in a shorter time.

158.

January 10th. I have to-day detected the pretextive instinct flagrante delictu. It is my rule not to do a certain thing for pleasure. I detected instinct looking about for a pretext to do it. The act—for it was an act—would have passed with me formerly for a volition. So far as the evidence of consciousness goes, it had all the aspect of a volition.

Here, then, was something in me distinct from will that was casting about for a pretext to evade duty; and, if it had found an adequate pretext, it would have undoubtedly caused me to do the forbidden thing, and so have defeated my will, which was committed to an opposite pur-
pose. That I, the voluntary power, was not a party to the act, was proved by the satisfaction which I experienced in the detection and rout of the enemy.

To some it is likely to appear that a fact of this kind proceeds, not from an instinct, but from a devil. Perhaps the opinion is not altogether erroneous; for is not a man a devil in so far as he is the organ of such an instinct, and are not such demons the possessing demons which Christ expelled from human hearts? They are truly in hell, for maleficence is the end of their existence, and they dwell in the torment which they make.

159.

January 26th. A friend objected to the style of a scientific work to which I had called his attention, complaining that the author used a timid Latin instead of plain Saxon English. The objection was calculated to wound my self-love, as I had recommended the work to him. My impression was, that he had read without understanding more than what popular knowledge had prepared him to take up easily. His objection to the style was frivolous, for one might as well object to the style of Euclid. The spirit of the criticism was this:—"In recommending me the book, you supposed in me an ignorance that did not exist: it is below me in matter and style." The egotism that instinctively uttered the criticism was doubtless latent as regards the self-consciousness of my friend. To him it appeared doubtless that he was expressing an opinion which had nothing to do with his self-love.

(After showing that the egotism was a malady deserving pity, not censure, the writer proceeds.)

One would suppose that the writer should be now in charity with his friend, and, clearly apprehending the egotism of the latter as a malady and a necessity, should never after view it with any feeling but one
The survival.

Of pity. Yet, after the lapse of only a day since writing the foregoing, an imagination of—as exhibiting some variety of the same egotism in the same connection, forms in a sour uncharity that manifestly steams up from hurt self-love. Which of us exhibits the uglier egotism—he who has no consciousness of the abuse that is put upon him, or I in whom the infirmity outlives such analysis? Decidedly I am the greater egotist of the two. But happily the uncharity cannot withstand the co-operative force of grace and my endeavour. Already an emotive discernment—a cordial discernment of the necessity that abuses my friend—has chased it away. No doubt it will return, and by God's help I shall drive it from me again and again, and at last it will find no footing in the heart: it will return no more. And by many exercises not only it but its kind will be banished for ever from my consciousness, and then I shall be perfect in charity.

January 28th. "For the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light." The words, "in their generation," probably signify relatively to the mere time of their earthly existence. The children of light absorbed in things eternal, are unduly indifferent to the things of time, to the dependence of eternal things upon things temporal, and to the fitness of means that have respect to temporal ends, which are themselves means in respect of eternal ends. The unjust steward deployed sagacity in the selection of means for a temporal end which occulted eternity. It were well that the children of light should deploy as much sagacity in the selection of means for temporal ends on which things eternal depend. They should be wise as serpents, should know the good and bad at a glance, be able to penetrate intuitively the plausiveness of cunning, so as to be in
1865. respect of its wiles what a rock is to the waves that break upon it. Abhorring craft, they should be of superlative sagacity in the discernment of means for the temporal as well as the eternal ends proposed by duty. They should have and apply the knowledge and power of wisdom as well as its love, and in respect of the temporal as well as the eternal.

161.

January 30th. For a few years past, I have from time to time experienced a remarkable phenomenon. A thought of doing or not doing a certain thing, but much more frequently, if not invariably of not doing, has appeared in me from time to time, and always as the expression of duty. The thought, being a mere intellection without anything of sentiment or emotion in it, failed at first to command my attention, but the observation that evil obtained which would have been excluded by compliance with the thought, induced me to consider whether it were not a word of God. It had no obvious mark by which to distinguish it from thoughts suggestive of forbearance or self-denial which might arise in my mind without Divine interference, and therefore, I have sometimes refused its suggestion, although complying with it much more than at first. To-day I am disposed to acknowledge to it a higher authority than ever before. It seems to me to be as it were, a language of the Almighty which he has been teaching me, and which he has at last brought me to understand. The thought appears like a whispered message. It has acquired this character, for it was without it at first, and so was confounded by me with even the caprices of consciousness.

Did not this kind of thought give rise to the idea of genii and angels waiting upon men. Was it not the occasion of the idea of Socrates that he was instructed by a demon, and of Numa Pompilius as regards Egeria?
Are not those genii and angels, the power of God acting upon the spirit of man?

162.

February 5th. Worldliness is a quasi-conscience. It experiences a quasi-remorse, and sets us upon a quasi-repentance. It has respect only to those sins which are known, or run some risk of being discovered. The counterfeit passes for the most part with the subject for pure gold. Sometimes an uneasiness of the real conscience is connected and confounded with the pain of the quasi one. When we become conscious that we have exhibited levity to others, we may be slightly troubled in the real conscience on account of defect of godliness, and greatly troubled in the quasi one for having betrayed the defect and so forfeited a portion of worldly consideration, while it appears to us that we are exclusively concerned on account of our failure towards God.

The worldly who have a lively apprehension of the noble are liable to an analogous illusion from the counterfeit of nobleness by worldliness. They seem to be greatly concerned about acting nobly when their grand interest is to appear to act nobly; and this is sometimes made manifest to them when circumstances require that a sacrifice, which at first it seemed proper to make openly be made secretly: this causes a sudden collapse of fervor. If they were actuated by nobleness only the secrecy would make no difference. When vanity counterfeits in this way the spirit of nobleness the vain person is the greatest dupe of the illusion, and to apprehend him with any other feeling than pity, is to be ourselves stultified by another form of infirmity.

163.

February 8th. I rise from prayer to record and secure the following experience:

A prudential desire to be about my ordinary business
predominated in my heart while I was in the attitude of worship. An inferior emotion of godliness was simultaneously in my heart. I felt culpable on account of the superiority of the selfish emotion until I bethought me that it was really to me a violation and an obstruction. Coming to myself as will I immediately endeavoured to supplant the selfish emotion, but presently bethought me that I had not immediate power over it—only such power as grace might give, and prayer obtain. Here was an instance of will at war with strongest desire.

But, it will be said, what appears to be will may be only an instinct whose emotive character is latent; and this character would be manifested if the adverse instincts should prevail. It would show itself in pain on account of violated godliness and violated purpose. It cannot be demonstrated that this argument is false, and it has even a certain plausibility. We must, therefore, impotently oscillate for ever between the opposite terms of the question, unless we cut the gordian knot by a volition—either the volition, I will to believe that I am free or, I will to believe that I am not free.

If we resolve that we are free, it becomes us to modify all our ideas accordingly, so as to bring them in respect of it as nearly as may be into theoretic consistency.

February 10th. The will has a function that may be distinguished as *ideo-modific*. This function is to modify ideas so as to eliminate inconsistency or any incongruity that is repugnant to belief. In the godly, it behoves the will to modify ideas, so as to harmonize them with faith. The function presupposes the judgment that, in proportion as we harmonize ideas with the mental constitution, and enhance their *aptness* in respect of sanctification, we advance them towards truth or an equivalent of truth, that this
work is done for us only up to a certain epoch of mental evolution and must subsequently be done by us, and that the will is to proceed according to rule or art in the modification of ideas. Its cardinal rule is that innovation is to be the minimum consistent with the end in view: in other words, that data are to be respected as much as possible. Of contradictory hypotheses it is to prefer those which are most congenial to sanctity and, after that, to the mental constitution, and which have the greatest analogy with the actual system of beliefs: it is also to postpone a preference, waiting for more experience, so long as the interests of faith do not require one. Whenever the evidence of experience makes against faith, even though it should be with the force of demonstration, the will is to sequester the heart in the consciousness of our fallibility, fortified by our purpose to hold to God against all the powers of reason, and mindful that the intelligence of reverence or godliness is higher than that of intellect.

February 21st. I write in bed. It is about 4.30 a.m. What I have to record occurred within an hour. I was anxiously occupied with matters concerning the education of my children when I passed into a state of depression that seemed to envelop the universe in a pall. The cause of my melancholy was doubtless physical, although it seemed to be a moral one; for without any change of what appeared to be its moral cause the melancholy has vanished. The apparent cause was a thought that has frequently troubled my religious musings and reasonings. It is the thought that there is no dignity in being. Allowing all that religion claims respecting the existence, goodness, and power of God, and the ultimate sanctity and happiness of his creatures, to what does it all amount, but that there shall be a certain pleasurable and various conscious-
ness maintained throughout eternity by means of the interaction of holy beings. But dignity would be wanting in an order of things involving eternal happiness of Creator and creatures that should proceed from eternal sport, and sport and the interaction of holy beings being alike mere means of universal pleasure, the discernment of the likeness should efface the sentiment of the dignity of the latter. Being thus considered appears useless and therefore without dignity: it appears, as to Hamlet, "weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable." The solace of the poor wretch who is thus abused is, if he be capable of faith, that the eye of the heart has become an organ of pain instead of vision. It is not that being has ceased to be radiant with divinity, but that reverence is sore and disorders intellection, substituting pain for vision.

On the night before last the horrid sentiment of the vanity of being began to oppress me. I cast about for a remedy and I found one in the sentiment of the vanity of my pretension to comprehend universal being or to think it otherwise than by means of a pitiful symbol. I had surpassed the child who was making the hole in the sand to put the ocean in, for I had put the ocean into the hole. I found relief and joy in child-like humility.

166.

February 22nd. The importance of a whole is the sum of the importance of its parts. To appreciate the whole and slight or contemn the part is absurd. As no sum of parts can make a line, no sum of unimportant things can make an important thing. Yet this absurdity vitiates the sentiment of many who, contemplating parts of the universe that are comparatively vast, such as astronomical bodies and systems, slight their minute parts. It seems to them that the concerns of such a minute and short-lived creature as man are infinitely beneath the attention of a being who directs the movements of the universe. But
the universe is merely an aggregate of such minute parts, and if the parts are unworthy of Divine attention, so is the whole. The contrary of this absurdity fits to the dignity of omniscience. The feeble mind of man cannot grasp at once the great and the small, whereas the infinite and the infinitesimal are simultaneously appreciable by God. His attention is applied at once to the atom and the universe. He may be founding Christianity in the person of Christ while he is conducting the Universe.

February 24th. Man without godliness is without power to forgive. He is without power to repel the reprobatory apprehension of which the sinner is object. He is necessarily uncharitable as he is necessarily gravitative. Obvious repentance and atonement can sometimes efface his uncharitable sentiment of the crimes of others, but his will has nothing to do with the process. He cannot freely make or contribute to make charity supersede condemnation in his heart. Whether he abhor the sinner or undergo the relaxing influence of the sinner's repentance and atonement, he is alike acted upon and alike without choice in respect of his sentiment. In so far as the words "condemn" and "forgive" imply volition, they are inapplicable to his apprehension of the sinner.

The godly on the contrary whom devotion has advanced a certain way, exercise volition in determining their sentiments of the sins of others, in limiting those sentiments by charity, and in merging charity in a higher appreciation of the quondam sinner when repentance has promoted him in sanctity. They choose to obey God and deny themselves by resisting their natural bias to an uncharitable sentiment of the sinner. They freely do violence to themselves by the application of corrective ideas to their hearts. They oblige themselves to separate between the
sin and the sinner—to abhor the one and pity the other. They voluntarily cherish hope of repentance, atonement, and sanctification. Of them it may be truly said that they forgive.

But forgiveness presupposes uncharity. Charity does not condemn, and, therefore, cannot forgive. To apprehend the quondam sinner as a saint is not to forgive. Therefore, forgiveness is impossible to the holy. It is impossible to them on account of their charity, as it is impossible to the godless on account of their impotence.

When the repentance of a sinner effaces a sentiment of condemnation excited by his sin, and conduct is correspondingly changed towards him, the change is commonly supposed to be wholly or in some degree voluntary. Thus apprehended it is known by the name forgiveness. Christ, who, to enable the poor to be the vehicle of Christianity, adapted his doctrine to their thought and language (which the doctrine would in time modify according to truth) employed the word forgiveness and its cognates, so that it would signify according to their understanding, and, to the enlightened Christian, according to a more discriminate understanding. He would not perplex the minds and delay the practice of those he addressed by difficult distinctions. He was able to build upon actual thought with familiar speech and so to build upon the heart. If he were not able to do this or would not do it, nature must, in all probability, have excluded Christianity. Accordingly, when Christ spoke of forgiveness to his disciples he signified a fact corresponding in some degree to the ideas connected with the word in the minds of all who heard him and of all who should receive his word through others, but also differing more or less from his own idea of the thing signified. This various signification was a necessity of the case, and is as remote from untruth as when the matter of a proposition is translated into a language that does not afford exact equivalents of the words of the proposition,
and is, therefore, put in the most appropriate analogous terms.

As Christ came to supplant Cæsar by the kingdom of God, so he came to supplant the idea of retribution by that of charity; and, as he was obliged to respect the reign of Cæsar temporarily, so he was obliged to pay temporary tribute of forbearance to the error that vindictiveness is justice. He planted a seed in the heart of Christendom that would grow until it burst the pottery of human dominion and of the infernal but indispensable idea of retribution.

As knowledge develops, God seems to signify to us with more and more clearness that Nature is not immediately modificable in every respect by his omnipotence, but that certain modifications need the intervention of means between them and the modifying volition. Religion recognizes that God operates by means. Christianity is means—a means of salvation. In view of this, and of the fact that God has constituted us to apprehend as useless and absurd the application of a means for the effectuation of an end which the agent could immediately cause, it becomes us to believe or opine that certain ends are not realizable by omnipotence without means. Moreover, it is incongruous with the idea of Divine goodness to suppose that God would postpone the happiness of his creatures which could be immediately realized in order to cause it by the operation of means involving ages of misery and sin. Divine dignity does not require us to believe that God prefers to employ useless, absurd, and cruel means rather than realize his ends immediately. It is reasonable to believe that the nature of man excluded the possibility of the perfect growth, development, or evolution of humanity, except by means of a Messiah founding the Divine word upon the mind of the poor of Judea in their familiar and inaccurate language, and conformed to the confusion as well as the correctness of their ideas.
To this it will be objected that Christ authorizes his Church to bind as well as to forgive sins, and expressly informs us that God has prepared everlasting fire not only for the devil and his angels but also for impenitent men. It is incredible to those whose sentiment of the charity of God excludes the possibility of belief in the eternal torment of any creature that Christ ever uttered a word designed by him to signify the reality of such a doom. It is probable, on the other hand, that the prejudice of the apostles and of all his immediate disciples in favour of eternal punishment imparted to certain words of Christ a corresponding signification, and that, although he knew that inevitable error would thus misrepresent his meaning, he knew also, that in what he taught respecting charity, he infused a corrective in the heart of the church that would finally neutralize the error. It may be true, nay it is most probable, that the universe involves both eternal pain and eternal bliss, but since it is under the control of Divine Omnipotence, it is incredible that any individual is to suffer pain eternally. It is not probable that the creative function began to be exercised and is to cease at a certain time for ever—that its exercise is limited, like the duration of an extinct species, to a section of eternity. And since man has to pass through an era of imperfection and pain, it is probable that from eternity to eternity orders of beings have been and will be beginning in pain a life destined to issue in eternal bliss. Here we have eternal pain, but not of any individual. In certain cases, individuals may have to repeat an ordeal of pain. The souls of bad men may need to be reincorporated in human form and repeat the painful ordeal of human life, or they may have to pass through some still severer ordeal—the pain from which Christ may have sought to save all persons susceptible to his influence. He may have referred to this eternal torment when he was understood to denounce against impenitent sinners an arbitrary eternal torment. The fact that he never smiled,
and that he indicated self-denial as the way of salvation—

"I shall show him how great things he shall suffer for my sake"—agree to the idea that he carried in the silence of his heart a terrible secret of torment which necessity, not the Divine will, attaches to a phase of human development.

What with inordinate force of uncharity and lack of voluntary power, the godless are unable to forgive; and even Christianity does not seem to have as yet so leavened any society as to enable it to forgive. But the impotence of Christian societies in respect of forgiveness is not wholly owing to defect of the spirit of charity and of will: it is in great part owing to ignorance—ignorance of signs of repentance that cannot be counterfeited. It wisely fears its liability to be deceived, and defends itself against hypocrisy by inexorableness. Nor will the true penitent regret the inexorableness which shuts the world against him, and limits him to the alternative of heaven. He can irradiate ignominy with sanctity—convert it into a temple of devotion. Ignominy elicited from Scupoli a book that educated the sanctity of St. Francis of Sales.

March 2nd. The results of theoretic research, in so far as they are hostile to religion, tend to make me a wretch and an abortion. Voluntary faith which ignores them is a condition of moral power and growth, and of corresponding happiness. Which is it reasonable to choose? in which to trust? Shall I abandon myself to theory and hell, or, God helping, scale heaven by force of devout will? Considered as mental functions, is that which gives growth and happiness the morbid one, and that which gives paralysis and pain the sound one?—or is the reverse the truth? And is it reasonable to surrender oneself to a morbid function of the mind? Therefore, although atheism were demonstrated, it would be absurd to believe accordingly. The demonstration should have as much value for us as a demonstration
that we do not exist. It should merely serve to signify to us the infirmity of the intellect, and the abortiveness of intellection without faith.

March 4th. The saint who does not theorize has an "atheoretic" cognition of the spirit (the voluntary and dominant soul) and of the soul, in so far as it is a subject of consciousness imposed upon it by the body and of instincts which depend upon its subjection to the body. Certain philosophers have attained to an imperfect theoretic discernment of the difference between the soul as spirit, and the soul as mere subject of consciousness and instinct imposed upon it by the body. Gassendi and Maine de Biran attained to an imperfect discrimination between the soul dominant over itself quoad subject to the body, and the mere soul quoad subject to the body. Gassendi discriminated between mental faculties partly psychical and partly corporal and mental faculties that are purely psychical. Maine de Biran judged that personality consists in will, and will is the soul dominant over itself quoad subject to the body. The atheoretic cognition of the saint has been fruitful; not so the theoretic discernment of the philosopher. The former has manifested itself as a condition of devout volition aggressive upon the body; and, although his asceticism has doubtless transgressed the limits of discretion, it has developed extraordinary sanctity, and contributed to the religious progress of the race. But we are not, therefore, to regard the theoretic discernment as a vain thing. On the contrary, it is probable that until those who are blessed with an atheoretic discernment of the spirit attain to a perfect theoretic discernment of it, man will have to grope his way in the dark.

March 5th. Knowledge may be premature. It may displace an illusion indispensable to action on which pro-
gress depends. For example, the knowledge that justice does not include retribution might exempt from the sanctifying influence of fear. It may be that a heart without fear must stagnate in evil.

171.

March 10th. The world presents a real superiority and importance to the child. His vanity aspires to such consideration as is enjoyed by his superiors, and his pride covets a like power and homage. To be like them becomes a dominant attraction. When experience promotes him to the discovery that the coveted superiority has not the substance to satisfy human capacity and hunger (which nothing less than heaven can content) vanity and pride persist in apprehending importance in the world, and, through this infatuation, continually return to their vomit. They cannot aspire to heaven, and can, therefore, have no object save the world. It is this persistence of vanity and pride—in a word, of worldliness—that chiefly distracts and enervates the worldly who by higher parts of their nature are called to godliness, and opposes or excludes devout volition. They find it difficult or impossible to be in the world and not of it—to have intercourse with the world and not to be worldly—to withdraw into humility and godliness from accustomed apprehensions of vanity and pride while they are in presence of the idol of worldliness. Habit holds the soul subject to the functions of the organs of pride and vanity if she have not the voluntary power to withdraw herself, or if she have, makes the transfer of herself to a different plane of apprehension and judgment difficult and painful. When the soul succeeds in tearing herself from the grasp of this habit, the sign of her success is that she feels the insignificance of the world except as a means to something higher—a round in Jacob's ladder—and desires to pursue in obscurity the way to heaven.
The name worldliness signifies two things, an organ and a spirit. The soul taken together with the physical organs on which vanity and pride depend, constitutes the organ, worldliness. The organ exists when the worldly are unconscious, as well as when it is generating the sentiment proper to it. The spirit of worldliness is the soul quoad subject of sentiments of pride and vanity, or of a correlated instinctive activity. The one may be distinguished as organal worldliness, and the other as spirit of worldliness.

Before reflection detects the spirit of worldliness, the latter is an instinctive energy or activity. Afterwards, if the subject exert due volition, it is reduced to a mere motive, but with an executive power in it capable of proceeding to the accomplishment of its end if the will permit. When detected by one incapable of corrective volition its nature as instinct is unaltered: there is nothing terminated by the change but the latency of the spirit or instinct. Previously it was not and now it is an object of consciousness, and it seems to its subject to be a mere motive with which he freely complies. In all cases it is a consciousness—in the latent state a latent consciousness, in the other two states an objective consciousness.

When the spirit of worldliness is latent, it is a necessary force in respect of which we have no power or responsibility. We are equally impotent and irresponsible in respect of it when, though it be discerned by us, we are without power to resist it, being destitute of will. It is for the voluntary to redeem first themselves, and then mankind from the dominion of this instinct. To them belongs the duty and the cross. But, to fulfil this duty,—to crucify themselves effectually on this cross—they must know what is to be done, and this they cannot know without discriminating between the power that is to do, and the thing upon which it is to act. They must distinguish will from instinct that counterfeits volition, climbing upon inference to cognitive apprehension involving sentiment and motive.
March 20th. Analysis shows that some of our fundamental cognitions are inconsistent, and common sense ignores this showing as being absurd. Is analysis entitled to more credit when it shows that the idea of God is contradictory? Common sense repudiates the total discredit of analysis no less than its absurd showing in respect of fundamental ideas. There is a selective virtue in common sense which adopts into belief what does not seem to it absurd in the product of analysis, and discards the rest. It is reasonable that faith should exert a like prerogative.

March 26th. To the godly an imperative of conscience is a command of God. Not that they are certain of this but know it in the way of faith as they know God. They can therefore truthfully say that God has commanded them to do this and that, and has made them the media of his commands to others, subject to their authority. They can also truthfully teach as dogma the theology (including a cosmogony) which has in any way formed in their faith. But are they bound to qualify their statement by an explanation or acknowledgment that it proceeds from faith, not certainty? They are bound to do this to those who are, but not to those who are not capable of understanding what faith is. To the latter they must be unintelligible if they should endeavour to state the whole truth: they would be understood to mean, not that they had faith, but that they doubted. Therefore you falsify their minds by your qualification in a greater degree than it is liable to be falsified by the unqualified statement.

There is another class of persons in respect of whom we are not only not bound to qualify the statement, but are bound to forbear from qualifying it, those, namely, whose minds it is our duty to form, and who are altogether
or as yet incapable of faith. It is our duty to mould their minds according to what we believe to be best in our own; and to state to them that we are not certain respecting matters of faith would be to exclude religion from their hearts. We deprive them of the benefit of habits, to the genesis of which either faith or certainty respecting God is indispensable. We in any case inflict on them a moral injury, and if they be incapable of knowing what faith is we falsify their minds respecting ours in a greater degree than by abstaining from attempt at explanation.

But persons of this class are prone to question their authoritative superiors as to the source of their knowledge, which tends to elicit the fact that the knowledge is not of the nature of certainty. In such cases, as in all cases, our words must be, not only as to what they express, but as to what they are intended to imply, conformable to truth. If we have no other resource, we must admit in our answer that we have not certainty of what we believe. Providence will know how to deal with the consequences of our truthfulness. But we have resources if we are at pains to prepare them, and do not expose ourselves to surprise. Our authority, if we have duly denied ourselves to exalt it, is a great resource. An intimation from an authoritative person that the question is improper easily dismisses it from the mind of the enquirer if the authority be great. To acquire this degree of authority it is necessary to shun familiarity. We can tell the enquirer that God forbids us to answer the question at that time—that the answer may be given to him later (provided we have hope that the faculty of faith will be developed in him by and by.) If we have the requisite skill, it is our duty to divert the questioner to other topics, as the skilful physician diverts the lunatic from topics on which it is hurtful for him to dwell.

It is the need of this legitimate art that has so often betrayed the priest into priestcraft. Lacking the fine discrimination and peremptoriness proper to the highest truthfulness,
priests devoutly bent upon establishing the reign of God in the human heart have confounded lying with truthful art, and, seeing occasion to employ the latter, have failed to see that they were not to employ the former, and have proportionately obstructed religion.

But all the force of authority and art will not avail to exclude need of an avowal that we do not know certainly what we know by faith when the avowal must beget either doubt or infidelity. And we have reason to rejoice at this, not to regret or fear. Change of theology—change from one system of religion to another—is essential to human progress. The theology of a society is determined by the degree of the mental development of the society. It is near or remote from the truth in proportion as our intellectual and emotive knowledge is greater or less. When a given theology has advanced us a given way towards God and truth, it tends to detain us at that point from God and truth. Reverence clings to it, supposing it to be the final word of God supernaturally revealed. It is now the devil's turn to be useful in the service of God, to demolish an impeding theology that was once progressive, and set free the spirit of godliness to inorganize itself in a theology nearer to the truth. Lucian and Voltaire serve God and man, though in a spirit the opposite of that of Moses and Christ. But the demolishers and founders of religion are alike insubordinate to human authority. It is good, therefore that humanity affords an order of mind upon which human authority cannot impose its empire. Not that we are not to exhaust all means to subdue to our authority those who, if it be possible, should be subject to it, but that, if our efforts prove abortive, we are not to conclude that the consequences of our failure must be altogether evil. We must have faith that Providence is able to utilize evil.

It is the duty of every individual, family, and society to excommunicate those who are not of his or its faith, that is,
to exclude them from an intimacy of intercourse calculated to infect the faith, relax its energy, or impair the authority on which it may be founded. Morality is in proportion to the energy of faith. In times of transition from religion to religion the energy of faith is either relaxed or effete in the bulk of the society. The practical life is proportionately unsound. There is a general corruption of manners. Now it is obedience, not theory, that sanctifies. Obedience according to a given faith prepares in the heart the basis of a higher faith. Without time for the operation of obedience or self-denying devotion faith must retrograde. Polemic must constantly substitute itself for the sanctifying energy of obedience or good works, and so must exclude the formation of a higher theory of faith. Without excommunication, constant polemic would exclude the practice indispensable to the formation of better theory. Hence excommunication is necessary to religious progress as giving an indispensable duration to particular systems of religion and a corresponding time for obedience, enabling each system to do its sanctificating and enlightening work.

Excommunication is mere exclusion from intercourse. It does not involve the cursing which the Church of Rome connects with it. Religion has no need of total excommunication. It can tolerate civil and industrial intercourse, and the interchange of humane offices. Churches trespass upon the freedom necessary to religious progress when they apply civil power against those who are opposed to them.

It will be objected against excommunication that it excludes the action of mind upon mind, whereby an impeding theology may be abolished, and, therefore, tends to petrify the spirit of godliness for ever in an imperfect theology. The answer is, that the normal genesis of religious revolution is within not without the church or religious organism. Obedience makes us better than the
theory of our faith, and increase of knowledge shows it to be contradictory. It ceases to fit to our enhanced sentiment of goodness as well as to our extended knowledge of nature. We endeavour to remove the incongruity. Invention exhausts itself in additions and subtractions, and all manner of modification, with a view to adjustment. Some prefer this explanation, others that, and thus an interior polemic obtains which splits the organism into sects. They endeavour to proselytize each other before they have got the length of excommunication, and thus an exterior polemic obtains which affords opportunity to the atheist and the scoffer. Jansenius and Pascal forge the weapons of Voltaire.

174.

April 1st. Upon occasion of reading how Athanasius availed of a pretext for refusing the command of the Emperor to leave Alexandria, whereby Arianism would be likely to have obtained an advantage, it occurred to me that, since certain ends of omnipotence are not realizable without use of means, a certain policy, craft, strategy within the limits of truth, if such a thing be possible, may be amongst the means that are indispensable for the achievement of the Divine ends, and that it may be the duty of holy men to employ such means in the service of God. For example, the Emperor Constantius sent orders to Syrianus, Duke of Egypt, to banish Athanasius, and the latter replied to the messenger of Syrianus that he had returned to his diocese by direct order of the Emperor, and that he would not leave it without a direct order. He did not affect to deny that the Emperor had indirectly ordered him into banishment, but by a crafty pretext that does not seem at first sight to involve anything contrary to truth, he evaded the order, and at the same time the appearance of rebellion against the authority and power from which it proceeded.
The spirit of truth answers the question at once in the negative. Nor would it be possible for a mind of a certain degree of purity to propose to itself such a question but for self-distrust and the authority of revered men who have sanctioned a certain use of craft. Falsehood is essential to craft.

APRIL 1ST. The religious principle tends to limit the operation of reason in the majority of men so as to render it abortive in respect of argument opposed to the religious dogmas of the man. This disposition of mind is of indispensable utility as securing duration to religious systems and corresponding obedience or practice, without which a progress in sanctity is impossible. Men would be liable to change their religion frequently, and so to lose all practical regard for religion, if they were as accessible to objections against their own tenets as they are quick to discover objections to those of others. The natural history of the human mind is the history of a progress through error towards truth. In the course of this development every theology is necessarily more or less erroneous. If men should shift from theology to theology as often as other men could indicate the errors inherent in each, there would be no religious conduct—no doing the will of the Father—whereby the faculty of spiritual truth is developed.

APRIL 2ND. I addressed myself to meditation with the view of exciting in my heart a clear sentiment of duty in respect of that part of the business of the day in which I was presently to engage. There was a tendency to consider the matter irrespective of God, as if it were competent to me to reason and purpose wisely without reference to God. My spirit revolted. It would fain address itself to listening
for the command of God, not to a process of mere ratio-
cination. Not that there must be no reasoning, but that it must form upon a basis of attention to God and expect-
tation of receiving the Divine command. It adores the authority of God, and is averse to receiving the reason of its action from any inferior source. It is its prerogative to have for its reason of action the command of God—a prerogative not proudly but lovingly apprehended.

A judgment formed upon such a basis must be the best of which the mind is capable. Is it not then by inspiring us to look to him for command and counsel that God, eliciting what is best in our mind as the scheme of our action, leads us through life along the way to Heaven?

177.

APRIL 2ND. The sadness which attends the thought that I am never in this life to recover my beloved daughter—now in Heaven—and which, if it were cherished, would develop into grief, carries with it a feeling that it is adverse to godliness, and that it is my duty to put it away. The indulgence of creature affection towards my living children brings with it no such immediate warning.

178.

APRIL 2ND. According to the idea of omniscience there is no necessary connection between it and power. The idea of an omniscient impotent being is not inconsistent. Omniscience then might be connected with different degrees of power, as well as with infinite power or omnipotence. The difference of different degrees of power connected with omniscience must be proportionate to the difference of the immediate effects to which the powers are adequate—the difference, in other words, of the change which they are competent to produce immediately upon the rest of being; for the difference of the changes which they would be
competent to cause *mediately* must be proportionate to the difference of what they could cause immediately, and is, therefore, superfluous as measure of the difference.

The immediate power of the human will extends and is limited to a certain determination of the action of the other mental faculties and of the automatic forces which are the immediate causes of the bodily motions commonly known as voluntary. The immediate power of a higher but finite will might be conceived to extend to causation of action of the faculties of certain other beings. The immediate power of yet another might be conceived to extend to the causation of change, not only in certain animate beings, but also in certain inanimate things, and so on through an infinitude of differences up to omnipotence. But omnipotence thus conceived does not suppose a correlative impotence in the rest of being, so that all changes of which the latter is susceptible, including that of which it is mediately susceptible, can be caused in it immediately. Omnipotence accordingly might be defined, power to cause immediately all change of which being is immediately susceptible, and infinite mediate change.

**April 4th.** The idea of will supposes it to exclude possibility of development. If it should appear that the intrinsic power of what we term will is variable, is greater at one time than at another, is improvable or the reverse, either by its own action or that of any improvement of the heart however caused, it would therein appear that it is a mere instinct, and not a free power. But its intrinsic power is the same from first to last—the same on the first as on the last occasion of self-denial in obedience to the call of duty and in opposition to strongest desire. By obedience it improves its *circumstances*, and diminishes the power of opposed instinct; and this is mistaken for an enhancement of its intrinsic power. The obedience
develops the germs of affection to God and the neighbour—to God and universal happiness—together with kindred affections. The soul is more frequently solicited by duty in proportion as it grows in spiritual affection. The multiplication of occasions of choice proportionately diminishes the reign of latent instinct, until at last every occasion of action becomes an occasion of reference to God through the moral sense, involving almost continual recollection. This seems to be a growth of will—of voluntary power—whereas it is merely an enhancement of conditions that abet the will and a degradation of hostile conditions. The abettors are spiritual affection and remembrance of devout purpose on pertinent occasions of action. If the soul, as will, choose contrary to duty, it impairs the sensibility of conscience, and augments the force of adverse motive. It is less and less solicited by duty on what might otherwise be occasions of choice, and less and less disposed to comply with them, until at last conscience solicits it no more.

April 4th. This morning distraction, during the time of meditation, provoked an insurrection of choleric, imperious, teeth-gnashing energy that would fain drive out the enemy in the name of God. It pretended to be will, and it somehow involved the pretext that to expect recollection from grace alone, is to exclude will from the service of God. Before I detected the spuriousness of the counterfeit, I was unaccountably commanded to refuse it.

October 6th. If moral good and evil be arbitrary, not absolute—if they depend on the Divine will—then, if God should break his promise to the elect, and consign them to eternal torment, the act would be good. Nay, if God should invariably act as a demon, the action would be good.
This exhibits the absurdity of the doctrine that good depends on the Divine will.

December 6th. There is a class of men who seem to themselves and others to be hierarchs of common sense. They are men of science, and usefully active in the promotion or application of science. As a rule, people of this class regard religion as a delusion. They ascribe to mere cerebration what the religious ascribe to the present action of Divine power. The Holy Spirit is a mere product of cerebral decomposition—an electrical delusion.

But is not this judgment also the creature of cerebration. and what guarantee has the judge that he is not its dupe? By what criterion, applied to both cerebrations, shall we distinguish the true one?

Christ has given us such a criterion: "By their fruits ye shall know them." Whether will it be more for human prosperity that aversion to religion, or aversion to irreligion, shall prevail with the bulk of mankind? If it be better that we altogether turn our backs upon God, the infidel cerebration is the wise one.

March 3rd. The idea of reading a certain passage in a manuscript of mine to—occurred to me this morning, and elicited an intention to that effect. The idea was not involved with one of not reading the proposed passage, so that the immediate antecedent of the purpose excluded choice. The mind had no more option in respect of the purpose than a falling stone has option in respect of the falling. And this privation of option is given to me as a datum of memory, not as an inference. I remember that I was without option. It would be as reasonable to insist that the fact of consciousness which I am relating included
a reference to the death of Caesar, as to insist that it included option. Either the fact did not occur at all, or it occurred as I remember it.

I did not discern pleasurableness in the end proposed in the idea and, because of the discerned pleasurableness, purpose to read the passage. Nothing intervened between the appearance of the idea and the purpose.

When the purpose was formed, it betrayed a suspicious aspect, and a moment of scrutiny detected that my vanity was interested. But how could vanity have been interested since the idea that the act could procure me consideration was not present to me?

When the detection brought me to myself, the purpose was annulled by the fact as something offensive that had been foisted upon me. It was clear that I had not formed that purpose—that it was an instinctive purpose—that it was no more an act of my will than the modifications of a man's locomotion by St. Vitus' dance are acts of his will.

April 18th. When a reflective man has long striven with his instincts, he comes at last to feel that in certain moods instinct sheds certain of his purposes; so that, if he do not find means to root them more deeply, life must proceed as if they had never obtained. The purposes which instinct thus nullifies are those which do not contemplate immediate action and in which the heart at the time takes no interest. The memory will not charge itself with a purpose unless some means be taken to engraft it in the heart. When we arrive at the immediate discernment of the abortiveness of such a volition, we are intuitively conscious of instinct—the spiritual, voluntary or personal mind is intuitively conscious of the instinctive one, feeling, as it were by touch, the instinctive momentum that tends to overbear volition.
Belief in beneficent tendency which the subject knows to be without the guarantee of inconsistency of the opposite is faith or trust. It has respect to unintelligent as well as to intelligent agents. The husbandman's hope of the harvest may be trust in the beneficent tendency of mere nature. The merchant's hope of profit is generally mere trust in the ordinary course of events. Filial and conjugal trust, the trust of friendship, and that more limited trust on which the public business of society proceeds, are examples of faith or trust that has respect to intelligent agents.

There are two kinds of faith or trust that have not been hitherto distinguished, viz., involuntary and voluntary faith. A man prone to infidelity, may, on discovering the perniciousness of his tendency, resolve to trust in the existence and government of God; and if a constant and self-denying devotion proceed from the act, it supposes trust, which, as being of the will, and not of the mental susceptibility, is voluntary trust. The rarity of this kind of faith has excluded it from general notice, so that faith has been supposed to be essentially involuntary.

It may be consistently held that voluntary faith depends upon grace: the idea of voluntary faith implies nothing to the contrary.

Involuntary faith is of various degrees. Involuntary faith in God is great in proportion as it exempts its subject from concern respecting his temporal future. The infidel believes that the empire of natural causes is unlimited. Perfect faith apprehends them as the mere instruments of Divine power, and is therefore unconcerned about those of their operations that but for the faith would appear to menace. Between these two terms, the maximum and zero of faith, there is an infinitude of degrees.

In certain cases involuntary faith in God looks for
extraordinary or miraculous manifestations of Divine power moving its subject to enterprises which proceed upon the expectation of miraculous co-operation. There have been signal instances of the justification of such expectations by fact. But there have been also remarkable instances of the contrary, such as the disappointment respecting the success of the crusade. The success of Mr. Muller, of Bristol, before the knowledge of his dependence on prayer became a natural abetting agent, is a striking instance of the success of transcendent faith.

One of the ends of voluntary faith in God is to merge itself in involuntary faith—to make for itself, by the help of God, a terra firma so that it may fold its tired wings and be at rest. If it should please God to give this blessed result to voluntary faith there would be as much difference as well as resemblance between its subject and the subject of an involuntary faith, which human will has not contributed to make, as there is between wisdom and innocence.

They would be alike as to childlikeness, which is the type of human perfection. But there would be a knowledge and power in the man whose will had contributed to bring him into this spirit which the other would lack.

The maxims and legislation of religion have hitherto referred only to involuntary faith: they have had respect to voluntary faith, not as a clearly distinguished species of faith, but as volition related to faith. It is true that many of the saints undergoing the torment of privation of involuntary faith have clung by bare will to God, and that this voluntary adhesion has become known in spiritual language by the name "love of the will." This did not suffice to disclose the specific character of voluntary faith. It is true also that this higher kind of faith, in spite of its partial self-ignorance, has been at work in every spiritual life, producing that species of sanctity which is known as solid virtue. Nevertheless, from failure to distinguish its specific character as a kind of faith, it is ignored by all received
religious theory, and is therefore liable to be regarded as an enemy: for up to a certain phase of human development reverence is averse to novelty. When religion recognizes voluntary faith, it will also recognize that God proceeds differently with those who are, and those who are not, capable of the dominion which it supposes.

May 11th. To speculate concerning the existence and government of God as things questionable, is a perversion of Reason that occasions a morbid operation of the faculty, necessarily resulting in scepticism, if the mind, revolting from the danger, do not betake itself in childlike faith to the shelter of Divine authority. Reason cannot wholesomely apply itself to what pertains to religion and morality, except it do so in obedience to God, which supposes it to have received Heaven as a little child, and to proceed upon the axiom that God is, and governs. Nor is reason free from danger of perversion, even when it applies itself as the mere handmaid of faith. It is prone even then to transgress the limits of safe speculation. It should never persist in studying what pertains to God after a warning to desist by anything that obstinately resists accommodation to faith, regarding the apparent resistance as a mere symptom of morbid cerebration consequent on perverse employment of the mind. A childlike self-distrust that admits of no feeling of security, except when we are obeying a feeling of duty, should limit the operations of reason.

May 17th. The faculties of reason and of the sentiment of the good have been given to exhibit to us the Divine imperative—that is to give us the reasonable and the good as Divine command. In their embryonic state they give us imperfect ideas of the reasonable and good detached
from Divine command, and, through morbid function, represent good as not only several from Divine command but as a law to God himself. According to this deliverance, God is only the chief subject and chief constable of the law of righteousness, a deliverance that oppresses the spirit of worship and shrivels the glory of God; but there is no escape from it until we discover the great criterion of credibility, viz., indispensableness to holiness. This discovers to reason its liability to morbid function, and that whatever judgment diminishes the glory of God in the view of the spirit of worship is a mere symptom of morbid operation. Good is not a law to God but simply his imperative to man, and the exponent of his intention with regard to man. It may be objected that to suppose good to be arbitrary—to suppose it identical with Divine command—is to suppose that if God commanded us to do what we now regard as evil, then that would be good. The answer is that it is not given to reason to divine what would or would not be if our Maker had been minded to give us a different law—that, in the view of enlightened reverence such speculations are impious, and that the judgments which they breed are symptoms of morbid function of the reason, and are thoughts in which man tends to lose himself and perish. God is good, not as a voluntary subject of goodness, but as its fountain.

188.

AUGUST 26TH. Conduct or intentional action, according to rule, counteractive of instinct, is the function of will.

The word conduct, means, according to one of its significations, self-guidance or self-government. In this sense it implies the existence of two things in one, viz., a guiding or governing mind and a guided or governed mind; and it supposes a rule or law of restraint which the government is to apply. The mind does in fact involve such a duality
in unity, and the self-governing member is provided with such an idea of rule. The mind, as organ of intelligent instinct, is the governed member, and, as will or faculty of volition, the governing member. As will it enacts or applies rule counteractive of intelligent instinct, or freely and consciously omits such an enactment or application. For example, when indulgence of appetite causes pain, prudence is roused to protect the future of the subject from the evil, and the idea of a prudential rule is evolved which the will is free to enact or not to enact, and subsequently to apply or not to apply. The specific character of the rule is that it is counteractive of intelligent instinct. Volition then is intelligent action of free power enactive or applicative of a rule of conduct.* It is chiefly to be distinguished from action of intelligent instinct, the species nearest to and most liable to be confounded with it. The specific quality of intentional action is that it proceeds upon cognition. In one of its species it proceeds from a free power, viz., will, and is either enactive or applicative of a rule of conduct; in another it proceeds from a power that is not free, viz. intentional instinct.

