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5)

if so, it is perhaps deviation from the instinctive, right & wrong.— (animals excepting domesticated ones have no right & wrong except instinctive ones). Perhaps my theory of greater permanence of social instincts explains the feeling of right & wrong— arrived at first rationally by feeling— reasoned on, steps forgotten, habit formed,— & such habits carried on to other feelings, such as temperance, acquired by education.— (In similar manner our desires become fixed to ambition, money, books &c. &c.) the "secondary passion" of Hutcheson unfolded by D. Hartley.

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p. 241

(1) Any action by habit may be thought wrong.— & conscience will imperiously say so, & produce shame & remorse— (Thus pungency of one's feeling for indecency— preposterously so, for Marquesans think only of prepuce, crepitando,) & if passion makes one break these artificial rules, get remorse— ((hence desires do not intervene between this kind of conscience & the will, though this conscience does between the desires & will?)) (2) It is other question what it is desirable to be taught,— all are agreed general utility (3) It is other question whether any thing is taught instinctively; I say yes, & my explanation agrees with last head. — (4) It is other question, how the feeling of ought, shame, right & wrong comes into mind in first case— seeing how shame is accompanied by blushing, bears some relation to others