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May 5th, 1839. Maer

Mackintosh Ethical Philosophy

p. 113 Mackintosh

Grotius has argued nearly so

On the Moral Sense

Looking at Man, as a Naturalist would at any other Mammiferous animal, it may be concluded that he has parental, conjugal and social instincts, and perhaps others.*— The history of every race of man shows this, if we judge him by his habits, as another animal. These instincts consist of a feeling of love & sympathy or benevolence to the object in question. Without regarding their origin, we see in other animals they consist in such active sympathy that the individual forgets itself, & aids & defends & acts for others at its own expense.— Moreover any action in accordance to an instinct gives great pleasure, & such actions being prevented by necessarily some force give pain: for instance either protecting sheep or hurting them.— Therefore in man we should expect that acts of benevolence towards fellow feeling creatures, or of kindness to wife

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and children would give him pleasure, without any regard to his own interest. Likewise if such actions were prevented by force he would feel pain.

(By a very slight change in association if others injured these objects, without his being able to prevent it, he would likewise feel pain.— If he saw another man acting in accordance to his instincts, he would know the many experiences pleasure & by association he would feel part of the pleasure, which the actor received.— If either man did not obey his instincts from interference of passion, he would feel pain, which would generally be anger, as he would be tempted to interfere, but with respect to himself it would be remorse as will be presently shown.— This then is moral approbation, as far as it goes.)

But should he prevented by some passion or appetite, what would be the result? In a dog we see a struggle between its appetite, or love of exercise & its love of its puppies: the latter generally soon conquers, & the dog

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probably thinks no more of it.— Not so man, from his memory & mental capacity of calling up past sensations he will be forced to reflect on his choice: an appetite gratified gives only short pleasure. passion in its nature is only temporary, & we do not afterwards think of it.— Whatever the cause of this may be, everyone must know, how soon the pleasure from good dinner, or from a blow struck in passion fades away, so that when man afterwards thinks why was such an instinct not followed for a pleasure now though so trifling he feels remorse.—

He reasons on it & determines to act more wisely other time, for he knows that the instinct (or conscience) is always present (which is indeed, often felt at very time it is disobeyed) & is sure guide.— Hence conscience is improved by attending & reasoning on its action, & on the results following our conduct.— If the temptation to disobey the conscience is extremely great

The cause perhaps lies in its frequency & in its consisting in desire gratified & therefore as soon as desire is fulfilled, pleasure forgotten

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as starvation, or fear of death, one make allowance & either excuses the /non-/ following of one's conscience, & palliates the offence; one always admires the habit formed by conscience obedience to instinct, or rather strengthened instinct, even when our reason tells us the action was superfluous, as one man trying to save another in desperation.— This shows, that our jealousy, that the instinct ought to be followed, is a consequence of that being part of our nature, & its effects lasting, whilst passions although equally natural leave effects not lasting. By association one gains the rule, that the passions & appetite should almost always be sacrificed to the instincts.— One does not feel it is wrong in very young child to be in a passion, any more than in an animal— which shows that it is owing to some subsequent power(reason) obtained by age, which should show the child, which of its instincts are best to be followed.— Yet even at this time, malevolence, when not urged to it by passion, shows a bad child.—

Hence there are certain instincts pointing out lines of conduct to other men,

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which are natural (& which when present give pleasure) & which man ought to follow— it is his duty to do so.— So we say a pointer ought to stand— a spaniels housedog's duty is to watch the house.— it is part of duty their nature.— When a pointer springs his bird, one says for shame (& the old dog really feels ashamed?) not so puppy, we do try to teach him & strengthen his instincts.— so man ought to follow certain lines of conduct, although even when tempted not to do so, by other natural appetites he is monster, or unnatural if malevolent, or hates his children without some passion.— If his passions strong & his instincts weak, he will have many struggles, & experience only will teach him, that the instinctive feeling in its nature being always present, & his passions shortlived, it is to his interest to follow the former; & likewise then receive the normal approbation of his fellow men.—

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6) Hence man must have a feeling, that he ought to follow certain lines of conduct, & he must soon necessarily learn that it is his interest to follow it, even when opposed by some natural passion.— ^(a)

By interest I do not mean any calculated pleasure but the satisfaction of the mind, which is /much/ formed by past recollections. — Hence he has the right & wrong in his mind.— Now we know it is easy by association to give /almost/ any taste to a young person, or it is accidentally acquired from some trifling circumstance.— Thus a child may be taught to think almost anything nasty (accidentally /by old association/ comes to this conclusion not owing to peculiarity of organ of taste, for when grown up often conquers it). It will be only rarely that it thinks that nasty, which the natural tastes say is good. Yet horseflesh shows that even this is possible.— So that there nice & nasty in taste, & right & wrong in action, so a child may be taught, or will acquire from seeing conduct of others, the feeling that almost (rarely if opposed to natural instincts) any action is either right or wrong.—

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Hence what parents think will be good for the child on the long run, & for themselves & others (as the parents are instinctly benevolent) they will teach to be wrong or right; this teaching may be curiously modified by circumstances of country, so will the conscience in these cases.— Those instructions, which the child sees uniformly performed by the teachers & all around him, will be paramount, hence the law of honour. & the etiquettes of Society— Anyone who will reflect must feel, how like to injured conscience, is the feeling of any custom of society broken.— & how far more acute the feeling really is.— all these associated /habitual/ feelings become like instinctive ones, which either lead to actions or not, as feeling of cowardice /this is not connected with sense/ instantaneous declaring it is right or wrong.— (just as in taste of the mouth)

* The conscience rebukes malevolent feelings, as much as actions, therefore Sir J. M. talks too much about the contiguity to will.

