| Comparison with 1859 | 
  | 
| 
may be called accidental 
variations of instincts;— that is of variations produced by the same unknown causes which produce slight deviations of bodily structure.  | 
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|  No complex instinct can possibly be produced through natural selection, except by the slow and gradual accumulation of numerous, 
slight, yet profitable, variations.  Hence, as in the case of corporeal structures, we ought to find in nature, not the actual transitional gradations by which each complex instinct has been acquired— for these could be found only in the lineal ancestors of each species— but we ought to find in the collateral lines of descent some evidence of such gradations; or we ought at least to be able to show that gradations of some kind are possible; and this we certainly can do.  I have been surprised to find, making allowance for the instincts of animals having been but little observed except in Europe and North America, and for no instinct being known amongst extinct species, how very generally gradations, leading to the most complex instincts, can be discovered.  The canon of "Natura non facit saltum" applies with almost equal force to instincts as to bodily organs.  Changes of instinct may sometimes be facilitated by the same species having different instincts at different periods of life, or at different seasons of the year, or when placed under different circumstances, &c.; in which case either one 
or the other instinct might be preserved by natural selection.  And such instances of diversity of instinct in the same species can be shown to occur in nature.  | 
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|  Again 
as in the case of corporeal structure, and conformably with 
my theory, the instinct of each species is good for itself, but has never, as far as we can judge, been produced for the exclusive good of others.  One of the strongest instances of an animal apparently performing an action for the sole good of another, with which I am acquainted, is that of aphides voluntarily 
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may be called 
 accidental | accidental 1859 1860 1861 1866 |  | spontaneous 1869 1872 |  
  
variations of instincts;— that is of variations produced by the same unknown causes which produce slight deviations of bodily structure.  | 
 | 
 No complex instinct can possibly be produced through natural selection, except by the slow and gradual accumulation of 
 numerous, | numerous, 1859 1860 1861 1866 1869 |  | numerous 1872 |  
  
slight, yet profitable, variations.  Hence, as in the case of corporeal structures, we ought to find in nature, not the actual transitional gradations by which each complex instinct has been acquired— for these could be found only in the lineal ancestors of each species— but we ought to find in the collateral lines of descent some evidence of such gradations; or we ought at least to be able to show that gradations of some kind are possible; and this we certainly can do.  I have been surprised to find, making allowance for the instincts of animals having been but little observed except in Europe and North America, and for no instinct being known amongst extinct species, how very generally gradations, leading to the most complex instincts, can be discovered. ↑| 1 blocks not present in  1860 1861 1866 1869 1872; present in  1859 |  |  The canon of "Natura non facit saltum" applies with almost equal force to instincts as to bodily organs. 
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Changes of instinct may sometimes be facilitated by the same species having different instincts at different periods of life, or at different seasons of the year, or when placed under different circumstances, &c.; in which case either 
 one | one 1859 1860 1861 1866 |  | the one 1869 1872 |  
  
or the other instinct might be preserved by natural selection.  And such instances of diversity of instinct in the same species can be shown to occur in nature.  | 
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 Again | Again 1859 1860 1861 |  | Again, 1866 1869 1872 |  
  
as in the case of corporeal structure, and conformably 
 with | with 1859 1860 1861 1866 |  | to 1869 1872 |  
  
my theory, the instinct of each species is good for itself, but has never, as far as we can judge, been produced for the exclusive good of others.  One of the strongest instances of an animal apparently performing an action for the sole good of another, with which I am acquainted, is that of aphides voluntarily 
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