Selection is either voluntary or involuntary. Choice is voluntary selection. It has respect to alternatives that have for their opposed terms either, 1st, the enactment or repudiation, or 2ndly, the application or pretermission of a rule of conduct.

By entrenching himself in rules of conduct, man secures himself against the caprices of mood. In the enactment of such laws he constructs a rudder wherewith to steer his life. He is no longer at the mercy of the passions, but is able to make them subserve his purpose. His action and his practical judgments acquire the dignity of consistency; not as not being liable to change, but as being liable only

* N.B.—This is true of regular, not of irregular, volition. The former is volition that has, and the latter is volition that has not respect to a rule of action. Instinct also enacts and applies rule of action.
to such change as proceeds from the modification of principle by experience. When the will assumes the conduct of life in the highest degree, that is, as priest of the Most High, the chaotic nature of the heart discovers itself in flagrant opposition. Its Titans strive against order. Its depravity consists, not in the exclusion of all good, but in its being a chaos of good and evil. The chief function of the will is to subdue it into order and so annihilate or bury the evil. The difference between the life that proceeds upon rules of conduct and the instinctive or irregular life is familiar. Every one knows what is signified by the term "man of principle," and the term "unprincipled man." The new thing here signalized is not the difference between conduct and its opposite, but between will and intelligent instinct.

The enactment and application of the best rules of conduct depend upon faith, that is, trust in the being and government of God. But in certain moods the sentiment of faith is impossible, and, were it not for the will, the mind must lapse into infidelity. In these moods, moreover, the evidence that makes against faith is more oppressive, the spirit of holiness affording little or no resistance. In such states of the heart it is possible for will to cleave to God—to substitute voluntary for emotive trust, and this supposes the enactment and application of a law of faith, viz., to hold to the being and government of God and to a corresponding obedience in spite of all that makes to the contrary though it should seem to be demonstration. This clinging of the will to God may be termed voluntary faith. Voluntary faith and conduct constitute the cardinal business of the will.

Duty requires will to exclude from theory (accredited hypothesis) of whatever is contrary to faith, and, when indispensable, to modify ideas, even the most fundamental, so as to harmonize them with faith. This function of the will, wherein it contributes an arbitrary determination of
theory, may be termed the *ideo-modific function of the will*. In the exercise of this function the will proceeds upon the axiom that indispensableness to holiness is the supreme criterion of credibility. It erects upon this axiom or law a new logic, subordinating even the principle of contradiction to its grand criterion.

As will, in conduct, makes intelligent action independent on mood, so, in *arbitrary or voluntary faith*, it makes religion independent on mood. Hitherto emotion has been supposed to be essential to godliness. The author of "Ecce Homo" will have the latter consist in an enthusiastic feeling of benevolence or humanity. According to this hypothesis no sacrifice to God and the neighbour possesses Christian value if it be destitute of reverential and benevolent emotion. But in the highest exercise of voluntary faith it elevates to God not only without the aid but in spite of the gravitation of emotion as well as of evidence that is all but overwhelming. Voluntary faith aims at making reverential and benevolent emotion the normal spirit and basis of all sentiment; but it is itself independent on present emotion. A religion that bases itself upon feeling builds upon the sand, and not only imperils those who risk themselves upon it but excludes those who are capable of scarcely more religious feeling than what suffices to set the will upon scaling Heaven. Such a religion is not in its nature Catholic.

189.

**September 24th.** "If the truth shall make you free, you shall be indeed free."

Knowledge is power. We are necessitated by instincts until we know them. Knowledge reduces them into mere motives with which we are free to comply. We are emancipated from the instinctive power of anger, for example, when we thoroughly know it, so as to discern its least movements, its faintest suggestions, and are bent on frus-
trating it in the name of God. We are freely able to the extent of our knowledge, not beyond it.

190.

April 9th. Providence seems to intend to show me that man cannot ameliorate his heart without grace, although the amelioration exhibits no supernatural character. What is peculiar in the improved heart or improved sentiment and in the mental habit in which the former is manifest, has so natural an air that it is difficult to believe in its supernatural origin. Hence the distrust of Providence to which the heart so strongly gravitates. The corruption wrought by sentiment that exhibits supernatural character has instructed me to distrust all such sentiment, and to cherish the opinion that grace-given sentiment has always an air of nature. Its supernatural origin communicates nothing supernatural to its essence. It is not by the immediate creation of a consciousness, but by mediately causing it through natural antecedents that God imparts improved sentiment.

191.

June 2nd. The change from ignorance to knowledge is for the most part gradual, and every degree of the progress save the last involves error. The movement of conscience from ignorance to wisdom lies through error, but its deliverances are none the less the commands of God. To obey them is not to act perfectly, but to advance towards perfection: to refuse them is to retrograde. What a startling paradox when unexplained, that the Word of God is often erroneous, that it is often a duty to comply with error—that obedience to error is a part of the way to Heaven.

192.

June 6th. Reading yesterday a sermon by Robertson on "Worldliness," I was scandalized by the intrusion into the
business of religion of a metaphysical hypothesis, which, whatever its merit or demerit as mere hypothesis, has no claim to be regarded as matter of knowledge and to be inserted into the foundation of religion. I did not overlook the fact, however, that cognition is in an imperfect state, and needs research to purge and ripen it. Hence the question whether religion should always refuse the modifications of primary belief proposed by philosophy, or if not, how and when should it adopt them. This answer appeared in me. The spirit enthroned in godliness is the judge of all the operations of reason. Indispensableness to holiness is its supreme criterion of truth. Whatever hypothesis appears to it to be indispensable to holiness, is therefore held to be true. However a thesis may otherwise agree to the mind, if it appear to make against faith it is with reason held to be false. The spiritual judge discards all primary beliefs that make against faith. It looks with favour upon every thesis that carries upon its face the recommendation of a felicitous agreement with faith, but only on the condition that it be otherwise of a nature to commend itself to belief. The spirit holds itself to be fallible in respect of all matter of belief save what is essential to holiness, so that it is ready to surrender what it has judged to be true if good cause be shown, providing nothing be surrendered that is indispensable to holiness. In the view of this judge, cognition consists of two species, that which is and that which is not indispensable to holiness. As to the former the mind is infallible, as to the latter, fallible. Nevertheless the spirit rests in the latter as if it were knowledge, and only consents under extraordinary pressure to put it in question. Fallible cognition is sometimes a mere form, an accident of infallible cognition, and may be changed without loss to the latter, as the form of wax without annihilation of the wax. Accordingly the mind is fallible as to the form of theology, but infallible as to its matter.

Hypothesis varies on the scale of probability from a
maximum that tends to confound it with cognition towards a minimum that makes it unworthy of serious attention. To thrust hypothesis that is not indispensable to faith into religious doctrine, is to sicken or expel the spirit of holiness.

JUNE 15TH. Mood is a state of the emotive system which determines the mind to undergo a kind of sentiments—sentiments having a common character, however various the external occasions which affect the emotive organ. It is only by the finest and most experienced reflection that this common character is discernible. Such a reflection can discern a tincture of irascibility, even in hilarity. What is common to the sentiments determined by and significant of mood, may be named latent spirit, as being for the most part ignored by its subject.

Mood may be caused either by a natural or by a supernatural cause; that which is caused supernaturally as by grace may be named supernatural mood; and that which is naturally caused, natural mood.

When natural mood is clearly discerned by the observer, and is known to him as the effect of physical causes, and when, moreover, it is obvious to him that the subject of the mood is ignorant of its existence, that, in other words, the spirit which proceeds from it is latent, and that, therefore, he has no option but to comply with it, the observer is not liable to be emotively affected by the mood as he would be without this knowledge. If, for example, it be an irascible mood, he is not liable to be angered by it, regarding it as an illness of the subject that challenges pity, not reprobation. He is affected towards the subject, as a good physician towards the irascible patient, but so long as this knowledge is merely intellectual it is of little use. Before it can come to the rescue provocation surprises the heart and so possesses it with adverse sentiment and
instinct that there is no room for the influence of the tardy knowledge. Such knowledge does not afford adequate ground for conduct; it is not wisdom. To become wisdom it needs to be transformed into sentiment, and to this end it must contribute to reorganize the heart. To reorganize the heart it must be much pondered and to the utmost practically applied in obedience to God. The obedience must be secured by well-devised mnemonical precautions. Thus, by the grace of God, the merely intellectual knowledge may be converted into heart knowledge—knowledge which the subject "thinks in his heart" and which signifies what he is—"as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he." This heart-knowledge is charity—one of the species of the genus wisdom.

To emancipate ourselves from the empire of mood it is necessary to be resolved upon a rule of conduct applicable to all occasions of action. Tenacity to such a rule would hold the agent in constant relation to a reason of action, maintaining him in personal or voluntary activity and so excluding the extinstive outflow of mood. Religion gives such a rule. But the corrupt heart tends to translate this rule according to its corruption. The proverb that the wish is father to the thought expresses a law of the unsanctified mind, and through this law mood tends to neutralize rule and exclude volition. Knowledge of one's own mood would cripple this tendency, and so enable the personal in man to rule his life. Discernment of the spirit that proceeds from the mood, and which is commonly latent, would be or would involve such a knowledge. Reflection should therefore be frequently directed to the detection of the latent spirit, but of course only by those who are duly prepared by nature and culture.

June 16th. When prudence is alarmed about temporal things its uneasiness tends to pass with its subject for a
culpable distrust of God. But if he have reached a certain point of spiritual development, he understands the alarm and the involved distrust to belong to the impersonal and irresponsible part of him; and his power to act according to faith and holiness—to stem the instinctive force of the prudential distrust—as measuring the personal and responsible part of him. He understands that his personality is signified by his voluntary or optional acts, not by his feelings or instinctive acts, and that he is responsible only so far as he has personal power. He even sees, in the motions of his emotive and instinctive nature that are adverse to faith and holiness, what, although evil, is indispensable to the development of the personal, responsible or new man. Resistance to this evil is the nutriment and exercise whereby the embryo of the personal man is developed into a regnant power of regular obedience. It is developed by irregular obedience into a power of regular obedience or power of conduct.

195.

JUNE 20TH. What is badly named self-respect is aversion to coarseness and every variety of irreverence, especially to familiarity that in the name of love would cast respect out of intercourse. The recoil of taste and reverence from vulgarity, which is no more a reasoned act than the shrinking of the sensitive plant, is erroneously imputed to a sentiment in which the subject is supposed to apprehend a dignity in himself that would be violated by participation in the vulgarity.

196.

JUNE 24TH. The name humility is ambiguous. It signifies congenital defect of a certain spirit, namely, the spirit of pride, vanity, anger, and the like, and it signifies sanctity considered as excluding that spirit. Holy humility is as remote from congenital humility as it is from pride, vanity
and anger. It is a spirit of wisdom and power. It elevates its subject above the reach of provocation and the sphere of worldly illusion, as the adult is raised above the passions and illusions of the child. The ambiguity contributes to maintain the obstinate error that supposes abjectness to be the alternative of a high spirit. It serves to confound holy humility with that which is congenital and abject, and so excites a moral repugnance to religion.

Holy humility has no natural language.

June 30th. There seems to be an epoch in the natural history of mankind whereat development has hitherto failed, and given place to decay. It is the point at which the anthropomorphic idea of the Divine exhibits flagrant contradictions, and religion ceases to support morality. Modern civilization seems in its most advanced parts to have touched this epoch, so that men who could better part with life than faith are driven to the alternative of infidelity or a scepticism that arbitrarily denies what to mere reason is demonstration. Reason assents that abortion, corruption and despair will be the portion of those who, because of apparent inconsistency, abandon religion, and that those who hold to it are likely to be the pioneers of the race into a new phase of development. It is reasonable then to accept as symbol of the incomprehensible God the anthropomorphic image which man formerly mistook for the true idea of the Divine, and, excluding disturbing speculation with all our might, sequester ourselves in worship and vigorous obedience, mindful of the words of Christ, “what is that to thee: follow thou me.”

June 30th. There are instinctive and uninstinctive feelings. Duty is given for the most part in uninstinctive sentiment.
It never generates spontaneous or instinctive action, but always appeals as mere motive to our power of choice—to will. That it has not power as it has authority is because it lacks instinctive force.

199.

JUNE 30TH. Perhaps the emotive and instinctive mind is not susceptible of any considerable amelioration, and that in this life devotion can do no more than perfect our knowledge of good and evil.

200.

JUNE 30TH. Latent desire is detected when we set about doing a duty that postpones a more congenial course of action. The gravitation of the heart to the more congenial action resists us in the performance of the duty. If the duty be a meditation involving prayer, self-examination, and enquiry what God will have us do, we find ourselves hurrying the mental discourse to get to the more congenial work. Yet if there were no interruption we would not be conscious of desire in respect of the work, but would seem to ourselves to be indifferently approaching it.

201.

JUNE 30TH. I have twice detected on enquiring of myself why I had not done certain things, that it was because of defect of power which, although in some inexplicable way appreciable to consciousness, was not known by me. In both cases what I had failed to do was writing a letter. When I demanded of myself why I should not at once write the letter I became aware that needful ideas were wanting to me and that to make a toilsome search for them would be incongruous with the spirit in which the letter should be written. I felt that the privation of power to throw ideas upon paper with ease and cordiality had
latently determined me to postpone writing, and that if the missing ideas had at any time in the interim appeared in my heart they would have at that time determined me to write, at least have put me in such a disposition to write that I would have been reluctant to deny myself the satisfaction of doing so. I did not postpone from knowing that I could not write. I had no option respecting the postponement, for the question of writing had not occurred to me. The privation determined me without choice. Most people would have felt under the circumstances that they had freely postponed and would be liable to regard the postponement as a violation of duty. Impotence vaguely modifying consciousness determined the delay.

October 5th. It is the power of God that causes the radical subjective changes which duty challenges the will to undertake, just as the automatic forces cause bodily movements in compliance with will. Without cordial knowledge of God there is no responsibility, because there is no power. I tried when atheist to lift myself upon the love of perfection out of a moral slough in which I had long grovelled; but instinct, deploying abnormal force, overthrew me. When I came to the knowledge of God, the instinct slunk away with scarce a show of resistance.

October 22nd. Suspicion that one for whom I am responsible was set upon deceiving me, and so demoralizing himself, was so active on my heart as to endanger an insurrection of anger. As my present most pressing affair in the business of spiritual improvement is to suppress the violent man and to establish my soul in peace as the condition of self-government, I turned to God in prayer—prayer for help, and also that, by referring my difficulty to
him, the involved contemplations of him might supplant violent tendency by holy love. I did not distinctly intend this, but instinct proceeded in me as though I so intended. The result of this reference to God was the discernment that my suspicion had formed upon a basis of moral infirmity—that the anxiety tends to inflame anger, and anger to exclude wisdom and conduct, substituting instinctive action for that of the commissioned servant of God. It was made manifest to me that until all uneasiness disappear and I think the matter upon a basis of peace, I am unfit, and therefore uncommissioned to meddle with it. It was also made clear to me that natural affection is a cause of the anxiety, and that the affection needs to be tempered by the supernatural love of God in order that I shall think of what menaces its object in the peace that passeth understanding. I welcome this word of God as an angel. The anxiety has disappeared in joy and gratitude; and experience gives me ground to hope that, if I act upon the word with due industry, my emotive nature will undergo a radical change.

DECEMBER 18TH. The truth of truths, which may be termed, as in holy writ, the truth, is the truth of the cordial cognition that holiness is the chief good. A cognition is cordial when it is emotive and a basis of desire. Holiness in the creature is a supreme love of God involving knowledge of God and a just love of the neighbour. Holiness is the basis of wisdom. Wisdom may be defined knowledge of all things that are important to the subject and to society as bearing upon the dignity and happiness of both, and of which holiness is the basis. Accordingly, one may be perfectly holy without being wise, since he may be perfectly holy without having knowledge of all things that are conducive to human dignity and happiness. Nevertheless, according to the popular mind, which regards every embryo
of wisdom as wisdom, not only perfect holiness, but every degree of imperfect holiness is wisdom.

December 29th. That Christ symbolized the instinct of nobleness under the figure of Satan is not altogether destitute of verisimilitude. Two members of his trinity of evil, the world and the flesh are parts of human nature, which authorizes a presumption that the third may also be a part. Satan was the archangel, and next in dignity to God.

Pure nobleness ranks, as constituent of sanctity, next to godliness, being the instinct of sincerity and generosity. Satan fell through forgetfulness of God in the contemplation of his own perfection. The instinct of nobleness has fallen into selfishness and violence through making itself a basis of virtue independent of God, as in stoicism, in the morality of chivalry, and in all morality that does not consciously hinge upon the will of God. When the suggestions of the instinct are given as Divine commands, it operates as a constituent, and next to godliness, the most precious constituent of wisdom. But if it generates moral sentiment irrespective of God, it converts into an enemy of God and man—an accomplice of the World and the Flesh.

December 30th. On Christmas Eve, a mistake respecting my financial resources excited a slight anxiety that, on Christmas morning, developed into enervative fear. Before I rose I had discerned ground of faith that Christ is our High Priest; and this thought excited a feeling of satisfaction that involved a mitigation of my fear if it did not altogether extinguish it. I prayed to Christ to intercede for me, that my strength should be made equal to my suffering; that I might be able to stand up under it with
personal power, with voluntary (not instinctive) patience. That to this end I should be relieved of the enervating excess of fear, I prayed to God to draw me to Jesus, and to confirm to me, by honouring Christ's intercession for me, my opinion respecting his hierarchic function and excellence. Then it occurred to me to honour the Mother of Jesus by asking for her intercession also. My faith included nothing to which prayer for the intercession of Mary was repugnant. It would be according to humility to pray to her on the understanding that, although on the one hand in doing so I might be wide of conformity with reality, on the other the intercession of the holy might be of more value with God than that of the unworthy. On this understanding, I asked for her intercession with her son to obtain for me the needed condition of personal power. I also prayed for the intercession of St. Joseph and St. Francis of Sales. After a little, I found that the enervating quality of my fear was extinguished, and that there remained only a warning anxiety which seemed to be rather an occasion of strength and courage than of weakness. I looked the menace of poverty in the face with the feeling that I could fight. Remembering at church that I had prayed to God directly as well as to Jesus and Mary for this relief, it appeared to me that the success of my prayer would not sufficiently signify a Divine sanction of faith in Jesus. I therefore besought the mother of Jesus to obtain for me such a love of God as would leave no room in my heart for worldliness, implying in the prayer that if this holy and purifying affection were granted to me, I should receive it as a command from God to recognize in Jesus a transcendent and adorable superiority and function in respect of mankind. That the function is temporary, and is to cease when the kingdom of God is finally established, and that its final establishment might obtain on earth, were distinctly included in the view of Christ to which the success of my prayer was to pledge me. The
1868. Theory of Christ's function and dignity to which the success was to engage my faith neither allows nor denies his divinity but postpones the question; although, when studied with a view to the solution of the question, it evinces signs of a development adverse to the thesis affirmative of a Trinity. That, according to Scripture, Christ is finally to resign the sceptre to God, makes against his divinity and in favour of the thesis that *God the Son* is God communicating with men through the Saviour, High Priest and King, Jesus Christ, that *God the Holy Ghost* is God immediately influencing the hearts of ordinary men, and that *God the Father* is God in relation to the only man who knew the paternal character of God, so that the holiness of the man was free to contemplate God as Father, and to authorize all other men to regard themselves as children of God.

Throughout Christmas Day, I was exempt from morbid fear, but on the following morning it again assailed me. On the other hand I was enabled to encounter it with unusual power of will, and the resistance seemed to raise me into a more commanding view of the situation. I comprehended that Divine love and wisdom had destined me to be tempered in a fire appalling to the ignorant and craven heart, but which knowledge strips of its paralyzing power. This knowledge does not abate the pain of fear but gives consciousness of power to fight it. Voluntary patience is not passive, but active—it fights.

The renewal of the assault of fear gave me to understand that God did not sanction my proceeding with regard to Jesus and Mary, and all the more that a part of the contemplated danger was danger of mortification of my worldliness. My reverence for Jesus indisposed me to acknowledge the apparent refusal of God to make me so far a Christian; but, considering how reverence, when not prevented by nobleness, tends, in such perplexities, to beget what may be named pious insincerity, I resolutely concluded
that God would not have me to be, at least as yet, a Christian.

That the fear was a symptom of bodily disorder was shown by the fact that while I was on my way to —, and before I had examined my affairs, it yielded to a feeling of animal strength and comfort.

In the calm that succeeded, it appeared to me, and still appears, that the event involved a transition of my spirit from the state of spiritual adolescence to that of spiritual manhood. The change seemed less a change of heart than an enhancement of spiritual vision and power. The fear that assailed me on the morning after Christmas was of the same enervating nature as that which attacked me on Christmas morning, but I was armed against it by a new consciousness of power. I felt able to cope, in the cause of God, with adversity. Thitherto my faith seemed to be impotent against fear of poverty, and, therefore, to be a mere nestling of temporal prosperity. I felt that it could not stand the blight of poverty. My consciousness of impotence to sustain it under the burden of poverty was wont to find refuge in trust that God measures power, including consciousness of power, to the believer according to his need, and that, therefore, what appears to be faith is not to be discredited because it does not evince power to support some merely possible or threatening contingency. But now all that was changed. I had become alive with consciousness of power to fight fear and every calamity it could threaten. I had become a soldier of God. The fear that used to vanquish was upon me, but now for the first time in front of a courage that measured and found itself equal to the danger.

The courage was the basis of a cognition of the "uses of adversity" upon which an affection to adversity might form. Take away the basis and there remains a vain symbol of the cognition, such as vulgarly allows the thesis that the uses of adversity are sweet, but affords
no fortitude, much less a desire, to suck wisdom from adversity.

JANUARY 2ND. Most people allow the thesis "sweet are the uses of adversity," but who knows so as to desire adversity from which the honey may be sucked. Who has the courage essential to this knowledge? Nature does not of herself afford this courage. It depends upon grace. It is this supernatural courage that was added to me last Christmas morning. It was withdrawn this morning and my heart was delivered over to a morbid fear of adversity, that, by abstraction and synthesis, I might distinguish it, know that it is supernatural, and know that it is essential to the faith wherein we believe with power that we are commissioned to achieve sanctity by suffering. It involves knowledge, viz., knowledge that "it is a vain thing that affrighteth thee"—vain as cause of the distrust of God involved in every fear of temporal danger, but important as occasion of sanctification. When this courage is withdrawn there remains but a vain symbol of that knowledge, and the soul, sick with fear, sees no resource within itself from which to recover the missing beatitude. Then, according to experience, this kind of courage never obtains but as the result of faith, prayer and obedience. Therefore we judge that it is supernatural, and that it is essential to cognition capable of being a basis of a desire of adversity.

JANUARY 5TH, 5 O'CLOCK A.M. I experienced a great love of God when I awoke, and a desire of needful adversity, and then a strong attraction to Mary Mother, and to all the Saints. Presently a hope obtained in me that I was, through Mary's intercession, to be relieved of worldliness. This augmented my joy in the Blessed Virgin and all
Saints, and I was delighting myself in the communion when it appeared to me that the delight was not based upon a supreme love of God. I am writing under the impression that the delight is idolatrous. My heart seems chilled towards God when I turn to him. The fact seems to be a rebuke of the thesis that the intercession of saints is of transcendent value and that they are entitled to solemn signs of respect, but it does not impugn the marvellous emotion of faith in which it began, and which raised me to such a business sentiment of the sanctifying value of adversity as made suffering desirable. In comparison with this what I experienced on Christmas Day was so insignificant that the difference seems to be one of kind rather than degree.

(June 12th, 1872. The rapture and the involved desire of adversity were morbid facts. Nothing remains of them but shame to have been their dupe.)

January 6th. To become a free subject of God is to become master of oneself. Out of the kingdom of God the soul is a mere implement of nature. Last evening a remembrance of an unatoned injury put upon me by persons who owed me respect, obedience and love, excited in me a violent indignation such as vulgar morality esteems justifiable. Urgent to escape from this bad feeling, and to recover my home in humility, charity and peace, I found myself in sudden enjoyment of these beatitudes, and of the liberty that depends on them.

January 7th. In obedience to a Divine command I have this morning vowed never to discourse with others about religion, except when I am distinctly ordered by God to do
This does not exclude such brief references to religious matters as are called for by common occasions.

211. January 9th. It has pleased God to deprive me since the 5th inst. of the supernatural sentiment which I then experienced. I am still perplexed as to what he will have me understand respecting Jesus and the value of the intercession of saints. In order to ascertain his will respecting faith in Jesus I have this morning prayed to Jesus to intercede for me that my desire of distinction be extinguished. I do not ask that I be altogether purged of worldliness: I ask only to be relieved of ambition.

212. January 10th. What I experienced on the 5th inst. has given me the following definition of faith. Faith is an emotion whereby Reason is persuaded that reality corresponds to the idea of God and to that of his government. It involves a supreme love of God and a corresponding disposition to comply with his will—a disposition that manifests itself as fortitude, and that, considered in relation to occasions of painful obedience, may be termed the spirit of the cross. There is an emotion that resembles faith as disposing to belief in God and involving love to God; but it does not afford rest nor support on occasions of difficult obedience. To those who have experienced both emotions the latter seems to be natural, and the former supernatural. The latter affords to will an occasion of trust in God which I have long mistaken for faith.

213. January 13th. There is no sign that my prayer of the 9th has or has not obtained what it asked. I have this morning prayed directly to God that if he have not assigned
a peculiar and superior value to the intercession of the saints, he will signify the same to me by some striking amelioration of my heart, some unmistakable enhancement of wisdom, some degradation of bad instinct.

Is this method of enquiring of God consistent with holiness? I am by no means at ease with it, and have asked pardon for employing it, if it be irreverent. A grave objection applies against it. If it were a valid method that could be universally applied the application must result in the substitution of certainty for faith as regards religion; in which case prudence would turn devotee and exclude the new man. But, on the other hand, it might be available only to those in whom faith had already developed personality—who had manifested a regnant will by unswerving devotion under due trial.

214.

January 14th. Thinking this morning of the worldliness of D—, I saw in it the image of the world in myself and in every member of my family. I stirred its cowardly sensibility by imagining relations and acts that wound it, and, by thus giving it consciousness of its power, I was able to regard D—'s subjection to the infirmity with perfect charity. But not without prayer. I prayed "forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those that trespass against us," and a hope appeared in me that in proportion as charity for the moral evil in others develops in my heart, the power of worldliness and of all other moral evil to which I am subject will diminish. In other words, hell is to be consumed by charity. I felt in my charity for D—a virtue that promised to heal my worldliness. The joy I experienced suggested the question whether God were operating any amelioration significant as to faith in Jesus. It appeared to me that he was not, and nevertheless the fact attested the wisdom of Jesus. Pondering these things, I was struck by a strange suggestion. Before reading the work that expelled
me while yet a boy from Christianity I prayed that God would enable me to detect and expose what my faith assumed to be the error of that work. What now if God had taken me at my word, and committed me to the terrible schooling of infidelity, as the condition of learning to prove that Christ is "the way, the truth, and the life!"

(August 14th, 1872. The illumination of the heart referred to above expired without leaving the least sign of itself in my memory, so that I have been since at a loss to know what was the wonder which it pretends to record. The extraordinary change of heart which I experienced yesterday, instructs me that it must have been a like change. Is the beatitude of yesterday to expire in like manner and leave me to wailing and gnashing of teeth?)

January 19th. Missing in a person subject to my authority the accustomed sympathy, I experienced a beginning of anger. Noticing the emotion, and knowing by experience what would be its development if unrestrained, I discovered it to be the manifestation of a truculent and tyrannical selfishness which, made sensitive by consciousness of power, tends to apprehend such a failure as an injury not only to love but to dignity and to apply the power penally against the offender. I was aware that bodily disorder was the cause of the mood that tended to provoke me. If the consideration of this fact had been at first as vivid as it became when I set myself to undo its effect, the effect would not have obtained. This is important with reference to discovery of the law of the emotion and of rules for its exclusion; for, if we can so reorganize the mind that it shall spontaneously refer the irritating mood to necessity—to a course that excludes responsibility—we may thereby paralyze the organ of the selfishness.
When I detected this latent devil in my heart tenderness supplanted irritation, and a cheerful consciousness of power to relieve myself for ever of an enemy proved that I had been all along irresponsible for the sentiments of which that enemy had made me the subject and for the consequent actions—in respect of which I was implement, not agent. The instinct with which I complied is the instinct of the tyrant. It is odious, but its odiousness should not stigmatize its first victim—the tyrant. It has a function of indispensable utility during the infancy of civilization, that of instigating coercion in parents, tutors, and magistrates, and of excluding occasion of coercion by the awe which it inspires when involved with authority. To regard the tyrant as culpable, is to be stultified by the presumption that he discerns not only the instinct by which he is instigated but also its moral character and chooses to comply with it. The Neros and Caligulas are as blamable as the missile that wounds you. You are the dupe of the uncharity with which you regard them. When are we to emerge from this embryoism into wisdom?

216.

A man becomes simple (at one with himself) when his heart consents with a business sentiment of the thesis that sanctity is the summum bonum. So long as the heart is set upon other ends, such as wealth, power, renown, it puts those who are minded to achieve sanctity at variance with themselves, so that they are in the position of a servant of two masters. If prudence or fear make wealth the cardinal end of such a one, he is liable to be latently influenced by it, even in deliberation, so as to be ignorantly deflected from the way of sanctification. An indistinct uneasiness attends this condition of mind, as is shown by the relief consequent on discernment of the right way, and a resolution to pursue it.
Without grace the spirit is asphyxiated and the man is altogether impersonal and instinctive. When St. Paul said, "In him we live, and move, and have our being," did he not mean by the pronoun "we," the spiritual? The impersonal or instinctive man disconnected from the spirit does not live in God. I have derived this from experience. During my illness, before the fever left me and convalescence began, I enjoyed almost constant spiritual life, and now that for many days I am physically stronger I am in a great degree abandoned to instinct. Looking for God's lesson in the fact, I understand him to mean that there is no spiritual life but that which he immediately sustains.

January 26th. I, the personal man, have had to defend myself this morning against my own cunning. I caught myself about to study how to evade an obligation. The instinct of self-interest unbalanced by a sentiment of justice was bestirring itself to look for a remedy.

February 6th. Sanctity, not the evasion of poverty or the acquisition of wealth, is the end of my earthly life. How shall I root this truth in an inalienable conviction of the heart so as never again to be for a moment the dupe of prudence or emulation. Let me not compare myself with this or that rich man as to wealth, but to this or that holy man as to sanctity. If I think of my neighbour as passing me on the road to wealth, I tend to envy, but if I think of him as passing me on the road to Heaven I love him all the more. My heart is stultified by prudence—stultified and constricted. If God should now relax the spasm, I should find myself relieved of a blinding and coercing
devil, relieved of a power to which I never consent, but which is ever deflecting me, in the absence of recollection, from the way of sanctity. I say relieved, for I am held by prudence to the painful work of buffeting great difficulties. How strange that a sentiment which I intellectually know to be an impostor and an enemy can persist—can continue to overcast—my mind so as to shut out Heaven—can even now molest me with anxiety. I know that to be released from it would be joy, and the knowledge has no power to undo it. I am as one who knows that he is undergoing an optical illusion, and who is nevertheless unable to prevent himself from feeling and acting on all occasions as though the illusion were a true perception.

February 6th. One of the most memorable events of my life has occurred this morning. It followed the writing of the foregoing note and occurred during my morning devotion. I am not free to record it more explicitly.

February 8th. My faith is passing through fire to be purified and strengthened by the ordeal. I have been endeavouring to harmonize the datum of the freedom of the will with the indisputable deliverances of modern physiology respecting the dependence of consciousness on nervous and encephalic event. If all consciousness including volition depend on such event man is incapable of choice; for the event, being an unconscious thing, cannot choose; and if what is named volition be a mere effect of unconscious event, it cannot be a choice. It is undeniable that a large part of consciousness is the mere effect of cerebration. Admitting this, I had taken my stand upon the thesis that the higher mental processes, such as reasoning and willing, are not effects of cerebration, that the brain
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is not immediately concerned in their causation, that the
soul is their only source. Accordingly I divided the men-
tal faculties into two orders, those that do, and those that
do not, include bodily organs, naming the former encephalo-
psychical faculties, and the latter, purely psychical faculties.
But yesterday my hypothesis was shocked by an objection,
against which I seem to be defenceless. It occurred to me
that consciousness of one's own temporal identity is essen-
tial to discourse, essential for example to a ratiocination of
say ten seconds; and as this consciousness is an effect of
cerebration, it seems to follow that all the essentials of
ratiocination are also effects of cerebration. Choice
presupposes deliberation, and deliberation is discourse.
As discourse occupying time, it must be the effect of
cerebration. Thus, reason declares against faith that man
is a mannikin, that all mental acts are effects of unconscious
change—change of unconscious matter—that there is no
moral freedom, no possibility of human choice, no basis
of morality in man, no personality, no dignity.

I was now driven into my last intrenchment of faith,
viz., the decree of devout will that reason is at fault when
it is not in harmony with faith. In this intrenchment I
felt myself to be impregnable. It is a great grief—a
desolation to be confined to it; but it is also a great con-
solation to have it proved to one that his house is built
upon a rock, which even earthquakes fail to shake.

Since I began to write this note, a conciliatory hypothesis
has come into view, viz., that ratiocination and delibera-
tion do not occupy time, but are instantaneous; that what
occupies time in connection with them is the mere prepara-
tion of consciousness for their action, and that this pre-
liminary is all that is due to cerebration.

February 16th. All depends upon trust that God is,
and rules. Sometimes the sickened heart—sick with
calamity—seems to be incapable of this trust; sometimes it is a prey to calamity without even the thought that the event is from God. At such times it is liable to be delivered up to a scoffing sentiment that desolates it with derision of faith. Happily these ordeals are generally not of considerable duration. They have never compromised me to an act contrary to faith.

There is a cause of trouble in my life which often invades the heart without encountering the thought that it is from God and a means of sanctification; and then, after a time, the thought appears in the intellect, challenging the heart to incarnate it in a corresponding sentiment. The heart grows faint with the feeling of impossibility, but the will is firm and faithful. It is from this point of view that the supernatural life exhibits its difference and difficulty most saliently. When grace fills the soul with faith, the natural and the supernatural are confounded in our view; but from this point of view they are given as separate and remote from one another.

223.

February 27th. According as we apply our time, we tend to make the mind a market, a kitchen, a playhouse, an alehouse, a church. He who knows this, and omits to apply time so as to construct the mind into a church, refuses communion with God.

224.

March 24th. Forgiveness presupposes resentment. One who is not subject to resentment is incapable of forgiveness. God is not subject to resentment and is therefore incapable of forgiveness. But forgiveness is the analogue and only analogue of a kind of Divine volition that is occasioned by repentance. Repentance alters the relation of its subject to God; and the Divine cognition of the fact coupled with a corresponding volition varying the course of Divine
government as regards the subject constitute a fact that could not be so well symbolized by anything in human experience as by forgiveness. God acts under the circumstances as a man would act towards one whom he had forgiven, and in both cases the action proceeds upon cognition of repentance. The illiterate mind is inaccessible to so subtle a distinction, except by a miraculous change of its constitution; and, without such a miracle, Christianity must have been excluded from the illiterate mind if Christ had fettered it to such a subtlety. Truth determined no such alternative. The general resemblance between forgiveness and its analogue in the Divine mind warranted the extension of the name forgiveness so as to include the latter under its signification. The prayer then which Christ taught his disciples to offer, "forgive us our trespasses," is not a prayer to be exempted from retribution due from Divine anger, but a prayer to be exempted from the rigour which God paternally opposes to the spirit of evil in man. The prayer implies the doctrine that God measures to us severity or bounty, according as we measure to our fellow men charity or uncharity.

APRIL 3RD.* If agreement with common sense be allowed to be, within certain limits, a criterion of right reasoning, why not agreement with the spirit of holiness, which is given by the mental constitution as being of greater dignity? To answer this question it is necessary to acquire a definite idea of common sense; for it has hitherto merely loomed on philosophy.

Common sense is that in the mental structure which tends to determine the most extensive and durable

* In this note a definition has been altered, and a portrait added—the definition and portrait of common sense. There has been no such interference with the other notes—only a little weeding and here and there a substitution of a better term or form of a sentence. I ought to state that the notes subsequent to September, 1875, were written after the idea of publication had taken serious possession of me.
unanimity. This attribute of the mental structure unmodified by thoroughness in philosophy and science, is what is denoted by the name common sense in the contrast of philosophy and common sense. When philosophy begins to menace the fundamental beliefs of mankind it splits and gives off a school that makes agreement with common sense as to fundamental or primary beliefs a criterion of truth. The Scotch common sense school of philosophy, comprising Reid, Stewart, Brown and Hamilton, is the most notable example. Common sense, according to the first signification of the name, does not, and, according to the second, does exclude thoroughness in philosophy and science. The context should show in which sense the name is used.

A man of common sense may differ extremely in belief from the rest of mankind. Evidence discovered by and known only to himself, may have forced him into extreme dissent as regards what is commonly held, his common sense being manifested by the conservatism with which he has striven against the evidence, by his reluctance to publish the change, and by the skill with which he appeases public opinion if he be moved to avow the change, or proceeds to bring others to his mind. If the genius of Galileo had been duly balanced by common sense, he would not have meddled with the theological embarrassments of his discovery; nor would Rome have molested him if, as she advised, he had exercised the discretion of common sense. He must needs usurp her function and modify her theology to suit his theory, instead of leaving it to her to accommodate at leisure. Common sense is conservative, but not necessarily to the degree of bigotry. Modified by science it is a ballast which keeps the ship aground only in shallow water, serving to keep it upright where there is depth enough to float. Common sense is averse to speculation that has proved to be barren, or that does not show signs of fruitfulness to moderate industry. The mind of
Hamlet, unweighted by common sense, is easily wafted into the inane, dreamily dallying with such questions as that of the possibility of Cæsar’s dust stopping a bung hole. The common sense of Horatio would fain recall him to terra firma—"It were to enquire too curiously, my lord." After a certain experience, common sense discovers a physiognomy in the insoluble which frequently exempts from the trouble of ascertaining insolubility by experiment.

The man of common sense is, to himself, a sample of the mind of the society; to which, therefore, he is able to conform at will, and which the power of conformity tends to enable him to manage. It tends to make men of genius the conductors and spokesmen of society. It is indispensable to the statesman in constitutional states. It disposes him to busy himself with what the knowledge and temper of the society make presently practicable.

Common sense is an important element of moral taste. This element is more salient in proportion as taste is more developed, and, therefore, more in societies that have, than in those that have not, a patrician order. The reason of this is not obvious. A certain fruit of experience, which may be distinguished as the moral or, more generally, the æsthetic fruit of experience, is the nutriment of taste. This fruit consists, 1st, of discriminations of what is and what is not agreeable to taste whereby taste is refined both as intelligence and instinct; 2nd, of canons of taste consisting of generalizations from those discriminations and constituting an art of culture. The cultivation of the young by this art conjoined with an enhancement of congenital sensitiveness, through the law of transmission of acquired faculties, causes a farther development of taste and instinct. This art of culture, united with the more potent doctrine of example, is not possible apart from a patrician order. Those whom poverty or a life-long pursuit of wealth absorbs for the most part in sordid care, and especially those who are condemned to live by manual toil, are in-
capable of accumulating any store of the æsthetic fruit of experience, and their precept and example tend rather to destroy than to develop the germ of taste. Lineage and the hereditary wealth on which it depends, are a sine qua non of æsthetic development.

Common sense, as taste, tends to banish egotism from manners, to annihilate self-assertion, to make dignity the mere skeleton of the moral man hidden by the tissues which it supports—by modesty, simplicity, gentleness, kindness, respect—and never felt either by its subject or by others except when unduly pressed upon or when duty exacts austerity or violence. It tends to banish from manners servility and sexual homage, and to substitute a levelling respect for human dignity. It tends to exclude affectation, and to conform manners to sincerity and candour in so far as they consist with amiability and respect. It is averse to the suavity that courts, and to blandishment of every kind except in the domain of legitimate love. It is averse to intensity that tends to depose self-possession, to caprice, impulsiveness, abruptness, except what serve for seasonable diversion.

Such is common sense—a fallible, trustworthy organ. Are its credentials superior to those of the spirit of holiness that philosophy so easily accepts its authority, and is so prone to reject religion? To be in a condition to judge, it is necessary to get a nearer view of the spirit of holiness than philosophy has hitherto commanded.

The spirit of holiness is a sentiment that adoringly affects and disposes to belief in the Divine. It contributes to determine the idea of the Divine. The faculty which it manifests is one that tends to convert the idea of intelligent first-cause, whether spiritually or materially, monotheistically or polytheistically, into the idea of the Divine. The sentiment varies as to intensity. In its higher degrees it involves an equivalent of belief in the Divine against which all adverse evidence is impotent: in its fainter degrees such
evidence afflicts it with despondency or despair. It adores Divine authority, sees in it the basis of virtue, longs that universal righteousness shall know, love, and obey, and so, in some mystical way, be united with the Divine. It is but rarely in any heart a constant sentiment. It comes and goes according to no known rule, and partly, at least, on that account is held by the spiritual to be a supernatural sentiment—one that God imparts and withdraws by immediate action on the mind. In its higher degrees, it involves a felicity that seems to be a foretaste of Heaven. It moulds the idea of the Divine (the symbol or name of the incomprehensible God) according to the highest moral dignity conceivable by its subject. It tends to apprehend duty as Divine imperative, and virtue as corresponding obedience. It tends to exact the elimination from the heart of whatever the subject conceives to be adverse to duty, and so sets the heroic upon the ascetic pursuit of perfection. If it so prevailed as to determine the practical life of a society, the life would be according to the highest moral ideal conceived at the time, and would improve with every improvement of that ideal; from which must result a temporal felicity of the society proportioned to its wisdom, and the most rapid possible increase of the felicity and the wisdom. It must be allowed, however, that when it elicits obedience from only a few members of the society, it puts them at disadvantage as regards the pursuit of wealth, and tends to subject them to the temporal power of the unscrupulous, their hands being fettered by virtue. The maxim that honesty is the best policy is true only of people of ordinary faculty; it does not hold as regards those who are provided with adequate predatory sagacity.