^(a) The origin of passions too strong for our present interest receive simple explanation from origin of man.—

Feelings of the mind, whether leading to action or not, are the parts of our nature, subject to their instincts, & associations.— often feelings which do not lead to action are repressed Thus avarice &c &c.—

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In the beginning I mentioned only three instincts,— I am far from saying there are not more, or that the three are as simple as I have said.— the social instinct may be combined with feeling towards one as a leader.— the conjugal feeling may be directed towards one or more.— It will be hard to discover this, for the different races of man may have different instincts, as we see in dogs and pidgeons.— But as man is animal at head of series in which special instincts decrease, I should think they were very few & general in their nature.— So that we have some it is sufficient to give rise to the feeling of right & wrong.— on which /almost/ any other might be grafted.—

Origin of the instincts

Hartley, (according to Sir J.) /p. 254, &c &c/ explains our love of another, as pleasure arising from association from having received benefits from this person.— But the love is instinctive, & how does it apply to mother loving child, from whom, she has never received any benefit.— Yet I think there is much truth in doctrine, for

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we can thus explain love of place.— although here we have not received pleasure from the place, but merely in the place. & yet place calls up pleasure.— This feeling seems to vary in races of man, & certainly in /species of/ animals in which case

Sir J. M. gives different explanation of law of honour from Paley

My theory of instincts, or hereditary habits fully explains the cementation of habits into instincts.

Instinctive fear of death: of hoarding . . L^d Kames which Sir J. says is so ridiculous

the instinct of sociability & sociability, doubtless grow together

it undoubtedly is instinctive. But does not Hartley explanation apply perfectly to origin of these instincts.— the having received pleasure from some one /person/ in early infancy, during many generations giving love of mother: the having received some advantage from man during many generations giving the social feelings.— *

Although I cannot pretend to say how far & minutely our instincts extend, yet as they are acquired by social animals, living under certain conditions, in this world, they will conform to the law can only be such, as are consistent with social animals, that is which have a beneficial tendency, (not to any one individual, but to the whole past race) I cannot no one doubts)

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that the instincts of bees & beavers /deer/ have been formed a beneficial tendency to them as social animals of peculiar kinds social feelings, & living under certain conditions; by my theory they have been formed by the circumstances, which have led to the peculiarities, & hence must only that have which had a beneficial tendency during past races could become instinctive.—

Better simply put it, beneficial tendency in every instinct to the species in which it occurs [or, more correctly /in which it/ has been so in some past time, hence passions) although perhaps useful at present to some extent./ Hence this is the law of our instinctive feelings of right & wrong,— education of parents strives*

According to my theory, all instincts demand some explanation

On Law of Utility Nothing but that which has beneficial tendency through many ages could be acquired, & we are certain from our reason, that all which (as we must admit) has been acquired, does possess the beneficial tendency)

It is probable that becomes instinctive which is repeated under many generations (& under unknown conditions) (for pig will not so readily attain instinct of pointing as a dog.— also, age has much influence.) — & only that which is beneficial to race, will have reoccurred. NB. Until it can be shewn, what things easiest become instinctive, this part of argument fails, or rather is weak.—

for it strives to give conduct beneficial to all the children, (each himself) & parents, & hence to nearly all the world—

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Our tastes in mouth by my theory are due to habit hereditary habit (& modified & associated during lifetime), as in our moral taste.

p. 152 Reason can never lead to action.—

p. 164 L^d Shatsbury under term of Reflex Sense seems to have compared perceived the comparison between our instinctive feelings & our short lived Passions.

State broadly in child or animal it is equally proper to obey anger as benevolence (but not cool malevolence). it only after reason comes into play that anger can be said to be wrong.— for then only is it perceived, that our passions are too strong for our instincts to gain long-lived good, ie happiness, yet this system not selfish.— explained by principles of Mackintosh.—

p. 262 Some good remarks on analogy of pleasure of imagination /the utility part being blended & lost/ & moral sense— my theory explains both, perhaps, by habit—

As emotions change, from civilization, education changes, & probably likewise instincts, for the same law effects both.—

changes /in accordance to beneficial tendency/ will most readily effect the instincts, for they are in accordance with it. thus a dog may be trained to hunt one pig sooner than other, rather than change hunting instinct.

to same end.— & general actions of community must frequently teach same end.— Hence this becomes the law of right & wrong, though that part which is acquired by association from education & imitation, has often been perverted from want of reason.— Hence as Eugenius says, slow growth of rule of right.—

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Whewells preface

It appears that Sir J. & others think there is distinct faculty of conscience.— I believe that certain feelings & actions are implanted in us, & that doing them gives pleasure & being prevented uneasiness, & that this is the feeling of right & wrong.— so far it has independent existence. & is supreme because it is a part of our nature which regulates our feelings steadily & not like an appetite & passion, which receive enjoyment from gratification & hence are forgotten— only so far do I admit its supremacy

p. 37 Whewell gives Mackintosh's theory: the remarks about "contact with will" is unintelligible to me.— conscience regulates feelings, as of cowardice.— the whole appears to me rather rigmarole. — He does not say anything about any principles born in us.— Great difference with my theory.— see p. 349— remark on this point.—

p. 194 &c. Butler's view given on conscience; I cannot admit it.— see notes by me.

p. 333 & 377 some remarks showing that instinct cannot be said to guide will, as bird building nest, but supplies it— instinctive feelings will doubtless lead to similar actions which in prior generations led to their formation.— N.B. feeling or emotion rises from hereditary action on body,— this feeling, when instinctive will lead to action.— the passion rising from weariness leads to striking blows.—

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p. 224 Hume's Inquiry— good abstract of Butler & arguments of beneficial tendency of affections.— If ever I write on these subjects consult following pages. p. 231 marked in my Mackintosh