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October 2^d 1838

Those emotions which are strongest in man, are common to other animals & therefore to progenitor far back. (anger at the very beginning, & therefore most deeply impressed) shame perhaps an exception. (does it originate in a doubting feel between conscience & impulse) but shame we alas know is far easier conquered than the deeper & worser feelings. Then bad feelings no doubt originally necessary revenge was justice.— No checks were necessary to the vice of intemperence, circumstances made

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the check— the licentiousness jealousy, & every one being married to keep up population. with the existences of so many positive checks.— (this is encroaching on views in second volume of Malthus).1 Adam Smith also talks of the necessity of these passions, but refers (I believe) to present day & not to wider state of Society.— Civilization is now altering these instinctive passions which being unnecessary we call vicious.— (jealousy in a dog no one calls vice) on same principle that Malthus has shown incontinence to be a vice & especially in the female

1 Malthus 1826, 2 (book 4, chap. 1): 255-69, "Of moral restraint, and our obligation to practise this virtue'; chap. 2: 270-82, 'Of the effects which would result to society from the prevalence of moral restraint."

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October 2^d. 1838.

Two classes of moralists: one says our rule of life is what will produce the greatest happiness.— The other says we have a moral sense.— But my view says unites both (& shows them to be almost identical) What has produced the greatest good (or rather what was necessary for good at all)

is the instinctive moral sense: (& this alone explains why our moral sense points is to revenge). In judging of the rule of happiness we must look far forward & to the general action— certainly because it is the result of what has generally been best for our good far back.— (much further than we can look forward: hence our rule may sometimes be hard to tell) ++ Society could not go on except for the moral sense, any more than a hive of Bees without their instincts.—

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The origin of the social instinct in man & animals must be separately considered.

The difference between civilized man & savage,- the former is endeavouring to change that part of the moral sense which experience (education is the experience of others) shows does not tend to greatest good.— Therefore rule of happiness is to certain degree right.— The change of our moral sense is strictly analogous to change of instinct amongst animals.—