It is in the highest degree probable that the spirit of holiness depends upon a peculiar mental faculty (a natural one) that is of different susceptibility in different minds, and is wanting in certain minds. There would be no ground for this opinion, if the spirit were manifested in a
way agreeable to the supposition of its being the effect of
the immediate action of God. But when we find it manifesting itself as a turbulent inspiration in prophets and
speakers of unknown tongues that incurs a call to order from St. Paul and a reminder that its use of the gift of
tongues is not always appropriate—when we find it inflating
St. Philip Neri so as to break one of his ribs, and forcing
St. Francis of Sales to cry out "enough Lord,"—reverence
discountenances the supposition that Divine action is
implicated. It becomes us to believe that in such cases the
rapture is the mere product of nature. The temper of wisdom
is peace, not rapture. Its felicity excludes excitement; and
this seems to signify that peace is the mark of felicity
imputable to grace—that the contemplative rapture is not
of grace. Peace agrees and rapture does not agree to
dignity. It is presumable that the action of God upon man
is such as to promote and not to impair the dignity of the
creature it blesses. When God condescends in love to
man, reverence expects it to be in such wise that the highest
faculties of the soul, viz., will and reason, are not excluded
by the beatitude. Rapture excludes discourse and volition,
and reduces the mind to a mere organ of emotion. The
indiscriminate reference of all religious emotion to grace
has foisted upon religion a mass of discrediting matter of
which we purge it by allowing the existence of an organ of
religious emotion that is capable of functioning indepen-
dently of grace.

The characteristics of the religious faculty are most
saliently exhibited in the saint, especially its power of
subordinating the other emotive organs, so as to make the
heart almost an organ of holy instinct. The saint is the
typical variety of a species of man differentiated by con-
genital predominant susceptibility of the religious organ.
This species is the natural priest, comprising both male and
female. In the opposed species, the natural laity, the
faculty is not congenitally predominant, but it may acquire
predominant susceptibility through grace and devotion. In the more highly endowed of the natural priesthood, the religious faculty is an ascetic instinct, and is averse to marriage.

The religious faculty, or faculty of godliness, is not an organ of moral discernment as regards duty of man to man. This discernment depends upon other faculties; but the spirit of holiness tends to lay hold upon the moral ideas evolved by these under the developing influence of experience, and to translate them into Divine commands. The moral scope of the spirit is limited to the moral ideas engendered by experience in the other faculties. This limitation has unreasonably, although inevitably, brought discredit on religion. The spirit of holiness is held responsible for the evil action which it ignorantly allows. The imposture and other sharp practice by which Jacob profitted against his brother, father and father-in-law, are imputed as a disgrace to his godliness: whereas they signify a moral ignorance that hid from the godliness the odiousness of his dealings. The imposture which Jacob practised upon his father aimed at achieving favour with God, which proves that when he designed the cheat he did not discern its immorality. The godliness of David did not discern the criminality of his murderous and adulterous design against the life and honour of Uriah; but the moment the authority of the prophet discovered to him the odiousness of his act in the view of God, he repented.

Another unreasonable and inevitable objection to the spirit of holiness, is that it has embodied itself in erroneous theologies, and, by migrating from one to another of these, allowed the error. But reason, common sense, and all the cognitive faculties have erred—have migrated from error to error, and are doubtless still universally plunged in error. To discredit a faculty because it has erred, is the blunder of pyrrhonism. One of the most important achievements of reason is the opinion that humanity is passing from ignor-
ance to knowledge through cognition and opinion that are a medley of truth and error. The function of the spirit of holiness is to light us through this time of darkness, and this supposes a progress from error to error—from greater error to less.

It is notorious that the instinct of the human individual urges him by the spur of pain to seek his happiness in a way adverse to the welfare of mankind. He cannot, without pain, conduct himself so as to forbear from injury to society. He is moved by four principles of his nature to endure the pain and forbear from injury; namely, 1st, fear of public opinion; 2nd, fear of civil power; 3rd, conscience; and 4th, religion. The first and second have this disadvantage, that they induce forbearance only as to injury in respect of which the agent considers himself liable to detection. They leave him the secret enemy of society. They are effective only to drive the enemy from the open field, and confine his warfare to the ambuscade of hypocrisy. Conscience unsupported by religion is, as regards the practical life, except in rare instances, a nullity. The instinctive force of the moral organs is feeble in the bulk of men, and, apart from religion, they afford no adequate motive for self-denial. If there be no Divine, if we are the mere products of blind nature, if nature natures with brute indifference to right and wrong, affording no guarantee that virtuous self-denial contributes to eternal moral order, it is folly to suffer for the sake of virtue, especially when transgression causes no appreciable injury to this or that person. Society then is indebted to religion, that is, to the immediate or mediate operation of the spirit of holiness, for whatever of sincere self-denial has counteracted in the bulk of its individuals the principle of social decomposition involved in their instincts. It is indispensable to moral development, or that whereby man is promoted from the condition of a mere implement of intentional instinct into a power of conduct—a regnant will.
Without it, he must be for ever an abortion and a wretch, feeding with the fuel of his own action a social misery that constitutes his hell. The criterion of practical importance then finds the spirit of holiness to be of the highest degree of credit. How much the constitution of humanity insists upon its importance, is manifested in the fact that civil society has always formed upon a religious basis, and that Christ is the foundation of the highest civilization now upon the earth, and probably the highest that ever existed.

It is not difficult to assign the reasons why philosophy tends to restrict research to the groove of common sense, and to ignore the guidance of the spirit of holiness. The principal cause is that scepticism has not yet promoted philosophy to the plane of artistic judgment, but has left it still in part subject to the rude influences that determine vulgar belief. The laws of cognition and opinion that bear upon reactive Reason, and, owing to differences of organization, bear dissimilarly upon different men, have not been themselves subjected to scrutiny and ordinated according to Reason. Consequently the mental defect of this and that philosopher depraves philosophy. A mental defect of Locke, of which the writer has encountered other instances, disabled him from cognizing time apart from event, and his theory, accordingly, insists that time without event is unthinkable and impossible. Men destitute of the moral faculties have manifested their poverty in theories that resolve morality into prudence, or assign it some other ignoble basis. The depraving influence of emotion and mood upon belief is notorious. To relieve itself of these causes of perversion, it behoves philosophy to study the laws of cognition and opinion, in order to elicit from them canons of artistic judgment agreeable to the reason of the great majority of those who are competent to pass upon the question. Such a system of canons would exempt reason from ignorant compliance with any of its laws, and from the vices incident to the ignorance,
and would compensate the defects of the individual mind by bringing to bear upon its operation the ablest faculty of the society. No number of men constituting a sample of mankind, and bent upon substituting an art of judgment for the rude operation of the laws of belief, could ignore the transcendent title of the spirit of holiness; and to allow it at all is to allow it to be the supreme criterion of truth. But during the era of inartistic judgment, philosophy tends to discredit this criterion. The errors to which the religious faculty has given its sanction, and the fact that even now it does not afford a theology satisfactory to reason, operate inordinately against its credit where there is no wise scepticism to see that this kind of objection applies against all the faculties of cognition and opinion—against all laws of reason and criteria of truth. Then, the spirit of holiness tends to retire from a mind that, uncaptivated by its authority, demands of it to prove its title; and it suffers from all occupation wherein the agent does not intentionally proceed as servant of God. Even the priestly mind, when in long and profound exercises of reason it omits to refresh itself from time to time at the fountain of Divine authority so as to maintain the consciousness that its work is obedience, tends to grow colder towards God, and all the more if the speculation be theological. How should it be with those who require of God to make them the judges of his title to credit? Moreover it fares with philosophy, prior to the era of artistic judgment, as with peoples subject to despotic monarchy. It goes well or ill with both according to the character of the reigning mind. If the monarch be wise it goes well with the people and the reverse: if the mind that gives philosophy its form for the time be holy, it goes well with philosophy and the reverse. And as the constitutions of limited monarchies rescue the public interest from dependence on the character of princes, so an art of judgment will rescue philosophy from dependence on the character of philosophers.
natural laity has had too much, and the natural priest too little to do with modern philosophy. Unhappily the priest is for the most part fettered by dogma.

If we study the mental faculties in the spirit of faith, and enquire into the significance of the fact that certain of them involve a necessity to believe that is impregnable to scepticism, whereas others—as for example the moral and religious faculties—are only too prone to surrender and abdicate, the answer seems to be that this constitution of the mind is indispensable as a condition of the development of personality—of the ascendancy of will. To this end human welfare, in so far as it hinges on religion and morality, is made dependent, especially as regards the natural laity, on voluntary trust, so that when scepticism discovers that religion rests upon no ground of certitude, the onus of substituting trust for certainty on peril of deserting the cause of dignity and human welfare, is thrown upon the will. The natural priesthood, like the natural laity, needs to put forth the nisus of voluntary trust. Although for the most part sustained by the spirit that gravitates to Heaven, the spirit and its involved confidence in God are sometimes absent from the heart of the priest, and he is left to cling to God by bare will, or at least without sensible aid. This exercise of faith and obedience is not infrequent in the experience of the saints, and it is allowed to be the most potent of sanctifying agents. It is mainly by this exercise that will achieves what is known to the spiritual by the name, solid virtue. Certitude is the nest of the human mind, and opinion the apparent void in which its adult life is to be mainly lived—sustained for the most part by personal action (acts of voluntary trust) but sometimes also at rest on the momentum derived from the action. This is the answer to the objection which the mental constitution signifies to sceptical reason, viz., that the moral and religious faculties and the faculty from which we have the psychical datum, are unworthy of credit
as not involving the necessity to believe which perception imposes on reason, or the potent attraction with which common sense, for the most part, controls reason.

226.

May 18th. According to experience self-denial depends upon faith. This does not compromise the thesis of freedom; for the faithful are free to deny or not to deny themselves. It implies, as regards freedom, only that the infidel is not free to deny himself. As conduct depends upon self-denial it depends upon faith. The dependence of conduct upon faith is the chief natural evidence of the Divine afforded to man. All other natural evidence is, in the view of Reason, inferior to this. Nature attests in it that, as regards man, she is in the alternative of faith or perdition, and that it is for will to settle with itself whether her position has been divinely, demonically, or fatally determined. The mind is disposed to credit a thesis on the belief of which human perfection and happiness depend; but is not necessitated to credit such a thesis. The tendency gives room for an act of choice—a fiat that the thesis is true—a voluntary assent, a judgment. Those who enjoy the faith of perfect sanctity are excluded from rendering to God the homage and obedience of such an act, and are therefore, prone to deny the possibility, or, allowing the possibility, to deny the value of such an act. They tend to think that a volition designed to be such an act, must be a mere make-believe—an abortion. Those, therefore, who are called to hold to God by voluntary trust, and to make the voluntary trust the ground of a life of conduct, must solve the problem of life and prove the solution distrusted and disowned by those who are held by supernatural faith, and despised by the infidel.

227.

June 8th. What faith exacts of reason that seems unreasonable is to discredit inconsistency when it is antago-
nistic to faith. This exaction is erroneously thought by many to be an exaction that reason shall abdicate. It merely requires of reason the development of a test of error superior to that of inconsistency, namely, that *indispensableness to holiness is the supreme criterion of truth*, and that this test is to be preferred when it conflicts with that of inconsistency. Without scepticism reason is impotent to discredit inconsistency. Scepticism undoes this inordinate and vicious power of the test over reason, makes it reasonable to discredit inconsistency when it conflicts with the supreme criterion of truth, and so proves itself to be the stronghold of faith. Before reason and faith are reconciled by scepticism, intelligent instinct or will in the believer frequently holds to an inconsistent dogma in the name of God and in defiance of reason; which occasions the idea that reason excludes faith.

According to experience we are frequently deceived by the test of inconsistency, and according to what we know of the nature of man and of the order of his mental development, it seems to be inevitable that he must be deceived by it. It is inevitable, for example, that in one phase of his development, he believe in an absolute up and down in space, and be incapable of an idea of the relativity that imposes the error. Under the reign of this error, the thesis that an unsupported solid could be at rest must appear to be inconsistent. The universe of matter is destitute of weight; but this thesis must appear to be inconsistent before man discovers that weight is gravitation. In view of such proofs that the test of inconsistency can deceive, is it not unreasonable to insist that reason shall prefer it to sanctity.

**JUNE 12TH.** Theory (understanding the name to signify explanatory thesis to which common sense assents) should not be object of certitude. Congruity with the experience
of human fallibility requires that it be the object of either opinion or voluntary faith. Scepticism allows the wisdom of the contrivance whereby certain theories incongruously elicit certitude; for the certitude is not only innocent but useful during the era of development in which its incongruity is undiscovered—the era anterior to that of scepticism—and it is subsequently innocent if not useful, being regarded as a mere accident of the supposed assent, incongruously substituting opinion. During the infancy of humanity, when intelligent instinct must be, for the most part, in place of will, certitude elicits a practical energy such as instinct cannot afford to mere opinion; and when scepticism challenges will to take the helm of life the survival of incongruous certitude is rendered innocent by cognition of the incongruity. The survival is as innocent as that of the visual fiction of the sky, or of the idea of an absolute up and down.

Rationalistic religion is theory which implies that it is not a proper object of certitude. To a mind unprepared by experience for scepticism and voluntary faith, a religious theory which implies that itself is not a proper object of certitude is not a religion. It does not afford due occasion to religious instinct nor to will, and an inoperative religious theory is not a religion. But, without the aid of religion experience could not ripen the conditions of voluntary faith.

The antecedence of instinctive religion therefore (of a religion grounded in certitude and tenacious of the thesis that it is a proper object of certitude) is indispensable to theoretic religion—to the religion of voluntary faith; and in this God signifies to faith that he has co-operated in the generation of instinctive religion.

**JUNE 13TH.** Certain ideas are not possible until the brain is organized in a certain way by experience and ratio-
1869. The theory of the Divine, and of the relation of the Divine to nature is probably such an idea. Our efforts to achieve it are probably premature, and this is signified by the perplexity and contradiction that result from them. When we have followed the spirit of holiness through the night of experience with the faith and humility of little children we may be blessed with the dawn and finally the daylight of a consistent theology.

230.

June 13th. Many of the differences that are supposed to be differences of grace may be differences of the mental susceptibility upon which God acts. A Divine volition that immediately affects the mind of the contemplative, causing in it a feeling of rapture, may not intrinsically differ from one that, in a colder heart, excites a languid sentiment of duty. God seems to signify to us with a force of evidence proportioned to our reverent reluctance to judge accordingly, that his power over the human mind is limited by the various susceptibility of minds, and that it is impossible for him to affect certain minds as he affects others. If it were not so, why the long ordeal of pain needful to sanctification? If a fiat could perfect holiness at the first moment of repentance, why subject the devout to needless pain of the sanctifying experience? Why tolerate the intervening corruption and sin? If cosmos could exist without evil, and is the creature of a supreme being, then the supreme being gratuitously created evil and is therefore not divine. We escape this conclusion by allowing, 1st, that omnipotence is power to do according to consistent ideas of the possible, and that in this sense the supreme being is omnipotent; 2nd, that inconsistent ideas of the possible form in the space of human ignorance, and that the idea of the possibility of cosmos free from evil in every era of its existence is such an idea; 3rd that although evil may be commensurate with the duration of cosmos,
nothing contained in cosmos is susceptible of pain beyond a brief era, that, if it outlive that era, its conscious life is one of more than compensating happiness, and that, if it do not outlive pain, the pain is a condition of more than compensating happiness which obtains in some other part of cosmos. To allow these theses, is to rid ourselves of an obstruction to what seems to be the only theology that reconciles the omnipotence and benevolence of the supreme being. Sanctity seems to demand assent to the thesis that the idea of the possibility of immediate sanctification by Divine volition in every case, is inconsistent. Allowing the inconsistency, we are free and morally bound to believe, without discrediting Divine omnipotence, that it cannot sanctify in certain cases but through the operation of natural means, with which the will of the beneficiary must co-operate. Grace, (Divine volition) sets in motion the natural means: if the person to be sanctified choose to co-operate, sanctity results: if not, the grace is applied in vain.

231.

JUNE 15TH. There are men who, naturally hungering and thirsting after righteousness, are deprived of the grace of supernatural faith. Are they thus deprived that they may fill the void of uncertainty with voluntary faith, and apply the art of sanctification with a minimum of Divine aid? Sometimes this nature enjoys a certain satisfaction in which it rests; but, for the most part, it is in a state of yearning uneasiness. In the former state, it seems to itself to be blessed by the presence and the immediate help of God, in the latter, to be deprived of both: and in this contrast it is signified to faith, that in the one case a supernatural instinct excludes volition, while in the other defect of grace affords occasion of obedient volition.

232.

JUNE 15TH. He who has not detached himself from the yoke of his own instincts, is unfit to conduct mankind. We
cannot unyoke ourselves from instinct but by faith and obedience to God. Perfect freedom and personality are not possible out of sanctity. Pope did not discern the dependence of freedom upon sanctity when he wrote the verse, "Who governs freemen should himself be free," but he discerned the dependence of fitness to conduct others on power to conduct oneself. The natural priest is the natural guide of mankind, not only as to things spiritual, but also as to things temporal—he should be legislator and chief civil executive. Short of a certain phase of human development, a condition of fitness for this high function is wanting. Society, to consummate and discern its true civil guide, needs to develop into the knowledge that there is a species of man whose specific difference is religious and moral idiotcy (privation of religious and moral faculty,) another species not indeed destitute of religious and moral faculty, but destitute of an experience necessary to quicken the faculty, that men of these two species probably constitute a majority of society, that they are no more amenable to religious influence than the lower animals, that their responsibility is limited by their invincible ignorance, that they are not obligated by the duties which religious and moral knowledge imposes, that they are to be governed according to merely civil maxims, as beings incapable of knowing and obeying God—of appreciating virtue; that they are to be held in civil order by the only pertinent motives of which they are susceptible, viz., fear of the power of the state, prudential concern for their temporal interests, and the love of honour. This knowledge must obtain in the society before it can obtain in the priest; and until it obtain in both it is ineffectual.

But how, it will be objected, should a society, mainly consisting of the religious and moral blind, discern the fitness of the natural priest—of one whose specific difference is his religiousness and his love of righteousness—for the civil conduct of mankind? The answer is, that religious
and moral blindness does not necessarily and cannot for ever exclude the evidence of experience that godliness strongly disposes a species of man to virtue. The blindness prevents appreciation of the motive but not knowledge of the fact. The disgrace that has been brought upon religion by the turpitude and malignity which the moral ignorance of the godly has enabled original evil to foist upon their practice and by hypocrisy that has simulated religion, will be effaced when the godly shall have acquired knowledge of moral law, and the consequent purity of their lives transcends counterfeit. The fact that, whether wisely or stupidly, they mean virtue will be as obvious, and as universally and confidently allowed as that nature in the poet means poetry, and in the painter, painting. When they are emancipated from the error that mistakes religious and moral idiocy for free rebellion against God and righteousness, and, instead of insulting and alienating the blind brother by ignorant condemnation, attract him by fraternal sympathy and accommodation, the confusion and discord that have hitherto stultified and embroiled the two orders, will give way to mutual intelligence and concord. The infidel will confidently allow the inflexible righteousness of the man of faith—counting the faith a felicitous absurdity—and will be disposed to apply him, where public prudence discerns the greatest need of virtue, to the function of conducting the state. The natural priest will be dedicated according to the instinct of his order to humility, poverty, and celibacy, and will therefore afford to society extraordinary guarantees against ambition and cupidity. He guarantees society against the abuse of power in the interest of this or that theology by his accommodation with infidelity. It would be impossible to apply the power of a state founded upon consent to infidelity against liberty of faith.

233.

June 16th. When I am conscious of deficiency of power of conduct I am either weary or set by latent instinct
towards pursuit that excludes conduct. It is the latter cause that, for the most part, occasions the consciousness; and it should set us upon detecting the instinct by inquiring of ourselves what we are disposed to do during the next few hours. Sometimes weariness is intolerant of the toil of conduct, and then we should endeavour to find wholesome recreation in surrender to instinct. Duty at such a time requires the surrender.

JUNE 24TH. In thee, my God, I live, move, and have my being, for in thee I am personal, and out of thee merely instinctive. Mindful of thee, and voluntarily and obediently referring to thy command as my rule of action, I am a free power, a power of conduct, lord of my instincts; but, unmindful of thee, I am necessitated, like the lower animals, by instinct—a mere implement of nature, a mere embryo of a person. And in this my dependence upon thee—in this dependence of human personality upon faith—thou hast given me the chief evidence of thy reality, an evidence not designed by thee to cause certitude which would exclude obedience by instinctive compliance with thy commands, but of a nature to present an aspect of probability to souls alive to dignity, and challenge, with sanction of reason, the free adhesion of will.

JUNE 27TH. Consciousness which the subject does not designedly endeavour to generate, perception excepted, is spontaneous. Remembrance not consequent to an effort to recall is spontaneous. A judgment not consequent to an intentional effort of reason, as the judgment that a rider, whose horse we perceive to be running away, is in danger, is spontaneous. A judgment consequent to a study of a mathematical demonstration, is not spontaneous, being an
effect designed by, and consequent to, an endeavour of the subject. Sentiments which the subject does not designedly contribute to generate, as quick gratitude or anger, are spontaneous. Those which we have designedly endeavoured to engender, as a charitable apprehension of one who has injured us, resulting from consideration of our common infirmity and substituting, by design and endeavour of the subject, an angry sentiment of the guilt of the malefactor, are not spontaneous. Indeliberate action of intelligent instinct within the domain of consciousness is spontaneous. Volition and deliberate action of intelligent instinct (the latter in so far as it is within the domain of consciousness) are not spontaneous.

As organ of mental spontaneity, especially of emotive spontaneity, the mind is constituted, in the bulk of mankind, to function, for the most part, unwisely. This constitution of mind, although it is the chief cause of human misery, is indispensable to the development of human personality. Without it we could not know good from evil, being without experience of evil, and instinctive perfection would exclude occasion of volition. Every act, like the acts of the lower animals, would be a necessary compliance with nature, and we should, therefore, like them, be impersonal, being at most mere embryos of persons. It would be impossible to do righteously for the sake of righteousness—impossible to conduct ourselves in obedience to God. Religion and morality would be instinctive, not voluntary. We should worship and comply with God as sheep might do if endowed with corresponding instincts.

Our sentiments of events differ according as the involved intellection forms upon more or less cognition. I see a man plunge a sharp instrument into the body of another. If I know the one to be a surgeon, and the other his patient, I have one sentiment of the event; but if I be destitute of this cognition, and have seen no antecedents...
of the event of a nature to prevent the idea that I have surprised an assassination, I have quite another. If a man endeavour to affront me and I be without vivid cognition of the instinctive necessity that allows him no option to do otherwise, I experience an angry sentiment that involves a stultifying apprehension of his guilt; but if I be protected by this cognition I experience instead a pitying sentiment of his infirmity as being a part of our common infirmity. The greater the knowledge upon which a sentiment forms the nearer it tends to be, other things being the same, to wisdom. But there is a kind of knowledge that is available as a basis of “inspontaneous” sentiment, and not as a basis of spontaneous sentiment—for example, the knowledge of instinctive necessity. The idea is strange and repugnant to the nature and habit of the mind, and cannot be easily domesticated. When by laborious discourse we fix it for a little in our minds, it modifies our emotive view; but, until we have deployed extraordinary effort to domesticate it in mental habit, it is rarely or never at hand when we have most need of it, and we are exploded by anger as helplessly as the savage. Sentiments of mortification are elicited by loss of worldly consideration if not excluded by cordial cognition of the incompatibility of vanity and pride with perfection, and that the objects of their idolatry occult Heaven. But few ever attain to this cognition, and of these but very few establish it in mental spontaneity. Indeed, Teutonic or Protestant Christianity rejects its thesis and holds to a moderate worldliness in spite of the injunction of Christ, “seek not the honour that cometh of man.”

The conformity of congenital spontaneity to goodness is not wisdom; for wisdom supposes discrimination between good and evil, whereas the conformity tends to exclude this knowledge by excluding experience of moral evil. The intelligent action which it occasions is instinctive. On the other hand the conformity of acquired spontaneity to goodness is wisdom; for it consists in moral knowledge,
and the action which it occasions is voluntary, not instinctive. It generates, not instinctive sentiment but motive. Instinctive sentiment necessarily proceeds into action whereas motive merely solicits choice. Congenital benevolence puts its hand in its pocket to relieve distress, as a stone falls, without option to do otherwise, whereas acquired benevolence is limited to the generation of mere motive, leaving action exclusively to will.

To make wisdom spontaneous is to achieve religious and moral perfection.

(July 29th, 1869. The process involves a modification of the organ of apprehension whereby it is conformed to wise judgment, so that wise apprehensions substitute wise judgments, and corresponding motives are in place of bad instinctive momentum.)

236.

July 12th. It has pleased God so to constitute us that worldliness should, during a certain era of our development, be as an embankment to several of our affections and sympathies, determining the social channels in which they shall flow, and measuring them according to what may seem to us to be the social importance.

237.

July 23rd. Godliness is, in one of its relations, the courage of virtue—the courage of voluntary self-denial. When an idea of a painful duty demands an act of self-denial unsustained by a cordial apprehension of the act as an obedience to God, we are oppressed by a cowardly reluctance that constitutes all but an impossibility to comply; and, if then the apprehension flow in upon us, it circulates through the heart as courage and power, making obedience more or less easy according to the degree of the cordiality.
238.

1869. August 1st. The idea of the universe, understanding the word universe to signify both the Divine and Cosmos, is untrue if it do not perfectly agree to the spirit of holiness. This spirit does not give perfect knowledge à priori either of the Divine or of Cosmos; but it is indispensable as a mould of the knowledge of the universe which experience is in process of constructing. Without the emotion involved in the spirit of holiness reason could not attain to knowledge of the Divine, and must needs be the dupe of an untrue idea of the universe. Emotion, therefore, is an indispensable condition of the truth of the most important of human cognitions, which shows the rashness of the judgment that emotion is altogether an impediment to reason—that we in all cases reason best when we reason in perfect indifference.

239.

August 3rd. Sometimes when God vouchsafes me a spiritual gain, my joy loses sight of him, ceases to be grateful, becomes absorbed in itself, and perishes in self-absorption. The heavenly dew evaporates, instead of nourishing the soil. We should divide the emotion excited by the gain between gratitude and work, and not allow it to waste itself in thankless and idle joy. We should endeavour to explore with the new light all the recesses of evil in the heart; for, to see moral evil subjectively by the light of Heaven, is to abhor it and to fasten upon it, in the abhorrence, a Nessus shirt.

240.

August 5th. Virtue has to fight two opposite kinds of enemies, viz., the instincts that seek the injury of our neighbour and those that seek his happiness. The former strive to overwhelm the latter, to enervate virtue. How hard it is to see duty in what is calculated to pain those we love!
The love breeds pretexts that hide the duty—the austerity of virtue seems to be evil.

241.

August 6th. T—recognizes in occasional instances that nature necessarily causes the moral evil manifested by her neighbour, and advises and otherwise acts accordingly; but she recoils from assent to the law manifested by the individual cases. The theory of venial sin stands in her way as to allowing the principle that privation of a distinct idea of duty supposes irresponsibility.

242.

August 18th. The spirit of holiness is emotive and instinctive consciousness that God immediately causes in the soul. As emotive consciousness, it is love of God, rest in God, and moral sentiment conformable to the highest moral ideal of the subject, and as instinct, it tends, on every occasion of action, to act accordingly. It is not essential to moral discrimination, but, on the contrary, presupposes and depends upon moral ideas. When it is vouchsafed to us, we are in immediate relation with God, we are, so to speak, in contact with him. The consciousness is the immediate effect of what may be named the Divine touch. But it does not, in its ordinary operation, immediately manifest God, as the action of perceived things upon sense manifests the things to perception.

243.

August 30th. I fish for myself, and must play my fish. I must give a little to the headiness of nature, and not attempt to land it at once in the Kingdom of Heaven.

244.

August 31st. The supernatural humility infused into me on Sunday, 29th inst., while meditating how I should
conduct myself to —, explains the several functions of will and grace in the process of sanctification. The part of will is to obey—to do according to virtue, in spite of opposite sentiment and propensity, and that of grace is to impart the spirit of holiness, which is the spirit of love, humility, charity, nobleness, and peace—a blissful propensity to all goodness. The obedience prepares the heart for the Divine touch that kindles this spirit.

245.

OCTOBER 23RD. What ought to be a regular renewal of purposes of obedience has, in me, degenerated into a mere review of formulas of purpose; and the reason seems to be that my interest in secular work has relaxed my interest in the work of God, because I have not commenced each meditation by shattering the projects of spontaneity.

246.

NOVEMBER 7TH. In so far as I am deficient in faith, distrust is put upon me, in spite of me, by my God-given nature. Was I, like Esau, hated before I was made?

247.

NOVEMBER 14TH. It is given to me this morning, that there are two kinds of sanctity, viz., supernatural and natural sanctity. The former is imparted by grace. The latter is emotive knowledge naturally evolved by the operation of obedience upon experience. The evolution is impossible without obedience. It is not achievable by obedience to the imperative of conscience without reference to God.

248.

Yesterday I felt the importance of effort to deliver myself from the instinct of worldliness. I was bent with all the power of my will, and all the help of aversion to the abjectness of worldliness,
upon making independence on "the honour that cometh of man," a throne of God in my heart, so that in society that evening I should be exempt from the instinctive dominion of worldliness; but I felt that I should fail. I was confident from experience that if it pleased God to put me in a mood of holiness, I would be master of the situation, but equally sure that, without supernatural aid, instinct would prevail against me. What folly to deny, in the face of such a fact, the reality of intentional instinct. I prayed for help, and was given to understand that I was left in the power of instinct in order that I should be confirmed in my belief. Just as one knows, who has inclined a certain way out of the centre of gravity, that he cannot save himself from falling, so I knew that I could not save myself throughout the evening from the operation of worldly instinct.

249.

An act of O— that seemed to proceed from a selfish instinct which has often disappointed and vexed me, elicited in me last evening a sentiment which, if it were not discredited by reflection and reason, and its instinctive energy restrained by will, would have been violent, and would have exploded in violent speech. If not so discredited, it would have imposed upon me a moral cognition, wherein I must seem to myself to see a huge culpability in O—, and a corresponding grievance in myself, and it would have made me an implement of retaliation, I being without freedom to prevent the abuse, as seeing no reason of resistance, and being therefore destitute of the idea of not retaliating—destitute of the practical alternative necessary to volition. The discrediting judgment informed me that some bodily derangement was imposing upon me a bad mental mood which exaggerated the fault of O—, and I allowed this in remonstrating with her. I did my best to temper the remonstrance accordingly, but I continued in a
morose state for the remainder of the evening. This morn-
ing I awoke in an opposite mood, full of love that was im-
patient to atone for the pain I had caused, and of a
large and manly charity that compassionated, as infirmity,
what, to the moroseness of last night's mood, appeared to
be an unpardonable vice. To the mood of the morning,
the mood of the evening appeared to be foolishness and
unmanly weakness. The former was as light wherein the
latter appeared as a malignant and stultifying selfishness
fashioned by bodily disorder into a mould of false and
mischievous cognition, or what would be cognition if re-
flexion and reason had not been enlightened by spiritual
experience and by present grace.

The event puts in relief a difference of great importance.
I knew last evening, as I know this morning, that I was
undergoing a false and mischievous sentiment, and I did all
I could to prevent its instinctive power; but the cognition
of the evening was unemotive and unconnected with in-
stinctive energy, while the sentiment which it challenged
will to counteract, and, if possible, extinguish, involved
an all but overwhelming momentum; whereas, the cogni-
tion of the morning is emotive and alive with instinctive
energy. The unemotive and uninstinctive cognition
afforded an opportunity of volition. It challenged will to
prevent the operation of a bad instinct against which it was
itself impotent. The emotive and instinctive cognition of
the morning sufficed for corresponding action without the
interference of will.

250.

Our subtlest temptations are put upon
us as being our intentions. It is only an inferior order
of temptations that appear as mere desires.

251.

November 20th. It is sometimes optional with us to
determine in ourselves a state of recollection when a frivolous
spirit wantons in the heart. I find my heart filled with low and frivolous emotion—in a mood that interests it in frivolous objects. I miss the elevation of spirit without which the soul is unfit for the eye of God. I cannot command the spirit of holiness, but there is a next best thing that I can do if I choose. I can intend and endeavour to withdraw my heart from sentiment inconsistent with the honour of God, and I am so constituted that the intention makes itself the nucleus of a corresponding state of recollection and gravity. When it is in our power to do this it is our duty to do it.

November 22nd. We are rarely unrecollected without some adulteration of folly. To exclude the folly, and because perpetual recollection is impossible, we should endeavour to provide safe grooves for the inevitable spontaneity.

November 29th. The paramount interest is the interior interest—the dominion of will as vice-gerent of God. It is described as interior interest because, in considering it, the subject becomes its own object, looks inward, is conversant about what is interior, and as the interior interest because it is, of all interior interests, the paramount one. It is important to familiarize the mind with the interiority of the interest, that temptation may suggest at once the need of looking inward for self-defence, and so counteract the tendency of temptation to fascinate the mind to its objects, and by distracting, cause it to overlook their damaging influence upon the soul.

November 30th. Study the plausible sentiment that has been actuating—.

For the sake of the self-complacency arising from the
contemplation of one's self as heroically devoted to God, the godly are sometimes tempted to mount some ascetic singularity and caracole to their own admiration along the way of the Cross. The self-complacency proceeds from an organ not hitherto distinguished, the organ of self-approbation. This organ experiences pleasure in the contemplation of what seems to be one’s own worth and pain in the contemplation of the contrary. It was a hinge of stoicism and chivalry. To enable godliness to purge itself of egotism thus generated, Christ enjoined “and when ye have done all these things, think yourselves unprofitable servants, saying, we have done that it was our duty to do.” Every lively sentiment of the noble in others tends to kindle, in the organ of self-approbation, a sentiment of self as being, because of the appreciation, of like nobleness. This is what Kames describes as the sympathetic emotion of virtue. The organ tends to ascribe to self whatever its subject admires. The recruiting sergeant fires it with martial music. It generates the illusion of the stage-struck, and turns the appreciation of poetry into a feeling of poetic power that glorifies the subject. This stultifying egotism is mistaken for magnanimity when the sentiment of the noble gives it its model.

255.

December 15th. In states of extraordinary irritability do not expect to remove the mood; seek only to prevent its operation in intercourse. Shun work and intercourse as much as possible.

256.

December 19th. Yesterday I experienced a compassionate sentiment of the pain which the pride of B— is suffering on account of his failure. This is the fruit of my effort to develop into the disinterestedness of wisdom. The pride of B— had borne upon me injuriously. If I could
make my heart to be on all occasions an organ of this kind of apprehension, viewing men as victims of moral evil where there is no decisive proof of free agency, I should be exempt from the provoking influence of the aspect of moral evil in others. As subject to this influence I see in myself a susceptibility and instinctive power which I know not how to exclude—which I abhor and which, in spite of my purpose, is sure to vitiate my action and belie my will. I long supremely to rid myself of this enemy. I use every means, or what seems to be means, to this end, and yet the sun is not more sure to rise again than I to be stultified by uncharity and to act accordingly, as though I acted with choice.

257.

DECEMBER 20TH. Endeavouring this morning to apply myself to the work of preventing impure intention in my intercourse with the spiritual, my resolutions seemed at first to lack pith, power, and sincerity, which was owing to a certain vagueness as to what was to be done. Suddenly I became clear as to means and conscious of power, and it seemed as if then, for the first time, I had really resolved. Consciousness of power which depends upon cognition of means is necessary to purpose. Without this the will works its wings in a void, and we subsequently seem to ourselves to have been guiltily substituting make-believes of purpose for purpose.

258.

DECEMBER 21ST. I am to endeavour to offer to God every work that I am about to begin.

259.

DECEMBER 22ND. I have just now detected the instinct of affectation at work in me. Which is the more pitiable dupe of nature—he upon whom she imposes the role of
1869. affectation, or his brother upon whom she foists an answering contempt? How she makes us her accomplices against ourselves! And how shall we vanquish her, but by charity?

260.

December 24th. My paramount business to-day and for some time to come, is to endeavour to establish the habit of offering every work to God.

261.

December 26th. I am to endeavour to be a pure mentor and a servant of God in my apprehension of the affair of —, and of all that obtains in the family.

262.

December 28th. In every trial of faith cling to the arbitrament that God is and governs. Your safety is in your personal power, not in your susceptibility, whereby nature tends to damn you. The power creates for itself duration in the arbitrament and in corresponding fidelity. Let not demonstration tempt you to let go your hold upon God.

263.

December 31st. When my heart judged that dignity depends on utility, and that being exhaustively considered, because it is destitute of utility, is destitute of dignity, I thought as a man. I made myself the measure of all being. Man, being designed for work, is adapted and disposed accordingly by an emotive constitution that apprehends paramount importance in utility, dignity in corresponding activity, and the opposite of dignity in the opposite of useful activity; and ignorant that the criterion is good only for creatures, adapted as man is for work, we tend to apply it beyond its proper sphere.
January 2nd. The causes of certainty and strong opinion do not afford a consistent theory according to which being involves dignity. Without a fiat that God is and governs, and that being is to be explained accordingly, we stagnate in suspense, destitute of a theoretic basis of religion, morality, and civilization. If we do not resolve and live accordingly, it is not reason but will that is in fault; for reason informs the will that its ratiocination has need of the fiat as a condition of the farther study and explanation of being.

(July 2nd, 1872. The loss of faith has not in the least relaxed my zeal towards virtue, nor impaired my conduct.)

January 9th. Unemotive cognition and will substitute in me the sentiment and instinct of the Christian. The Christian knows by heart what I know by mere intellect, and does by the instinct of grace what I do by bare will. The self-distrust and humility that are emotive in the Christian are in me unemotive cognitions. I know but unemotively my dependence upon God and that I have nothing of which to be proud or vain.

January 18th. I am to shun topics that involve irritating matter until I shall have prepared myself for the discussion.

January 19th. I detect an irascible energy deciding a moral question. The religious and moral judgments that form upon a basis of humility, piety, nobleness, and peace are alone worthy of credit.
JANUARY 20TH. Voluntary faith and devotion seem to the subject to be a mere make-believe. Sanctity does not present to him an aspect of importance significant of resistless attraction, such as it presents to those who are altogether drawn by grace. It does not stir his instinct as it stirs theirs.

JANUARY 26TH. I am pledged, on peril of perfidy, to frustrate, by voluntary tenacity to the thesis of Godliness, what would otherwise be a cause of certainty that there is no God. Though all mankind should surrender faith, and atheistic demonstration be so obvious that the denial of it must seem ridiculous, I am to hold to God by sheer volition.

JANUARY 28TH. I am never to remonstrate without having been ordered to do so during meditation.

(NOVEMBER 10TH. Failed through forgetfulness.)

FEBRUARY 2ND. My resolves in the cause of sanctity have hitherto emanated from a combative spirit. The goodness of the resolves disguised the evil of the spirit. Its tincture of irascible energy passed with me for energy of will. Humility is essential to will. What passes for volition, if it show any tincture of sentiment opposed to humility, is mere instinctive action. Will chooses and purposes in humble dependence upon God's help.

FEBRUARY 3RD. The paramount business assigned to me is the custody of peace. I am to conduct myself so as to
The survival.

exclude whatever is prejudicial to peace—especially work that wearies either mind or body.

273.

February 3rd. Humility is peace, charity, disinterestedness, sanity, liberty, basis of moral knowledge.

274.

February 24th. The world is a hospital, not a hell. There are incurables in it, but no devils. The business of the wise, over and above secular duty, is to be as physicians to the sick. To regard any man as a devil, is to have a hell in one's own mind. By forgiving, as we hope to be forgiven, we extinguish the hell in our minds. We substitute a purgatory and so prepare a heaven both within and without us. I discovered to-day a dungeon in my heart to which were consigned my ideas of people who had presented to me a certain aspect of moral evil. They figured there as doomed wretches. I insisted, in the name and by the command of God, that they would be ultimately blessed, and I found myself better for the arbitrament. I forgave them as I hope to be forgiven. I had not by any deliberate judgment consigned them to perdition, but an unconscious mental process had condemned them; the forgiveness on the other hand was a voluntary act.

275.

On Friday evening wine recovered me from uncharitable sentiment and the involved pain. This morning strong tea has raised me out of an irritating field of moral vision into view of enlarging and appeasing theses. Is it by exciting pleasant emotion which suggests theses formerly connected with that kind of emotion, that those stimuli so affected me? Is it because of the habitual connection of pain with bad moral apprehension that
corporal causes of pain tend to suggest and confine the mind to such apprehension?

March 13th. The failure of an important prayer roused my pride last night and, through that, a choleric energy which looked desperately about for a resource and tended to gnash the teeth because it looked in vain. This bad excitement would not have obtained in view of the theory that it is God who determines the place of every man, and that it is our duty to bend the heart if possible into acquiescence, in which endeavour we at least voluntarily acquiesce. When this idea occurred to me this morning, it immediately undid the spasm of pride and anger which in its absence the situation imposed upon me. I instinctively acted in its absence as though I distinctly held that every man appoints himself his place according to his power. When one acts in inadvertent conformity with such a thesis he is, in respect of the action, a necessary agent. To be free to forbear from such proceeding he must have the thesis and its opposite in view. If the opposite be, that it is God who assigns to man his place, and if this be put in a feeling of duty, then one is free to comply with or refuse the proud and angry animus; and if he comply he freely and knowingly prefers impious selfishness to humility and the glory of God. He is irresponsible for the acts that proceed from the animus when the opposite theses are not present to his mind, and responsible when they are and each exhibits an aspect of practical importance.

