RECORD: Darwin, C. R. n.d. Why may it not be said thought perceptions will, consciousness, memory. CUL-DAR91.39-41. Edited by John van Wyhe (Darwin Online, http://darwin-online.org.uk/)

REVISION HISTORY: Transcribed by John van Wyhe. RN1

NOTE: See record in the Darwin Online manuscript catalogue, enter its Identifier here. Reproduced with permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library and William Huxley Darwin. The volume CUL-DAR91 contains early notes on guns & shooting. Darwin's draft of recollections of Henslow, 1861. Notes on the moral sense. Wallace pension. 'a sketch of the principal events in my life' & list of Darwin's works. Loose notes found with CUL-DAR119 'Books to be read'.


[39]

Why may it not be said thought perceptions will, consciousness, memory, &c. have the same relation to a living body (especially the cerebral portion of it) that attraction has to ordinary matter.

The relation of attraction to ordinary matter is that which an action bears to the agent. Matter is by a metaphor said to attract; & hence if thought, &c bore the same relation to the brain that attraction does to matter, it might with equal propriety be said that the living brain perceived, thought, remembered, &c.

Well the heart is said to feel

Now this would certainly be a startling expression, & so foreign to the use of ordinary language that the onus probandi might fairly be laid with those who would support the propriety of the expression. They would do well to ask themselves the converse (because there are living bodies without these faculties) of the question above stated, & indeed until we know what answer they would give in support of their view it is impossible to shew satisfactorily its erroneousness.

it is point of indifference

[39v]

we attribute the attraction to the attracting body is that [illeg]

2)

In the absence of such a guide we can only point out the mode of perceptive action by which we come to conceive of matter as attracting & shew that the groundwork of this is entirely wanting by which thought or memory might be in like manner attributed to brain.

There are two modes of perceptive action by which bodily action is made known to us, revealing respectively what are called its subjective & objective aspect.

The subjective aspect of bodily action is revealed to us by the effort it costs us to exert force or by internal consciousness; the objective, by our external /what/ senses in the way in which we apprehend the force of inanimate bodies. How we identify the two aspects as different phases of the same object of thought is a question which ought to be clearly comprehended by anyone who wishes to fully understand this subject, but the answer to it would require a considerable degree of attention.

How do the senses affect us except by internal consciousness—

[40]

3)

We must endeavour to do without it as well as we can.

The objective aspect of Bodily action ((as recognized by our external senses)) consists in the manifestation of force i.e. movement capable of being traced to the body of the individual to whom the action is attributed: force (be it remembered) being a phenomenon apprehended by the same faculty with matter & being necessarily exhibited in & by matter.

The phenomena of gravity considered in themselves consist in a force manifested in every particle of matter directed towards every other particle; but FORCE, objectively considered, is a phenomenon the essence of whose existence consists in its communication to other matter in the course of its DIRECTION, & thus when we apprehend force in inanimate matter we feel dissatisfied until we can point out

[40v]

4)

the source from which it arises.

How can force be recognized by our external senses— only movement can

But coming round to the subjective aspect of action (as known by the exertion of our own power & consciousness of it) we are conscious that we ourselves can originate in any point an opposition of forces balancing each other & moving in opposite directions. We are satisfied therefore if we can trace any force in inanimate matter up to the action of some animated agent Now the phenomena of gravity are manifestly the same as if every particle of matter were an animated being pulling every other particle by invisible strings & as on this supposition the forces manifested would be fundamentally accounted for, we prefer this metaphorical mode of stating the fact to the mere statement of the force exhibited in every phenomena actually apprehensible by sense.

[41]

5)

There is nothing analogous to this in the relation of thought, perception, memory &c. either to our bodily frame or the cerebral portion of it

Thoughts, perceptions &c, are modes of subjective action— they are known only by internal consciousness & have no objective aspect. If thought bore the same relation to the brain that force does to the bodily frame, they could be perceived by the faculty by which the brain is perceived but they are known by courses of action quite independent of each other. A person might be quite familiar with thought & yet be ignorant of the existence of the brain. We cannot perceive the thought of another person at all, we can only infer it from his behaviour.

attraction of sulphuric acid for metal

Thought is only known subjectively?? the brain only objectively

We do not know attraction objectively

[41v]

6)

The reason why thought &c should imply the existence of something in addition to matter is because our knowledge of matter is quite insufficient to account for the phenomena of thought. The objects of thought have no reference to place.

[in Darwin's hand:] (We see a particle move one to another, & (or conceive it) & that is all we know of attraction. but we cannot see an atom think: they are as incongruous as blue & weight: all that can be said that thought & organization run in a parallel series, if blueness & weight always went together, & as a thing grew blue it uniquely grew heavier yet it could not be said that the blueness caused the weight, anymore than weight the blueness, still less between action things so different as action thought & organization: But if the weight never came until the blueness had a certain intensity (& the experiment was varied) then might it now be said, that blueness caused weight, because both due to some common cause:— The argument reduced itself to what is cause & effect: it merely is invariable priority of one to other: no not only thus, for if day was first, we should not think night an effect.)

Cause and effect has relation to forces & mentally because effort is felt


Return to homepage

Citation: John van Wyhe, ed. 2002-. The Complete Work of Charles Darwin Online. (http://darwin-online.org.uk/)

File last updated 6 September, 2023