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Mackintosh's Ethical Philosophy

p. 6— "The pleasure which results when the object is attained (the gratification of one's offspring) is not the aim of the agent, for it does not enter into his contemplation"— Now Eugenius would contend against this— but the pleasure a dog has in obeying its instinct, as young pointer to point— clearly shows this is true.

p. 13— Affections cannot be analysed with "power" &c &c &c— & if termed "selfish," must be subclassed as "disinterested"

p. 14 It is allowed, that we have conception of moral obligation /when grown up ? ? ?/ & the question is, whether this can be resolved into some operation of intellectual faculties— Will Eugeniusallow this moral obligation?

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(The improvement of the instinct of a sheperd dog, is strictly analogous to education of child,— causing many actions to be considered right & wrong,— to be associated with the approving or disapproving instinct— which were not originally, if the shepherd dog had no instinct to commence with scarcely possible to teach it— all dogs might be taught, but not cat, that is not act by gusto, though by fear it might be partly made.)

p. 21 "Why ought I to keep my word"— gives the problem of ethics— [my answer would be to all such cases— either, that from the necessities /& good/ of society such conduct is instinctive in me (& as a consequence, but not cause gives me

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pleasure) or that I have been taught or habituated to associatical, the emotions of this instinct, with that line of conduct, & if taught rightly, it will be for the general good, that is the same cause which gives the instinct.— )

p. 22 says affections, desires, & moral sense all different.—

p. 22 Butler & Mackintosh characterize the moral sense by its "supremacy."— I made its supremacy, solely due to greater duration of impression of social instincts, than other passions, or instincts.— is this good?— I should think some parts of the emotive part of man, may be quite artificial, as avarice love of gold.— love of fame— Yes Hartley explains this & Mackintosh shows the change produced—

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p. 38) Conscience checks the wish to outward gratification, whilst no desire of gratification will check the consciences desire for virtue:— (I expect there is some fallacy here.— at least point of /false/ honour will stop all wish to gratify it anything contrary to it) NB. the very end of conscience is stop to wishes of passion &c. Whilst the passions have no relation I think this is nonsense— My theory of durableness will explain it.—

Would not the maternal affections (in a dog & therefore not instinct conscience) equally destroy all wish of outward gratification.— see what cases Mackintosh gives & try it.—