Here we have contrasted the spiritual, personal, free, or voluntary mind, and the carnal, impersonal, or merely instinctive mind. The latter is necessitated to act according to a reason of action of which it is ignorant, as inanimate things act according to laws of which they are ignorant. The psychical event is the necessary sequence of a cerebral
event, and is, in that sense, carnal. It obtains in the absence of a practical alternative—without the reference to opposites essential to choice. As intelligent action, therefore, it is opposed to choice or true volition, which supposes a reference of reason to opposite theses and a choice between them, determining in the preferred thesis a reason of action. The volition is spiritual, the opposite of carnal, as not being a necessary sequence of a carnal event. The instance illustrates the dependence of will and the independence of intelligent instinct upon reason. If when the instinctive animus obtains the opposite theses be present to reason, but either or both without an aspect of practical importance, they are a nullity as regards the will, being destitute of a condition indispensable to its action. Will is necessarily in abeyance, and the agent irresponsible.

277.

March 18th. It is now many years since I resolved to endeavour to regard the demeanour of others towards me as significant of Divine intention, especially demeanour of a nature to wound self-love, intending thereby not only to prevent a motion of self-love, but also to secure an exercise of piety and charity. But I have failed to establish such a connection of ideas that a perception of the demeanour must bring with it the idea of the significance of the demeanour in respect of the will of God. The association of ideas depends upon connections of the cerebral organs of the ideas; and nature seems to be averse to the formation of such cerebral connections by the practice of contemplation. When I perceive such a demeanour I tend to undergo an angry sentiment that apprehends the agent as a culprit and to carry myself towards him resentfully without thinking of God in the connection or of the necessity in human nature that causes and excuses man's inhumanity to man.
March 23rd. To be of the kingdom of God, is to be of a god-like mind, which is to be so minded towards our neighbour, our race and all conscious beings, that, if there be occasion, our conduct towards them shall be that of a tutelary deity—not indeed of one who apprehends himself as such, but of one who, in the spirit of obedience, acts divinely. Obedience makes us vice-gerents of God, pure of an arrogant sentiment of the dignity. We are perplexed by the apparent incongruity of the co-existence of God and evil, and tend to atheism because of the testimony of evil against the existence of God; but evil, wisely understood, challenges and persecutes us to become instruments of God for the elimination of evil. To suffer evil to convince us atheistically, is to become the paralyzed prey of evil: to understand it as a call from God, is to become strong for resistance, and in some degree a Providence to ourselves and our neighbour. Our choice is between impotence and power, abjectness and magnanimity. And, as regards evil that transcends human power, "what is that to thee, follow thou me."

March 27th. Illustrate the theory of intelligent instinct by the morning's experience of the abortive effort of anger to break from my purpose of peace. Dyspepsia has excited the physical source of anger, and the debauched attachment of X—to a haunt of pleasure which moves him to betray the cause of God acts as a provocative. My excitability is a sign that I am suspended from the function of remonstrance, and yet I find myself every now and then in the way of being swept into violent blame. I catch myself in the act of denouncing X—in an imaginary conversation with him a few minutes after having quelled the fit, and brought myself to the knowledge that I am out of commission, and
have no business to meddle. My purpose is to abstain from interference, as one incapable of wise remonstrance, but the fit is of another mind, and threatens to put me in action in spite of me. That the blame which it instigates obtains in imaginary intercourse, does not exclude it from the category of intentional action. If the fit should come upon me during real intercourse with X—, as in the imaginary intercourse, doubtless, according to experience, it would explode in blame. When I have subdued the fit, and remember how it possessed me, it appears to me as an insanity remembered in a lucid interval, and which the patient has but too good reason to fear will again and again master and abuse his faculties.

Insanity is intentional instinct—so intelligent that its cunning sometimes outwits the sane.

March 31st. I realized in heart this morning the necessity that makes X— ungrateful and mean, and felt for her as the good physician feels for his patient. It seems to me that in achieving this sentiment, I have obtained an advantage over anger which promises an end of war. My heart begins to realize how it is injured by anger, and to revolt from its stultifying and malignant dominion. It was subsequently tried by a slight provocation, kept the peace, appreciated the dignity of its impassiveness. Is not this the beginning of the end?

April 2nd. No: last evening I experienced violent anger.

March 31st. When one who is by nature publicist discovers a moral rule, instinct in him tends to the publication, not to the practice of the rule; and he tends to mistake the interest of the publicist for earnestness as to the practice. This prevents the interference of his will,
which would otherwise purpose accordingly, and do the needful to give effect to the purpose.

(January 2nd, 1876. I hope that the experience of to-day has scotched the propensity.)

March 31st. I am sometimes crushed under the consciousness of my littleness. I become to myself as though I were a mite to which the caprice of an experimentalist had given existence. The love of God enlarges me from this stifling sentiment: it makes me infinite, like its object.

April 3rd. I pledge myself never to address a word to any one calculated to trouble his self-love without prior deliberation unless the occasion make it morally indispensable. This now refers especially to my wife, children, and those whom I employ. Its aim is to deprive anger of opportunity.

April 5th. I am to endeavour to undo the cerebral property that tends to make me an end to myself, and apprehend as wrong or otherwise evil whatever disturbs me.

April 23rd. I was selfish, officious, and intemperate in my remonstrance to X—yesterday, and it bore bad fruit. This was because I remonstrated without due deliberation.

April 29th. Quiet, as excluding intense cerebration, is a condition of the ascendancy of the spirit over the flesh.
The new man should know the old one as the physician his patient and should deal with him accordingly.

287.

May 4th. Study how to order the day so as to secure the greatest plasticity of cerebral function to the will, that the mind be not in a condition to work distractedly when you endeavour to apply it to heavenly things. Especially limit its operation as regards philosophy, that it may not be subjected by an inordinate bias.

288.

May 11th. I found this morning that languor can exclude sincerity. I found myself incapable of sincere prayer and of purposing conduct. Habit uttered forms of prayer and counterfeits of purpose; but as to the reality of prayer and purpose I was a paralytic. Are there not people who are always in that state of paralysis? What chiefly struck me at the time was that the insincerity was without hypocrisy.

289.

May 12th. Endeavour to be incessantly like the Lamb of God. Abhor the spirit that can question the reality of God because of evil. Abhor the spirit of reproach and condemnation. Abhor the spirit of violence.

290.

May 16th. When we endeavour to transfer our hearts from an impious to a pious temper, the impiety determines a moral contempt of the pious sentiments which we would have to be the life of the heart, and, according to this quasi-moral contempt, we seem to ourselves to be hypocrites in so far as we pretend to be aiming at superinducing piety. In this way sincerity is opposed to sanctification.
1870. **May 16th.** When I consider how the spirit of violence strove with me this morning during meditation, and insisted that in a certain matter it would oblige me, for all my prayers, meditations, and precautions to comply with it, how shall I hold that the herd of men subject to violence are free to keep the peace?

**291.**

**May 28th.** Yesterday, while endeavouring to extinguish an uncharitable apprehension of one who had behaved towards me superciliously, I was roused for a little to a state of mind wherein the life, power, and self-consciousness of the new man exceeded that of the old. I seemed to be rather a principle of reason and of godliness exterior to a human body than a mind contained in one and constituting with it a human individual. The old man appeared to be several from me, and as plastic to my will as any of the voluntary organs. Love to God and man was my predominant sentiment. I emotively ignored all secular interests of the old man. He was given to me as the least of men, for I loved all other men, not him. Nevertheless I felt that according to the will of God, I owed him justice. I pray God to raise me to, and keep me for ever in this blessed state, wherein the spirit distinguishes itself from the body and lives a separate life.

**292.**

**May 27th.** Yesterday I noticed that I take refuge in religion from the storms of life, and when the sun shines disport myself abroad forgetful of God. This is to make a mere convenience of godliness. But how, without morose and injurious sequestration, keep oneself in godliness when secular prosperity gives occasion for sympathy and
social enjoyment? By seeking, on such occasions, to promote the happiness of others in the name of God. It is impossible for will to cause such constant recollection; will can only pray for the boon, cherish it when granted by endeavouring to attend to the things of God, and dispose the brain by suitable practice to corresponding cerebration. By endeavouring to restrict the heart to such reserve in respect both of society and the propensity to seek one's own happiness, we become, if it please God to aid us, more and more independent on man, and especially on the "honour that cometh of man;" we relax and tend to annihilate the power of worldliness; we strike and are on the way to break the shell of worldliness and escape into the new life.

Trusting in God's help, I undertake to seek hereafter, in all intercourse, the happiness of another and not my own, and never to abandon my heart unreservedly to any human being.

OCTOBER 26th.—How I have failed! and innocently, because of necessity.

294.

MAY 29th. I renew my vow to decide in all doubtful cases against inclination. My errors of late have been chiefly because of forgetfulness of this rule.

295.

MAY 29th. I am to endeavour to make my happiness depend less and less upon human intercourse, and in order to resist the timid prudence that would fain make me agreeable to men I shall act with due limitation of charity, as though I did not love society, and were not solicitous to disguise my indifference. Let the selfish indifference of X—be an example, but with the selfishness left out.

296.

APRIL 24th. Thinking it probable that my long study on the unreasonableness of infidelity will be abortive, I
could not, in obedience to God, exclude disappointment and elicit cordial acquiescence with the Divine intention; but I know that this was owing to the evil constitution of the heart, and my will protested against the disappointment and inacquiescence. The protest caused a feeling of satisfaction that seems to be auspicious of a change whereby the heart will be perfectly accommodated to God.

297.

April 24th. Study your indisposition to acquaint X— with the disorder of the Æcumenical Council lest it should discourage her faith. Study it with reference to Christ sending those he healed to the temple to perform the customary rites: also with reference to the expediency of her being part of a religious community.

298.

April 24th. Providing I know by mere intellect the rules of virtue, and conduct myself accordingly, I need not be troubled about the non-conformity of the heart. My power to do and forbear according to virtue is, if it be self-determined to corresponding conduct, the personal part of me, and is perfectly pure in spite of the emotive foulness that surrounds it. Its purity is manifested by its resistance to evil inclination—by self-denial.

299.

April 28th. God is a being signified by the spirit of holiness as one to whom it owes worship, trust, unlimited devotion, and perfect righteousness. This spirit insists that the moral imperative is Divine command, and that obedience to duty, which is not obedience to God, is the mere body without the life of goodness. It implies that God is the Creator of order in so far as order coincides with or tends to promote goodness, that he acts immedi-
ately, as well as mediately through law, upon Cosmos, is influenced by prayer and modifies his action upon Cosmos accordingly. It finds itself immured in evil character, and holds that to struggle for enlargement is the paramount business of man. But certain deductions from these premises are inconsistent and repugnant to the spirit of holiness. Does it follow that the spirit of holiness is at fault? Is it not possible that the deduction may be vicious?

300.

April 14th. Emotive cognition is so different from unemotive cognition of the same object that what was at first unemotively known appears to be altogether different and strange when it is first emotively cognized, the difference of the apprehension projecting a corresponding difference upon the object.

Thus when one cordially cognizes a spiritual thesis which he had formerly cognized by the intellect alone, he seems to himself to have discovered.

301.

April 14th. A frivolous event wounds my worldliness. I see the pusillanimity of the worldliness, but without counteracting emotion. I cast about in my heart for a resource. I find none. I tell myself that if the pusillanimity were known and elicited dishonour it would offend me, and that I am ignoble in lacking a counteracting abhorrence when the vice is not scandalous. This does not help me. The heart remains stupid.

302.

April 21st. It is folly to be wise if wisdom means following evidence to perdition. If I save myself from unrighteousness and misery by turning my back upon
appearance of inconsistency that stigmatizes a *sine qua non* of salvation, is it not according to dignity, duty, and reasonableness to do so? When hemmed into this practical alternative, it needs only a *fiat* that the apparent inconsistency is a speciosity to balk the devil. "Why the power and corrigeble authority of this lies in the will." Do you say it is impossible? I tell you from experience that fact guarantees the possibility. I have quietly walked away from perdition in which apparent inconsistency would otherwise have plunged me.

(August 23rd, 1872. It is no longer competent to my will to hold to God.)

May 18th. Faith is power to be good. It is the life of the will—personal life. It is gravitation to God. It disposes to trust that God is and governs. It is of the heart, not of the reason. It loves God more than righteousness; for it is, as being alive in God and in the creature—a live obedience to God—that righteousness is transcendently dear to the godly. For them, righteousness without God is but a corpse—a reign of righteousness without God would be desolation making—believe to be heaven. Faith is love, life, detachment, power.

June 1st. The spiritual who are not yet experienced are for thrusting themselves, in the name of God, upon business to which they are not commissioned. They seem to the inexperienced observer to be arrogant and meddlesome. Both parties are in error.

June 10th. In what consists the temporal perfection of the heart? In its being through perfect love of God and
the neighbour unsusceptible of temptation, so as to need no self-denial, no volition for its government? Or in its being perfectly subject, notwithstanding it be liable to temptation, to a wise will abetted by grace?

306.

**June 11th.** It was because of lack of modesty that I was wont to speak so freely of my spiritual experience. Modesty would have felt that the topic involved a parade of self. Immodesty has been one of the crying evils of my life and character.

307.

**June 12th.** Never, except in extreme cases, remonstrate under circumstances unsuited to the dignity of the Divine word. Appoint the time of remonstrance in advance, and deliver your messages humbly, not imperatively. I remonstrated with X—yesterday, while lying down, and at a time not pre-appointed, and the remonstrance proved unseasonable.

308.

**June 12th.** "If the truth shall set you free, you shall be indeed free." I have this morning had proof of this. My heart was becoming disaffected towards one who has a right to my love. A vice of character in the person was the cause of the change. I put before me the inhumility of the growing intolerance—its arrogance, however unconscious, towards God, and in a moment the old affection bloomed as of old.

309.

**June 12th.** It is good for me to be exercised by the immodesty and insolence of X—, at least when I have the grace to defeat the temptation.
JUNE 13TH. Humility is the perfect subordination of intelligent instinct to godliness whereby the subject is averse to acting without Divine sanction. Privation of pride, vanity, and anger is not humility; for, in their absence, intelligent instinct may impiously, injuriously, immodestly, scandalously proceed to its ends—it may ignore God and the neighbour. The opposition of worldliness, and especially of pride to humility, is so conspicuous that it has hitherto withdrawn attention from that of other intelligent instincts. They are all unhumble until they are disciplined to wait for Divine sanction. Humility excludes empressement.

JUNE 13TH. The latent sycophancy of worldliness—latent relatively to its subject—sometimes puts itself as a love of those who can help it, duping the subject with a corresponding belief. When detected one cannot be too round with the cheat if he would not be himself a cheat.

JUNE 16TH. If, when about to meditate, there be no topic of meditation in my mind, or if, through fatigue, the mind be indolent, the project excites reluctance; but if then a topic occur, the mind tends to rally and to proceed in the work with cordiality. It is not a distinct thought of the absence of a topic that causes the reluctance, but the absence in connection with the idea of the work to be done. Formerly the reluctance appeared to me culpable, and even now I need a second thought to dissipate the feeling of guilt.

JUNE 17TH. I frequently pray to be drawn to Christ. I may say that I have been importunate in this prayer. I imagine vividly what would obtain in me if the prayer were granted. A joyous persuasion or confidence that
THE SURVIVAL.

Christ is the way, the truth and the life, would possess me, overbearing and reducing into insignificance the objection that God created in view of the eternal torment of a part of his creatures. By withholding from me this persuasion, God intimates that he will not have me to be Christian as regards belief in hell, but he holds me to a sentiment of Christ according to which Christ is his messenger or word to a large part of mankind, and is, indeed, to that part the way, the truth and the life.

314.

JUNE 17TH. I addressed myself to meditation on the conduct of the day, and the train of ideas drifted me into consideration of a secular interest. The wandering would have formerly passed with me for a voluntary act, and for a sinful one as involving a preference of secular interests over the service of God, its necessity being latent.

315.

JUNE 20TH. I pledge myself to strive to exclude empresse-ment, and to prevent my instincts from inordinately pressing to their own satisfaction in intercourse. This is to strive for humility and the happiness of others.

316.

JUNE 24TH. Amenableness to will is the measure of the sanity of the mind. It is most sound when it is equally disposed to work to the utmost of its faculty in any direction in which it may suit the will to apply it. It is sometimes disposed to profound and subtle operation in one direction and averse to light labour in another: it is not then in the soundest state. Empressement is a sign of unsoundness, quiet of sanity. Peace that passeth understanding is the sign of perfection.

(JANUARY 7TH, 1876. Is not insanity the alternative of
this peace? Is not the world a mad-house because of the Holy Ghost?)

317.

**June 26th.** Instinct sets us upon deceit, in ignorance that we are deceiving. I detected myself this morning asserting, in an imaginary conversation, that my circumstances excluded a motive by which I am actuated. If the opposite theses “you are, you are not, actuated by that motive” be put to me, the former commands certainty; and, nevertheless, I was unconscious of deceit in alleging the absence of the motive. Worldliness moved me to allege the absence.

318.

**June 29th.** Certain temptations fill my consciousness so as to leave no room for adverse moral sentiment. I remember to have held in other states of mind that to comply with such a desire as now possesses me would be sin. I have a notion, but not a sentiment, of the sinfulness. My heart does not help my will to resist. Sexual temptation tends above all others to put moral sentiment, and with it responsibility, in abeyance. The latitude of intercourse which manners allow to the sexes, evinces the stupidity of society relatively to this property of temptation.

319.

**June 30th.** It seemed to me this morning as though the attempt to seek perfection in the world can never be more than a service of two masters, God and the World, and that of these the World is preferred. Does this signify that God requires of me a radical change of life—to become a pilgrim and stranger in this world? That this should be required of me would not imply that it is required of all who are called to perfection.
JULY 1ST. I am still a courtier, or rather the old man in me is still, through the instigation of prudence and vanity, a courtier. He practices arts which it would mortify him to have detected. Seeing reason to fear that his tricks had betrayed themselves, he underwent a while ago a mortification that tended to pass with him for remorse. I have no shame before God, but am susceptible of deadly shame before men. I did not make myself so, but was made so. The courtier and his tricks belong to an old skin which I am endeavouring to shed. It is by the will of God, and against my will, that I am still enveloped in this skin. He means it to be the condition of an experience from which I have not yet sucked all the wisdom. It would be sheer joy to me to know that I am presently to be released from the abject condition of this experience. Does not this prove that I have no option as to the courting and the tricks—that it is instinct, not I, that is the courtier—the trickster? If the idea of the moral character of the courting and tricking animus had been present to me, instead of allowing the animus to use my organs, I should have lashed it into its kennel.

JULY 1ST. The habit of prayer and worship tends to exclude both.

JULY 5TH. A jealous fear that a discovery of mine had been pirated, possessed me. It was succeeded by a sentiment of the unworthiness of being concerned about the honour that cometh of man. I rejoiced that in this sentiment I had become the new man. The joy was chastened by the consciousness of the preceding impurity. I was resigned before God, adoringly resigned, to be
1870. theatre and agent in respect of these fluctuations and contests.

323.

JULY 5TH. Until we have domesticated the conviction that pain is the cost of obedience we are liable to be inattentive to the whisper of conscience when it proposes obedience. Aversion to pain indisposes the mind to heed suggestions that propose the incurring of pain, so that the mind instinctively evades the suggestion, and, as doing so instinctively, without the guilt, though not without the penalty, of disobedience. If we habituate ourselves to expect from conscience a challenge to incur pain and are resolute to be prompt to incur it when so suggested, we shall be free to give due heed to conscience.

324.

JULY 5TH. The fluctuations of the mind from recollection to irrecollection, from the new man to the old, are like the fluctuations of intermittent insanity. How shall I secure quiet?

325.

JULY 5TH. Yesterday the contemplation of the dependence of mental event upon cerebration and causes foreign to the mind tended to beget sceptical despair—belief that we are incapable of knowledge beyond the knowledge of our impotence, pettiness, and misery. To-day the same contemplation finds in me an immovable faith that we are capable of the dignity, perfection and happiness to which faith aspires. Yesterday I was fatigued by loss of sleep, to-day I am refreshed.

326.

JULY 11TH. The instinct of worldliness bent upon making its subject appear well tends to ursurp the function
of will in respect of purpose to be and do according to Divine imperative, and to substitute simulation for conduct. It sets us upon counterfeiting what we intend to be real.

327.

July 13th. I have undergone within the last two hours (it is now nearly 6 p.m.) a temptation that leaves behind it an indignant conviction that man is abused by his nature, and that we hold one another guilty of actions in respect of which the agent has no option. The indignation has nothing atheistic or irreverent in it: it does not cast a shadow on my love of God, nor dim his glory. It takes for object the necessity by which we are abused, and does not raise its eye from that to the Creator. I detain it in order to draw its portrait: it is ready to vanish out of being the moment I turn my heart upon the duty of acquiescing that since God permits what seems so great an evil we should bless him for its existence. The temptation obscured in me the moral and prudential reasons for refusing it, all but engrossing my consciousness so as to leave scarce any to conscience and prudence, so, indeed, that a little increase of its intensity must have made me its irresponsible implement. What resource had I in youth, when ignorant of God, against like temptation? I thank God for it. I recognize that his grace preserved me—that I could not have resisted without his aid. It was sent to me that experience might augment knowledge.

328.

July 13th. I have blended in me a fawning disposition and a nature that abhors the abject. I am the dupe of a prudential sycophancy that passes with me for love. It dupes me, and makes me dupe others. I would rather die than knowingly comply with it; and yet if it were detected, what contempt and hatred would it not bring upon me? It
makes me fawn upon people who become indifferent and even repugnant when they cease to be important. I am necessitated by instinct to make use of them and cast them aside when they are no longer useful; and while I am using and fawning upon them I take it for granted that I love them. When will man cease to despise and hate his neighbour for being in this vile way the dupe and implement of nature? The infernal necessity to which, through ignorance of God and of ourselves, we are subject, makes us unintentional hypocrites, and causes the hypocrisy to draw down upon us contempt, hatred, and persecution. When will man intrench himself in charity against this enemy? When will he learn, without corruption of needful civil austerity, to pity the human victims of nature, and to see not personal action, but nature naturing, in much that seems to be crime. But nature is not all infernal—rather a chaos of the infernal and divine: for if, on the one hand, she subjects us to such disgraces, on the other she makes us abhor them, and challenges the will to strive with and destroy them. Christ has shown us the way—the "how"—the way of charity and self-denial.

329.

July 26th. "Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven,"—that is, thy will be done by the unsanctified as by the sanctified devout. Sanctity is Heaven. There is no sanctity on earth, but it is possible, and it is our duty to do as though we were saints.

330.

August 16th. To-day an inquiry of God whether I should, through meekness, yield to a certain request—a compliance wounding to self-respect—elicited a clear, peremptory answer, unadulterated by the least tincture of selfishness, that the ignoble is repugnant to God. Now
the sentiment of the noble that thus instructs me respecting the will of God is the subject of this study, and especially its difference from the wounded self-love that on other like occasions has obtained in its stead. My self-love is altogether untouched and in abeyance. I consider the question as though it concerned another. It has pleased God so to constitute the mind that it apprehends as ignoble a conveniency repugnant to self-respect, and, because I understand this condition of mind to be significant of the Divine animus, and not from any flinching of self-love, I decide to refuse. The serenity, the peace with which I see my duty, is a sign the contemplation of which fills me with content and with conviction that I have been divinely counselled. I prayed yesterday that grace should promote me at once into a higher phase of character, so that I should not find myself toiling during any part of my —th year in the same conditions of nature as have hitherto hindered my progress. Is this event a sign that my prayer has been answered?

August 27th.—No. I am still grovelling—still in the shell.

August 19th. Is not the apprehension of retribution as just and obligatory, an indispensable but a merely provisional condition of human development—especially as involved in conviction of sin, the chief deliverance of conscience. In so far as conscience differs from the moral sense as insisting that punishment is due to its subject on account of sin, is it not such a condition? And is it not designed that the moral sense, minus conscience, is to deliver man from that condition after the condition shall have accomplished its end? It may be that man could not have been roused to the struggle with nature on which his growth depends without the instinctive force of the aversion to self and of the terror consequent to this deliverance of
conscience, and that, after it had engaged men in the pursuit of sanctity, and they came to love and pursue sanctity for itself and for God's sake, the moral sense should correct the deliverance as regards retribution.

332.

AUGUST 22ND. Praying for grace to recover me from an angry mood caused by what falsely seemed to be the sloth of X—, I was given to understand that I was to recover myself without Divine aid, by natural means available to my will, such as pondering the arrogance of creature anger, which sets us upon usurping the judicial prerogative of God, the lowliness of my place in creation and even amongst men, the decency of humility, the indecency of its opposite, the duty to confine myself to solitude so long as I am in an irritable temper. By thus pondering and resolving accordingly I can throw a wet blanket upon the mood, and bring myself into peace. I am instructed that I can do this without help and that I am responsible for success. This is indeed significant. Am I to infer that man is destined to become independent on grace, and that, in proportion as he approaches this point of development, Divine aid is given in smaller measure—that a time will come when practical religion will comprise only worship and obedience—not prayer?

333.

AUGUST 24TH. O my God! my business is to endeavour to become master of myself in thy name.

334.

AUGUST 29TH. In certain fatigued states of the brain my faith is harassed by false certainty or something that would be certainty but that my will protests against it—a certainty of the thesis that impersonal evil reigns in the universe
to the exclusion of God. Humility would fain exclude this harassing cognition, substituting cognition that I am incapable of rightly estimating appearances which make against faith.

335.

September 3rd. I am to postpone meditation when the circumstances do not afford ample time.

336.

September 3rd. The love that knows the moral leprosy of the beloved should penetrate and purify all other love. No love of man for man is sound and durable save what is modified by charity. The love that knows the leprosy of the beloved—the love of the neighbour—seeks not itself—seeks not to regale itself with the society, sympathy, or esteem of the beloved, but seeks his beatitude, his salvation, his sanctification, his perfection.

337.

September 7th. I am to enquire of God how I am to secure that I be more occupied—occupied during a longer time with the business of sanctification so as to keep my heart free from the low spirit that tends to possess it when its attention is not turned heavenward—how I am to give more time to God, to conduct, to personal life—how to mount to, and keep myself poised in a plane of knowingness that excludes every apprehension opposed to charity.

338.

September 18th. When daily employed in the business of making money it is more difficult for me to realize that sanctity is the paramount end. This law of the heart is brought to my notice this morning by an unintended com-
parison of my past and present temptations as regards faith. Of late I am not made dull or insensible to the importance of sanctity by undue appreciation of the importance of wealth, whereas, when I am actively engaged in business this kind of obscuration of the heart is one of my chief difficulties. When occupied by a prosperous business the obscuring influence is less than when the working spirit in me is striving with adversity. This suggests how needful it is that a class of men be set apart from the pursuit of wealth to devote themselves to the interests of religion; and it illustrates the wisdom of the Roman Catholic Church which excludes her priesthood from marriage and thereby from prudential interests dangerous to faith.

339.

September 22nd. Cease to pray for things which, according to the induction from the ineffectualness of past prayer, God does not mean to grant. He has signified that he means you to strive throughout life with the temptation, and therefore with an evil nature. Do not pray for detachment from your lower nature, but only to be enabled to act perfectly. Pray that your moral sense be not drowned in excitement of the lower nature so as to be ignorant of duty, but do not pray for the kingdom of God as though it might be vouchsafed at once. Pray every part of the Lord's Prayer except "thy kingdom come."

September 25th. Three days having elapsed since I wrote the foregoing, it appeared to me probable that the elimination of evil from the faculties of emotion is not designed to be the result of spiritual strife, that what we are to achieve by the utmost obedience of which we are capable is a perfect ideal of character, and an art of conformable conduct which we are free to apply or not to apply; that we are always, here on earth to be subject to
temptation in order that we may have occasion for self-denial. Perfection of the moral nature would exclude conduct. If this view be true we err in praying to be detached from the lower nature.

**340.**

**September 30th.** I am helped by the hints of vanity. When I feel, in a mortification of vanity, that I have fallen in the esteem of others I am set upon detecting, and endeavour to undo the infirmity that has compromised me; not, however, for vanity's sake, but for God's sake; and I do not aim at mere suppression of appearance but at extirpation of the vice.

**341.**

**October 2nd.** Never speak of things pertaining to religion without securing yourself in a sentiment of the Divine presence involving a grave sentiment of responsibility. To speak recollectedly of religion is to exclude pleasantry, irreverent familiarity, and whatever is inconsistent with humility and charity.

**342.**

**October 2nd.** I have this morning detected an element in my idea of spiritual perfection that has hitherto held me in ignorant bondage to pride. Sanctity elicits respect in all to whom it is intelligible, and the respect sees in it the aspect of dignity. Accordingly, dignity was given to me as an essential attribute of sanctity, respect as sign of dignity, and defect of respect as sign of defect of sanctity. It was thus put upon me that, to be a godly and righteous man, I must be a man of dignity; and pride, avid of dignity, irrespective of godliness and righteousness, sought its object under cover of duty. Thus masked, it has duped and perverted me, making me, as it were, priest of my own
dignity in the name of God. Under its influence, I have been, so to speak, doing dignity, jealous of dignity, busy in keeping my dignity erect in the minds of others, while all the time I believed myself to be complying with the spirit of holiness. And I was probably the only one that was completely dupe of the influence: others no doubt felt, in vague aversion or uneasiness, the pride by which I was instigated. As soon as I detected the abuse and my ideal of perfection was purged of the bad element, I was relieved of all affection to appearance of dignity, intent to be regarded as one of God's invalids, having nothing better in me than a longing for health. The relief filled me with joy. It was an escape into life and liberty. I felt as though I had been immured. . . . . I left the memorandum unfinished, and now revert to the topic.

**October 23rd.** When a young man, I was frequently asked for explanations of things of which I was ignorant, and the questions used to set me upon answering as though I knew; not so much from an affectation of knowledge as from an absurd feeling of responsibility to find an answer—a feeling imposed upon me by the question. One day it occurred to me that I was under no such responsibility, and also that I could afford to avow ignorance; and the thought rid me for ever of a tyrannical and perplexing tendency. I was in this case relieved by a natural cause—a natural cognition. There was no ground for a presumption that the relief was caused by grace. Now there seemed to be a certain analogy between the two cases, and this suggests two questions, viz., 1st, was the event of 2nd inst., an effect of grace, or merely natural? 2nd, was the intellectual or cognitive change, cause or consequent of the emotive change?

**October 5th.** Assumption of the sufficiency of the cognitive faculty in oneself excludes wisdom. Even an infallible
human judgment, if such existed, would lack an element of
perfect wisdom, if, being confident of itself, the confidence
were that of self-esteem, and not based upon the evidence
of experience. The surgical benefit of calamity that in-
volves failure of our designs is the breaking down of latent
self-confidence, and it involves the discovery that we are
unsafe without self-distrust and the trust in God which self-
confidence excludes—the discovery that we have need of a
divinely sanctioned rule and criterion of action. Wisdom
is knowledge, that is the basis of a saintly life—a life
that proceeds on rule given by conscience as the will of
God.

October 10th. May God raise to himself an altar in
my soul before which I may prostrate myself with a heart
forgetful of all without, save what concerns worship and
prayer. May I be thus enabled to live in the now with
God when I pray, worship, and meditate, and to paralyze
the distracting gravitation of the heart to secular interests,
that, at such times, disorder my intercourse with God.
May my soul become a sanctuary.

October 11th. I am reluctant to forbear from praying
for help, which, according to induction from the past
failure of such prayer, God seems to signify he will not
grant. Prayer seems to be of itself, irrespective of what it
obtains, a good, a guarantee, a help; and one is reluctant
to lose occasions of such benefit and to trust himself to
himself in respect of things as to which he had been ac cus-
tomed to invoke, with hope, Divine support. Thus I find
myself in a position of pious insincerity, or, shall I say
insimplicity, praying in order that I may derive from prayer
what I pretend to ask from God.
THE SURVIVAL.

346.

1870. November 6th. The second exercise of St. Ignatius supposes that the person meditating has the gift of tears, a gift peculiar to the natural priest. The second prelude requires that the agent pray for intense grief for sin with abundant weeping, and the fifth point of the exercise is to break forth into exclamation when we have stirred up a vehement commotion of the feelings. Now people akin to St. Ignatius as to emotive constitution can pray for grief and tears with some countenance of hope because of natural aptitude, whereas the natural layman has no such sanction of hope, and would seem to himself to exercise an unwarrantable presumption in praying for such grief and tears, as in praying for a miraculous translation into Heaven. The natural priest can count upon a vehement commotion of feeling consequent to the contemplation of his sins; not so the natural layman.

347.

November 7th. The pious fraud to which Muller owed his exemption from military service, and which he innocently boasts as being a manifestation of Divine power in his behalf, coupled with the apparition of Lourdes, suggests that either the religious faculty in man is liable to be worked by intelligent agents that are enemies of God and man, or is liable to perversion by vicious natural influences akin to those that cause delirium and delusion of every kind. Muller's delight in prayer (see his narrative page 49) shows that he is a contemplative, and modern experience finds a general likeness between the contemplative and the medium. They are like as to susceptibility in virtue of which they undergo what seems to them to be a supernatural influence and possession. They differ in this, that the contemplative believes himself to be influenced by God, the medium by a finite spirit. Allowing that both
are supernaturally influenced, there is abundant proof that people who suppose themselves to be divinely influenced are actuated in a way adverse to holiness. Many have been moved to exhibit their nakedness. Many have been forced to cry out against the violent rapture imposed by what seemed to them to be the Divine embrace. Many have sung the rapture with an erotic ardour repugnant to purity. Madame Guion believed herself to be an organ of revelation—a mere amanuensis of God for the writing of "The Spiritual Torrent." Reference of the supernatural influence to God, then, does not distinguish the contemplative from the mere medium. The former, like the latter, may be the dupe of an infernal influence. Now, when we consider that Muller is launched upon England by a perfidy which he exultingly imputes to God, and that the power which thus inaugurated his career manifests itself in the support of a costly institution founded upon no other capital than that of prayer, and when we see Mariolatry foisted upon Christianity by such apparitions as that which converted Ratisbonne, and that of Lourdes, it is time for man to study how to protect himself from the gift-giving Greeks of the supernatural world, and to look for a criterion of truth by which to distinguish what is from God and what from the enemy.

A noble mind could not be made the ignorant agent of a deception by any influence however mystical or plausible. It is privation of nobleness that exposes the religious faculty to such abuse.

348.

November 10th. Instinct proceeds differently, according as the system of conscious responsibility in which it works is great or little. He who is not weighted by an habitual sentiment of grave and large responsibility is apt to be rash, precipitate, voluble, flippant, unscrupulous. These signs manifest his levity and untrustworthiness to the
The thought was suggested by detecting the absence of due feeling of responsibility which left me free to disparage last evening an author of great dignity, and by a consequent reference to the freedom with which I am in the habit of censuring public men.

**November 21st.** I have shut the door against infidelity, but I suffer it to look in at the window. I have not been intolerant of atheistic evidence, such as instances of apparently useless torture testifying against the sovereignty of goodness. I was unprovided with a resolution to draw down the blinds of the heart against this evidence the moment it appeared. It could not make me an infidel, but it elicited discussion, made me despondent, and tugged at the support of devotion. Hereafter it will be my duty to turn my back upon it *instantly*. To give it optional entertainment for a moment will be a crime, except when it is necessary to refer to it for the benefit of others, and then only so long as the idea of it is merely notional and in no degree emotive.

**November 25th.** Instinct persists in blaming in spite of my purpose. What is the remedy?

**November 27th.** That I am unable to imagine a worthy end of the being of creatures, informs me according to the logic of faith, not that our being has no worthy end, but that the end is not, in our present state, discernible. I owe this relieving thesis to the supreme criterion of credibility, indispensableness to holiness. The criterion has saved me from the absurdity of making myself a measure of the possible.
352.

December 1st. Again, as on the 27th ult., I have found relief from atheistic evidence in the humility that distinguishes the latent self-confidence of the cognitive faculty. I was thinking of the heathen ascetics of all ages, and of the inutility of their religious efforts, and then I bethought me of the abortiveness of my own religious industry. Assuming that the former had been unavailing, what hope for the latter? It was almost pressed home upon me that religion with its theories, hopes, fears and strivings, is a vain thing, altogether out of agreement with reality. I found refuge from the baleful induction in the thought and belief that the cognitive faculty in man is unequal to a view of all the facts indispensable to a right judgment on the subject.

353.

December 4th. It is given to me as eminently probable that practical religion should be confined to worship and obedience to the exclusion of prayer. Obedience includes enquiry as to what is the will of God: it includes worship and all duty. Three objections to prayer have been urged upon me of late. The first is inductive, proceeding out of the fact that my prayers have not elicited what they asked for, and that the prayers of others, so far as I am informed, have not, according to a candid understanding, obtained what they asked for. The second is the implication that the supplicant knows better than God what is good for him. The third is that the regular failure of regular prayer has generated a conviction of the vanity of prayer which violates and scandalizes sincerity by substituting a make-believe of hope for the hope supposed by prayer. It is true that my prayers have sometimes prevailed—that they have elicited what seemed to be supernatural event; but the occasions have been states of mental in-
firdmity that reduced me to the condition of a child, signifying that when I am quite unable to do for myself, God sometimes vouchsafes, in answer to prayer, to help me. The difference of the occasions on which he has and those on which it has not helped me, signifies that I am to be divinely helped in answer to prayer only when I am abnormally weak.

The imperative thus signified that in my normal state I am not to pray, does not imply that God does not immediately and helpfully act upon me—that, in the language of the Church, I am not aided by grace and impotent to do good without it.

I once exerted all my might, without reference to God, against a temptation, and the temptation overwhelmed me. I subsequently strove with it in the name of God and the temptation opposed to me a mere cobweb resistance. Was the power which I exerted, on the second occasion, natural or supernatural? I do not know. I only know that it depended on faith and piety. And of what concern is it to me whether it be natural or supernatural, or partly one and partly the other? What is important is to have and exert it, and to see in it an evidence that subjection to moral evil is the penalty of infidelity—that man must be in a social and political hell until he base himself upon the power of faith. Whether the power be natural or supernatural, it is proper to godliness; it is available only to faith. Those who believe it to be natural and perseveringly endeavour to apply it, proceed as much on consciousness of dependence upon faith as those who believe it to be supernatural; and if it be supernatural it is clear that it is imparted to them without prayer.

Another reason for the exclusion of prayer occurs to me here. The religious are prone to expend themselves in prayer and rites, and neglect conduct and the study of duty. If their fervour be cut off from escape in prayer it must needs employ itself in conduct and the study of duty,
whereby their progress towards moral perception would be likely to be accelerated. Certainly, from whatever cause, religious fervour has not realized what might be expected in the way of moral progress, and is it not likely that its escape in prayer is the cause?

Granting that I am divinely commanded not to pray, it does not follow that the command applies to others, or to more than a class of persons. It may be that some are, and that others are not, dependent on supernatural aid that is only given to prayer. If so, it is probable that God so deals with those whom he has made dependent on prayer that induction from experience of failure does not deprive them of the hope essential to genuine prayer, nor put them in conflict with sincerity.

I am to pray whenever hope sanctions prayer.

354.

December 14th. On Monday, 12th inst., I came by a healing knowledge of an infirmity by which I have been badly duped and discredited. The infirmity is manifested in the fuss I am prone to make over what seems to me to be discovery. I tend to go into an ecstasy of self-complacency at the contemplation of myself as being in advance of all the ages, and to fill the barn yard with cackle over the discovered grain. The infirmity is a protracted puerility. I was previously aware of its existence and have even been able to frustrate its operation; but the cognition was almost ignorance compared to that which obtained on Monday, and which carries in it efficient repugnance—an instinctive force. The new cognition is emotive: it is a sentiment: the former one was a mere unemotive inference. It suggested a duty and a rule to will, and will did its best accordingly; but it was not, like the new cognition, instinctive.

What a Malvolio the infirmity has made me! But is
it on this account that it is so abhorrent? Is the instinctive force involved in my new cognition of it derived after all from pride or vanity, or both? No. I have persevered so long in the effort to purge my heart of those constituents of worldliness, and know them so familiarly from the frequency of our encounters, that I am warranted in trusting the consciousness which declares in me that they do not compose, nor in any way adulterate, the instinctive force of the new cognition—a force that consists in hunger and thirst after God and righteousness.

The cognition was given to me in a contrast between myself and certain able men of my acquaintance who, without noise, apply faculties that greatly transcend mine. They are not tempted to make a marvel of every success; and when they do what, perhaps, no amount of culture and discipline could enable me to do, they do not seem to themselves to apply more than ordinary power. In the course of the day another specimen of the infirmity was presented to me in Motley's "Dutch Republic." It was the pedantic coxcombrery of Vigilius which shrivels an historical crisis into an occasion of oratorical display.

With what reason are we morally averse to men who are afflicted with this infirmity? Selfishness would move them to frustrate it if they had option to suppress its manifestation. That it makes them conspicuously contemptible, or otherwise repugnant, proves that they are without option in respect of it, and, indeed, without knowledge of its nature. They are as ignorant of what moves them and of the momentum, as children and savages of what moves the world and that it is in motion. It is a disease to which, though loathsome, pity, not blame, is due. It is not because of a reason that it is an object of moral aversion, but because human susceptibilities, prior to our development into a certain phase of knowledge—knowledge that is destined to substitute a scientific for the mystical ground of charity—is constituted to misapprehend it.
December 14th. I was struck this morning by the fact that we are constituted to apprehend joy beyond a very moderate degree as a manifestation of weakness. God seems to signify in this that dignity coincides with peace, and excludes excitement.

December 16th. A husband and wife to whom I promised pecuniary assistance beyond their expectation, evinced, instead of gratitude, a disposition to extract more from me, which begot in me a faint rudiment of indignation. The sentiment was no sooner engendered than discerned and destroyed, leaving me in the temper of the Good Physician. As reasonable for the parent to be indignant at the naughtiness of the child, or the physician at the delirium of the patient, as for a man of high religious and moral culture to have intolerant apprehension of his dwarfed brother.

December 16th. I have been troubled of late by evidence that seems to make against the trustworthiness of the spirit of holiness. Religion has been always a pretext of man's inhumanity to man. Pagans have burned Christians, and Christians one another for God's sake. Monks have gloried in the auto-da-fé. But if this evidence be conclusive, I should by analogy judge that reason is not trustworthy, because men have so frequently and grossly erred. As it is reasonable to trust Reason in spite of the evidences of its fallibility, it is reasonable to trust the spirit of holiness, although it has dwelt in brutal hearts without purging them of the brutality. It moves us to do in the name of God what we think to be good, but it does not prevent us from thinking evil to be good and doing
How shall I distrust a spirit that demands of me the utmost of what I think to be good, and imposes upon me the duty to hold voluntarily, if I be not otherwise held, to the thesis that God is and governs? Without God there is no guarantee that self-denial is not wasted—a guarantee indispensable to conduct, and without God there is no dignity in being. To whom shall I go if I distrust this spirit?

**December 16th.** Last evening the misery of a pauper put upon me an emotion like that with which I contemplate atheistic evidence, but without distinct reference to the question of God's existence. When I detected the impious character of the emotion, I made an act of faith that the misery was an inexplicable good, and I was instantly relieved of the emotion—instantly exorcised. The emotion was the equivalent of question of Divine goodness. It corresponded on the emotive plane to what on the intellectual plane would be question of Divine goodness. The feeling of being at one with God involved in the relief, signified from God that my obedience had achieved knowledge.

**December 22nd.** A feeling of moral indignation informed me this morning that I was highminded. If I were under the chastisement of some humiliating calamity there would be no room in my heart for indignation. It would not blind me to the iniquity of my neighbour but it would see in the iniquity a symptom of disease, and not of his disease merely, but of our common disease. Impatience of the neighbour's infirmity signifies inhumility.

**Christmas.** Last evening I attained to an intuitive and subjective view of the religious spirit. It dis-
cerned itself in my consciousness in contrast to the spirit of one to whom I had on that day spoken on the subject of charity and who seemed to hear me with an amused mind. The unimportance of the topic to that mind determined in it a 'gay apprehension of my weakness in addressing to it such discourse. The profanity which I thus amused was inherited. The mother of the person had lately died, and her corpse was the first to present death to me stripped of solemnity. It distinctly proclaimed itself to be no better than the body of a dead cat. She had lived and died impiously. Her spirit survived in her child. In contrast to the profane spirit typified in the child, and apprehended by the religious spirit in myself while I was narrating the event to X, I became immediately conscious of the apprehending spirit; and it was given to me not only as a fact of my own nature but as the spirit and specific difference of a class to which I belong. It was given to me as an unemotive bias, propensity, or momentum—as unemotive, for it was given, in contrast to all religious emotion, at least to all religious emotion that is distinctly such to the subject, as a momentum that bears upon the will when the heart is dry or even consciously averse to the business and interests of religion.

If death should lose its solemnity, if the heart should become universally accommodated to the dead-cat theory, for what reason should one endure the torture of temptation and deny himself, especially when it is not obvious that indulgence will injure the neighbour? Why shall he respect truth, for example, if the lie do not seem to him to injure any one? Why shall he forbear to rob the rich of what the rich man would not miss with pain? Why shall he not covet his neighbour’s wife and more than covet if circumstances promise secrecy? As Othello implies, it is only the knowledge that is painful. Dignity is not involved. What has dignity to do with beings who terminate in equality to dead cats. Dignity is the end, reason, and life
of virtue. It is Divine dignity that godliness adores. Strip man of dignity, and you strip him of the possibility of virtue. So long as men honour their dead there is in them a matrix of dignity and virtue. A theory of human nature that deprives death of solemnity, annihilates the foundation of virtue and civilization.

January 5th. In order to secure my outdoor inter course I am to meditate daily after lunch and plan the disposition of the interval till dinner.

January 14th. I certainly have a sentiment of the importance of sanctity, but it is not efficient like my sentiment of the importance of wealth, it is not instinctive. Emotion, then, is either instinctive or uninstinctive. Is faith a species of the sub-genus instinctive emotion, and is it for this reason that works are its measure? Because my sentiment of the importance of sanctity is uninstinctive it gives occasion for obedient volition in quest of sanctity. If it were instinctive the instinct would exclude volition from the work of sanctification.

January 20th. When the world in this or that individual looks askance at me, and I have reason to believe that it is in reproof of some fault of mine I am to respect that person as the exponent of Divine reproof and so exclude the discrediting apprehension of which pride tends to make him the object. God assigns me a position of inferiority relatively to such persons which I am to take, if it be possible, with cheerful humility. Moreover, I am to endeavour to apprehend the rebuke as an act of society, not of a mere individual, as one apprehends himself as
seeing or touching the whole of a thing when only a part is in immediate relation with the organ of sense. If I thus merge the individual in the society the rebuke tends to humble not to exasperate.

364.  
January 23rd. I am never to allude to a spiritual experience unless commissioned to do so in meditation.

365.  
January 27th. If I seek to explain the antecedents of creation conformably to Divine dignity I am plunged in confusion and discouragement. If I confine myself to time measured by natural event I find sufficient evidence of God to serve as a basis of faith, and the more we obey and study the business of obedience the brighter becomes the evidence and stronger the faith. Does not this signify a prohibition to investigate beyond the boundary of natural event.

366.  
January 28th. I have defeated an angry apprehension, and the victory was immediately followed by a lively sentiment of the folly and malignity of the apprehension. I hope much from this.

367.  
February 10th. The death of Mr. —, closing in torment a life of torment, tempted me as to faith. Its testimony seems to be that we are the offspring of mere nature (too often a stepmother), not of a Divine creator. I weigh the testimony, allow its plausibility, and turn it out of court in the name of God, and at the instance of the spirit of holiness, on the ground that indispensableness to holiness is the supreme criterion of truth. Yesterday I gave
1871. God the homage of a like obedience, but the volition was put forth in despondency, as though the heart despaired of what the will affirmed. To-day, on the contrary, the volition is supported by confidence that it is the way and the truth, or rather the confidence has followed the volition; for discouragement occupied the heart when the will protested against the testimony. This confidence, I take it, is what is known to the Christian by the name, *faith*. It is constant in those who are remarkable for sanctity, and in its higher degree constitutes “the peace which passeth understanding.” No thanks to them for their conduct and their moral loveliness. As the “Imitation” says, “They ride pleasantly enough who are borne by grace.” They are excluded from opportunity of self-denial, and therefore of true obedience by the fact that their strongest desire is always to comply with God. But thanks to God for their beauty and example. They are models given to will to copy—to will unaided save by a minimum of grace.

The relief, courage, and peace of this faith appeared in me immediately after I had addressed God as one against whose existence the evil prevalent in nature testifies. God seemed to send me the boon as a sign of his approval of the spirit that thus addressed him—as a sign of reprobation of the spirit that deals with religion as if it required tender handling—a spirit half dupe and half impostor.

368.

**February 15th.** To be humble is to be exempt from vicious moulds of apprehension and judgment. The humble man is free to inquire what is expedient in intercourse instead of unconsciously taking for granted the expediency of that way of proceeding to which he is instinctively prone.

369.

**February 20th.** It is good to have mortifications to offer secretly to God. When X—exhibits an amused feel-
ing of what seems to her the childishness of your judgment, prefer to put up with the mortification and to offer it to God rather than to humble her by justifying yourself.

370.

February 21st. The love of God tends to conform the heart to the moral ideal of its subject. Its efficiency is in proportion to the energy, culture and discrimination of the moral sense. It tends to subordinate all other sentiment—to reduce all other attraction—under a supreme love of God and of the neighbour.

371.

February 28th. Eschew intensity. It is neurotic. Exclude it even from worship.

372.

March 14th. A theological stumbling-block has been just now got out of the way. The idea of God as Creator has been embarrassed by the objection that it presupposes an eternity in which there was nothing but God. It presupposes no such thing, but merely signifies that the infinite baffles investigation by human Reason, and stops its perplexity when it strives to trespass beyond the limits of human cognition.

373.

March 15th. Study the effect of faith on prudence. Perfect faith should extinguish prudential anxiety.

374.

March 25th. I am authorized to believe that, notwithstanding the intensity of my prudence, I do not serve two masters. I serve only God. When Mammon disputes with duty, it can alarm, pain, tempt me, but not for an instant obtain hesitation.
March 26th. I notice just now (being in meditation) that godliness is not in me, as it is in pious Christians, an energy that quickens intelligence and is instinctive. I was looking for a resource against my liability to be surprised by provocation from members of my family when I became aware that my sagacity was all but torpid because I am not adequately interested to find means of defence. If it were a question of protecting my capital, my sagacity would pursue with untiring energy the desired means, but I can only obtain from it a languid effort as regards the end now in view. This would be discouraging, but that I am given to understand it is a necessary condition of voluntary as opposed to instinctive devotion—of spiritual progress mainly caused by human will as opposed to spiritual progress mainly caused by the instinctive force of grace. The apparent disadvantage is to be compensated by persistent and patient volition.

April 1st. In every meditation endeavour to discover of what spirit you are so as to regulate accordingly the next interval. Look especially for signs of irascibility and the jealousy of self-respect.

April 1st. Try whether you cannot now afford to lean less on family sympathy and intercourse, so that, being less dependent for happiness on the strength of the family, you may be less exposed to provocation from its infirmity.

April 2nd. My meditation is conversant about parental self-respect, how usefully it functions at first and seems to be a sentiment of great dignity and purity, and how, sub-
sequently, in the view of the new man, it is discovered to be pusillanimous and impure. It functions usefully in insisting on filial piety, but exposes its impurity and littleness in its vulnerability. It is our duty to supersede it by a purpose to apply all legitimate means of eliciting filial respect, not for the satisfaction of our self-respect but, in the name of God—in obedience to God. We should endeavour to destroy or at least reduce the susceptibility that is flattered by filial piety, and wounded by its opposite.

**379.**

**April 4th.** A reprobatory apprehension of X—consequent on disappointment, obtained in me this morning, and projected a corresponding scheme of demeanour, as though I had purposed to conduct myself accordingly. I discerned the moral character of the sentiment, and instantly strove with it. I applied the power of the thought that I am servant of God, and should look at all things from that point of view. The evil sentiment succumbed at once to this thought which imparted self-consciousness to the new man. The heart of the old man, red with evil reprobation, was for a moment visible to the new bent upon conduct according to Divine command. An instant of strife and the enemy gave way. But how shall I secure that whenever a bad spirit possesses me, I shall discern its moral character? Of late I have been favoured by slight temptations that left room in the mind for discernment of their character. There is improvement; but as yet God has not vouchsafed me security of fair play. The new man is deprived of what, for want of a better name, I call fair play, when evil so absorbs him that he does not discern it as evil.

**380.**

**April 4th.** Perfection excludes all feeling opposed to charity such as anger and envy. Whatever of violence to the neighbour it may be the duty of the perfect man to do,
he does without the support of emotion opposed to charity. All the feelings that agree to humility and charity are fostered by perfection and all others excluded.

**April 6th.** Anger tends to exclude reverence. When in company a man shows signs of anger he is guilty of disrespect. He is absorbed into a resentful self and ignores the dignity of the company. He who is free to suppress anger and allows it insults the Divine presence. We should endeavour to attach this thought redintegratively to the emotion, so that the incipient stage of the emotion shall suggest the thought and alarm the will in time to prevent the sacrilege. To the godly mind the thought is a power that may be successfully applied against anger, so that its first motions shall be warnings to respect God by humility.

**April 10th.** The temporal end of the art of sanctification is to modify the brain in order that cerebration shall cause a continual self-consciousness of the new man involved in a continual consciousness of need and power to conduct the old man; a self-consciousness analogous to a sovereign's consciousness of himself as ruler involved in his consciousness of the need which it is his function to satisfy.

(July 24th, 1872. Habit is congenital disposition developed by practice. All men are congenitally and strongly disposed to be kings, but few are so disposed to be saints.)

**April 11th.** A sentiment of one's own dignity, but especially one that is instinctive and modifies deportment, is a stultification.
APRIL 12TH. Eschew honour and cleave to dignity. To realize dignity in our nature and our acts is an end, and, till we reach perfection, the end of our being. The love of honour instinctively counterfeits dignity, making its subject its first and blindest dupe; and when, in the name of God, he purposes to live according to dignity and in contempt of honour, he tends, deflected by the instinct, to describe a course between the directions of opposite forces. Self-respect is, in the bulk of men, concerned not about dignity but honour.

APRIL 14TH. Self-respect is a species of self-love, not, as is commonly supposed, a species of affection to dignity. It is an abject thing as involving an abject dependence on the animus of another, whereby we are susceptible of offence from insult or slight, and of elation from praise. Its physiognomy is typically instanced in that full length portrait of Louis XIV., in which the looped-up robe suggests a petticoat, and Louis is doing deportment. But the physiognomy varies according as pride or vanity predominates in the self-respect. When vanity predominates, pusillanimity is expressed; when pride, the expression is lurid and suggestive of strength of the infernal kind; for example, the first Napoleon. Self-respect supposes its subject to be still an embryo in the shell of worldliness.

APRIL 16TH. The instinct of uneasiness to seek relief tends to set us upon such work as the correction of others—work to which humility, recollection, and peace are indispensable. It tends to set the old man upon doing what is possible only to the new man divinely commissioned. If we could fasten a bell upon the neck of temptation we
should starve him; but how to do this I know not. If I cage spontaneity in rule I degrade it, and if I restrict it in a less degree I leave room for the usurping instinct.

387.

APRIL 17TH. Thinking of the disorder of my heart throughout yesterday, I was tempted to doubt the possibility of modifying the brain so as to oblige temptation to make known its character, and alarm the will. I recall what reassures me—that I confined the tempest within my own breast, and that what seemed to be defeat was victory.

388.

APRIL 19TH. The end of our being is to pursue and enjoy happiness consistent with dignity. Bentham and his school overlooked the limitation of happiness by dignity.

389.

APRIL 22ND. X— is set upon doing dignity a little for its own sake, but mainly for honour. He does it pedantically enough. Let the instance be a type of the baseness of seeking honour.

390.

APRIL 28TH. Keep the heart pure of discouragement of faith. It is competent to will to do this by an act of faith, protesting that appearance of truth in an infidel thesis is a symptom of ignorance or of mental disorder, and is to be ejected from the mind as a thing unworthy of discourse. To reason about it is to dishonour God.

391.

APRIL 29TH. Conduct, not the decay of evil in the old man, is the measure of personal empire and development.
The tenor of the life viewed at due distance, that is, by people outside the family, is the exponent of one's rank on the scale of personality. The minute deviations visible to a closer inspection are of no more account than the disorder that offends the eye of the fly on St. Paul's. This is God's answer to the discouragement caused by the persisting evil of the old man.

392.

April 30th. Offended self-respect generates in me retaliatory schemes that seem at the time to be, in the view of reason and conscience, indispensable, and afterwards avow themselves to have been symptoms of disorder.

393.

May 3rd. This morning a sign of impenitence in respect of misconduct that had formerly for a long time embittered and obstructed me, elicited an incipient motion of impatience, which was instantly quelled by the thought that the impenitence was a cerebral necessity. My love for the person longed for the repentance, and the starved longing determined a reprobatory apprehension of her in the temporary absence of conscious theoretic cognition that she could not help it, that her cerebral structure excluded the repentance. Cerebration stultifies me with cognitions incongruous with my theoretic knowledge, and with instinctive emotions involved in the cognitions. It seemed to me that this kind of event is peculiarly an occasion of Divine interference, and therefore of prayer. I accordingly prayed that God would make me consistent with myself by harmonizing my cognitions, so that I should not hereafter experience a reprobatory sentiment inconsistent with my theory, nor be set upon effort to elicit an impossible improvement. Does reason evolve knowledge only to illuminate the folly of the heart?
MAY 8TH. It is given to me as an article of faith that God is always aiding me. When I am tempted and seem to have been almost guilty of consent, the event is from God, not as a trial, for God has no need of experiment, but as a lesson.

MAY 8TH. Self-esteem tends to feed on devotion and especially on the consciousness of singularity in view of the paucity of the devout. The theoretic knowledge of the danger does not of itself neutralize the tendency. It is necessary for a man to snub himself with the thought that he is one of the herd, and that there is no favouritism with God.

MAY 8TH. Analogy affords room for the hope that society will cease to flatter worldliness, and that, deprived of its aliment, it may perish. Deprived of the stimulus of light, fishes have lost the organ of vision, and why should not the organ of worldliness perish for lack of occasion? The utmost the spiritual can now do in respect of it, is to refuse it satisfaction.

MAY 9TH. The impotence of the personal man to watch spontaneity for any considerable time, seems to be analogous to the monkey's impotence to attend. Is not man, then, the ancestor of a new species capable of sustained personality?

MAY 10TH. I am often tempted by a quasi-conviction that there is no good reason for creation, but especially for the creation of beings susceptible and liable to pain.
Pleasure, even according to dignity, does not always appear to me to be an end warranting creation, but at the cost of pain it seems to afford no apology for creation. It is when the state of the nervous system and brain relapses or suspends all emotive attraction that I undergo this quasi-conviction. When I recover from such an approximation to apathy, the temptation ceases and happiness, according to dignity, appears to me a sufficient reason for creation.

May 16th. I have now come by an efficient cognition of myself, as necessary agent involving an uneasy distrust of that self, as a fountain of discrediting spontaneity, and giving in contrast my personal self, the two selves being immediately manifest to me like objects of perception or reflection. They are intuitively discerned, not as heretofore, theoretically or inferentially. The difference of the efficient from the theoretic cognition is so great, that at first one has difficulty to allow the identity of their objects. The efficient knowledge seems to be discovery, and the theoretic mere conjecture. The former, like faith, weighs upon the heart, determines all pertinent sentiment, and bears upon the instinctive life. We feel, apprehend, judge, and act differently because of it. But this improvement of knowledge and of power of conduct, how vain is it without the spirit of holiness! By means of it one might live perfectly so far as the neighbour is concerned, and consciously live in a slough if he be without the sentiment of God. Now it has pleased God to deprive me for the most part of this sentiment, which, in its highest degree, is probably vision of God, so that, without its aid, I should make a progress towards wisdom different from that of the Christian and all who seek perfection mystically. Is it intended that the part of nature shall be distinguished from that of grace in the work of sanctification?—that God's immediate
part in the work shall be distinguished from that of man? and that the infinite value of the Divine part shall be made known by the comparative worthlessness of the utmost that human will can achieve? Or is the privation designed to show that the spirit of holiness is indispensable to recollection, and that without it personality is capable of only a fitful life, not of sustained being, vigilance and control?

400.

I.—Sicken self-love by the thought of its baseness.

II.—Recover yourself frequently in a purpose to hallow the name of God in conduct.

III.—Bethink you that to keep yourself in peace is the fundamental condition of conduct.

IV.—Endeavour to fasten a bell upon the neck of temptation.

V.—Strive to detect and frustrate every movement of worldliness, especially in intercourse with the family, preventing its tendency to substitute pursuit of honour for pursuit of dignity.

VI.—Eschew familiarity.

VII.—Purge the heart of discouragement of faith.

VIII.—Endeavour to stifle self-esteem in the sentiment of yourself as one of the herd. Consider how self-esteem is salient in the insane.

401.

JULY 28TH. Am I not the subject of an unconscious duplicity which, while allowing the goodness of God in applying adversity to man, reserves a latent infidelity to be let loose in case the pain applied to me exceed a certain intensity and duration? Or is it that, being now a believer, I have a presentiment that such a pain would change me into an infidel—that cowardice would melt down the basis of faith?
The Survival

402.

August 9th. Last evening the pusillanimity of the desire of fame was strikingly manifested by a lecturer in reading to me with rhetorical tone and gesture a portion of a lecture. His subject was virtue, and on this he caracoled. I inferred, but without any corresponding emotion of disgust, that my desire of fame is just such a contemptible spirit; and this spirit in me is all the more contemptible that my mind is mainly conversant about religion, and that, if I am to caracole at all, it must be on the back of religion. How shall I extinguish this vile spirit? It is like a morbid appetite that craves what health loathes. My mere intellectual knowledge of its vileness affords indeed the possibility of preventing corresponding action, but has no healing property in respect of the disease.

August 12th. Nevertheless I am not without hope that the event has damaged the spirit.

403.

August 9th. I see no escape from the judgment that God does not sanction regular prayer. Induction insists that he disregards it, and it is condemned by the a priori reason that Divine wisdom is not to be instructed by human suggestion. God knows our needs without being told of them; and his infinite goodness needs no persuasion to do the best for us. Reason and faith give no countenance to regular prayer. We owe God worship, conduct, and the study needful to conduct, but not prayer. Since prayer offered in extremity has sometimes prevailed for me, I reserve extreme occasions. This is not a mere re-discovery. The objections against prayer that have hitherto obtained with me applied against the kinds of prayer that had been regularly offered and disregarded. A new objection abolishes all regular prayer whatever, and allows only prayer in...
insupportable extremity. Even this it allows with distrust.

404.

August 15th. I am ordered not to parley with the topic of the existence of evil. I am allowed but one function in respect of it—to cast it out of my mind when it appears. It obtains attention by the lure of a hope that study may discover a satisfactory explanation—a bait presented in every striking instance of the apparent cruelty that reigns in the universe, especially when the instance rouses indignation. I know from experience that the hope is vain; and this knowledge is God's message to me to give no entertainment to the topic.

405.

August 16th. My business is primarily with human nature, and only secondary with human individuals. Above the man is the nature that determines his animus and action except within the narrow confines of his freedom. If I keep this in view I am either exempt from the intolerant emotion and instinct which the bad spirit and misconduct of others tend to excite, or able to prevent the instinct: I am mindful that my business is with the nature that instigated the provocation, not with the human manikin whose strings it pulls. I turn from the individual to our common enemy—our common human nature—and the very distraction helps me. The fascination of attention to the offender helps the law of violence. My business is not with him, but with nature in him, and in myself. If I put him aside and make myself so far master of nature, I rule law by opposing law to law. To such dignity does godliness tend to raise us.

406.

August 17th. Instances of evil that testify against a Divine creation and government of Cosmos sometimes
impose atheistic cognition on the mind without giving time to the will to interfere. This morning the horror caused by histories of insanity written by restored patients, seemed for a moment to involve atheistic cognition. In such cases the will should take refuge in scepticism and deny the veracity of the cognitive faculty.

407.

**August 18th.** There is a natural peace dependent on health and the absence of exciting moral causes, especially of a painful kind, which is a condition of the highest judiciousness possible to the subject. When the mind is established in this peace, it regards all opposite states as involving more or less alienation or proneness to false apprehension and judgment. Such states appear to it somewhat as dreaming to the waking mind. Religious exaltation seems to it to be morbid. It distrusts all strong religious emotion and sentiment. It is averse to enthusiasm of every kind and degree. I call it natural to distinguish it from the masked excitement which, as pretending on its face to be supernatural, the subject imputes to the immediate action of God upon the mind. Induction gives us so much reason to distrust every mental event bearing upon its face the mark of the supernatural, that God seems to have stigmatized all such event. Its relation to insanity especially renders it an object of grave suspicion. The truth seems to be that God works through secondary causes, and that the mental changes which he operates are not *prima facie* distinguishable from merely natural change. By these reasons I seem to be instructed to regard natural peace, when penetrated by the spirit of holiness, or when the subject is resolute to tolerate no emotion, apprehension, or judgment incompatible with holiness, as the best possible emotive state, and the condition of the most intimate communion with God.
August 21st. According to experience there is no sign of Divine government in the universe, but, on the contrary, too many signs that Cosmos is not divinely governed. The predatory system amongst the lower animals, for which no wretched apology of responsibility, sin and retribution can be offered, is a flagrant sign. That torture is a condition of the life of these irresponsible victims, declares against their being the creatures and subjects of a being answering to the idea of God. Human misery and the human instincts from which the misery mainly proceeds, the obstacles to faith, the impossibility (at least hitherto) of forming a consistent theology which obliges men of godly disposition to put up with an inconsistent theology, the apparent truculence and ingenuity with which calamity seems to select and pursue certain victims till death comes to the rescue, the existence of human monsters suggestive of the hypothesis of reversion, the sneer of fact at every effort to trace the course of providence in human affairs, whether of nations or individuals—these signs declare against a Divine origin and government of the universe with a force which it needs the utmost effort of faith to resist. It occurred to me this morning that in view of such evidence I could not charge unreasonableness on atheism, and that, therefore, reason is not on the side of faith; and it occurred to me also that my vow to hold to faith in spite of demonstration might involve me in sheer hypocrisy, as professing what I knew to be a lie, and pretending to make the sham a ground of conduct. When I made the vow, I did not make account of the possibility of its putting me in opposition to the moral sense; and, although reason, in view of the radical fallibility of the cognitive faculty and the importance of faith, might sanction my holding to God in spite of atheistic demonstration, a fiat that God exists could not survive such a sanction, without which it would be without support of the moral sense.
When conscience declares that its subject does not believe in God, it is impossible for will to decree that God exists and governs. The experience has brought me into view of the fact that a legitimate unconditional resolution or fiat that God exists and governs is impossible; for no one could know that mental development might not wreck such a fiat upon impossibility to believe, when any effort to be faithful to the resolution must, in the view of the moral sense, be sheer hypocrisy. On the other hand a conditional fiat that God exists and governs is no more possible than a square circle. I am therefore reduced to uncertainty as regards the existence of God—an uncertainty unrelieved by a fiat that God exists. I am free to cherish the spirit of holiness—a spirit that can be hope and trust, as well as confidence—and to endeavour to make it my cardinal spirit. I am free to say to God, according to this spirit, "hallowed be thy name," and to regard conduct as a thing commanded by him, although I can at the most only trust that God exists.

September 1st. I hope that I have achieved a great advantage over anger and selfishness in a view of a nascent feeling of anger that obtained in me just now. I felt, in seeing it, that I was looking at an enemy, and recognized that the person who provoked me had no option. I was able, while undergoing the feeling, to apprehend the person as blameless, so that the emotion ceased to determine my apprehension of the offender. I trust that this fact will prove a model according to which I shall be able to frustrate future emotions of anger, and so release the intellect altogether from a pernicious influence of emotion.

409.

September 7th. Keep in mind that the spirit of holiness enabled you to free yourself from a bondage to sin from which stoicism failed to free you, and that prayer obtained
for you a release from the fear of death. Remember, but not so trustfully

On the other hand (this I write October 19th), allowing a Divine government of the universe, God veils himself behind the facts that testify against his existence and government, and it is by his choice and power as manifested in the mental constitution which he has given me, that these facts bear as evidence upon my mind. In so far, therefore, as they determine my state of mind as to certainty, opinion and doubt, I am irresponsible; nor does it seem to be my duty to oppose to them violent volition under the form of a fiat that they are mere speciosities, understanding a fiat to be violent when it troubles the sense of candour.

I thank God that I am still able to hold to him without violence to my sense of truth.

410.

October 21st. Don't gush. The most intimate and fervent love should be but rarely fervent in expression. Gush expresses not the force of love, but the levity of the lover.

411.

October 21st. Intolerance of moral ugliness is a moral ugliness. Remember your tendency to be intolerant of the crude egotism of X—.

412.

October 22nd. I felt this morning that if I did not sequester myself in the spirit of godliness, I must be worked by an evil spirit. I felt that the spirit of nobleness and that of common sense afforded no adequate refuge. I record this as evidence of the importance and therein of the truth of religion.

413.

October 23rd. I have at times departed too much from the type of godly man in order to suit my spirit and
manner to those of other men. For the sake of manliness as well as godliness, let me give other men more room to move towards me.

414.

October 23rd. It seems to me that since I have ceased to adore and pray, and have confined myself to aiming, in the name of God, at perfect manliness, it has fared better with me. I think I have prevailed more against worldliness and have been nearer to simplicity.

415.

November 6th. I am not watchful to preserve composure against small temptations of temper. In fact, the business of conduct is not with me of late the paramount business of the heart. It is then only the paramount business of the heart, when all opposed desire is humble and easily yields, the opposition being detected. I recover myself in view of the axiom that the heart tends to submit to fixed purpose as it tends to submit to necessity. I firmly purpose to make conduct my paramount business.

416.

November 24th. Keep quiet, keep desire humble. May God enable me to achieve every morning, and maintain throughout the day, a masterful quiet.

417.

November 28th. Without power of conduct according to what I understand to be the will of God I am incapable of masterful quiet. According to Christians, the power is a supernatural addition to human faculty. I am ignorant whether this be true; but I know too well that the power is not a constant faculty, and that it is but rarely enjoyed. We are often without it when we would, with all our hearts,
apply it. Its presence and application constitute recollection. But the fact that I am dependent on it for conduct, that, without it, I am exposed to be a prey to all the evil in my nature, to be an offence to myself and others, is for me an evidence of the Divine on which atheistic argument dashes itself to pieces.

418.

December 2nd. When you encounter people who signify that they think themselves too good for you, strive to exclude a worldly sentiment of the fact by viewing it as significant of the place assigned to you for the time by God. Strive to see the animus of God in the fact, and to apprehend the animus of the creature that tends to offend you as merely significant of a Divine intention. Consider that the person who thinks himself too good for you did not and could not optionally create that sentiment, nor could he, without the use of means that are probably not at the disposition of more than one man in a million, exclude it—that it is as much a physical fact as a toothache—that it is a part of the divinely created order of things to which it is your duty to accommodate—that to be wounded and angered by it manifests stupidity of the heart as well as a pusillanimous dependence upon the opinion of others—that the necessity of nature which imposes upon you the worldly, unmanly, uneasy and irascible apprehension imposes its cause upon your neighbour, and that if you, who are provided with means to resist, succumb, you are probably lower on the scale of dignity than he, seeing that he might prevail where it is certain that you have failed. Whenever your neighbour is painful to you, put between him and your anger that it is God who makes him so, that he is the instrument and probably the irresponsible instrument of God's action upon you. When your neighbour seems to you to be malevolently actuated, regard him as an impersonal agent,
like fire that burns you, or a missile that wounds you. In all probability he is instinctively necessitated, and no more blameable than a lunatic. At any rate, by thinking so you suppress, or tend to suppress, anger and are so far, or tend to be, in a condition to "judge not at all,"—nay, to do better than forgive—to exclude occasion for forgiveness.

419.

December 4th. One may be in a resentful mood without resentment. This mood consists of the elements of resentment in a fused state, needing only the smallest occasion to crystalize. They indispose the heart to all incongruous emotion. I now experience such a mood. It is caused by pain arising from circumstances of a nature to provoke anger but for the operation of reason. The mood tends to protest against the thesis of a Divine government—a tendency that relaxes under this criticism. Study of the mood has now dispersed it. My heart is no longer sour, it is only fatigued; it loves and believes in God.

420.

December 15th. My meditation was troubled by an instinct pressing to get me to the end of it in order to get me abroad and occupied about ends more desirable to the natural man than preparation for conduct. I detected the pressure (with which I must have complied if it had borne upon me undetected) and it has succumbed to my purpose to persist in spite of it. I put before me that all the business of the day is of the minimum of importance compared with that of preparing for the service of God—that, in the view of wisdom, the paramount importance of all such occasions of action is their importance as occasions of serving God, and that to slight the paramount for the inferior importance, is to manifest defect of personal intelligence and power, and inferiority on the scale of being.
1871. **December 18th.** I am commanded to exercise a severe custody of the tongue: to suppress the tendency of sentiment to put itself in words irrespective of moral considerations. I tend to occupy my children with topics that interest me and do not interest them. If I am troubled, I tend to turn the conversation upon, and to propagate, the trouble. I am warned to humble the tongue by consideration of the fact that ungovernable loquacity is one of the salient symptoms of insanity. A thorough government of the tongue is an evidence of an abiding personal power.

I have to note in this connection that nature in me rejoices when she is honoured by a Divine command.

### 422.

**December 23rd.** During the evening of the 19th or 20th inst. I was sunk in the condition of heart that determines the apprehension of being as destitute of use and dignity. I applied myself in obedience to God to endeavour to wrest it from this morbid sentiment. There came to my aid the thought of my incapability of judging respecting what my melancholy puts in question, and the thought instantly filled me with the delight of relief. The delight involved gratitude to God, and it was enhanced by the consciousness that it had humility for its basis. It was attended by a fear that the relief was but momentary, and that presently I must relapse into gloom. The fear was groundless. The relieving power seemed to be disproportioned to the thought with which it connected, as exceeding what could be supposed to be a property of the thought, and so seemed to be supernatural. I am instructed to distrust such appearances, and therefore gave no entertainment to the thesis (which I would have to be true with all my heart) that God was acting upon me immediately.
December 24th. I tend to fall into discouragement when my study on * * * threatens to be abortive. This shows that I live mainly on the hope of fame on worldliness. I am commanded to proceed against this enemy on trust that I shall discover in myself resources wherewith to destroy it—resources whereof my nature contains the germs, or which are to be supernaturally supplied to me. I am somehow to resist—not to be supine. I am to insist that there is a potential value in my life independent on human consideration.

Christmas Day. I am again called to exercise extraordinary vigilance with a view to conduct—to make vigilance a paramount business of the day—to recur after brief intervals, especially in intercourse, to the fact that what I am doing exposes me to temptation; and that I should take measures for my protection. The occasion of the call is that I am so frequently overcome by temptation, and that my health seems to be now equal to such a personal effort. Yesterday I was discomposed by an indiscretion of X—. Had I been on guard I should have baffled the provocation.

December 26th. As a condition of the vigilance to which I was called yesterday I am ordered to make the care of my health a cardinal duty—especially guarding against risk of morbid sensibility which makes us all but impotent against temptation.

December 26th, Evening. Accordingly I gave up the habit of smoking, reserving the privilege of smoking occasionally.
THE SURVIVAL.

426.

December 28th. An efficient idea of all the circumstances bearing on my instincts and will as being occasion of conduct, is not always within my reach even when I am minded to look for it. Yesterday I tried in vain to recover the efficient idea with which my heart was strong throughout the previous day. I could not make distinct to myself what that idea symbolized, and I felt myself incapable of any considerable resistance to temptation if it should present itself. This I have frequently experienced, and have vaguely seen in it how knowledge and power are interdependent. When I am able I have an idea of what is to be done by the power which I have not when the power is absent. But it is not merely power that I miss. I miss beside some element of the merely intellectual object: I see as it were only parts of it, not the whole. I am at those times an easy prey to temptation.

427.

December 29th. I have need to insert between the natural heart and its circumstances the sentiment that it is, in all relations, servant of God—has for its paramount function conduct, and that it is to be tempted, in all intercourse, by evil in the nature of others over which they have no control, and for which, therefore, they are wholly blameless. If I keep my heart alive to the necessity that makes men instruments of pain to one another—if I view them, in so far as their action tends to stir my anger, as things, not persons, I paralyze the infernal part of me—the spirit of violence. If I do not insert the organic condition of this sentiment between my heart and what is bearing on it, I remain subject to the law of evil. By frequent effort to induce the sentiment, I hope to make it an abiding constituent of consciousness—to make it by practice a habit of the heart. It is not in being constantly
in action that the reign of will, and therein the kingdom of God, consists, but in the reign of an instinct created by volition—an instinct whose function is to do what, without it, must be either done by self-denying choice or not at all.

428.

December 31st. I am ordered to undo the puerility that disposes me to trifle with the business of eating as though duty had no concern with it. My power to serve God depends upon what I eat: therefore, I should be imbued with religious concern about what I eat. An indigestion tends to stultify the heart, and impair power of conduct.

429.

December 31st. My animus in conversation with X—today instanced one of my ruling vices—the effort to break from the mould which hides while it forms me. My worldliness is intolerant of the obscurity, and strives on every occasion to make known what it takes to be my worth. It is in no wise daunted by the knowledge that if it had, at any time prior to a not very remote date, prevailed, it must have disgraced me by making my deformity conspicuous. It always takes for granted that now I am sufficiently near perfection. God has put me in this obscurity, and my pride and vanity are impatient of it. They seize every opportunity to make known that I am wiser and abler than I appear. I pledge myself now to uncompromising enmity to this disposition, and that hereafter its motions shall be a challenge to protect the obscurity. I enter upon a crusade against it, and I shall exercise all my ingenuity to defeat it.

(January 4th. The animus is not altogether, nor perhaps mainly worldly.)
1872. **January 1st.** Personality is opposed to nature. The idea of a person is the idea of a master, not of a part of nature. The Divine person is conceived as being not only the unlimited master, but even the Creator of nature.

The idea of will is the idea of a faculty not subject to nature, and it is, as possessing this faculty, that man is held to be a person. Reason, being subject to law, is a part of nature, and, therefore, although essential to, it does not differentiate personality. Now, this definite idea of the opposition of personality to nature, and of will as being the *differentia* of personality, symbolizes what is indefinitely and implicitly known to the charity of the good physician who has not explicated and defined his knowledge. He pities the workers of iniquity as being for the most part the irresponsible and impersonal implements of nature, as embryos indeed of personal beings, but as yet mere parts of nature destitute of the power whereby persons are masters of nature. When we think of nature we think of a mass consisting of the inorganic and organic kingdoms, persons excepted. An insane man and a bad one are viewed by the good physician as potential persons either lapsed into or not yet developed out of the mass of nature. They are in nature like the statue in the block. They are in his view without personal individuality, and to this he yearns to promote or restore them.

431.

**January 1st.** I have begun the New Year with a success. Finding in myself a sentiment of B—that impoverishes my heart towards her, depriving it of prompt disposition to do her good, and this because of her meanness and ingratitude, I set myself toward recovering the animus of the good physician in respect of her. In a moment my effort was rewarded with complete success. I felt with lively pity
how much she is deprived in being deprived of nobleness and gratitude, and how hard upon her to be excluded by her privation from love. I shall now endeavour to vanquish all uncharity, and to love my neighbour in every man in spite of his evil nature—to make my heart large, tender and robust; in a word, wise.

432.

January 2nd. When the spirit of holiness possesses the heart we can afford to dispense with vigilance—to indulge the spontaneity that is known as liberty of spirit. The more remote the heart from God the more need of vigilance, gravity, self-restraint and severity with self.

433.

January 8th. My effort to relate my heart to X—, so as to apprehend her in the love of the neighbour in spite of her baseness, has not been rewarded with such success as attended the like effort made on New Year's day in respect of Y—. Pondering the subject just now, I saw the advantage of a militant spirit against what is hostile in nature—especially in human nature—to man. This spirit involves discrimination of persons from nature, and tends to beget tenderness to the person in proportion to its aversion to his nature—as aversion to a foreign enemy tends to beget affection to one's countryman. Our heart warms to a fellow countryman abroad who might be repugnant to us at home in proportion as the people about us are strange and repugnant. Whenever I am strong in a militant spirit against the nature that oppresses my race I am strong to endure the vices and infirmities of my neighbour.

434.

January 8th. I am alive with indignation against the infernal in nature when I consider how it dupes man with the
assumption that a man's moral knowledge is always present to him, constituting an abiding basis of responsibility, whereas it is for the most part in abeyance when he has most need of it. I am striving with all my power to conduct myself according to my idea of perfection, and I find myself continually frustrated by the law of my mind.

February 26th. Failure in regard of observing the laws of health the day before yesterday, betrayed me into a fatigue that deprived me of peace and power of conduct throughout yesterday. I was palsied by irascibility. Waking from a siesta towards 5 o'clock, I found myself grovelling in feelings towards certain of our company that made my aspiration after perfection seem to be the aspiration of a toad to swell into a perfect man. I seemed to myself to be an impotent thing in the hands of an omnipotent nature that had fashioned me for base uses and now mocked my spiritual pretensions. Nevertheless, I resolved to conduct myself as though these vile feelings did not exist; and after a while they vanished.

February 27th. Respect souls, especially those of the wicked whose wickedness has offended you. Not to endeavour to respect them is disobedience.

The discovery of this duty is given to me as being a spiritual promotion. My first act of obedience to it has healed my heart of offence, and has imparted to me a certain consciousness of power to keep myself above the ordinary commerce of the heart with men. To respect a bad man is to put a distance between what is evil in both of us.

March 6th. The tendency of the mind to depreciate as impracticable what experiment has failed to realize, tends
to disparage the project of spiritual regeneration—to put upon it an aspect of Quixotism. The impossibility in which I for the most part find myself to respect bad men tends to impose upon me contempt of the idea of the undertaking. I defend myself by the thought that, though I fail, it is in my power to conduct myself as though I had succeeded, and that the exercise of this power is even better than the respect.

438.

March 11th. My heart generates apprehension and judgment inconsistent with the knowledge in which my principles of conduct are grounded, and its instincts have way in opposition to my purpose. This stupidity of the heart—its ignorant of knowledge—the brute necessity that is in it to go on feeling and doing in the light as it felt and did in the dark

439.

March 16th. To-day my sentiment of truth affords no basis of trust in God.* I have not worshipped nor undertaken to transact the business of the day as work assigned to me by God. I am wrong in saying that I have not worshipped—I mean that I have not regularly worshipped. An emotion of worship obtained in me, of which I, the will, was only too glad to avail myself.

440.

March 18th. Still deprived: but I am not without hope that I shall be restored to faith.

Last evening a sinister fact occurred. I allowed myself more wine than usual at dinner, and the consequent exaltation took the form of religious emotion. I found myself

* Faith had exhaled during sleep the previous night.
worshipping. The fact proves that the sentiment of God is an effect of cerebration.

441.

March 27th. Virtue is purity, not greatness. The sentiment that apprehends it as greatness is a blown and corrupting one. It makes ambition the animus of the pursuit of virtue.

442.

April 7th. I have been dupe to the craving for sympathy. It has instigated me to assume that people below the level of my knowledge and sentiment are up to it. I have bored them by conversation for which they were not ripe. My interest in all that concerns the work of perfection, seizing with live zeal every pertinent fact, would fain kindle the hearts of those about me to keep itself alive by their heat: but even those who intellectually, and only intellectually, understand me, and who are not wholly destitute of Christian preparation and experience, if they find nothing novel in the fact to interest them as discovery, regard it as an old story. I was tried just now by an exquisite specimen of meanness—I and another, who, though young, has done her best to promote herself in piety and nobleness. I succeeded in dominating the tendency of nature to overwhelm me, in indignation, as though the meanness were the fault of the individual and not an injury put upon him by nature. The joy of escape from the temptation, the wonder at the force of the instinct that had all but overwhelmed me, looked for sympathy to my companion. I saw, and she acknowledged, it did not interest her. It was the old story.

When a man has a genius for a given work, every detail of pertinent means, every helpful fact whether new or old, interests him; but only the ripe results of his labours interest those who have not his vocation. Is it not time
to understand that I am instigated to strive for perfection by an instinct that must needs work in solitude?

443.

April 9th. Respect the laws of health with a view to the peace and power needful to conduct. Strive to conduct yourself throughout the day according to reverence, benevolence and nobleness, according to a heart large, tender, and robust. To this end, plan the day, in so far as you can reduce it under plan without violence, and plan it so as to accommodate to unforeseen events—eschew familiarity and the ordinary commerce of the heart with men, except the circumstances manifestly guarantee the exclusion of evil motive; respect souls, especially those of the wicked; insert between the natural heart and its circumstances the sentiment of the necessity that for the most part excludes choice from human action, so as to see moral evil with charity, apprehending it as disease, not sin, as the good physician apprehends the malignity of the insane patient; in intercourse, have to do less with the individual than with nature in him; strive to subordinate all love to an invulnerable love of the neighbour, so that the intimacies of creature affection shall not expose your self-love to the involuntary action of what is evil in those you peculiarly love; cherish manliness, applying it especially against anger; fear worldliness and the susceptibility of self-love; strive to have custody of the tongue; never blame, and never re- monstrate or say anything calculated to disturb; but after one of your regular meditations wherein conscience may give you commission to speak, take heed to secure frequent recollection and to revive the thought that you are abroad to be tempted.

444.

April 9th. It seems that I cannot afford the ordinary commerce of the heart with even the members of my
family: my self-love is too sensitive, and their instincts are too prone to sting it. Spontaneity will not work according to my purpose with the liberty which I have hitherto allowed it.

445.

April 10th. The infirmities of X—excite in me an unmanly intolerance that continually breaks through my rule not to blame.

446.

April 10th. One whose mind I formed, and who, through the greater part of her life regarded me as her mentor, has of late showed signs of distrust of my judgment, and has transferred her confidence to a man who has wounded my self-love, and whom I can hardly keep myself from disliking. With both I am in intimate relations; the lady I love as one loves a dear sister, and my relations with the man are such as commonly involve affection. To the lady I am so linked, that I can make no important move in life but what it bears upon her, so that I cannot avoid an intercourse that dishonours me. The decay of her esteem for my judgment has been aggravated of late by an outbreak of one of my greatest infirmities, but is in great part owing to the fact that I have been obliged to wound and disappoint her. When the thought of her in this new relation surprises me in a weak mood, it provokes resentment and jealousy, and sets me upon the thought of re-ordering my relations with her so as to exclude her from the accustomed intimacy of intercourse, a proceeding which, because of her love for my family, would plunge her in unhappiness. But when the thought attacks my strength, I quickly suppress the evil feeling which it excites, raise myself into a manly tolerance of the dishonouring opinion, and intrench myself in a manly love of the person
whose opinion dishonours me. This morning its attack found me strong, and I am victorious.

447.

April 13th. My chief obstacle is that the train of ideas withholds from me when I have most need of it, the part of my knowledge on which wisdom hinges, leaving me to be emotively and instinctively affected, as though I were altogether destitute of the knowledge. How we are duped by the doctrine that we are free to be good if we will, and that an omnipotent Providence helps those who are resolute to be good, that the constitution of the mind is such as to afford choice on every practical occasion in which morality is concerned, that the structure of the universe manifests a creative plan according to a paramount intention in favour of virtue!

448.

April 18th. X—'s effort to watch herself with a view to conduct has begotten a morbid action of the brain which shows itself in a painful reference to self while in intercourse, attended by a consciousness of moral vagueness and consequent impotence. Is there a class of men then who, being neither madmen nor fools, are incapable of conduct?

449.

April 23rd. I am sometimes deprived of moral grip by intellectual languor. At such times I cannot grasp a scheme of conduct in a purpose. This morning it is otherwise. I am conscious of an intellectual vigour as regards moral ideas, and of an instinctive disposition towards conduct that carry with them a consciousness of power of efficient purpose. How many are there whose normal condition of mind is an intellectual languor that excludes moral power!
April 24th. When nobleness blossoms self-complacency sucks the flower.

April 26th. Those who are habitually respectful are liable to a mood that deprives them of the habitual animus. Their demeanour at such times is marked by defect of the ordinary dignity and self-possession. They are loose in their gaiety, quick to take offence, familiar in the direction of coarseness, irreticent, nearer on every side to vulgarity. Habitual reverence, then, is a condition of human dignity; for, although, a man may know how to act according to dignity when he is destitute of reverence, and is free so to act, if the idea of so acting be present to him, he must, for the most part, act otherwise, because, without habitual reverence, the train of ideas will not seasonably afford him the needful idea. But if one is deprived of faith and all men appear to him unworthy of the esteem that waits on good qualities, is he not necessarily deprived of reverence, being deprived of an object of reverence? This question has emanated this morning from a consciousness that I was about to proceed into the business of the day with an irreverent heart, and my recoil from the vulgar and mischievous mood, my voluntary effort to return into my habitual animus, seems, by its success, to have answered the question. Faith and the illusion that certain men are good, were, doubtless, indispensable conditions of the development of reverence; but now that I am deprived of faith, and know that almost all men are mere embryos of personal beings, I am able to establish myself in a reverent animus. Deprived of faith and belief in human worth, my heart is still a temple of the spirit of holiness. I regard men with respect, although I know them to be destitute of goodness, and I do so not because they are worthy, but
because I am reverent. Being avows to my reason that it is destitute of dignity; but reverence protests in me that this is a mistake incident to defect of experience.

452.

April 29th. A dreary day has had a glimpse of comfort. I ordered a rancorous affection out of my heart and I was instantly obeyed. It referred to a clergyman who had certainly behaved ill to me.

453.

April 30th. A certain indolence of my mind in view of a challenge to rouse itself to the business of conduct, suggests the question whether conduct be not dependent upon the spirit of allegiance to a person—a divine person. This may be true of all men or of only a class. That I persist in the business of conduct though deprived of faith, may be only a moribund action of an animus that may be no longer possible after a few months or years. Whether conduct be so dependent or not, certain it is that it is helped by the feeling of obligation to a person.

454.

May 4th. My purpose as to conduct and acquiring the spirit of the Good Physician is continually defeated (though never destroyed) by my inability to beget in myself an habitual sentiment of men corresponding to my knowledge of the degree to which, as regards intelligent action, they are subject to necessity, and therein to the infernal part of nature. It would be as armour to my self-love, that no shaft of malice or disrespect could pierce. With what helpful tenderness would it enable me to regard the outbreaks that now propagate their insanity to my own mind.

455.

May 4th. Thinking of my demeanour towards my guide, which has been somewhat modified by distrust, it appeared
to me that I do not sufficiently consult the happiness of those against whose cunning I have, or fancy I have, need to defend myself. The thought involved a mandate to respect and be kind to them, accounting the cunning an evil to be parried without unkindness. With the mandate was a consciousness of power to obey and of sweetness in the obedience. The sentiment elicited an act of worship that did not refer to God. The act was the natural language of joy in the reign of goodness—joy in my subjection to the law of goodness. How, it will be asked, is it possible to worship the impersonal? I don't know. I only know that just now I found myself worshipping the impersonal. Perhaps it was a mere motion of the habit that formerly referred every moral mandate to God. But if I found myself suddenly empowered as well as impersonally commanded to live a perfect life, it seems to me that my joy must be a worshipping joy, a boundless gratitude, although without a personal object. Still the gratitude and worship might be mere vestiges of an embryonic state which are destined to perish before the moral nature ripens.

MAY 7TH. The purity of joy in subjection to a law or person, however good, is now for the first time, and to my great surprise, brought in question with me. It is put to me to consider whether it be not a servile spirit, and one alien to pure reverence.

JUNE 3RD. The day before yesterday a dose of chlorodyne extinguished in me a feeling of injury, and substituted an amused consciousness of the necessity that bore upon those who had injured me.
JUNE 28TH. A habit of resentment against nature as being the cause of misery has been forming in me. I pledge myself to endeavour to stifle it.

JULY 9TH. The problem of problems is how to make stable and efficient the knowledge on which virtue depends, and which is for the most part in abeyance. The cerebral conditions of temptation—especially of strong temptation—tend to exclude it from consciousness, and so to hold will in abeyance. When in our peaceful moods we are enlightened by this knowledge, and cast about in our hearts for a point d'appui on which to establish it, so that it may be whenever we have need of it, a conscious knowledge, induction tells us that we are in a mere interval of an intermittent insanity, and that our nature affords us no such condition of wisdom as we look for. Hope which is, in this case, faith, derides the induction, and moves us to persist in the effort. In the wise mood I know that the world is a madhouse, and that it is insanity to be angry with the patients. I see with the eyes and heart of the Good Physician. But I know also that I have to lapse from this knowledge, and fall into fits like the rest. Yes, the problem is, how to become physician by healing one's self. "First bring thyself to peace."

JULY 10TH. One of the vices that most discredits me in my family is the itch to speak of what interests me. It tends to thrust upon peoples' attention what they are averse to consider, excluding the thoughtfulness for others characteristic of the wise and polite. It manifests to those whom
it annoys an impotence of the egotist from whom it proceeds, the impotence that not merely misses one's aim but causes the opposite of what he intended. Though it confined itself to topics of general interest, it would be hard to bear; but, being as it is for the most part the blatant organ of latent self-love, it is next to intolerable.

And now for years this vile instinct has actuated me undetected!—made me a nuisance and a disgrace where egotism itself was interested to have me pleasing and honourable!—and we censure people for not seeing the beam in their own eye!—and we resent the pain of which "poor fools of nature" are the blind instruments. O thou infernal subtlety of nature, how long wilt thou ambuscade behind the stupidity of thy victims? Will they never detect and rise up against thee in the light and strength of charity!

August 14th. I have this morning to record an event that if I were a believer would seem to me miraculous. Circumstances bearing momentously upon our future assumed a threatening aspect, and acute fear barely short of the enervative degree moulded my apprehension of them. I woke under this influence. After my morning meditation I conversed with X—upon the subject. We were agreed that the circumstances had the importance which my fear imputed to them, and that, if we should come to regard them fearlessly, it would not be through finding that we had been mistaken about them, but because the heart, acknowledging all their power to injure, could accept the evil with peace. Gradually, as I conversed, a feeling of peaceful acquiescence in whatever might befall formed in me. At first it seemed to be a fugitive sentiment, as shortlived as the lull of a storm; then it looked as though by effort it might be detained, and finally it declared itself a durable fact. How differently I now apprehended the circumstances. They could deprive me of certain conditions
of happiness, but they could not cause me pain. They could be troublesome, but they had ceased to be dangerous. They could not exclude peace.

The peace that thus obtained was not given as effect of any known antecedent. It was not given as effect of my meditation, nor of any reason evolved in my conversation with X—. Every reason bearing on me when it obtained, had borne on me when I feared. I found myself rescued from torment and pillowed on peace without any act of mine, whether of understanding or will. I found a pure spirit substituted for a vile one. I found myself promoted into a higher order of being, enjoying a courage and fortitude not based on self-reliance. This was not the consequence of any study of the worth or beauty of humility, or of any reasoning or contemplation whatever. If it had to do with my meditation and the effort I made in my conversation with X— to recover manliness, it was as the fall of Jericho had to do with the antecedent trumpet-blowing. Events like these tend to compel the mind to regard them as supernatural and as the manifestation of a Divine agent.

I have reason to think that the newly-acquired peace had for antecedent a manifestation of the principle of worldliness rather than that of fear.

(September 11th, 1874. On Tuesday, the 8th instant, under like circumstances, and in conversation with X—, I experienced a similar change of heart. A noble, modest, and lovely courage which, though in me, seemed to be several from me, suddenly replaced a profound anxiety—suddenly, but without surprise. Next day it was gone. Except as being a spirit of nobleness, not of piety, it was wonderfully like the spirit of holiness.)

August 15th. The beatitude continues to abide with me. But it may become extinct at any moment, leaving me to "wailing and gnashing of teeth." On January 14th, 1869,
I experienced and recorded a like promotion of the heart into wisdom, and then fell back into such darkness that I could not understand the record. Now I understand by inference from yesterday's change of heart that it referred to a like change.

August 17th. The experience of the 14th instructs me to rely for conduct and spiritual improvement upon a strength that does not account itself mine. When I was deprived of faith I fell back upon a self-reliant manliness and strove to conduct myself with that. The power that relieved me on the 14th excludes, and a principle of moral criticism included in it condemns, self-reliant manliness. Under the influence of the power that relieved me the heart is humble; under that of self-reliant manliness it is the reverse. A faint hope obtains in me that my yearning for the Divine may not, after all, be a vain longing; for is there not here an opening to faith? Does not the moral strength that will not account itself my strength—that is not given as human—manifest God, and God not otherwise known or knowable? Does not this explain how theology has been strangling religion by pretending to know God otherwise than as cause of the moral strength and spirit of holiness of man? If the hope bear good fruit, if it yield to consequent effort toward spiritual amelioration, it will convert into faith: otherwise I must judge it to have been an ignis fatuus.

I have now to apply it to the accommodation of my heart to circumstances that molest my pride.

August 23rd. I have done my utmost to cherish and detain the good spirit that came to my relief on the 14th, but it would not abide with me. I had need of it yesterday to support another assault like that of the 14th, but it abandoned me to a day of torment! On the presumption
that it is the gift of a Divine power I prayed for it in vain. Now according to my experience of these apparently supernatural endowments, they are lawless; and if they are to be imputed to intelligent power, they signify a capricious, not a divine, source. I have now for fifteen years striven to domesticate them in my nature, or to merit a constant action of God on my heart, maintaining in it those beatitudes, but I have striven in vain. The wind that "bloweth where it listeth" is not more capricious. I conclude at last, in spite of my love of God, that they are the effect of blind causes—of inexorable cerebration. I have conceded more than enough to the prejudice of godliness. It is time to allow the evidence against a Divine creator and government. *Vivisection* is the condition of human development. A vivisective providence—one that enlightens by flaying us alive—does not correspond to the idea of the Divine. Imagine a pious goose possessed by a worshipful trust in the man who is giving him the liver-complaint with a view to the *post mortem paté de foie gras*. Behold, says the goose, the bounty with which he feeds—nay, stuffs me. If he gives me more than enough is it not excess of bounty? If I suffer—for example, in the stifling heat in which I constantly live—is not that a condition of some future eternal good, worthy of a divine and omnipotent benefactor? To think otherwise is to wound reverence and alarm fear. It would be horrible to allow that I am in the hands of one who values me only for my liver! If ignorance is bliss it is folly to be wise. Let me hold to my faith in the divinity of my proprietor.

That religious reverence is capable of stultifying, is implicitly acknowledged in every man's view of those who differ from him in faith and whom he believes to be sincere. This deprives it of an unlimited right to our allegiance. It deserves at most only a discriminate trust. Then virtue requires that the propitiatory spirit of fear and prudence be sternly excluded.
August 28th. I have already noted that the baseness of my passion for fame was exposed to my intellect without eliciting an adverse sentiment. It is only as manifested by others that the animus excites reprobation. If its subjective aspect had the property of exciting reprobation the subject might be able to consume it in his abhorrence. But no such facility is afforded to the will. We seem to be the mere sport of nature. She constitutes us slaves of vice and disposes us to be enamoured of virtue. She gives us the soaring instinct of the bird that we may lacerate our breasts against her cage. She enlightens us that we may see our impotence. With what joy would I not see myself purged of the filthy passion for fame. With what courage and self-denial would I not apply any probable means of attaining to this purity. Yet the baseness instigates me now with as much force as when it was latent. Of course I can at times prevent it from going into action, but the self-denial is an otherwise useless pain.

The devil knows how to trim his garden. He is too cunning to let vice perish in its own luxuriance; and in trimming he looks like virtue. If a bad animus has injured us in the world's view and we are aware of it, worldliness will trim or even uproot the animus. Nature succumbs to selfishness, but not to will, bent upon perfection.

August 28th. The religious principle after having betrayed its fallibility by generating a multitude of mutually contradictory religions, gives us Christianity as its last word, and therein that the Divine evoked the human race out of nothingness in view of eternal torment to be incurred by the bulk of the race. A more infernal act is not conceivable. We are told by way of apology that men are made
free to avoid the foreseen damnation. The fatuity that can be blinded by so flagrant a contradiction is evidence of the stultifying influence that religion can evolve. We are told on the other hand that man is impotent to save himself without grace, and that grace calls many but chooses few. We are told that a single act of disobedience by a single pair instigated by a supernatural and infernal power, made it imperative on Divine justice to condemn billions of human beings to the temporal misery in which we find them and on which most of them are destined to drift to eternal torment. The constitution of the human being considered together with the Christian revelation, implies that conditions of the corruption imputed to the Fall were optionally inserted into human nature by the Creator. He might have made man so that the disobedience of a progenitor should not derange the moral constitution of his posterity. God preferred to constitute man in such wise that the foreseen disobedience of a single pair should plunge the race in such a propensity to evil—propensity founded in corporal organization—that human action is necessarily determined by it except the agent be assisted by grace, and even then at the cost of pain. Daily, hourly, monthly, how many souls are called out of nothingness to be incarcerated in bodies descended from that of Adam to become culpable of original sin, to be subjected to the consequent corruption, and to incur the foreseen damnation! To question this revelation, it is pretended, is to stiffen ourselves against God—to question his right to do as he wills. No—it is to question what pretends to be a message from God. I say to the messenger you are deceived in thinking yourself God’s messenger, for your putative message confounds the Divine with the infernal. But the miracles? Miracles cannot make the contradictory to be true. St. Paul’s argument implicit in the figure of the vessel and the potter, is a *petitio principie*: the argument which it pretends to rebut puts St. Paul, not God, in question.
1872. September 4th. Three causes of bodily fatigue, viz., the gymnasium, the weather, and a third that shall be nameless, plunged me this morning into despondency. I was intellectually master of the position. I knew it was the effect of fatigue, and would pass away with its cause; but the knowledge did not mitigate the pain. I drank with my lunch the better part of a pint of Hermitage. This raised me into a state which appeared to me analogous with that of the female servant instanced by Maudesley, who was temporarily restored by fever to the normal condition of mind from which she had for years lapsed into idiocy. I felt that my strength was mere excitement, and I knew that the excitement was a basis of judiciousness.

468.

October 17th. If I had a wise heart, the folly of my children, especially what is manifested by filial impiety, would elicit my pity: as it is it angers me. My folly is angered by theirs. How shall I wrench this disgrace from my heart? I am, in respect of it, as the madman in lucid moments in respect of the insane symptoms. I am for the moment free from it, but I know that it is to return upon me. I have applied every means I could think of to eradicate anger—prayer, worship, meditation, caging of spontaneity in rule—all in vain.

(May 20th, 1876. No; on the contrary, I have achieved a great success.)

469.

November 1st. The sentiment expressed in the foregoing note, or rather the resolution it occasioned, has not been in vain. I had occasion to do some surgery upon X—, and he turned upon me. His disobedience and disrespect wounded and angered me; but the pain and the resentment were
intermittent occasions of a sentiment and purpose becoming the good physician. Whenever the event caused me a spasm of self-love, I raised myself into a peaceful and cordial sentiment that my dignity could neither be enhanced nor impaired by the animus or behaviour of another, and that the animus of X—, being put upon him by the infernal in nature, made him a proper object of pity, not of blame. When the heart is intrenched in this knowledge it is beyond temptation. It has no longer need to put forth effort against a stultifying instinct. From time to time, and especially when fatigued, I would relapse into obscurity, and then, retaining only an intellectual view of the truth, I would need to put forth effort against insurrectionary pain and anger. How strikingly were contrasted the three states of mind, viz., that in which the mind was wholly possessed and instigated by pain and anger, that in which will strove with self-love, and that in which the mind reposed upon knowledge. Does the third state illustrate the aphorism, “knowledge is power?” Hardly; for power supposes something to be resisted, whereas the knowledge in question excluded resistance. But it certainly makes for the aphorism of Socrates that “virtue is knowledge.” Did Socrates really mean that knowledge is not a mere condition of virtue—a condition of self-denying action—but is virtue, and that it excludes occasion of volition? Manly self-denial, all but proper to the vir, gave its name to what the Latin race accounted virtue. Did Socrates see, beyond the phase of self-denying struggle in the interest of goodness, the higher animus that excludes temptation? Suppose a transition of a hog into a man. There would be a period of the development in which the animal would carnally affect and morally abhor swill. His will would strive with the temptation. But this moral nisus would signify a lower state than the later one in which the perfected man would abhor swill, and the human apprehension of swill exclude temptation. Did Socrates
1872. refer to such higher knowledge when he identified knowledge with virtue?

470. November 7th. Depression of spirits put it upon me last evening with great plausibility that it could be relieved by wine, and that it fell under the rule of exception allowed by my view of abstinence. To strengthen myself against future temptations of this kind I protest that I should have little reason to count upon a mind that could be the dupe of such an argument.

471. November 7th. I am falling into a dangerous spontaneity.

472. November 9th. Virtue is an unhonoured superiority wherein one consciously, and because of the solitude sadly, and in the humility of sadness, soars above society. He soars above society because he soars above all that is evil in human nature—even above moral disgust. I say he soars; for at the elevation of virtue nature affords nothing whereon to rest. The consciousness of the superiority is necessarily humble; for pride and vanity are indifferent to what does not involve honour. This note is elicited by the fact that I am called upon to love my enemies—to take into affection and intimacy a crew by which I have been harpooned and captured. To do this I must ascend into and keep myself in a region of thought above the level of spontaneity, and, therefore, of society. Like Moses I prevail only so long as my hands are raised.

473. November 14th. I am menaced with a great loss in consequence of ***, but I look at the danger without
enervative fear. Health has restored to me my old fortitude.

474.

November 14th. A Jew broker called on me last evening to offer me the furniture of a woman of the demi-monde. The man was made for the function of pimp. I took the right view of him from the beginning, regarding him without disrespect and with a feeling of kindness that modified my expression in giving him to understand that I would have nothing to do with the demi-monde. I see in him a soul injured by the blind causes that have given it its carnal tenement, and therein its inevitable way of apprehending, judging, feeling and doing—a soul excluded from personality.

475.

November 14th. Although free from enervative fear in view of a wide-spread calamity that threatened me with loss, I was not free from a gnawing anxiety. Suddenly it occurred to me that I ought to contribute to the relief of the sufferers—a thought that had been excluded by the supposition that I was myself a sufferer. An inspiration said in me "give nevertheless," and I resolved to give. I was at once relieved from the anxiety. The sentiment to which I consented transformed my mind, eliminating the sordid element that generated the anxiety. My prudence ceased to be pusillanimous. My heart has ceased to occupy itself with the danger. I am enlarged into hope and courage respecting risks of loss.

476.

November 14th. I repeat what I noted on the 7th inst., that I am falling into a dangerous spontaneity. I must conduct myself more quietly.
THE SURVIVAL.

1872. November 17th. Those who believe in Providence, and that the imperative of conscience is Divine command, are perplexed by the fact that conscience issues contradictory commands discrediting in the same individual a former sentiment of duty by a later one, and fomenting discord between different individuals. If those who, like Moses, habitually "enter the tabernacle to consult the Lord," were divinely counselled or commanded, they must be unanimous in respect of any given occasion, whereas they are frequently sent back to strive with one another in the name of God. And not only has conscience failed to evince that its imperative is the word of God by the congruity of its occasional commands, but it has failed to achieve a code of morals, and even to get to axioms on which the code should be constructed. Instead of a code acceptable to a reverential and noble mind, we have the abortions of casuistry, and we are still without a definition of truth and a definite knowledge of the extent of its obligation. Then we have this evil growing out of the belief that we are divinely guided—wrong-headedness is made more obstinate by taking its moral judgment to be Divine command. Hard people are made harder, and, because of them, virtue itself is discredited.

December 19th. X—refused me a slight favour, and the refusal hurt me. It disappointed a love that was disportioned to the nature of its object. Wisdom proportions love to the nature of its object, to the worthiest the highest degree, to the least worthy the lowest. This adaptation excludes such disappointment of love as the selfishness of X—occasioned. Wisdom loves every man with the love of the neighbour: to this it superadds in the father paternal love which it proportions to the moral worth of the child,
in the brother fraternal love proportioned to the moral worth of the brother or sister, in the friend friendship correspondingly proportioned. The love of the wise is graduated by knowledge: it is limited by esteem. It expects nothing of the object that he is not disposed to give. If he be selfish it expects ingratitude, and loves him none the less when it gets what it looked for.

Thirteen days have elapsed since I wrote the above, and although my heart has accommodated to wisdom as regards love and esteem of X— and corresponding expectation, it has been unwisely affected in those respects towards others, especially Y—. The stupidity of the heart manifested in its tendency to apprehend and instigate contrary to its deliberate sentiment that which possesses it when it is in view of all the pertinent matter, makes against the existence of a Divine Power. It seems to testify that nature excludes virtue and affords only an abortive affection to virtue. I am often angered by the frustration of my efforts to feel and act at all times conformably to the wisdom of my moments of recollection, and the anger takes the stultifying form of resentment against God for not existing and so disappointing the spirit of holiness, as though he had made hunger and thirst after righteousness to disappoint them by his non-existence. To blame me for infidelity is to blame a miser for having been robbed of his hoard.

479.

January 1st. A man may be an atheist, and yet subject to the sentiment of the sacred—the spirit of holiness *

January 8th. I forgot that I had written the above. It catches my attention as I am about to set down that the spirit of holiness bears on my life now no less than when I had faith. I never fail to honour this spirit. When it is absent I keep the fortress for it, when present I, the will, obey it and give it all homage. I rejoice that it per-
sists, that the extinction of faith is not the extinction of the sentiment of the sacred. So long as it enlightens me, the Divine, though not a personal and providential Divine, exists for me, and there is a hope that I shall at last recover God. Did Christ refer to this state of mind when he said, "And if any one shall speak evil of the son of man it shall be forgiven him, but if any one shall speak evil of the Holy Ghost it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the next," implying that even though a man be deprived of faith, if he hold to the spirit of holiness he is still on the road to Heaven, i.e., still in process of development toward human perfection?

According to mere reason, reverence is an inconsistency in the infidel. What should he revere? There is no God, and man is a mere composite of animal tissues, bones, and liquids—a higher kind of brute. I am inconsistently rescued from this degradation by the spirit of holiness. Is it unreasonable to cling to my Saviour? So long as it is my moral life I am able to respect myself and my kind: if it abandon me or I it, respect perishes, dignity perishes, brutality supersedes the Divine, self-denial is foolishness, virtue is foolishness; there is no reason why those who are able should not prey upon mankind as maggots upon their matrix: but this is hell, and is it unreasonable to cleave to that which keeps me out of hell? I have lost God, but not Heaven, so long as I cling to the spirit of holiness. I prefer, with full assent of reason, an inconsistent salvation to a consistent perdition.

1875. APRIL 14TH. To become good is to become sane: to become sane is to exclude exaltation: but how, without the enthusiasm or exaltation on which the self-denial seems to depend, become good, sane, sober? There is a zeal that is not exaltation, but differs from it as normal muscular strength differs from convulsive force. The term, exalta-
tion, might etymologically be as well applied to denote the sound as well as the morbid zeal; but custom has confined it to the latter. The sound zeal is a quiet strength, the strength of the spirit of peace: to minds diseased with neurotic zeal it seems to be mere inertia. A Roman Catholic priest, speaking to X—of the contemplative orders of his church, said, "Nous autres aussi, nous avons nos maisons des fous." Was he not an enfant terrible, exposing a truth which the discretion of the church would fain conceal, seeing that exposure must scatter the lunatics.

There are minds that are capable of the sound while prone to the neurotic zeal. They only need to distinguish in order to exclude the latter. The mind of the writer is of this order. It is necessary for him to pause at times to take measures against his infirmity.

Is it legitimate to use the morbid zeal in the interest of religion? May it not be sometimes indispensable for the starting of a devout life? The first breathing of the infant begins in a convulsion, and the accoucheur sometimes finds it necessary to excite the convulsion by slapping or by a splash of cold water, so that analogy seems to accredit recourse to a moral convulsion for the starting of a moral life.

481.

April 16th. Holiness and nobleness constitute goodness. Detached from nobleness holiness is satanic. United, they made Lucifer prince of heaven. Disunited, nobleness became prince of hell, and holiness lapsed into poverty of spirit. The profane Esau is an example of nobleness without holiness; the mean, crafty, selfish, pious Jacob of holiness without nobleness. It seems to me that Christ must have regarded nobleness as the proper home of holiness, but was constrained to use poverty of spirit as its temporary asylum. Christianity is not an exhibition of the whole mind of Christ, but, at most, of only so much
as men could bear when Christ was on the earth. "I have more things to tell you but you cannot bear them now."

I had been drifting away from the spirit of holiness, and was becoming more and more possessed by a Promethean indignation against the ῥοπαν as though it were altogether infernal, and involved no Divine, when, one morning, while considering the misfortunes of a friend and the lovely patience they had put in relief, I found myself exorcised of anger—relieved of what was at once a wickedness and an infirmity. A quiet strength had replaced a convulsive force. I then became aware that I was visited by the spirit of holiness, and that it has the property of enhancing manliness. The aspect of holiness as a promoter of manliness restored the empire of the spirit over my heart. I knew that the visit would be a brief one, but that it would leave with me strength to keep the fortress in its absence. It is only with the neophyte that it makes a long sojourn. It soon left me, but with the natural mind so strengthened that I have been able to fight its battle ever since.

X—who had been the means of despoiling me of half my means, referred a few days ago to my loss with brutal indifference. He doubtless felt himself irresponsible because he had not intended wrong, and he knew no reason why he should not speak of the event as one who had been in no wise concerned in bringing it about. While I was indignantly regarding the brutality, I became aware that I was condemning my former self; for I remembered occasions on which I had manifested a like animus. This plunged me in mortification. I remembered other evidences of moral vileness that covered me with confusion. I was debased in my own esteem, but the abjection proved to be a purgatory from which I emerged more humble, charitable and manly. Other events assailed my self-respect and reminded me that self-respect is concerned not about dignity but honour. Dignity is neither more nor less because of
honour or dishonour. If one who owes me honour fails to pay the debt, it is *his* dignity not *mine* that is bankrupt. This thought restored me to peace and charity, and enabled me to be as the good physician towards those who had wounded me; and it seemed as though I had secured a vantage ground against self-respect from which I could not hereafter be easily dislodged.

These successes revived the hope that it is possible to alter the heart so that it shall no longer apprehend unwisely.

I had written so far when an event occurred which showed how little impression I had made on the stupidity of my heart. X—undertook to explain to me that I had failed to pay a certain debt of politeness to Y—, and his manner signified censure. I was offended and discomposed and with difficulty refrained from expressing my feeling of the affront. This occurred yesterday, and, in spite of repeated effort to apprehend it wisely—to bring home to the heart the necessity—I am still under the influence of indignation.

482.

**November 15th.** To-day while speaking with A—about the want of consideration for others manifested by S—, I experienced a faint sentiment that censure would be sacrilege, that it would be to blame a man for existing. To censure a man for lacking a moral faculty is as though one should censure him for lacking sight, or hearing, or health. The apparition of the sentiment recalled and classed itself in a group of events of which the most characteristic was given as being a beatific vision. It enables me to know *by heart* the spirit that enjoined the Christian to forbear from calling his brother Raca. It apprehends a sacredness in man which no vice, privation, or pollution can exclude.

483.

**December 11th.** *A Conciliatory Hypothesis.*

The dynamic in nature comprehends the Divine and the infernal. The Divine impersonal power in nature is God
the Father. It engendered a Divine person, God the Son, who has been striving from the beginning against the impersonal infernal, figuratively represented as a person and named Satan. God the Son created Cosmos out of chaos and in a part thereof, to wit, man and probably other species of persons, the spirit of holiness, figuratively represented as a person and named the Holy Ghost. “In the beginning was the word (the personal organ of the impersonal Divine), and the word was with God” (cooperative with the impersonal Divine), “and the word was God,” i.e., Divine dignity or sacredness was proper to the personal Divine. God the Son, creator of Cosmos, is the supreme personal power but not omnipotent. He “can do all things,” meaning all possible things, but he cannot, by a fiat, annihilate evil. He is obliged to use means. Cosmos includes no evil which it is presently possible for the power of the Son to exclude; but we may have hope and faith that, by the action of the three members of the Trinity, evil will be ultimately imprisoned in order, like the internal fire within the crust of the earth. The Son became man in order to make man an ally against Satan, and so to save man as well as all savable life. He was obliged to accommodate his doctrine to what the human mind could receive. “I have more things to tell you but you cannot bear them now.” There are errors in the report of his doctrine. These he had not the power to prevent; and probably, in many instances, he counted on the misunderstanding of his disciples, knowing that if they did not misunderstand his words they would desert him, as so many had done when he was understood to announce that he would give them his flesh to eat. He came to beget in man the Christian spirit, and counted more on that than on a right understanding of the letter of his doctrine and commands.

January 2nd. I am striving to bear with manliness a threatened loss. This concerns the spirit of nobleness
rather than the spirit of holiness. Nevertheless I tend to look prayerfully to the latter for the needed fortitude.

485.

January 2nd. How should a man of transcendent mind and endowed with transcendent personal influence, lead men toward the goal of wisdom? Should he attempt to do it by reasoning or by authority, by an exposition of his reasons, or by the use of his attractive power? To attempt a premature exposition of truth, is to outrage prejudice. There is a physical impossibility in the bulk of men to traverse at once a line of argument conducting to remote truth. To attempt to drag them to the conclusion is to exasperate. But if they can be led to live a certain kind of life adapted to conduct them to the truth, our transcendent man should make himself authority, and command them to live accordingly. In this way Christ proceeded, giving himself as "the way, the truth, and the life." He had to accommodate to error, especially to that which confounds retribution with justice. As he could not live beyond the term of human life, to keep his disciples in the way of salvation he provided a successor in the natural priest, a man naturally prone to the spirit of holiness, "the salt of the earth." As head of this order he is high-priest.

486.

January 2nd. Victory! My effort to cast out fear has proved successful. It achieved a success while I was writing the two previous notes. I feel that I owe this victory to my attachment to the Holy Ghost—to the reverence that adoringly owns the supremacy of sacredness or the Divine, and the subordination of the spirit of nobleness. While I enjoyed faith, prayer obtained for me relief from the fear of death: now that I am deprived of faith, I am vouchsafed relief from the morbid fear of poverty by which I have been so long beset. I can scarcely believe
that my emancipation is permanent; it seems to me as though the devil had only gone out to bring back seven other devils. I am given to understand that the condition of my freedom is that I be mainly occupied about the work of self-sanctification. If I cease to keep my hands lifted up, I shall again fall into the power of the enemy.

My first impulse when I gained the victory was to tell of it. This pusillanimity has been hitherto devouring the good seed that has fallen on my heart. It seemed at first as though I had not power to prevent it; but by holding up its baseness before my mind's eye I have deprived it of power.

I must not rejoice weakly. Joy that is not a mere irradiation of the spirit of peace is unmanly and impure. Pure joy smiles, it does not laugh; nor does it look for sympathy, nor importune a long attention of its subject. Am I not on the eve of another beatitude, namely, relief from that need of sympathy on which worldliness hinges? If the Holy Ghost would dwell with me, I should have no need of sympathy—I should be sufficient to myself. Not that my sympathy with others would abate, or my relish of theirs with me, but that privation of the latter would not be painful.

January 3rd. The spirit of holiness sojourned with me throughout yesterday till evening. He left me as imperceptibly as he came. He made the day one of the happiest of my life. He has usually, since 1857, passed with me my birthdays and the New Year's day, but never in such plenitude of influence, never so manifestly as yesterday. He distinguished by surpassing favour the infidel, but the infidel who holds to Christ. His presence had clearly to do with the two first of yesterday's notes, of which it seemed to be a confirmation. One of the latest signs of his presence was the perfect charity with which I found myself thinking
of injuries inflicted on me by some who are peculiarly dear to me. I was lifted as far above provocation as a fond mother relatively to the naughtiness of her infant. One of the signs of the Divine presence was that it indisposed me to smoke—reverence recoiled from the liberty. How gladly would I find myself always excluded by that cause from the indulgence. Towards 9 o'clock I was unhappily free to smoke.

Notwithstanding the departure of the spirit I am free from fear of pecuniary loss. I am also free from the itch to talk of spiritual favours and successes, and I look with the tenderness of the Good Physician on all who have injured me.

Perhaps the most precious of the beatitudes with which the visit has enriched me, is intolerance of the notion that the spirit is impersonal—that it is a mere attribute of my own mind. I shrink from the profanity of assenting to such a thesis. Reason protests in vain. The protest provokes the smile of the heart that has been visited by the Holy Ghost. In this blessed unreasonable apprehension of the Holy Ghost the supernatural is restored to me. Yet, so late as December 11th, I explain the spirit of holiness as being impersonal. But I am not now dogmatic as regards the personality. All I can say is, that I dare not address the spirit of holiness otherwise than as a person, and that I rejoice with all my heart in the imperative of reverence which forbids me.

It may be that certain states of body and mind exclude the Holy Ghost, so that, although Divine and personal, he cannot always command access to the soul. It may be that he never misses an opportunity of influence, and that, when he is not influencing the soul, it is not because he will not, but because he cannot.

1876.

488.

January 4th. I seemed to have been awakened this morning by an ebullition of fear, the fear that was cast out
on Sunday by the spirit of holiness. The fact tended to impose upon me a discrediting sentiment of religion. The capriciousness of the spirit of holiness was urged. There was a beginning of a feeling of shame that I was so prone to be the dupe of the religious affection. Had I not ample evidence that it has its source in the brain, can be quickened by alcohol and opium, has befooled man in all ages, is a basis of insanity, makes a shambles of the ascetic's cell, and has bred more discord and violence than it has healed? I did not for a moment allow this tentative of the heart except as regards the personality of the spirit of holiness. A Divine person would not so behave, would not sanction the violent and unseemly acts which men have committed, as they supposed, under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. But is there not room for the hypothesis that God sometimes communicates with us, or influences through our faculty of reverence, which, unhappily, is prone to counterfeit the sentiment that is the word of God—that a differentia of the true word of God in the heart will be ultimately discovered, and, after that, the counterfeit will cease to deceive? The Roman Catholic Church allows that we are liable to counterfeits of grace, and that certain persons endowed with the gift of discernment of spirits are capable of distinguishing the true coin from the counterfeit.

489.

January 8th. For some days, a doubt has appeared in my heart that the spirit of prayer, and especially the worship it involves, is a pure spirit. It seemed to exhibit a tincture of abjectness. Is this owing to a temporary depravity of the spirit of the noble? The doubt suggested the theory that the perfect man is the friend, not the worshipper of God, that he asks of God as a friend, not propitiates by worship, that the time has come for evolution to lift man into this dignity, and that, accordingly, worship begins to exhibit its abjectness, that the organ of reverence
needs to be modified so as to exclude from its apprehension of the Divine the fond and propitiatory spirit. If the spirit of holiness will visit me and approve this theory, I shall of course, adopt it. Now that I have condensed into distinct shape its elements which were before but loosely connected and vague, it seems to me more worthy of experiment.

I am not well to-day, and faint symptoms of morbid fear have been threatening me. The contemplation of man as destined to rise above worship, has somewhat relieved and strengthened me.

Since writing the foregoing, I have read the note of November 7th, 1870. Surely the spirit of holiness is depraved when divorced from the spirit of the noble.

Is not worship the flattery of fear solicitous to exclude the ills that press into hearts devoid of the Holy Ghost? Or rather is not that what passes with me for worship? When the spirit of holiness is with me do I not seek to detain it by this flattery, and is not a great part of my joy the pleasure of relief? If this be so, the adulteration did not begin with the reign of godliness in my heart. My sentiment of God was at first perfectly conformable to magnanimity. It was through endeavouring to follow Christ into poverty of spirit that it contracted this taint, if taint it be. In compliance with Christ, I long endeavoured to depose the spirit of the noble, thinking it insubordinate to duty or God, and that obedience exhausts virtue. On the 16th August, 1870, I was set free from this repugnant error, to which I had endeavoured for years to reconcile my soul.

490.

January 15th. On the 13th inst., I received a discouraging report of the character of a person on whose integrity my means depend. I was surprised to find that there was no movement of morbid fear. I received the news as I would have received it prior to the illness that
generated this craven spirit. Is the change significant of Divine assent to the view of worship to which I inclined on the 8th inst., or was it a mere casual coincidence? I have allowed no expression to emotions of worship since that day, or at least only a subdued one.

Meantime I have asked of the spirit of holiness to make me a soldier of the Divine—to give me a soldierly heart relatively to all disaster that threatens to impoverish, so that I shall be more concerned to feel and act well under the circumstances than to preserve my means. I hope to be given a soldier's joy in conflict, and to feel that every event which brings me nearer to poverty is, if it also bring me nearer to Heaven, a victory. By Heaven I mean a heart perfectly holy and noble.

January 15th. I have been obliged to abstain from wine for many days. It occurred to me this evening that I might safely allow myself a few glasses of old white port for dinner. I did so, and the exhilaration caused a cerebral exaltation that promoted me in charity—lifted my heart to a point of view from which it could see a truth that was previously hid from it, though palpable to the intellect, and so divested me of a stupid indignation that held its object to an impossible responsibility. I had an amused feeling of the absurdity of expecting stoicism from a sheep.

That I should owe this enhancement of wisdom to wine—to any influence but that of the spirit of holiness—is amazing; yet I owed a like promotion in charity to a dose of chlorodyne.

Philosophy has not duly pondered emotive insight and its wonderful difference from mere intellectual insight when both are related to the same object.

January 27th. I have acquired the soldierly courage and fortitude for which I prayed, and I understand the
boon to be an approval of my views respecting the method of Christ, the limitation of piety by manliness, and the disgrace of worship by propitiatory fear. Last night I was awakened by some symptoms that seemed to me to promise death, and I hailed it with a soldierly welcome.

493.

March 11th. The injuries put upon me by M— have excited an unobvious resentment that is signified in a disposition to judge him harshly. Vices of manner which, if exhibited by others, I should observe with leniency, grate upon me when they appear in him. His voice is sometimes modulated by a sense of his own importance as though he were doing the importance homage, and reminding the company that they owe it the like. This disposes my lip to curl, although I was myself given to that infirmity. I pledge myself to the spirit of holiness to fight this enemy.

494.

April 26th. I am now of the mind that the spirit of holiness is an attribute, not a person. It is so given that it sometimes seems to be a person, sometimes an attribute. If authority favour the apprehension of it as a person, reverence tends to regard the opposite apprehension as a sacrilege. The conclusion that it is an attribute threatens to deprive me of its visits, causing a vague sentiment that it cannot exist in a heart in which there is no room for worship. I feel, moreover, that I shall strive in vain to raise my heart from the slough of uncharity into the spirit of the Good Physician, being deprived of prayer. If there be no person to pray to, there can be no prayer. I seem to have lost a prehensile in losing the reason of prayer.

The extinction of faith in the personality of the spirit of holiness makes an epoch in my moral history. I have no longer a personal Divine to love, to worship, to lean upon, to pray to. My duty in respect of holiness is now
merely to make myself holy. To do this I understand that I should wean myself from dependence on human love. I do not mean that I should endeavour to diminish my love of human beings, but that I should wean myself from the need to lean upon their love of me. If I lean upon it I am prone to be wounded by its perfidies, and so inflamed into uncharity. But how demean myself? What resource have I? Human love seems to be as needful to me as air. Immediately before I began to write this note, when I was rapt in the sentiment of the vocation to sanctify myself without faith in God or a personal spirit of holiness, I had no thought but to endeavour from that moment to do what holiness required of me; but now (two days later, for when I began the note I wrote only a few lines) I seem to myself to have undertaken the impossible. However, I do not despair. I may find out how to regulate my intercourse so as to give more than I receive in an ever increasing ratio, until I get to the point where I give all and receive nothing with which I could not have in-differently dispensed.

The spirit of holiness has not been with me since January 2nd.

May 4th. The idea that the spirit of holiness which gives itself as being a person is a morbid exaltation, has had serious possession of me for two days past. This morning it appears to me that I have already gone far enough in that direction, that to go farther would be to divest myself of the sentiment of the sacred. Grant that it is an exaltation, that it is owing to an exceptional cerebral action, it is not, therefore, to be accounted morbid. We owe not only the highest products of art but also the greatest discoveries in science to such exaltations. Why should not the way of moral development be revealed by flashes of exaltation as well as that of art and that of
sciences? Besides, peace is a conspicuous characteristic of the spirit of holiness given as personal, and peace is a sign of sanity, at least one that makes sanity probable. I think that in this conclusion I have safely reached a terminus of a Mahomet's bridge.

496.

May 5th. The analogy between legal fiction and what may be termed "pious apology," viz., the strained apology to which the pious are driven in defence of theology, deserves attention. Each feigns that the moral sense and something else are in harmony: legal fiction that the moral sense and law are harmonious, pious apology that the moral sense and theology are harmonious. They agree also in this, that the inventor of the figment is its first dupe. Legal fiction has the advantage of pious apology in that it seeks to accommodate "the something else" to the moral sense, whereas pious apology tugs at the moral sense to accommodate it to something else, e.g., to vicarious atonement and predestination. They agree as being protective of authority by hiding its defects while authority is still indispensable to progress, but they also agree in so graduating error into deception that the mind which they abuse can sometimes scarcely tell when it ceases to be dupe and turns impostor. If we suppose man to have been created, his natural history does not, as regards legal fiction and pious apology, attest a Divine solicitude for truth in his maker.

497.

May 6th. During the last two days my heart has been lighted up by three or four flashes of wisdom, consisting of spontaneous, compassionate and apologetic apprehensions of baseness in others. It seems as though my long effort had at last broken here and there through the crust of the heart's stupidity so as to let in some rays of wisdom.
MAY 9TH. The vices of the moral sense are amongst the profoundest and most tenacious of the causes of human misery. Such a vice is that which causes the moral sense to glorify fierceness, or the spirit of violence when benevolently applied—applied for the defence or promotion of virtue. It is often our duty to use violence against malefactors, whether individuals, classes or states, as it is sometimes the duty of a modest woman to expose her body to her physician; but as the exposure should be made without effrontery, so the violence should be done without fierceness; and the fierceness no more deserves to be apprehended and extolled as heroic than the effrontery. The benevolence, the generosity, the righteousness, the courage, the fortitude that incite or support the spirit of violence, are indeed deserving of all praise, but the fierceness itself is as foul as effrontery.

Surely it was to cashier the spirit of violence, not that of nobleness, that Christ enjoined his followers to sequester themselves in poverty of spirit. I rejoice to be freed from the belief that, under the names, meekness and poverty of spirit, he commended abjectness and made it an asylum for the spirit of holiness. He who is attached to virtue is attached to dignity, and above all to dignity in himself, which is the object of pure self-respect. He is peculiarly concerned about his own conformity to dignity, not because he prizes himself more than others, but because he is responsible for his own nonconformity and not for that of others. Christ did not discredit pure self-respect in enjoining meekness, poverty of spirit, humility: what he discredited was pride, vanity and fierceness.

Fierce men who lack courage and fortitude tend to hide the fierceness, so that undissembled fierceness is for the most part associated with those qualities, which are therefore taken to be of its essence. The error clothes it with dignity and makes it worshipful in the view of the hero-worshipper.
LAST WORDS.

Protestantism seems to me to be the offspring of the vis medicatrix of Christianity, which would have rotted but for the purifying and invigorating opposition. Christ is a Divine life working in and upon an infernal medium which the life will ultimately subdue into conformity with holiness. That the resultant organism—the Church—should split, and the divided parts contend for a time, is scarcely a prodigy, considering what might be expected from the effort of heaven to assimilate hell. What though the Church put on at times the semblance of a scarlet whore, what though a Borgia be pope, inquisitions torture, and indulgencies for crimes to be committed flood the market? These are but the monstrous forms of a hell into which Christ has descended. On the other hand the Church teems with Sisters of Charity and Little Sisters of the Poor. I was once confronted by that scarlet aspect of the Church. It was at a dinner where a cardinal—a pope's nuncio—was the chief guest. He was flanked by two women, the dazzling effrontery of whose naked breasts matched the stolid effrontery of that cardinal's face. What the extended wings of the cherub are to the cherub head, that, in my imagination, those breasts have become to that face, making the imagination when present a Dante's Inferno. The species of which that poor brazen priest-diplomat—bastard of Cæsar and the Church—is a type, too often rule the Church. How should it be otherwise? How should Satan abandon the government to the children of light? Where the power is there the vultures are gathered together—ambition, craft, cruelty, cupidity, sensuality. But the Divine life within the Church will ultimately consume all that, and substitute Cosmic order for Chaos and the Titans.

Conformity to right, that involves no self-denial, scarcely deserves the name of righteousness. It is at
most a mere fringe of righteousness. We may ignore it for the present, and treat of righteousness as being con-
formity to duty that involves self-denial. Nobleness is a
sine qua non of righteousness; for, without it the self-
denial essential to justice is not possible. Baseness is at
once a cataract and a paralysis, blinding conscience and
deprieving will. Yet righteousness is not commonly held
to be as rare as nobleness; and this is because conformity
to human and Divine law tends to pass for a sign of
righteousness, whereas conformity for God's sake, or
prudence sake, is not righteousness. When Christ de-
clared that he came to call, not the righteous but sinners
to repentance, he implied that his mission was directly to
the base. He, the paragon of nobleness, poured himself
as leaven into the base. Was not the sacrifice on Calvary
a mild anguish compared to this long spiritual crucifixion?
And how well it explains his injunctions against high-
mindedness! Pride is the only high-mindedness to which
the base are prone; and, therefore, he made no reserve as
regards magnanimity—the high-mindedness of nobleness.
In proportion as my heart is enlarged into an apprehension
of Christ as the great exemplar of nobleness as well as
holiness, my love for him and its loyalty are disembarassed.

Religious aversions are sometimes transformed into
aversions merely moral: what at first offended godliness
without being otherwise odious, becomes at last an offence
irrespective of Divine prohibition: a repugnance of the
votary has become a repugnance of the gentleman. Here
we have godliness as authority superseding itself by the
substitution of righteousness. Suppose now that Christi-
anity had finished its work, and all men were righteous—
all had acquired Christ-like hearts, Christ-like affections,
Christ-like antipathies—were counterparts of Christ all but
his power—what would be our relation to Christ? He would
be apprehended by boundless love as our Saviour, as the
vine of which we were branches; but no longer as authority—no longer as king—the society being exempt from the need of government. He would have surrendered the sceptre, and righteousness, being all in all, would sway in his stead.

It is essential to Divine action to be frustrative of conditions of pain not caused by the Divine agent—frustrative of evil not Divinely caused. This is exposed by the negative response of the moral sense to the question, whether it would comport with dignity to create us for no other end but the enjoyment of sport. It follows that, whether there be or be not a God, evil has existed from all eternity, and, if there be a God, his action has been from all eternity a conflict with evil. That the conflict has not been a constant and complete frustration of evil experience too painfully proves, seeing that past eternity has brought us no farther than the predatory system and the Cross. It is, therefore, extremely probable that, with certain unimportant exceptions, existence is a calamity—a calamity so great that, if any being had power to annihilate both himself and all beside, it would become him to do so. And wisdom exacts of those who discern this terrible truth to propagate the knowledge of it, in order that a delusive optimism, begotten of a false idea of Divine power, shall no longer prevent man from exerting all his might against the enemy, and, if there be a God, co-operating more effectually with God. Belief in the absoluteness of evil is in no respect hostile to faith, but, on the contrary, is in all respects an ally of faith. It exempts God from the odium of being the Creator of evil, explains that omnipotence (power to do the possible) must needs operate by means, apologizes for the shortcomings of Providence, and urges co-operation with God upon fear, prudence, reverence, and magnanimity. It relieves Christianity of all the disgraces with which it has been loaded by the doctrine of unlimited omnipotence. The Incarnation and the Passion were not
occasioned by an order of things needlessly created, but by a dreadful necessity against which the free will of God could not otherwise prevail. In some cases God must use straws for implements, for instance miracle that, to the enlightened mind, connotes impotence while it denotes power. If truth interpose between God and human salvation, the spirit of truth disdains to strain at a gnat. Shall a man starve rather than lie to a fish in the bait with which he may catch it? Christ was a fisher of men. The creation of Cosmos and of man relieved an agony that reigned in Chaos. Hell or evil is co-eternal with God, not his creature. The theory of Christianity is perfectly consistent, perfectly in harmony with the moral sense, perfectly reasonable. Its art is the only conceivable means at the disposal of man for saving himself from the hideous social insanity in which he has been agonizing. Until society acquire CHRISTIAN COMPASSION, it is in a condition analogous to that of the insane who drink scalding water without discomfort. It lacks the sensitive unity that self-preservingly interests the whole in the part; and the incident indifference to human misery that does not threaten imminent social death makes society a prey to torment, the contemplation of which is appalling to the sane heart. Christianity involves the only conceivable art for the attainment of the missing faculty—a love of the neighbour as compassionate as maternal love. Again, until self-denial establishes the empire of will in the bulk of men, or in a majority of some society, so long as intentional action is for the most part instinctive, so long as uncontrolled cerebration makes, in the majority, a mere counterfeit of personal life, so long must society be a lunatic, and insane ends fascinate the faculties of mankind. There is no salvation but by the way of the Cross. Whether it be possible for any considerable number of men to traverse the way of the Cross may be doubted; but there can be no doubt that man has never yet imagined any other way of salvation that could be decently proposed to the attention of Christendom.
AN APOLOGY FOR SCEPTICISM.

The vagueness, confusion and error of certain undefined definable ideas is the habitat of Dogmatism, where it maintains itself and harasses truth by perpetual evasion and sham. To let in upon its cloud-land the light of rigorous definition, is to deprive it of a *sine qua non* of existence. The ablest defence of dogmatism against modern science is Father Newman's "Grammar of Assent"—a cloud-fortress contrived with marvellous ingenuity, an ingenuity all the more marvellous for being inspired by faith, and because its subject is the first against whom it prevails. Our campaign of definition will be mainly directed against this fortress; but so as to undermine it, not to detain us in direct controversy.

I.

Definitions of choate and inchoate consciousness, ception, preter-object, cognition, conscious and unconscious cognition, satisfactory and unsatisfactory probability, opinion, doubt, judgment, communicative and uncommunicative question, judicial and practical question, speculation, apprehension, Reason (the faculty), reason (incentive to belief or action), evidence, inevidential reason, guaranteed and unguaranteed data, demonstrative and indemonstrative evidence, opinal and certitudinal judgment, inference, guaranteed and unguaranteed inference, intuition, presentative and impresentative intuition, pseudillation, thesis, proposition.

What is denoted by the name, consciousness, is undefinable. Certain philosophers have narrowed the signification of the term to a part of the whole which it tends and
ought to denote, viz., to consciousness that involves self-consciousness. Patients who fall asleep while in pain are sometimes aware when they wake that the pain persisted throughout the sleep, but not as an attribute, not as inherent in an Ego or in anything, but as an absolute thing, and the only thing then given as existing, save space and time. Ecstasy sometimes suspends self-consciousness while one is gazing at some sublime spectacle, such as an Alpine peak commands. Wordsworth's beautiful fiction of such an ecstasy, in "The Excursion," is, to the writer's knowledge, a copy of fact. Visual objects persist, but without sensation and self-consciousness. There is reason to believe that certain parties suffering from cerebral lesion caused by gun-shot wounds are permanently, or for a long time, deprived of self-consciousness. They never employ the pronoun I; and when they speak of past events in which they figured, they speak of themselves in the third person. Some patients refer their sensations to others, when hungry telling their attendants that they, the attendants, are hungry, and after coughing, saying to the attendant, "what a bad cold you have." A person known to the writer remembered, on recovery from a swoon, that during the swoon there existed in the midst of indefinite dark space, several luminous variously coloured concentric rings, and that, apparently, there existed nothing besides save time: after a while there was added to this apparent sum total of being a subjectless or impersonal wonder contemplating the rings: in a third phase a subject was added to the wonder, namely, the person who had swooned, who, in a state of partial recovery, was conscious of himself as looking at and wondering at the rings; this state lasted but a second or two, complete recovery banishing the hallucination. In this instance we have, not only a suspension of self-consciousness but, a discernment on the part of the reflective faculty without a reference to the Ego; for, the intuition of the impersonal wonder must be accounted reflective intuition.
AN APOLOGY FOR SCEPTICISM.

Now, if such abnormal psychical events be not accounted consciousness, by what general name should we designate them? They resemble, as to objectivity, what, according to the narrowed signification of the term, is consciousness, and they bear no such resemblance to anything beside. Clearly we should make room for them in our idea of consciousness, and divide the genus, consciousness, into the two species, *choate* and *inchoate consciousness*; the former being consciousness that *does*, and the latter consciousness that *does not*, involve self-consciousness.

The theory that perception has an immediate as well as a remote object has as yet but few adherents. Those who hold the opposite thesis, viz., that there is no object of perceptive consciousness, save what is extrinsic to the consciousness, are bound by consistency to hold that object is not a constituent of all consciousness—that at least, as regards perception, consciousness is one thing, and its object another. There is a school that implies, if it does not directly put, the thesis that object whether immediate or remote, is several from consciousness. It pretends that ideas do not perish when they are no longer present to consciousness, but descend into and dwell in an unconscious part of the mind, to re-ascend, as occasion requires, into the region of consciousness, as fishes move up and down between the illuminated stratum of the sea and its dark depths. For example, when one is thinking of his absent friend, the idea of the friend is supposed to be in the region of consciousness: when he ceases to think of the friend, the idea is supposed to descend into the unconscious region of the mind, and to return when he again thinks of the friend. The inconsistency of the notion that an idea can subsist out of consciousness is overlooked by those who hold this theory—a theory that until lately commanded universal belief, and is not yet completely eliminated from philosophy. When discovery distinguished between immediate and remote objects, and found that immediate
object is essential to consciousness, it demanded, on penalty of inconsistency, that consciousness includes two elements, viz., 1st, immediate object; and 2nd, that which before passed for the whole of consciousness, that which is consciousness of, to which we may now assign the name, ception. Outside philosophy ception passes, and has ever passed, for the whole of consciousness, and object for a thing extrinsic to consciousness. The claim of imperceptive consciousness that immediate object is intrinsic and essential to it, is and has been overlooked. Even philosophy is not exempt from the error.

The true nature of ception, as being merely one of several constituents of consciousness, is ignored by those with whom it passes for the whole of consciousness. Tell such an one that consciousness of is a constituent of consciousness, and you will seem to him to affirm that consciousness is a constituent of consciousness. But show him that immediate object is essential to consciousness—is a constituent of consciousness—and then he is constrained to allow that consciousness includes as a constituent what he previously took to be the whole of consciousness, viz., what I have named ception.

Let the word ceive be a verb, signifying to be conscious of. It gives the cognates ception, cept, ceptive, ceptual, as the verb perceive gives the cognates, perception, percept, perceptive, and the verb conceive, the cognates conception, concept, conceptual.

Ception is for the most part object: but it is sometimes unobjective. In choate consciousness it is always objective, in inchoate consciousness always unobjective.

Ception and object are correlatives, intrinsic and proper to consciousness. He usurps the name, object who applies it to a thing out of relation to consciousness. Ception may be described as psychical embrace of immediate object. It is as intimately united to immediate object as a concave to the convex it embraces, or acclivity to declivity.
Indeed, scepticism and object seem to be merely different faces of the same thing.

Let the word preter-object be the common name of things capable of existing otherwise than as object. Cosmos is a preter-object: immediate objects are things incapable of existing otherwise than as object. For want of such a name as preter-object, philosophy has been obliged to contradictorily imply that objects proper to consciousness are unreal—do not exist. Both it and its cognates will be found to be highly convenient.

Certitude is undefinable. Is it, or is it not, proper to consciousness? If the term be a synonym of cognition, certitude is not proper to consciousness; for, as we shall presently show, cognition is not proper to consciousness. We are at liberty, for the sake of convenience, to restrict the term to event proper to consciousness, and of this I avail. We profit by the limitation at once; for it enables us to define cognition. There are no degrees of certitude. It may be either true or untrue.

Cognition is such a relation of a mind to a thesis, that the mind cannot be conscious of the thesis without certitude of its truth. We are cognizant of things of which we are not conscious, e.g., of the existence of friends of whom we are not thinking, of the truth of axioms that are not at the time objective. Coma or dreamless sleep does not suspend any of our cognitions. The mathematician in dreamless sleep is unconscious, but not ignorant, of mathematics. We must therefore dissent to Sir William Hamilton's deliverance "that consciousness and knowledge" (by knowledge he means cognition) "each involve the other"* a dictum with which he is by no means in constant agreement. Cognition, then, comprehends the two kinds, conscious and unconscious cognition. Certitude is proper to conscious cognition. The mathematician is cognizant, but not certain, of mathematical truths of

which he is not conscious. Knowledge is true cognition. The lunatic cognizes, but does not know, that he is the Emperor of the moon. Untrue cognition is the species proximately opposed to knowledge.

The cognitive relation of a mind to a thesis the truth of which is made known by experience, depends upon the existence of epiorgans constructed by the experience. The effacement or suspension of these organs by lesion or desuetude extinguishes, or puts in abeyance, the corresponding relations or cognitions. This supposes the brain to be a constituent of mind, not merely an auxiliary organ. Evidence is accumulating that words generate cognition by causing corresponding epiorgans without the intervention of any consciousness save that of the sounds and a certain nondescript consciousness more analogous with sensation than with idea, and which is the sufficient substitute of a conscious cognition of knowing. If the words lack logical form, or if a nonsensical word be intruded into the sentence, or if a proposition express a thesis repugnant to some previously established cognition, an opposite feeling obtains—one analogous with uneasiness—and this challenges an interference of consciousness that would not otherwise obtain. A part of this evidence sufficed to establish Nominalism, which has made for itself too large and enduring a school to admit of the supposition, in this day of eclecticism, that it is altogether wrong. In view of the great probability that the evidence will be ultimately conclusive, it would be unwarrantable to assume, or even lean to the assumption that mind is proper to the soul, and that cerebral organs are not essential to its faculties. The best provisional hypothesis is, that brain and soul together, or indeed body and soul together, constitute mind.

Probability, like certitude, is undefinable. It has degrees, varying from a maximum that is scarcely distinguishable from certainty—the differentia of objects of certitude—down to what is correlative to a scarcely discernible incli-
nation of the mind toward certitude. The higher degrees of probability afford a rest to the mind and a ground of intentional action but little short of the conveniency of certitude. These I shall distinguish as *satisfactory*.

Opinion is cognition of probability. Opinion cognizant of satisfactory probability may be distinguished as *dominant* and the opposite species as *faint opinion*.

Doubt is privation of certitude of the truth of a thesis that either is, or is supported by, a reason. It is essential, but not proper to opinion. It sometimes refers to opposites both of which appear to be destitute of probability. Privation of certitude respecting a thesis that neither is nor is supported by a reason, is not a doubt, but mere ignorance.

A judgment is a conscious cognition of a union or non-union of objects, or of a satisfactory probability of such a union or non-union, a cognition objective to reflection, and either involving, or identical with, a conscious cognition that the opposite of what it cognizes as true is untrue.

The species proximate to judgments, and with which they are most likely to be confounded, are cognitive *apprehensions* and unconscious cognitions, both referent to the things to which the judgments refer. When I dissentiently refer to the thesis, John is innocent, I *judge* that he is guilty; but when I consciously cognize the guilt without the dissentient reference, I *apprehend* it; I do not *judge* that John is guilty. My unconscious cognition of the guilt is neither judgment nor apprehension. When a cognition of the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles involves dissentient reference to the opposite thesis, the cognition is a judgment. When cognition of the equality contemplates it as evidence, the cognition is an apprehension, not a judgment—it does not dissentiently refer to the opposite thesis. When I cognize, but am not thinking of John's guilt, or of the equality, my cognition is not a judgment. *Distinct or explicit dissentient*
reference to the opposite is the differentia of judgment. Perception is cognition that does not involve such reference: therefore it is not judgment, but a species of the opposed genus, apprehension. Nevertheless science has fallen into the error of ascribing judgment to sense; for example, accounting a visual perception of distance an inference from apparent size. According to Sir William Hamilton, the new born infant judges that existence, otherwise than as object, inheres in its percepts; which supposes that the percept is not given from the beginning as having the attribute of existence otherwise than as object, but that, having considered the two objects apart, the infant, by an intentional synthesis, unites them as subject and quality. No one whose opinion merits attention will deny that the differentia of cognition involved with question is a notable specific difference, and that the species deserves to have appropriated to it a non-descriptive name. Such an one, however, might deny the expediency of limiting the name, judgment, to that species, thinking it best to reserve the name to the genus to which philosophy has applied it, and which comprehends that species. This is a mere dispute about words. If it be found that my use of the term has enfranchised some important explanations, especially the definition of Reason, and moreover that custom tends to limit the term to cognitions which obtain under question (for what cultivated man, not intimately conversant with philosophy, could learn without surprise that every perception involves a judgment) the limitation, I presume, will command general acquiescence.

Another species proximate to judgment is opinion that has for object an unsatisfactory probability. The line that divides this kind of opinion from judgment is as undiscernible as the conterminus of the neighbour colours of the rainbow.

The term assent is synonymous with the term judgment. It supposes distinct dissent.
The genus, question, is undefinable; but it comprehends species that are of course definable. Question is either communicative or incommunicative. When an unusual event suggests the idea of its cause and the cause is unknown, the event suggests therewith the incommunicative question, what is the cause? The question is not put by one person to another: it does not involve communion. Language, either natural or verbal, and communion are essential to communicative question, whereas the former is excluded, and the latter is essential to (it is sometimes an accident of) incommunicative question. When the incommunicative question, what is the cause? obtains, it is not necessarily, nor always, embodied in words. When the incommunicative questions, what is that distant object? what the name I miss? what the sound I hear?—questions involved in the corresponding visual, recollective or listening scrutiny—obtain, they are not always embodied in words.

There is a species of question of which the specific attribute is that it addresses the judgment, is answerable only by a judgment, and another of which the differentia is that it addresses the will, is answerable only by a volition. Let the former be distinguished as judicial, and the latter as practical. Judicial and practical question constitute a sub-genus that may be distinguished as superior: all other question belongs to the sub-genus, inferior question.*

Let attention inquisitive according to superior question be termed speculation. Speculation is essential to judgment. Judgments sometimes flash upon us unpreceded by speculation, but, all the same, they involve scrutiny according to superior question. We owe the word, scepticism, to an appreciation of the connection of judgment and speculation. Scepticism scrutinizes, questions, does not take for

* It is noteworthy that superior question is a sine qua non of the action of Reason and Will, the two highest faculties of man, that reasoning and volition refer to opposites, the former in order to judge between, the latter to choose between—that, agreeing with one another in this respect, they are thereby differentiated from all other faculties.
granted, does not receive as a little child. We have the word theory from nearly, but not quite, the same source. The word σκέπτομαι signifies to look or scrutinize, the word θεωρεω, to gaze. Gazing differs from looking no otherwise than that in the former attention is fascinated, whereas in the latter it is conative*. The etymology of the word speculation evinces an appreciation of the relation of scrutiny and judgment.

An apprehension is a consciousness of what is not in question.

Reason is the faculty of speculation and judgment, or more briefly the questioning faculty. The function of

* Attention has not been hitherto rightly defined, nor its species, fascinated and conative attention, discerned. Following the analogy of the term, "field of vision," let the term, objective field, signify all the objects that simultaneously occupy a mind. As, in the field of vision, the central object, comprising one or more objects, is vivid, and the rest more or less obscure, so there is a central part of the objective field that excels in vividness the rest of the field. Let this part, comprising one or more objects, be distinguished as central object, and the objectivity as central objectivity.

From time to time we intentionally, with consciousness of effort, shift the centre of the objective field. We intentionally, with consciousness of effort, turn from this or that topic of conversation to another, from this or that person whose business is ended to this or that other person who waits for us. The shifted consciousness is attention. Again, we intentionally, with consciousness of effort, prolong a consciousness of a central object. The train of ideas tends constantly to distract us and rapidly shift the centre of the objective field. We resist the tendency and dwell on a given central object. In proportion as the object interests the effort is less: when the object is indifferent or disagreeable, the effort is toilsome and fatiguing. Consciousness of a central object that seems to the subject to be maintained by effort, is a species of attention. Sometimes the Ego is held to a painful central object from which it would fain turn away, but cannot. If, during this fascination of the Ego, we endeavour to withdraw the mind from the fascinating object, it becomes manifest to Reason, though not to intuition, that we are held to the object in spite of ourselves. Nevertheless, the fascination passes for attention. Accordingly, attention may be defined consciousness of a central object apparently dependent on effort. Let attention that involves fascination be distinguished as fascinated attention, and the opposite as conative attention.

Attention is the differentia that distinguishes looking from mere seeing, listening from mere hearing, recollecting from mere remembering. When, according to a recently purposed scheme of work, a merchant reluctantly applies himself to the study of his books, the attention involved in the look is obviously of the conative kind, and differs, by the absence of fascination, from what is known as the look of horror and that unpremedi-
**Reason**, viz., ratiocination or reasoning, comprises speculation, judgment, and all mental events contemporaneous with and subsidiary to these. It proceeds on apprehension; for example, apprehension of the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles when the equality is put as evidence. Let apprehension involved in ratiocination be distinguished as *co-questional*: the opposed species, apprehension not so involved, is what is denoted by the name *simple apprehension*. Reasoning comprises co-questional apprehension, hypothesis engendered by speculation, observation, and intentional action that is the psychical element of experiment. It includes nothing emotive, such as the curiosity by which it is excited and maintained.

tated and ever-shifting looking to which people are prone when vision is not controlled by purpose. Those who practice what is known to the Roman Catholic Church as custody of the senses, have opportunity to learn how much that passes for volition is the effort of mere automatism: how, where the Ego seems to be freely active, it is a mere feather in the wind of *sensory motor* force. They find themselves obliged to look and listen contrary to purpose and all the effort they can exert.

Deliberation is a species of attention: it is attention in quest of a satisfactory practical idea.

Fascinated attention prepares the mind for the exercise of a conative attention. Fascinated looking imparts to the mind the art of conative looking. Fascinated listening originates the art of conative listening. Fascinated recollection originates the art of conative recollection. The child misses some complement of a central object, say its name. The consequent uneasiness prolongs the centrality of the object, and, according to a familiar law of the mind, which tends, on this condition, to supply the missed complement, the complement is annexed by the train of ideas. Hence arises an expectation of a like result from a like proceeding, and thus is generated the rule or art of unfascinated recollection. In like manner, fascination or automatic deliberation generates the art of conative deliberation. Balked on some occasion of action by lack of satisfactory practical ideas, uneasiness fascinates the Ego to the idea of the occasion, and the train of ideas finally presents the missed idea. The automatic deliberation suggests a method or art of deliberation. This process of the generation of art by automatism is analogous with that by which the blind irritability that causes the first sucking of the infant, generates intentional sucking, and this the art of eating. Accordingly, we see that art differentiates conative attention.

How freely nature employs illusion, and how jealously we should limit our trust in the datum-giving faculty, is shown in its abuse of our confidence as regards effort. She duces us with the appearance of doing freely and with effort what she compels us to do. The effort passes for volition: it is given as involving choice.
According to a secondary signification of the word *reason*, the word is the common name of incentives to belief or action that are under question. Reasons that are incentives to action (motives) may be distinguished as *practical reasons*, those that are incentives to belief as *theoretic reasons*. An unquestioned motive is not a reason. An unquestioned incentive to belief, such as an unquestioned assertion, is not a reason. Theoretic reasons comprise two species, viz., *evidence* and *inevidential reasons*. The latter are those that tend to make themselves respectively objects of the beliefs which they tend to cause; evidence is theoretic reason that tends to make a thesis other than itself an object of belief. Inevidential reasons are a species of data, viz., *discoverable* data, *e.g.*, "time is infinite," "space is infinite," *"nothing can begin to be uncaused."

(A datum is a thesis intuitively cognized as true.) The data, "I exist," "the whole is greater than its part," are examples of *undiscoverable* data. The cognitions whereof they are the objects do not begin when they are at first distinctly considered. We unconsciously cognize our own existence before consciousness of it is possible, and with the child's first apprehension of a whole begins his first cognition of the datum, "the whole is greater than its part." It is not possible for such data to be incentives relatively to the beliefs of which they are objects, to initiate or tend to initiate them; but they may be evidence relatively to other beliefs. Data, including inevidential reasons, are either *guaranteed* or *unguaranteed*, the former being those that are, and the latter those that are not, guaranteed by appearance of inconsistency of the opposite. The data, "I exist," "the whole is greater than its part,"

* The discovery of the infinity of space by the writer, some time in his seventh year, constitutes an epoch in his life. He was overwhelmed by amazement and awe. The fact is conclusive of the existence of the inevidential reason, and against the doctrine of Kant, that the idea of *infinite* time exists as a moulding concept from the very beginning of perception. The *absoluteness* of time and space is doubtless given from the first, but not their infinity.
are examples of guaranteed data: the datum, "an antitype existing otherwise than as object corresponds to the idea of Cosmos," exemplifies unguaranteed data. Evidence is either demonstrative or indemonstrative; the former when it either is or hinges upon a guaranteed datum, e.g., mathematical demonstration, otherwise the latter. Inductive evidence is indemonstrative.

Judgment that involves opinion, being certitude, not of a union or non-union but, of probability of union or non-union, may be distinguished as opinal, and judgment that does not involve opinion as certitudinal.

Inference is judgment caused by evidence. It is either opinal or certitudinal. It presupposes ignorance of the truth of what is inferred; for, it is essential to it to be a beginning of cognition, since, otherwise, it could not be caused—initiated—by evidence. It is impossible to re-infer except the cognition initiated in the prior inference has been obliterated. It is essential to inference to seem to its subject, when it obtains, to be discovery, and to be distinctly objective to reflection. There is no such thing as latent inference. Inference caused by demonstrative evidence may be distinguished as guaranteed; the opposite kind as unguaranteed.

The tendency of the word intuition is to settle upon the signification, immediate cognition. But, according to this signification, perception is not intuition, seeing that it cognizes certain remote objects by means of immediate ones. Perception of distance, for example, cognizes by means of apparent size. It will be convenient to employ the term as signifying cognition that does not originate in inference. Intuition is common to apprehension and judgment. Perception is intuitive apprehension. A judgment that a datum is true is intuitive.

Intuition is either presentative or impresentative, the former when it does, and the latter when it does not, intuite its object as present.
There are mental events that seem to be, but are not inferences. In order to isolate and name them, let *pseudillate* be a verb signifying to undergo* a mental event that seems to be, but is not an inference; and *pseudillation* the common name of all such individuals, and the proper name of the kind. I shall presently, after having defined thesis and proposition, and judicial and non-judicial thesis, give examples of pseudillation.

We have need to refer to a species of perception not hitherto discerned—what may be termed *analytic perception*. The *differentia* of analytic perception is that it distinguishes subject and attribute in the percept. There are exceptional causes of perception that tend to make this or that quality of the perceived thing an object of attention. When, for example, colour or form is such as to cause surprise, delight, or repugnance, it is object of attention. To one staggering under a heavy burden, weight tends to be an object of attention. A stone pillow tends to make

* In inference, and in every event save volition, the mind is passive. One of the most notable of the delusions that discredit the datum-giving faculty is that which gives mental event other than volition as action. It is only when we find ourselves obliged to *attend* and to *reason* against our will that the delusion collapses. Philosophers have made much of so-called mental activity as a *differentia* of mental events. Kant, for example, makes activity and passivity to be distinctive of reason and understanding on the one hand, and of sensibility on the other, activity being essential to the two former, and passivity to the latter. The latter he classes as *capacity*, the two former as *faculties*. He limits cognition to the faculties, and denies it to sensibility, which he holds to be capacity to receive representations of objects by means of impressions which the objects cause. Accordingly, if sensibility, such as it is in man, existed apart from faculties, we should have images resembling in all respects percepts, except as to cognition. These images would be unattended, not only by cognition that they existed otherwise than as object, but even by cognition that they existed. He implied that the understanding, when sensibility presents it such an image, considers the question whether existence otherwise than as object, inhere in this image, and judges that it does. Such is the tremendous metaphysical theorem that the infant encounters in the proximate sensational antecedent of his first perception. At the outset, poor child, he has to jump this metaphysical gulph, although the philosophers might have spared him the feat by the mild supposition that the mental structure gave him with the image the apprehension of its existence otherwise than as object.
hardness an object of attention. In these cases the other qualities of the perceived concrete tend to pass for subject, and the salient quality for attribute. In ordinary or unanalytic perception the qualities of the perceived concrete are only latently objective, like its halves, quarters, and eighths, or the infinitude of figures contained in it, which the mere removal of adjacent parts would make distinct.

A thesis is an idea that is susceptible of question. The immediate objects of analytic perception are not susceptible of question. They imply the questionable; but, in order that question shall obtain, it is necessary that what is implicit in them be explicit, which requires an idea that is not a percept. An affirmation is never the expression of a mere percept; for it supposes the explicitness of objects—objects corresponding to its terms—that in unanalytic perceptions are merely implicit. The announcement, "John has arrived," made and received without question, is the expression, not of a mere percept but, of ideas originated by a percept, and which explicitly symbolize what is implicit in the percept. An idea susceptible of question may exist without being in question. Ideas susceptible of question but not exhibiting an aspect of questionableness, are common; for instance, the idea, "John is in the house," when expressed and received without question. Let ideas that exhibit an aspect of questionableness be distinguished as judicial theses, and those that do not exhibit an aspect of questionableness, as non-judicial theses.

A proposition is a verbal expression of a thesis. A proposition expressive of a judicial thesis is a judicial proposition, and one expressive of a non-judicial thesis is a non-judicial proposition.* Narrative, including history, consists

* The failure of philosophy to distinguish between judgment and pseudillation is referable to the fact that we use the selfsame words—the selfsame propositions—to express the judicial and the non-judicial form of a thesis. The proposition, "Brutus killed Cæsar" expresses, according to the animus with which it is uttered and received, either a judicial or a
of non-judicial propositions. Doctrine may be either authoritative or explanatory. Authoritative doctrine, for example, the kind of doctrine usually applied to little children, consists of non-judicial propositions. Considered as a species of sentence, proposition is assertive sentence. The genus, sentence, comprehends the four species, assertive, interrogative, mandatory, and precatory sentence.

*Examples of Pseudillation, with an Explanation of Induction.*

The majority of our percepts are composed by redintegration. It annexes the symbol of burning power to luminous appearance in the percept, flame; the symbols of the gable, rear, and interior to that of the front of the house that is reflecting light upon the retina and is object of attention; those of the unseen parts of the friend with whom we are conversing to that of the superficial part of him that is imaged on the retina; the symbol of hardness to that of colour, whereby we seem to see solidity; the symbols of colour, hardness, motion, friction, and peculiar figure, as that of a machine or carriage in motion, to such or such a sound. Its syntheses are more intimate in proportion as the experience which develops its organ is more uniform—the fewer the exceptions the more intimate and obstinate the cohesion, and the reverse. After hectic has several times borne on perception in connection with other symptoms of consumption, it becomes to the intuition of the percipient a face of the disease, so that, in looking at it, he seems to be looking at consumption, as one takes himself to be looking at the whole of a horse whose head is protruded into the street through the stable door, the rest of the body being concealed. But as the complexion of non-judicial thesis. Logicians studied mental event in its verbal signs, and, finding nothing in the words constituting a proposition that differentiated judicial from non-judicial, proposition inadvertently assumed that proposition supposes judgment. Logic transmitted the error to its offspring, psychology.
AN APOLGY FOR SCEPTICISM.

441

health is in some cases puzzlingly similar to hectic, and also because the experiences are much less frequent than those which beget perceptive synthesis, the connection is one of less condensation and tenacity. Therefore people commonly seem to themselves to see in hectic rather a sign than a face of consumption. But it is well known to medical men that there are those who, after a certain experience of symptoms, intuite the disease by means, but without discernment, of the symptoms. They are unable to explain their diagnosis, as many witnesses who truly swear to identity are unable to discern and describe the parts whereby they identify, these being indistinct parts of the image, like its halves, quarters, eighths, &c. Experience of the series of antecedents and sequents termed weather, develops an organ of redintegration that makes us intuitively expectant of imminent rain when we see certain clouds, feel a certain moisture in the air, and hear and feel a certain wind. We are thus made weather-wise, some with full discernment of the antecedents, and some without. To the former the antecedents seem to be signs, not to the latter. The former, if they ponder the mental process, seem to themselves to have regarded the antecedents as evidence, and to have inferred the imminence, whereas the cognition mostly obtains without question. When question makes it a judgment, it is no more an inference than a perception of an identity that is in question—a perception which the question involves with a judgment. A, being on trial for the murder of B, and the latter who is known to judge and jury, appearing alive in court, the identifying perception is, by the question, involved with a judgment; but the judgment is intuitive, not inferential. When Columbus first set his eye on trans-Atlantic land, he not only saw, but judged that trans-Atlantic land exists. The judgment was an intuition, not an inference. So the judgment respecting the weather, when certitude of the sequent is involved in perception of the antecedent, is an intuition, not an inference. If weather-
AN APOLOGY FOR SCEPTICISM.

signs suggest question without causing certitude in the perception, and if then the observer judge that such or such weather is imminent, the signs appear and operate as evidence, and the judgment is an inference: otherwise the judgment is a pseudillation. Analogously, as regards the signs of character with which the sagacity of the detective is conversant, redintegration operates its synthesis so as sometimes to insert certitude into perception of the signs, in which case the cognition is intuitive, and sometimes to make the certitude posterior to question, scrutiny, and comparision, in which case the judgment is inference. Detectives are often of fatal sagacity without discernment of the signs that cause their convictions—their divinations are pseudillations.

What has been held to be intuition from the single instance is a remarkable example of pseudillation. Its speciousness so deceived the late Mr. John Mill, that he closes Chapter III., Book III., of his "System of Logic" with this paragraph: "Why is a single instance in some cases sufficient for a complete induction, while in others, myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception, known or presumed, go such a little way towards establishing an universal proposition? Whoever can answer this question, knows more of the philosophy of induction than the wisest of the ancients, and has solved the great problem of induction." Now, in order to show more conveniently that what is known as induction from the single instance is mere pseudillation, let us, in the first place, ascertain what induction is.

Inferential generalization (inference of the general) from several instances undiscredited by a contrary instance, is accounted induction, e.g., Bakewell’s induction from several instances of rapid fattening, that cattle of a certain shape tend to fatten rapidly. The name induction has been, and is still fluttering around this species of inference as a centre, lighting occasionally on neighbouring species, but always
manifesting a preference for the central one. Convenience requires that it be finally attached and confined to this species. No other species of inference so well deserves, or deserves to share with it, a non-descriptive name so familiar. I shall accordingly apply the name as proper to this species. Induction, accordingly, being inference, is discovery, supposes question, and is distinctly objective to its subject, i.e., he is fully aware that he is performing a kind of mental act (in reality undergoing a kind of mental event) which, if he know what inference is, he must know to be inference. No addition to cognition that obtains latently or without question is inductive.

It is essential to induction, as we shall presently see, to be unguaranteed, whereas guaranteed inferences have been classed as inductions.

Induction proceeds upon the datum that, allowing for interferences of will, Cosmos is subject to necessity, both as to what it is, and as to the changes it undergoes. Its view is confined to a province in which it sees necessity dominant. It proceeds also as though it had for major premiss an axiom which cannot be intelligibly put without an explanation of what is denoted by the term, regularity.

Regularity is the *differentia* of a species of the genus, series. It is the specific attribute of series that consist of mutually like units. The series which it differentiates is either a series in time, as the succession of days, or a series in space, as the succession of the pillars of an aisle. Likeness, by a latent bearing on the brain, tends to unify or concatenate the mental symbols of like things, so that the several is given either as a simple or as a collective unit: difference, on the contrary, tends to disunite the symbols, so that the things which differ in a degree to mask what may be like in them are given as several, and in contrast one to another. Accordingly, the likeness of the units of a series tends to unify or concatenate their mental symbols, so that, if the series be a time series, the
units are given as a single event, *e.g.*, the events that constitute the tide, and, if the series be a space series, the units are given as a single thing, *e.g.* a colonnade. Likeness of the constituting units *differentiates* regular from irregular series. Take the following as an example of an irregular series: a leaf fell on the head of Chang Tie in China; one second after, Captain Jones of the bark "Victoria" in the middle of the Atlantic, ordered the sails to be furled; one second after, the wind changed from north to east at Singapore; and one second after, a crocodile emerged from the Nile at a point near Nineveh. The mind is so little habituated to the consideration of irregular series that one is disposed to eject them altogether from the kind signified by the name, series.

A difference of mental structure tends to impute a kind of regular series to a special necessary force, and would refer all such series to Cosmic forces but for experience of certain regular series which the circumstances give as being fortuitous. When will interferes with necessary forces in the production of time series, as in throwing dice, or dealing cards, and undesigned regular series, such as throwing sixes or turning up the ace of spades as *trump* five or six times successively, result from the co-operation, they cannot be ascribed to the action either of will or of necessary force, and are, therefore, accounted fortuitous. But such series never, or scarce ever, exceed a few units. A series much in excess would be accounted a prodigy. This exceptional experience reacts upon the mental organ that tends to beget cognition of regular series as being effects of necessary forces or *infortuitous*, and disposes it to insist only on regular series of many units as being infortuitous. Now this organ, so modified, determines the mind to proceed, in induction, according to the axiom, "regular series of many units are infortuitous." I say *according to* the axiom, not *on* the axiom; for induction, as is implied in our definition, is inference from the non-
AN APOLOGY FOR SCEPTICISM. 445

general to the general, and therefore a species of non-
deductive inference.

Regularity is a species of order, what may be termed serial order. The fitness of several unlike things relatively to an end given as important is another species of order. (The fitness deserves a non-descriptive name, and I make free to name it eo-aptiness.) It is remarkable that this species of order is also given by a mental property as presupposing a special necessary cause. We owe to it the idea of first cause. Future students will inquire whether the apparently teto mental properties be not really one, which determines cognition according to the axiom, “order presupposes cause.”

Whateley will have it that induction is a species of deduction, and propounds a thesis which he holds to be the major premis for all induction. It is impossible to imagine a major premis for all induction that is not itself dependent on an induction for whatever credit it may receive. For example, the thesis “regular series of many units are infortuitous” carries with it no prima facie recommendation to certitude or strong opinion until we consider the number of instances of human consent to it, and that there is no contrary instance; and, even then, it rather discredits, than reflects honour upon, the inductive faculty — so remote is induction from guaranteed inference.

There is no such thing as induction from a single instance, e.g., on first seeing a diamond burn, that all diamonds are combustible. Such a beginning of cognition is indeed a discovery, but not an inference: it is an intuitive generalization of the kind that begets in the burnt child the general idea of fire. The child seems to himself to have touched a burning power inherent in the luminous thing which, prior to the contact, he had taken to be innocuous, and a peculiarity of mental structure necessitates a synthesis of the symbol of such a power with the next and
every subsequent like luminous thing he sees. Thereafter, such luminous objects of vision are apprehended, not as innocuous things but, as fire; and the faculty of intuitive generalization, that which generates our first ideas of kinds, begets, out of his experiences of such luminous things, the general idea of fire. In like manner a child stung by a bee, which, through the operation of a peculiarity of mental structure, he had latently assumed to be innocuous and had pursued, is thereby necessitated to impute a stinging property to the next and to every subsequent bee he sees; and from several perceptions of bees the faculty of intuitive generalization derives the idea of the kind, bees, which supposes stings to be attributes of bees. These general extensions of the child discoveries are owing to the mental property on which redintegration depends. It causes cognitive apprehension according to the thesis, the unobvious like inheres in the obvious like. So far is it from forming under question and corresponding scrutiny that the conscious cognitions which the property generates are almost always preceded by unconscious cognition. The stung child acquires at once, from the cruel experience, unconscious cognition, that every insect like that which stung him is of a stinging nature; and so the burned child, that every luminous thing like that which burned him is of a burning nature. So when one sees for the first time a diamond burn, the experience tends to beget in him unconscious cognition that combustibility is essential to diamonds. But if a physicist who had been inquisitive about the properties of crystals, and was previously ignorant of the combustibility of diamonds, should see a diamond burn, the fact would immediately cause in him an intuitive general judgment, to wit, that all diamonds are combustible. The mental property that would cause unconscious cognition of the combustibility of diamonds in other minds would have its operation immediately connected with question in his; but the cognition is not made
inferential by the accident that prevents it from being at first unconscious.

Until philosophy discovers pseudillation, it tends to confound intuitions of sense, e.g., mirage, intuition of distance by means of apparent size, intuition of the pseudo-third-dimension of the picture, with judgment. Intuition of pictorial third dimension is caused by the latent bearing on the brain of the resemblance of light reflected on the retina by a picture to light reflected by that which the picture counterfeits. The illusiveness is in proportion to the resemblance. It is complete when the picture is well painted, and all light, or nearly all light save what is reflected by the picture, is excluded. It is to such an exclusion, as well as to enhancement of resemblance by reflection from two pictures instead of one, that the surpassing illusiveness of the stereoscope is due.* Prior to the discovery of the true cause of the illusion, inference seems to be implicated in the exclusion or degradation of the illusion by the interference of light reflected by the environment of the picture. It seems as though we infer the superficiality of the picture from the incompatibility of the opposite thesis with the manifest relation of the picture to its environment. So long as inference is held to include an indistinct species so long is philosophy liable to be duped by such shams of explanation. The illusion termed mirage, which is a congener of pictorial illusion, is still accounted by scientists a visual judgment—is so set down in scientific books. Physiologists employ the term,

* Sir Charles Wheatstone supposed that the third dimension of the visual object is due to the difference of the impressions on the two retinæ. If this were true, vision with one eye should exclude a symbol of the third dimension, which is so remote from truth that we enhance pictorial illusion by looking with only one eye. When we look at a picture with both eyes, the two retinal impressions which it causes differ slightly from those caused by the counterfeited object: by closing one eye, we shut out the "disillusionising" influence of this dissimilarity, and so enhance the illusion. Vision is incapable of intuition of the third dimension until redintegration imparts to the visual object a symbol originated by experience that may be rudely described as tactile.
judgment of sense. It is held that visual perception of distance involves an inference from the apparent size of the objects in the field of vision, as though judgment engendered the idea of distance to explain apparent size. When it is admitted that cerebration has the property of immediately (without interference of judgment) exciting appearance of a third dimension corresponding to no preter-object, and even of imposing it on the mind as preter-objective, philosophy will be disposed to spare the infant the condition of judging that existence otherwise than as objects, inhere in percepts.

Blind Causes of Cognition.

We have now to direct our attention to a species that may be named blind causes of cognition. There are causes of cognition that sometimes cause by means of a reason, and sometimes without intervention of a reason, and there are causes that are incapable of "ratiolistic" operation. Let the genus of these two species be termed blind causes of cognition. They bear to cognition a relation analogous to that which blind instinct bears to action. When those of them that are capable of assuming the form of reasons operate by means of reasons, they apply no efficacy different from what they apply when they operate "irratiolistically": the ratiolistic attribute imparts to them no virtue that exempts them from the character of blind causes.

The organic structure of the human body, especially of the brain, in virtue of which it is a mental organ, is a blind cause of cognition. The action of our material environment upon our organs of sense, and all the nerve, spinal, and cerebral changes that contribute to cause consciousness are blind causes of cognition. The peculiarity of mental structure that causes cognition of identity as underlying change, e.g., that the ice consists of imperceptible particles (either atoms or molecules) that mainly constitute the water, will mainly re-constitute it when the ice melts, and will
mainly constitute the vapour when the water evaporates, is a blind cause of cognition. The thesis that every change is total, not partial, that when anything begins, every constituent of the thing begins, so that, if Cosmos be a creature, creation is incessant—this thesis is consistent. But for the prejudice caused by the very peculiarity of mental constitution which obliges cognition of identity underlying change, it would counterpoise, in the view of reason, the opposite thesis, and Reason would be held in suspense between the two. This peculiarity causes cognition of the underlying identity without the intervention of a reason. It causes a prejudice to be a fundamental and inalienable part of human cognition—a convenient prejudice, it is true, and in all probability, a true one, but all the same a prejudice. When the cognition caused by this peculiarity is in question, the peculiarity annexes certitude to the correlated thesis, and puts it as reason, casting the shadow of absurdity on the opposite thesis; but in this ratiolistic operation of the peculiarity the efficacy of the blind cause of cognition is in no wise intrinsically differentiated, except, perhaps, as showing a symptom of tendency to relaxation.*

* The detection of the mental law that gives identity as underlying change, deserves to be regarded as an epoch in the natural history of the human mind; for the reasoning that conducts to the detection exposes in Cosmos a sufficient, eternal, natural, intrinsically immutable cause of all change. Cosmos consists of two kinds of constituents, viz., those that are, and those that are not naturally generable and annihilable. The various forms which are arbitrarily imposed upon wax, are examples of the naturally generable and annihilable constituents of Cosmos. The wax is detached from one form, which is annihilated, and simultaneously united with a newly and naturally generated form, the wax under the later form being identical with the wax under the prior form. The forms of all organisms are examples of naturally generable and annihilable constituents of Cosmos, and their particles, which existed when they were not, and which survive them, e.g., the dust of which man was made and to which he returns, are naturally ungenerable and annihilable constituents. Now the thesis that these constituents had no beginning, is consistent, and, according to the principle of parsimony, is preferable to the thesis that they were created. That they are the beginningless source of beginningless change is a consistent thesis in spite of our aversion to the idea of beginningless change, and even this aversion is humbled when we consider,
Another blind cause of cognition is the peculiarity of mental structure that causes us to cognize identity in the object of perception during the time of the perception. The object might be a mere series of like things, not a durable thing. The immediate object of perception is such a series. As regards that, the law operates delusively, the image that is the immediate object of true vision being really a series of images caused by a succession of impacts of light upon the eye. The real image caused by reflection is a succession of like things, not a durable thing. The peculiarity of mental structure that endows us with the idea of duration, so far from being an impeccable source of cognition, has deceived, and is commonly deceiving men by giving organic bodies as consisting of the same molecules during their apparent existence. Its operation is, for the most part, irratiolistic, but it is often ratiolistic. Question of the duration of inorganic bodies, as of the rock of Gibraltar, makes its operation ratiolistic; but the thesis to which it annexes certitude, and so constitutes a reason, adds nothing to, nor in any wise alters, its efficacy.

Let the kind of identification whereby we distinguish one of several specifically like objects from the others, and, in that sense, recognize it, be termed discriminate identification. This kind of identification is caused by a latent bearing of likeness on the brain—for the most part likeness considerably in excess of the specific likeness. When a thing that resembles in a certain degree the object of a former perception bears on an organ of sense so as to excite perceptive consciousness, it tends to insert into the consciousness the feeling or symbol of identity and, that to deny beginningless change, is to impale ourselves on the alternative of eventless pre-eternity. When, to this exposure of a sufficient natural first-cause, physiology annexes her discovery that all human design springs from a source out-side consciousness, from cerebral change, the ground of guaranteed natural theology gives way, and religion is wholly thrown upon faith.

The law that gives identity as underlying change, gives also the paradoxical axiom, "what changes remains the same."
because of the accident, that the needful degree of likeness is rare, the feeling is for the most part true. The event excludes notice of the likeness. Because of their extra-specific likeness, one twin frequently passes for the other. To put in relief the fallibility of the principle of identification, it is worth while considering what would have befallen if all human males were perfect counterparts one of the other, and all our females counterparts one of the other. There would be no attachment of individual for individual; no one would be important so long as a substitute was at hand; conjugal, parental and filial love would be impossible; death would occasion no mourning: so much does the social structure depend upon the accident, uniqueness. The peculiarity of mental structure on which discriminate identification depends is a blind cause of cognition that acts for the most part irrationally, but often rationally; as when witnesses testify to an identity that is in question.

We are indebted to the peculiarity of mental structure that determines the laws of identification for the fact, that, while Cosmos was still supposed to be a plane, having the sky for a dome, the daily appearances of the sun were taken to be the several appearances of one thing, and not appearances of several like things. This is all the more wonderful that it seemed to be inexplicable how the sun got back to the east; but, supposing the mind to have been contrived, the marvel is more creditable to the inventor of the human cognitive faculty than to the faculty itself.

Amongst the most notable of the blind causes of cognition are the following—the mental property that causes cognition of the existence of most objects of perception as existing prior and subsequent to the perception—that which causes cognition of power as inhering in a perceptible thing in local connection with which the event significant of the power obtains, e.g., that the burning power inheres in the luminous thing instead of being merely
accidentally in the same place with it—the mental property that causes cognition of event as being effect, whereby we have cognition of power and cause—that which causes cognitive expectation according to experience, as that the sun will rise again and again. These are remarkable instances of blind causes of cognition that are sources of cognition à priori, and so far from being dependent on experience that they are moulds of experience—not concepts, as Kant would lead us to regard them, but peculiarities of mental structure, as the nobler intellect of Liebnitz would account them—conformably to his well known dictum, "there is nothing in the understanding that was not in sense, except the understanding itself."

We have unconscious cognition, that the field of vision does not include, or has not included, things of a certain magnitude, and that certain unseen minute things may be, or may have been, in the corresponding preter-objective field. We acquire this knowledge without inference. The experience of which it is begotten engenders it without question, and, therefore, without the operation of evidence. Multitudes have possessed it in whom no corresponding conscious cognition ever appeared. The experience develops an epiorgan that has for function to cause the corresponding consciousness under due stimulus. Such cognitions are effects of blind causes.

Understanding the term constancy to denote the differentia of regular series commensurate with a long time, whereby it is distinguishable from brief regular series that are not parts of long series, and from all irregular series, and that it is a common name of individuals as well as the proper name of their kind—the constancies of nature organize the brain, through experience, without intervention of speculation or judgment, fashioning in it organs of cognition, opinion, doubt, expectation, and surprise. Through this blind cause of cognition as well as to that already noticed, which makes our idea of the future to be more or less an
image of the past, we expect the persistence throughout an indefinite future of such regular series as the succession of day and night, that of the seasons, that of the tides, the regular part of the series that constitutes social and political events, the various series of which custom is the general name. When anything falls out contrary to a constancy that has served as a cerebral mould, it causes surprise. It does not first cause cognition of the surprising event, and then, by means of the cognition, surprise, but the surprise simultaneously with the cognition, as the symbol of perceived identity is given simultaneously with the perception. The proximate cause of the surprise is extrinsic to consciousness, and, therefore doubtless, cerebral.

If we are challenged to account for the surprise, we assign, as its reason, the past constancy, as though the constancy had been contemplated by us as evidence and its futurity inferred, whereas, in the great majority of instances, the mind had never before adverted to the constancy. A man's confidence that he is alone in his private chamber, and that a given thoroughfare now contains a large number of people, or, if it be in the business quarter of the city and the day be Sunday, that the thoroughfare is comparatively deserted—this confidence is the effect of the latent operation of the corresponding constancy on the brain. The organific action of constancy on the brain is illustrated by the fact that workmen accustomed to the thunder of machinery are lulled to sleep by it, and are smitten and roused by silence if the action of the machinery be suddenly stopped. Considered as cause of cognition the organific force of constancy is clearly a blind one.

The large room for error afforded by irrationlistic causes of cognition is strikingly illustrated by contrast with guaranteed data considered as causes of cognition, the latter being differentiated by appearance of exhaustively cognizable aptitude and necessity to cause. Let us examine this attribute.
AN APOLOGY FOR SCEPTICISM.

In every cognition of cause we cognize aptitude to cause, and, excepting room for the freedom of volition, necessity to cause—the aptitude involving the necessity. But the aptitude and necessity are in some cases exhaustively, and in others only inexhaustively cognizable. In discoverable data, viewed as causes of certitude, we exhaustively cognize the aptitude and necessity; we inexhaustively cognize them in the cerebration that is the immediate cause of visual identification, or in the conjunction of fire and combustible matter that causes combustion. Between exhaustive and inexhaustive cognition of aptitude and necessity to cause there is a difference analogous to that which differentiates visual cognition of a cloud from a blind man’s cognition of a cloud. Enlightened by exhaustive cognition, we see, so to speak, that the antecedent post-supposes the sequent—that it must, by intelligible aptitude and necessity, cause the sequent. We see no aptitude in the impact of light upon the retina in virtue of which the impact seems to post-suppose vision. We see no aptitude in the impact of the flint upon the steel that post-supposes the spark. We see no aptitude in any antecedent whatever that post-supposes cognition of the prior and the posterior existence of this or that object of vision. We are cognizant of a hiatus in our cognitions of cause which do not exhibit an aptitude that post-supposes the effect. Any other antecedent might as well, for aught we know, cause the sequent. They are, as it were, opaque to mental vision, so as to hide the aptitude and necessity which we are, in some unaccountable way, obliged to ascribe to them. Causes of the opposite kind are, on the contrary, as it were, transparent to mental vision, affording exhaustive, or what seems to be exhaustive, cognition. Let us accordingly distinguish one of the kinds as transparent, and the other as opaque.

There are two kinds, and only two kinds of transparent causes, viz., 1st, discoverable guaranteed data, and, 2nd,
demonstrative evidence whereof all the parts are simultaneously objective to cognition. In evidence whereof the parts are only successively cognizable, but which are otherwise demonstrative, there is a flaw. When we are considering the final part of the demonstration we have only the guarantee of memory for the demonstrativeness of the other part. The bearing of this kind of evidence upon the mind, as regards cognition and opinion, differs from that of the opposed kind of evidence and of discoverable data. It does not always cause certitude in the mind in which it originates, but, instead, an opinion that is liable to be enhanced by the consent, or degraded by the dissent of a considerable number of considerable men. The dissent of all the world is impotent against my certitude that I exist, or that space and time are infinite, or that the three angles of a right angle are equal to two right angles; but, if I were informed on good authority that an error had been detected in the putative demonstration of the equality of the square of the hypothenuse to the squares of the other two sides, and that the most eminent mathematicians allowed the error, I should be likely to fall into incertitude respecting that thesis. Strictly considered, evidence whereof the parts are only successively cognizable, is not demonstrative but at the most almost demonstrative; and the flaw that excludes it from strict demonstration excludes it from the kind, transparent causes.

Pseudillation comprehends a species which the keen eye of Father Newman all but detected. What he divined of it he distinguishes by the name, informal inference. In this species a certitude or dominant opinion is caused partly by evidence and partly by unconscious cognition. Let us consider an instance. Intercourse constructs, without intervention of reasoning, an unconscious cognition of character. The character has never been in question, the mind has never adverted to it in any way, and nevertheless we have acquired a cognition of it that disposes our
instinct in a given way towards its subject, so that we behave
towards him accordingly. An incident, altogether inade-
quate of itself to cause a certitude or dominant opinion,
excites question of that person's sincerity or honesty.
The incident presents itself, and operates as evidence; and
being abetted by the unconscious cognition, an adverse
certitude obtains. This certitude, as not being wholly
caused by evidence, is not a conclusion: the mental event
in which it begins is not an inference. It is a pseudilla-
tion, and serves to show us that pseudillation comprehends
the two species, evidential and inevidential pseudillation,
the former being that which does, and the latter that which
does not, involve action of evidence.

There is another species of pseudillation which our
definition of inference strips of its speciousness, viz.,
pseudillation involving assent to syllogism (or rather syllo-
gistic formula) whereof the terms are insignificant, e.g.,
A is B: C is A: therefore C is B. The formula breeds,
not a cognition but, a mental motion that mimics a cogni-
tion.

The difference of mental structure that enables the
assertion of others to cause cognition is a blind cause of
cognition. It enables the parent, and through him, the
society, to mould the mind of the child in the errors as
well as the knowledge of both—if the society be savage, to
make him a savage in cognition as well as instinct.

The system of the emotive faculties, susceptibilities or
organs (which indeed it would be convenient to name
emotect*) is a blind cause of cognition. Fear, in the coward,
generates certitude of danger in view of circumstances
that excite mere conjecture in the courageous. "Trifles
light as air are to the jealous confirmations strong as proofs
of holy writ." If suspicion rouse anger, the anger substi-
tutes certitude for suspicion. Love engenders cognition of

* The mind, considered apart from its events, as it is in coma or
dreamless sleep, consists of five faculties, viz., "Sensutect," Intellect,
"Emotect," Intentional Instinct, and Will.
AN APOLOGY FOR SCEPTICISM.

457

angelic qualities in the beloved; aversion, qualities of the opposite kind. Self-esteem regales its idol with cognition of self-excellence, and makes swans of his geese. Reverence equally knows the truth of the doctrine which authority teaches, whether the authority be that of Chrishna or of Christ. Cognition generated by and involved with emotion tends to be instinctive. A man may be intellectually certain that Cosmos is a creature governed by its Creator, who rewards virtue and punishes sin, and be without a sentiment of the importance of obedience to the Divine imperative; but, if reverence, prudence, or fear, or all three breathe the breath of life into the cognition, it becomes faith, and manifests itself by works. Works are the measure of faith. When intellectual certitude is enhanced by emotion, when, in other words, we acquire a cordial cognition of what was before known only to the intellect, we seem to ourselves at first to have discovered; and when the object of our previous cognition insists upon its identity with that of the apparently new cognition, we are reluctant to admit that so indifferent a thing is one with an object so flush with life and power. The merely intellectual certitude is what Father Newman terms notional assent, and certitude flush with emotion is what he terms real assent. Apart from the self-confidence of real assent and the discredit with which it prejudices the mind against all adverse thesis, the study of it elicits nothing that is favourable to the cause of dogmatism, but on the contrary, puts into greater relief the precariousness of cognition that is the effect of blind causes.

Our exhibition of the dependence of cognition on blind causes exposes the accidentalness of whatever agreement there is between cognition and preter-objective fact—an accidentalness analogous with that of the intervention of wind in the generative processes of plants, and best illustrated by the accident to which discriminate identification is indebted for generally hitting the mark. The idea of this accidentalness
was the pivot of Liebnitz's theory of pre-established harmony. The deeper our insight into the mechanism and circumstances of the cognitive faculty, the more we are disabused of the prejudice that its nature excludes fallibility; but common sense sheds the discouragement which the discovery tends to pour in upon us, and experience justifies the courage and trust of common sense. After all there is sufficient agreement between our cognition and our environment to enable us to live the allotted period of human life, and make us in some degree masters of nature, and the progress of philosophy and science seems to be augmenting the agreement. Then, although it is not to the credit of the cognitive faculty that it is dependent on epieorgans, we have a compensation in ample evidence that the brain is plastic to the events occurring in its environment, and that they are moulding its cognitive product into a microcosm, the resemblance of which to its prototype the progress of philosophy and science is gradually enhancing. Of course the validity of the consequent system of cognitions depends upon the persistence of the present order of nature. A considerable change in our environment might make the greater part of our cognitions untrue, and our instincts suicidal; but this need not impair our confidence in our cognitions, for, so long as they enable human life, they must be more or less true.

It is to the point to notice here, that in all probability, the truth of ideas symbolic of preter-objects consists in their aptness relatively to the realization of purpose, not in their likeness to the things symbolized. If our souls were incarnated in organisms involving a system of organs of apprehensive intuition altogether different from the human one, say a system of senses altogether different, except as giving a perceiving self and a perceived Cosmos, and, if the resulting mind were, in all other respects, like the human mind, the truth of our ideas of preter-objects would not be necessarily greater or less, although the ideas sym-
bolic of them would differ *toto caelo* from the human ideas significant of the same preter-objects. Instinct availing of the non-human symbols might practically adjust us to the rest of the universe, so as to enable us to maintain our own existence, to give existence to our like, and to realize purpose as frequently as we now do. We would know nothing of solidity, extension, space, colour, sound, flavour, odour; but by means of quite different sensations and percepts we might know Cosmos, and a vast variety of the species it includes, distinguishing the organic from the inorganic, the animate from the inanimate, the rational from the irrational, the voluntary from the instinctive. Society, political institutions, philosophy, science, art, theology, conviction of sin, tillage, navigation, war, progress might obtain. The history of such a race might closely resemble that of man. The part of the terminal apparatus of the afferent nerves on which the sensation of resistance depends is several from that on which depend the sensations of heat and cold and of pain referred to the periphery. There are paralytics, who are incapable of tactile perception of solidity, although capable of tactile perception of heat and cold, and even of contact. Suppose, now, that a human being were congenitally deprived of this part of the tactile organ, being otherwise well organized. For aught we know to the contrary, the defect might escape detection, as colour-blindness escaped it. The person thus deprived would have no idea of the third dimension, nor need he suffer in consequence any notable embarrassment. He would not be cognizant of thickness, nor of perspective distance. The universe would be, in his view, not indeed a surface, for that supposes thickness, but what may be termed a *bidiment*—a thing of two dimensions. His Cosmos would be as unsubstantial as a shadow, and would seem to consist of shadow-like preter-objects, most of them coloured, many sonorous, and some flavourous and odourous. He might apply the words thickness, perspective
distance, third dimension, hardness, softness, denoting by them the self-same preter-objects to which we apply those names; but the corresponding immediate objects would differ monstrously from ours. Nevertheless his ideas would be as true as ours if they enabled him to realize his purposes as successfully.

II.

Direct Refutation of Dogmatism.

Scepticism is the offspring of experience—experience of detection of errors that manifest radical fallibility. The delusion (converted by philosophy into mere illusion) that the immediate object of perception exists otherwise than as object is such an error. It abuses the mind with the belief that perceptive consciousness embraces and penetrates the parts of Cosmos that are objective to it, whereas it knows nothing of Cosmos but by symbols of which consciousness is the substance. Science is still embarrassed by the effect of this delusion upon language, the name, colour, ambiguously and confusingly denoting both an immediate object of visual consciousness incapable of subsisting apart from consciousness and the external cause of this consciousness—a cause that exists otherwise than as object. Reserving the name colour to denote the modification of visual consciousness that symbolizes the remote object of vision we should employ some such name as "colorific" to denote the external cause and remote object of vision. In like manner we should linguistically provide for due discrimination between sounds and "sonorifics," odours and "odorifics," flavours and "flavorifics," solidities and "solidifics." The delusion imposes belief that perception is infallible until experience exposes the imposture. A kindred delusion dupes us with the belief that the Ego is immediate object of its own consciousness, whereas, like the non-ego, it is merely the remote object of self-con-
consciousness corresponding to a phenomenal immediate object by which it is symbolized. If it were the immediate object of self-consciousness, its various modifications would be objective to intuition, and intuition in the infant would achieve a science of psychology. Self-knowledge would be one of the earliest fruits of experience. So remote are we from immediate objectivity of the Ego that the mendacious symbol which passes for it seems to hold us as much aloof from self-knowledge as when the inscription on the Greek temple proclaimed it the goal of human research. When we see men of keen faculty of reflection and strongly instigated to accommodate to the esteem of others disgracing themselves by ridiculous compliances with intuitive modifications of the Ego, we should be convinced that the Ego no more sees itself than the eye sees itself.

Another detected error manifestive of radical fallibility is the mistake of appearance of inconsistency for inconsistency. Mere privation of one thesis suffices to confer upon another a false appearance of inconsistency. This informs us that whatever we know of inconsistency we know only by means of an appearance, and that appearances of inconsistency have not kept themselves above suspicion: they have sometimes deceived us. They are a good make-shift—a fair substitute for a criterion of truth—but nothing more. With absurdity considered as test of truth and error it fares still worse. It is found to be a mere shadow of certitude—a shadow which certitude casts upon the opposite of its thesis. The thesis of idealism that there is no real Cosmos answering to the idea of Cosmos is consistent; it has acquired credit enough to constitute a school: but to the bulk of men it appears absurd. This thesis, if we were not prepossessed by certitude of truth of its opposite, although it might not seem to be true, would not certainly appear to be absurd.

Our radical fallibility is evinced by the law of our mental constitution which makes delusion a matrix of science.
There is no such thing as rest in nature. All things that constitute Cosmos are in motion. But certain things whose mutual relation in space is not varied by motion appear to perception to be at rest. The delusion engenders the idea of rest without which the idea of motion is not possible. On both depend the ideas of force and inertness and on all four physical science. We owe the ideas of space and Cosmos to the delusion which gives relative place as being absolute place. Without this delusion there could be no ordination of the voids successively perceived into the whole denoted by the name space, and no ordination of the solids successively perceived into the whole denoted by the name Cosmos. Without the ideas of space and Cosmos science would be impossible. Without the delusion which passes long narrow surfaces upon us for lines and their linear extremities for points, we could not have the ideas of line and point, nor, therefore, the science mathematics. We owe the idea of the monad or atom to the delusion that masks the multiplicity of certain objects of perception. Wholes of which the parts are indistinct, for example a pebble, pass with us at first for monads, and thus experience begets the idea of what may be termed immultiplicity. We owe the ideas of will and responsibility to the delusion that causes intentional instinct to pass for will. Attention passes for volition until we discover that we are sometimes attentive against our will. Masked succession passes for duration, for example the succession of molecules that constitute the human body or any organism whatever.

There are binaries of opposite theses each of which theses is guaranteed by inconsistency of the opposite. Let antinomy* be the common name of such theses. In note

* Of the antinomies, or rather, antinomial binaries proposed by Kant, not one appears to me to have the antinomial character, viz., that of which the thesis affirms and the antithesis denies the existence of monads. The thesis "what in matter is, through all change, intrinsically the same" (like wax through changes of form) "had no beginning," is a
I have exhibited a notable inconsistency of the antinomial kind, that of the idea of time. This idea evaporates under scrutiny. An old Roman replied to one who asked him what is time, "If you don't ask me I know." It resolves, as I have shown, into a composite of three nonentities. It involves the guaranteed thesis "time exists," and the guaranteed antithesis, nothing answering to the idea of time (which is the idea of a composite of three nonentities) exists or is possible. The idea involves another pair of antinomies, viz:—Thesis—The present is a time. Antithesis—The present is a mere limit of a time. The figment termed the present gives occasion for the discrimination of two parts of the past, viz., the present past and the pre-present past. The delusion is analogous with that which, on one side, gives the subject of consciousness as inextended, and on the other as being or including a bodily organ. What should be thought of the security of a cognitive faculty subject to antinomial delusion—obliged to put up with inconsistency in a cognition on which nearly the whole system of cognition depends. I shall adduce one more antinomy, which, though less fundamental than what is involved in the idea of time, has more perplexed philosophy.

Likeness is either perfect or partial, the former when its subjects do not, and the latter when they do, intrinsically consistent thesis. Matter consists of what is, and what is not, naturally generable and annihilable. Oversight of the latter (the fundamental part) determined the datum that all things known to experience, including Cosmos, begin. When we domesticate the idea of the fundamental part, and clearly know that, under all change, it remains intrinsically the same, we are under no pressure to assign it a beginning. The idea of the finiteness of matter is consistent, and so is the idea of its infiniteness, except to minds constituted to regard space as the mere sum of the void parts of Cosmos. The idea of power of choice, or, as it is badly termed, freedom of the will, is consistent. The thesis with which its adversaries assail its consistency, viz., that preference presupposes strongest desire, is a petitio principii. The idea of the pre-eternity of a part of Cosmos not naturally generable nor annihilable as cause or suscipient of a beginningless series of changes is consistent, and excludes from the kind, antinomies, the last thesis and antithesis proposed by Kant as being antinomial.
differ from one another. The likeness of two points, two equal straight lines, two equal angles, two equal circles, are examples of perfect likeness: that of two unequal straight lines or two unequal acute angles of partial likeness. Considered by itself the thesis that partial likeness involves perfect likeness seems to be necessarily true, that in other words, one of two partially like things must contain a part that is perfectly like either the whole or a part of the other. The alternative of this axiom is the inconsistency that there is a species of likeness to which difference is essential; for, if there be not a part of one of the partially like things that is perfectly like either the whole or a part of the other, the likeness is destitute of a basis several from that of the difference involved with it, which supposes the difference to be essential to the likeness. But, on the other hand, we have ideas of partially like things that seem to exclude the possibility of any of them consisting of two parts, one a basis of the likeness, and the other of the difference, e.g., the curvatures of two unequal curves of equal length. Slightly curve a straight piece of steel wire. In the transition the wire has been successively each one of a series of unequal curves. The differences of these several curves are not differences of any of the concretes constituting the wire save the curvature, all the other inconcretes, e.g., the length, solidity, hardness, weight, colour, &c., being the same in all the curves. The curves resemble and differ from one another only as to curvature. The curvature is the sole basis of the likeness and difference involved in the partial likeness of the curves. The thesis that the curvatures of curves which differ as to quantity or otherwise are perfectly like seems to be flagrantly inconsistent, yet none of them can be consistently supposed to include two parts, one a basis of the likeness to, and one a basis of the difference from, the others. Here then we seem to be stopped by an antinomial limit of thought, against which it is to be hoped none of us will long persist.
in knocking his head, seeking, like Sterne's starling, to "get out." Therefore wisely accommodating to the inevitable, we should provisionally acknowledge that there is such a thing as partial likeness that does not suppose several bases of the likeness and the connected difference. Let this kind of partial likeness be distinguished as paradoxic, and all other as anti-paradoxic.

Paradoxic likeness explains that we do not always, nor for the most part, discern in an individual of this or that species a part in respect of which the individual is like individuals of its genus, and a part in respect of which it is specifically different from those of them that belong to other species of the genus; in other words, a part that is the basis of the general likeness and a part that is the basis of the specific difference. For example, we do not discern in the obtuse angle $A\ B\ C$ a part that is the basis of its likeness to the acute angle $D\ E\ F$ and a part that is the basis of its difference from $D\ E\ F$. The mutual likeness of the angularities of all unequal angles, that of the circularities of all unequal circles, that of all unequal lengths, that of the lives of all animals that are not counterparts one of the other, that of the melodiousnesses of all melodies, that of the beauty of beautiful things which differ from one another, is paradoxic.

Differences of mental structure determine opposite data in different minds. Time is given in some minds as a mere attribute of event—incapable of surviving the annihilation of all subjects of change and duration. The mind of Locke was constructed to give this datum, that of Cousin the opposite one, evinced by his able criticism of Locke's doctrine of time. In some minds space is given as a mere part of Cosmos, its void part; in others as an infinite in which Cosmos is a mere speck. To the former space is given as contingent, to the latter as absolute. I have experimented upon cultivated minds dominated by the exceptional data respecting time and space, and have
been amused by the feeling of absurdity excited in them by my efforts to translate them to my point of view. When these profound differences of mental structure are universally recognized the tendency of difference to provoke dissension will be greatly relaxed, men will learn and apply the great lesson of agreeing to differ, and inevitable scepticism will be found to be a condition of charity and peace.

In section XIII. of Introduction, I have given the reason of the inference that experience and all cognition which it generates, partly consists in, and is partly the product of, somatic event outside the sphere of consciousness, that conscious cognition à posteriori, and skill active, are functions of epiorgans constructed, the former by experience and the latter by practice, and that unconscious cognition à posteriori is a relation dependent on an epiorgan. Inactive skill consists in the existence of an epiorgan developed by practice. Let us look a little more closely at the evidence on which this momentous inference depends; for if the inference be true, it refutes dogmatism, and regards cognition à posteriori—cognition caused by somatic event outside consciousness could only be accidentally true.

One sees for the first time an object, the first of its kind that he has seen. When he next sees it, the perception includes a constituent that was not in its predecessor, namely, a recognition or identification. He does not first perceive and then identify: consciousness is peremptory that the identification begins when the perception begins, not later. Whatever coupled it with the perception must have operated outside consciousness. He sees it several times, and now a new constituent is added to the perception, namely, familiarity. This is an indistinct addition. A concussion of the brain obliterates these constituents of the percept without otherwise impairing the faculty of perceptive identification: for, although the object is not recognized when it is perceived for the first time after the concussion,
it is recognized in the second subsequent perception as having been perceived once before, and may afterwards become familiar? but without another cerebral revolution it is never remembered as having been seen prior to the concussion. Concussion sometimes destroys all power of recognition relative to antecedent experience, reducing the mind to a tabula rasa without impairing the power of acquiring new recognition: it sometimes effaces a considerable part of the power, but not all: and sometimes it suppresses only some minute and unimportant part of the power. It sometimes deprives the patient of all skill, without impairing his power of acquiring skill. It sometimes enhances the mental faculties. In the seventeenth chapter of "Obscure Diseases of the Brain," the author (to whose work I am greatly indebted) gives six well authenticated instances of enhancement of mental faculty by concussion.

The psychical effects of disease like those of concussion, testify that knowledge depends upon epiorgans. A servant girl who had fallen into idiocy was temporarily restored by fever to mental integrity.* A patient who had several paralytic seizures, knew when the attack was approaching by the sign of forgetting his own Christian name.† An acute bodily affection consequent on parturition deprived a patient of knowledge of the events that made her wife and mother, leaving her otherwise so much of her mind as to be able to infer from the representations of her friends, the forgotten relation.‡ Boerhave mentions a Spanish tragic poet whose memory was so paralysed by fever that he could not recognize his own works. He was subsequently convinced that they were his when, recovering the power of composition, he discovered the similarity of style between them and his new compositions. A serious attack of illness so affected the mind of a patient, that when, in all other respects restored, he was found to be without recollection.

* Physiology and Pathology of the Mind.
† Obscure Diseases of the Brain. Page 388.
‡ Ibid. 414.
of recent events, whereas the forgotten past was revived in his memory. Later, his memory of the event returned, but he forgot all antecedent events.* Paralysis deprived a farmer of knowledge of common names, all but the initial letter. He knew, and so long as his eyes were upon it, could pronounce the written name, but not otherwise. He made a dictionary of the names most useful to him, and, being able to refer to this by his knowledge of the initial letter, was able to communicate orally.† Doctor Alderson mentions an instance of conversion of violent headache into spectral illusion by the formation of an abscess beneath the integument of the skull.‡ Perversion of mind succeeding acute disease of the brain caused a patient of John Hunter to refer all his sensations to others. He would tell his nurse and the bystanders that they were hungry or thirsty, and so signify his own hunger and thirst.§ According to Thucydides, the typhus fever that followed the famine at Athens during the Darian war so paralysed the memory of many Athenians, that they forgot their own names. Diarrhoea deprived a lady of memory of a part of her life, comprising about twelve years, without otherwise impairing her mind.|| The power of fever to cause the train of ideas known as delirium is familiar to every one.

Disease, like concussion, sometimes exalts the faculties. An ignorant servant under the influence of fever copiously recited Hebrew, Greek, and Latin which many years before her master was wont to read aloud in her hearing as he paced a passage communicating with the kitchen.¶ An aneurismal tumour of the middle cerebral artery with a general sanguineous congestion of the brain aggravated by nine hours' study of accounts, caused an extraordinary exaltation of memory a few hours before they proved fatal.** Insanity consequent on parturition developed in a patient.

† Ibid. 311. †† Ibid. 457. § Ibid. 311.
|| Ibid. 457. ¶¶ Ibid. 446. ** Ibid. 422.
of Doctor Rush a poetic faculty that had previously made no sign.* Talents for eloquence, poetry, music, and painting, writes Doctor Rush, and uncommon ingenuity are often evolved in this state of madness.† Half-witted people have had their minds raised to the ordinary level by incipient insanity.‡

Mechanical causes that indirectly injure the brain, such as hanging and drowning, corroborate, in their psychical effects the testimony of concussion and disease. A gentleman who, in a state of great mental depression, hanged himself but was cut down in time to save his life, related that his fall plunged him into a delightful dream fashioned by an inventive memory that made him re-live his childhood and boyhood.§ Two instances of ecstasy caused by drowning, and one of them with a panoramic display of the past, are given by Doctor Winslow.||

The psychical effects of alcohol, opium, haschisch, chloroform, dentoxide of azote, &c., insist upon the power of somatic event to cause consciousness and to exalt and degrade the mind. They are inexplicable save by supposition of epiorganal agency. It is known to every one how alcoholic drink exalts and suspends consciousness, causes double vision, inflames emotion, degrades the moral faculty, delivers the drunkard to the infernal consciousness that constitutes the psychical part of delirium tremens. For the effects of opium and other narcotic agents the reader is referred to M. de Boismont's "Rational History of Hallucinations," Chapter xiv. Second Division.

That the moral faculty is not wholly psychical is proved by its liability to perversion by disease, which makes for the dependence of knowledge on epiorgans, as establishing that mind is not merely psychical but includes, in addition to a soul, material organs. "I have had under my care,"

† Ibid. 371. ‡ Ibid. 273. § Ibid. 440.
|| Ibid. 442.
writes Doctor Winslow, "a lady who invariably stole whatever she could lay her hands upon during certain uterine changes, and another patient always manifests the same propensity at the period of utero-gestation."

The degradation of intellectual power consequent on fatigue and hunger has been experienced by most people. Fatigue and inanition in a deep mine in the Hartz mountains deprived Sir H. Holland of his knowledge of German, which food and wine restored to him. Fatigue, privation and exposure, consequent on shipwreck, deprived a sailor of all remembrance of his history antecedent to the event.* We may notice in this connection that an ascent of one of the Alps was followed by an impairment of memory, especially as to names and dates.†

A morbid state of the body sometimes causes a consciousness that is more or less prophetic. According to Portal, impending apoplexy is sometimes wonderfully prophetic. He alleges that he saw a patient who predicted the time of his own death six days before it occurred, there being at the time no symptom appreciable by another to warrant the prognosis. A remarkable instance of a partially prophetic and partly delusive anticipation of a morbid crisis is related by Doctor Hibbert.‡ A gentleman subject to periodical swooning caused by tendency to apoplexy, consulted Doctor Gregory and told him that every day, at 5 o'clock p.m., his usual dinner hour, a hag, after the pattern of the Macbeth witches, would break into his room, and, advancing upon him with incensed face and violent words and gestures, would strike him with a staff upon the head and fell him senseless to the floor. The Doctor remained for dinner and succeeded in beguiling him over the hour of five; but, as the clock struck six, the patient cried out "the hag comes again!" and dropped in a swoon upon his chair. The abstraction of a small

* Obscure Diseases of the Brain. Page 399.
† Ibid. 399.
‡ Ibid. 312.
quantity of blood completely cured the patient. A little excess of blood had developed in the brain a faculty of melodramatic invention and an equivalent of prescience, so that it could shape its fiction conformably to, and in a way to explain, a future although imminent event.

I terminate this discussion with two questions. Granting the human mind to be a creature, is it credible that its Creator did not design his creature to be cognizant of all the evidence that makes for radical fallibility and in view of it to become sceptical? Why are Christians tenacious of radical infallibility seeing that Christ has committed religion to the raft of faith?

THE END.